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71-2 6 ,54-7 EDDY, James Howard, 1933- . the' neutralization of LAOS, 1959-62: A CASE STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF A THEORY OF EQUILIBRIUM. The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1971 Political Science, international law and relations University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan d) Copyrighted by James Howard Eddy 1971 THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED THE UNIVERSITY 0? OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE THE NEUTRALIZATION OF LAOS, 1959-62: A CASE STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF A THEORY OF EQUILIBRIUM A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY JAI.ES HOWARD EDDY Norman. Oklahoma 1971 THE NEUTRALIZATION OF LAOS, 1959-62s A CASE STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF A THEORY OF EQUILIBRIUM APPROVED BY T DISSERTATION COMMITTEE ACKNOWLEDGMENT The research undertaken in this paper was conducted with the assistance of a large number of people. The writer is indebted to Dr. Rufus G. Hall for his invaluable assistance during the researching and writing of this paper. Dr. Hall, who served as the major advisor for the paper, spent many long hours beyond the call of duty with the present writer. The preliminary and final draft of this paper was typed by Iiîrs. Paul Rivers. To her the writer owes a note of thanks. No amount of thanks would be sufficient for my wife and son who spent many hours without my company, and who offered all possible assistance to make this research possible. And to my mother who has given me her moral support throughout my life, my thanks would not suffice. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .......................... PART I. CAUSES BEHIND OUR INABILITY TO ACHIEVE ORDERLY CHANGE Chapter I. THE AMERICAN OUTLOOK......................... 22 II. THE ASIAN OUTLOOK............................. 3^ III. THE PROTRACTED OUTLOOK....................... 42 PART II. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1945-1960 IV. CAUSE BEHIND THE EFFECT........... ............. 57 V. LOOKING BACKWARD.............................. 84 PART III. THE KINGDOM OF LAOS AND POWER POLITICS VI. THE LAOTIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM .................. 105 VII. LAOS AND CONTAINMENT VS. PROTRACTED V/AR .... 122 VIII. A POLITICAL POWER VACUUM ...................... 142 IX. THE UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE .................. 155 X. TO THE BRINK IN LAOS . 197 XI. A STEP FORWARD................................ 238 APPENDIX ............................................... 256 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................. 264 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION International politics in 1959 and. 19&9 has in common certain changes in the world affecting the formulation of foreign policy of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. These changes are the basis for equilibrium among nation-states, and for the satisfaction of a balance of power reflecting the realities of political power among the nation-states. The writer believes the United States has not accepted, thus not reflected, an understanding of these changes in the formulation, administration, and execution of the containment policy of the United States. The United States foreign policy of containment does not allow this nation-state to initiate an active and consistent participation in international politics. Instead, the policy is formulated to react to events. It allows the United States to pursue a de facto problem-solving methodology in international politics, which is inconsistent with the very necessary equilibrium of international politics among nation-states. United States foreign policy can only gain flexibility when it recognizes the fallacy of applying topical solutions to long range organic problems. This is no less true in relation 1 2 to Southeast Asia, than to other areas commanding attention of united States foreign policy. In fact it is more true, for in the under-developed third world it becomes apparent to the conscientious observer that the fate of the world may be well that of Asia; for in this growing, increasingly interdependent world it seems likely there may be a common destiny for mankind. Charles E. Merriam noted this, when he stated: Politics cannot be extirpated because wherever there is interaction there is interdependence; and whenever there is interdependence there are adjustments to be made that implicate and affect all or many of those who are constitutive of the context.1 At this time the writer would like to introduce those attributes present in the international politics of 1959 through 1962 that remain structurally strong today. These attributes are the predominate changes that serve as assump tions which were inputed into the case study of the United Nations presence in laos during 1959 and the neutralization of Laos in I962. These attributes are the predominate changes misinterpreted as crisis factors in 1959 and I969. The basic characteristic of international politics from 1959 forward was that of change. There was change as evidenced in a lessening in the ideological conflict between the bi-polar powers, the reduction in violence among the developed nation states, and the fragmentation of power in the world among the 1 Charles E. Merriam Political Power (New York: Collier- MacMillan, 1964), p. 9» 3 developed nation-states and between the developed and under developed nation-states. Since the Soviet Union detonated a hydrogen device in 1951» ideology of all shapes, except nationalism, became less important in the inter-state relations among nation-states. The writer suggests this was the result of the following changes in international politics. First, communism became unable to lead and control a militant revolutionary world movement. Instead, the communist movement has been broken apart by the disengagement process starting in 1948 with Tito leading Yugoslavia in an independent manner, and climaxing with Mao Tse-tung breaking with the Soviet Union in August, i960. Of course, fragmentation has not negated the presence of Communist nation-states, Communist movements, and Communist subversion. What is significant and sometimes forgotten by the formulators of United States foreign policy is that Communism has become more limited; it represents a method to implement change in the new nation-states. That is, change as it is related to the quest for national identification and stability in a newly created nation-state. Communism provides the method ology for organizing the society for the protracted effort towards nationhood, and the vision of utopia to keep the populace disciplined to the protracted quest for stability. Second, ideology has lost the ability to satisfy the aims of nation-states interested in social change. Ideological formulas like the dialectic unfolding to show the historical 4 development of a classless society achieve little in the way of rectifying problems of health, housing, and v/elfare. This is all too obvious to decision-makers in developed and under developed nation-states. Most governmental leaders have adopted a problem-solving approach characterized by the utilization of a number of approaches to satisfy the multiple nature of the problems in under-developed nation-states. Third, and most important, there is the power of the nuclear balance of terror. The destructive power of nuclear devices is known to men only in terms of their potential capabilities. Hiroshima and Hagaski introduced nuclear weapons to men, and the general reaction to their use in 19^5 was that such devices could never be used again. Since 19^5* the develop ment of hydrogen devices along with awesome delivery systems has cemented a very strong impression in the minds of all human beings that it is beyond what is rationally acceptable to conduct warfare in a nuclear manner. The restraint reflecting this attitude towards nuclear weapons has introduced a new factor into international politics, that is; force defined in terms of violence has a scale of limitation. Charles E. Merriam noted this limitation, when he said:^ ^Charles E. Merriam, loo. cit., p. 35* 5 It may also prove true that the profession of general interest and responsibility is merely a verbalism to cover selfish exploitation. In any case, deference to the "common interest" is a tribute to the basis of authority. It will be paid by the tyrant as well as by the demagogue, by the patrimonial ruler who must care for his people as for his cattle as well as by the popular courtier who flatters and fawns as a part of a play for prestige and domination. The tyrant will not admit that he is a tyrant, at least not an experienced one, or that he is arbitrary or irresponsible, for he is always the vicar of someone or something, God or the nation or the class or the mass or the customs of his folk. And, indeed, however arrogant he may be, he finds it difficult to escape from the world of law which he himself and his system have invoked. The most arrant imposter may thus find himself irrevocably committted to a system which no longer allows him that untrammeled liberty of choice and action, which he may dearly love but which by virtue of his very power escapes him. His sense of power is once more reduced to the dream world from which it came, and its earthly shape eludes him. So it may be said the price of power is limitation. The ruler is ruled by his own rules.^ With the decline in importance of ideology as the factor- pre-emanate in conflict among nation-states there has been a lessening of violence among at least the developed nation-states of the world. This is a break from what has been the mainstream of political interaction between nation-states; especially European nation-states. Today, violence is confined to those ^Ibid. 6 continental areas of residence for emerging nation-states, ffliis statement is qualified "by the confrontation between the bi-polar powers. Yet, the Cold War has reached a level of diplomacy where both great powers search out roads to a detente. This is es pecially true, since 19^6 and the adoption of peaceful co existence by the Soviet Union.