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Politics-Business Interaction Paths ∗ Marianna Belloca and Ugo Paganob

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Politics-Business Interaction Paths ∗ Marianna Belloca and Ugo Paganob Politics-Business Interaction Paths ∗ Marianna Belloca and Ugo Paganob Abstract Most pre-crisis explanations of the various corporate governance explanations have considered the separation between ownership and control to be an advantage of the Anglo-American economies and have attributed the failure of other countries to achieve these efficient arrangements to their different legal and/or electoral systems. In this paper we compare this view with the co-evolution hypothesis that countries have a tendency to cluster along complementary politics-business interaction paths. We argue that this hypothesis provides a more convincing explanation of the past histories of major capitalist economies and can suggest some useful possible scenarios of their future institutional development. In support of the co-evolution hypothesis we run Bayesian simultaneous equation estimation and perform Bayesian model comparison of the various theories on employment protection determination. Keywords: employment protection, corporate governance, ownership concentration, Bayesian model estimation, Bayesian model comparison. JEL Classifications: G32, G34, J50, K22, P10 ∗ We thank for their suggestions Pranab K. Bardhan, Sam Bowles, Giancarlo Gandolfo, Mark Roe, Gèrard Roland, Pierre Salmon, and Massimiliano Tancioni. We received useful comments from the participants to the Third Annual Conference of the Italian Society of Law and Economics held at Bocconi University - Milan on November 9-10, 2007. None of the above has responsibility for the shortcomings of the paper. a Department of Economics, Sapienza University of Rome. Email: [email protected] b (Corresponding author) Department of Economics, University of Siena, and Central European University, Budapest. Corresponding address: Ugo Pagano, Department of Economics, Piazza S. Francesco 7, 53100 Siena; Tel: direct +39-0577- 232614; secretary +39-0577-232620. Fax: +39-0577-232661. Email: [email protected] Politics-Business Interaction Paths Abstract Most pre-crisis explanations of the various corporate governance explanations have considered the separation between ownership and control to be an advantage of the Anglo-American economies and have attributed the failure of other countries to achieve these efficient arrangements to their different legal and/or electoral systems. In this paper we compare this view with the co-evolution hypothesis that countries have a tendency to cluster along complementary politics-business interaction paths. We argue that this hypothesis provides a more convincing explanation of the past histories of major capitalist economies and can suggest some useful possible scenarios of their future institutional development. In support of the co-evolution hypothesis we run Bayesian simultaneous equation estimation and perform Bayesian model comparison of the various theories on employment protection determination. Keywords: employment protection, corporate governance, ownership concentration, Bayesian model estimation, Bayesian model comparison. JEL Classifications: G32, G34, J50, K22, P10 1 1. Introduction The current crisis has marked new end of the end of history in corporate governance1. Before, the crisis, like the earlier successes achieved by Japan and Germany, the recent success of the American economy and the revival of the British economy had attracted the attention of many economists and policy makers. The legal origin approach claimed that the Anglo-American success was rooted in the different common law and civil law traditions which characterized these countries well before the advent of capitalism. In common law systems, private owners, including the minority shareholders of contemporary large firms, could be better protected. Other approaches had emphasized that the non- proportional electoral systems prevalent in the Anglo-American countries favored political coalitions, which are more friendly to shareholders. Legal and electoral reforms were advocated to change what was once upon a time an American exception into the general rule to be followed by all countries. In a relatively recent past American institutions were not accepted as the natural ones and special reasons were given to explain the persistent divergence from other countries. Indeed, “American exceptionalism” has long been a puzzle for social scientists. However, the nature of the problem has somewhat changed over time. Becht and De Long (2005) have observed that a century ago academics like Werner Sombart were worried by the exceptional nature of the United States in that it did not have socialism, while today academics are concerned about a different form of American exceptionalism: the negligible role of block holding in the United States. Mark Roe has suggested an interesting link between the past and the recent American puzzle. A tradition of very weak social democracy could explain the negligible role of block holding. According to Roe (2003), the higher the degree of social democracy (and, in particular, the strength of employees’ rights), the stronger the tendency of employers to organize themselves into concentrated forms of corporate ownership with one or few major block holders. Figure 1 plots the residuals obtained from the regression of the labour protection index and of the ownership concentration index over log GDP per capita for 47 countries.2 As is apparent from the fitted regression line, there is a significant positive cross-country correlation between the degree of protection of workers’ rights and the degree of corporate ownership concentration (once the cross-country differences in GDP per capita have been considered). According to this figure, American exceptionalism is an extreme case of a general relation linking employee job protection with the degree of separation between ownership and control. In order to explain the positive relation between protection of workers’ rights and corporate 1 Hansmann and Kraakman (2004) have even described convergence to the Anglo-American model as the “end of history of corporate governance”. Other authors (see, for instance, Morck et al., 2005, and James, 2006) have argued that a variety of arrangements exist in modern capitalist economies, and that family groups are the prevailing form of organization in some countries. Bebchuk and Roe (2004) have emphasized the path-dependent nature of corporate governance. 2 The data source for the labour protection index (which includes protection of labour and employment laws plus protection of collective relations laws) is Botero et al. (2004); GDP per capita in 2000 is from World Bank (2004); the ownership concentration index is from La Porta et al. (2006). See paragraph 3.3 for a more detailed description of the variables. 2 ownership concentration, Roe (2003) suggests that there is a causality relation which runs from employees' political rights to corporate governance forms.3 One form of American exceptionalism (no socialism) has influenced the other (little block holding). FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE Belloc and Pagano (2005, 2009) have argued that the relationship is more complex because the causation operates in two opposite directions. Forms of corporate governance, such as the degree of separation between ownership and control, influence the strength of workers’ organization. When there is no separation between ownership and control, employees are more likely to seek protection against interference by the dominant block holders and their social circle, including their relatives and friends, who may otherwise monopolize the best jobs in the company. Thus, while employees' rights may prevent the separation between ownership and control, conversely the existence of powerful block holders may favour some sort of “social democratic reaction” and, in particular, a high degree of union activity. This two-way relationship entails multiple co-evolution paths between ownership concentration and workers' organization: a certain degree of centralization of one side’s interests may easily induce a corresponding concentration of the other side’s interests. As in an arms race, the interactions between business and politics can produce different degrees of organization in the owners’ and workers’ interests (Belloc and Pagano, 2009) and there is no reason for which one set of the resulting institutions should the natural outcome of an efficient legal or electoral system4. However, the latter routes have been taken by a great deal of the recent literature. La Porta et al. (1999) analyze the role of legal traditions in explaining cross-country variation in ownership concentration. Starting from a sample of 27 wealthy economies, the authors classify them in two groups with respectively high and low degrees of shareholder protection. They observe that widely-held firms are more common in the former group of countries, while family-controlled and state-controlled firms are more numerous in the latter. Moreover, the first subsample is dominated by British law economies, and the second one by French law countries. La Porta et al. (2006) further investigate the determinants of stock market development in 49 economies, focusing this time on securities laws. The authors argue that “laws matter” because they improve market discipline. In particular, they show that laws imposing the mandatory disclosure of relevant information and those 3 Roe (2003) presents overwhelming evidence that countries characterized by stronger job protection and employees' political rights (stronger “social democracy”) tend to have more concentrated
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