John Gunther Dean’s introductory comments to the 10 files on and complete inventory of the individual folders [14 pages] donated to the National Archives of the USA [The Library in Atlanta, Georgia]. [1973].

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Introduction to the Lao Files donated by John Gunther Dean to the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, part of the National Archives and Records Administration.

Is there an alternative to the “win-loose” strategy in foreign affairs? In the US involvement in Indo-China, did it always have to end in the defeat of one side and the victory of the other? Was a military solution the only way for the US to deal with emerging nationalism in Southeast Asia which had the full backing and material support of the communist world? Was the adoption of communist policies by the governments of former French Indo-China really a threat to US national security? To the security of the rest of the Free World? Were Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia vital to the US policy of containing communism? When the French lost the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, why could the French disengage from their former colonial possessions in Southeast Asia by working with the Geneva Conference in 1954, i.e. using multilateral diplomacy to limit their losses; and the US could not use this approach in the 1970’s? Did it really matter to the US and the “Free World” whether a tiny country like Laos became part of the communist orbit for a few decades? Should the US use all its might to stop communist expansion into Laos because behind Laos stood the communist giants: the Soviet Union and Communist China? How many Americans or American mercenaries [the Mung People] had to die to stop the advance of Lao communists in that tiny kingdom?

When John Gunther Dean was assigned to Laos for the second time in his Foreign Service career, he returned with a reputation of having been for two years with the US military in Vietnam as Deputy for CORDS. He was a “fighter”. During John Gunther Dean’s earlier assignment to Laos [1956-58], J.G. Dean had become an admirer and friend of the neutralist Lao leader, Prince Souvanna Phouma. [This is explained in J.G. Dean’s Oral History recorded by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training]. Was Prince Souvanna Phouma’s approach of trying to find a negotiated, internal settlement with his communist Pathet Lao countrymen a better way to defend his country’s unity and long-term interests than continuing 20 years of intermittent warfare? Was Laos just a pawn in the overall confrontation between the communist world and the Free World?

For about six months [autumn of 1972 to April 1973] J.G. Dean served as Deputy [DCM] to Ambassador Mac Godley who was convinced of the need to confront the communist in Laos. Mac Godley, like many others, believed that “neutralism” was not a solution for a country caught in the struggle between the communist and Free World. In this confrontation, Ambassador Mac Godley favored calling in the US Air Force to use its awesome bombing capacity to support the Royal Lao military forces in fighting communists in Laos. Godley encouraged the neutralist Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma to “ask” for heavy bombing strikes against Pathet Lao positions, thereby shoring up the Royal Lao military in their fight against the communists. Ambassador Godley was a decent man and he enjoyed the loyalty and friendship of all who worked for him. John Gunther Dean was no exception. Ambassador Godley believed that American military might would make the Royal Lao government prevail over the Pathet Lao. John Gunther Dean was more inclined to put his hopes in negotiation and diplomacy.

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When Ambassador Godley left , Laos, for a senior assignment in the State Department in Washington, J.G. Dean became Chargé d’Affaires. This status lasted for five months. During that time, J.G. Dean worked very closely with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and the senior negotiator for the Royal Lao side, Pheng Phongsavan, in helping the two Lao sides come to agreement whereby a cease fire would stop the violence, and political confrontation would be taken care of in a coalition government where both sides would be represented. This process was known as negotiations for a Lao Protocol which would set forth the precise details to implement the accord. Neither the US, nor the North Vietnamese, or for that matter neither China, nor the French were directly involved in the negotiation. This was strictly an internal Lao negotiation. But outsiders tried to influence the terms of the agreement to protect their own national interests. J.G.D. played a significant role in helping Souvanna Phouma and his team to achieve a compromise solution. The ten files on Laos donated to the National archives document the events leading to the agreement.

During the negotiating period, J.G.D. helped to put down a coup d’état attempt against Souvanna Phouma carried out by a group led by Lao Air Force General Thao Ma. The latter undoubtedly had the support of foreign elements. A detailed description of the coup attempt, how it was foiled, and the way it was reported in the world press is set forth in File 4.

One of the remarkable achievements of that internal Lao Protocol was that the US government never broke relations with Laos, even after the US withdrew from Vietnam and Cambodia in . After the victory of the communists in Cambodia and Vietnam, the coalition government in Laos was replaced by a communist dominated government. But unlike in Vietnam and in Cambodia, the Lao population did not suffer from the change in orientation of the Lao government. Some Lao personalities who had openly opposed the Pathet Lao went into exile. Some Lao underwent “re-education”. But 1975 was in Laos a soft “modus vivendi” and the US did not loose face as in Vietnam and Cambodia leaving by helicopter from the roof tops. Today, more than thirty years later, the US still maintain uninterrupted diplomatic links with Laos. Western aid programs are very much sought after by the Lao government. Neighboring pro-Western Thailand plays a major role in Laos. Who is really concerned today that Laos has a Marxist government? But perhaps as the result of the US having backed the compromise settlement set forth in the Lao Protocol of 1973, the were spared the genocide that occurred in Cambodia and the harsh regime imposed by the victors on the people of South Vietnam.

This is not a defense of neutralism. But aren’t there different ways for a major world power like the US to deal with difficult international problems? Is the use of military might the only way? Perhaps a negotiated compromise settlement is preferable to relying on military might until the bitter end.

While the study of the files on Laos [1973] may not answer all these questions, at least they may provide an alternative approach to problem solving on the international scene.

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File 1: Outgoing Chronological File - January 1973 to April 1973

• First secret session between Royal Lao Government and Pathet Lao negotiators to find a solution to years of warfare and how to settle the internal political differences. Vientiane 0781 dated February 1, 1973. • Vice President Spiro Agnew’s conversation with Prince Souvanna Phouma – Vientiane 0858 – February 5, 1973 • A readout from Chairman RLG delegation Pheng Phongsavan on the prospects for a cease fire – Vientiane 0907 – February 6, 1973. • Is the cease fire agreement a first step or should there be a linkage to a political settlement among Lao as seen by Prince Souvanna Phouma and Pathet Lao delegation – Vientiane 0933 – February 7, 1973. • Pathet Lao links political solution to a military cease fire agreement – Vientiane 0952 – February 8, 1973. • A cease fire accord, including political accommodation, is coming nearer – Vientiane 0976 – February 8, 1973. • Back channel messages dated February 7 and 13 by Ambassador Godley to Dr. Kissinger, National Security Advisor, regarding Lao agreement under negotiation. Memorandum of conversation on meeting of Dr. Kissinger with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma on February 9, 1973 as reported by note taker DCM Dean in February 9, 1973 backchannel. • Backchannel from Ambassador Godley to Dr. Kissinger on February 13 reporting on DCM Dean’s meeting with RLG chairman of delegation Pheng Phongsavan. • Backchannel February 14 from Ambassador Godley to Dr. Kissinger reporting on DCM Dean’s meeting with Pheng Phongsavan devoted to discussion of specific clauses in Lao Agreement under negotiation. • February 18 backchannel to Dr. Kissinger, dealing with specific points in RLG-PL negotiation as reported by DCM Dean from his meetings with Pheng Phongsavan. • February 17 backchannel to Dr. Kissinger dealing with specific points in RLG-PL negotiation as reported by DCM Dean from his meetings with Pheng Phongsavan. • February 19 backchannel to Dr. Kissinger and Scowcroft dealing with specific points in RLG-PL negotiation as reported by DCM Dean from his meetings with Pheng Phongsavan. • Ambassador Godley points out differences between direct US-Vietnamese negotiations in and RLG-Pathet Lao process in Vientiane where US Government is not directly involved and is only indirectly making known its views through RLG negotiator [DCM Dean’s meetings with Pheng Phongsavan] – February 1973. • DCM Dean’s meeting with Soth Phetrasy, Pathet Lao Permanent Representative in Vientiane re: US POWs in Laos – February 21, 1973 report. • Vientiane 1901 re: formation of a coalition government and chances for support of National Assembly. Message is dated March 15, 1973. • Vientiane 2058 March 20 1973 – regarding US POWs in Laos. • Vientiane 2139 March 23, 1973 – regarding US POWs in Laos.

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• Vientiane 2503 April 4, 1973 – Pathet Lao negotiators continue to link formation of a new coalition government to agreement on military issues, i.e. cease fire. • Vientiane 2454 April 2, 1973 – status of negotiations • Vientiane 2714 April 8, 1973 – Ambassador Godley departs post. DCM Dean becomes Chargé d’Affaires. At this stage in time, nothing has been signed between the two Lao parties putting an end to the war or agreeing on a political formula for working together in the future.

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File 2: Outgoing Chronological file: May – July 1973:

• Vientiane 3315 – Search for MIA’s in Laos – May 1973 Vientiane 3441 dated May 5, 1973: Chargé Dean discusses with senior Pathet Lao negotiator Phoumi Vongvichit search for US MIAs, status of RLG/PL negotiations for an agreement, essential role of Prince Souvanna Phouma in reaching a Lao settlement. • Report on meeting with Phoumi Vongvichit, chief Pathet Lao negotiator in which Phoumi reiterates that formation of a coalition government, neutralization of and Vientiane, and all military problems must be resolved at the same time – Vientiane 3577 dated May 10, 1973. • Chargé Dean’s meeting with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma in which latter gives status report on negotiations with Pathet Lao – Vientiane 3664 dated May 15, 1973 • Chargé Dean’s meeting on May 30 with Pathet Lao senior negotiator Phoumi Vongvichit - Vientiane 4038. • June 18 meeting of Chargé Dean with Pheng Phongsavan reported in 3 messages: Vientiane 4439; Vientiane 4440 discusses reference of USG and Thailand in Lao Protocol; Vientiane 4478 Chargé suggests changes in specific language in agreement under negotiation. All are dated June 18, 1973. • June 21 message Vientiane 4515 on status of Lao Protocol negotiation. Pathet Lao demand the stationing of Pathet Lao battalions on outskirts of Vientiane and Luang Prabang. RLG refuses. This refusal confirmed by Prince Souvanna Phouma in Vientiane 4578 and Vientiane 4609 who opposes “neutralization of Luang Prabang and Vientiane”. • June 29 report in Vientiane 4707: At Pathet Lao initiative, serious Lao negotiations resume after 5-day stalemate. • Chargé Dean’s talk with PL Senior Negotiator Phoumi Vongvichit on July 3 re: narrowing up differences in language of Protocol. Vientiane 4777 and Vientiane 4778. • Royal government and Pathet Lao make mutual concessions. Vientiane 4844 dated July 7 and Vientiane 4899 dated July 10. • Chargé’s talk with PRC [China mainland] Chargé re: Lao negotiations. PRC chargé claims that a settlement is also needed for Cambodia. Chargé Dean says there is no link between Laos and Cambodia. Vientiane 4980 July 16, 1973. • Vientiane 5076 dated July 20, 1973; Vientiane 5046 dated July 19, 1973; Vientiane 5168 July 25, 1973; and Vientiane 5183 dated July 25, 1973. • July 24 Vientiane 5130 King of Laos supports Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma’s effort for a rapid settlement. • July 25 Vientiane 5337 setting forth summary of provisions of Lao Protocol as explained to Chargé Dean by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and chief RLG negotiator Pheng Phongsavan.

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File 3: Outgoing Chronological File: August – December 1973

• Vientiane 5400 dated August 3, 1973 in which Chargé Dean suggests that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma authorize the establishment of a US Defense Attaché Office in Vientiane but Souvanna Phouma told Chargé that the request did not give a precise figure for the number of military personnel to be assigned to DAO. • Vientiane 5504 dated August 8, 1973. Souvanna Phouma informs Chargé Dean that DAO must not exceed 30 military. • Vientiane 5565 dated August 10, 1973: The Lao generals become restless and unhappy with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma’s policies. • August 1973: Many cables on the need for progress in the negotiation among the two Lao parties. [The August 21 coup d’état against Souvanna Phouma and how Chargé Dean helped to put it down is reported separately and assembled in a separate file devoted to the coup attempt.] • Vientiane 5602 dated August 12, 1973. Souvanna tells Chargé that he understands that in addition to the US, Australia and the French will issue a statement of support after the 2 Lao parties have signed the Accord. Souvanna also said that he had approached Soviet and Chinese to make a gesture showing their approval for Souvanna’s efforts to establish a united and neutral Laos. Souvanna Phouma reveals that he expects the two communist countries to make such gestures of support. • Vientiane 5862 dated August 22, 1973: Chargé Dean’s conversation with the Royal Lao Military Deputy Commander, General Kouprasith to ascertain that any prisoners taken by his troops in the August 21 coup d’état attempt against Souvanna would get a fair trial. General Kouprasith agreed. • Vientiane 5936 dated August 24, 1973 [3 days after coup attempt]: Joint military/civilian cabinet meeting on August 23 in which both the military and civilians on the Royal government side reaffirm fidelity to Souvanna Phouma’s leadership. Both the RLG and the Phathet Lao move toward signing of the Protocol. • Vientiane 6104 dated September 4. Unable to bridge last outstanding differences with the Pathet Lao, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma threatens to resign. [pressure on RLG hold-outs.] Vientiane 6140 dated September 5. Soviet Ambassador Vdouvine’s call on Chargé Dean which indicated that Soviets want Souvanna Phouma to continue to lead the Lao government in the future. Soviet Ambassador also said that Soviets had been active in Vientiane to bring Royal Lao military [certain generals] together with Pathet Lao to iron out remaining differences. Vientiane 6180 dated September 7, 1973: Chargé Dean talks on French radio to rebut Pathet Lao accusations that while most members of the American Embassy in Vientiane support Souvanna Phouma, some elements in the US mission actively back the anti-Souvanna Phouma rightists. Chargé Dean reiterates that the US pursues vis- à-vis Laos only one policy: firm support for Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. • Vientiane 6216 dated September 8, 1973: Soviet Ambassador expects signing of Protocol next week.

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• Vientiane 6252 dated September 11, 1973: message suggests ideas and text of what Washington may need to state after the Lao Protocol is signed in Vientiane. Washington may want to use occasion to set forth how Protocol is viewed by the US and the meaning for Laos’ future. • Lao Protocol is signed in Vientiane on September 14, 1973 by the two Lao parties, putting an end to 20 years of intermittent warfare and maintains unity of Laos within the recognized international boundaries.

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File 4: Coup Attempt by General Thao Ma Foiled: August 20, 1973

The papers in this folder – all linked to the August 20, 1973 coup d’état attempt to overthrow the neutral Souvanna Phouma government in Lao – are divided into three sections: 1. Description of the coup attempt as reported by the Embassy. Among the papers is a minute by minute description of events as viewed by the Acting Chief of US Aid Air Support Branch at Vientiane Airport, Mr. Frank Franco. His 12-page report was written and dated August 20, 1973. 2. Press clippings on the August 20, 1973 coup against the Souvanna Phouma government as reported in American, Thai, French and Lao newspapers and magazines. Among the American written media reporting on the event are articles in Time Magazine, Newsweek Magazine, and in the New York Times. 3. Report of proceedings in the US Senate: Hearing held before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the nomination of John G. Dean to be Ambassador to Cambodia, held on Wednesday, March 13, 1974. The Senate confirmation hearing turned largely into questions by some senior US Senators about J.G. Dean’s intervention at the Vientiane airport on August 20, 1973 foiling efforts of rightist Lao General Thao Ma to overthrow the legal and internationally recognized government of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. The questions asked by some Senators turned around the following: Did John G. Dean have the right as Chargé d’Affaires to intervene in the coup attempt against the legal government of Souvanna Phouma, thereby foiling the coup, or should he have confined himself to reporting such events? In the precise language of the Senator from New York, Senator Javits: In your opinion [Mr. Dean] which is the more important consideration [in deciding whether to intervene or not] – “Legitimacy or control”? J.G.Dean’s answer on that day was “legitimacy”. In the case of Thao Ma’s coup on August 20, 1973, there is no doubt that certain elements in the US government had sympathy for the rebellious Lao General’s effort to overthrow “neutralist” Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. J.G.Dean defended his action in Laos of foiling the usurpers by pointing out that supporting the “legitimate” government of Souvanna Phouma was the policy Washington had asked him to carry out in Vientiane.

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File 5: Basic texts of documents leading to Lao Protocol: October 1972 – September 1973

This folder contains basic texts which were used from October 17, 1972 onward in the negotiation between the Royal Lao government [the Vientiane side] and the Pathet Lao [Sam Neua based]. For the Vientiane side, Pheng Phongsavan started and finished the negotiation in September 1973. For the Pathet Lao side, General Phoune Sipraseuth started the negotiation but later Phoune Vongvichit was the top negotiator for the Pathet Lao.

The Lao Protocol, as it got to be known, was to end the intermittent warfare which had opposed the RLG in Vientiane against the Pathet Lao for 20 years. The latter insisted that a military cease fire was not enough but needed to be supplemented by an agreement for the political unity of the country with a coalition government in which both sides are represented. Both sides agreed that such a coalition was to be headed by the veteran neutralist leader, Prince Souvanna Phouma.

This file, as all other files on Laos reports on the lengthy negotiation and narrowing of differences between the two Lao sides. The US government was not directly involved in this negotiation but tried to influence the negotiators to keep in mind US strategic interests in a final settlement.

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File 6: Negotiations leading to agreement and US views on progress of Lao negotiators

This file deals with the negotiation in the period when Ambassador Godley was still at the post before his leaving Vientiane on April 8, 1973. It includes many formerly confidential messages among Americans – Ambassador Godley, Assistant Secretary Green, Ambassador Sullivan, National Security Advisor Dr. Kissinger, General Scowcroft – as well as reports on conversations with RLG leaders. While the US government was not party to the negotiation, we tried to influence the progress and direction of the Lao negotiation through meetings and messages addressed to the Royal Lao government side [Vientiane].

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File 7: Press clippings on September 14, 1973 signing of the Lao Protocol: end of war.

This folder is devoted to the press coverage given when the Royal Lao government and the communist let Pathet Lao finally signed the Accord on September 14, 1973 creating a coalition government charged with mending the wounds of 20 years of intermittent civil war. In addition to publishing an English translation of the Accord, the media reported how these negotiations [which had been going on for one and half years] were finally concluded. The press considers the “moderate, neutralist leaning” Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma as the Lao leader essential for any agreement for the establishment of a coalition government. The newspapers also give credit to the US Embassy under Chargé Dean’s leadership for the constructive role it played in bringing about this compromise settlement among different Lao factions. Two State Department memoranda are including on Chargé Dean’s performance in helping to bring about a modus vivendi in Laos.

It is interesting to note that when less than 2 years later the United States left Vietnam and Cambodia [April 1975] “from the rooftops” under ignominious conditions, the American Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, was not closed. Diplomatic relations and an American diplomatic presence in Laos remained uninterruptedly until today, despite the fact that after the fall of and Saigon, the communist ministers in the Lao government took control of the country. The transition in Laos in 1975 from a neutral coalition government to a communist controlled government did force some Lao personalities to go into exile or in a reeducation camp inside Laos; but on the whole, Laos was spared the severe treatment handed out by the communists in Cambodia and Vietnam to the civilian population and to those who were perceive as “enemy” of the victorious regime.

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File 8: Back-channels between Dr. Kissinger and John Gunther Dean – 1973

This folder contains exclusively “back-channel” messages between Chargé Dean and Dr. Kissinger. These messages are largely devoted to certain aspects of the negotiation between the two Lao parties on the Lao Protocol and how certain clauses impact on US interests. Dr. Kissinger’s messages often relate his meetings with North Vietnamese, Soviet and Chinese leaders and how they affect the situation in Southeast Asia.

Some messages are addressed by Chargé Dean to Ambassador Godley who was scheduled upon his return to Washington to become Assistant Secretary for Asian Affairs at the State Department. Since there was some opposition in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to this nomination, Ambassador Godley’s name for a senior Washington assignment was withdrawn and he was sent as US Ambassador to .

The messages in this folder, as well as some others in the Laos File, reflect the importance of the Chief of Mission at an Embassy working not only with the State Department, but also with the White House, the National Security Advisor, the head of the CIA, the National Security Agency, important US Departments [Defense, Commerce] and agencies [Drug Enforcement Agency] all having a direct stake in the country of accreditation.

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File 9: Lao section in J.G.D.’s Oral History

The section devoted to Laos in the interviews conducted between 1996 – 2003 by Mr. Charles Stewart Kennedy with Ambassador Dean on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training is in this file. The section dealing with Laos comes to 19 pages. The total Oral History of Mr. Dean comes to 419 pages. The files donated by Mr. Dean to the National Archives [the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta, Georgia] support all parts of the Oral History. These interviews are available in written form and by CD-ROM through the Carter Library or the Association of Diplomatic studies and Training in Arlington, Virginia.

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File 10: Photographs

This file contains a large envelope with photographs of Chargé Dean with different Lao personalities at the time: With the King of Laos in Luang Prabang, with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma in Vientiane, and with Pheng Phongsavan, head of the Royal Lao government delegation to the negotiations with the Pathet Lao in 1973.