DOCSLIB.ORG

Marx Versus Walras on Labour Exchange

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Marx Versus Walras on Labour Exchange Marx versus Walras on Labour Exchange Motohiro Okada Abstract: This paper compares Léon Walras’s and Marx’s thoughts on labour exchange, thereby illuminating the latter’s perspective that can lead to a forceful counterargument to the neoclassical principle of labour exchange, for which the former affords a foundation. Both Walras and Marx distinguish between labour ability as a factor of production and labour as its service, but exhibit a striking contrast in their explanations of the distinction. Walras’s distinction between ‘personal faculties’ and labour never attempts to re- veal the peculiarities of the relationship they share. Walras essentially equates the re- lationship between the two with that between non-human factors and their respective services by stripping the former of human elements. This not only allows labour ex- change to be incorporated into Walras’s general equilibrium system but also provides the groundwork for its neoclassical principle, which, on the basis of marginal theory, assumes work conditions to be determinable through the stylised market adjustment of the demand and supply of labour on each entrepreneur’s and worker’s maximisa- tion behaviour. In contrast, especially in his pre-Capital writings, Marx underlines the worker’s subjectivity in deciding her labour performance. This implies that the type and inten- sity of time-unit labour varies depending on the worker’s will and the constraints upon it. Accentuating the particular characteristics of the relationship between labour power and labour in this way, Marx’s arguments lead to the invalidation of the neo- classical principle of labour exchange and rationalise the intervention of socio-politi- cal factors represented by the labour-capital class struggle in the determination of work conditions. Thus, this study focuses on the potential of Marx’s labour power-la- bour distinction independent of his exploitation theory-the basis of a weighty refu- tation of the neoclassical system. JEL classification numbers: B 13, B 14. Walras’s views on labour exchange, and I Introduction thereby shed light on an aspect of Marx’s The objective of this study is to attempt a thinking that has received scant attention but comparison between Karl Marx’s and Léon can lead to a forceful counterargument to the The History of Economic Thought, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2011. Ⓒ The Japanese Society for the History of Eco- nomic Thought. OKADA: MARX VERSUS WALRAS ON LABOUR EXCHANGE 47 neoclassical economic doctrine. contemporary forerunners of the neoclassical Marx’s economics was formed through school are required because such investiga- his in-depth study of the classical school. His tions have lagged behind the vast enquiries value and exploitation theory, which consti- into the Marx-classical economist relation- tutes the kernel of his economic thought, is ship. purely a product of his criticisms of and in- On the basis of this viewpoint, this study heritances from the works of David Ricardo investigates the worth of Marx’s views on la- and other classical economists. Although, in bour exchange in comparison with those of contrast, the Marginal Revolution writings of Walras, who played a leading role in the William S. Jevons, Carl Menger, and Walras Marginal Revolution and originated the gen- appeared during his life, Marx died without eral equilibrium theory. I have chosen Wal- having an opportunity to learn neoclassical ras as Marx’s match from among numerous economics, which they pioneered. However, neoclassical economists not only for his im- even if Marx had had this knowledge, it may portance and contemporaneity with Marx but have made little impact on his thinking. It also because the two distinguish between la- seems fairly reasonable to imagine that Marx bour ability as a factor of production and la- would have swept the neoclassical doctrine bour as its service. The distinction between aside as a mere sophisticated version of ‘vul- labour power（ Arbeitskraft） and labour（ Ar- gar’ economics. beit）, with the criticism of the obscurity in However, it is an unshakable fact that ne- classical economists’ notion of this issue, un- oclassical economists advanced analytical derlies Marx’s exploitation theory. Yet the techniques and minuteness significantly from comparison between Marx’s arguments on the pre-marginalism ‘vulgar’ economists labour exchange, especially in his pre-Capi- whom Marx savaged, thus having built the tal writings, and Walras’s demonstrates that predominant theoretical system. So, to re- Marx’s labour power-labour distinction- evaluate Marx’s thought with due considera- quite independently of his concept of exploi- tion of the history of economics after his tation-has the potential for a weighty refu- death, we must investigate whether his argu- tation of the neoclassical rather than the clas- ments contain what may qualify as intrinsic sical system. criticisms of neoclassical economics. Long Disregarding factor-service relations pe- discussions on Marx’s value and exploitation culiar to labour exchange, Walras sees work theory, which has been widely recognised as conditions as determinable through the styl- representing Marxian conflicts with the neo- ised market adjustment of the demand and classical school, suggest that it is inadequate- supply of labour on each entrepreneur’s and ly qualified.1） Thus, comparative studies of worker’s maximisation behaviour. This intro- Marx’s and neoclassical economics from a duces the neoclassical manner of explaining broader perspective may be needed to reap- even labour exchange by the marginalism- praise Marx in the current situation. In his- based market theory. It may be called the torical research, it seems that close and wide- neoclassical principle of labour exchange.2） ranging comparisons between Marx and his Recognising the particular characteristics of 48 経済学史研究 52 巻 2 号 the relationship between labour power and II Walras on Labour Exchange labour in contrast to that between non-human factors and their respective services, Marx’s Walras’s theory of labour exchange is incor- views can reveal the groundlessness of the porated into his general equilibrium system neoclassical principle, and rationalise the in- in Elements of Pure Economics. In Part IV of tervention of socio-political factors repre- the book, Walras describes markets for ‘pro- sented by the labour-capital class struggle in ductive services’ in addition to those for the determination of work conditions. ‘commodities’ （consumption goods） expli- By thus opposing Marx against Walras, cated in the previous part, and presents si- this study, unlike the traditional value and multaneous equations to satisfy the equilibri- exploitation theory-centred comparison be- um of all service and product markets. Wal- tween Marx and neoclassical economists, il- ras begins this part by distinguishing be- luminates a facet of Marx’s thought which tween ‘capital’ and ‘income’ or service.3） Here can be an intrinsic and potent criticism of the he remarks: neoclassical paradigm and thereby justify his socio-economic views. The elementary factors of production are Section II deals with Walras’s treatment three in number. In listing these factors, of labour exchange. It will be shown here most authors employ the terms: land, la- that Walras’s distinction between ‘personal bour and capital. But these terms are not faculties’（ facultés personnelles） and labour sufficiently rigorous to serve as a founda- （travail） never leads him to recognise the tion for rational deduction. Labour is the vital difference between their relationship service of human faculties or of persons. and the nonhuman factor-service relation- We must rank labour, therefore, not with ship. As a result, Walras perceives no partic- land and capital, but with land services ular characteristics of the human labour ex- ［‘rente’］ rendered by land, and with capi- change. This contributes to the formation of tal services［ ‘profit’］ rendered by capital the neoclassical principle of labour exchange goods. （emphasis in original; L. Walras as well as Walras’s general equilibrium sys- ［1926］ 1954, 212） tem. Section III focuses on Marx’s discus- sions that stress the worker’s subjectivity in Thus, Walras stresses the distinction between the decision on her labour performance and human（ or personal） faculties and labour as the resulting peculiarities of the labour pow- their service. This perception is comparable er-labour relationship. It will thus be argued with Marx’s labour power-labour distinction. that, as opposed to Walras’s personal facul- The similarity was previously pointed out by ties-labour distinction, Marx’s labour power- Mark Blaug（ 1996, 258）. Walras mentions labour distinction involves the grasp of the that he follows The Theory of Social Wealth human elements of labour exchange, and this by Auguste Walras, his father, regarding his insight leads to a cogent denial of its neo- definition of capital and income, as referred classical principle. Section IV concludes the to in note 3（ see L. Walras［ 1926］ 1954, paper. 212）. In that book, indeed, Auguste supplied OKADA: MARX VERSUS WALRAS ON LABOUR EXCHANGE 49 the same definition（ see A. Walras［ 1849］ of labour power （see L. Walras ［1926］ 1997, 140）. Furthermore, Auguste distin- 1954, 237-40, 271; Marx ［1867］ 1996, guished between personal faculties and la- 180-83）. bour before his son: ‘Labour, it is the income Walras states that the amount of labour is from personal faculties’（ Le travail, c’est le measurable in terms of labour time per capita revenu des facultés personnelles） （see A. （see L. Walras［ 1926］ 1954, 237）. This im- Walras［ 1849］ 1997, 157）.4） Although Wal- plies that each time-unit use of a personal ras’s personal faculties-labour distinction faculty provides the same service. Hence, the was thus an inheritance from his father, it is variability of the type of labour（ which is noteworthy because Jevons, Menger, and limited by the worker’s abilities but ought to most other early neoclassical economists did be considered different even if assuming one not specify a similar distinction.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Information Technology, Organizational Form, and Transition to the Market
    Upjohn Institute Working Papers Upjohn Research home page 6-1-2004 Information Technology, Organizational Form, and Transition to the Market John S. Earle W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research Ugo Pagano University of Siena Maria Lesi Budapest University of Economic Sciences Upjohn Institute Working Paper No. 02-82 **Published Version** In Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 60(4): 471-489 (2006). Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers Part of the Eastern European Studies Commons Citation Earle, John S., Ugo Pagano, and Maria Lesi. 2002. "Information Technology, Organizational Form, and Transition to the Market." Upjohn Institute Working Paper No. 02-82. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. https://doi.org/10.17848/wp02-82 This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Information Technology, Organizational Form, and Transition to the Market Upjohn Institute Staff Working Paper 02-82 John S. Earle* Upjohn Institute for Employment Research Central European University Ugo Pagano University of Siena Central European University and Maria Lesi Budapest University of Economic Sciences Central European University Revised: June 2004 Abstract The paper reviews theories of information technology adoption and organizational form and applies them to an empirical analysis of firm choices and characteristics in four transition economies: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. We argue that these economies have gone through two major structural changes – one concerning technology and another concerning ownership and boundaries of firms – and we consider if and how each of the two structural changes has affected the other.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Ugo Pagano. Organizational Equilibria and Production
    1 UGO PAGANO. ORGANIZATIONAL EQUILIBRIA AND PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY1. New Institutional Theory has pointed out mechanisms by which technology can influence property rights and organizational forms. We argue that the argument can be integrated and enriched by using also the opposite argument: property rights and technology can also influence technology. We develop an "organizational equilibria" framework and we show that when New Institutional Theory is developed in this direction, a multiplicity of "organizational equilibria" can arise and production efficiency may no longer be achieved. The paper introduces the argument by pointing out some similarities between Marx's theory of history and modern transaction cost theories, which imply a common substantial departure form the standard methodology of traditional neoclassical neoclassical theory. 1 This paper has been written for the conference on Production Organization, Dynamic efficiency and Social Norms to be held in Rome on April 4-6 1991. I thank the discussant of this paper Stefano Zamagni for his useful comments. 2 Introduction. A simple definition of an organization of production can be based on two factors. The first is its technology and, in particular, the technological characteristics of the resources used in production. The second is the set of rights (which may be legal rights and/or customary rights supported by social norms) on the resources employed in the organization and on the organization itself. The relationship between these two factors has traditionally been a controversial issue in social sciences: if causation exists, it can go both ways. On the one hand property rights can be seen as factors shaping the nature and the characteristics of the resources used in production.
    [Show full text]
  • Privatisation and Supply Chain Management: on the Effective Alignment of Purchasing and Supply After Privatisation/Andrew Cox, Lisa Harris, and David Parker
    Privatisation and Supply Chain Management Privatisation and Supply Chain Management brings together two of the most important issues in current management thinking: the impact of privatisation on the performance and behaviour of the companies involved, and the increasingly important role of purchasing and supplier relationships. The notion that efficiency is improved with privatisation is critically examined, as is the idea that privatised organisations have recognised the importance of the procurement role and developed both their procurement functions and supplier relationships so as to enhance competitiveness. Grounded in economic theory, and providing rich case study material, this volume makes a major contribution to an increasingly important area. It will be of interest to students and researchers in economics, business and management studies and specialist courses in procurement management. Andrew Cox is Professor of Strategic Procurement Management and Director of the Centre for Strategic Procurement Management at Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, UK. Lisa Harris works in supply management for the BMW/Rover Group. David Parker is Professor of Business Economics and Strategy and Head of the Strategic Management Group at the Aston Business School, Aston University, Birmingham, UK. Routledge studies in business organizations and networks 1 Democracy and Efficiency in the Economic Enterprise Edited by Ugo Pagano and Robert Rowthorn 2 Towards a Competence Theory of the Firm Edited by Nicolai J.Foss and Christian
    [Show full text]
  • Interlocking Complementarities and Institutional Change
    Journal of Institutional Economics (2011), 7: 3, 373–392 C The JOIE Foundation 2010 doi:10.1017/S1744137410000433 First published online 21 December 2010 Interlocking complementarities and institutional change UGO PAGANO∗ University of Siena, Siena, Italy and Central European University, Budapest, Hungary Abstract: In biology, the laws that regulate the structuring and change of complex organisms, characterised by interlocking complementarities, are different from those that shape the evolution of simple organisms. Only the latter share mechanisms of competitive selection of the fittest analogous to those envisaged by the standard neoclassical model in economics. The biological counterparts of protectionism, subsidies and conflicts enable complex organisms to exit from long periods of stasis and to increase their capacity to adapt efficiently to the environment. Because of their interlocking complementarities, most institutions share the laws governing the structure and change of complex organisms. We concentrate on the complementarities between technology and property rights and consider historical cases in which organisational stasis has been overcome by mechanisms different from (and sometimes acting in spite of) competitive pressure. The evolution of institutions cannot be taken for granted; but even when institutions seem frozen forever by their interlocking complementarities, their potential for change can be discovered by analysis of those interactions. 1. Introduction Exchanges of analogies between economics and evolutionary biology
    [Show full text]
  • Thesis-Thiago-Oliveira-Finale Compressed.Pdf
    ESSAYS ON THE MATHEMATIZATION OF ECONOMICS Thiago Dumont Oliveira Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics Supervisor: Carlo Zappia Examination Board: Nicola Giocoli Harro Maas Ivan Moscati Universities of Florence, Pisa, and Siena Joint PhD Program in Economics Program Coordinator: Ugo Pagano Cycle XXXII — Academic Year: 2019-2020 ii iii iv Acknowledgements I should start by thanking my parents Angela and José Carlos, and my sisters Carla and Florença for their unconditional love and support. Without my parents’ help this thesis would never have materialized, so I thank them with all my heart for everything they have done for me. They have always believed in me, even when I did not, and I dedicate this thesis to them for without them neither my M.A. nor my PhD would have been possible in the first place. Next I would like to thank Carlos Eduardo Suprinyak who has been a friend and mentor throughout the past five years. I have learned a great deal from him about the process of writing academic papers when he was my supervisor at the Federal University of Minas Gerais. During my PhD I was fortunate to keep working with him on a couple of projects and that increased even more my admiration for him and also gave me the opportunity to develop further as a researcher. I also owe much to Rebeca Gomez Betancourt and Pedro Garcia Duarte who were part of the examination board at the end of my masters and gave me invaluable suggestions.
    [Show full text]
  • Encyclopedia of Law and Economics
    Encyclopedia of Law and Economics Alain Marciano Giovanni Battista Ramello Editors Encyclopedia of Law and Economics With 146 Figures and 50 Tables Editors Alain Marciano Giovanni Battista Ramello MRE and University of Montpellier DiGSPES Montpellier, France University of Eastern Piedmont Alessandria, Italy Faculté d’Economie Université de Montpellier and IEL LAMETA-UMR CNRS Torino, Italy Montpellier, France ISBN 978-1-4614-7752-5 ISBN 978-1-4614-7753-2 (eBook) ISBN 978-1-4614-7754-9 (print and electronic bundle) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019930845 © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.
    [Show full text]
  • Cultural Globalisation, Institutional Diversity and the Unequal Accumulation of Intellectual Capital
    Cambridge Journal of Economics 2007, 31, 649–667 doi:10.1093/cje/bem015 Advance Access publication 6 August, 2007 Cultural globalisation, institutional diversity and the unequal accumulation of intellectual capital Ugo Pagano* National economies used to be characterised by cultural standardisation and social protection. Globalisation pushes cultural standardisation beyond the boundaries of national states and induces a global dilution of the standards of social protection. At the same time, if national economies specialise according to their comparative institutional advantage, global economic integration may help promote institutional diversity and variety in welfare policies. However, the institution of a global system of intellectual property rights may seriously limit the ‘biodiversity’ of capitalism and imply a global revenge of a new international form of Taylorism. The overall result may be a very unequal accumulation of intellectual capital. Paradoxically, the modern global economy may end up sharing some aspects of the agrarian societies that have been displaced by modern nation states. Key words: Global economy, Global development, Cultural standardisation, Social protection, Institutional diversity, Intellectual property rights JEL classifications: F020, O340, P140, P510 1. Introduction Is globalisation pushing the world towards a single model of capitalism characterised by a more unequal distribution of the intellectual assets embodied in individuals and in commodities such as patents, copyrights and trademarks? What can national governments and international organisations do to promote a more egalitarian access to the acquisition of intellectual capital? Globalisation is a complex phenomenon and the answer changes according to the particular mechanisms on which we focus our attention. Even when we restrict our analysis to the problems considered above, the answers are complicated by the fact that each mechanism involves different tendencies.
    [Show full text]
  • Cambridge JOURNAL of ECONOMICS
    ISSN 0309-166X (PRINT) Cambridge Journal of Economics ISSN 1464-3545 (ONLINE) Volume 38 Number 6 November 2014 Cambridge Journal of Economics Introduction S. Blankenburg The future of capitalism: a consideration of alternatives Cambridge Wendy Harcourt Towards a political economy of the theory of economic policy K. Vela Velupillai Journal of Economic history and economic theory: the staples approach to economic development Alexander Dow and Sheila Dow A neo-Kaleckian–Goodwin model of capitalist economic growth: monopoly Economics power, managerial pay and labour market conflict Thomas I. Palley A new theoretical analysis of deindustrialisation Fiona Tregenna Triggers of change: structural trajectories and production dynamics Volume 38 Number 6 November 2014 Antonio Andreoni and Roberto Scazzieri Special Issue The crisis of intellectual monopoly capitalism Ugo Pagano Contemporary capitalism and progressive political economics: Back to which Bretton Woods? Liquidity and clearing as alternative principles for reforming international money Contributions to heterodox debates about economic Massimo Amato and Luca Fantacci 2014 38 Number 6 November Volume A bright future can be ours! Macroeconomic policy for non-eurozone method, analysis and policy Western countries J. W. Nevile and Peter Kriesler Identity economics meets financialisation: gender, race and occupational stratification in the US labour market Philip Arestis, Aurelie Charles and Giuseppe Fontana Veblen Contra Clark and Fisher: Veblen-Robinson-Harcourt lineages in capital controversies
    [Show full text]
  • The Code of Capital
    THE CODE OF CAPITAL The Code of Capital How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality Katharina Pistor PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON AND OXFORD Copyright © 2019 by Katharina Pistor Requests for permission to reproduce material from this work should be sent to permissions @press .princeton .edu Published by Princeton University Press 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TR press .princeton .edu All Rights Reserved LCCN: 2018965763 ISBN 978- 0- 691- 17897- 4 British Library Cataloging- in- Publication Data is available Editorial: Joe Jackson and Jackie Delaney Production Editorial: Nathan Carr Production: Jacquie Poirier Publicity: Caroline Priday and James Schneider Copyeditor: Karen Verde This book has been composed in Adobe Text Pro and Gotham Printed on acid- free paper. ∞ Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 To Carsten CONTENTS Preface ix 1 Empire of Law 1 2 Coding Land 23 3 Cloning Legal Persons 47 4 Minting Debt 77 5 Enclosing Nature’s Code 108 6 A Code for the Globe 132 7 The Masters of the Code 158 8 A New Code? 183 9 Capital Rules by Law 205 Notes 235 Index 279 vii PREFACE The idea for this book has been with me for quite some time. It first emerged when, in the fall of 2007, the global financial system began to teeter toward the abyss. The speed of the unfolding crisis left little time for deep thinking, but once the eye of the storm had passed, I, along with many others, sought to discover what might explain finance’s stupendous expansion in recent decades, and what ac- counted for its steep fall.
    [Show full text]
  • On Keynes's Theory of the Aggregate Price Level in the Treatise: Any Help for Modern Aggregate Analysis?
    29 Max Gillman On Keynes's Theory of the Aggregate Price Level in the Treatise: Any Help for Modern Aggregate Analysis? W a r s a w , 1 9 9 9 Responsibility for the information and views set out in the paper lies entirely with the editor and author. Published with the support of the Center for Publishing Development, Open Society Institute –Budapest. Graphic Design: Agnieszka Natalia Bury DTP: CeDeWu – Centrum Doradztwa i Wydawnictw “Multi-Press” sp. z o.o. ISSN 1506-1639, ISBN 83-7178-172-5 Publishers: CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research ul. Sienkiewicza 12, 00-944 Warsaw, Poland tel.: (4822) 622 66 27, 828 61 33, fax (4822) 828 60 69 e-mail: [email protected] Open Society Institute – Regional Publishing Center 1051 Budapest, Oktober 6. u. 12, Hungary tel.: 36.1.3273014, fax: 36.1.3273042 Contents 1. Abstract 5 1. Introduction 6 2. The Treatise's Theory of the Aggregate Price 6 3. Construction of a Keynesian Cross 8 4. Linkage Between the Treastise – Type Cross Diagram and the IS-LM Analysis 10 5. Modification with a Neoclassical Definition of Profit 13 6. A Treatise – Motivated Approach to Aggregate Demand Analysis 15 References 21 CASE-CEU Working Papers Series No. 29 – Max Gillman Max Gillman Department of Economics, Central European University e-mail: [email protected]. Max Gillman is an assistant professor in the Economics Department of Central European University. He writes on monetary economics and macroeconomics, with some applications to transition countries. He served as a fellow at the Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute in Prague, the University of Melbourne, the University of New South Wales, and the University of Otago, and served as aide for tax and social security legislation in the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Marx After New Institutional Economics
    Evol. Inst. Econ. Rev. 4(1): 27–53 (2007) ARTICLE Karl Marx after New Institutional Economics* Ugo PAGANO Department of Economics, University of Siena, Siena, Italy and Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. E-mail: [email protected] Abstract In this paper, we consider the two main causation mechanisms characterizing the Marxian theory: the one running from productive forces to relations of production (Marx I) and the other moving in the opposite direction (Marx II). We argue that Marx did not achieve a satisfactory integration of the two mechanisms and that he failed to point out how multiple technological-institutional paths may stem from the cumulative interactions between relations of production and productive forces. In spite of many important analytical insights, NIE has exacerbated the primacy of technology and productive forces, which characterized “Marx I”. After NIE, the analysis of the complex relations between “Marx I” and “Marx II” can still help to extend the scope of institutional theory and, in particular, its application to the comparative analysis of models of capitalism coexisting in the global economy. Keywords: Marxian Theory, New Institutional Economics, organizational equilibria, institutional complementaries. 1. Introduction The main claim of this paper is that there are some parts of Marxian theory that, together with “Old-Institutionalism”,1) can be used to improve upon the important contributions of New Institutional Economists, like Coase, Alchian, Demsetz and Williamson, who have greatly helped our profession to overcome the sterility of the neoclassical theory. In this paper I will draw a schematic distinction between two Marxes—a senior brother Marx (or Marx I) and a junior brother Marx (or Marx II)—which will strike JEL: B130, B140, B250, P100, P140.
    [Show full text]
  • Ernesto Screpanti-Global Imperialism and the Great Crisis The
    GLOBAL IMPERIALISM AND THE GREAT CRISIS This page intentionally left blank Global Imperialism and the Great Crisis The Uncertain Future of Capitalism by ERNESTO SCREPANTI MONTHLY REVIEW PRESS New York Copyright © 2014 by Ernesto Screpanti All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Screpanti, Ernesto, 1948– [Imperialismo globale e la grande crisi. English] Global imperialism and the great crisis : the uncertain future of capitalism / by Ernesto Screpanti. pages cm ISBN 978-1-58367-447-5 (paperback) — ISBN 978-1-58367-448-2 (cloth) 1. Capitalism—Political aspects. 2. Imperialism. I. Title. HB501.S47613 2014 337—dc23 2014011018 Monthly Review Press 146 West 29th Street, Suite 6W New York, New York 10001 www.monthlyreview.org 5 4 3 2 1 Contents Introduction................................9 1. Mythologies in the New Millennium .............. 15 Globalization and Its Ideology ................... 16 Comparative Advantages and Disadvantages ............ 20 Financial Globalization and Development ............. 25 Poverty and Inequality ....................... 30 2. A New Form of Imperialism ................... 39 Historical Forms of Capitalist Imperialism ............. 41 Ultra-imperialism and “Imperialism” ................ 44 Global Imperialism ......................... 48 What Global Imperialism Is Not .................. 51 What Is Global Imperialism? .................... 59 An Imperium Maius without a Sovereign .............. 64 3. Governing the Global Empire .................. 69 The “Law of Value” ........................
    [Show full text]