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Making Peace in Drug Wars Benjamin Lessing Index More Information Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-19963-7 — Making Peace in Drug Wars Benjamin Lessing Index More Information Index Acemoglu, Daron, 85, 105, 280 Beltrame, José Mariano, 31, 183, 191–199, ADA (Amigos dos Amigos cartel), 78, 81, 178, 244, 253, 258–267, 272, 274, 198 275 Adorno, Sérgio and Fernando Salla, 118 Berlusconi, Silvio, 51, 290 Aguayo, Sergio, 109, 212, 230 bicheiros, see jogo de bicho Ahnen, Ronald E., 168 Blattman, Christopher, 24, 28, 103, 276 alternative explanations, 23–27 Bloque de Busqueda, 90, 140, 143, 151, 153, in the Colombia case, 127–129 273 in the Mexico case, 208–212 alleged cooperation with Los Pepes, 152 in the Rio de Janeiro case, 165–170 Bonner, Robert C., 222 Amorim, Carlos, 168, 176, 177 BOPE (Police Special Operations Battalion), Andreas, Peter, 44, 85, 213, 236 11, 90, 193, 197 ARs (autos de resistência, police killings of eventual corruption of, 110, 186 civilians in Rio) as measure of cartel-state as example of “violent enforcement”, 186 conflict, 173 “no rendition” policy, 182 Arias, Enrique Desmond, 167, 190 Arjona, Ana, 166 Bowden, Mark, 70, 109, 133, 140, 143, 147, 150–153, 155, 273, 274 armed pressure groups, 16 arrego (“arrangement”), 160, 187 bribe-negotiation (model) definition, 85 as conceptual map, 68–69, 82–83, 87 negotiation of, 188 contrasted with canonical models of war as Astorga, Luis, 212, 213, 218, 219, 236 bargaining breakdown, 73, 87 AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of effect of crackdowns on, 69, 89–96 Colombia), 78, 131, 280 formal definition of, 89–96 formation, 154 equilibrium outcomes, 68–69, see also autodefensas (Mexico), 78, 117, 280 coerced peace, fight-and-bribe, hide-and-bribe, peaceful enforcement, state-sponsored protection, violent Bailey, John, 70, 85, 86, 118, 222 enforcement Balcells, Laia, 276 Britto, Lina, 129 Barbosa, Antonio Rafael, 179 brute-force versus coercion (as “functions of Bates, Robert H., 279 violence”), 15, 39 Batista, Eike, 257 Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, 13 321 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-19963-7 — Making Peace in Drug Wars Benjamin Lessing Index More Information 322 Index Caldeira, Teresa, 168 coerced peace, 68, 84, 94, 109, see also Calderón, Felipe, 1, 202, 262, 263 bribe-negotiation (equilibrium outcomes) friendship with Álvaro Uribe, 154, 221–222 in Colombia, 136, 156 switch to conditional repression, 234 formal definition, 106 and unconditional crackdown, 207, 209, in Mexico, 218, 220 211, 220–230 Cold War, 30, 30 use of word “war”, 222, 278 Collier, David, 30, 237 Calderón, Gabriela, 28, 46, 209, 223 Collier, Ruth Berins, 30 Cali cartel, 64, 125, 153 Colombia attitude toward anti-state violence, 64, 122, Bogotá, 153, 221, 249, 260 141 Cali, see Cali cartel, collaboration with the state, 140, 152 Medellín, see Medellín cartel relationship with the Medellín cartel, 125, Comando Vermelho, see CV (Red Command 138 cartel) Camarena, Enrique “Kiki”, 215–216 commitment problems (as cause of conflict) Cano, Guillermo, 133, 135 in Colombia, 116, 149 Cano, Ignacio, 170, 184, 163 in drug war as opposed to civil war, 53–54 Capone, Al, 50, 74 in model of bribe negotiation, 87 Carballo Blanco, Antônio Carlos, 189, 190, conditionality of repression 189, 271 across/within cartels, 97 Cárdenas, Osiel, 216, 218, see also Gulf cartel definition, 14 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 31, 200, 296 in Colombia, 126, 128, 129, 138, 140, Caro Quintero, Rafael, 215 141, 144, 148, 150 cartels in Rio de Janeiro, 261, 262 definition and justification of the term,2 definition 8, 11 as compared to mafias, 16–17 as interest groups, 16–17, 111 in relation to degree of repression, 7, 9 cartel-state conflict logistical constraints on, 22–22, 245–247 definition, 2 need for keeping something in reserve, 12, as opposed to inter-cartel turf war, 46 140, 288 as opposed to civil war, 50–55 negative optics of, 12 substantive and normative importance of, 48 political (acceptability) constraints on, timing of, in relation to turf war, 46–49 247–249 Castañeda, Jorge G., 16 varieties of, 13–15 Castillo, Juan Camilo, 28, 46, 103, 209, 217 conquest versus constraint (as “proximate Centeno, Miguel Ángel, 278 battle aims”), 39, 52 Cerqueira, Carlos Magno Nazareth, 172, 173, Corchado, Alfredo, 231, 234 181, 181 Cornell, Svante E., 28 Chapo, el, see Guzmán, Joaquín “El Chapo” corruption Chazkel, Amy, 170 centrality of, in cartel strategies of influence, Cheney, Dick, 231 60 Chalmers, Iain, 25 as complement, not substitute, of violence, Chepesiuk, Ron, 65, 72, 128, 138, 140, 141, 61–63 142, 146, 154 as opposed to lobbying, 63–66 Chwe, Michael Suk-Young, 85 crackdowns CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 152, 273 conditional and unconditional, 9, 30 CISEN (Center for Research and National consequences of in formal model, see Security), 207, 232, 255, 259, bribe-negotiation (model) working group structure, 265 CV (Red Command cartel), 159, 161, civil war, see cartel-state conflict as opposed to 175–183, 195–196, 199 civil war as “cartel” vs prison gang, 178–180 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-19963-7 — Making Peace in Drug Wars Benjamin Lessing Index More Information Index 323 Dal Bó, Ernesto, 61, 66, 73, 85, 88, 96, 110, FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), 79, 149 286 Fearon, James D., 5, 6, 16, 18, 30, 45, 51–53, Dal Bó, Pedro, 61, 66, 73, 85, 286 59, 67, 73, 87, 115, 116, 209, 222, 287, Darden, Keith, 18, 213, 218, 283, 288, 297 284 Felbab-Brown, Vanda, 31, 227 DAS (Administrative Department of Security), Fernandes, Rubem César, 189–190, 248, 260, 116, 135, 136, 143 271 Davis, Diane E., 22 fight-and-bribe, 69, 101, 106, see also De Greiff, Gustavo, 150–153 bribe-negotiation (equilibrium outcomes) De Silva, Pumaka L., 16 formal definition, 94 DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency), 152, 11, 79, Fiorentini, Gianluca, and Sam Peltzman, 66 129, 140, 153, 154, 155, 273 Fisman, Ray, 90 officer killed by cartel, see Enrique “Kiki” focused deterrence (policing strategy), 4 Camarena as example of conditional repression, 8 degree of repression, 7, 12, 90 Fox, Vicente, 216, 219–220, 225 in model of bribe negotiation, 90, 93 Freixo, Marcelo, 163 Dell, Melissa, 28, 45, 46, 209 Fukuyama, Francis, 277 Detroit organized crime in, see Purple Gang DFS (Federal Security Directorate), 212, 216, GAFES (Special-Forces Airmobile Group), 218 203, 217 Di Tella, Raphael, 61, 66, 73, 85, 110, 286 Galán, Luis Carlos, 128, 132, 142–143 Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto, 28, 46, 209, 223, Gallardo, Miguel Ángel Félix, 216, 218, see 215 also Guadalajara cartel Dowdney, Luke, 31, 163, 167, 169, 169 as example of hide-and-bribe strategy, drug cartels, see cartels 213–216 drug legalization, see legalization Gambetta, Diego, 6, 17, 39, 39, 44, 51 DTOs (drug trafficking organizations), see cartels García Luna, Genaro, 222, 232, 233, 237, 254, Dube, Arindrajit, Oeindrila Dube, and Omar 266 Garía Ponce, 24, 203 García Márquez, Gabriel, 118, 122, 146, 147, Durán-Martínez, Angelica, 15, 17, 31, 77, 84, 155 85, 92, 108, 216, 217, 284 Garotinho, Anthony, 182, 182, 199 Gaviria, César, 3, 125, 126, 140, 143, 149–151, 244, 273, 274, 297 Escobar, Pablo, 150, see also Medellín cartel and Sometimiento, 144, 145, 147, 253, 263, death of, 153 266 election to Congress, 132 Goldstein, Paul J., 38, 39, 41, 43 escape from prison, 150 Gootenberg, Paul, 203 expulsion from Congress, 133 Gottschalk, Marie, 279 as a rational actor, 127 GPAE (Policing in Special Areas Unit), 164, surrender, 146 165, 188–191, 243, 248, 271 Escobar Gaviria, Roberto, 118, 150 Grayson, George W., 216 Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Grillo, Ioan, 2, 47, 50, 70, 76, 214, 218, 219, Theda Skocpol, 282 220, 226 Extraditables, los, 137, 144, 145, 147, 148, Guadalajara cartel, 213–216, 216 149, 151 Guerrero, Eduardo, 209, 222, 223, 232, 234, 255 Familia Michoacana cartel, 70, 72, 76, 110, Gugliotta, Guy and Jeff Leen, 134, 141 116, 117, 231 Gulf cartel, 203, 210, 217, 219 FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Guzmán, Joaquín “El Chapo”, 225, 238, see Colombia), 27, 154, 222 also Sinaloa cartel © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-19963-7 — Making Peace in Drug Wars Benjamin Lessing Index More Information 324 Index Hacker, Jacob S., 27, 244, 257 Mahoney, James, 29, 30 Hagedorn, John M., 45, 179 Mampilly, Zachariah Cherian, 166 hearts and minds, 164, 166, 167, 197 Mancera, Miguel Ángel, 256 hide-and-bribe, 69, 86, 101, 106, see also Mann, Michael, 236, 282 bribe-negotiation (equilibrium outcomes) March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen, 27, 244 formal definition, 92 Martínez, María Teresa, 209 Holland, Alisha C., 223, 281 MAS (Death to Kidnappers), 73–74, 130, 131, Hope, Alejandro, 5, 207, 232, 236, 238, 254, 135, 141, 146 255, 260 McCann, Bryan, 167, 173 Huntington, Samuel P., 6, 284–286 Medellín cartel, 126, 152, see also Escobar, Pablo war with Cali cartel, 248–249 jogo de bicho, 170–172 Mejía, Daniel, 28, 46, 103, 209, 217 Mexico Kalyvas, Stathis N., 6, 18, 39, 39, 41, 50, 51, Ciudad Juárez, 79, 150, 222 59, 65, 276, 287 Mexico City, 205, 229, 256 Keen, David, 6 Michoacán, 67, 70, 76, 221, 222, see also Kennedy, David M., Anthony A. Braga, Anne Familia Michoacana M. Piehl, and Elin J. Waring, 255, 258, Nuevo Laredo, 47, 219, 223 262 Miguel, Edward, 24, 28, 90, 103, 276 Kingdon, John, 7, 27, 244, 259 milícias (police-linked paramilitaries, Rio de Kirk, Robin, 130 Janeiro), 78, 191, 193, 200, 261, 280 Kleiman, Mark, 13, 77, 80, 232, 234, 258, overview, 163 260, 262 Misse, Michel, 85, 166, 168, 170, 175, 177, Knights Templar cartel, 52, 117 178 Movimiento de Renovación (Movement for Renovation, Colombia), 280 Labrousse, Alain, 27, 154 Munck, Ronaldo, 16 Laitin, David D., 16, 18, 30, 51, 52, 53 Myerson, Roger B., 179, 288 Lara Bonilla, Rodrigo, 2, 65, 121, 125, 127, 128, 132–137, 141–143, 147, 148, 155 Leal Buitrago, Francisco, 30, 146, 249 Nadelmann, Ethan A., 281, 292 Lee, Rensselaer W., 64, 86, 153 Needler, Martin C., 212 Leeds, Elizabeth, 167 Negros, los, 219 legalization, 129, 219, 281, 296 Noriega, Manuel, 130, 133 Lehder, Carlos, 128, 130, 133, 134, 137, 141, NRI (Narcoviolence Research International), see also Medellín Cartel 25, 138 Lerman, Amy E., and Vesla M.
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