EXPERT REPORT OF DR. EVERARD MEADE
July 12, 2016
1. Counsel for has
asked me to offer expert testimony to assist the Court in evaluating his claim for asylum. I
respectfully submit this report, and any corresponding testimony at the hearing, in order to:
(1) provide background regarding the events in question and the areas of Mexico in which
they occurred; (2) explain the country conditions in Mexico, both in the present and in the
period extending back to 2006; (3) offer my opinion on the consistency of the declaration of
Mr. with the conditions in Mexico at the relevant times and in the
relevant places; and (4) discuss the likelihood that Mr. would be harmed
if returned to Mexico.
2. As the Director of the Trans-Border Institute at the University of San Diego, I monitor the
conditions in Mexico on a continual basis. As a historian of Mexico and Central America
focused on the relationships between violence, memory, and the law, I have tracked patterns
of violence and their relationship to the criminal justice system since at least 1998. See
attached (curriculum vitae). I have testified before Immigration Courts across the country in
conjunction with removal proceedings and asylum applications.
3. Before preparing this report, I reviewed and consulted a number of academic, journalistic,
and government sources (from Mexico and the United States), many of which are cited
herein. As discussed herein, I conducted certain independent research using resources that I
customarily consult when researching country conditions in Mexico and the impact of the
latest developments in drug trafficking, organized crime, and law enforcement operations on
basic human rights conditions, in particular. This report is also based on my own ongoing
research in Mexico.
Page 043 4. For the reasons discussed herein, I conclude that Mr. description of
events is consistent with country conditions in Mexico at the relevant times and places.
5. For the reasons discussed herein, I also conclude that Mr. , his wife, and
son would face extreme danger if returned to Mexico. In light of the current conditions in
Mexico and his account of events to date, I believe he and his family would very likely face
kidnapping, torture, and/or murder if he were returned to Mexico.
6. For the reasons discussed herein, I further conclude that Mr. and his
family members could not safely relocate to Michoacán or anywhere else in Mexico. In light
of the current conditions in Mexico and his account of events to date, I believe that they
would very likely be identified and targeted for extortion, kidnapping, torture and/or murder
if he were to attempt to settle in Jalisco or anywhere else in Mexico.
A. Beyond the body count – The violence of the current drug war in Mexico (since 2006) has caused a much greater negative impact on Mexican society than the homicide rate alone might suggest, especially in Mr. home state of Michoacán (on the border with Jalisco) during the period from 2013 to the present.
7. Most accounts of the present “drug war” in Mexico begin in 2006, especially those that
explore its impact on ordinary civilians. At the national level, the homicide rate declined by
nearly half from the early-1990s to 2007, to levels lower than most American cities.1 This
decline was part of a relatively steady downward march dating all the way back to the 1930s,
and one which avoided the marked escalation in homicides across the United States and
urban Latin America from the early 1960s through the early 1980s.2 By this indicator,
1 Kimberly Heinle, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk, “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2013” (Justice in Mexico Project, University of San Diego, April 2014), stable URL: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/140415-dvm-2014-releasered1.pdf 2 Pablo Piccato, “El significado político del homicidio en México en el siglo XX,” Cuicuilco, Vol. 15, No. 43, 56-78; David Shirk and Alejandra Ríos Cázares, “Introduction: Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico,” Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico, Wayne Cornelius and David Shirk, eds (South Bend: The University of Notre Dame Press/Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 2007), 1-49; Fernando Escalante Gonzalbo, “Homicidios 2008-2009 La muerte tiene permiso,” Nexos, 1 enero 2011. Stable URL: http://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=14089
Page 044 Mexico was one of the safest and most stable countries in the Western hemisphere for most
of the twentieth century.
8. Beginning in late 2006, the change was dramatic. President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012)
initiated major anti-drug operations across the country – including the deployment of 45,000
troops and partial military occupations of the states of Michoacán and Baja California.
Calderón deployed 4,000 troops to Michoacán (the president’s home state), who destroyed
more than 2,000 marijuana plots the first week. By 2009, there were 7,000 soldiers and other
federal forces deployed in the state; 10 mayors and 20 other local officials had been arrested
for ties to drug traffickers; and a naval blockade closed all of Michoacán’s Pacific ports. The
homicide rate shot up, with increases year-over-year of 58% in 2008, 41% in 2009, 30% in
2010, and 5% in 2011. Homicide declined in 2013 and 2014, but increased by 9% in 2015 to
14.2 per 100k, and the rate still remains near historic highs.
9. Exactly how many of these murders are directly attributable to the illicit drug trade and
organized crime is a matter of some contention. Rigorous studies from government
agencies, academic researchers, and news organizations estimate that 40-60% of Mexico’s
recent homicides can be attributed to organized crime.3 The breadth of the definition of an
“organized-crime-related homicide” – whether it attempts to capture only murders directly
attributable to their members or business interests, or all those facilitated by the
environment they create – accounts for most of the variation. There’s little substantive
variation in the data, and there’s little disagreement that killings related to organized crime
account for the lion’s share of the dramatic increase in homicides since 2007. A wave of
murder rolled over Mexico by historical standards, and much of it was related to organized
crime.
3 Heinle, Rodríguez, and Shirk, 18-21.
Page 045 10. By comparison to other places in the world, the body count alone does not amount to a
“war” that has touched nearly every aspect of Mexican society, nor does it justify the intense
media coverage that the most spectacular acts of violence and the most infamous gangsters
have generated. Despite the dramatic rise since 2007, Mexico’s overall homicide rate
remains slightly lower than the regional average for Latin America. For the entirety of the
present “drug war,” homicide rates in neighboring Guatemala and El Salvador have
remained more than twice as high as in Mexico and in Honduras it has been four times
worse.4 Mexico’s homicide rate is also considerably lower than that of other large middle-
income countries in Latin America, including Colombia, Brazil, and Venezuela.5
11. On the other hand, in particular cities and regions within Mexico, the homicide rate is high
by any standard. One of the most striking features of the explosion of homicides after 2007
was their geographic spread from a small number of regional hotspots across the country.
In border towns like Tijuana, Nuevo Laredo, and Ciudad Juárez, or regional organized crime
hubs like Culiacán and Acapulco, intense violence began at least a couple of years earlier,
complicating any simple association with the “war” on drug cartels declared by the Calderón
administration, but validating the broader association between a series of conflicts involving
organized crime and a dramatic rise in murder. This general trend repeated itself in micro as
the conflict spread and the murder rate shot up in previously peaceful areas.
12. According to the non-governmental organization Semáforo Delictivo [The Crime Traffic
Light] (which has contracts with government agencies across Mexico to monitor crime data),
Mr. home state of Michoacán has the 6th highest murder rate in Mexico
4 According the Global Study of Homicide compiled by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014), the homicide rate in Mexico was 21.5 per 100k in 2012. In 2012, the average rate for South America and Central America in was 25.7, and for Central America alone was 34.3. For the period 2006-2012, the period of the “drug war,” the homicide rate in El Salvador averaged 59.9, Guatemala 43.1, and Honduras 69.9 per 100k. 5 In 2012, the homicide rate in Mexico was 21.5, Brazil 25.2, Colombia 30.8, Venezuela 53.7 per 100k inhabitants. http://www.unodc.org/gsh/en/data.html
Page 046 (19.8 per 100k population), and more than double the national rate of targeted assassinations
(11.3 per 100k vs. 6.7 per 100k). By way of comparison, in 2014 Michoacán had more than
twice as many targeted assassinations per capita as the state of Illinois had murders (5.3 per
100k). In 2014, the states with the largest number of organized-crime homicides in Mexico
were Chihuahua (1,143), Guerrero (1,075), Sinaloa (747), Michoacán (594), and Jalisco
(518).6
13. More recent data indicates that conditions have worsened in Michoacán since 2014. In the
first 3 months of 2016, there were 231 executions carried out by organized crime in
Michoacán, second only to the state of Guerrero.7
14. Organized crime controls much of the violence in the region where Mr.
is from. In 2014, organized crime was responsible for 57% of all homicides in Michoacán.
By the first quarter of 2016, Michoacán exceeded the national average for executions per
capita by 112% (the highest in the country), and by the end of May of 2016, the rate had
risen to 97% of all homicides in the state. In recent opinion polls asking residents if they
had witnessed acts of corruption by local officials, Michoacán ranked third worst in the
country, with 56% of residents polled responding that such occurrences were “very
frequent.”8 Data on extortions backs this up – in 2014, Michoacán had the 14th highest rate
of extortion (4.4 per 100k) and Jalisco had the fourth highest rate of extortion among
Mexican states, at 8.5 per 100k. (The ranking matters here more than the actual number –
extortion is chronically under-reported, unlike homicide).
6 Heinle, Kimberly, Cory Molzahn, and David A. Shirk. “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data Analysis Through 2014.”University of San Diego. April 2015. https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015-Drug- Violence-in-Mexico-Report.pdf 7 Semáforo de ejecuciones (as of May 2016) http://www.semaforo.mx/content/semaforo-de-ejecuciones 8 Semáforo de la corrupción http://www.semaforo.mx/content/semaforo-de-la-corrupcion
Page 047 15. A skeptical observer might point out that the average homicide rate in New Orleans for the
period 2007-2012 was about the same as that of Culiacán, the home base of the infamous
Sinaloa Cartel – 62 and 61 (per 100k inhabitants), respectively.9 The recent homicide rate in
New Orleans, of course, was a statistical outlier in the United States, especially in the chaotic
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, as racial tensions flared and police and politicians scrambled
to limit the exposure of deep-seated patterns of corruption.10 Furthermore, throughout the
period in question, the murder rate in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico’s most dangerous city, was
significantly higher than it was in New Orleans – more than double at its peak of 206 per
100k in 2010 (and higher than almost any other city in the world, for that matter)11; and it’s a
similar story with Acapulco. At particular moments since 2007, the homicide rates in
Monterrey, Nuevo Laredo, Culiacán, Torreón, and Ciudad Chihuahua have far surpassed the
highest rates in U.S. cities. Still, there are cities in the United States where the long-term
homicide rate is comparable to all but the most extreme cases in Mexico during the height of
the “drug war.” Detroit, for example, averaged 46.7 homicides per 100k from 2007-2012,
worse than Tijuana or Morelia, where violence got so bad that the government deployed
thousands of soldiers and marines to occupy the streets. 12
9 Data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report, aggregated in: “New Orleans murders down in first half of 2014, but summer's death toll climbing,” The Times-Picayune, August 21, 2014 (original data available at: http://www.fbi.gov/about- us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/resource-pages/downloads/download-files) ; and “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2013.” https://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/dvm-2014-final.pdf 10 Murder has a very particular history in New Orleans, which includes racial biases familiar in other large American cities, along with contract enforcement in various black markets due to its role as an international port, and entrenches patterns of police and political corruption. 11 Homicide rate for Ciudad Juárez, per 100k: 2007=249, 2008=101, 2009=168, 2010=206, 2011=110, 2012=49, 2013=30. Data from: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), and summarized in Shirk et al, 2014, 26-28. Within, Chihuahua, moreover, Ciudad Juárez and the border area accounted for more than half of the increase in homicides between 2007 and 2009. Fernando Escalante Gonzalbo, “Homicidios 2008-2009 La muerte tiene permiso,” Nexos, 11 enero 2001. 12 “Despite recent shootings, Chicago nowhere near U.S. ‘murder capital’,” Pew Research Center, July 14, 2014. Stable URL: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/14/despite-recent-shootings-chicago-nowhere-near-u-s-murder- capital/ .
Page 048 16. The homicide rate alone does not explain what ordinary people mean when they describe
“the violence” associated with the present “drug war” in Mexico, nor the fear and grief,
frustration and outrage that it provokes. Nowhere in the United States has experienced
anything like it. As bad as things got in Detroit, there weren’t bodies hanging from freeway
overpasses with threatening notes on them; mass graves full of mutilated victims weren’t
discovered on a regular basis; criminals didn’t force their victims to read confessions, torture
them, and then kill them on camera and then post it on the internet; there wasn’t widespread
kidnapping for ransom, extortion, or highway robbery; journalists weren’t threatened and
assassinated for covering the violence. All of these additional elements of violence have
become common occurrences in Mexico since 2006.
17. The strategic display of tortured and mutilated bodies is a defining aspect of the current drug
war. Along with the reigning impunity, such spectacles of violence have magnified the
impact of individual killings, sowing terror and hopelessness beyond the body count. Most
analysts trace the practice to a gory scene from Michoacán (Mr. home
state). In the wee hours of September 6, 2006, a group of twenty commandos stormed into
a popular nightclub in sleepy Uruapan (less than 100 miles from Mr.
hometown of La Plaza del Limón). The commandos claimed to be from La Familia [the
family], the dominant drug cartel in Michoacán at the state at the time. They shoved their
way through the startled crowd, fired automatic weapons into the ceiling and ordered
everyone on the ground. The gunmen shook five severed heads out of a trash bag and
rolled them onto the dance floor, along with a message scrawled on a piece of cardboard.13
13 The cardboard stated that La Familia doesn’t kill for money, doesn’t kill women, doesn’t kill the innocent. Only those that must die will die. Everyone should know this. This is divine justice.” “Mexican Gangs Displaying Severed Heads,” Washington Post, October 21, 2006; “Guatemalans Arrested in Case of Five Severed Heads,” Los Angeles Times, September 13, 2006.
Page 049 18. In the neighboring state of Jalisco, the mutilation and display of the bodies of those executed
by organized crime has been a routine occurrence going back to 2010, but particularly in the
period from 2013 to the present, due to the rise of Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG)
and its battles with rival cartels including the Zetas and La Familia (described below). On
September 20, 2011, CJNG operatives murdered 35 alleged members of the Zetas Cartel in
Boca del Río Veracruz (nearly 600 miles from their home territory in Jalisco), and then
dumped the bodies out of the back of flatbed trucks on one of the main boulevards of the
city, in front of a busy shopping center.14 In 2013, CJNG operatives left multiple decapitated
bodies of their apparent rivals, along with notes and banners claiming responsibility for the
killings at various sites in the states of Michoacán, Jalisco, Guerrero, Veracruz, and Tabasco
– and these only represent the mass killing incidents in enemy territory that made the
national and international press; there were dozens of individual incidents at the local level in
Jalisco, as well.15 Often, the mutilated bodies appeared in series. For example, on December
20, 2015, a decapitated body was found in the Oblatos neighborhood of Guadalajara, Jalisco.
Exactly one month earlier, a decapitated body was found in the San Juan Bosco
neighborhood of the same city; and three months before that a decapitated body was found
in Jalostotitlán, just outside of the city.16 In each case, the bodies were left at busy
intersections where they would be seen by a large number of people. Such spectacular acts
of violence are not limited to CJNG. In July 2014, a group called Aliados de Jalisco hung an
alleged member of CJNG by his feet, and then tortured and dismembered him on camera,
and posted the video on the internet.17 A propaganda film produced by CJNG in April of
14 Borderland Beat, September 20, 2011; El Financiero, 5 mayo 2015; and Zeta Tijuana, 9 abril 2015. 15 Al Jazeera, Reuters, and Latin American Herald Tribune, December 28, 2013; Huffington Post, July 3, 2013; ABC News, November 28, 2014; BBC, November 5, 2013; El Informador, 12 abril, 12 diciembre 2013; and El Financiero, 20 agosto 2014. 17 Blog del Narco, 18 julio 2014. 17 Blog del Narco, 18 julio 2014.
Page 050 2015, shows how CJNG gunmen interrogated and killed the adolescent son of an alleged
Zetas operative by tying a stick of dynamite to his neck, lighting the fuse and watching his
head explode. They then did the same to the grieving father amidst a round of cheers.18
19. Aside from the violent spectacle, the biggest difference in the experience of high rates of
homicide between cities in the United States and those in Mexico is the rate of impunity.
The homicide clearance rate in Detroit – the percentage of cases in which a suspect is
arrested and indicted – was 92.5% in 2014; at its very worst, in 2012, it was 38.5%. (In New
Orleans, the clearance rate was 64% in 2014, up from a low of 25% in 2010).19 According to
the FBI, the U.S. national average was 62.5% in 2012.20 By comparison, a suspect is
detained and charged in fewer than 2% of reported homicides in Mexico. In two states,
Hidalgo and Tlaxcala, there wasn’t a single suspect indicted for the murders committed there
in 2012. In the states with the most murders that year – Guerrero, Estado de México,
Chihuahua, and Sinaloa – more than 98% of reported homicides did not produce an
indictment. In Michoacán, the impunity rate was 96.8%, and in the neighboring state of
Jalisco, the impunity rate was 97.8% in 2012. According to the most recent data from
Semáforo Delictivo, 43% of all criminal cases filed in Michoacán in 2013 remain unresolved
(meaning that no charges were filed) (Jalisco does not report this data). This staggering level
of impunity magnifies the social impact of any individual murder, breeding generalized fear
and mistrust.21
18 Blog del Narco, 20 junio 2015; Sin Embargo, 20 junio 2015. 19 “Detroit police report 92.7 percent homicide clearance rate so far in 2014,” MLive.com, March 18, 2014; “New Orleans murders down in first half of 2014, but summer's death toll climbing,” NOLA.com, August 21, 2014. 20 FBI Uniform Crime Report, data through 2012. Stable URL: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the- u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/clearances 21 Data from INEGI, compiled and analyzed in: “98% de los homicidios cometidos en 2012 están impunes,” Animal Político, 17 julio 12013. Stable URL: http://www.animalpolitico.com/2013/07/98-de-los-homicidios-de-2012-en-la- impunidad/; Survey data largely confirms the government figures for impunity; see: Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE) 2013: Stable URL: http://www3.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/tabuladosbasicos/tabgeneral.aspx?c=33623&s=est
Page 051 20. Impunity for homicide translates directly into generalized impunity for organized crime in
many areas of Mexico, including Mr. home state of Michoacán.
According to Semáforo Delictivo, executions made up 57% of all homicides in Michoacán in
2014, meaning that the overall murder rate would only be 8.5 per 100k without drug mafias.
That percentage has steadily risen since then, however, such that in May 2016, 97% of all
homicides in Michoacán were executions. The neighboring state of Jalisco, executions made
up 46% of all homicides in 2014, meaning that the overall murder rate would only be 6.2 per
100k without drug mafias, about the same homicide rate as the state of Maryland at the time,
and a much lower rate than the state of Louisiana or any city in the top 100 murder rates in
the United States (and the rate has held fairly steady). Without organized crime executions,
the region containing the states of Michoacán and Jalisco would be considered relatively safe
by global standards.22
21. In response to the reigning impunity, Michoacán has been ground zero for the formation of
auto-defensas, or self-defense groups – armed local groups with no formal legal standing,
which range from slightly more militant versions of a neighborhood or community watch, to
highly regimented paramilitary cells, with automatic weapons, and aspirations to seize and
control territory (see section D below, beginning at paragraph 120).
22. It’s not just that crimes go unpunished, or that criminals kill each other. Anyone who tries
to speak up for the victims and demand justice can be targeted. On August 16, 2008, a
dozen gunmen in three trucks rolled up to a popular meeting hall in the picturesque
mountain town of Creel, Chihuahua and opened fire, killing 13 young people, one of them
only 18 months old. After the massacre, the victims’ parents organized a series of protests
blocking highways and a train route popular among tourists, and they inundated local and
22 Semáforo Delictivo, http://www.semaforo.com.mx/Semaforo/Incidencia
Page 052 state officials with petitions demanding justice for their children. In response, they received
anonymous threats that their tongues would be cut out if they continued to complain. The
following spring, Daniel Parra Urías, the father of one of the victims, was kidnapped by
armed men in the town of Cuauhtémoc. A couple of days later, his lifeless body was
discovered by the side of the highway leading to Chihuahua City.23
23. Aligning with national or international solidarity networks has failed to protect parents and
activists in similar situations from harm. On November 28, 2011, in the central plaza of
Hermosillo, Sonora, Nepomuceno Moreno Núñez was gunned down while protesting the
disappearance of his son at the hands of the state police.24
24. In Michoacán, other members of the peace movement have been targeted for denouncing
the seizure of their communities and the collusion of local landowners with organized crime.
Over the course of 2010, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission facilitated
negotiations between local residents, landowners, and the state and federal governments to
reach a peaceful solution to the conflict.25 But, local activists continued to pay a heavy price
23 The body of Daniel Parra Urías was found with two bullet holes in the head, sitting in his pickup truck on the Cuauhtémoc-Chihuahua highway late in the evening of March 20, 2009. http://xepl.com.mx/completa1.php?i=30097; and “Creel: la masacre que el gobierno de Chihuahua olvidó,” Proceso, 17 agosto 2014. 24 “Don Nepo” as he was known, joined the national Movimiento por la Paz con Justicia y Dignidad [Movement for Peace with Dignity and Justice], led by the poet Javier Sicilia after his eighteen-year-old son and three friends were kidnapped from a rural highway in the Yaqui Valley in 2010 and never seen again. Thanks to his participation in the movement’s “caravan of peace,” Don Nepo had spoken eloquently about his loss across the country. In a formal event at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City, he had handed a copy of his son’s file to President Felipe Calderón, who embraced him and promised to look into the case. “Don Nepo y sus muertos vivientes,” Proceso, 1 diciembre 2011. 25 On the Pacific Coast of Michoacán, more than 27 indigenous villagers from Santa María Ostula were murdered and much of the rest of the population forced from their homes by paramilitary groups acting in conjunction with local drug traffickers. Much of the best land in the villages had been illegally seized by private landholders over the preceding 40 years, and the extreme violence rained down upon them during the drug war pushed local villagers to attempt to reclaim it – they felt they had nothing to lose. In the spring of 2009, they banded together, formed their own independent security force, and occupied a stretch of coastal land to which their communities had a well-documented claim. They renamed it Xayakalan. “La recuperación comunitaria de Xayakalan,” La Jornada, 8 marzo 2014; “Pobladores de Santa María Ostula denuncian falta de justicia en su comunidad,” La Jornada, 4 julio 2014;
Page 053 for defending their communities and denouncing crimes committed by local landowners and
drug traffickers.26
25. Many of the most infamous cases are from Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, and they stem from a
series of crimes predating the current drug war. An epidemic of rape and murder targeting
female factory workers in the booming border town dating back to 1993 was subsumed by
the current drug war, but women’s bodies continue to appear in the desert.27 One of the
victims was sixteen-year-old Rubí Frayre, killed in 2008. Her mother, Marisela Escobedo
Ortiz, was able to track down the apparent murderer in Zacatecas, only to see him released
on a technicality after being charged with the crime. Escobedo, who took her protest to the
state capital in 2010, was murdered on December 16, 2010.28 Police discovered the
mutilated body of prominent activist and poet Susana Chávez on January 11, 2011. For
years, Chávez had worked with the families of murdered women and girls in Ciudad Juárez
26 On October 7, 2011, Pedro Leyva Domínguez, a local delegate to the national peace movement from Santa María Ostula, was murdered by paramilitaries. The following year, during a publicity tour through the area, armed men surrounded about 20 traveling activists from the peace movement. “Asesinan a comunero de Ostula que participa en Movimiento por la Paz,” El Informador, 7 octubre 2011. They identified and kidnapped José Trinidad de la Cruz Crisóstomo, aka “El Trompas” or “Trino,” one of the founders of Xayakalan, who had denounced the ties between local landowners and drug-trafficking organizations far and wide. His body was discovered in a nearby town the next day, with signs of severe torture. He was 73. “Mexico: No Protection for Activists,” InterPress News Service, December 14, 2011; and “Hallan muerto a activista secuestrado en Michoacán,” El Universal, 7 diciembre 2011. 27 The Juárez “femicides” have been the subject of an entire subfield of academic literature, a series of scathing reports on local and state law enforcement and recommendations by federal prosecutors in Mexico, and the subject of a recent decision by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on behalf of three of the victims: Alicia Gaspar de Alba, Georgina Guzmán eds, Making a Killing: Femicide, Free Trade, and La Frontera (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 2010); INFORME DE LAS ACCIONES DE LA PGR EN LOS HOMICIDIOS DE MUJERES EN CD. JUÁREZ, CHIH. http://www.pgr.gob.mx/Temas%20Relevantes/Casos%20de%20Interes/Muertas%20de%20Juarez/Informe%20Final. asp#; [The Cotton Field Decision, IACHR] Corte IDH. Caso González y otras (“Campo Algodonero”) Vs. México. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 16 de noviembre de 2009. Serie C No. 205. Stable URL: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_205_esp.pdf 28 On the evening of December 16, she was holding a placard in the Plaza Hidalgo, when a gunman jumped out of car, chased her across the street and shot her in the head on the steps of the statehouse. The whole thing was captured by security cameras and posted on YouTube. The murder of Rubi Marisol Frayre Escobedo took place in Ciudad Juárez in 2008. “A dos años de la muerte de Marisela Escobedo, persiste exigencia de justicia,” Proceso, 8 diciembre 2012. The murder of Marisela Escobedo was captured on video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7AM3G0D-hZA . The man likely responsible for both killings, Sergio Rafael Barraza was killed in a shootout with police in 2012. “Cierran casos de asesinatos de Marisela Escobedo y su hija,” Animal Político, 23 noviembre 2012.
Page 054 to raise awareness of the crimes and prevent further killings.29 Fellow activist Norma Esther
Andrade barely escaped with her life.30 Advocates for truth and justice in the Juárez
femicides are well organized; they’ve enjoyed considerable international solidarity; and, most
important, they began their work before the country was engulfed in the present “drug war.”
26. Law enforcement officers and military officers engaged in law enforcement operations have
also been targeted for violence on an unprecedented scale during the current drug war.
More than 2,500 police officers and 400 soldiers have been killed in Mexico since 2006.31
Nearly 200 local police officers were killed within the first 18 months of the Presidency of
Felipe Calderón.32 In Tijuana alone, 32 police officers were killed in 2009. The new police
chief, Lt. Col. Julián Leyzaola Pérez weathered several assassination attempts, after the
Deputy Chief was killed in 2008, and the Chief in nearby Tecate was killed in 2007.33 The
border town of Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas suffered the assassination of its police chief in
2005, 2010, 2011, and twice in 2013. Every police chief to serve there since 2006 has either
been killed or disappeared. The last of these officials, Alejandro Domínguez, was killed
within seven hours of taking office.34
27. In Jalisco, law enforcement officers have been targeted for murder on an incredible scale,
especially since the beginning of 2013. The killing of large numbers of police officers in
29 “Death of Susana Chavez, female activist in Ciudad Juarez, not tied to organized crime, state says,” Los Angeles Times, January 14, 2011; “Juarez killings activist Chavez murdered in Mexico,” BBC, January 12, 2011. 30 A schoolteacher who co-founded Nuestras Hijas de Regreso a Casa [May Our Daughters Return Home] after her daughter was murdered, Andrade was shot five times by a masked man in front of her Juárez home in 2011 and taken to the local hospital. After she and the hospital staff treating her were repeatedly threatened, she was sent home prematurely, under guard. She fled to Mexico City, where she was stabbed in 2012, and she has remained in hiding ever since. Sandra Rodríguez Nieto, La fábrica del crimen (México: Editorial Planeta, 2012); “Norma Andrade es dada de alta; buscará refugio lejos de Ciudad Juárez,” CNN México, 7 diciembre 2011; and “ONG se solidarizan con la activista Norma Esther Andrade, quien planteó exiliarse,” 10 febrero 2012. 31 Sara Schatz, Impact of Organized Crime on the Murder of Law Enforcement Personnel at the U.S.- Mexican Border (Springer, 2014), 1, 15. 32 “Mexico’s War Against Drugs Kills Its Police,” New York Times, May 26, 2008. 33 “In The Name of the Law,” The New Yorker, October 18, 2010. 34 “Police Chief Is Shot Dead in Mexico,” New York Times, February 3, 2011; “Authorities search for Nuevo Laredo police chief,” CNN, February 19, 2013; “From the archive: Nuevo Laredo police Chief Omar Pimentel says he's 'not here to fight' cartels,” Dallas Morning News, February 23, 2013.
Page 055 Jalisco is a very recent phenomenon and thus there is no reliable data going back to 2006 (or
earlier). In July 2015, however, the state government reported that 111 public functionaries
had been murdered since Governor Aristóteles Sandoval Díaz took office in January 2013,
most of them law enforcement officers. In the first half of 2015 alone, 35 police officers
were murdered in Jalisco.35 Credible accounts of the rise of CJNG claim that the cartel is
responsible for the murder of more than 100 police officers in Jalisco, alone. The local police
chief in Zacoalco de Torres, Miguel Ángel Caicedo Vargas was gunned down by a group of
armed men in an SUV, who surprised him while he was walking across the plaza of the
municipal seat on April 6, 2015. After shooting the police chief, they got out of the vehicle
and pinned a note to his body, threatening local officials who refused to do the bidding of
CJNG. The killing came on the heels of an ambush in which 15 state police officers
manning a highway checkpoint were killed by CJNG gunmen, in the municipality of San
Sebastián del Oeste.36 That spring was especially bloody – 21 police officers were killed in a
span of 20 days in Jalisco, and all of the killings were attributed to CJNG.37 The killing of
police officers by CJNG has continued. On February 24, 2016, for example, 3 police
officers were riddled with bullets in Tlaquepaque, Jalisco (located less than 80 miles from La
Plaza del Limón), when their vehicle was attacked by a heavily armed CJNG convoy.38
28. In Mr. home state of Michoacán, on May 8, 2006, law enforcement and
military officers engaged in the current drug war have also been targeted by organized
crime.39 In Villa Madero, Michoacán in 2006 (located less than 120 miles from La Plaza del
35 “Asciende número de funcionarios asesinados en Jalisco; otro golpe al Gobernador Aristóteles,” AZ Noticias, 20 julio 2015; and “La acelerada vida de El Mencho, el hombre más buscado de México,” BBC Mundo, 15 mayo 2015. 36 El Informador, 7 abril 2015. 37 “Sangriento ataque contra la policía de México hace que el Cartel de Jalisco llame más la atención de las autoridades,” Insight Crime, 9 abril 2015. 38 “¡El narco cobra venganza y acribilla a tres policías!” Página 24, 25 febrero 2016. 39 McKinley Jr., James. “With Beheadings and Attacks, Drug Gangs Terrorize Mexico. The New York Times, October 26, 2006.
Page 056 Limón): “the entire 32-member police force resigned or failed to show up for work this
week after being threatened by drug traffickers, local authorities said. Members of the force
complained about a lack of arms and communications equipment to protect themselves.”40
29. In Michoacán, federal police commander Gonzalo Domínguez Díaz was shot and killed
while driving home from work in Pátzcuaro (located less than 100 miles from La Plaza del
Limón). He had been threatened by phone minutes after arresting 2 men on weapons
charges. After prosecutors released the men, he feared for his life. Commander Domínguez
was one of 16 federal police commanders assassinated in Mexico in 2006. Commander
Cándido Vargas, commander of the state police in Uruapan, Michoacán (less than 80 miles
from La Plaza del Limón) was killed in August 2006. He was walking to his car when he was
surrounded by 15 armed men in black commando outfits and kidnapped within 100 yards of
the police headquarters. His body was found at a nearby ranch the next day. He had been
shot 25 times. A sign near him read, “For playing with two bands.” The state prosecutors for
Uruapan found no evidence that Commander Vargas had colluded with organized crime.
30. Threats on police officers became so ubiquitous that all state and federal police officers were
ordered to stay in hotels or barracks separate from their families, in order to prevent attacks
on their homes or the use of their families as leverage. On July 11, 2009, federal police
arrested the leader of the La Familia Cartel, Arnoldo Rueda. In response, cartel gunmen
attacked police in 10 different cities in Michoacán and neighboring states. Gunmen in
passing cars strafed police officers’ hotels, and tossed grenades into police stations and
checkpoints, killing 20 and injuring dozens. Police at all levels faced ambush, random
strafing with machine guns, bombings, and kidnappings often triggered by fake emergency
calls. On July 13, 2009, the bodies of 12 federal agents were found, executed and dumped by
40 Alfredo Corchado, “Are drug cartels gaining upper hand in Mexico?” Dallas Morning News, September 21, 2006.
Page 057 the side of the highway near the town of La Huacana (located less than 100 miles from La
Plaza del Limón). A note on the bodies read: “Lets’ try to see if you arrest another one.” In
the aftermath of the above attacks, cartel assassins in Michoacán started to use diversionary
tactics and ambushes in order to catch law enforcement officers unawares and vulnerable.
On the highway outside of Apatzingán (less than 100 miles from La Plaza del Limón), three
federal agents raced to the scene of an apparent car accident, after being alerted by an
anonymous caller, and drove into an ambush. Their vehicles were shot to ribbons and all
three agents were killed. 41
31. Soldiers involved in law enforcement and drug eradication efforts were also targeted. In
Zamora, Michoacán, for example two off-duty soldiers were gunned down while riding
bicycles outside of their base in 2006. According to SEDENA (Mexico’s Defense Ministry),
from December 31, 2006 through the end of 2012, 357 members of the Armed Forces have
been killed during the Permanent Campaign against Drug Trafficking. Of these, 224 were
murdered (171 by firearms); 31 were “executed” (meaning that they were the victims of
targeted assassinations); 12 drowned; and 4 were electrocuted.42
32. The number of military personnel killed as a result of the drug war has risen since the end of
the Calderón administration and armed attacks have now become the leading cause of deaths
among military officers. In the past two years, 73 members of the armed forces have lost
their lives in attacks by drug cartels and organized crime. Military officials are targeted in all
41 “Mexican state awash in recent violence,” CNN, July 4, 2009. http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/07/14/mexico.violence/index.html?iref=nextin ; and “Mexican drug cartel seeks vengeance against federal forces, escalating violent drug war.” Carleton Place. 15 July 2009. 42 “Muertos militares diciembre 2006- noviembre 2012,” Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (in response to Mexico’s equivalent of a freedom of Information Act claim made by Aristeguinoticias), http://www.scribd.com/doc/119252931/Muertos-militares-diciembre-2006-noviembre-2012 ; “224 militares asesinados durante la ‘guerra’ de Calderón; la mayoría en Tamaulipas,” Aristeguinoticias, 7 enero 2013, http://aristeguinoticias.com/0701/mexico/224-militares-asesinados-durante-la-guerra-de-calderon-la-mayoria-en- tamaulipas/
Page 058 parts of the country as officials were killed in Tamaulipas, Jalisco, Michoacán (Mr.
home state), Durango, Guerrero and Sinaloa during the past year.43
33. The family members of current and former soldiers who have been involved in counter-
narcotics operations have also been targeted for violence, especially in areas where the
cultivation and production of illicit drugs make up a significant portion of the local
economy.44
34. Much less information is available to researchers and the general public regarding the killing
of members of the armed forces than the killing of other law enforcement personnel
involved in counter-narcotics operations. In part, this is due to the remote areas where
many military operations against drug traffickers have taken place – in the remote highlands
of Sinaloa or the tropical forests of Guerrero, for example – where very few of the
journalists, bloggers, and civil society organizations who publish information on the violence
of the drug war elsewhere in Mexico dare to venture. But the lack of specific information is
also a result of the secrecy maintained by the armed forces, as a matter of policy. Incident
reports and press releases from the SEDENA do not include the names of military
casualties, nor do they include much detail on the nature of the encounters in which they
43 SEDENA recently reported that in 2013 there were 44 registered military deaths, 54% of these officials were killed with firearms or other weapons. I. Alzaga, (2014, December 30). Mueren 29 militares en lucha 'antinarco' en 2014. Retrieved March 2, 2015, from http://sipse.com/mexico/lucha-antinarco-cobra-vida-29-militares-durante-2014- 129903.html ; Ángel, A. (2014, June 2). Tamaulipas, trampa mortal para militares. Retrieved March 2, 2015, from http://www.24-horas.mx/tamaulipas-trampa-mortal-para-militares/ 44 Pablo and Mariana Jaimes fled the community of San Pedro Las Garzas, Guerrero, after they were threatened and their two sons were killed by corrupt officials. Their son Reynaldo was a soldier in the Mexican Army tasked with manning checkpoints and destroying marijuana and poppy fields. He was gunned down along with another soldier by Mexican police in August of 2011. Afterwards, the family received threatening phone calls telling them to move, and they moved to a municipality 1.5 hours from San Pedro Las Garzas. Elfego Jaimes, their other son, was found dead shortly thereafter. He had been shot and left by the side of a Guerrero highway. (The family believes he had been overheard talking with his older brother about counter-narcotics operations). Then their 14-year-old daughter was kidnapped, beaten, and raped. The family fled to Tijuana with their four daughters, as well as the wife and children of their son, Elfego. They applied for asylum at the San Ysidro Port of Entry, and it was granted by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. “Asylum for Mexican Family in San Diego,” San Diego Union-Tribune, September 28, 2014, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/sep/28/drug-violence-mexicans-asylum-guerrero-san- diego/#article-copy
Page 059 have been killed (nor does the SEDENA report cited above). Such secrecy is designed to
protect the families of members of the armed forces from recriminations on the part of
organized crime for their counter-narcotics activities.
35. But, the armed forces also remain highly secretive about their activities and the losses they
have suffered in counter-narcotics operations because they have been accused of serious and
systemic human rights violations by multiple credible sources. Reports by Mexico’s official
human rights ombudsman, the National Human Rights Commission, and its analogs in
various Mexican states, and by international human rights monitors including Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch have accused the military of extra-judicial
executions, kidnappings, torture, and disappearances committed by active-duty personnel.45
The infamous case is the extrajudicial execution of 22 organized crime suspects in Tlatalaya,
Estado de México, on June 30, 2014 (where the Mexican government initially claimed there
had been a prolonged firefight).46
36. In other cases, law enforcement and military officers have been directly involved in
kidnapping, torture, murder, and forced disappearance. A variety of databases and studies
confirm the complicity of law enforcement in a significant proportion of the killings and
forced disappearances that have taken place since 2006.47
45 “Abusers known, victims ignored: Torture and ill-treatment in Mexico ,” Amnesty International (2012), https://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR41/063/2012/en/74354a01-4946-4301-b922- 8d048782bfef/amr410632012en.pdf ; Neither Rights Nor Security: Killings, Torture, and Disappearances in Mexico’s “War on Drugs,” Human Rights Watch (2011), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/11/09/neither-rights-nor-security-0 ; and “Uniform Impunity: Mexico's Misuse of Military Justice to Prosecute Abuses in Counternarcotics and Public Security Operations,” Human Rights Watch (2009), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/04/28/uniform-impunity 46 Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos México, RECOMENDACIÓN No. 51/2014, SOBRE LOS HECHOS OCURRIDOS EL 30 DE JUNIO DE 2014 EN CUADRILLA NUEVA, COMUNIDAD SAN PEDRO LIMÓN, MUNICIPIO DE TLATLAYA, ESTADO DE MÉXICO, México, D.F., a 21 de octubre de 2014, http://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/fuentes/documentos/Recomendaciones/2014/REC_2014_051.pdf 47 In 2013, Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), an independent government ombudsman, reported 27,243 disappearances from 2006-2012, a number very similar to that reported by the office of the Attorney General. The CNDH found evidence of possible participation by agents of the state in 2,443 of these cases. A more qualitative study by Human Rights Watch documented 249 enforced disappearances in six Mexican states, 149 of which included compelling evidence of state participation. Mexico’s Disappeared: The Enduring Cost of A Crisis Ignored (New York: Human
Page 060 37. When retired army general Carlos Villa took over as police chief in the industrial town of
Torreón, Coahuila in January 2010, he discovered that a majority of local officers were taking
money from, providing information to, and carrying out operations for the Zetas Cartel,
who were fighting for control of the city with the Sinaloa Cartel, based across the river in
Gómez Palacio, Durango.48
38. Probably the most infamous case was the forced disappearance of 43 teachers-in-training
from rural Ayotzinapá, Guerrero on September 26, 2014, which ignited protests across
Mexico and around the world. Acting on orders from Mayor José Luis Abarca, Municipal
Police in Iguala, Guerrero attacked three busses that the student protestors had
commandeered, captured 43 of them, and handed them over to members of the Guerreros
Unidos drug cartel, who more than likely tortured and murdered them.49
39. Law enforcement officers and military personnel involved in law enforcement operations
have been both the targets and the perpetrators of violence during the current drug war in
Rights Watch, 2013). Anecdotal evidence suggests that while the number of homicides has declined under the administration of Enrique Peña Nieto, the number of disappearances has increased. The fact that Mexico failed to include data on forced disappearances in its March 2014 report to the United Nations Human Rights Commission is suggestive as well. 48 Local police were implicated in kidnapping, torture, and murder; and several commanders had openly affiliated with drug traffickers. In 2009, the homicide rate had shot up, pushing Torreón into the top ten bloodiest municipalities in Mexico for the first time ever, and prompting more than 300 local police officers to resign. When Chief Villa announced a loyalty oath and rigorous measures to root corruption out of the police force in March, more than 90% of the remaining officers resigned “Mexican City Battered by Drug Gangs Feels Lure of Truce,” Reuters, October 29, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/29/us-mexico-drugs-idUSBRE89S0FQ20121029 ; “Si agarro a un zeta lo mato; ¿para qué interrogarlo?: jefe policiaco,” La Jornada, 13 marzo 2011,http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/03/13/politica/007n1pol 49 The indigenous scholarship students were on their way to Mexico City to protest education reforms initiated by President Enrique Peña Nieto. The Mayor and his wife fled Iguala after the kidnapping was revealed, and the state governor facilitated their escape, despite the fact that they were wanted for questioning. The governor later resigned, and Abarca and Pineda were arrested. Abarca was indicted in January 2015; Pineda was released for lack of evidence. The indigenous scholarship students were on their way to Mexico City to participate in a protest against national education reforms passed by new President Enrique Peña Nieto. The protest was timed to coincide with the commemoration of the massacre unarmed student protestors in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas Tlatelolco, in Mexico City on October 2, 1968. See: “43 Missing Students, A Mass Grave, and a Suspect: Mexico’s Police,” New York Times, October 6, 2014; Investigators in Mexico Detain Mayor and His Wife Over Missing Students,” New York Times, November 4, 2014; “Drug Gang Killed Students, Mexican Law Official Says,” New York Times, November 7, 2014; “Mexico’s Barbarous Tragedy,” New York Times, November10, 2014; “Ayotzinapa: A Timeline of the Mass Disappearance That Has Shaken Mexico,” Vice News, December 9, 2014; “Iguala: Historia no oficial,” Proceso, 13 diciembre 2014; “Mexican Federal Police Admit to Surveilling Ayotzinapa Students,” Telesur, December 16, 2014; and “Mexico Charges Former Iguala Mayor In Missing Students Case,” NPR, January 14, 2015.
Page 061 Mexico. The vast majority of the time, whether they are the victims, the perpetrators, or
bystanders to violence, it is the result of the same set of coercive power relationships. Put
another way, when they collude or collaborate with organized crime, law enforcement
officers are more often than not doing so under an implicit or explicit threat to their lives
and/or the lives of their family and friends. This relationship is a reflection of the broader
business model and structure of organized crime in Mexico.
B. The decentralized structure of organized crime groups in Mexico and the role of various kinds of leverage in their dominant business model make it very easy for individuals who pose even the most incidental or perceived threat to organized crime to be targeted and nearly impossible to safely opt out once they have been targeted.
40. Most of the killing in the drug war in Mexico is the result of targeted assassinations, rather
than shootouts or firefights. These ambush-style killings account for the vast majority of
deaths in the conflict. They are known as ejecuciones, or “executions.” Even the name is
chilling; it explains that someone has ordered a death sentence on the target. The gunmen
rarely miss. Mexico has no death penalty, but the worst days have seen more than sixty
executions—two dozen in Ciudad Juárez, more sprinkled over Michoacán, Guerrero,
Tamaulipas, Sinaloa, Durango, Tijuana. The next-highest number of war victims are people
who are kidnapped, murdered, and have their bodies dumped. Deaths in shoot-outs account
for a small percentage. This is a war fought by assassins. Their hit-and-run tactics are
extremely difficult to defend against.” 50 Many assassinations, however, are not carried out
on direct orders from one particular boss that filter down a chain of command to a particular
assassin or band of assassins. What often happens instead is that a particular boss adds an
individual, class of individuals, or family members to what amounts to a free-floating hit list,
50 “Firefights, Raids, and Assassinations: Tactical Forms of Cartel Violence and Their Underpinnings,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Volume 21, Issue 1, 2010; Ioan Grillo, El Narco: Inside Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), kindle ed., loc. 3079; Mexico’s Disappeared (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013), 5-7; John Gibler, To Die in Mexico: Dispatches from Inside the Drug War (San Francisco: City Lights Open Media, 2011), 38-40, 161.
Page 062 and then assassins who wish to curry favor with that boss or his organization will seek out
and kill that individual or members of that group.51
41. In addition to actual lists that bosses circulate to their henchman, the “list” exists in the form
of banners and posters, known as narcomensajes, left in public places and/or alongside the
discarded bodies of other assassination victims;52 as well as in the form of YouTube and
other online video posts in which individuals are tortured into revealing their confederates
(or reading off a list of names and accusations against particular individuals and groups)
before they are executed (sometimes on camera), and/or their assassins level warnings and
threats against specific individuals and groups.53
42. Once the word gets out that a particular individual or group has been targeted, various
assassins will make their own risk-reward calculations as to whether they will choose to go
after them. Equally important, because the list is not centrally controlled or maintained,
once a name or the description of a group gets “on the list” it is nearly impossible to retract
it.54
43. At the margins of this virtual list, assassins will target particular individuals and groups on
purely speculative grounds. Because of some obvious characteristic, the assassins feel that
taking down a particular target might please a particular boss or serve the interests of a
particular organization, even without receiving any specific order or contract. For example,
51 Molly Molloy and Charles Bowden, El Sicario: The Autobiography of a Mexican Assassin (New York: Nation Books, 2011), kindle ed, locs. 1205, 2462; Vidriana Ríos, “Why is killing so cheap in Mexico?” Stephanie Delgado-Garcia trans. Este País, February 5, 2010, Stable URL: www.gov.harvard.edu/files/uploads/Rios_EstePais_KillingE.doc; “Sicarios de élite, entrenados para matar,” Proceso, No. 1913, July 29, 2013; “Suspect on Zetas' hit list is arrested in San Antonio,” Borderland Beat, February 9, 2012. 52 “Mexico’s Drug Wars: Where Brutality Knows No Bounds,” Sunday Herald, July 8, 2012. 53 Paul Eiss, “The Narco Media: A Reader’s Guide,” Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 41 No. 2 (March 2014); Blog del Narco, Dying for the Truth: Undercover Inside the Mexican Drug War by the Fugitive Reporters of Blog del Narco (Port Townsend, WA: Feral House, 2013), kindle ed., locs. 290, 1429, 1961, 1988, 3009, 3821, 3986, 4037, 4371; Gibler, 7; http://elnarcotube.com/4-mujeres-incluida-la-guera-loca-son-decapitadas-por-los-zetas.html 54 Molly Molloy and Charles Bowden, El Sicario: The Autobiography of a Mexican Assassin (New York: Nation Books, 2011), kindle ed. locs. 231, 1654, 2711. Charles Bowden, Murder City: Ciudad Juárez and the Global Economy’s New Killing Fields (New York: Nation Books, 2011), 185, 243, 285.
Page 063 assassins may kidnap and ransom family members of individuals on the virtual hit list, in
order to get access to their primary target – this practice is widespread by all the drug
trafficking organizations in Mexico.55
44. As another example, aspiring assassins for the Zetas Cartel kidnapped and killed the owners
of a “Sinaloa-style” seafood restaurant in Torreón, Coahuila, simply because the men
appeared to be from Sinaloa – the home state of the rival Sinaloa Cartel – and thus they
might have had some connection with or even sentimental value to members of the rival
Sinaloa Cartel. By all accounts, the killing was purely speculative and done with no prior
intelligence or orders.56
45. This kind of speculative killing has become increasingly common due to the structure of the
drug-trafficking organizations, particularly at the middle and lower echelons of their security
apparatus. The organizations pay low-level assassins and hit men a retainer for their
affiliation, but most of their income from the organization comes from specific assignments.
As a result, they are always looking to identify potential assignments and thus prove their
value to the organization.57
46. The freelance nature of the killing makes more sense if one thinks of it as a competitive
marketplace, rather than a struggle or war between discrete parties. In this marketplace, the
leading drug trafficking organizations act like other for-profit corporations (but, without the
usual ethical and legal constraints). They hire legions of accountants and lawyers to maximize
55 As another example, aspiring assassins for the Zetas Cartel kidnapped and killed the owners of a “Sinaloa-style” seafood restaurant in Torreón, Coahuila, simply because the men appeared to be from Sinaloa – the home state of the rival Sinaloa Cartel – and thus they might have had some connection with or even sentimental value to members of the rival Sinaloa Cartel. By all accounts, the killing was purely speculative and done with no prior intelligence or orders. Javier Valdez Cárdenas, Levantones: historias reales de desaparecidos y víctimas del narco (México: Aguilar, 2012), 65-72. 57 Valdez Cárdenas, 98-102. 57 Valdez Cárdenas, 98-102.
Page 064 their profit margins;58 they eliminate operations and individuals who hurt the bottom line;59
and they zealously guard their brands from both competitors and would-be imitators.60 The
Zetas Cartel, in particular, boldly displays its trademark “Z” at the scene of killings,
firefights, and acts of terrorism.61
47. The cartels also make strategic alliances with the very same competitors in various locales
and segments of the market – to shut out third parties, to stave off government regulation,
or simply to achieve economies of scale. And they compete for top talent. Similar to
professional sports, high-tech, and other industries, enterprising drug lords have poached
each other’s most valuable people – such as accountants, financiers, assassins, and
smugglers;62 sought talent abroad – such as gang members in the U.S., Honduras, and El
Salvador;63 and recruited skilled assets from government and other industries – such as
special forces operatives from Mexico and Guatemala.64
48. This competition for skilled people has created a more or less regular career path, especially
for security personnel and assassins. The drug trafficking organizations offer both on-the-
job training and advanced paramilitary training. But, they leave most of the basic training to
the police and the military. It is a well-documented fact that all of the major drug trafficking
organizations send promising young personnel to various police forces to learn basic
marksmanship, communications, and the politics of law enforcement; and that they recruit
58 David Shirk, The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011), kindle ed. loc. 602. 59 George W. Grayson and Samuel Logan, The Executioner's Men: Los Zetas, Rogue Soldiers, Criminal Entrepreneurs, and the Shadow State They Created (Piscataway, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2012), kindle ed. loc. 921. 60 Corchado, kindle ed. loc. 2044; Grayson and Logan, kindle ed. locs. 282, 1081, 1184; “Cartel boss falls, but Zeta brand strong,” Washington Post, July 19, 2013; “'Sadist' Los Zetas Cartel Set Brutal Standard in Drug War,” PBS, July 16, 2013. 61 They have been known to track down and kill lesser criminals who have tried to use the “Z” in order to intimidate rivals or civilians into doing their bidding. 62Grayson and Logan, kindle ed. locs. 1007, 1231. 63“El Salvador Becomes Drug Traffickers' 'Little Pathway',” Los Angeles Times, March 22, 2011; “El Salvador Fears Ties Between Cartels, Street Gangs,” National Public Radio, June 2, 2011; “Zetas Cartel -Mara Salvatruchas Alliance in Mexico Unites Brutal Gangs,” El Paso Times, April 15, 2012. 64 Shirk, kindle ed. loc. 278; Grayson and Logan, kindle ed. loc. 21716.
Page 065 from within the ranks of the police and the military.65 Successful operatives often return to
law enforcement connections they have made earlier in their careers in order to place
informants or collaborators in positions of authority. There is some debate among
researchers about the precise portion of drug cartel forces who are trained by or recruited
out of law enforcement and the military, and the cartels certainly recruit personnel from
other sources – such as from the ranks of lookouts and messengers (often local teenagers),
whom they gradually incorporate into kidnapping and assassination operations – but there’s
no question that they do recruit many key personnel from law enforcement and the
military.66
49. Most soldiers and law enforcement personnel are not directly involved in the drug trade.
However, because drug trafficking organizations send operatives to train in the police and
the military, and because they recruit from among their ranks, soldiers and law enforcement
officers often find themselves under extreme pressure to ignore or tolerate illegal acts by
fellow officers, and they are often subject to threats on their lives and families or to violent
acts of coercion by organized crime.
50. The porous boundary between law enforcement and drug traffickers both facilitates and
feeds off of the central operating principle behind their internal discipline, their control of
the civilian populations within their territories, and their side ventures into other criminal
activities – leverage. Within drug trafficking organizations, superiors control their
subordinates by extending them credit and holding their friends and family responsible
65 Valdez Cárdenas, 131-47; Shirk, kindle ed. loc. 278; Gibler, 29; Grayson and Logan, kindle ed. loc. 2704. 66 Schatz, 13-15; G. H. Turbeville, “Firefights, Raids, and Assassinations: Tactical Forms of Cartel Violence and Their Underpinnings,” Small Wars, Vol. 21, No. 1, 123-44; Vidriana Ríos, “Why is killing so cheap in Mexico?” Stephanie Delgado-Garcia trans. Este País, February 5, 2010, Stable URL: www.gov.harvard.edu/files/uploads/Rios_EstePais_KillingE.doc; and America Guevara, “Propaganda in Mexico’s Drug War,” Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, no. 5 (Fall 2013), 131-51.
Page 066 (through torture and/or murder) for any personal transgressions.67 Among the civilian
population, they operate protection rackets that serve to indebt ordinary people to the
organizations, but also to implicate them in criminal activities and thus to keep them from
complaining or seeking assistance from the regular authorities.68 Outside of drugs, these
criminal organizations specialize in kidnapping for ransom, migrant smuggling, and the
extortion of public officials, all of which rely upon leveraging bodily harm and the
compromised position of their victims for profit and all of which benefit from the collusion
of law enforcement agents.69
51. Leverage operates on a national scale. While the intensity of their activities (and violence)
varies dramatically by region, there is nowhere in the country where the cartels are not active,
where they do not keep track of potential threats, or where the Mexican government has
effective sovereignty over them. The lion’s share of the profits in drug trafficking comes
from international sales, and even for provincial drug trafficking organizations far from the
border, day-to-day operations involve international connections and commerce. Buying
weapons, trans-shipping cocaine and heroin imported to Mexico from abroad, exporting
marijuana, laundering money, keeping rivals in check, and enforcing contracts involve
maintaining access to ports of entry and exit from Mexico and a national presence.70
52. The freelance nature of the killing, the porous boundary between law enforcement and drug
traffickers, the primacy of leverage as a political and business strategy, and the global nature
of the drug trade make it exceedingly difficult for law enforcement officers in affected
67 Sandra Rodríguez Nieto, La fábrica del crimen (México: Editorial Planeta, 2012), 97-122; Valdez Cárdenas, 98-102; Grayson and Logan, kindle ed. loc. 740. 68 Grayson and Logan, kindle ed. loc. 365. 69 Gibler, 88, 185. 70 Howard Campbell, Drug War Zone: Frontline Dispatches from the Streets of El Paso and Juárez (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 2009), kindle ed. locs. 125, 3755; “Mexico under Siege,” Los Angeles Times, August 19, 24, 2013.
Page 067 departments to opt out of collaborating with the drug trade, and make it nearly impossible
for anyone connected to the system to leave it alive.
53. It has become virtually impossible for personnel in affected police departments and military
units to opt out of collaborating with drug trafficking organizations without facing severe
threats to their lives or the lives of their families. Alfredo Corchado, a correspondent with
the Dallas Morning News who has covered the drug war for more than a decade explains: “If
the newcomers refused to accept bribes or resisted intimidation from colleagues and hit
men, they would risk their lives and the well-being of their loved ones: an ultimatum known
as plata o plomo—silver or lead.”71
54. In one of the most infamous cases, Sidarta Alfredo Walkinshaw, a Sinaloa detective whom
Mexican and U.S. authorities praised as “Mexico’s top cop,” was murdered after he refused
to accept money and a position from two different drug trafficking organizations.72
55. The same is true for those whom the drug trafficking organizations attempt to recruit,
regardless of whether they are a civilians, or even wholly uninvolved in the drug trade. First,
to protect their own fearsome reputations, they do not take “no” for an answer. More
important, when they make someone an offer to join their organizations, they try to get
leverage over them as quickly as possible, whether they accept the initial offer or not. In
addition to offering lavish gifts, clothes, cell phones, and cash, they call their family
members, show up randomly at their homes or places of work, leave notes, or take other
71 Alfredo Corchado, Midnight in Mexico: A Reporter's Journey Through a Country's Descent into Darkness (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), kindle ed. loc. 348; Grayson and Logan, kindle ed., loc. 1924; William Finnegan, “Silver or Lead; The Drug Cartel La Familia Gives Local Officials a Choice: Take a Bribe or a Bullet,” The New Yorker, May 31, 2010; Tony Payan, The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration, and Homeland Security (Greenwood Press, 2006), 43. As a result, the federal government has often found the only effective way to deal with police departments under the thumb of particular drug cartels is shut down entire departments. On December 29, 2007, federal agents dismissed and disarmed the entire police force in Rosarito, Baja California. San Diego Magazine, August 2009. The fear that arresting one of their own will incriminate the others has led to standoff between various police departments, military units, and vigilante groups. Sylvia Longmire, Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico’s Drug Wars (New York: Macmillan, 2011), 109. 72 Valdez Cárdenas, 131-147; El Universal, June 18, 2004, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/53736.html; “Sinaloa: policía bajo fuego,” Proceso, June 20, 2004.
Page 068 measure to make sure that prospective recruits know what and who are at risk, should they
turn down or betray the organization.73 Kidnapping of or violence against family members
is another common form of leverage over would-be recruits. Elaborate initiation rites
including participation in torture, murder and mutilation serve similar purposes of mutual
incrimination and leverage. Cartels also take extreme measure to prevent the family
members of their employees from knowing if and how their employees are killed, including
having their employees work in towns and states where they have no family.74
56. With rare exceptions, no one is allowed to leave.75 An individual outside of the system is an
individual over whom they hold no leverage, and thus someone whose behavior they cannot
predict or control. Any individual with significant information on the drug trade or any of
its connections to various political leaders poses a risk to their operations and to their
reputations.76
57. When the leaders of drug trafficking organizations are incarcerated or killed, their surviving
associates pursue perceived traitors, witnesses, and informants far beyond the actual value of
the incriminating information they may hold over a particular leader or organization. This is
73 Grayson, kindle ed. locs. 1039, 1076, 1220; Phil Williams, “The Terrorism Debate Over Mexican Drug Trafficking,” from James J.F. Forest ed. Intersections of Crime and Terror (London: Routledge, 2013), Ch. 6; Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime, 10th ed. (New York: Cengage Learning, 2012), 151; “Bodies hung from Bridge in Cuernavaca,” BBC News, August 22, 2010; “Ruthless, intelligent Zetas leader to be succeeded by brother,” Houston Chronicle, July 16, 2013. 74 The Reporters of Blog del Narco, Dying for the Truth: Undercover Inside Mexico’s Violent Drug War (Port Townsend, WA: Feral House: 2012), kindle ed., locs. 290, 296, 3562, 4343; Gibler, 198, 211. 75 Leaving the system removes or, in some cases, reverses the leverage that drug trafficking organizations hold over particular individuals. 76 For example, Vice Admiral Carlos Salazar, a senior officer in the Mexican Navy, was assassinated in a remote area of the state of Michoacán on July 28, 2013. Three gunmen from the Knights Templar drug cartel confessed to the killing and explained that that Salazar had threatened their ability to collect protection money, distribute bribes, and carry out kidnappings. “Why a Mexican Cartel Killed a Top Navy Officer,” ABC News, July 29, 2013. Shirk, kindle ed. loc. 278; Grayson and Logan, kindle ed. loc. 21716; Grillo, kindle ed locs. 249, 1895, 2568. See also: Shannon O’Neil, “The Real War in Mexico: How Democracy Can Defeat the Drug Cartels,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 4 (July/August 2009), 72- 74.
Page 069 particularly true in the case of individuals who have or might expose connections to public
officials whose careers outlast those of their criminal allies or patrons.77
58. More than mere personal vengeance (of which there is plenty), they do this in order to
protect the fearsome reputations of their organizations.78 The reputations they build by
leaving mutilated bodies with warning notes in public places, posting videos of gruesome
executions on the internet, hanging bodies from freeway overpasses, or rolling severed heads
into crowded nightclubs serve not only to intimidate rivals and enemies, but also to maintain
internal discipline, to remind their associates what happens to those who betray the
organization.79
59. Equally important, the same risk calculus applies when assassins consider whether or not to
pursue a target who is no longer an active threat to an organization, as they are one whom a
particular boss orders executed. In the case of a former enemy of one of the organizations,
who has left law enforcement or a rival organization and is not affiliated with one of the
other criminal organizations, even if the information he might hold over former bosses has
declined into total irrelevance, the risk of capturing or killing an unconnected person would
be low as well. A potential assassin would have to worry a lot less about provoking the
wrath of the police, the military, or one of the criminal organizations in going after an
77 Former Reuters correspondent in Mexico City, Ion Grillo, reports that from 2007-2011 “cartel gunmen slayed more than twenty-five hundred public servants, including twenty-two hundred policemen, two hundred soldiers, judges, mayors, a leading gubernatorial candidate, the leader of a state legislature, and dozens of federal officials.” Grillo, kindle ed. loc. 2568. See also: Cory Molzahn, Viridiana Ríos, and David A. Shirk, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2011 (San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2012). http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/2012-tbi- drugviolence.pdf 78 Valdez Cárdenas, 173-75; Corchado, kindle ed. loc. 2044; Grillo, kindle ed. loc. 249; Grayson and Logan, kindle ed. loc. 516, 79 The severed heads of seven off-duty soldiers and a local police commander were tossed into a shopping mall in Chilpancingo, Guerrero, along with a note to the regional military commander, after they had been kidnapped, tortured, and decapitated. “Mexican Soldiers’ Decapitated Bodies Discovered,” Bloomberg, December 22, 2008. The following year, in Ciudad Juárez, after the bodies of two murdered police officers were found, drug traffickers threatened to kill another officer every two days until the new police chief resigned. “Death threats force Juárez police chief to resign,” CNN, February 20, 2009; “Mexicans Discover Mutilated Body of Police Officer,” Borderland Beat, August 15, 2010; “Vídeo: Entrevista a un Zeta ‘los cocinábamos con diesel’ ; parte 1,” Blog del Narco, October 15, 2013.
Page 070 unconnected individual. They would be one more casualty in a war that has claimed more
than 100,000 lives.
C. From protecting a black market to attacking the rule of law – The violence associated with the current drug war has shifted from contract enforcement in a black market, to a more generalized assault on institutions that seek to uphold the rule of law, posing an increasingly dangerous threat to innocent civilians, like Mr. .
60. An increasing proportion of the violence carried out by Mexican drug cartels does not
directly serve as contract enforcement in their illicit business dealings or for the silencing of
potential witnesses and whistleblowers, but rather for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian
population into submission in the areas in which they operate. As Professor Guillermo
Trejo, a Political Scientist at Notre Dame University, explains: “in states like Guerrero,
Michoacán and Tamaulipas, organized crime…has now entered a new phase in which one of
its great objectives is to take local control – taking over municipalities and their resources to
extract local wealth through forced taxation.”80 In the state of Michoacán organized crime
takes 30% of public revenues and 20% of the salaries of all public officials.81 In other states,
cartels attempt to control the municipal infrastructure and resources of the state.82
61. In 2008, a combination of Mexican Army units and drug traffickers took over the towns of
Guadalupe, Praxedis Guerrero, El Porvenir, and Esperanza, Chihuahua in the Valle de
Juárez (the valley just southeast of Ciudad Juárez along the U.S.-Mexico border). Since then
80 “¿Por qué el crimen organizado atenta contra la sociedad civil en México?” El País, 12 octubre 2014, translated and re- published as “Why Does Organized Crime Attack Mexican Civil Society?” by the Freedom of Expression Project at the Trans-Border Institute, http://www.sandiego.edu/peacestudies/institutes/tbi/from-the-field/freedom-expression- archives.php/Trejo-OrganizedCrimeAyotizinapa-ElPais.pdf 81 Benjamin Locks, “Extortion in Mexico: Why Mexico’s Pain Won’t End with the War on Drugs,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, October 6, 2014, http://yalejournal.org/article_post/extortion-in-mexico-why-mexicos-pain-wont- end-with-the-war-on-drugs/ 82 In the state of Tamaulipas, the Zetas use municipal infrastructure to facilitate the theft of gasoline and crude oil, kidnapping for ransom, and migrant smuggling. The Zetas compel both government officials and ordinary citizens to cooperate through the use horrific and spectacular acts of violence. “Pemex Struggles to Stop Spike in Petroleum Theft,” Houston Chronicle, August 16, 2014, http://yalejournal.org/article_post/extortion-in-mexico-why-mexicos-pain- wont-end-with-the-war-on-drugs/ ; “Mexican Crime Gangs Expand Fuel Thefts,” Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2011, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303635604576391910225256264 ; Ricardo Ravelo, Zetas, franqicia criminal (México: Ediciones, 2014); and Diego Osorno, La guerra de los zetas: viaje por la frontera de la necropolítica (México: Vintage Español, 2013).
Page 071 these towns have experienced unprecedented violence with annual rates of homicide as high
as 1,600 per 100,000 inhabitants.83 The soldiers were ostensibly deployed to contain the
violence between the Juárez, Sinaloa, and Gulf Cartels in nearby Ciudad Juárez, but they
have been widely accused of either carrying out or tolerating violence perpetrated by the
Sinaloa Cartel.
62. In Guadalupe, Chihuahua, the Reyes Salazar family was almost entirely exterminated after
denouncing the abuses committed by soldiers stationed in the town beginning in 2008.
Their case has been recognized by the Inter American Human Rights Commission and
NGOs around the world.84
63. Other parts of Chihuahua have also suffered the total takeover of institutions trying to
maintain the rule of law. The police chiefs of Ascención, Ciudad Camargo, Villa Ahumada,
and Namiquipa, Chihuahua were murdered after pledging to end impunity for acts of
83 “The Deadliest Place in Mexico: Whose Killing the People of the Valle de Juárez?” Texas Observer, February 29, 2011. 84 Josefina Reyes Salazar was already a well-known activist, who had led campaigns to investigate a local nuclear waste dump and the rape and murder of teenage girls in and around Ciudad Juárez, when the Mexican Army occupied Guadalupe in 2008. She protested the arbitrary arrest and detention of many of her neighbors. A week after condemning military abuses at a public forum, her son Miguel Ángel disappeared. After Josefina declared a hunger strike, the military admitted grabbing him off of the street and released him. He was arrested less than a month later and held without charge, however. Two months later, Josefina’s other son Julio César was murdered by paramilitary commandos who stormed into a wedding reception, identified him and shot him through the heart. Josefina was arrested during a protest march later that fall, and on January 3, 2010, she was murdered by armed commandos at the barbeque stand where she worked. Her brother Rubén Salazar Reyes, an opposition politician who worked at the family bakery, denounced the murder and demanded justice. After months of death threats, he was murdered one evening when he went out for milk. The family kept up the fight for justice, once again at a terrible price. On Friday, February 5, 2011, the bodies of Magdalena Reyes Salazar, her brother Elías Reyes Salazar, and his wife Luisa Ornelas Soto were discovered by the side of a road in Guadalupe; they had been disappeared but then dug up and left next to a gas station, likely in the wake of public pressure. Sara Salazar, the family matriarch, led the remaining family members first to Mexico City, where they continued to receive death threats, and then to El Paso, Texas. To date, 32 members of the Reyes Salazar family have been granted asylum in the United States. “Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Demands Protection for Activists,” Frontera NorteSur, New Mexico State University, November 12, 2012, http://fnsnews.nmsu.edu/oas-human-rights-commission-demands-protection-for-activists/ ; “More Members of the Reyes Salazar Family Win Asylum,” Texas Observer, March 22, 2013, http://www.texasobserver.org/more-members-of- the-reyes-salazar-family-win-asylum/ ; “Familia Reyes: historia de exterminio,” La Jornada, 19 agosto 2011; and “Entérate la cruz de la familia Reyes Salazar,” El Universal, 25 febrero 2011.
Page 072 violence, imposing loyalty oaths or tests for their officers, and seeking outside resources to
strengthen their departments.85
64. In response to the San Fernando Massacre – the kidnapping, extortion, and murder of 72
Central American migrants headed to the U.S. on a ranch in Tamaulipas in 2010 – a
confidential U.S. diplomatic cable admitted that the logic of violence seemed to have
changed: “It remains unclear how these deaths benefit the Zetas.”86 The impoverished
migrants found in this and other mass graves were not witnesses, traitors, or competitors in
the drug trade; they were simply targets of opportunity.
65. As part of the cartels’ strategy of local control and extortion, the expansion of their business
portfolios into migrant smuggling, as was evident in the San Fernando Massacre87, and the
spillover crime created by having large groups of heavily armed and underpaid gunmen on
retainer, members of drug cartels target individuals returning or deported from the United
States for extortion. In March of 2014, for example, three recently deported Mexican
women were kidnapped by armed men from a Western Union office in Matamoros,
Tamaulipas. They were never seen again.88 On Christmas Eve, 2012, 15 men were
kidnapped from a migrant shelter, also in Matamoros.89 Reports from Matamoros, Tijuana,
85 In none of these cases did the police even threaten to seriously curtail lucrative drug trafficking activities – all they proposed was a modicum of protection for local civilians and independence for local government. Schatz, 23-63. 87 In response to the San Fernando Massacre – the kidnapping, extortion, and murder of 72 Central American migrants headed to the U.S. on a ranch in Tamaulipas in 2010 – a confidential U.S. diplomatic cable admitted that the logic of violence seemed to have changed: “It remains unclear how these deaths benefit the Zetas.” The impoverished migrants found in this and other mass graves were not witnesses, traitors, or competitors in the drug trade; they were simply targets of opportunity 87 In response to the San Fernando Massacre – the kidnapping, extortion, and murder of 72 Central American migrants headed to the U.S. on a ranch in Tamaulipas in 2010 – a confidential U.S. diplomatic cable admitted that the logic of violence seemed to have changed: “It remains unclear how these deaths benefit the Zetas.” The impoverished migrants found in this and other mass graves were not witnesses, traitors, or competitors in the drug trade; they were simply targets of opportunity 88 “MÉXICO: TEMOR POR LA SEGURIDAD DE MIGRANTES SECUESTRADOS,” Amnesty International, March 26, 2014. 89 “Dangerous Deportations,” The American Prospect, August 26, 2013.
Page 073 Mexicali and other border cities that receive large number of deported individuals indicate
that deportees face extortion, kidnapping, and forced recruitment by drug cartels90
66. During the 1980s and 1990s, the drug trade in Mexico was characterized by a series of fairly
stable regional mafias. Corrupt government officials took bribes from the leading traffickers
to protect their routes and concentrate enforcement efforts on their rivals. The government
also used drug enforcement efforts as a pretext to target political dissidents and other
enemies of the one-party regime (1929-2000). The cartels, in turn, used violence to enforce
contracts that they couldn’t enforce legally and to eliminate witnesses to their illegal
activities, much the way mobsters and bootleggers used violence during Prohibition in the
United States. Since 2006, this relationship has been reversed and the targeting of ordinary
civilians and institutions seeking to uphold the rule of law has become much less
discriminate. Drug cartels now seek to conquer and tax local governments (rather than the
other way around); they use violence to terrorize local populations into submission; and
those seeking to break into the business or to make a living at lower rungs of the business
seek out perceived targets along much more speculative, open-ended grounds than enforcing
illicit contracts or eliminating individuals with specific actionable information on their illicit
activities.
90 While the recent escalation of the drug war have made these practices more acute and widespread, there’s a long history of local police and organized crime demanding cash payments from Mexican migrants returning to their hometowns for the holidays, or to build a house or start a small business. “Fear and loathing at the border,” The Chicago Reporter, September 1, 2013; “Report: Deportations Can Be Dangerous,” KPBS Fronteras Desk, July 31, 2013; “Migrant Heads Home To Mexico — And Joins Fight Against Cartel,” NPR, July 20, 2014; David Fitzgerald, A Nation of Emigrants: How Mexico Manages Its Migration (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2008); Lynnaire Maria Sheridan,"I Know It's Dangerous": Why Mexicans Risk Their Lives to Cross the Border (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2009); M. Laura Velasco Ortiz, Mixtec Transnational Identity (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2005); and New Perspectives on Remittances from Mexicans and Central Americans in the United States(Germany: Kassel University Press, 2007).
Page 074 D. A national war among Mexico’s drug cartels began before the escalation of law enforcement operations in 2006. Mr. home state of Michoacán was one of the original flashpoints in this war and, along with the neighboring state of Jalisco, has become one of the most dangerous places since 2013 or so due to the meteoric rise of Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). This position has produced successive waves of violence against civilians and law enforcement personnel, the most recent of which began just as Mr. and his family decided to flee.
67. Mr. born in the municipality of La Barca, Jalisco, which sits on the
border with Michoacán (which follows the Río Lerma), just northeast of the Lago de
Chapala, a large highland lake, and about 30 minutes from the Guadalajara metropolitan
area. “La Barca” [the ship] is named after a vessel fashioned by the original inhabitants to
cross the river.91 La Barca, population 64,269, is a semi-urban population where more than
half of residents live in large towns, and most residents read and write.92 The current
municipal president is Javier Arturo Franco Esqueda, a member of the coalition of PRI-
PVEM parties (2015-18).93
68. Mr. last residence was in the state of Michoacán in the town of La
Plaza del Limón in the municipality of Ixtlán de Hervores (hereafter cited as Ixtlán), 20 miles
east by southeast (upriver) from La Barca, just on the other side of the Michoacán border.
La Plaza del Limón, population 1,819, is a rural indigenous community, made up largely of
agricultural laborers and small landholders, about 15 miles inland from the Río Lerma, and
about 100 miles from the state capital in Morelia.94 Ixtlán has a total population of 13,548
91Prior to the founding of the municipality, the population of La Barca lived in an area known as Chie, which was bordered by the Río Lerma. Given the topographical characteristics of the region, the local inhabitants were forced to build a large boat in order to traverse the river. The construction of this large boat is the origin of the name of the municipality. The municipality is located in the eastern portion of the state along the border of Michoacán (to the south) and is bordered by Ocotlán, Atotonilco el Alto, and Ayotlán to the north, Ayotlán to the east, and Jamay and Ocotlán to the west. “La Barca.” Enciclopedia de los Municipios y Delegaciones de México. http://www.inafed.gob.mx/work/enciclopedia/EMM14jalisco/index.html 92 Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal. http://www.snim.rami.gob.mx/ 93 “Ing. Javier Arturo Franco Esqueda.” Gobierno del Estado de Jalisco. http://www.jalisco.gob.mx/es/directorio/municipal/ing-javier-arturo-franco-esqueda & Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal. http://www.snim.rami.gob.mx/ 94 “La Plaza del Limón.” Pueblos America. http://mexico.pueblosamerica.com/i/la-plaza-del-limon/
Page 075 spread out in 22 rural villages. 95 The climate is temperate, with humidity and precipitation
occurring throughout spring, winter, and fall.96
69. The highland area along the Jalisco-Michoacán border has a long history of independence
from the federal government befitting its rugged terrain. During the civil wars of the
nineteenth century (and earlier under the Spanish Empire), indigenous communities took
refuge there to resist excessive taxation and forced conscription. In the aftermath of the
Mexican Revolution (1910-20), the highlands area was the epicenter and bas of operations
for rural rebellions against the restriction of religious practices and the imposition of socialist
education and land reform by the federal government. During the Presidency of José López
Portillo (1976-82), marijuana cultivation expanded in the region, with the protection of state
and federal officials who ingratiated themselves to local populations with public works
projects.97 Nearby municipalities like Pihuamo, within a few hours’ drive from Guadalajara,
became major site of Marijuana cultivation in the heyday of the Guadalajara Cartel (1994-
2003), Mexico’s first modern drug cartel.98
70. Until very recently (since 2012 or so), the highlands along the Jalisco-Michoacán border near
the Lago de Chapala have been spared much of the violence of the drug war in Mexico.
95 There are 22 localities in the municipality of Ixtlán, with the municipality classified by the Mexican government as rural. More than 50% of the population lives in localities with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants. In 2010, there were 13,584 inhabitants in the municipality (6,621 men, 6,963 women). The rate of illiteracy in the municipality is moderate, around 14% (13.26% men, 14.92% women). Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal. http://www.snim.rami.gob.mx/ 96 The municipality of Ixtlán de Hervores has a rich indigenous culture and history. In 1598, Don Lucas Carrillo unified small indigenous communities in the area in order to form the town of Ixtlán. Located in the northeastern portion of the state, the municipality is bordered by the municipality of Tanhuato to the north, Ecuandureo to the east, Chavinda and Zamora to the south, and Pajacuarán and Vista Hermosa to the west. The municipality is about 15 miles from the northern state border with Jalisco. It is also located a little over 100 miles from the state capital of Morelia. “Ixtlán.” Enciclopedia de los Municipios y Delegaciones de México. http://www.inafed.gob.mx/work/enciclopedia/EMM16michoacan/index.html 97 Carlos Reza Nestares, “El estado como maximizador de rentas del crimen organizado: El caso del tráfico de drogas en México,” Biblioteca de Ideas del Instituto Universitario de Gobernabilidad, 1 octubre 2001. 98 “El mapa del cultivo de drogas en México, 1994-2003,” Notes de Investigación, sf. Stable URL: https://www.uam.es/personal_pdi/economicas/cresa/nota0205.pdf
Page 076 71. The highland municipalities of Mazamitla, Quitupán, Pihuamo, San José de Gracia, Vista
Hermosa, Tanhuato, Tecaltitlán, and Ixtlán along the border between Jalisco and Michoacán
have been embroiled in a series of direct territorial disputes between rival drug cartels since
the fall of 2012 – Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) from Jalisco and the Caballeros
Templarios Cartel, from Michoacán, a running dispute that has sometimes drawn the
participation of allies and rivals including the powerful Sinaloa Cartel and Pacífico Sur
Cartel.99
72. Due to their remoteness and rough terrain, the lack of law enforcement personnel and
infrastructure in the area, and long tradition of local governments ignoring the cultivation of
illicit drugs in the area, government forces have largely declined to intervene directly in these
escalating disputes, to expel the cartels from the area, to disrupt their operations, or to
protect the civilian population from the resulting violence.
73. As they have elsewhere, the drug cartels active in these small rural municipalities are not
exclusively concerned with producing and trafficking illicit drugs to the U.S.-based market
and/or fighting off rivals in this traffic. They aspire to seize and maintain power at the local
level in order to use public infrastructure to extract taxes and other resources from the local
population.
74. The current violence in this border region is the direct product of the intensification of the
drug war at the national level. Michoacán borders Jalisco to the north, on the coastal sierra
and (further inland) the highland plateau that rise above what is known as the tierra caliente, a
fertile valley extending along a northwest-southeast axis from the state of Guerrero to the
state of Jalisco, between the towering peaks of the Sierra Madre del Sur and the Sierra Madre
Occidental. The subtropical lowland contains rich farmland irrigated by rivers and streams
99 “Jalisco: La invasión de Los Templarios,” Proceso, 30 enero 2013.
Page 077 flowing down from the mountains on both sides, and has long been a leading avocado and
mango producer. Unlike the highland areas where Mr. Collazo is from, the tierra caliente has
been a center of successive waves of drug-war violence going back decades.
75. Michoacán became an early focus of the new phase of the drug war in 2006, due mainly to
the geographic isolation in the tierra caliente region of the state and the fertile agricultural land
(in a country where only about 10% the land is suitable for farming) that attracted poppy and
marijuana growers.100
76. In 1970, with financial, technical, and logistical support from the United States, the Mexican
government pursued an aggressive campaign of aerial eradication followed by the incursion
of thousands of Mexican soldiers in select regions. “Operation Condor,” as it was known
targeted the highlands of Sinaloa, in particular, along with several regions in Guerrero and
Michoacán. The operations destroyed thousands of hectares of poppy and marijuana plants
and, for a time, drove the most important drug traffickers from the state of Sinaloa. The
founders of the Guadalajara, Tijuana, and Ciudad Juárez Cartels (along with many smaller
offshoots) were all drug traffickers from Sinaloa, forced out of the state by anti-drug
operations between 1970 and 1976. During Operation Condor, drug traffickers from
Sinaloa started growing marijuana and buying out local producers in Sonora, Chihuahua, and
Michoacán in particular.
77. The same operations also displaced hundreds of rural communities in their entirety.
Recently declassified documents from Mexican and U.S. archives detail a systemic pattern of
abuse committed by occupying Mexican soldiers against the civilian populations they
encountered in Sinaloa, including arson, theft, rape, torture, and murder. Not all of this
abuse was simply a matter of harsh tactics, undisciplined troops, or poor military leadership.
100 Illicit drug production, however, remained a relatively modest, small-scale endeavor even as the market for illicit drugs in the United States boomed in the late 1960s.
Page 078 The same sources reveal that the Mexican federal government, through the Dirección
Federal de Seguridad (DFS) a secret police agency used by one-party state (1929-2000) to
maintain its monopoly control over Mexican politics, collaborated with the Mexican armed
forces to use drug enforcement operations as a pretext to hunt down political dissidents and
other perceived enemies of the regime. During the 1970s, they kidnapped, tortured, killed
and disappeared at least 1,000 dissidents, the vast majority of them in Sinaloa, Guerrero, and
Mexico City, many of them at the exact times and places where they were supposedly
conducting anti-drug operations. 101
78. The DFS also colluded with drug traffickers when it suited their interests, and this
relationship was an open secret.102
79. After Operation Condor was cancelled in 1976 (by the new President, José López Portillo),
drug traffickers and illicit investment capital flooded back into the highlands of Sinaloa.
With cash from their new regional hubs and the expanding market for illicit drugs from the
United States, drug traffickers rebuilt many of the communities devastated by the Mexican
armed forces, and they expanded and modernized both poppy and marijuana production.
80. Guadalajara, Jalisco, however, remained the financial and political capital of the drug trade in
Mexico, and the Guadalajara Cartel coordinated a national federation of drug traffickers.
81. As the United States concentrated drug enforcement efforts on south Florida and the
Caribbean, Colombian cocaine traffickers increasingly relied upon Mexican drug traffickers
to move their products into the United States. Sinaloans Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo and
101 During the 1970s, they kidnapped, tortured, killed and disappeared at least 1,000 dissidents, the vast majority of them in Sinaloa, Guerrero, and Mexico City, many of them at the exact times and places where they were supposedly conducting anti-drug operations. Jorge Luis Sierra Guzmán, El enemigo interno: contrainsurgencia y fuerzas armadas en México (México: Plaza y Valdés, 2003). 102 When a group of United States Drug Enforcement Agency operatives arrived in Guadalajara, Jalisco in 1985 to investigate the kidnapping, torture, and murder of fellow agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, their local guide showed them a safe house shared by the DFS and the Guadalajara Cartel. They used the large, centrally-located mansion for holding meetings and entertaining, and they sometimes hosted parties together. Kuykendall, kindle ed, locs 98-109.
Page 079 Amado Carrillo Fuentes pioneered this trade. Mexican drug traffickers gradually took a
larger portion of the profits and began to supplant Colombians in both production and
smuggling to the United States.103 Coupled with the financial collapse of the Mexican state,
which was left with few resources to invest in rural communities and little credibility, the
new drug boom in the area reinforced the idea that drug traffickers were the true local
leaders – the ones who paid for new schools, health clinics, and roads, but also local people
who grew up poor and made their mark on the world (however infamous that mark might
appear).
82. In the early 1990s, two cousins from Uruapan, Michoacán, Armando Valencia Cornelio and
Luis Valencia Valencia built a network of small marijuana producers in the tierra caliente of
Michoacán and collaborated with the Guadalajara Cartel in the trans-shipment of Andean
cocaine through remote airstrips and Pacific beaches. The Valencias, also known as the
Milenio Cartel, controlled much of the local drug production and trade until 2001.
83. Like previous large-scale drug enforcement efforts, the eradication and interdiction efforts of
the 1990s in Mexico were severely compromised by political corruption. General José de
Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, appointed Mexico’s “Drug Czar” in 1996, was convicted of
working for the Juárez Cartel and sentenced to 30 years in prison in 2007.104 Similar scandals
103 In 1985, Mexico surpassed Colombia for the first time as the world’s leading producer of marijuana. 104 Gutiérrez Rebollo, commander of the military region including the state of Jalisco participated in several high-profile actions in the takedown of the Guadalajara Cartel after the arrest of its leaders in 1989, and he continued to lead eradication efforts in Jalisco, Guerrero, and Sinaloa into the 1990s. In 1996, he was appointed Mexico’s “Drug Czar” (Director del Instituto Nacional para el Combate a las Drogas (INCD)), where he had access to intelligence, resources, and equipment from Mexico and the United States, and where he had command and control authority over the drug eradication operations. He was apparently using these resources to help the leader of the Juárez Cartel, Amado Carrillo Fuentes, to weaken his enemies and grow his own illicit empire. From the payments he received from Carrillo, the general became fabulously wealthy, so wealthy that he was investigated for corruption and fraud. General Rebollo was fired, arrested, and sentenced to 30 years in prison (and a subsequent 40 years after a second trial in 2007). His immediate subordinate, Brigadier General Alfredo Navarro Lara, was arrested on bribery charges a month later. “Another Mexican General is Arrested and Charged with Links to Drug Cartel,” New York Times, March 18, 1997; and “Drug Ties Taint 2 Mexican Governors,” New York Times, February 23, 1997.
Page 080 took down important leaders in the Federal Judicial Police and many state police forces in
this period.105
84. Such notorious corruption and abuse of local civilian populations tainted smaller-scale drug
eradication efforts across the country. Regardless of the officers in charge or the motives and
actions of the soldiers involved, locals generally resented Army incursions and were deeply
suspicious of drug eradication efforts. Most of the marijuana plots in rural Michoacán and
Jalisco were small-scale family operations run by impoverished rural farmers with few other
options for subsistence. Social and ethnic divisions played a role in such suspicions as well.
85. While farmers in highland communities are poor by most measures, many still own their
own plots of land and trace their connections to that land back generations, whereas the
agricultural workforce in the tierra caliente is largely comprised of landless laborers, who are
much more recent migrants. 106
86. In 2001, the security wing of the Tamaulipas-based Gulf Cartel, a group of former Special
Forces officers who deserted the Mexican Army known as Los Zetas, moved into
Michoacán in force. They aimed to take over the lucrative cocaine trans-shipment business,
and they made war on the Valencias/Milenio Cartel.
87. The Zetas were originally founded in 1999 as a special security force for the Gulf Cartel,
which dominated the drug trade in the states of Veracruz and Tamaulipas, along the Gulf of
105 The commander of the (extinct) Federal Judicial Police in Baja California, Rodolfo García Gaxiola, aka “El Chipolín,” coordinated a formidable network of corrupt law enforcement officials and front businesses for the Arrellano Félix Cartel (based in Tijuana). Among many related crimes, García Gaxiola was implicated (along with former Sonora Governor Beltrones) in the cover-up that followed the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio on March 23, 1994, and the assassination of the Tijuana police chief a month later. In the aftermath of the Colosio assassination, he was re-assigned to Sonora (from Baja California). When a series of warrants were issued for his arrest in 1996, García Gaxiola disappeared, becoming a fugitive from justice. García Gaxiola reappeared dead in May of 1998, after he was gunned down in Ciudad Obregón by members of the Beltrán Leyva Organization. In 2003, the U.S. Department of the Treasury black-listed 14 businesses and 17 individuals affiliated with García Gaxiola and his family, for their relationship with organized crime. 106 Regardless of the broader public health or law enforcement aims behind eradication efforts, they were destroying the livelihood of poor, but highly independent and locally rooted families, and providing little in the way of compensation or alternatives.
Page 081 Mexico. Gulf Cartel leader Osiel Cárdenas Guillén recruited a group of 37 Special Forces
operators from two different elite units within the Mexican armed forces and deployed them
in aggressive attacks against rival organizations, law enforcement, and anyone else perceived
to be in the way of Gulf Cartel operations. The Zetas grew from there into a sizeable
mercenary army, with its own arms trafficking, recruiting and training apparatus. Thanks
largely to the bold and ruthless Zetas, the Gulf Cartel expanded dramatically, consolidating
its control over eastern Mexico, and developing new operations across the country. After
Cárdenas Guillén was arrested in 2003, the Zetas began to operate more independently from
their home base in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas (also on the Gulf Coast) although still in
partnership with the Gulf Cartel.
88. In 2002, the federal prosecutor’s office in Mexico City (PGR) reported 167 drug-related
executions in the state of Michoacán, the second highest in the country, behind Sinaloa.
Shootouts and tit-for-tat executions between the Valencias and Los Zetas claimed dozens of
lives and terrified the civilian population. The consequent battles were a result of various
alliances between the different cartels, with the conflict centered on the contested territory
of Apatzingán.107
89. Los Zetas were firmly entrenched in Apatzingán by 2003 and they opened a network of
laboratories producing synthetic drugs there, in direct competition with the Sinaloa Cartel.
The Valencias retreated to the northwest and into the state of Jalisco.
90. However benevolent they were with some of their social investments, the drug traffickers
ruled their territories with an iron fist. They tolerated no opposition; they enforced contracts
with extreme violence; and they often battled among themselves. They also imported forced
107 In response to the onslaught of Los Zetas, the Valencias made an alliance with the Sinaloa Cartel, the most powerful cartel in Mexico and the main rival to the patron of Los Zetas, the Gulf Cartel. Los Zetas still managed to dominate the tierra caliente, where they expanded into the production of synthetic drugs. Their operations were centered in Apatzingán, and it became a highly contested territory.
Page 082 laborers from other parts of Mexico; tortured and killed politicians, journalists, and human
rights activists whose work threatened to reveal their operations or political connections;
and, they sought to corrupt or kill any law enforcement or soldiers active in their territory.
91. The local affiliates of the Zetas developed a reputation for asserting control over local
politics and trying to control everyday life for the civilian population to a much greater
degree than other drug cartels. Beginning in 2004, Carlos Rosales Mendoza, a close associate
of the boss of the Gulf Cartel, Osiel Cárdenas, and Nazario Moreno González, aka El Más
Loco [The Craziest Guy] began to refer to their organization as La Familia [The Family], and
to impose a set of moral strictures upon its members and the civilian populations they
controlled. They prohibited cartel members from using drugs, punished drunkards and
adulterers, enforced evening curfews, delivered harangues about expunging corruption and
sin from the state, and left messages citing biblical passages with their victims when they
carried out assassinations. All of these endeavors placed local police and soldiers in delicate
and vulnerable positions – which laws were they to enforce, those of the state or those of
the cartel?
92. In 2005, the Sinaloa and Milenio Cartels struck back. Their first target, on August 28, was
the municipal police in Apatzingán.108 Massive shootouts and a wave of assassinations
followed across the state of Michoacán.
93. In 2006, La Familia broke away from Los Zetas in order to monopolize local resources for
themselves, but also likely hoping to deflect the aggression of the Sinaloa Cartel.109 They
proceeded to consolidate control over the tierra caliente in particular, coercing local officials
and police into compliance, and imposing their draconian rules on the civilian populations.
108 They considered the municipal police of Apatzingán to be stooges for La Familia and Los Zetas 109 The incident described above, in which members of La Familia rolled the heads of 6 Zetas commanders into a nightclub in Uruapan, mark the split
Page 083 94. In the Municipality of Coalcomán, Michoacán (in Mr. home state), near
the Jalisco border, Los Zetas targeted local officials and ordinary people for extortion and
forced recruitment, particularly young men. And the families of those who refused faced
kidnapping, torture, and execution. In July of 2006, for example, operatives for Los Zetas
disguised as federal agents, stormed the house of a young man who refused to join them,
and kidnapped three people. Two young men were found with more than twenty bullets in
each, and the young woman taken with them was never seen again.110 Elsewhere in
Coalcomán, Los Zetas endorsed candidates for office and threatened anyone who supported
or voted for other candidates, and paramilitaries blocked known opponents from voting.111
A Regidor [representative] in the Coalcomán Municipal Council for the town of El Guayabo,
Fabián Jiménez Martínez was murdered in 2006, after being kidnapped and tortured by cartel
gunmen near the Colima border, along with two other local officials.112
95. Over the same period, 2000-06, a national drug war that would ultimately prompt a massive
military intervention by the Mexican government was brewing outside of Michoacán.
96. The Beltrán Leyva brothers were original founders of the Sinaloa Cartel along with Joaquín
“El Chapo” Guzmán Loera, Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, and Edgar Valdez Villarreal, aka
“La Barbie.” Their organization was in charge of operations in Sonora, a key transit route to
the United States. After Guzmán’s arrest and imprisonment in 1993, the Beltrán Leyva
brothers helped to carry out his orders and keep the organization running. Once Guzmán
escaped from prison in 2001, the Beltrán Leyva brothers led a massive expansion effort for
110 “Dan último adiós a jóvenes acribillados en Coalcomán,” Cambio de Michoacán, 27 julio 2006. http://www.cambiodemichoacan.com.mx/vernota.php?id=47991 111 Grayson and Logan, The Executioner’s Men, 78. 112 “Comando armado ejecuta a regidor de Coalcomán,” Cambio de Michoacán, 29 septiembre 2006, http://www.cambiodemichoacan.com.mx/vernota.php?id=51157
Page 084 the Sinaloa Cartel, taking on rival organizations across the country. They targeted local
police departments, in particular.113
97. The election of Vicente Fox of the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) to the Presidency of
Mexico in 2000, the first candidate from an opposition political party to hold that office
since 1929, threatened a dramatic shake-up in the structure of political power and the
mechanics of corruption related to the illicit drug trade. While many honest government
officials and members of civil society saw an opportunity to rid the country of corruption
once and for all, ambitious organized crime groups saw an opportunity to expand their
influence by filling in the power vacuum created by the dismantling of parts of the old
regime and corrupt politicians and government officials looked to infiltrate opposition
political parties and the institutions they came to control. Perhaps the most ambitious of
these crime bosses, El Chapo Guzmán, smelled opportunity and orchestrated his escape
from the federal penitentiary just after Fox took office.
98. As soon as he got his bearings, Guzmán went after new territory far beyond Sinaloa,
attacking the Gulf Cartel in Nuevo Laredo, the Arellano Félix Cartel in Tijuana, the Carrillo
Fuentes Cartel in Ciudad Juárez, and the Zetas Cartel in Michoacán and Zacatecas. In each
of these cases, he used the networks of corruption laid out by the Beltrán Leyva brothers to
buy off, intimidate, or kill local police departments, political machines, and military garrisons.
The war with Carrillo Fuentes (a crime family from the same part of Sinaloa) officially began
on September 11, 2004, with the assassination of Rodolfo Carrillo Fuentes, aka “El Hijo de
Oro”[The Golden Child] outside of a movie theater in Culiacán, Sinaloa, but a gradual
escalation was already well underway.114
113 José Reveles, El cártel incomodo: el fin de los Beltrán Leyva y la hegemonía del Chapo Guzmán (México: Grijalbo, 2011) kindle ed, locs. 50-230. 114 Valdez Cárdenas, 131-47.
Page 085 99. Guzmán sent the Beltrán Leyva brothers to Tamaulipas in 2003, to conquer territory, transit
routes, and access points to the United States from the rival Gulf Cartel. Massive shootouts,
the takeover of entire local police departments, and a wave of assassinations followed. The
Gulf Cartel responded by attacking Sinaloa Cartel territory, and places like Michoacán were
caught in the middle.
100. Violence escalated dramatically in 2004, thanks to the territorial expansion of the Sinaloa
and Gulf Cartels, and the expiration of the U.S. assault weapons ban.115
101. Local and state police officers came under enormous pressure. As Daniel Sabet explains:
“Even though a municipal officer is not responsible for, nor authorized to, pursue and
investigate drug trafficking, she nonetheless might be asked to look the other way, provide
security for a shipment, provide weapons, information, and uniforms, or actively engage in
transport and sale.”116
102. In order to fuel the growing war, the Zetas recruited gangsters from the United States and
members of the Kaibiles, the Guatemalan Special Forces. The Sinaloa Cartel responded by
hiring special security squads from as far away as El Salvador, and deploying its own special
assassination team, known as Los Antrax [Anthrax].
103. Drug violence spread to previously unaffected areas of Mexico after 2006 due to a series of
internal struggles within Mexico’s two strongest drug trafficking organizations – the Sinaloa
Cartel and the Gulf Cartel; and aggressive law enforcement operations against two of the
strongest regional cartels – the Tijuana Cartel in Baja California and the La Familia Cartel in
Michoacán.
115 Arindrajit Dube, Oeindra Dube, and Omar García Ponce,“Cross-Border Spillover: U.S. Gun Laws and Violence in Mexico,” American Political Science Review Vol. 107 No. 3, 397-417; and Howard Campbell, “Drug Trafficking Stories: Everyday Forms of Narco-Folklore on The U.S. Mexico Border,” International Journal of Drug Policy Vol. 16, no. 5, 326- 333. 116 “The Border Bottleneck: Drug Trafficking, Civil Society, and Incentives for Police Corruption,” Deceiving (Dis)Appearances: Analyzing Current Developments in Europe and North America’s Border Regions, Harlan Koff, ed.(Brussels: Peter Lang, 2007).
Page 086 104. In 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderón announced the “Permanent Campaign against
Drug Trafficking,” which resulted in the deployment of 50,000 Mexican soldiers, sailors, and
marines in counter-narcotics operations over the next six years. At the same time, the
Mexican government’s virtual destruction of the Tijuana (Baja California) and La Familia
(Michoacán) Cartels created power vacuums across western Mexico and the surviving
organizations battled over the spoils. The Calderón administration (2006-2012) deployed
heavily-armed soldiers, marines, and federal police to occupy parts of Michoacán and Baja
California beginning in late 2008 and escalating through 2009; arrested much of the
leadership of the Tijuana and La Familia Cartels; and seriously disrupted their operations.117
What had been a set of more or less stable regional cartels going back to the 1990s, quickly
devolved into a series of chaotic and overlapping national archipelagos. Alliances were made
and broken more quickly than ever before; the competition for local territories (known as
plazas) grew increasingly violent; and many previously peaceful areas were pulled into the
conflict.118
105. On December 12, 2006 President Calderón ordered 4,000 troops to Michoacán where over
500 had been killed in drug related crime. Troops were sent to areas of the state in which the
government had no control, in order to conduct raids, make arrests and establish control
points on highways and other key roads.119 Ten hitmen were detained as part of the
Operación Conjunta Michoacán, three of which were in Apatzingán and the other seven
117 The first target in President Calderón’s offensive was his home state of Michoacán, and the tierra caliente, in particular. In the lead-up to the military intervention in the state, Members of the Policía Federal Preventiva (PFP) arrested Alfonso Barajas Figueroa, known as Poncho el Feo, presumed leader of the Gulf Cartel in 2006 in the city of Apatzingan.117 And then, SEDENA and the PGR conducted a surprise operation in Apatzingán in which they arrested more than 200 local police for involvement in drug trafficking operations. “Y el narco, desatado...” (2006, August 6). Retrieved June, 8, 2015. http://www.noroeste.com.mx/publicaciones .php?id=193136 118 Robert C. Bonner, “The New Cocaine Cowboys: How to Defeat Mexio’s Drug Cartels,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 4 (July/August 2010), 35-47; George W. Grayson, La Familia Drug Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012). 119 Operation Michoacan. (2010, August 14). Retrieved June 15, 2015, from http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2010/07/operation-michoacan.html
Page 087 were in the municipality of Aguililla.120 There was a major confrontation including several
drug trafficking organizations as well as the Ministerial Police, all occurring in the
municipality of Apatzingán.121
106. La Familia took advantage of the military assault on Los Zetas to consolidate its control
over the tierra caliente. In part, they used their status as locals and portrayed the federal police
and military as occupiers, out to destroy the state. They also invested heavily in legitimate
businesses and created a protection racket giving them a stake in nearly 85% of the
legitimate businesses in the state. Outmanned and outgunned, local police departments were
cowed into submission. In probably its boldest and most terrifying move, La Familia
launched a series of grenade attacks on revelers at the Independence Day (September 16,
2008) celebrations in the state capital of Morelia.
107. At the northern edge of the Tierra Caliente and along the Jalisco border, violence heated up
in 2008, with shootouts in broad daylight, threatening banners and messages left by drug
cartels in public places, and an ever-increasing military presence.
108. During this time, many political candidates and politicians were targeted by organized
crime.122 In 2007, the leading mayoral candidates in Nueva Italia, Michoacán (about 100
miles from Ixtlán) and dropped out before election day after receiving death threats. In
2008, on June 2, the Mayor of Villa Hidalgo, Marcelo Ibarra was gunned down. On June 25,
the same thing happened to the Síndico [popular representative] of Tuzantla, Raúl Martínez
Ulloa. And, on July 4, the Síndico of Zamora, Gamaliel Mendoza Mendoza was murdered in
the street by gunmen, presumed to be in the pay or organized crime. Then, on August 4,
120 Gómez, F. (2006, December 21). Los Zetas están acabados: Jefe militar en Michoacán. Retrieved June 9, 2015, from http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/primera/28144.html 121 Antonio Duarte, M. (2006, July 22). Chocan policías y narcos en Apatzingán. Retrieved June 14, 2015, from http://www.cambiodemichoacan.com.mx/vernota.php?id=47738
Page 088 2008, the Regidor of Trojes in the Municipal Council of Coalcomán, was killed in an ambush
on his vehicle on a remote stretch of highway. There were eighteen bullet-holes in his
pickup truck, and his daughter and niece survived with wounds to the hands and face,
respectively.123
109. The assault, kidnapping, torture, execution and mutilation of law enforcement officers and
soldiers in Michoacán escalated over the course of 2009 and 2010. (See paragraphs 24-31
above).
110. In the winter of 2008, the Beltrán Leyva Organization split away from the Sinaloa Cartel.124
The Beltrán Leyva brothers were co-founders of the original Sinaloa Cartel, along with
Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, and they had spent nearly a decade conquering and
controlling territory, transit routes, and government offices for the Sinaloa Cartel in the
northeast (far from their home base on the Pacific Coast). After the split, the two remaining
factions fought vicious battles to control these conquests.125
111. Then, in the winter of 2010, the Zetas formally split from the Gulf Cartel and initiated a
reign of terror in the states of Tamaulipas and Veracruz. Five separate drug trafficking
123 “Ejecutan a regidor,”El Sol de Morelia, 6 de agosto de 2008; “Ejecuta grupo armado a regidor de Coalcomán, Michoacán,” W Radio, 5 agosto 2008. http://www.wradio.com.mx/noticias/ejecuta-grupo-armado-a-regidor-de- coalcoman-michoacan/20080805/nota/646041.aspx 124 Following the split and in there struggle with the Sinaloa Cartel for the territory they had acquired during their alliance, the Beltrán Leyvas forged an alliance with the Zetas – at the time, the security arm of the Tamaulipas-based Gulf Cartel, the second most powerful criminal organization in Mexico, based on the Gulf Coast. The Sinaloa Cartel retaliated to incursions on its turf by attacking Beltrán Leyva, Zetas, and Gulf Cartel territories across the country. Anabel Hernández, Narcoland: The Mexican Drug Lords and Their Godfathers (London: Verso, 2013); Proceso, 16 octubre 2011; Los Angeles Times, May 12, 2012. 125 Malcolm Beith, The Last Narco: Inside the Hunt for the World’s Most Wanted Drug Lord (New York: Grove Press, 2010), 149, 197; Diego Enrique Osorno, El Cartel de Sinaloa: Una historia del uso político del narco (Mexico: Grijalbo: 2010); June S. Beittel, “Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence,” Congressional Research Service, April 15, 2013, stable URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf
Page 089 organizations were now fighting for territory in Mexico – the Sinaloa Cartel, the Beltrán
Leyva Organization, the Juárez Cartel, the Zetas, and the Gulf Cartel.126
112. Over the course of 2008 and 2009, as the Gulf Cartel and the Zetas embarked on more
ambitious operations – in the states of Nuevo León, Zacatecas, and Michoacán in particular
– rivalries and disputes emerged among the leadership, which led to a formal rift in the
winter of 2010.
113. In many other places throughout the country, the battle between the Gulf Cartel and the
Sinaloa Cartel to fill the vacuum created by law enforcement operations against the Tijuana,
Juárez, and La Familia Cartels turned increasingly violent, and it became increasingly difficult
for the civilian population to escape it.
114. In 2010, 10 mayors in Michoacán were arrested in a federal sweep along with eighteen other
officials, on suspicion of working for La Familia.127 By 2010, the Army claimed to have
destroyed more than four hundred methamphetamine labs in the Tierra Caliente region.
However, La Familia remained one of the largest meth producing organizations in North
America.128 Upon the death of Nazario Moreno, the founder of La Familia, in 2010, and the
arrest of many of its most powerful commanders, a splinter group formed a new cartel called
the Knights Templar. The Knights Templar formed a temporary alliance with the Sinaloa
and Gulf Cartels to drive the Zetas from the region. (Many analysts also assert that because
the Zetas were the primary target of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and Mexican law
enforcement, allying against them took some initial heat off of the Knights Templar).
126 Freddy Mariñez Navarro and Leonardo Vivas, “Violence, Governance, and Economic Development at the U.S.- Mexico Border: The Case of Nuevo Laredo and Its Lessons,” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Summer 2012), 377-416. 127 Finnegan, W. (2010). Silver or Lead. The New Yorker. Retrieved June 10, 2015, from http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/05/31/silver-or-lead 128 Finnegan, W. (2010). Silver or Lead. The New Yorker. Retrieved June 10, 2015, from http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/05/31/silver-or-lead
Page 090 115. The Knights Templar Cartel quickly assumed most of the former territories of the La
Familia, and then moved into the adjacent states of Guerrero and Estado de México, using a
similar brand of evangelical preaching, military zeal, and interpenetration of the local
economy to entrench themselves. The Knights Templar organization controls much of the
drug trade and maintains a formidable labyrinth of corruption and protection rackets across
the state of Michoacán.
116. Since 2012, the Knights Templar Cartel has faced two new and formidable threats to their
authority, which have brought a return to mass violence to many areas of the state: the auto-
defensa or vigilante movement129, and the Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartel.
117. First, auto-defensas, or vigilante groups, comprised of local citizens tired of being the victims
of violence and being perpetually occupied by law enforcement officials and soldiers from
outside of their towns and villages started to organize armed patrols and checkpoints. Along
Michoacán’s remote Pacific coast and the tierra caliente self-defense groups successfully
pushed local affiliates of drug cartels out of their towns, thwarted kidnappings and
extortions by creating hotlines for people to call and showing up in force to respond to such
incidents, and intimidated law enforcement, whom they suspected of collaborating with
organized crime.
118. The Mexican government’s initial response was to accuse the self-defense groups of
committing crimes and/or arrest them for carrying weapons. And, to the government’s
credit, some of the groups may have been colluding with organized crime – like local police,
they can be corrupted as well. Over time, the government changed its tune and started to
129 The Star (South Africa). 14 Jan. 2014. They faced sporadic gunfire from unknown persons, but neither the state nor the local government tried to stop them. Members of the vigilante groups have been invited to join the police force in return for giving up their presence in the vigilante groups. However, Estanislao Beltran, a leader in the vigilante movement stated: “If we give up our weapons without any of the drug cartel leaders having been detained, we are putting our families in danger because they will come and kill everyone, including the dogs.” Tuckman, Jo. “The vigilantes taking up arms against Mexico’s ‘Knights Templar’ drug cartel: Self-defence groups blame lack of government action, Leaders claim they have created oases of peace.” The Guardian. 18 Jan. 2014.
Page 091 request that self-defense groups voluntarily surrender their arms, and pledged to incorporate
some of their more cooperative elements into a rural police force.
119. Over the course of 2013, masked vigilantes took effective control over dozens of
communities in Michoacán, issuing their own laws, and accusing the authorities of failing to
stop corruption, kidnapping, and murder. By January of 2014, they had taken over
Apatzingán, and moved on Nueva Italia (a little over 100 miles from Mr.
home town). On January 12, hundreds of vigilantes entered Nueva Italia,
claiming that they were liberating the town from the grip of the Knights Templar.130 They
faced sporadic gunfire from unknown persons, but neither the state nor the local
government tried to stop them. Members of the vigilante groups have been invited to join
the police force in return for giving up their presence in the vigilante groups. However,
Estanislao Beltran, a leader in the vigilante movement stated: “If we give up our weapons
without any of the drug cartel leaders having been detained, we are putting our families in
danger because they will come and kill everyone, including the dogs.”131
120. Two days later, the government launched a major offensive and promised to restore law
and order. “So far, however, the revamped army and federal police presence in Tierra
Caliente has done little more than freeze the crisis and reveal rising local support for the
vigilantes.” Leaders of the vigilante movement claim that an agreement has been negotiated
with the government – they will be discreet with their weapons as long as the government
directs more time and effort to taking out cartel leaders in the mountain areas. Local
community leaders, including the local diocese, claim they will march with the self-defense
groups if the federal police don’t start targeting the cartel leaders. The Mexican government’s
130 “Mexico urges vigilantes to stand down in drug gang conflict.” The Star (South Africa). 14 Jan. 2014. 131 Tuckman, Jo. “The vigilantes taking up arms against Mexico’s ‘Knights Templar’ drug cartel: Self-defence groups blame lack of government action, Leaders claim they have created oases of peace.” The Guardian. 18 Jan. 2014.
Page 092 response to the groups has been mixed. Initially, soldiers tried to disarm the vigilantes, which
led to a shootout that resulted in several deaths. President Enrique Peña Nieto has urged the
groups to work within legal limits.
121. Meanwhile, as Elizabeth Malkin of the New York Times described it, “in Michoacán’s
agricultural lowlands, pickup trucks filled with armed men calling themselves self-defense
forces have been careening down country roads for the past week, advancing on towns
circling the region’s main city, Apatzingán. They have promised to seize the city, the
stronghold of the Knights Templar, the state’s powerful drug gang.”132 Leaders of the
vigilante movement claim that they will lay down their weapons once the crisis is resolved,
but they assert “the government should recognize that this is their failing.” Bruce Bagley, at
the University of Miami’s International Studies Department argues that the vigilante groups
have been created to fill the citizen security void/vacuum. For their part, self-defense groups
claim the Knights Templar employs the police (local & state).133
122. In June 2013, the Knights Templar engaged in fierce firefights with self-defense forces.134
New incursions by Los Zetas and their allies, however, have prompted some self-defense
groups to ally with the Knights Templar. According to Dr. Juan José Mireles, the founder
and original charismatic leader of the self-defense forces of Michoacán, who later became a
critic of their heavy-handed and lawless tactics, the self-defense forces in Coalcomán, in
particular, have allied with the Knights Templar Drug Cartel, and tolerate little dissent or
interference in their business operations.135
132 Malkin, Elisabeth and Paulina Villegas. “Enemies of Mexican Drug Gangs Pose a Security Challenge.” The New York Times, January 13, 2014. 133 “Mexico vigilantes in turf war with drug cartel.” The Guardian, January 13, 2014. 134 “Balacera entre Caballeros Templarios y Policía Comunitaria de Coalcomán, Michoacán,” Red Noticiero, 11 junio 2013. 135 “Asegura Mireles que autodefensas de Coalcomán pactaron con Templarios,” Changoonga Michoacán, 9 abril 2014.
Page 093 123. In Ixtlán, self-defense groups took root in the towns of Plaza de Limón, Montelongo,
Rincón del Mezquite, and San Simón. By 2014, most of the members of these self-defense
groups had taken advantage of President Peña Nieto’s offer to incorporate them into Los
Rurales (federal rural police units) and they partnered with state and federal police in convoys
to round up suspected members of CJNG. Like other self-defense forces in Michoacán who
joined Los Rurales, some of these groups took advantage of law enforcement resources to run
their own illicit businesses, including drug-trafficking operations coordinated by a group of
self-defense forces known as Los Viagras, who have built a formidable regional drug cartel in
Michoacán.136 Los Viagras have engaged in a fierce territorial battle with CJNG and a variety
of violet encounters with local law enforcement in Ixtlán.137 This dual reality of the local
self-defense forces in Ixtlán – vigilante law enforcement and homegrown drug cartel
supplied by the federal government – is entirely consistent with Mr.
ambivalent description of the self-defense forces in Plaza de Limón as armed, dangerous
men to be avoided whenever possible. It also explains why they are targeted as enemies by
CJNG – whether they are helping law enforcement to go after CJNG personnel or
competing with them for the local drug market, self-defense forces in Ixtlán threaten
CJNG’s operations and monopoly control.
124. With the changing nature of the conflict, members of the self-defense forces and their
families have become targets of the cartels. In June 2014, a former member of the self-
defense forces and his family were murdered in the border region between Michoacán and
Jalisco. The member, who had been incorporated into the Rural State Force from
136 Quadratín, 4 junio 2014; and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KTwLn-4N2t8. 137 “Each Rurales Member Issued 45 Bullets to Take on Tuta's Men,” Borderland Beat, 13 noviembre 2014; “Detienen a 4 presuntos agresores de policías en Ixtlán,” La Voz de Michoacán, 25 abril 2016; “Se reunirá en mañana gabinete nacional de seguridad en Michoacán,” Milenio, 21 marzo 2016; and Informe especial sobre los grupos de autodefensa en el estado de Michoacán y las violaciones a los derechos humanos relacionadas con el conflicto (México: Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, 2015).
Page 094 Tepalcatepec (about 100 miles from Ixtlán), was killed along with his wife and three children.
Santiago Moreno Valencia, and his wife, Bianca Godínez Chávez, and their three children
(ages 11, 14, and 16) were visibly tortured and shot. According to the social media page of
Valor Por Michoacán SDR, the family was ambushed by CJNG.138 In 2016, an ex-member
of the self-defense forces in Uruapan, Michoacán, was killed in the business he operated.
Salvador “C”, as he was known, was 35-years-old and had been shot three times by a lone
gunman, who fled on foot, according to witness testimony.139 In April 2016, three former
members of the self-defense forces were killed in a gunfight at a gas station. Authorities do
not have a motive, but all three of them were members of the self-defense force located in
the region.140 In June 2016, a gunfight broke out between armed civilians, allegedly members
of the Knights Templar Cartel, and ex-members of the self-defense forces at a ranch in
Michoacán and comprised over about 50 people. The battle between the alleged cartel
members and the former self-defense forces is part of a string of violent acts occurring in
the region including the discovery of three decapitated bodies.141
125. The second major threat to the Knights Templar Cartel, and to peace and security in the
state of Michoacán, has been the meteoric rise of the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación
(hereafter CJNG). CJNG rose to fame recently with a series of roadblocks and attacks on
military and law enforcement outposts that brought the metropolis of Guadalajara to a
138 “Former Autodefensa Member and Family Murdered” Borderland Beat, 19 June 2014. http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2014/06/former-autodefensa-member-and-family.html 139 “Ejecutan a ex autodefensa en Uruapan, Michoacán” MiMorelia.com, 12 June 2016. http://www.mimorelia.com/grid/ejecutan-a-ex-autodefensa-en-uruapan-michoacan/238654 140 “Matan en Michoacán a tres supuestos miembros de los Grupos de Autodefensa de Tierra Caliente” La Voz Libre (Europa Press), 24 April 2016. http://www.lavozlibre.com/noticias/ampliar/1210907/matan-en-michoacan-a-tres- supuestos-miembros-de-los-grupos-de-autodefensa-de-tierra-caliente 141 “Michoacán: Ex autodefensas y civiles armados se enfrentan en balacera” Noventa Grados, 9 June 2016. http://www.noventagrados.com.mx/seguridad/michoacan-ex-autodefensas-y-civiles-armados-se-enfrentan-en- balacera.htm
Page 095 standstill on May 1, 2015, and culminated with the shooting down of a Mexican Army
Blackhawk helicopter, using a shoulder-fired missile.
E. Violence in Mr. s home region of Michoacán along the border with Jalisco has escalated dramatically since 2012 thanks to the rise of Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), Mexico’s fastest growing drug cartel.
126. The violence in Michoacán spread to the neighboring states of Jalisco and Colima thanks to
the meteoric rise of the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), and made previously
peaceful border areas upriver from the Lago de Chapala, like Vista Hermosa, Tanhuato, and
Ixtlán particularly dangerous, consistent with Mr. of
conditions in his hometown.
127. The CJNG emerged originally as the “Matazetas” (“Zeta killers”).142 CJNG achieved global
infamy recently with a series of more than 25 roadblocks and attacks on military and law
enforcement outposts that brought the metropolis of Guadalajara to a standstill on May 1,
2015, and culminated with the shooting down of one of the Mexican army’s Blackhawk
helicopter, with a shoulder-fired missile.
128. CJNG was founded by Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, “El Mencho,” from the Tierra
Caliente of Michoacán. Oseguera began his career as a police officer in Tomatlán. Oseguera
worked in drug trafficking and making synthetic drugs with the Valencias in Michoacán (the
same group mentioned above) throughout the 1990s. In addition to his marriage to one of
the sisters of the Valencia brothers, the connection between the Valencias and El Mencho
was also strengthened by the formation of “Los Cuinis,” a group responsible for the
financial operations of the criminal organization that was eventually converted into a group
142 Beittel, June S. “Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations. Congressional Research Service. 22 June 2015. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf
Page 096 within CJNG.143 In 2005, he opened as a local branch of the Sinaloa Cartel in Jalisco, largely
involved in the manufacture and supply of methamphetamines for the U.S. market. CJNG
was deployed by the Sinaloa Cartel in Michoacán and other states as part of a Zeta-killing
collaboration, and then placed in charge of protecting the Sinaloa Cartel’s interest in
Guadalajara. Since the recapture of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán of the Sinaloa Cartel, El
Mencho has been classified as public enemy number one.
129. In 2010, the CJNG’s main contact and patron in the Sinaloa Cartel, Ignacio “Nacho”
Coronel, was killed, and the two organizations severed ties. They battled to a stalemate over
several drug production areas in the mountains of Sinaloa, and then CJNG retreated to
Jalisco. CJNG them moved its methamphetamine production out of Michoacán and into
the state of Colima in order to steer clear of the Knights Templar Cartel. CJNG also
invested heavily in heroin production in the state of Guerrero, where it acts as a financier
and wholesale buyer for other organizations. With the decline of the Knights Templar cartel,
CJNG has been able to expand its influence, reaching into as many as nine Mexican states as
of 2015.144
130. As the CJNG grew and went to war with its rivals, violence in the border region with
Michoacán escalated, and it often included the mutilation and display of corpses with
threatening notes and other morbid spectacles, consistent with Mr.
description of his brother’s 2012 murder. According to accounts in local newspapers, the
decapitated body of , the brother of Mr. ,
was founded hanging from an overpass (the Estación de Negrete bridge) in Vista Hermosa,
143 Jorge Morales Almada. “‘El Mencho’, el deportado que se convirtió en el narco más sanguinario”. Univision Noticias. 11 de abril 2016. http://www.univision.com/noticias/narcotrafico/el-mencho-el-deportado-que-se-convirtio-en-el- narco-mas-sanguinario 144 Beittel, June S. “Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations.” Congressional Research Service. 22 June 2015. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf
Page 097 Jalisco on the highway that runs through Ixtlán north to La Barca (Vista Hermosa sits along
the border), along with that of another young man, also from Plaza del Limón (Ixtlán).145
131. Twenty-two people were killed in one weekend in Jalisco in January 2013.146 The
competition between CJNG, Los Zetas, the Knights Templar, the Mexican army and various
self-defense forces turned many of the villages on the border between Michoacán and Jalisco
into ghost towns by 2014.147
132. In December 2013, Mexican authorities discovered a mass grave in La Barca, Jalisco, where
Mr. z was born and less than 20 miles from his hometown of La Plaza del
Limón. Sixty-four bodies were found. Some of the victims had been dead for two or three
years, others for only a few months. The investigation into the area was prompted by a
series of arrests in an investigation into the whereabouts of two federal police officers who
had disappeared in November 2013. One civilian and more than 20 police officers had
taken part in kidnapping, and several of them confessed that they had turned the federal
officers over to CJNG personnel near La Barca. The town of La Barca has been the site of
pitched battles between the Knights Templar Cartel and CJNG.148 The victims in the mass
graves are believed to have been casualties of the ongoing battle between the Knights
Templar and CJNG.149 The federal Attorney General reported that the local police arrested
were colluding with the CJNG cartel. The arrest warrant against these individuals cited their
“alleged ties and collusion with organized crime, kidnapping, grand theft, auto-theft,
145 Quadrtín, 11 marzo 2012; El Sol de Zamora, 12 maro 2012; La Policiaca, 12 marzo 2012; El Sur de Jalisco, 15 marzo 2012. 146 El Informador, 6 enero 2013. 147CJNG bases much of its production in Colima along the border with Michoacán. In 2014, reporter Valentina Valle described a visit to the region beginning in Coalcomán, and heading through the highlands to the Colima border. In Hihuitlán, in the Municipality of Chinicuila, she passed the last roadblock headed north towards Trojes, where soldiers and later self-defense groups warned her that she was entering “no man’s land,” controlled exclusively by drug traffickers. She describes passing through a half a dozen villages where all of the permanent residents have fled or been killed, and the only people visible during day light are hired hands, working for various drug cartels and cells. “Michoacán’s Ghost Towns,” Borderland Beat, May 30, 2014. 148 “64 bodies discovered in western Mexico.” Kashmir Monitor (India). 5 Dec. 2013. LexisNexis. 149 “In the grip of terror.” The Nation (Thailand). 9 Dec. 2014. LexisNexis.
Page 098 possession of a firearm without a license.” The arrested police officers acknowledged their
ties to organized crime and their involvement in the disappearance of the federal police
officers.150
133. The same day as the federal officers disappeared, November 3, 2014, national media outlets
reported the discovery of four bodies in a ditch in Ixtlán, apparent execution victims, found
near the charred remains of a pickup truck. The three men and one woman were all rural
laborers, with no apparent connection to organized crime.151
134. CJNG affiliates are very active along the highway between Mr.
hometown of La Plaza del Limón, Michoacán and the state of Jalisco (the same road on
which his brother’s body was found). They have engaged in fierce firefights with federal
police and soldiers. In May 2014, a military truck came under fire from assailants in the town
of Guachinango, Jalisco (about 80 miles west of Guadalajara). The assailants crashed their
vehicle into the truck carrying to soldiers, causing the military truck to catch fire, and the
assailants opened fire with machine guns. The attack, which has been attributed to CJNG,
left 4 soldiers dead and 2 others seriously wounded.152 Similarly brazen assaults show the
audacity and firepower of CJNG. In September 2014, armed men ambushed and attacked a
group of soldiers returning to the highway after completing a patrol in the hills above Quila,
Jalisco. Three soldiers were wounded and one was killed in the encounter. The encounter
continued with a vehicle pursuit down the highway. The assailants took refuge in a house,
from which they threw fragmentation grenades and fired high-powered rifles at the soldiers.
150 “Mexico’s 20 municipal policemen imprisoned for ties to organized crime.” BBC Monitoring Latin America - Political. 28 Jan. 2014. 151 “Hallan 4 ejecutados en Ixtlán, Michoacán,” La Jornada, 3 noviembre 2014; “Macabro hallazgo 4 ejecutado en una brecha, en Ixtlán, Michoacán,” Blod del Narco, 2 noviembre 2014; “Macabro hallazgo 4 ejecutado en una brecha, en Ixtlán, Michoacán,” El Norte, 2 noviembre 2014; “Eran hermanos tres de los ejecutados en Ixtlán,” La Voz de Michoacán 3 noviembre 2014; and “Eran campesinos los cuatro ejecutados de Ixtlán de Los Hervores,” Provincia, 3 noviembre 2014. 152 “Mexico investigating attack that killed 4 soldiers.” The New Zealand Herald. 15 May 2014. LexisNexis.
Page 099 They were only subdued after state police helicopter arrived. Three CJNG gunmen were
arrested on the scene.153
135. CJNG has carried out a variety of targeted executions in the region. Eladío Ávila Pérez, 67,
the father-in-law of Nestora Salgado García, head of a community police force in Guerrero,
who was arrested and serving time in Nayarit prison, was killed in Tomatlán, Jalisco by an
assassin working for CJNG, Juan Pérez, who managed to escape. Ávila and relatives in the
U.S. had been threatened to stop their activism in favor of their detained daughter-in-law.
CJNG had declared its opposition to all community police forces, self-defense groups, or
vigilante groups, and Pérez was known in the area. He rode up to the old man’s car on his
motorcycle and shot him at point blank range.154
136. Through a family connection, CJNG is allied with another emergent drug cartel, made up
of former members of the Gulf Cartel called Los Cuinis, which has captured much of the
state of Veracruz over the last two years. This alliance was a direct affront to Los Zetas and
part of a strategy of intimidation dating back to their alliance with the Sinaloa Cartel and a
September 2011 massacre in which CJNG operatives killed 35 alleged associates of Los
Zetas on their own territory, in Boca del Río, Veracruz (mentioned above).
137. In June 2015, Mexican authorities arrested a suspected CJNG leader as part of Operation
Jalisco. Victor Manuel García Orozco was a CJNG lieutenant and involved in the trafficking
of drugs, fuel and resource theft, and other attacks on governmental officials in La Barca
(the municipality where Mr. was born), Jamay, Poncitlan Tizapan El
Alto, Jalisco, and in Brisenas, Sahuayo, Vista Hermosa, Tanhuato, Ixtlán (Mr.
hometown), Pajacuaran, and Venustiano Carranza, Michoacán. Prosecutors
believe that García Orozco was also responsible for November 3, 2013 kidnapping and
153 La Crónica, Jalisco, 24 septiembre 2014. 154 La Jornada, 22 mayo 2016.
Page 100 murder of the two federal police officers mentioned above. The arrest of García Orozco
gave authorities a glimpse into CJNG’s network. Ixtlán was one of the regions controlled by
García Orozco.155
138. The search for the murdered police officers led to the discovery of 37 mass graves in and
around the town of La Barca.156
139. Also in 2015, 40 people were killed in a confrontation between CJNG members and
government forces at a ranch (Rancho del Sol) in Jalisco – 39 cartel members were killed and
1 police officer was killed trying to assist a wounded colleague. The national security
commissioner, Monte Alejandro Rubido, asserted that the suspects were members of “a
criminal organization operating in Jalisco state,” however he did not mention which cartel.
The shootout occurred about 20 miles from La Barca. When armed men appeared suddenly
at the ranch, soldiers, police, and state and federal officials investigated, leading to an intense
attack on the state and federal officials. The border zone of Michoacán and Jalisco is “an
area dominated by the Jalisco New Generation cartel and has been the scene of numerous
incidents of cartel violence in recent years.” In April 2015, CJNG attacked a police convoy
and killed 15 state officers and wounded 5 more officers.157
140. In March 2016, a gunfight broke out between municipal officers and members of the
CJNG in Ixtlán, Michoacán. Five members of the CJNG were captured. Authorities assume
the attack was related to territorial expansion by the CJNG into Ixtlán, Michoacán.158 In
155 “Mexican law-enforcers arrest suspected cartel operator.” BBC, June 4, 2015. 156 “31 Bodies Unburied in Narcofosas in La Barca, Jalisco,” Borderland Beat, November 13, 2013; and “Mexican law- enforcers arrest suspected cartel operator.” BBC, June 4, 2015. 157 “Dozens killed in ranch gun battle.” Belfast Telegraph Online. 23 May 2015. LexisNexis 158 Miguel García Tonoco “Caen 5 integrantes del CJNG tras enfrentamiento en Michoacán” Excélsior, 21 March 2016. http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2016/03/21/1082239
Page 101 April 2016, Samuel Vargas, a police officer from Ixtlán, was shot and killed during a
confrontation with members of organized crime.159
141. To date, CJNG have killed more than 100 officials and police officers in Jalisco; driven Los
Zetas out of northern Jalisco and parts of Zacatecas; and seized control of the ports of
Manzanillo and Lázaro Cárdenas. Mexican security experts are warning that local authorities
face the possibility of losing control over the western portion of the state of Jalisco with an
increase in attacks on security forces. In February 2016, five police officers were murdered in
the span of a week. In March, a local mayor barely survived an assassination attempt. After
the targeting of three police officers outside of the popular tourist district of Tlaquepaque,
the police chief and his deputy resigned citing personal security and safety concerns. 160 They
aggressively recruit soldiers and marines; they use heavy weaponry; and they are rumored to
have trained with the FARC in Colombia161, and the Kaibiles in Guatemala.162 In 2016, it was
discovered that CJNG had set up a front business to recruit members into the cartel. Called
Segmex, this business claimed to be “a leader in private security.” Jobs were offered with a
159 “Muere policía herido en enfrentamiento en Ixtlán de los Hervores.” Quadratín. 29 abril 2016. http://www.quadratin.com.mx/justicia/Muere-policia-herido-enfrentamiento-Ixtlan-los-Hervores/ 160 Tucker, Duncan. “Cartel Gunmen Are Targeting Police and Politicians in Mexico’s Jalisco State.” Vice News. 4 March 2016. https://news.vice.com/article/cartel-gunmen-are-targeting-police-and-politicians-in-mexicos-jalisco-state 161 161 According to the DEA, the Colombian guerrilla force known as FARC (Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) has been working with Mexican cartels in order to introduce tons of cocaine into the U.S. The various cartels that the FARC appears to be allied with include the Sinaloa Cartel, CJNG, Los Zetas and also the Beltrán Leyva Organization. The DEA claims that there is a working relationship between multiple fronts of the FARC and criminal organizations in Mexico. http://www.dea.gov/docs/2015%20NDTA%20Report.pdf 162 Jalisco state public security commissioner, Alejandro Solorio, has asserted that the CJNG, like the Zetas Cartel, has a foundation based on paramilitary methods. Solorio even claims that CJNG has received tactical training from Mexican and foreign mercenaries. The use of rocket-propelled grenades to bring down an Army helicopter is seen as further evidence of this training. With the weakening of the Zetas Cartel and the Knights Templar, both enemies of CJNG, the cartel has strengthened. Solorio asserts that former members of Guatemala’s army special forces, the Kaibiles, and Mexican military veterans have provided strategic and paramilitary training to the gang. Solorio also claims that captured cartel members have said that an American veteran has also been training the group. http://www.wsj.com/articles/deadly-mexican-cartel-rises-as-new-threat-1431509401
Page 102 salary that could increase if the individual had previously belonged to a municipal
corporation, the federal police, or the army.163
142. In May 2016, there were 63 firearm assassinations in 10 municipalities. The area with the
largest number of assassinations was in Zamora, Michoacán (about 40 miles from La Barca,
20 miles from Ixtlán) and Jacona, Michoacán (about 50 miles from La Barca, 25 miles from
Ixtlán). On May 12, the widow of a former mayor of Tanhuato (about 20 miles from La
Barca and Ixtlán) was killed. Also in May, 6 bodies were left in an area adjacent to La Barca
Jalisco.164 They were left in a taxi on the La Piedad-Sahuayo highway, some of the bodies
were decapitated.165
143. Like La Familia and the Knights Templar, CJNG seeks to impose significant social control
over the civilians in the areas they operate. CJNG is known for recruiting at drug
rehabilitation centers.166 In May 2016, in a double rescue operation in Guadalajara, police
freed more than 270 people, forcibly kept in two drug rehabilitation centers, working for
CJNG. Neither had a legal mandate.167
F. The rise of Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación coincides with a dramatic rise in kidnappings in the region, despite public statements by CJNG that they oppose the kidnapping of ordinary citizens and vow to eliminate them, consistent with the experience described by Mr. and his family.
144. The number and severity of kidnappings for ransom and other illegal deprivations of liberty
have surged in Mexico since 2006, following the same trajectory as homicide and other
163 “Cártel de Jalisco recluta a sicarios a través de empresa de seguridad.” El Universal. 9 de marzo 2016. http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/estados/2016/03/9/cartel-de-jalisco-recluta-sicarios-traves-de-empresa-de- seguridad 164 “Fueron asesinadas 63 personas en mayo.” Quadratin. 31 mayo 2016. https://www.quadratin.com.mx/principal/Fueron-asesinadas-63-personas-en-mayo/ 165 Ignacio Roque Madriz. “Hallan seis cadáveres adentro de un taxi en Michoacán.” La Crónca de Hoy. 5 mayo 2016. http://www.cronica.com.mx/notas/2016/963234.html 166 Cartels are said to target private, unlicensed rehabilitation centers because there is a higher likelihood that the center will take in active gang members who are trying to get over their drug addiction. These private rehabilitation centers often have little security, thus increasing the vulnerability of their patients. http://www.insightcrime.org/news- analysis/no-exit-why-mexicos-drug-gangs-target-rehab-clinics 167 Rasa Informe, 19 mayo 2016.
Page 103 violent crimes. Nationally, the broadest measure of kidnapping (which uses both police and
citizen survey data) went from 4,307 incidences in 2006 to 32,120 in 2014. By 2013, Mexico
had the second highest kidnapping rate in the world.
145. During the first 27 months of the presidency of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-18) there was a
52.7% increase in kidnappings, according to figures from the Sistema Nacional de Seguridad
Pública (SNSP), de la Procuraduría General de la República (PGR). Kidnappings that result
in life threatening injuries or death of the victim at the hands of the kidnappers has increased
341% according to data from the PGR. Michoacán, Guerrero and Jalisco rank in the top 10
for states of Mexico with the highest kidnapping rates.168
146. Following official crime data, the state of Michoacán is ranked 5th in the nation for
kidnappings. In Jalisco, the number of reported kidnappings for ransom jumped from 5 in
2006 to 66 in 2013 (and tripled since 2009). (Most kidnappings for ransom in Mexico are
not reported to the police, but survey data suggests that the trend in reported kidnapping for
ransom broadly follows the overall criminal pattern, rather than the idiosyncrasies of
reporting).169
147. The targets of kidnapping have also changed. During the significant wave of kidnappings
in the region of Jalisco and Michoacán (and Mexico more broadly) in the 1990s, the targets
were mostly wealthy businessmen, star athletes, and politically-connected families capable of
paying large ransoms. In the present wave (since 2006), the targets have included middle-
class people and even the poor – anyone with a credit or debit card or whose contacts might
be able to raise a few thousand or even a few hundred dollars on short notice. Those with
168 Paris Martínez. “El secuestro se dispara durante la gestión de Peña Nieto” Seguridad, Justicia y Paz: Consejo Ciudadano Para la Seguridad Pública y Justicia Penal A.C., 26 Marzo 2016. http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/temas-de- interes/secuestros/1208-el-secuestro-se-dispara-durante-la-gestion-de-pena-nieto 169 In April 2016, a kidnapping ring famous for cutting off the fingers of its captives and sending them to their family members was broken up and its principle operatives arrested in Jalisco. Excélsior, 11 abril 2016.
Page 104 family in the Unites States are easy targets as well, thanks to cheap long-distance calls and the
speed and anonymity of wire services like Western Union. Guadalajara law professor Dante
Haro Reyes calls it “the democratization of kidnapping.” His research shows that 8 out of 10
kidnappings in Mexico are successfully resolved by paying a ransom.170 While there are
gangs that specialize in kidnapping for ransom, much of the growth and democratization of
kidnapping is simply opportunity crime created by the larger expansion of organized crime in
Mexico – the presence of heavily armed and often underemployed bands of young men,
with access to vehicles, safe houses, and corrupt law enforcement contacts. The central
elements of the kidnapping described by Mr. z are entirely consistent with
this reality, especially the attempts at recruitment experienced by his kidnapped brother who
escaped the cartel.
148. The kidnappings orchestrated by CJNG fit a broader pattern of contradictory behavior on
behalf of the cartel in the territories they control. In April 2015, CJNG left banners (known
as “narcomantas” or “narcomensajes”) hanging from a pedestrian bridge in downtown León
Guanajuato (in the state of Guanajuato, which is located to the northeast of Michoacán and
the east of Jalisco), accusing the governor and other law enforcement officials of protecting a
band of kidnappers and extortionists, who kill children and innocent people. The banners
listed specific law enforcement officials and alleged kidnappers by name.171 In another
recent case, CJNG operatives posted a video on YouTube in 2014, where CJNG gunmen
interrogate 4 kidnappers, working for an outfit in Sinaloa who kidnapped several prominent
citizens in Jalisco, including the daughter of General Castro and force them to confess
before killing them (the killing doesn’t appear on the YouTube version). Responding to the
CJNG interrogator, the captives detail how they collected ransoms, but in several cases
170 El Informador, 27 noviembre 2013 171 Quadratin Guanajuato, 25 abril 2015.
Page 105 captives died before their families could get to them, or they simply killed them anyway.
After the confession, the CJNG commander gives a lecture to the captives and the camera
about the kidnappers’ dishonorable deeds, and pledges that CJNG will not tolerate such
crimes in Jalisco. The captives were then executed.
G. Despite the arrest of several CJNG commanders and the very public seizure of real estate, businesses, and other assets from some of its affiliates, the CJNG remains stronger than ever and growing. The power of the CJNG is national in scope within Mexico, and its ability to reach enemies anywhere in the country is very well documented.
149. While there are projections that most Mexican cartels will lose power in 2016, CJNG is
projected to continue to rise. CJNG has “pushed to fill the void” in territory formerly
controlled by Sinaloa and Tamaulipas based groups. CJNG is assumed to be pushing in to
Zacatecas and San Luis Potosí and will continue fighting Los Zetas and the CDG in
Veracruz, Tabasco and Guanajuato.172 CJNG is credited with the increase in violence in
Michoacán, Colima, Veracruz, and Baja California. On the Michoacán-Jalisco border, six
bodies were found, allegedly killed by CJNG in their war with Nueva Familia. CJNG is
currently battling with Nueva Familia for control over the municipality of Venustiano
Carranza (located less than 20 miles from Mr. hometown of La Plaza
del Limón) along the Michoacán-Jalisco border. A police officer was killed in Michoacán and
a note left behind indicated the officer was fighting against the CJNG.173
150. A least a dozen high-level CJNG commanders have been arrested since 2015.174 These
high-level commanders include relatives of “El Mencho.”175 In May 2016, federal officials,
172 “Special Report: Mexico's Cartels Will Continue to Erode in 2016” Stratfor, 25 January 2016. https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/special-report-mexicos-cartels-will-continue-erode-2016 173 “Jalisco Cartel Fuels Violence in four states” Mexico News Daily, 28 May 2016. http://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/jalisco-cartel-fuels-violence-in-four-states/ 174 Proceso, 4 mayo 2016. 175 Abigail Gonzalez Valencia (“El Cuini”) captured 2/28/2015. http://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime- news/jalisco-cartel-new-generation. Heriberto Acevedo Cardenas (“El Gringo”) killed 3/2015. http://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/jalisco-cartel-fuels-violence-in-four-states/.Rubén Oseguera González (“El
Page 106 by way of the Special Prosecutor for Organized Crime (SEIDO) seized 160 million pesos
($8.6 million) worth of property, including 34 homes, jewels, luxury cars, 139 total vehicles,
boats, and 348 animals. The seizure also included a luxury hotel called Cruz de Loreto on
the coast of Tomatlán.176 The columnist Carlos Loret de Mola had claimed that CJNG
owned El Hotelito Desconocido in Tomatlán, a boutique seaside hotel where Sandra
Bullock stayed, a few months earlier.177 However, Mexican authorities have yet to touch the
assets of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, the founder and leader of CJNG.178
151. Despite these arrests and seizures, CJNG continues to expand its operation. A week after
the property seizures and arrest listed above, the attorney general of Michoacán admitted
that CJNG had a renewed presence in the state. 179 Similar reports attribute rising violence
in neighboring Colima to CJNG, including 42 murders in the port of Manzanillo in the first
quarter of 2016.180 More than a thousand miles east of Jalisco, 15 CJNG assassins were
arrested in Cancún in March 2016.181 Similar operations have targeted CJNG in Querétaro
and Tabasco, and rising CJNG presence has been linked to an increase in shootouts and
homicides in Chiapas, along Mexico’s southern border with Guatemala.182
152. CJNG’s presence has continued to grow internationally, as well. Two CJNG operatives
were arrested for money laundering in Montevideo, Uruguay in April 2016 (thanks in part to
the revelations of the Panama Papers – CJNG affiliates were clients of Mossack Fonseca tax
Menchito”) captured 7/3/2015. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf. Ivan Cazarin Molina (a.k.a. Victor Hugo Delgado Renteria) captured 11/18/2015. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/mexico-captures-jalisco- cartel-leader-right-hand-man. Eduardo González Valencia, brother-in-law of El Mencho, captured 1/2/2016. http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2016/01/03/1066546. Pedro Stanley Herrera Jelinek (“El Peter”) captured 5/2016. 176 El Universal, 10 mayo 2016; Latin American Herald-Tribune, May 22, 2016. 177 El Universal, 26 agosto 2015. 178 Excélsior, 3 mayo 2016. El Universal, 31 marzo 2016. 179 El Financiero, 22 mayo 2016. 180 Zócalo, 22 mayo 2016. 181 El Universal, 31 marzo 2016. 182 Silla Rota, 22 mayo 2016.
Page 107 advisors).183 The DEA and other law enforcement officials in San Diego, California suspect
that CJNG has been involved in the construction of a series of recent cross-border drug
tunnels leading into California and Arizona from Baja California.184 CJNG’s rising presence
in Baja California has sparked conflicting reports about its relationship with the Sinaloa
Cartel, but the fact that CJNG has money, weapons, people, and influence far beyond its
home base in Jalisco is plain.185 In documents revealed to the newspaper Excélsior, law
enforcement officials investigating El Chapo’s 2015 escape from prison informed Mexican
legislators that CJNG had likely financed his escape.186
153. According to the PGR, federal authorities have detected participation on the part of
operatives of the CJNG in the defense of El Chapo. The PGR has located a payment of
2,070,000 pesos for the logistics for the planned escape of El Chapo. The escape revealed an
alliance between the CJNG and El Chapo. Authorities assert that El Chapo maintained
communication with his lawyer Óscar Manuel Gómez Núñez and operatives of CJNG in
order to escape from the maximum-security prison where he was held.187
154. This alleged connection between CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel has been presented in
conflicting and contradictory news stories. However, the discovery of an 800-meter CJNG
tunnel on the border between Tijuana and San Diego has led to further speculation that
CJNG and Sinaloa, or at least factions of both, might be connected. The tunnel, according
to Proceso, is similar to the tunnel used to help El Chapo escape. Authorities detained 16
presumed drug traffickers, one from Tijuana and the rest from Sinaloa. The traffickers were
believed to have operated on behalf of the CJNG, trying to transport 10 tons of marijuana to
183 Aristegui Noticias, 25 abril 2016. 184 San Diego Union-Tribune, May 2, 2016. 185 Business Insider, March 28, 2016 Zeta, 17 mayo 2016. 186 Business Insider, November 4, 2015. 187 Leticia Robles Rosa. “Cártel de Jalisco ayudó al Chapo; por evasion, pagos por 2 mdp: PGR.” Excelsior. 26 Oct. 2015. http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2015/10/26/1053403
Page 108 the U.S. The men arrested ranged in age from 21-years-old to 50-years-old and they
acknowledged their ties to the CJNG.188
155. The tunnel that was discovered between Tijuana and San Diego was 300-meters longer than
the 2013 “super-tunnel” that was described “as one of the most sophisticated structures of
its kind ever to be discovered.”189 The presence of CJNG in Tijuana is surprising,
considering that the Sinaloa Cartel is believed to be the dominant drug organization in Baja
California. Since April 1, 2015, violence in Tijuana has increased, with more than 100
murders and a majority of the crime attributed to the increased competition over the city’s
drug trade. According to the San Diego Union Tribune, Tijuana’s drug trade is now “a world of
shifting alliances with small, semi-independent cells functioning at the base of an intricate
organized crime pyramid.”190 Gary Hill, an assistant special agent in charge of the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration in San Diego, says that the Sinaloa Cartel is believed to control
the plazas of both Tijuana and Mexicali. In Baja California, the alleged leaders of the Sinaloa
Cartel are brothers Alfonso Arzate (“El Aquiles”) and René Arzate (“La Rana”). Alfonso
Arzate has been described by the U.S. Attorney’s Office as “the alleged plaza boss for the
Sinaloa cartel.”191 René Arzate is allegedly the Tijuana enforcer of the cartel and “is believed
responsible for a significant amount of violence in the Tijuana plaza.”192 DEA special agent
Hill states that the incursions of the CJNG and the Knights Templar into Tijuana are a result
of permission granted by the Sinaloa Cartel.193
188 La Redacción. “Hallan narcotúnel similar al de la fuga de ‘El Chapo’ en Tijuana; servía para trasiego de droga.” Proceso. 22 Oct. 2015. http://www.proceso.com.mx/418853 189 Yagoub, Mimi. “New Mexico ‘Narcotunnel’ Again Showcases Cartels Engineering Skills.” Insight Crime. 23 Oct. 2015. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/new-mexico-narcotunnel-showcase-cartels-engineering-skills 190 Dibble, Sandra. “Drug rivalries turn violent in Tijuana.” The San Diego Union Tribune. 23 May 2015. http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/may/23/tijuana-violence-mexico-drug-trade-sinaloa-arellan/ 191 Ibid. 192 Ibid. 193 Ibid.
Page 109 156. Gualberto Ramírez Gutiérrez, head of Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office for kidnapping
has stated that CJNG is moving into Tijuana. CJNG has developed a reputation as a brutal
and violent cartel. There are fears that the CJNG will utilize violent tactics to wrest control
of the region, as they have done in other states in Mexico.194 Increased violence in Baja
California Sur’s capital of La Paz have been attributed to CJNG’s desire to control Baja
California by claiming La Paz, Ensenada, and Tijuana.195
157. The DEA’s National Drug Threat Assessment (NTR), released in November 2015,
documents the growing influence of CJNG, noting its dramatic rise over the last three years
and claiming that it rivals the Sinaloa Cartel in its global reach, which now includes Asia,
Europe, and Oceania. It shows that CJNG’s home territory includes all of the state of
Jalisco and large swaths of the neighboring states of Michoacán, Nayarit, Zacatecas,
Guanajuato, Aguascalientes, and San Luis Potosí; and that CJNG holds all of the Pacific
coast of the states of Oaxaca and Chiapas and a significant base of operations on the Gulf
coast in Veracruz. The DEA’s NTR also shows that CJNG controls strategic ports of entry
across the country, including Tijuana, La Paz, and Cabo San Lucas in the northwest, Nuevo
Laredo in the northeast, Lázaro Cárdenas on the Pacific coast and Tabasco on the Gulf
coast (in addition to their larger territories in these regions).196
158. The balance of power among the various organized crime groups competing for supremacy
remains fluid, and it is difficult to diagnose precisely at any given moment, much less to
make coherent predictions for the future. All of the major organized crime groups make and
break strategic alliances on a routine basis; all of them spread false information about their
194 Sam Tabory. “Mexico's Jalisco Cartel Expands to Baja California: Official” InSight Crime, 23 March 2016. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/mexico-jalisco-cartel-expands-to-baja-california-official 195 “Guerra de cárteles genera violencia en La Paz” Informador, 31 May 2016. http://www.informador.com.mx/mexico/2016/664235/6/guerra-de-carteles-genera-violencia-en-la-paz.htm 196 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, 2015 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary (DEA- DCT-DIR-008-16).
Page 110 activities and those of their rivals; and they all have a vested interest in keeping their most
recent criminal activities secret. As a result, all real-time snapshots of the drug war in
Mexico involve a degree of speculation. It does not require any speculation, however, to
note that the CJNG and its main rivals at the national level – the Sinaloa Cartel, the Zetas,
and the Knights Templar – remain extremely powerful, and their influence in Mexico is
national in scope.
159. Despite the efforts of the Peña Nieto administration (2012-present), the Sinaloa Cartel and
the Zetas remain as powerful as they have ever been nationally, regional cartels like the
Knights Templar still hold sway in Michoacán, and they have been joined by emergent
forces such as the CJNG. Their continued strength lies in both their ruthlessness and the
diversification of their business portfolio.
160. Since they broke away from the Gulf Cartel in 2010, the Zetas have colonized and
expanded existing human smuggling, sex trafficking, illicit arms dealing networks, and they
have built kidnapping and extortion rackets across Mexico and Central America.197 For its
part, the Sinaloa Cartel does not appear to have lost its influence, despite the re-arrest of its
charismatic leader Joaquín Guzmán Loera, alias “El Chapo” in January 2016, and his
pending extradition to the United States.
161. For those who have been threatened by any of these cartels or their local allies, this means
that the danger they face has not likely diminished, even if the particular action or piece of
information (real or perceived) that caught the cartel’s attention has long since lapsed into
irrelevance, or if there has been a complete turnover in cartel personnel in a particular area.
All of the major drug cartels in Mexico can be ruthless, and they all use cruel and spectacular
197 Ricardo Ravelo, Zetas: La franquicia criminal (México: Ediciones B, 2014); Martínez, 109-27.
Page 111 violence to cow their enemies, the government, and the civilian populations in the areas in
which they operate.198
H. If he and his family were to return to Mexico, Mr. , his wife, and son would very likely face extreme danger in the form of kidnapping, torture, and/or murder due to the fact that his cousin joined a self-defense group targeted by CJNG and Mr. and his family have been publicly identified as an enemy of CJNG.
162. The individuals and organizations who threatened Mr. and his family
members are still active in Mexico, and in fact dominate the illicit drug trade. Very few of
them have been arrested, convicted, or incarcerated, and those who have been incarcerated
are still able to target their enemies. The Mexican government has proven entirely unwilling
and unable to control the cartels, particularly in areas dominated by the ruthless CJNG, like
Plaza de Limón (Ixtlán), Michoacán and the Jalisco-Michoacán border region.
163. The CJNG is national and in fact international in scope and has built a fearsome reputation
for hunting down its perceived enemies anywhere in Mexico. If Mr. were
to be returned to Mexico, he would be easily identified and targeted by organized crime due
to: 1)the infamy of the region he is from as a hotspot in the Mexican drug war; 2) lax privacy
protections and rampant corruption which make data associated with the CURP (the
Mexican equivalent of a U.S. Social Security number used for all basic civic functions –
paying taxes, registering to vote, getting a business license, procuring healthcare, etc.) easily
accessible to even the most lowly officials; and 3)the prevalence of extortion networks across
the country, and particularly in Michoacán and neighboring Jalisco, which would prompt
inquiries on behalf of any new person arriving in a given area in order to better exploit them.
164. CJNG has ruthlessly tracked down and killed members of self-defense groups and their
family members in Jalisco and the areas of Michoacán it controls, including the municipality
198 Grayson and Logan, kindle ed. locs. 585, 1290, 1311.
Page 112 of Ixtlán. Recent clashes between self-defense groups and CJNG in Mr.
hometown of Plaza de Limón demonstrate the ongoing strategic importance of
the region to CJNG and thus their willingness to pursue any and all potential enemies from
there.
165. Mr. association with persons kidnapped and killed by organized crime
makes him a person of interest and possible target of opportunity for extortion, kidnapping,
and murder following the logic of the “virtual hit-list” explained above. The fact that the
family was likely targeted by CJNG identified them as a potential enemy of the dominant
organized crime group in the area, and thus fair game for those wishing to curry favor with
them or simply not to cross them.
166. Mr. was publicly identified as an enemy of CJNG through four separate
incidents. First, his brother was murdered and hanged from a
bridge in March 2012, a spectacular narco-style execution that was widely publicized in local
media, including multiple mentions of his family name and hometown. Second, his brother
was disappeared in 2015, last seen as armed men
grabbed him and shoved him into an SUV with tinted windows, an archetypal narco-
kidnapping. Third, his brother was kidnapped by CJNG
personnel and interrogated about his cousin, before he managed to escape and flee the area.
Fourth, neighbors in Plaza del Limón reported that CJNG personnel have coming looking
for Mr. there, indicating that they are still looking for his cousin and
perceive him and his family as potential enemies. Each of these incidents served an
indicator to local witnesses and other interested parties that Mexico’s fastest growing drug
cartel has targeted this family and perceives them as enemies. CJNG’s demonstrated policy
for dealing with its enemies in Ixtlán and elsewhere has been swift and ruthless violence.
Page 113 167. Mr. description of the unfolding of the murder and kidnappings
detailed above is entirely consistent with the broader pattern of escalating violence in Jalisco
and Michoacán in the period he describes, and with CJNG’s contradictory statements and
actions with regard to kidnapping – while they often publicly condemn and brutally punish
kidnapping rings operated by their rivals in organized crime, CJNG has a considerable
record of carrying out kidnappings as a form of strategic terror accompanied by various
forms of torture and murder. In home region, the CJNG
operations he alleges are entirely consistent with the pattern evident in multiple published
reports about CJNG’s involvement in kidnapping, forced disappearances, and murders, and
his hometown has been the scene of shootouts, murders, and strategic operations by
important CJNG lieutenants.
168. The targeting of individuals like Mr. has become less discriminate and
more focused on imposing strategic terror and eliminating perceived defenders of the rule of
law than on those who possess specific actionable information about the illicit drug trade.
In this environment, the family members of a member of a local vigilante group targeted by
the dominant organized crime group in the area would be an easy target, and one unlikely to
garner much protection from the Mexican government at any level.
169. Mr. was born and raised in a remote area of Western Mexico that has
been overrun by the country’s fastest growing and most audacious drug cartel, the CJNG.
He and his family grew up in a place that remained relatively peaceful and democratic, even
as other parts of Mexico descended into garish violence, beginning in 2006. In the period in
which he describes his family’ ordeal and flight – from the spring of 2012 to the present –
the CJNG carried out a large and well-documented wave of violence, kidnapping, and
political assassinations in Mr. home region. As a native of a recent
Page 114 hotspot in the drug war, whose family has been targeted for various kinds of narco-violence,
Mr. would be easily identified and targeted anywhere in Mexico, using
standard federal databases and intelligence networks. For these reason and the reasons
stated above, I conclude that Mr. and his family could not safely relocate
to Michoacán or another part of Mexico if he had to return.
170. For all of the above reasons, I conclude that Mr. and his family would
face extreme danger of kidnapping, torture, murder, and or disappearance if they were
returned to Mexico.
Page 115 I declare under the penalty of perjury of the laws of the United States that all information contained in my report is true and correct.
Page 116