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Overview of Corruption in Uganda www.transparency.org www.cmi.no Overview of Corruption in Uganda Query: Please provide me with an overview of corruption and anti-corruption efforts in Uganda Purpose: developments tend to demonstrate a lack of political backing for anti-corruption efforts. Combined with understaffed and underfinanced anti-corruption bodies, I am going to Uganda and Tanzania on inspections the state faces considerable challenges in its ability to of embassies on behalf of my agency. effectively enforce the legislative framework against corruption. Content: Part 1: Overview of Corruption in Uganda Part 1: Overview of Corruption in Uganda Political and economic transformation since the NRM’s Part 2: Anti-Corruption Efforts in assumption of power in 1986 has translated into a Uganda period of economic recovery in Uganda. The country Part 3: Sources and Further Reading has experienced one of the highest growth rates in Africa in recent years. These trends have led to Uganda gaining a reputation as one of the most Summary: successful reform-oriented countries in Africa. Yet the country continues to face major challenges. Poverty, inequitable wealth distribution and corruption raise Since the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came questions about the impact of the government’s anti- to power in 1986, Uganda has undertaken an ambitious corruption reforms. set of economic and political reforms. These reforms have led to the establishment of a solid legal, administrative and institutional framework to fight corruption. In spite of initial success widely heralded by the international community, corruption remains widespread at all level of society and the country faces major implementation challenges. Recent political Authored by: Marie Chêne, U4 Helpdesk, Transparency International, [email protected] Reviewed by: Robin Hodess Ph.D., Transparency International, [email protected] Date: 4 March 2009 U4 Expert Answers provide targeted and timely anti-corruption expert advice to U4 partner agency staff www.U4.no South-South Anti-Corruption Cooperation Mechanisms Forms and Extent of Corruption in Uganda The World Bank’s 2007 Worldwide Governance Extent of Corruption Indicators note that Uganda performed moderately in terms of regulatory quality (48.5) and government In 2006, President Yoweri Museveni announced a effectiveness (42.7), below average in terms of rule of policy of zero-tolerance for corruption. However, at the law (37.6), and voice and accountability (33.2) and beginning of Musevini’s third term following the first weakly in terms of control of corruption (24.6 compared multi-party (but not entirely fair) elections, most to 26.2 in 2003) and political stability (13.9). (Please governance indicators show that corruption is perceived see: as widespread and endemic at all levels of society. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_chart. Global Integrity’s 2006 report on the country asp). estimates that more than half the government’s annual budget is lost to corruption each year, amounting to Further surveys conducted in the past five years USD 950 million. confirm these findings. The World Economic Forum's (http://www.globalintegrity.org/reports/2006/uganda/ind Global Competitiveness Report for 2008-09 identifies ex.cfm). Corruption scandals involving personalities corruption as one of the major constraints for doing close to those in power periodically hit the headlines. A business in the country, after access to financing. former health minister and loyal supporter of the (http://www.weforum.org/documents/GCR0809/index.ht president, along with two deputies, have been charged ml).The World Bank Investment Climate with misappropriating USD 2 million from funds Assessment undertaken in 2004, corroborates this provided by the Global Alliance for Vaccine and finding with 46.3% of small firms and 56.5 % of middle Immunization (GAVI) in 2005. size firms identifying corruption as a major or severe (www.yigg.de/sonstiges/uganda-ex-ministers-arrested- constraint to doing business in the country. in-corruption-scandal). (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAFRSUMAFTP S/Resources/note_11_screen.pdf). More recently, in 2007, the government circumvented official procurement guidelines to contract an unknown Forms of corruption company, Kenlloyd Logistics, to replenish Uganda’s fuel reserves. The company was being run by the son- Bureaucratic Corruption in-law of the foreign minister, who is himself related to the president. Bureaucratic and administrative forms of corruption are (http://report.globalintegrity.org/Uganda/2008/notebook) widespread in the Ugandan administration, with practices of bribery, nepotism, and misuse of official Public confidence in government officials is severely positions and resources. Government bureaucracy, affected by such scandals. A majority of citizens complex regulatory procedures and red tape provide surveyed for the 2005 Afro barometer perceived numerous opportunities for corruption and rent seeking. corruption to be rampant. In addition, 36% of respondents to the survey believed that most or all The 2006 World Bank-IFC Enterprise Survey government officials - whether at the central or at the indicates that more than half of firms expect to make local level - were involved in corruption. informal payments to public officials to get things done. (http://www.afrobarometer.org/uganda.htm). 80% of companies report paying bribes and make on average more than 30 unofficial payments per year. Other empirical data corroborates this. The 2008 (http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ExploreEconomies/? Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks Uganda at economyid=193&year=2006). Firms typically make 126th place with a score of 2.6. Previous iterations of facilitation payments to speed-up bureaucratic the index show that, despite slight improvements, the processes, especially to obtain licences, construction various sources of the CPI continue to perceive permits and/or customs clearance, or to connect to corruption as rampant and systemic in Uganda, with phone lines and electricity supplies. Large and foreign scores ranging from 2.1 to 2.8 between 2002 and 2007. companies appear to be the most vulnerable targets for (Please see: bribe solicitation, paying close to 4% of their revenue in http://transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices informal payments. /cpi/2008). www.U4.no 2 South-South Anti-Corruption Cooperation Mechanisms (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAFRSUMAFTP 70% of government contracts were not awarded S/Resources/note_11_screen.pdf) according to established procedures, while half of the national budget is spent on procurement deals. Political Corruption (Please see the 2008 Global Integrity report: http://report.globalintegrity.org/Uganda/2008). Political patronage and favouritism further characterise the Ugandan administration, with NRM patronage The US-Department of State Investment Climate systems reaching into the private sector. In local Statements for 2009 also notes that government government bodies, giving jobs and contracts to procurement is not transparent, particularly for defence relatives or supporters appears to be common practice. items. In previous years, several high-profile A 2006 Freedom House report denounces government tenders for infrastructure projects were widespread patronage and corruption in government, suspended due to allegations of corruption. with the exception of the public, health and education (http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ics/2009/index.htm). service commissions that are generally credited with making open, merit-based appointments. Even here, The 2006 World Bank-IFC survey indicates that close however, there have been recent cases of interference to half of the firms questioned expect to give a gift to in the appointment of senior officials in the ministries of secure a government contract. Companies further health and of education and sports. report the gift value to amount to approximately more (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22& than 5% of the contract value. A baseline survey of year=2008&country=7511). National Public Procurement Integrity conducted in 2006 by the Procurement and Disposal of Assets In terms of political finance, the Freedom House report Authority (PPDA), the Inspectorate of Government notes that regulations controlling influence over (IGG) and USAID reports that illegal payments to campaigns are not enforced effectively, with many secure government contract at both the local and the instances of economic privileges given to investors. central levels are even higher, representing Although the government allocates USD 25,000 for approximately 7 to 9% of the contract value. The survey campaign expenses to each presidential candidate, the further estimates that direct losses due to corruption in ruling NRM party appears to be one of the greatest procurement - at both the central and the local levels – beneficiaries of the system, receiving funds from both amounted to between USD 64-85 million in 2004-2005. private and public sources. During the 2004 elections, The majority of respondents identified the secretary to 35% of respondents to the Afro Barometer reported the Tender Board and Tender Board members as being having been offered food or a gift in return for their most corrupt. vote. (http://www.ppda.go.ug/downloads/Integrity%20survey (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363 %20FINAL%20REPORT%202007.pdf). &year=2006&country=7080). The PPDA, IGG and USAID survey identifies the lack of Sectors Most
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