Negotiation and Policy-Making in the Climate Regime
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Negotiation and Policy-Making in the Climate Regime A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Saskia A. van Wees November 2009 © 2009 Saskia A. van Wees. All Rights Reserved. 2 This thesis titled Negotiation and Policy-Making in the Climate Regime by SASKIA A. VAN WEES has been approved for the Department of Political Science and the College of Arts and Sciences by Patricia A. Weitsman Professor of Political Science Benjamin M. Ogles Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 ABSTRACT VAN WEES, SASKIA A., M.A., November 2009, Political Science Negotiation and Policy-Making in the Climate Regime (127 pp.) Director of Thesis: Patricia A. Weitsman In order to understand why the Kyoto Protocol has not been as stringent as many hoped, this paper will seek to answer two main questions. First, why do international treaties on climate change always result in a lowest common denominator of commitment? Negotiations for the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol indicate that the policy goals of proactive parties are deflated by the foot- dragging of even just a few resistant parties. Secondly, this thesis will examine why some states are more progressive about fighting climate change than others. The European Union and the United States—which have displayed vastly different policy preferences throughout the duration of the international climate regime—will be compared to answer this second question. A two-level games approach is employed to examine how the international system, as well as domestic characteristics, affected the EU and US policy preferences. Approved: _____________________________________________________________ Patricia A. Weitsman Professor of Political Science 4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to express my great appreciation to my committee chair, Professor Patricia Weitsman, who spent countless hours reading (and re-reading) drafts of my thesis and providing me with her brilliant insight into international relations. It has been an honor to work with Professor Weitsman, and her enthusiasm and constant encouragement have made this project (and graduate school in general) very rewarding. I would also like thank Professor Nancy Manring, who taught me a great deal about domestic environmental issues and went out of her way to serve on my thesis committee during her year on sabbatical. I am very appreciative of her ability to find hope and optimism in all subjects—even those which seem quite discouraging. The idea of this whole project came about during an independent study under the guidance of Professor Harold Molineu. He helped me to come up with this research topic, and the paper I wrote for his course ended up becoming the foundation of this thesis. I will forever be grateful to Professor Molineu, who has served as a mentor to me, providing invaluable advice during the crafting of this project and also throughout my education at Ohio University. I could not have written this thesis without the support of my family—especially my mother, who first got me interested in environmental issues and was always a phone call away whenever I felt overwhelmed. I would also like to thank my friends, Skrobot, Teri, David, and Julie, who have been so supportive of me. 5 DEDICATION To my parents 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract ............................................................................................................................... 3 Acknowledgments............................................................................................................... 4 Dedication ........................................................................................................................... 5 Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................. 9 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 9 Climate Change is a Global Commons Problem ...................................................... 10 Political Responses, Cooperation, and Regimes ....................................................... 12 Overview ....................................................................................................................... 15 The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ............................... 18 The Framework Convention on Climate Change ......................................................... 19 COP1 and COP2 ........................................................................................................... 21 COP 3 and the Kyoto Protocol ..................................................................................... 22 Ratification and Subsequent COP Meetings ................................................................. 24 Where the Protocol Stands Now ................................................................................... 26 Levels of Analysis ........................................................................................................ 28 The Two-Level Game Approach .............................................................................. 30 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 31 Chapter 2 ........................................................................................................................... 32 The Global Commons and Collective Action Problems ........................................... 35 Game Theory: Climate Change as a Prisoner’s Dilemma or a Stag Hunt? .............. 38 7 Regimes ........................................................................................................................ 43 Regime Structure ...................................................................................................... 44 Concerns with Relative Gains Cause a Lowest Common Denominator Effect ........ 46 Small Groups v. Large Groups in the Provision of Collective Goods .......................... 48 The Systemic Level of Analysis ................................................................................... 51 Problems with the Systemic Level of Analysis ........................................................ 52 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 54 Chapter 3 ........................................................................................................................... 56 State Level of Analysis ................................................................................................. 57 The Framework Convention on Climate Change ......................................................... 58 The European Union Negotiating Position ............................................................... 58 The United States’ Negotiating Position ................................................................... 59 The Resulting Framework Convention on Climate Change ..................................... 60 COP meetings and the Clinton Administration ............................................................ 61 Interest Groups in the United States ......................................................................... 65 The Kyoto Protocol ....................................................................................................... 68 The EU Negotiating Position .................................................................................... 68 The United States’ Negotiating Position ................................................................... 70 The Resulting Kyoto Protocol ...................................................................................... 71 Domestic Characteristics Complicate International Climate Treaties .......................... 72 Perceptions of Threat and the Validity of Climate Science ...................................... 73 Energy Dependence .................................................................................................. 75 8 Interest Groups and Lobbying .................................................................................. 79 The State Level of Analysis .......................................................................................... 85 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 88 Chapter 4 ........................................................................................................................... 90 The Two-Level Game Approach .................................................................................. 91 Criticism of the Two-Level Game Approach ........................................................... 94 Findings ........................................................................................................................ 95 The Future of the Climate Regime ............................................................................... 99 The Development of a Global Carbon Market through Emissions Trading ........... 101 US Acid Rain Program ........................................................................................... 104 European Emissions Trading Scheme ........................................................................ 106 Phase 1 ...................................................................................................................