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“Letting the Big Fish Swim” Failures to Prosecute High-Level Corruption in Uganda H U M A N Allard K. Lowenstein R I G H T S International Human Rights Clinic Yale Law School WATCH “Letting the Big Fish Swim” Failures to Prosecute High-Level Corruption in Uganda Copyright © 2013 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-62313-0633 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world. We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice. We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable. We challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law. We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www. Human Rights Watch.org The Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic is a Yale Law School course that gives students first-hand experience in human rights advocacy under the supervision of international human rights lawyers. The Clinic undertakes litigation and research projects on behalf of human rights organizations and individual victims of human rights abuses. Recent work has included involvement in human rights litigation in U.S. courts, preparing amicus briefs on international and comparative law for U.S., foreign, and international fora, advocacy before international and regional human rights bodies, and investigating and drafting reports on human rights situations. More information about the Lowenstein Clinic is available at http://www.law.yale.edu/intellectuallife/lowensteinclinic.htm OCTOBER 2013 ISBN: 978-1-62313-0633 “Letting the Big Fish Swim” Failures to Prosecute High-Level Corruption in Uganda Summary ........................................................................................................................... 1 Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 6 To the President, Cabinet, and Government of Uganda ............................................................. 6 To the Ugandan Police ............................................................................................................. 6 To the Anti-Corruption Court and Ugandan Judiciary ................................................................. 6 To Uganda’s Parliament ............................................................................................................ 7 To Uganda’s Development Partners and Donors, including the World Bank ................................ 7 Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 9 I. Context .......................................................................................................................... 11 Endless Zero-Tolerance Promises ............................................................................................ 11 Concerns for the Future .................................................................................................... 14 Patronage Politics and Lack of Political Will ............................................................................ 15 The Impact of Corruption on Human Rights ............................................................................. 17 Uganda’s Anti-Corruption Mechanisms ................................................................................... 22 The Anti-Corruption Court ................................................................................................. 22 The Office of the Inspectorate of Government ................................................................... 22 The Auditor General .......................................................................................................... 22 Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee .......................................................................... 23 Directorate for Ethics and Integrity .................................................................................... 23 II. Political Interference with Anti-Corruption Institutions ................................................. 24 Lack of Appointed Personnel .................................................................................................. 24 Lack of Disclosure of Financial Assets ..................................................................................... 27 III. Shortcomings in Anti-Corruption Laws ......................................................................... 31 Overlapping Mandates of the IGG and DPP .............................................................................. 31 Vague Legal Definitions .......................................................................................................... 32 Security of Tenure ................................................................................................................... 34 IV. Obstacles to Successful Prosecutions .......................................................................... 36 The Record of the Anti-Corruption Court .................................................................................. 36 Political Influence and Corruption in the Gathering of Evidence ............................................... 38 Threats to Prosecutors and Witnesses ..................................................................................... 39 V. Harassment and Intimidation of Anti-Corruption Activists ............................................ 44 The “OPM” Scandal 2012-2013 .............................................................................................. 48 VI. The Role of Uganda’s Donors ....................................................................................... 50 Strategic Need, Economic Considerations, and Entrenched Self-Interest ................................. 51 Inconsistency and Poor Coordination ...................................................................................... 53 Ineffective or Incomplete Donor Demands ............................................................................... 56 Dangers of Budget Support and Inadequate Exploration of Funding Alternatives ........................... 57 VII. Uganda’s Obligations to Prosecute Corruption in International Law ............................ 60 Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... 63 Summary “Untouchables. Come rain, come shine, they’re never going to court, not while there’s somebody close to them in power. That’s because of the politics involved.” —Prosecutor in the Anti-Corruption Court, May 21, 2013 “This court is tired of trying tilapias when crocodiles are left swimming.” —Justice John Bosco Katutsi, former head of the Anti-Corruption Court, during a ruling convicting an engineer during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting scandal, June 29, 2010 “Someone will ask, ‘Will it pay?’ If it will, one will steal. If it won’t pay, one won’t steal. It should be too expensive to steal. This is why corruption is happening on a grand scale. They must steal enough to stay out of jail.” —Auditor General John Muwanga, May 31, 2013 The news that US$12.7 million in donor funds had been embezzled from Uganda’s Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) hit the headlines in many donor capitals in late 2012, prompting serious questions about Uganda’s commitment to fight corruption. The stolen donor funds were earmarked as crucial support for rebuilding northern Uganda, ravaged by a 20-year war, and Karamoja, Uganda’s poorest region. Approximately 30 percent of the national budget came from foreign aid in 2012. As a result of the OPM scandal and claims that the money was funneled into private accounts, the European Union, United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway suspended aid. The OPM scandal was not the first time that grand scale theft of public money deprived some of Uganda’s poorest citizens of better access to fundamental services such as health and education. Past corruption scandals have had a direct impact on human rights. For example, millions of dollars’ worth of funds were diverted from the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation in 2006 and from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2005. Despite investigations, none of the high-ranking government officials who managed the implicated offices have faced criminal sanction. Most often they have 1 OCTOBER 2013 remained in office, untouched, while individuals working at the technical level have faced prosecution and, in some cases, jail time. Even when ministers have been forced to resign from office, such resignations have been temporary; they were eventually reappointed to key positions in government, in what one diplomatic representative calls a “game of musical chairs.” Years of evidence indicate that Uganda’s current political system is built on patronage and