DOCSLIB.ORG

Analysis of Maritime Support Vessels and Acquisition Methods Utilized to Support Maritime Irregular Warfare

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Analysis of Maritime Support Vessels and Acquisition Methods Utilized to Support Maritime Irregular Warfare Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2010-06 Analysis of maritime support vessels and acquisition methods utilized to support maritime irregular warfare Clark, William J. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10518 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT ANALYSIS OF MARITIME SUPPORT VESSELS AND ACQUISITION METHODS UTILIZED TO SUPPORT MARITIME IRREGULAR WARFARE By: William Clark, Christopher Kelley, and Justin Bummara June 2010 Advisors: Keenan Yoho, and James Greene Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2010 MBA Professional Report 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Analysis of Maritime Support Vessels and Acquisition 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Methods Utilized to Support Maritime Irregular Warfare 6. AUTHOR(S) William Clark, Christopher Kelley, Justin Bummara 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ________________. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) As the U.S. military continuously aligns the appropriate platforms to conduct Maritime Irregular Warfare (MIW), Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has leased/chartered civilian ships to provide the appropriate vessels needed to support operations in Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF–P). The framework of this study showcases three specific vessels with their corresponding capabilities on cost per day basis. Our findings and analyses may aid commanders in determining the most appropriate vessel and cost-effective acquisition method to accomplish specific MIW missions in not only OEF-P, but also in other MIW environments. Based on the analysis and recommendations presented in this project, decision makers in this arena will have a mechanism from which to make a more informed decision regarding the acquisition of vessels supporting MIW. Decision makers will be able to evaluate various potential MIW scenarios; identify specific vessel capabilities to meet their operational requirements; and acquire vessels more cost-effectively based on total daily rate costs. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Maritime Support Vessel, Maritime Irregular Warfare, Naval Special 15. NUMBER OF Warfare, Leasing, Chartering, USSOCOM, Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines, SOF, SEALs, PAGES HSV, LCS, Military Sealift Command 115 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ANALYSIS OF MARITIME SUPPORT VESSELS AND ACQUISITION METHODS UTILIZED TO SUPPORT MARITIME IRREGULAR WARFARE William J. Clark, Major, United States Army Christopher S. Kelley, Lieutenant, United States Navy Justin M. Bummara, Lieutenant, United States Navy Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2010 Authors: _____________________________________ William J. Clark _____________________________________ Christopher S. Kelley _____________________________________ Justin M. Bummara Approved by: _____________________________________ Dr. Keenan D. Yoho, Lead Advisor _____________________________________ RADM James B. Greene, USN (Ret.), Support Advisor _____________________________________ William R. Gates, Dean Graduate School of Business and Public Policy iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ANALYSIS OF MARITIME SUPPORT VESSELS AND ACQUISITION METHODS UTILIZED TO SUPPORT MARITIME IRREGULAR WARFARE ABSTRACT As the U.S. military continuously aligns the appropriate platforms to conduct Maritime Irregular Warfare (MIW), Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has leased/chartered civilian ships to provide the appropriate vessels needed to support operations in Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF–P). The framework of this study showcases three specific vessels with their corresponding capabilities on cost per day basis. Our findings and analyses may aid commanders in determining the most appropriate vessel and cost-effective acquisition method to accomplish specific MIW missions in not only OEF-P, but also in other MIW environments. Based on the analysis and recommendations presented in this project, decision makers in this arena will have a mechanism from which to make a more informed decision regarding the acquisition of vessels supporting MIW. Decision makers will be able to evaluate various potential MIW scenarios; identify specific vessel capabilities to meet their operational requirements; and acquire vessels more cost-effectively based on total daily rate costs. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....................................................................................................1 I. PREFACE...................................................................................................................13 II. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................15 III. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY .........................................19 IV. LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND .................................................21 A. LITERATURE ADDRESSING MARITIME IRREGULAR WARFARE.....................................................................................................21 B. A CONTEMPORARY CASE OF MIW: OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM–PHILIPPINES..........................................................................25 1. Background ........................................................................................25 2. OEF–P Strategy and Mission............................................................26 3. OEF–P Organization .........................................................................28 4. Terrorist Organizations.....................................................................31 5. Operations ..........................................................................................32 6. U.S. Foreign Assistance .....................................................................33 7. Maritime Aspect of OEF–P...............................................................33 8. Vessel Characteristics........................................................................34 V. VESSEL ACQUISITION STRATEGIES ...............................................................35 A. ACQUISITION METHODS.........................................................................35 1. Procurement .......................................................................................35 2. Purchasing ..........................................................................................36 3. Leases ..................................................................................................37 a.. Types of Leases........................................................................38 b. Risk Associated with Leases ...................................................39 c. Guidelines for Making the Lease or Purchase Decision.......39 d. Leasing Background...............................................................40 B. MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND OVERVIEW....................................42 C. EARLY HISTORY OF THE MARITIME SUPPORT VESSEL (MSV)..............................................................................................................47 D. MSV PROGRAM STRATEGY ...................................................................49 E. MSV PROGRAM EXECUTION .................................................................51 1. Acquisition of Funding Phase ...........................................................51 2. Requirements Phase...........................................................................52 3. Construction Phase ............................................................................53 F. MSV BUDGET AND FINANCE..................................................................56 G. LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT ......................................................................57
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Navy Perspective on Joint Force Interdependence
    Airmen working on Distributed Ground Station–1 Operations Floor at the U.S. Air Force’s 480th Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Wing (U.S. Air Force) Navy Perspective on Joint Force Interdependence By Jonathan Greenert ooking ahead to the Department line intelligently, innovate, and wisely more dramatic fiscal changes can lead of Defense’s (DOD’s) fiscal pros- use funds at our disposal. We need a to retrenchment. While Service rivalries L pects and security challenges in the broader conversation about how to cap- are somewhat natural, and a reflection second half of this decade and beyond, italize on each Service’s strengths and of esprit de corps, they are counter- the Services and their partners will “domain knowledge” to better integrate productive when they interfere with have to find ever more ingenious ways capabilities. Moving in this direction combat performance, reduce capability to come together. It is time for us to is not only about savings or cost avoid- for operational commanders, or produce think and act in a more ecumenical way ance; it is about better warfighting. unaffordable options for the Nation. as we build programs and capabilities. The DOD historical track record Rather than expending our finite energy We should build stronger ties, stream- shows episodic levels of joint deconflic- on rehashing roles and missions, or com- tion, coordination, and integration. Wars mitting fratricide as resources become and contingencies bring us together. constrained, we should find creative ways Admiral Jonathan Greenert is Chief of Naval Peacetime and budget pressures seem to to build and strengthen our connections.
    [Show full text]
  • Navy Littoral Combat Ship/Frigate (LCS/FF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
    Navy Littoral Combat Ship/Frigate (LCS/FF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress (name redacted) Specialist in Naval Affairs May 19, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov RL33741 Navy Littoral Combat Ship/Frigate (LCS/FF) Program Summary The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship/Frigate (LCS/FF) program is a program to procure a total of 40, and possibly as many as 52, small surface combatants (SSCs), meaning LCSs and frigates. The LCS/FF program has been controversial over the years due to past cost growth, design and construction issues with the first LCSs, concerns over the survivability of LCSs (i.e., their ability to withstand battle damage), concerns over whether LCSs are sufficiently armed and would be able to perform their stated missions effectively, and concerns over the development and testing of the modular mission packages for LCSs. The Navy’s execution of the program has been a matter of congressional oversight attention for several years. Two very different LCS designs are currently being built. One was developed by an industry team led by Lockheed; the other was developed by an industry team that was led by General Dynamics. The design developed by the Lockheed-led team is built at the Marinette Marine shipyard at Marinette, WI, with Lockheed as the prime contractor; the design developed by the team that was led by General Dynamics is built at the Austal USA shipyard at Mobile, AL, with Austal USA as the prime contractor. The Navy’s proposed FY2017 budget requested $1,125.6 million for the procurement of the 27th and 28th LCSs, or an average of $562.8 million for each ship.
    [Show full text]
  • Home Hawaiian Raptors
    What’s INSIDE DBIDS to be implemented O’Kane brings hoops Joint Base to celebrate Magic show coming to at JBPHH this month championship back to Earth Day at Hickam Sharkey Theater > A-3 ship Harbor >B-4 > B1 >B-3 April 15, 2016 www.cnic.navy.mil/hawaii www.hookelenews.com Volume 7 Issue 14 Welcome home Hawaiian Raptors Story and photos by Fighter Squadron, supported area of responsibility encom- coalition forces and conducted September Tech. Sgt. Aaron Oelrich by the Hawaii Air National passes the Southwest Asia our operations flawlessly,” 2015. Guard’s 154th Maintenance and most of the Middle East. said one of the pilots from the 15th Wing Public Affairs Squadron and the active duty The Hawaiian Raptors were Hawaii Air National Guard. 15th Maintenance Squadron. an integral part of Operation The F-22 fighter aircraft Editor’s note: Because of se- The deployment to the Inherent Resolve. and the Airmen of the Hawai- curity considerations and host Central Command area of re- “Our Airmen performed ex- ian Raptors started this nation sensitivities, the Ha- sponsibility marked the first tremely well and they did it mission by departing waii Air National Guard will operational deployment for with the Aloha spirit. Mainte- from Joint Base not release the names of its the Hawaiian Raptors. The nance did an outstanding job, Pearl Harbor- personnel who deployed, and Cen- tral Command and met all their tasks. We in- Hickam the country, or base where the tegrated well with the other in late Raptors operated. Friends and family cele- brate the homecoming of their loved ones as they returned to Joint Base Pearl Har- bor-Hickam, April 8.
    [Show full text]
  • Brings the Latest Technology and Capabilities to the 7Th Fleet
    SURFACE SITREP Page 1 P PPPPPPPPP PPPPPPPPPPP PP PPP PPPPPPP PPPP PPPPPPPPPP Volume XXXI, Number 2 August 2015 “Rebalance” Brings the Latest Technology and Capabilities to the 7th Fleet An Interview with RDML Charlie Williams, USN Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific / Commander, Task Force 74 (CTF 73) / Singapore Area Coordinator Conducted by CAPT Edward Lundquist, USN (Ret) What’s important about the Asia-Pacific area of operations (AOR), country we tailor what we bring in CARAT to the needs and capacity and how does your command fit into the “rebalance” to the Pa- of our partners. Here in Singapore, CARAT Singapore is a robust cific, or the so-called “Pacific Pivot.” varsity-level exercise. It typically features live-fire, surface-to-air Looking strategically at the AOR, the Indo-Asia-Pacific region is on missiles and ASW torpedo exercises and we benefit and gain great the rise; it’s become the nexus of the global economy. Almost 60 value from these engagements. With other CARAT partner na- percent of the world’s GDP comes from the Indo-Asia-Pacific na- tions, we focus our training on maritime interdiction operations, or tions, amounting to almost half of global trade, and most of that humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and make it more commerce runs through the vital shipping lanes of this region. applicable to the country’s needs and desires. Another exercise that compliments CARAT, yet Moreover, more than 60 with a very different focus, is percent of the world’s SEACAT (Southeast Asia Co- population lives in the operation And Training).
    [Show full text]
  • Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress
    Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs June 12, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33741 Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress Summary The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate program is a program to procure 52 LCSs and frigates. The first LCS was funded in FY2005, and a total of 23 have been funded through FY2015. The Navy’s proposed FY2016 budget requests the procurement of three more LCSs. The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of these three ships at $1,437.0 million, or an average of $479.0 million each. The three ships have received a total of $80 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy’s FY2016 budget requests the remaining $1,357.0 million that is needed to complete their combined procurement cost. From 2001 to 2014, the program was known simply as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, and all 52 planned ships were referred to as LCSs. In 2014, at the direction of Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, the program was restructured. As a result of the restructuring, the Navy now wants to build the final 20 ships in the program (ships 33 through 52) to a revised version of the baseline LCS design. The Navy intends to refer to these 20 ships, which the Navy wants to procure in FY2019 and subsequent fiscal years, as frigates rather than LCSs. The Navy has indicated that it may also want to build ships 25 through 32 with at least some of the design changes now intended for the final 20 ships.
    [Show full text]
  • Fastship, LLC V. United States, 122 Fed
    In the United States Court of Federal Claims No. 12-484C (Filed Under Seal: April 28, 2017) (Reissued: May 5, 2017) ********************************** ) Post-trial decision in a patent case; U.S. FASTSHIP, LLC, ) Patent Nos. 5,080,032 and 5,231,946; 28 ) U.S.C. § 1498(a); infringement; non- Plaintiff, ) obviousness; enablement; reasonable and ) entire compensation v. ) ) UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant. ) ) ********************************** Mark L. Hogge, Dentons US LLP, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff. With him on the briefs and at trial were Shailendra K. Maheshwari, Rajesh C. Noronha, and Carl P. Bretscher, Dentons US LLP, Washington, D.C., and Donald E. Stout, Fitch, Even, Tabin & Flannery LLP, Washington, D.C. Andrew P. Zager, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant. With him on the briefs and at trial were Scott Bolden and Lindsay Eastman, Trial Attorneys, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. Also with him on the briefs were Benjamin C. Mizer, former Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Gary Hausken, Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. OPINION AND ORDER1 LETTOW, Judge. This post-trial opinion addresses plaintiff’s claims for damages attributable to alleged infringement of patents pertaining to large ships with a semi-planing monohull design and 1Because this order might have contained confidential or proprietary information within the meaning of Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) and the protective order entered in this case, it was initially filed under seal.
    [Show full text]
  • USS Freedom (LCS 1)
    ® Serving the Hampton Roads Navy Family Vol. 17, No. 42, Norfolk, VA FLAGSHIPNEWS.COM October 22, 2009 Pentagon offi cials stress cybersecurity on all computers BY JIM GARAMONE curity Month. The Defense Department is Everyone needs to take precautions, the keyboard, and it doesn’t matter if the key- American Forces Press Service one of the largest computer users in the captain said during a recent interview. “If board is at the home or at work, Jamshidi world, and security has to be in the fore- you’re locking your car doors, then you said. Computer users often inadvertent- WASHINGTON — Pentagon offi cials front of all users, offi cials say. help make the parking lot safer,” she said. ly carry viruses back and forth between stress that no matter what computer you Navy Capt. Sandra Jamshidi, director of “If everyone is locking their car doors, home and work computers. use, you need to take cybersecurity into the department’s Information Assurance then you make the parking lot a less attrac- Users have a better chance of detecting account. Program, said that if everyone did their tive target. It’s the same for cybersecurity. something unusual on their computers, With growing dependence on informa- part for cybersecurity, it would “fi lter out If we all pay attention to security, then it she said. People need to understand what tion technology and increasing threats the low-level hacker type of attacks, so raises the threshold across the entire In- is normal for the computer and the soft- against it, President Barack Obama we’re better able to go after the profession- ternet.” declared October to be National Cyberse- al hackers who do the most harm to us.” The frontline of this cyberwar is the See CYBERSECURITY, A9 U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • BIOGRAPHICAL DATA BOOKK Class 2019-1 7-18 January 2019 National
    BBIIOOGGRRAAPPHHIICCAALL DDAATTAA BBOOOOKK Class 2019-1 7-18 January 2019 National Defense University NDU PRESIDENT NDU VICE PRESIDENT Vice Admiral Fritz Roegge, USN 16th President Vice Admiral Fritz Roegge is an honors graduate of the University of Minnesota with a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering and was commissioned through the Reserve Officers' Training Corps program. He earned a Master of Science in Engineering Management from the Catholic University of America and a Master of Arts with highest distinction in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He was a fellow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Seminar XXI program. VADM Fritz Roegge, NDU President (Photo His sea tours include USS Whale (SSN 638), USS by NDU AV) Florida (SSBN 728) (Blue), USS Key West (SSN 722) and command of USS Connecticut (SSN 22). His major command tour was as commodore of Submarine Squadron 22 with additional duty as commanding officer, Naval Support Activity La Maddalena, Italy. Ashore, he has served on the staffs of both the Atlantic and the Pacific Submarine Force commanders, on the staff of the director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion, on the Navy staff in the Assessments Division (N81) and the Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (N13), in the Secretary of the Navy's Office of Legislative Affairs at the U. S, House of Representatives, as the head of the Submarine and Nuclear Power Distribution Division (PERS 42) at the Navy Personnel Command, and as an assistant deputy director on the Joint Staff in both the Strategy and Policy (J5) and the Regional Operations (J33) Directorates.
    [Show full text]
  • Jhsv and Lcs Program Update
    COMPANY ANNOUNCEMENT 19 MAY 2013 JHSV AND LCS PROGRAM UPDATE Austal Limited (Austal) (ASX:ASB) is pleased to announce that Joint High Speed Vessel USNS Choctaw County (JHSV 2) successfully completed Acceptance Trials (AT) on May 3, 2013, in the Gulf of Mexico. This milestone achievement involved the performance of intense comprehensive tests by the Navy while underway, which demonstrated the successful operation of the ship’s major systems and equipment. This is the last significant milestone before delivery of the ship, which is expected in June. Austal Chief Executive Officer Andrew Bellamy said, “It is very pleasing to see that the JHSV program is maturing quickly as we drive operational improvements in our state of the art production line. JHSV 3 is expected to be launched in a matter of weeks and keel laying of JHSV 4 is scheduled for later this month”. This vessel is the second of ten JHSVs that Austal has been contracted by the Navy to build in its Mobile, Ala. shipyard. The Navy selected Austal as the prime for this $1.6 billion contract in 2008. "With these extensive tests, this new, highly-flexible ship class continues to demonstrate its performance ability and endurance", said Capt. Henry Stevens, JHSV program manager. "Leveraging commercial design and technology, JHSV 2 is building on the successes and lessons learned from USNS Spearhead (JHSV 1), while improving our processes for the entire JHSV program." The vessel is capable of transporting 600 short tons 1,200 nautical miles at an average speed of 35 knots and can operate in shallow-draft ports and waterways, interfacing with roll-on / roll-off discharge facilities and on / off-loading a combat-loaded Abrams Main Battle Tank (M1A2).
    [Show full text]
  • Littoral Combat Ship Crew Scheduling
    Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2015-03 Littoral Combat Ship crew scheduling Fitzsimmons, Van R. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/45186 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP CREW SCHEDULING by Van R. Fitzsimmons March 2015 Thesis Advisor: Javier Salmeron Second Reader: Nedialko Dimitrov Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED March 2015 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP CREW SCHEDULING 6. AUTHOR(S) Van R. Fitzsimmons 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943–5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The US Navy in the World (2001-2010)
    The U.S. Navy in the World (2001-2010): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts Peter M. Swartz with Karin Duggan MISC D0026242.A2/Final December 2011 CNA is a not-for-profit organization whose professional staff of over 700 provides in-depth analysis and results-oriented solutions to help government leaders choose the best courses of action. Founded in 1942, CNA operates the Institute for Public Research and the Center for Naval Analyses, the federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. CNA Strategic Studies (CSS), created in 2000, conducts high-quality research on and analysis of issues of strategic, regional, and policy importance. CSS’ analyses are based on objective, rigorous examination and do not simply echo conventional wisdom. CSS provides analytic support to U.S. Government organizations and the governments of partner countries. CSS also maintains notable foundation- sponsored and self-initiated research programs. CSS includes a Strategic Initiatives Group, an International Affairs Group, and a Center for Stability and Development. The Strategic Initiatives Group (SIG) looks at issues of U.S. national security, and military strategy, policy and operations, with a particular focus on maritime and naval aspects. SIG employs experts in historical analyses, futures planning, and long-term trend analysis based on scenario planning, to help key decision makers plan for the future. SIG specialties also include issues related to regional and global proliferation, deterrence theory, threat mitigation, and strategic planning for combating threats from weapons of mass destruction. The Strategic Studies Division is led by Vice President and Director Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress
    Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs January 5, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33741 Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress Summary The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate program is a program to procure a large number of LCSs and modified LCSs. The modified LCSs are to be referred to as frigates. Prior to December 14, 2015, Navy plans called for procuring a total of 52 LCSs and frigates. A December 14, 2015, memorandum from Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter to Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus directed the Navy to reduce the LCS/Frigate program to a total of 40 ships. The memorandum also directed the Navy to neck down to a single design variant of the ships starting with the ships to be procured in FY2019. (Two different variants of the LCS are currently built by two shipyards.) The first LCS was funded in FY2005, and a total of 26 have been funded through FY2016. The Navy’s proposed FY2016 budget requested the procurement of three LCSs. The Navy estimated the combined procurement cost of these three ships at $1,437.0 million, or an average of $479.0 million each. The three ships had received a total of $80 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy’s FY2016 budget requested the remaining $1,357.0 million needed to complete their combined procurement cost. From 2001 to 2014, the program was known simply as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, and all 52 then-planned ships were referred to as LCSs.
    [Show full text]