John Gunther Dean’s introductory comments to the 10 files on Laos and complete inventory of the individual folders [14 pages] donated to the National Archives of the USA [The Jimmy Carter Library in Atlanta, Georgia]. [1973]. 1 Introduction to the Lao Files donated by John Gunther Dean to the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, part of the National Archives and Records Administration. Is there an alternative to the “win-loose” strategy in foreign affairs? In the US involvement in Indo-China, did it always have to end in the defeat of one side and the victory of the other? Was a military solution the only way for the US to deal with emerging nationalism in Southeast Asia which had the full backing and material support of the communist world? Was the adoption of communist policies by the governments of former French Indo-China really a threat to US national security? To the security of the rest of the Free World? Were Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia vital to the US policy of containing communism? When the French lost the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, why could the French disengage from their former colonial possessions in Southeast Asia by working with the Geneva Conference in 1954, i.e. using multilateral diplomacy to limit their losses; and the US could not use this approach in the 1970’s? Did it really matter to the US and the “Free World” whether a tiny country like Laos became part of the communist orbit for a few decades? Should the US use all its might to stop communist expansion into Laos because behind Laos stood the communist giants: the Soviet Union and Communist China? How many Americans or American mercenaries [the Mung People] had to die to stop the advance of Lao communists in that tiny kingdom? When John Gunther Dean was assigned to Laos for the second time in his Foreign Service career, he returned with a reputation of having been for two years with the US military in Vietnam as Deputy for CORDS. He was a “fighter”. During John Gunther Dean’s earlier assignment to Laos [1956-58], J.G. Dean had become an admirer and friend of the neutralist Lao leader, Prince Souvanna Phouma. [This is explained in J.G. Dean’s Oral History recorded by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training]. Was Prince Souvanna Phouma’s approach of trying to find a negotiated, internal settlement with his communist Pathet Lao countrymen a better way to defend his country’s unity and long-term interests than continuing 20 years of intermittent warfare? Was Laos just a pawn in the overall confrontation between the communist world and the Free World? For about six months [autumn of 1972 to April 1973] J.G. Dean served as Deputy [DCM] to Ambassador Mac Godley who was convinced of the need to confront the communist in Laos. Mac Godley, like many others, believed that “neutralism” was not a solution for a country caught in the struggle between the communist and Free World. In this confrontation, Ambassador Mac Godley favored calling in the US Air Force to use its awesome bombing capacity to support the Royal Lao military forces in fighting communists in Laos. Godley encouraged the neutralist Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma to “ask” for heavy bombing strikes against Pathet Lao positions, thereby shoring up the Royal Lao military in their fight against the communists. Ambassador Godley was a decent man and he enjoyed the loyalty and friendship of all who worked for him. John Gunther Dean was no exception. Ambassador Godley believed that American military might would make the Royal Lao government prevail over the Pathet Lao. John Gunther Dean was more inclined to put his hopes in negotiation and diplomacy. 2 When Ambassador Godley left Vientiane, Laos, for a senior assignment in the State Department in Washington, J.G. Dean became Chargé d’Affaires. This status lasted for five months. During that time, J.G. Dean worked very closely with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and the senior negotiator for the Royal Lao side, Pheng Phongsavan, in helping the two Lao sides come to agreement whereby a cease fire would stop the violence, and political confrontation would be taken care of in a coalition government where both sides would be represented. This process was known as negotiations for a Lao Protocol which would set forth the precise details to implement the accord. Neither the US, nor the North Vietnamese, or for that matter neither China, nor the French were directly involved in the negotiation. This was strictly an internal Lao negotiation. But outsiders tried to influence the terms of the agreement to protect their own national interests. J.G.D. played a significant role in helping Souvanna Phouma and his team to achieve a compromise solution. The ten files on Laos donated to the National archives document the events leading to the agreement. During the negotiating period, J.G.D. helped to put down a coup d’état attempt against Souvanna Phouma carried out by a group led by Lao Air Force General Thao Ma. The latter undoubtedly had the support of foreign elements. A detailed description of the coup attempt, how it was foiled, and the way it was reported in the world press is set forth in File 4. One of the remarkable achievements of that internal Lao Protocol was that the US government never broke relations with Laos, even after the US withdrew from Vietnam and Cambodia in April 1975. After the victory of the communists in Cambodia and Vietnam, the coalition government in Laos was replaced by a communist dominated government. But unlike in Vietnam and in Cambodia, the Lao population did not suffer from the change in orientation of the Lao government. Some Lao personalities who had openly opposed the Pathet Lao went into exile. Some Lao underwent “re-education”. But 1975 was in Laos a soft “modus vivendi” and the US did not loose face as in Vietnam and Cambodia leaving by helicopter from the roof tops. Today, more than thirty years later, the US still maintain uninterrupted diplomatic links with Laos. Western aid programs are very much sought after by the Lao government. Neighboring pro-Western Thailand plays a major role in Laos. Who is really concerned today that Laos has a Marxist government? But perhaps as the result of the US having backed the compromise settlement set forth in the Lao Protocol of 1973, the Lao people were spared the genocide that occurred in Cambodia and the harsh regime imposed by the victors on the people of South Vietnam. This is not a defense of neutralism. But aren’t there different ways for a major world power like the US to deal with difficult international problems? Is the use of military might the only way? Perhaps a negotiated compromise settlement is preferable to relying on military might until the bitter end. While the study of the files on Laos [1973] may not answer all these questions, at least they may provide an alternative approach to problem solving on the international scene. 3 File 1: Outgoing Chronological File - January 1973 to April 1973 • First secret session between Royal Lao Government and Pathet Lao negotiators to find a solution to years of warfare and how to settle the internal political differences. Vientiane 0781 dated February 1, 1973. • Vice President Spiro Agnew’s conversation with Prince Souvanna Phouma – Vientiane 0858 – February 5, 1973 • A readout from Chairman RLG delegation Pheng Phongsavan on the prospects for a cease fire – Vientiane 0907 – February 6, 1973. • Is the cease fire agreement a first step or should there be a linkage to a political settlement among Lao as seen by Prince Souvanna Phouma and Pathet Lao delegation – Vientiane 0933 – February 7, 1973. • Pathet Lao links political solution to a military cease fire agreement – Vientiane 0952 – February 8, 1973. • A cease fire accord, including political accommodation, is coming nearer – Vientiane 0976 – February 8, 1973. • Back channel messages dated February 7 and 13 by Ambassador Godley to Dr. Kissinger, National Security Advisor, regarding Lao agreement under negotiation. Memorandum of conversation on meeting of Dr. Kissinger with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma on February 9, 1973 as reported by note taker DCM Dean in February 9, 1973 backchannel. • Backchannel from Ambassador Godley to Dr. Kissinger on February 13 reporting on DCM Dean’s meeting with RLG chairman of delegation Pheng Phongsavan. • Backchannel February 14 from Ambassador Godley to Dr. Kissinger reporting on DCM Dean’s meeting with Pheng Phongsavan devoted to discussion of specific clauses in Lao Agreement under negotiation. • February 18 backchannel to Dr. Kissinger, dealing with specific points in RLG-PL negotiation as reported by DCM Dean from his meetings with Pheng Phongsavan. • February 17 backchannel to Dr. Kissinger dealing with specific points in RLG-PL negotiation as reported by DCM Dean from his meetings with Pheng Phongsavan. • February 19 backchannel to Dr. Kissinger and Scowcroft dealing with specific points in RLG-PL negotiation as reported by DCM Dean from his meetings with Pheng Phongsavan. • Ambassador Godley points out differences between direct US-Vietnamese negotiations in Paris and RLG-Pathet Lao process in Vientiane where US Government is not directly involved and is only indirectly making known its views through RLG negotiator [DCM Dean’s meetings with Pheng Phongsavan] – February 1973. • DCM Dean’s meeting with Soth Phetrasy, Pathet Lao Permanent Representative in Vientiane re: US POWs in Laos – February 21, 1973 report. • Vientiane 1901 re: formation of a coalition government and chances for support of National Assembly. Message is dated March 15, 1973. • Vientiane 2058 March 20 1973 – regarding US POWs in Laos.