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Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date

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Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date MEXICAN DRUG WARS: Bloodiest Year to Date D ec. 20, 2010 This analysis may not be forwarded or republished without express permission from STRATFOR. For permission, please submit a request to [email protected]. 1 STRATFOR 700 Lavaca Street, Suite 900 Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date (GLWRU¶V1RWH In this annual report on 0H[LFR¶VGUXJFDUWHOVZHDVVHVVWKHPRVW significant developments of 2010 and SURYLGHXSGDWHGSURILOHVRIWKHFRXQWU\¶V powerful drug-trafficking organizations as well as a forecast for 2011. The report is a product of the coverage we maintain on a weekly basis through our Mexico Security Memo and other analyses we produce throughout the year. In 2010, 0H[LFR¶VFDUWHOZDUV have produced unprecedented levels of violence throughout the country. No longer concentrated in just a few states, the violence has spread all across the northern tier of ERUGHUVWDWHVDQGDOODORQJERWKWKHHDVWDQGZHVWFRDVWVRI0H[LFR7KLV\HDU¶VGUXg-related homicides have passed the 11,000 mark, a 60 to 70 percent increase from 2009. The high levels of violence in 2010 have been caused not only by long-term struggles, such as the fight between the Sinaloa Federation and the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization (the VCF, or Juarez cartel) for control of the Juarez smuggling corridor, but also by new conflicts among various players in an increasingly fluid cartel landscape. For example, simmering tensions between Los Zetas and their former partners in the Gulf cartel finally boiled over and quickly escalated into a bloody turf war in the Tamaulipas border region. The conflict spread to states like Nuevo Leon, Hidalgo and Tabasco and even gave birth to an alliance among the Sinaloa Federation, the Gulf cartel and La Familia Michoacana (LFM). Additionally, the death of Arturo Beltran Leyva in a December 2009 Mexican marine raid led to a vicious battle between factions of the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) for control of the organization, SLWWLQJ$UWXUR¶VEURWKHU+HFWRU%HOWUDQ/H\YDDJDLQVW$UWXUR¶VULJKW-hand man, (GJDU³/D%DUELH´ Valdez Villarreal1HZFRQIOLFWVWKLV\HDUKDYHFOHDUO\DGGHGWRWKHFDUQDJHIURPSUHYLRXV\HDUV¶ battles, such as those pitting the Sinaloa Federation against the Juarez cartel and LFM against the BLO. The administration of Mexican President Felipe Calderon has also made strides against these cartels, dismantling several cartel networks and taking down their leaders over the course of 2010, most notably Sinaloa No. 3 Ignacio ³(O1DFKR´&RURQHO9LOODUUHDO and Valdez. However, while such operations have succeeded in capturing or killing several very dangerous people and disrupting their organizations, such disruptions have also served to further upset the balance of power DPRQJ0H[LFR¶V criminal organizations and increase the volatility of the Mexican security environment. In effect, the imbalance has created a sort of vicious feeding frenzy among the various organizations as they seek to preserve their own turf and seize territory from rival organizations. Calderon has also taken steps to shift the focus from the controversial strategy of using the Mexican military as the primary weapon in the conflict against the cartels to using the newly reformed Federal Police. While the military still remains the most reliable security tool available to the Mexican government, the Federal Police have been given more responsibility in Juarez and northeastern 0H[LFRWKHQDWLRQ¶VPRVWFRQWHQWLRXVKRWVSRWV&DOGHURQKDVDOVRSODQWHGWKHVHHGVIRUUHIRUPLQJWKH VWDWHV¶VHFXULW\RUJDQL]DWLRQVZLWKDXQLILHGFRPPDQGLQKRSHVRISURIHVVLRQDOL]LQJHDFKVWDWH¶V security force to the point where the states do not have to rely on the federal government to combat RUJDQL]HGFULPH$GGLWLRQDOO\WKH0H[LFDQ&RQJUHVVKDVWDNHQVWHSVWRFXUEWKHSUHVLGHQW¶VDELOLW\WR deploy the military domestically by proposing a National Security Act that would require a state governor or legislature to first request the deployment of the military rather than permitting the federal government to act unilaterally. There is simply not enough federal military manpower to 2 © 2010 STRATFOR Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com respond to all requests and deploy to all trouble spots, a position in which the federal government is increasingly finding itself. Cartel Membership and Organization Los Zetas Los Zetas are a relatively new power on the drug-trafficking scene, having only recently become an independent organization. Although Los Zetas were characterized as an aggressive and ascendant organization in our 2009 cartel report, the group has experienced some major setbacks in 2010. Los Zetas have had a roller-coaster year, beginning with the severing of relations with their former parent organization, the Gulf cartel, in January 2010. Though Los Zetas have been operating more or less independent of the Gulf cartel for almost three years now, things finally came to a head with the Jan. GHDWKRIRQHRI/RV=HWDV¶WRSOLHXWHQDQWV6HUJLR³(O&RQFRUG´0HQGR]D3HQDDWWKHKDQGVRI *XOIPHQXQGHUFDUWHOOHDGHU(GXDUGR³(O&RVV´&RVWLOOR6DQFKH]0HQGR]DZDVUHSRUWHGWREHWKH right-KDQGPDQRI/RV=HWDV1R0LJXHO³=-´7UHYLQR0RUDOHVDQGLQUHVSRQVHWRKLVDVVRFLDWH¶V death, TrHYLQRGHPDQGHGWKDW&RVWLOORKDQGRYHUWKHPHQUHVSRQVLEOHIRU0HQGR]D¶VGHDWK:KHQ Costillo refused, Trevino ordered the kidnapping of 16 known Gulf cartel members. Tit-for-tat operations escalated into all-out war between the two groups throughout the spring. It is no secret that Los Zetas are operationally superior to their former parent organization, which is why, once the fighting escalated, the Gulf cartel reached out to the Sinaloa Federation and LFM, two of their former rivals, for assistance in fighting Los Zetas. This new alliance was called the New Federation. 3 © 2010 STRATFOR Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com Since the formation of the New Federation, Los Zetas have been on the defensive, fighting both Gulf cartel advances on traditionaO/RV=HWDVWHUULWRU\DQGWKHGLUHFWWDUJHWLQJRIWKHJURXS¶VUHJLRQDO leadership by Mexican security forces. Los Zetas were pushed out of their traditional stronghold of Reynosa, Tamaulipas state, and were forced to retreat to other strongholds such as Nuevo Laredo and Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state (even so, both Monterrey and Nuevo Laredo have been contested at various times during 2010). Despite losing key areas of their home territory, Los Zetas have continued to expand their operations throughout Mexico by working with other criminal organizations, such as WKH&DUWHO3DFLILFR6XU RU&36ZKLFKLV+HFWRU%HOWUDQ/H\YD¶VIDFWLRQRIWKH%/2 DQGDUH penetrating deeper into Central America, South America and Europe. /RV=HWDV¶WRS-WLHUOHDGHUVKLSKDVUHPDLQHGXQFKDQJHGZLWK+HULEHUWR³(O/D]FD´/D]FDQR/D]FDQR atop the organization followed by his No. 2, Trevino, but the regional leadership of the group below Lazcano and Trevino has suffered tremendous setbacks in a number of locations, none more pronounced than in the Monterrey metropolitan area. The June 9 DSSUHKHQVLRQRI+HFWRU³(O7RUL´5DXO Luna Luna/RV=HWDV¶0RQWHUUH\regional leader, in a Mexican military operation set in motion a string of operations over the next three months that netted at least five senior regional leaders of Los Zetas in Monterrey who were designated as replacements for Luna. Additionally, regional Los Zetas leaders have been apprehended in Hidalgo and Veracruz states, and at least three leaders have been captured in Tabasco state. 4 © 2010 STRATFOR Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com However, events in the second half of 2010 have placed Los Zetas in a position to possibly regain some of the territory lost to the Gulf cartel and the New Federation earlier in the year. This opportunity has been presented by the apparent weakening of the New Federation alliance and the death of a key Gulf cartel leader. In response, Los Zetas appear to be preparing for an assault to regain lost territory, though a recent deployment of federal security forces to the region may delay or alter their plans for an anticipated offensive. Gulf Cartel In the early half of the decade, the Gulf cartel was among the most powerful criminal organizations in Mexico and served as an effective counterbalance in the east to the Sinaloa Federation, which dominated the western coast of Mexico. However, after the arrest of charismatic Gulf leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen in 2003, the group found itself on the decline while its enforcement wing, Los Zetas, gradually became the dominant player in their relationship. During times of intense conflict, the warriors in a criminal organization tend to rise above the businessmen, and this dynamic was seen in /RV=HWDV¶DVFHQVLRQ)LVVXUHVEHJDQWRHPHUJHEHWZHHQ/RV=HWDVDQGWKHLU*XOIFDUWHOPDVWHUVLQ late 2008, when Los Zetas began contracting their enforcement and tactical services out to other criminal organizations such as the BLO and the VCF. These fractures were widened in 2009 when Gulf FDUWHOOHDGHUV&RVWLOORDQG(]LTXLHO$QWRQLR³7RQ\7RUPHQWD´&DUGHQDV*XLOOHQ 2VLHO¶VEURWKHU UHIXVHG offers to be integrated into the Los Zetas organization by its leader, Lazcano. The situation finally boiled over into all-RXWZDUEHWZHHQWKH*XOIFDUWHODQG/RV=HWDVLQ)HEUXDU\DIWHU&RVWLOOR¶V men killed the Los Zetas lieutenant in January during a heated argument. The Gulf cartel had relied on Los Zetas for its enforcement operations for the past several years and knew exactly what Los Zetas were capable of. Because of this, the Gulf cartel knew, with its current capabilities, that it could not take on Los Zetas alone. So the cartel reached out to its main rivals in Mexico ² the
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