Ernesto Screpanti-Global Imperialism and the Great Crisis The
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Information Technology, Organizational Form, and Transition to the Market
Upjohn Institute Working Papers Upjohn Research home page 6-1-2004 Information Technology, Organizational Form, and Transition to the Market John S. Earle W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research Ugo Pagano University of Siena Maria Lesi Budapest University of Economic Sciences Upjohn Institute Working Paper No. 02-82 **Published Version** In Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 60(4): 471-489 (2006). Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers Part of the Eastern European Studies Commons Citation Earle, John S., Ugo Pagano, and Maria Lesi. 2002. "Information Technology, Organizational Form, and Transition to the Market." Upjohn Institute Working Paper No. 02-82. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. https://doi.org/10.17848/wp02-82 This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Information Technology, Organizational Form, and Transition to the Market Upjohn Institute Staff Working Paper 02-82 John S. Earle* Upjohn Institute for Employment Research Central European University Ugo Pagano University of Siena Central European University and Maria Lesi Budapest University of Economic Sciences Central European University Revised: June 2004 Abstract The paper reviews theories of information technology adoption and organizational form and applies them to an empirical analysis of firm choices and characteristics in four transition economies: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. We argue that these economies have gone through two major structural changes – one concerning technology and another concerning ownership and boundaries of firms – and we consider if and how each of the two structural changes has affected the other. -
1 Ugo Pagano. Organizational Equilibria and Production
1 UGO PAGANO. ORGANIZATIONAL EQUILIBRIA AND PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY1. New Institutional Theory has pointed out mechanisms by which technology can influence property rights and organizational forms. We argue that the argument can be integrated and enriched by using also the opposite argument: property rights and technology can also influence technology. We develop an "organizational equilibria" framework and we show that when New Institutional Theory is developed in this direction, a multiplicity of "organizational equilibria" can arise and production efficiency may no longer be achieved. The paper introduces the argument by pointing out some similarities between Marx's theory of history and modern transaction cost theories, which imply a common substantial departure form the standard methodology of traditional neoclassical neoclassical theory. 1 This paper has been written for the conference on Production Organization, Dynamic efficiency and Social Norms to be held in Rome on April 4-6 1991. I thank the discussant of this paper Stefano Zamagni for his useful comments. 2 Introduction. A simple definition of an organization of production can be based on two factors. The first is its technology and, in particular, the technological characteristics of the resources used in production. The second is the set of rights (which may be legal rights and/or customary rights supported by social norms) on the resources employed in the organization and on the organization itself. The relationship between these two factors has traditionally been a controversial issue in social sciences: if causation exists, it can go both ways. On the one hand property rights can be seen as factors shaping the nature and the characteristics of the resources used in production. -
Privatisation and Supply Chain Management: on the Effective Alignment of Purchasing and Supply After Privatisation/Andrew Cox, Lisa Harris, and David Parker
Privatisation and Supply Chain Management Privatisation and Supply Chain Management brings together two of the most important issues in current management thinking: the impact of privatisation on the performance and behaviour of the companies involved, and the increasingly important role of purchasing and supplier relationships. The notion that efficiency is improved with privatisation is critically examined, as is the idea that privatised organisations have recognised the importance of the procurement role and developed both their procurement functions and supplier relationships so as to enhance competitiveness. Grounded in economic theory, and providing rich case study material, this volume makes a major contribution to an increasingly important area. It will be of interest to students and researchers in economics, business and management studies and specialist courses in procurement management. Andrew Cox is Professor of Strategic Procurement Management and Director of the Centre for Strategic Procurement Management at Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, UK. Lisa Harris works in supply management for the BMW/Rover Group. David Parker is Professor of Business Economics and Strategy and Head of the Strategic Management Group at the Aston Business School, Aston University, Birmingham, UK. Routledge studies in business organizations and networks 1 Democracy and Efficiency in the Economic Enterprise Edited by Ugo Pagano and Robert Rowthorn 2 Towards a Competence Theory of the Firm Edited by Nicolai J.Foss and Christian -
Capitalism Has Failed — What Next?
The Jus Semper Global Alliance In Pursuit of the People and Planet Paradigm Sustainable Human Development November 2020 ESSAYS ON TRUE DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM Capitalism Has Failed — What Next? John Bellamy Foster ess than two decades into the twenty-first century, it is evident that capitalism has L failed as a social system. The world is mired in economic stagnation, financialisation, and the most extreme inequality in human history, accompanied by mass unemployment and underemployment, precariousness, poverty, hunger, wasted output and lives, and what at this point can only be called a planetary ecological “death spiral.”1 The digital revolution, the greatest technological advance of our time, has rapidly mutated from a promise of free communication and liberated production into new means of surveillance, control, and displacement of the working population. The institutions of liberal democracy are at the point of collapse, while fascism, the rear guard of the capitalist system, is again on the march, along with patriarchy, racism, imperialism, and war. To say that capitalism is a failed system is not, of course, to suggest that its breakdown and disintegration is imminent.2 It does, however, mean that it has passed from being a historically necessary and creative system at its inception to being a historically unnecessary and destructive one in the present century. Today, more than ever, the world is faced with the epochal choice between “the revolutionary reconstitution of society at large and the common ruin of the contending classes.”3 1 ↩ George Monbiot, “The Earth Is in a Death Spiral. It will Take Radical Action to Save Us,” Guardian, November 14, 2018; Leonid Bershidsky, “Underemployment is the New Unemployment,” Bloomberg, September 26, 2018. -
Libertarian Marxism: Reality Or Illusion?
Libertarian Marxism: Reality or Illusion? Adam Lovasz Lovasz, A.: Libertarian Marxism: Reality or Illusion? In: Ostium, roč. 15, 2019, č. 2. Libertarian Marxism: Reality or Illusion? Over the past few years, several works have been written relating to the issue of libertarian socialism. In my presentation, I seek to critically investigate two contemporary systematic attempts at a distinctly libertarian reading of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ work. Theodore A. Burczak’s 2006 book, Socialism After Hayek constitutes an ambitious synthesis of F.A. Hayek’s notion of catallaxy and Marxism. Self-organization, Burczak argues, has a place in Marxist theory and may be unified with an anti-capitalist social philosophy. In fact, socialism would be the epitome of society as a self-organizing system, and the inclusion of market mechanisms does not endanger egalitarianism. A similar emphasis on freedom may be found in Ernesto Screpanti’s 2007 book, Libertarian Communism. From Marx’s work, Screpanti extracts an emphasis on voluntary association, and suggests that true communism would constitute the emancipation of the individual, a paradoxical position that contradicts the standard view of communism as collectivist politics. I suggest that both Burczak and Screpanti’s approaches ultimately fail to produce a political philosophy that is consistently libertarian. Keywords: catallaxy, individualism, libertarianism, Marxism, social philosophy Introduction: Socialism and Economic Freedom One of the primary dilemmas in socialist thought has been the issue of what place, if any, market mechanisms should have in an ideal, egalitarian society. During the 1920s and 1930s, economists of various persuasions, most notably Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich August Hayek on the libertarian side, and Oskar Lange on the part of the socialists, debated whether socialism is compatible with the calculation of prices. -
Interlocking Complementarities and Institutional Change
Journal of Institutional Economics (2011), 7: 3, 373–392 C The JOIE Foundation 2010 doi:10.1017/S1744137410000433 First published online 21 December 2010 Interlocking complementarities and institutional change UGO PAGANO∗ University of Siena, Siena, Italy and Central European University, Budapest, Hungary Abstract: In biology, the laws that regulate the structuring and change of complex organisms, characterised by interlocking complementarities, are different from those that shape the evolution of simple organisms. Only the latter share mechanisms of competitive selection of the fittest analogous to those envisaged by the standard neoclassical model in economics. The biological counterparts of protectionism, subsidies and conflicts enable complex organisms to exit from long periods of stasis and to increase their capacity to adapt efficiently to the environment. Because of their interlocking complementarities, most institutions share the laws governing the structure and change of complex organisms. We concentrate on the complementarities between technology and property rights and consider historical cases in which organisational stasis has been overcome by mechanisms different from (and sometimes acting in spite of) competitive pressure. The evolution of institutions cannot be taken for granted; but even when institutions seem frozen forever by their interlocking complementarities, their potential for change can be discovered by analysis of those interactions. 1. Introduction Exchanges of analogies between economics and evolutionary biology -
Introduction to Economics Broadly Considered Jeff E
Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Economics Faculty Research and Publications Economics, Department of 1-1-2001 Introduction to Economics Broadly Considered Jeff E. Biddle John B. Davis Marquette University, [email protected] Steven G. Medema Published version. "Introduction," in Economics Broadly Considered: Essays in Honor of Warren J. Samuels. London: Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2001: 1-29. Permalink. © 2001 Taylor & Francis (Routledge). Used with permission. Introduction Economics broadly considered: a glance at Warren J. Samuels' contributions to economics Jeff E. Biddle, John B. Davis, and Steven G. Medema Warren J. Samuels was born in New York City and grew up in Miami, Florida. He earned his B.A. from the University of Miami in 1954 and his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin in 1957. After holding positions at the University of Missouri, Georgia State University, and the University of Miami, Samue1s was Professor of Economics at Michigan State University from 1968 until his retirement in 1998 (for biographical details, see Samuels 1995 and Blaug 1999). Samuels' contributions to economics range widely across the discipline, but his most significant work, and the largest share of his corpus, falls within the history of economic thought, the economic role of government (and par ticularly law and economics), and economic methodology. All of this work has been undertaken against the backdrop of an institutional approach to economics and economic thought. Samuels was exposed to the institutional approach already during his undergraduate days at Miami, and he pursued the Ph.D. at Wisconsin because of its institutionalist tradition (then drawing to a close), as evidenced in faculty members such as Edwin Witte, Harold Groves, Martin Glaeser, Kenneth Parsons, and Robert Lampman. -
Thesis-Thiago-Oliveira-Finale Compressed.Pdf
ESSAYS ON THE MATHEMATIZATION OF ECONOMICS Thiago Dumont Oliveira Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics Supervisor: Carlo Zappia Examination Board: Nicola Giocoli Harro Maas Ivan Moscati Universities of Florence, Pisa, and Siena Joint PhD Program in Economics Program Coordinator: Ugo Pagano Cycle XXXII — Academic Year: 2019-2020 ii iii iv Acknowledgements I should start by thanking my parents Angela and José Carlos, and my sisters Carla and Florença for their unconditional love and support. Without my parents’ help this thesis would never have materialized, so I thank them with all my heart for everything they have done for me. They have always believed in me, even when I did not, and I dedicate this thesis to them for without them neither my M.A. nor my PhD would have been possible in the first place. Next I would like to thank Carlos Eduardo Suprinyak who has been a friend and mentor throughout the past five years. I have learned a great deal from him about the process of writing academic papers when he was my supervisor at the Federal University of Minas Gerais. During my PhD I was fortunate to keep working with him on a couple of projects and that increased even more my admiration for him and also gave me the opportunity to develop further as a researcher. I also owe much to Rebeca Gomez Betancourt and Pedro Garcia Duarte who were part of the examination board at the end of my masters and gave me invaluable suggestions. -
MARX's LEGACY REINTERPRETED Karl Heinrich Marx and Political
MARX’S LEGACY REINTERPRETED Karl Heinrich Marx and Political Philosophy Bora Erdağı (Kocaeli University) Abstract Karl Heinrich Marx (1818–1881) is one of the most important refer- ence thinkers for contemporary political theory, contemporary political phi- losophy and contemporary political history. The bases for this view are manifold. The ideas and criticisms presented by Marx are inclined to create friends and foes from the aspect of political praxis; and the most profound elements of his critique on capitalism are, I wish to argue, still valid. These also reflect the potentiality of Marx’s ideas to create alternative perspectives for study of the contemporary world. This ensures the recall and the discus- sion of Marx’s political ideas by alternative political agents in terms of both scientific concern and the contemporary world. Another reason for Marx be- ing a reference thinker of the history of political philosophy—depending on the first two reasons—is that his ideas have been perceptibly “realized” in political practices albeit partially. Thus, whenever the Marxist tradition and its political practices are remembered, the agents of the political arena are obliged to reconsider Marx. In this article, the fact that Marx is considered as a reference thinker in the history of political philosophy will be analyzed in more detail. The basic concepts of his theory will be presented, related to each other with regard to philosophical, real and concrete moments. As con- clusion, a short commentary on Marx’s political theory will be provided. -
Marx Versus Walras on Labour Exchange
Marx versus Walras on Labour Exchange Motohiro Okada Abstract: This paper compares Léon Walras’s and Marx’s thoughts on labour exchange, thereby illuminating the latter’s perspective that can lead to a forceful counterargument to the neoclassical principle of labour exchange, for which the former affords a foundation. Both Walras and Marx distinguish between labour ability as a factor of production and labour as its service, but exhibit a striking contrast in their explanations of the distinction. Walras’s distinction between ‘personal faculties’ and labour never attempts to re- veal the peculiarities of the relationship they share. Walras essentially equates the re- lationship between the two with that between non-human factors and their respective services by stripping the former of human elements. This not only allows labour ex- change to be incorporated into Walras’s general equilibrium system but also provides the groundwork for its neoclassical principle, which, on the basis of marginal theory, assumes work conditions to be determinable through the stylised market adjustment of the demand and supply of labour on each entrepreneur’s and worker’s maximisa- tion behaviour. In contrast, especially in his pre-Capital writings, Marx underlines the worker’s subjectivity in deciding her labour performance. This implies that the type and inten- sity of time-unit labour varies depending on the worker’s will and the constraints upon it. Accentuating the particular characteristics of the relationship between labour power and labour in this way, Marx’s arguments lead to the invalidation of the neo- classical principle of labour exchange and rationalise the intervention of socio-politi- cal factors represented by the labour-capital class struggle in the determination of work conditions. -
Marxian Economics: a Reappraisal
Marxian Economics: A Reappraisal Essays on Volume HI of Capital Volume 1: Method, Value and Money Edited by Riccardo Bellofiore Department ofEconomics University ofBergamo Italy First published in Great Britain 1998 by MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Contents Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Notes on the Contributors VB ISBN 0-333-64410-7 Introduction by Riccardo Bellofiore xi First published in the United States of America 1998 by Acknowledgements xxvi ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC., Scholarly and Reference Division, Part I Method and Value 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 0-312-17664-3 1 Engels, Logic and History 3 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Christopher J. Arthur Marxian economics: a reappraisal/edited by Riccardo Bellofiore. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and indexes. 2 The Structure of Marx's Argument in Capital 16 Contents: v. 1. Essays on volume III of "Capital": method, value, David P. Levine and money - v. 2. Essays on volume III of "Capital" : profits, prices, and dynamics. ISBN 0-312-17664-3 (vol. I). - ISBN 0-312-17665-1 (vol. 2) 3 Some Reflections on Marx's Theory of Value 29 1. Marxian economics. 2. Marx, Karl, 1818-1883. Kapital. Gilbert Faccarello English. 1. Bellofiore, R. (Riccardo) HB97.5.M33426 1997 335.4'I-dc21 97-17608 4 Capital, Labour and Time: The Marxian Monetary CIP Labour Theory of Value as a Theory of Exploitation 48 Selection and editorial matter © Riccardo Bellofiore 1998 Riccardo Bellofiore and Roberto Finelli Text © Macmillan Press Ltd 1998 All rights reserved. -
Employer's Moral Hazard and the Emergence Of
ISSN: 2039-4004 Via Po, 53 – 10124 Torino (Italy) Tel. (+39) 011 6704043 - Fax (+39) 011 6703895 URL: http//www.de.unito.it WORKING PAPER SERIES EMPLOYER’S MORAL HAZARD AND THE EMERGENCE OF WORKER COOPERATIVES Cecilia Navarra and Ermanno Tortia Dipartimento di Economia “S. Cognetti de Martiis” Working paper No. 03/2011 Università di Torino Employer’s moral hazard and the emergence of worker cooperatives♣ Cecilia Navarra, University of Turin♥ [email protected] Ermanno Tortia, University of Trento♦ [email protected] Abstract We argue that in a capitalist enterprise the need to fix wages is a consequence of the asymmetric distribution of decision-making power, since this power can entail the use of private information in favor of the strongest contractual party (the employer), and against the weaker contractual party (the employee). The capitalist entrepreneur holds control rights over the production and strategic decision making in the firm, up to the power to liquidate it. S/he moreover has contrasting interests with the workers he hires, and has private information on market conditions and risks. He has therefore the possibility to take decisions whose negative consequences are borne by workers, for example in terms of lower wages, which would increase his/her profits. In order to escape the emerging risk of employer’s moral hazard, a fixed wage is paid, but this implies that workers face the risk of layoffs. The organizational form that can guarantee employment stability (by allowing wages to fluctuate) is therefore the worker cooperative: here, we depart from the framework of the interaction between a principal and an agent with contrasting interests and private information, because workers themselves have decision making power.