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The Mexican Hydra: How Calderón’S Pursuit of Peace Led to the Bloodiest

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The Mexican Hydra: How Calderón’S Pursuit of Peace Led to the Bloodiest Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship 2011 The exM ican Hydra: How Calderón's Pursuit of Peace Led to the Bloodiest War in Mexican History? Will the Mexican People Inherit a Failed State in 2012? Marco A. Pinon-Farah Claremont McKenna College Recommended Citation Pinon-Farah, Marco A., "The exM ican Hydra: How Calderón's Pursuit of Peace Led to the Bloodiest War in Mexican History? Will the Mexican People Inherit a Failed State in 2012?" (2011). CMC Senior Theses. Paper 200. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/200 This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized administrator. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE THE MEXICAN HYDRA: HOW CALDERÓN’S PURSUIT OF PEACE LED TO THE BLOODIEST WAR IN MEXICAN HISTORY. WILL THE MEXICAN PEOPLE INHERIT A FAILED STATE IN 2012? SUBMITTED TO PROFESSOR RODERIC AI CAMP AND DEAN GREGORY HESS BY MARCO ANTONIO PINON-FARAH FOR SENIOR THESIS FALL 2010-SPRING 2011 4.25.11 “And she will have a son, and you are to name him Jesus, for he will save his people from their sins.” – Matthew 1:21 (NIV). To all those whose voices are all too often drowned out and forgotten. May God Bless you and give you peace in the reality that one day we will all live united as human beings. A mi abuelo “Chuso” quien sigue vivo en mi mente y en mi corazon. Este triunfo es suyo abuelito. Jesus “Chuso” Piñon y Prieto. To my uncle Nick Farah. Thank you for your constant love and support. “Mexico lindo y querido, si muero lejos de ti, que digan que estoy dormido, y que me traigan aqui…” “Siete leguas, el caballo, que Villa tanto estimaba…” “Que van a hacer para garantizarnos que 35 mil mas Mexicanos no mueran? Que van a hacer para garantizar que Mexico sea libre otra vez? Que van a hacer para decirle al narco que ya no tiene casa en nuestro pais?” A mis hermanos y hermanas Mexicanos, cuanto mas vamos a tener que sufrir? Que Dios nos bendiga, y que Mexico sea nuestro. Fuera con el narcotrafico, fuera con la corrupcion, fuera con la violencia! Acknowledgments This thesis has been more than an academic project and pursuit for me. As a Mexican-American it has been a soul-searching journey into some of the more conflicting elements of my identity and heritage. I am a more complete person after having completed this work. Without the Grace of God I would not be in such a blessed position as to be graduating from an incredible phenomenal institution after having grown as a student, but more importantly as a person. Without Jesus, without my faith, I would not have made it to this milestone in my life. None of this would have been possible without the advice, support, and wisdom of my advisor Roderic Ai camp, who spent countless hours responding to my questions and working through my thesis with me. Without his passion for Mexico my project would have remained an idea with no form and no life. Thank you professor for your lessons, your support, and for awakening a new interest in my personal heritage. I have been privileged to have studied under you and can say that you were the biggest influence on my academic experience at any level. I hope this work of mine demonstrates my gratitude and some of the skills I have learned from your lessons. To my parents, who supported me through my life and always believed in me. Thank you for pushing me and challenging me to better myself and treat people with respect. I cannot express my gratitude and love for you as I submit this culminating work of my academic career. Without you, this would not have happened. Thank you for never letting me give up. Brian, Laura, and Holly thank you for accepting me and bringing me into your lives. I have felt so loved and cared for by all of you and I cannot begin to explain how much I appreciate everything you have done for me. I have learned a great deal from your wisdom and experience as graduates who are pursuing their dreams and succeeding. From the bottom of my heart, thank you. Tio Eduardo nunca he dudado cuanto me apoyas. Te lo agradezco y espero que yo pueda ser la mitad de la persona que eres. Te quiero y te apoyo en todo. Gracias. To all my professors, coaches, and friends who have been a part of my life, thank you for pushing me. Seeing the greatness, the humility, and the love in each one of you has challenged me to examine myself in order to grow. Don Juan Carlos Ramirez-Pimienta, Don Ramon Geronimo Olvera, Don Ruben Tinajero Medina. Gracias por su apoyo. Sus ideas, palabras, y studios fueron indispensables para mi proyecto. Este proyecto no se hubiera traido a cabo si no fuera por lo que han compartido conmigo. Se los agradezco. Taylor there is not much I can say that I haven‟t already told you. Thank you for being so understanding and supportive during this process. Thank you for believing in me, and believing in this work. I love you more than I can explain and I hope I can repay a fraction of what you have given to me. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1: Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….……1 Chapter 2: The Military…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………18 Chapter 3: The Catholic Church……………………………………………………………………………………………….……62 Chapter 4: El Narcocorrido…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………90 Chapter 5: Findings, implications, and conclusions………………………………………………119 Appendices…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………145 Appendix A…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………………………145 Appendix B…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………148 Appendix C…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………158 Appendix D…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………160 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………166 Chapter 1: Introduction Hypotheses: The aim of this thesis is to determine whether or not the drug war in Mexico will cease as a result of the Mexican government‟s current anti-narcotic operations and strategy. Furthermore, it will investigate the feasibility of maintaining the current strategy as is, and if so, is this morally responsible to do? So long as the current levels of violence show no signs of slowing, it does not appear that any semblance of “victory” can or will be achieved by the Mexican government anytime in the foreseeable future. I propose that, if the violence continues to escalate at its current rates, Mexico will become a failed state by the end of President Felipe Calderón‟s term and the next presidential transition of power, after the 2012 election. I will argue that this is evidenced by increased death tolls, increases in gruesome crimes, a blatant disregard for authority by the cartels1, as well as the increase in diversification of criminal activity of these organizations.2 Furthermore, another area of alarm is that of the increasingly “cross-border” nature of the violence. That is, the Mexican drug organizations are demonstrating an increased presence in not only the Mexican trafficking industry, but also within the central and Latin-American drug supply industry.3 1 This disregard for authority and consequences can be seen clearly in the organizations‟ pursuit of assassinations of government officials and cartel leaders, as reported frequently in the press. 2 Such as extortion, kidnapping, assassination, as reported in STRATFOR, “Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and Growing Violence,” (December 11, 2008); 10. 3 STRATFOR, “Mexican Drug Cartels,” 2. Pinon-Farah 2 In order to determine whether or not Mexico will, by my definition, become a failed state, I will investigate to what extent the drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) have infiltrated Mexican society. I will demonstrate that their domain extends well beyond the political arena, intfo those of: 1) law-enforcement, 2) the religious lives of Mexicans, and 3) the mainstream cultural avenues of expression. I believe that such an extensive infiltration of Mexican society effectively eliminates the government‟s ability to adequately govern and protect its citizens. The thesis will be divided into five chapters: 1) introduction and background, 2) the military and its role in the conflict, 3) the Catholic Church, its silence in regards to the violence, and religion‟s role in the violence in general, 4) the “narcocorrido” as a cultural expression and political indicator and 5) initial findings, future implications, and conclusions. Through these chapters, my hypotheses will be investigated and tested based on the various research questions I have posed in writing each chapter. In discussing the military, I have determined that long-term success cannot take place under a counter-drug strategy primarily dependent on military might. Unfortunately, the Mexican military, I believe, is entirely ill equipped and trained to pursue an all open engagement of the DTOs in a conflict that more closely resembles guerilla warfare than conventional war. In order to determine whether or not this is the case there are several important questions that must be asked as the driving force behind the research, for the military these include: Is corruption an issue in the Mexican military and other law enforcement agencies? How do their arsenals compare to those of the cartels? Are the armed forces adequately financed for this type of Pinon-Farah 3 conflict? What training are the soldiers receiving in anti-guerilla warfare? Where are the cartels‟ weapons coming from? How will the military phase itself out in order to prevent Mexico from becoming a military state? What role should the United States play in the conflict? Alarmingly, the Catholic Church has been relatively silent throughout the violence, although they have become more vocal recently. In my opinion, there could be tremendous progress if the Church were to frequently speak out against the violence and encourage reconciliation between the government and the cartels.
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