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Uganda Police Force Anti - Corruption Strategy

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Uganda Police Force Anti - Corruption Strategy UGANDA POLICE FORCE ANTI - CORRUPTION STRATEGY From Colonial Policing to Community Policing 2017/18-2021/22 Uganda Police Headquarters Naguru Plot 42/49, Katalima Road, P.o Box 7055, Kampala Uganda Fax: +256-414-343531/255630. General Lines: 256-414-343532/233814/231761/254033 Toll Free: 0800-199-699, 0800-199-499.Website: http://www.upf.go.ug Aligned to the JLOS Anti-corruption strategy With Support from Contents FOREWORD ........................................................................................... 4 LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................ 6 CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND ........................................................ 8 1.0 Introduction ................................................................................... 8 With Support from 1.1 Situational analysis ..................................................................... 10 1.2 Definition of Corruption ............................................................. 12 1.3 The Police Mandate .................................................................... 15 1.4 Forms of corruption in the UPF .................................................. 16 1.5 Factors influencing corruption in UPF ........................................ 17 CHAPTER 2: EXISTING LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK TO FIGHT CORRUPTION IN UGANDA ................. 21 2.0 Introduction ................................................................................. 21 2.1 NRM Ten Point programme ....................................................... 21 2.2 The Constitution of Uganda, 1995 .............................................. 21 2.3 Anti-corruption Amendments Act 2013...................................... 22 2.4 The Leadership Code (Amendment) Act, 2017 .......................... 22 2.5 The Inspectorate of Government Act, 2002 ................................ 23 2.6 The Access to Information Act, 2005 ......................................... 23 2.7 The Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2010 .................................. 24 2.8 The Local Government Act, Cap 243 (Amended) ...................... 24 2.9 The Uganda Police Act, 2006 ..................................................... 24 2.10 The Budget Act, 2001 ................................................................. 25 2.11 The Public Finance Management Act, 2015 ............................... 25 2.12 The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act, 2003 2.13 The National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2014 –2019) ................ 27 2.14 JLOS Anti-Corruption Strategy .................................................. 28 CHAPTER 3: THE UPF ANTI – CORRUPTION STRATEGY ........... 30 3.0 Introduction ................................................................................. 30 3.1 Goal and objectives ..................................................................... 30 3.1.1 Strategic Objectives, Interventions and Indicators ...................... 31 2 CHAPTER 4: IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND EVALUATION ...................................................................................... 38 4.0 Introduction ................................................................................. 38 4.1 Implementation ........................................................................... 38 A. Implementation at National Level .................................................. 39 4.1.1 Police Authority .......................................................................... 39 4.1.2 Police Council ............................................................................. 39 4.1.3 IGP .............................................................................................. 39 4.1.4 Directors ...................................................................................... 39 4.1.5 Finance Committee ..................................................................... 40 4.1.6 Heads of Departments/Specialized units ..................................... 40 B. Implementation at Regional Level ................................................. 40 4.1.7 Regional Police Commanders ..................................................... 40 C. Implementation at District Level ................................................... 41 4.1.8 District Police Commanders ....................................................... 41 4.1.9 Individual officers ....................................................................... 41 4.1.10 Cooperation with external partners ............................................. 42 4.2 Implementation Matrix ............................................................... 43 4.3 Monitoring and Evaluation ......................................................... 50 4.3.1 Data Collection and information dissemination .......................... 50 4.3.2 Institutional framework and roles on M&E ................................ 51 4.3.3 Evaluation ................................................................................... 51 4.3.4 Impact assessment ....................................................................... 52 3 CHAPTER 4: IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND FOREWORD EVALUATION ...................................................................................... 38 The Uganda Police Force (UPF) is mandated by the 1995 Constitution of 4.0 Introduction ................................................................................. 38 4.1 Implementation ........................................................................... 38 the Republic of Uganda among other things, to fight crime in Uganda A. Implementation at National Level .................................................. 39 which includes acts of Corruption. The Uganda Police Force (UPF) Anti- 4.1.1 Police Authority .......................................................................... 39 Corruption Strategy is a framework to guide the protracted fight against 4.1.2 Police Council ............................................................................. 39 corruption in the Police. The Strategy is anchored to the National Anti- 4.1.3 IGP .............................................................................................. 39 4.1.4 Directors ...................................................................................... 39 Corruption Strategy’s principle of ZERO TOLERANCE TO 4.1.5 Finance Committee ..................................................................... 40 CORRUPTION to enhance good governance. It is also aligned to the 4.1.6 Heads of Departments/Specialized units ..................................... 40 JLOS Anti-corruption Strategy. B. Implementation at Regional Level ................................................. 40 4.1.7 Regional Police Commanders ..................................................... 40 This Strategy is not an isolated intervention but rather a part of a broader C. Implementation at District Level ................................................... 41 Government effort to address the vice and is critical in the enhancing the 4.1.8 District Police Commanders ....................................................... 41 4.1.9 Individual officers ....................................................................... 41 image of the UPF. 4.1.10 Cooperation with external partners ............................................. 42 4.2 Implementation Matrix ............................................................... 43 Over the years, UPF has tried its best to fulfill this mandate but there has 4.3 Monitoring and Evaluation ......................................................... 50 been persistent allegation of corruption in reports like the 1999 Judicial 4.3.1 Data Collection and information dissemination .......................... 50 Commission of Inquiry by Justice Julia Ssebutinde, IGG Integrity Survey II 4.3.2 Institutional framework and roles on M&E ................................ 51 & III, Transparent International Global Corruption Barometer 2010 and 4.3.3 Evaluation ................................................................................... 51 4.3.4 Impact assessment ....................................................................... 52 the UBOS National Service Delivery Survey of 2016. These allegations affect our effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy in service delivery. This state of affairs cannot continue and UPF is determined to fight corruption among its rank and file and one of the measures we have undertaken is to come up with this Strategy. For the implementation of the strategy, the existing Police structures like Police Authority, Police Council, Directorates, Departments and 3 4 LIST OF ACRONYMS AIGP Assistant Inspector General of Police CBO Community Based Organization CID Criminal Investigation Directorate CPC Chief Political Commissariat DEI Directorate of Ethics and Integrity DMC Dangerous Mechanical Condition DPC District Police Commander DPP Directorate of Public Prosecution GBC Global Corruption Barometer HRD Human Resource Development HRLS Human Rights and Legal Services HRM Human Resource Management ICT Information Communication Technology IGG Inspector General of Government IGP Inspector General of Police JLOS Justice, Law and Order Sector M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MDALG Ministries, Departments, Agencies and Local Governments MoFPED Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development NACS National Anti-Corruption Strategy NGO Non-Governmental Organization NIS National Integrity Survey PAC Policy and Advisory Committee PF Police Form PPDA
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