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Mexican Drug Wars Update: Targeting the Most Violent Cartels

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Mexican Drug Wars Update: Targeting the Most Violent Cartels MEXICAN DRUG WARS UPDATE: Targeting the Most Violent Cartels July 21, 201 1 This analysis may not be forwarded or republished without express permission from STRATFOR. For permission, please submit a request to [email protected]. 1 STRATFOR 700 Lavaca Street, Suite 900 Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com Mexican Drug Wars Update: Targeting the Most Violent Cartels Editor’s Note: Since the publication of STRATFOR’s 2010 annual Mexican cartel report, the fluid nature of the drug war in Mexico has prompted us to take an in-depth look at the situation more frequently. This is the second product of those interim assessments, which we will now make as needed, in addition to our annual year-end analyses and our weekly security memos. As we suggested in our first quarterly cartel update in April, most of the drug cartels in Mexico have gravitated toward two poles, one centered on the Sinaloa Federation and the other on Los Zetas. Since that assessment, there have not been any significant reversals overall; none of the identified cartels has faded from the scene or lost substantial amounts of territory. That said, the second quarter has been active in terms of inter-cartel and military-on-cartel clashes, particularly in three areas of Mexico: Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas and Veracruz states; southern Coahuila, through Durango, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosi and Aguascalientes states; and the Pacific coast states of Nayarit, Jalisco, Michoacan and Guerrero. There are three basic dimensions of violence in Mexico: cartel vs. cartel, cartel vs. government and cartel vs. civilians. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Mexican government has focused its efforts (and the bulk of its military forces) on defeating cartel groups that it considers the most violent — especially those that are the most violent toward civilians. We believe this is why three major military campaigns have been launched over the past three months against Los Zetas and the Knights Templar. We can expect to see these campaigns continue over the next three months, although we doubt that the government will be able to destroy either of these well-entrenched groups in the short term, and certainly not in the next quarter. Still, we will need to look for evidence that the government’s efforts are having an impact. In the northern states, conditions remained fairly unchanged over the last quarter, though cartel- related deaths in Juarez did not reach the severe level anticipated by regional law enforcement. STRATFOR’s sources in the region say there has been a diminishing military presence in Juarez and that there have been fewer cartel-related deaths as a result. This is not to say that the Sinaloa Federation and the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes organization (VCF, aka the Juarez cartel) have let up in their battle for the Juarez plaza, only that the lessening of military pressure on those cartels has reduced overall friction. In any given area of Mexico, cartel-on-cartel violence is caused by the dynamics among cartels and is entirely separate from whatever the government presence may be, but the introduction of military forces into this environment exacerbates existing hostilities. This happened when Mexican troops moved into the Juarez area in 2009, at which point the already heated battle between cartel elements rose to a boil. While violence has trended downward in Juarez, we can expect to see the Sinaloa Federation continue its efforts to advance and consolidate control over Juarez. The severity of the violence will depend on the VCF’s ability to resist Sinaloa’s advances. 2 © 2011 STRATFOR Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com STRATFOR expects a similar escalation of violence in Tamaulipas state, where the military suddenly replaced municipal (and some state) law enforcement personnel with federal troops in 22 cities in mid- June. The same sort of dynamics are in play in Tamaulipas as were seen in Juarez in 2009, and we anticipate a similar long-term reaction over a much larger region encompassing the urban areas of Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, Rio Bravo, Matamoros, Valle Hermoso, San Fernando and the state capital Ciudad Victoria. We expect to see increasing violence in all of these cities for as long as the military presence remains, with larger escalations in Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa and Matamoros because they sit astride the most valuable smuggling corridors along the easternmost 1,600 kilometers (1,000 miles) of U.S. border. While federal troops have not replaced municipal police in neighboring Nuevo Leon state, violence will also likely escalate in Monterrey and the surrounding region given its key location and strategic importance. Here the Zeta presence is being challenged by the Gulf cartel, which seeks to enlarge its foothold in the city and expel the entrenched Zetas. The cartels across Mexico continue to become more fractured and numerous, particularly in the central and Pacific regions. As we discussed in the last quarterly update, the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) no longer exists as it once did. The newer cartels, which began as factions of the BLO, continue to fight each other as well as the Sinaloa Federation and, in most cases, Los Zetas. (Cartel Pacifico Sur [CPS] is actually aligned with Los Zetas.) From Durango and Zacatecas south to Nayarit, Jalisco and Michoacan states and into Guerrero’s coastal port of Acapulco, seven different groups of varying sizes and organizational cohesion are fighting to the death for the same overlapping regions. Looking ahead to the next three months, STRATFOR expects to see increased violence in northeast Mexico as the Gulf-Zeta battle for the region becomes more complicated by the presence of the Mexican military in Tamaulipas. Added to that are the out-of-work former police officers, many of 3 © 2011 STRATFOR Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com whom were on cartel payrolls in more passive roles and now may become cartel gunmen to maintain their income. This, combined with the material losses Los Zetas have suffered over the past quarter, will likely cause the cartel-vs.-civilian violence to remain high, and we anticipate that crimes such as kidnapping, extortion and carjacking will proliferate. With the military also becoming heavily involved in Michoacan, we can expect to see a phenomenon in that state similar to the one in Tamaulipas. We also do not anticipate that the violence that has plagued the Pacific coast will let up during the next quarter. With the Atlantic/Gulf hurricane season now coming into full swing, the fighting could be slowed by major storms that roar into the Rio Grande Valley. At the same time, torrential rains would significantly increase cross-border smuggling activity, since shallow water in the flood plain increases the number of locations where smugglers can meet and load vehicles on the U.S. side. Cartels are known to take advantage of flooding conditions to insert drug loads as much as 1.5 kilometers north of the border with fast, shallow-draft boats and jet skis, which U.S. riverine patrols using deeper-draft boats cannot pursue. Current Status of the Mexican Cartels To assist in navigating the fractured cartel landscape — as much as conditions in Mexico currently allow — we have arranged the discussion below into three camps: the Sinaloa Federation and other cartels aligned with it, Los Zetas and their associated groups, and the independent cartels that have declared war on all other cartels and are determined to go it alone. The Sinaloa Federation and Associates The Sinaloa Federation continues to be the largest and most cohesive of the Mexican cartels. Run by Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman Loera, Sinaloa continued its expansion into Durango state, Mexico D.F. and Guerrero and Michoacan states over the last three months as well as its fight to take over the plazas in Juarez and Chihuahua City. The cartel has also clashed occasionally with CPS in the city of Hermosillo in Sonora state and in parts of Durango state; with Los Zetas in Torreon, Coahuila state; and with both CPS and Los Zetas in Culiacan, Sinaloa state. On May 27 in Nayarit state, Sinaloa conducted a major ambush of Zeta forces in which Sinaloa fighters apparently utilized Zeta defensive positions close to a Zeta camp. During the second quarter of 2011, three significant Sinaloa leaders were captured. In early April federal forces arrested Jesus Raul Ochoa Zazueta, a former Baja California ministerial police officer who, at the time of his arrest, was Sinaloa’s operations boss for the Mexicali plaza. Then in mid-April, Bruno “El Gato” Garcia Arreola was captured in Tepic, Nayarit state. The following month, Martin “The Eagle” Beltran Coronel, nephew of Ignacio “El Nacho” Coronel Villarreal (a top Sinaloa leader killed in a gun battle in July 2010), was arrested in the Zapopan neighborhood of Guadalajara, Jalisco state. With Guzman Loera’s approval, Beltran Coronel had taken over Coronel Villarreal’s operations, overseeing cocaine importation from South America through the Pacific ports in Jalisco and Colima states. Coronel Villarreal’s operations included very substantial methamphetamine production facilities and distribution networks, so much so that one of his nicknames was the “king of crystal.” That being the case, it is likely that Martin Beltran Coronel also took over his uncle’s methamphetamine operations, though that portion of his inherited operations has not been delineated. These Sinaloa leadership losses could be significant, though Guzman Loera is believed to have removed high-level threats within his organization before via anonymous tips to federal authorities. That so many Sinaloa leaders were apprehended by federal authorities in the last quarter was just as likely the result of betrayal as it was of legitimate government investigations.
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