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1. Canada and Northern Border States 1 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF VIOLENT GROUPS (www.isvg.org) DAILY BORDER NEWS REPORT FOR 14 NOVEMBER 2011 COMPILER, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF VIOLENT GROUPS (www.isvg.org) EDITOR, JOINT TASK FORCE NORTH (www.facebook.com/USA.JTFN) (U) This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and portions may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under FOIA. DoD 5400.7R, "DoD Freedom of Information Act Program", DoD Directive 5230.9, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release", and DoD Instruction 5230.29, "Security and Policy Review of DoD Information for Public Release" apply. (U) FAIR USE NOTICE. This document may contain copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making it available to recipients who have expressed an interest in receiving information to advance their understanding of threat activities in the interest of protecting the United States. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' you must obtain permission from the copyright owner. (U) Use of these news items does not reflect official endorsement by Joint Task Force North or the Department of Defense. For further information on any item, please contact the JTF-North Knowledge Management (KM). Compiled By: Mr. Tom Davidson, Institute for the Study of Violent Groups Edited by: Mr. Jonathan Kaupp Approved for Release by: Dr. Rodler Morris CONTENTS: (Note: All active EXTERNAL hyperlinks have been removed) Table of Contents CONTENTS .............................................................................................................................. 1 1. CANADA AND NORTHERN BORDER STATES ............................................ 3 A. B.C. Fisherman Held in Drug Bust Again (BC) ................................................................. 3 2. INNER UNITED STATES ...................................................................................5 A. Mexican Meth Operation Busted in Two Central Valley Counties (CA) ........................... 5 B. Suspected Terrorist Charged in U.S. with Supporting Al-Qaeda (NY/GE) ....................... 6 C. 138 Arrested in Oakland during Multi-Agency Sweep (CA) ............................................. 6 2 D. Crime Connection between Valley and Mexico (CA) ........................................................ 7 E. Feds: Mexican Cartel Planned Attack against US (IL/MX) ............................................... 8 3. MEXICO AND SOUTHERN BORDER STATES.............................................. 9 A. A Leader of Mexico's Caballeros Templarios Gang Arrested (GTO) ................................ 9 B. Zetas Cartel Paymaster Arrested in Northern Mexico (NL) ............................................. 10 C. Mexico Detains a Top Operator of Sinaloa Cartel (SIN) ................................................. 12 D. University Researcher Gunned Down in Central Mexico (MOR).................................... 13 E. Mexican Army Arrests Top Tijuana Cartel Lieutenant (BC) ........................................... 14 F. Would-Be Killeen Bomber Gets Additional, Harsher Charges (TX) ............................... 14 G. Calif. Budget Cuts Threaten To Cut Elite Special Agent Units (CA) .............................. 15 H. Mexican Democracy Tested by Drug Lords in Politics (MICH) ...................................... 17 I. Official Says Shootout Revealed Communication Issues (TX) ........................................ 20 J. Mexican Legislators: Punish Those Who Glorify Drugs, Violence (DF) ........................ 21 K. Campaigning Ends Ahead of Election in Violent Mexican State (MICH) ....................... 22 L. Battle for the Border: Cartel Insider Speaks (TX) ............................................................ 23 M. Battle for the Border: Cartel Safe Zones (TX) .................................................................. 25 4. CARRIBEAN, CENTRAL, AND SOUTH AMERICA ....................................26 A. Brazilian Cops Nab Rio’s Most Wanted Drug Kingpin (BR) .......................................... 26 B. DEA Commando Teams Deployed in Central America (DR/GT/BZ/HN) ...................... 27 C. With Lorenzana Arrest, Guatemala Raises Game against Old-School Traffickers (GT) . 29 D. Kidnapped Washington Nationals Catcher Wilson Ramos is Alive, Police Say (VE) ..... 31 5. OPINION AND ANALYSIS..............................................................................33 A. EDITORIAL: Central America Elections Prove We Are Stuck in the Past (GT/NI) ....... 33 B. Operation Cancun Fugitive Lands in Mexico To Buy Airline (US/MX) ......................... 34 C. NGOS to Washington: Cut Military Aid to Mexico (DC) ................................................ 36 D. Success Plan Colombia 'Greatly Overstated': Study (US/CO) ......................................... 37 E. Bureau Recommends: Torture Used by Army in Mexico’s ‘War on Drugs’ (BC/NL/TAB/GRO/CHIH) .............................................................................................. 39 F. Curing Central America’s Crime Epidemic Is Up to Latin America, Not the U.S. (HN/GT) ............................................................................................................................ 39 G. Mexico: Anonymous Shifts Sights from Zetas to Government Corruption (NL) ............ 41 3 1. CANADA AND NORTHERN BORDER STATES A. B.C. Fisherman Held in Drug Bust Again (BC) 11 November 2011 Seattle Times A Canadian fisherman and drug smuggler who escaped prosecution after authorities seized his boat and cargo of 2 ½ tons of cocaine off the Washington coast in 2001 is now suspected of trying to smuggle 400 kilograms of cocaine from Colombia by boat. The 18 Oct. arrest of John Philip Stirling, a gruff 60-year-old fisherman from Vancouver Island, marks the third time in a decade that he has been caught red-handed smuggling large quantities of drugs, according to court records. Until now, he has managed to avoid prosecution on both sides of the border, although nobody has ever said on the record how. He remains unabashed and unapologetic, according to charges filed in the recent case in Miami. While being transported to the Federal Detention Center in Miami, Stirling is alleged to have remarked that "there was nothing wrong with cocaine trafficking and that the United States should mind its own business." The charges say Stirling's sailing vessel, the 58-foot Atlantis V, was intercepted 300 miles off the Colombian mainland by the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Confidence on 17 Oct. The boat, which was in international waters sailing under a Canadian flag, was shadowed by the cutter while the Coast Guard awaited authority from Canada to board her. The next day, while still awaiting permission, an Atlantis V crewman identified as Luigi Barbaro jumped into the sea and was picked up by the cutter. "Barbaro informed the USCG that narcotics were on the Atlantis V and that he feared for his life." He claimed the remaining crew members were preparing to scuttle the boat. In the meantime, a second crewman jumped and was rescued, according to the charges. After Canada provided permission to board the boat, a team from the Confidence found 358 bundles of suspected cocaine, weighing roughly 880 pounds, hidden behind woodwork. Two of the bundles were later found to contain heroin and methamphetamine, the charges say. In 2006, Canadian authorities boarded another fishing vessel captained by Stirling in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and found $6.5 million worth of marijuana. Stirling was charged in British Columbia. However, the prosecution was "stayed" — without explanation — and Stirling and his crew went free. But the 2001 case involving Stirling and another boat, the Western Wind, still sets eyeballs rolling in federal law-enforcement circles. 4 Stirling was master of the 88-foot tuna boat, which was stopped by the U.S. Coast Guard entering the Strait of Juan de Fuca off Cape Alava. Under several tons of frozen fish, searchers found nearly 5,000 pounds of cocaine in bags marked as sugar. At the time, it was considered the largest cocaine seizure in Northwest history. U.S. Customs took Stirling and four crewmen into custody, only to release them to Canada a few days later without official explanation. He was never charged. Stirling, in an interview with The Seattle Times the following year, admitted he was smuggling the drugs but said he had been caught in a squeeze-play between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and an international motorcycle gang. Stirling said the RCMP backed out of a deal to pay him $1 million to set up a drug sting of the motorcycle gang. Stirling said he had been approached about the deal by a biker intermediary he met in prison in the early 1990s while serving time for smuggling drugs. The bikers helped him buy the Western Wind, he said, but then the RCMP pulled out of the deal. He claimed he was left owing money and drugs to the bikers, and said they would kill him if he did not deliver. Law-enforcement sources on both sides of the border told a different story. They said Stirling told the RCMP the deal had gone south — so to speak — and that he had simply gone fishing. However, while at sea, he said, he received a threatening email from the bikers telling him to go to Colombia and get the drugs, or else. Either way, it was a double-cross, said a
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