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RESEARCH ON A COGNITIVE-RELATIONAL THEORY OF EMOTION: A REPLICATION AND EXTENSION OF SMITH, HAYNES. LAZARUS, AND POPE
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University
by Charles Roderick Blons, M.A.
*****
The Ohio State University 1999
Dissertation Committee;
Professor Theodore Kaul, Adviser Approved by
Professor Lyle Schmidt Adviser Professor W. Bruce Walsh Department of Psychology
Professor Don Dell DMI Number; 9941288
UMI Microform 9941288 Copyright 1999, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by Charles Roderick Blons 1999 ABSTRACT
More than two decades of research have produced convincing evidence of a close link between cognition and emotion. A large body of research now supports the view that emotions occur in the wake of complex situational judgments called appraisals, and that each emotion is the result of a unique combination of these appraisals. In a recent series of articles outlining their own cognitive-relational theory, R. S. Lazarus and C. A. Smith have further distinguished appraisals from knowledge, and have suggested a number of ways in which the two may interact to influence (cause) emotion. Knowledge, they argue, is a representation of the way things are and how they work, and consists only of the emotionally relevant "facts" of a given encounter, whereas appraisal is the mediational process by which such knowledge is judged for its relevance and its implications for personal well-being. While this theoretically important distinction is not without empirical support, it has been tested only once in a study by Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, and Pope. The purpose of the present study was to provide (by means of replication) a second test of the model, and to attempt to extend it further by adding a new class of variables (contextual attributions) and testing the associations across a wider range of emotions (eight instead of six). Two hundred forty-three subjects were asked to recall and retrospectively report on the causal attributions, contextual attributions, appraisals, and emotions associated with a variety of past experiences. Data were analyzed through a series of simultaneous and hierarchical regression analyses designed to assess the relative explanatory power of attributions and appraisals. The results closely matched those originally reported by Smith et al., and extended to include both the new class of variables and the two new emotions being studied. Findings from the present study were seen as providing relatively strong support for the cognitive-relational theory in general and the mediational hypothesis in particular. Theoretical implications, implications for counseling, and suggestions for future research are discussed.
in for lee
IV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This was a very demanding project; one I could not have completed without the help and support of many others. Thanks first to my graduate adviser. Professor Ted Kaul, for his humane wisdom and sensitivity, and for (almost) always being there when I needed him
(and never when I didn't). Thanks also to my co-adviser. Professor Lyle Schmidt, for his warmth and generosity, and for the countless ways and times he reached out to help me.
Special thanks to my dissertation proposal committee, which included Professor W. Bruce
Walsh, for having the compassion and good sense to recommend that I postpone work on study 2 until my post-doctoral year (I could still be entering data). Very special thanks, too, to Professor Don Dell, for his staunch support and his willingness to step in so late in the process. Deepest appreciation to Professor Craig Smith of Vanderbilt University, for providing the materials needed to replicate and extend his earlier work and for sharing his real interest and passion for this topic with me. And finally, warm thanks to Angel
Edwards and Lee Blons for agreeing to serve as narrative judges. Their efforts will always be much appreciated.
All copyrighted materials first appearing in Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, and Pope (1993) and reappearing in this text have been reproduced with the written permission of the principal investigator, Craig A. Smith. VITA
November 11, 1953 ...... Bom - St. Paul, Minnesota
1979 ...... B. A. Psychology University of Minnesota, Minneapolis
1994...... M. A Psychology The Ohio State University, Columbus
1992 - 1994...... Academic Advisor and Course Instructor University College The Ohio State University, Columbus
1994 - 1996 ...... Graduate Assistant (Counselor) Counseling and Consultation Service The Ohio State University, Columbus
1997 - 1998 ...... Psychology Intern University Counseling Service Virginia Commonwealth University Richmond, Virginia
FIELDS OF STUDY
Major Field; Psychology Studies In Counseling Psychology
VI TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract...... ii
Dedication ...... iv
Acknowledgments ...... v
Vita...... vi
List of Tables...... x
Chapters Page
1. Introduction ...... I
Origins of C T...... 2 Early Work on a Typology of Normal Emotions ...... 5 The Status of Current Research ...... 5 The Present Study ...... 6
2. Literature Review ...... 7
Heidefs Theory of Phenomenal Causality ...... 8 Appraisal Theory ...... 9 Process-Oriented Theories of Appraisal ...... 9 Arnold's Theory ...... 9 Schachtefs Two-Factor Theory ...... 10 Work on a Theory of Stress and Coping ...... 12 Lazarus and Folkman's Theory of Stress, Appraisal, and Coping 13 Structural Theories of Appraisal ...... 15 Scherer's Appraisal Component Model ...... 15
vii Roseman's Structural Theory ...... 16 Smith and Ellsworth's Transtheoretical Model ...... 18 Frijda's Work on Appraisal ...... 19 Reisenzein's Studies of Appraisal and Emotion ...... 19 Weiner’s Attributional Theory ...... 20 Lazarus and Smith's Cognitive-Relational Theory ...... 22 The Theoretical Distinction Between Knowledge and Appraisal ...... 25 The Study by Smith, et al. (1993) ...... 28 The Present Study ...... 29 The Extension to Other Emotions ...... 30 The Extension to Contextual Knowledge ...... 30 Agency ...... 31 Certainty ...... 32 Predictability ...... 33 Familiarity ...... 33
3. M ethod ...... 35
Subjects ...... 35 Overview...... 35 Procedure...... 37 Measures ...... 38 Causal Attributions ...... 39 Contextual Attributions ...... 40 Aporaisals...... 40 Emotions ...... 42 Data Analysis ...... 42 Procedural Checks ...... 42 Planned Analyses ...... 43 Post Hoc Analyses ...... 43
4. Results ...... 46
Procedural Checks ...... 46 Primary Analyses ...... 48 Alpha Coefficients ...... 48 Mean Scores Across Measures ...... 51
vm Simultaneous and Hierarchical Regression Analyses ...... 54 A Test of the Cognitive-Mediational Hypothesis ...... 60 Post Hoc Analyses ...... 61
5. Discussion ...... 68
The Attempt to Replicate Smith et al. (1993)...... 68 The Extension to Contextual Attributions and to Other Emotions ...... 69 Inconsistencies, Unexpected Findings ...... 70 Revisions to the Model ...... 74 Revisions to the Set of Causal Attributions ...... 74 Other Revisions...... 75 Methodological Concerns ...... 75 Intercorrelation of Dependent Variables ...... 75 The Use of Retrospective Reports...... 76 The Use of an Analytic Test of the Mediational Hypothesis ...... 77 Failure to Control for Possible Order Effects ...... 78 Theoretical Concerns ...... 78 The Impact of Personal Beliefs ...... 79 The Role of Unconscious or Automatic Processes ...... 80 The Impact of Emotions on Cognition ...... 82 Implications for Counseling ...... 83 The Applied Theory ...... 84 Applied Treatment Interventions ...... 85 Applications to Cross-Cultural Counseling ...... 87 Suggestions for Future Research ...... 88
Appendices ...... 89
A. Text of the General Instructions Given to All Participants ...... 89 B. Text of the Eight Prompts Used...... 90 C Text of All Measures Used ...... 94 D. Debriefing Statement ...... 115 E. Representative Sample of Written Accounts Judged to be Ambiguous (Questionnaires Excluded From Data Analysis) ...... 116
List of References ...... 118
IX LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
2.1 Appraisal Components and Core Relational Themes Hypothesized for Six Emotions ...... 24
2.2 Proposed Appraisal Dimensions ...... 26
2.3 Contextual Attributions Hypothesized for Eight Emotions ...... 34
3 .1 Summary of Methodological Similarities and Differences Between Smith et al. ( 1993) and the Present Study ...... 44
4.1 Effectiveness of Prompt Manipulation...... 49
4.2 Mean Scores for Causal Attributions, Contextual Attributions, and Appraisal Components ...... 52
4.3 Mean Scores for Core Relational Themes and Emotions ...... 53
4.4 Analysis of the Variance in Emotion Accounted For by Attributions and Appraisals ...... 56
4.5 Analysis of the Variance in Emotion Accounted For by Attributions, Appraisal Components, and Core Relational Themes ...... 59
4.6 Analysis of the Variance in Appraisal Accounted For by Attributions ...... 62
4.7 Correlation Matrix for 43 Variables ...... 64 Chapter 1
Introduction
Cognitive and cognitive-behavioral approaches to therapy have proliferated since their introduction in the mid 1970's (Brewin, 1989). Roberts and Jones (1991) have identified as many as 20 current cognitive therapies, each with its own rationale and prescribed set of procedures, but all based on a cognitive-mediational view of behavior and behavior change. Among the earliest and most influential of these, and the most widely studied to-date, is Cognitive Therapy (CT; Beck, 1976; Beck & Weisharr, 1989;
Hollon & Beck, 1994).
A number of reviews and clinical studies (e.g.. Bowers, 1990; Dobson, 1989; Miller,
Norman, Keitner, Bishop, & Dow, 1989; Shea, et al., 1992) have documented the relative effectiveness of CT over medication and other forms of therapy in the treatment of major depression. Other more recent research has supported its use in treating generalized anxiety (e.g., Butler, Fennell, Robson, & Gelder, 1991), panic attacks (e.g., Clark,
Salkovskis, Hackman, Middleton, & Gelder, 1992), and agoraphobia (e.g.. Beck, Sokol,
Clark, Berchick, & Wright, 1992). Yet, despite its clinical appeal and its success in treating some forms of psychopathology, CT has so far failed to address a number of important questions regarding the correspondence between cognitive processes and emotion. The nature of these questions and the reasons for the lapse can best be understood by briefly considering the epistemological origins and early development of
CT. Origins of CT
CT is often associated with the cognitive theory of depression (Beck, 1967) from which it was developed. The original theory, derived from Beck's own clinical observations and his work with depressed patients, sought to highlight the role of negative core beliefs and systematic bias in precipitating and maintaining various kinds of depressive symptomatology. The theory held that many of the of negative core beliefs common to depression (e.g., "I am unloveable") were actually formed in early childhood and embedded at that time into complex associative networks called schemas, where they remained in an inactive state until (and unless) acted upon by relevant life experiences
(e.g., interpersonal rejection). Once activated, these negative beliefs were thought to contribute to a pattern of systematic cognitive bias (observable through certain errors in thinking) that could negatively influence the way in which new information was processed and quickly become self-sustaining and self-perpetuating. In the case of depression, this pattern was thought to include a characteristically negative view of self, the world, and the future, features more commonly referred to by Beck and others as the cognitive triad
(Beck, 1967; Beck & Weishaar, 1989).
Beck generalized the principles underlying his cognitive theory of depression to other disorders as well and, over time, developed a cognitive profile of neurotic disorders based on the unique pattern of bias associated with each (see Beck 1967; Beck & Weishaar,
1989). Anxiety, for example, was thought to be associated with a pattern of bias favoring interpretations of physical or psychological danger; hysteria, with a pattern favoring interpretations of motor or sensory abnormality; and hypomania, with a pattern favoring an inflated view of self. CT was offered as a general approach to the treatment of such disorders, aimed at reducing or eliminating systematic bias by empirically challenging the negative core beliefs that sustained them and the errors in thinking that inevitably followed
2 (an exception can be found in the treatment of phobias and panic which has tended instead
to focus mainly on the errors in thinking that result from the misattribution of
physiological arousal [Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985]).
In his later years. Beck (1991) developed what came to be called the continuity
hypothesise a notion that on its surface seems to suggest that a science of normal cognitive
(and cognitive-emotive) functioning can be derived from what is known about certain
kinds (or all kinds) of psychopathology. In support of this idea, he writes that "... the
systematic negative bias in depression and positive bias in mania supports the presence of
similar but more subtle biases in normal everyday reactions," and that "... the
overconcem about evaluation in the social phobias and of physical danger in the
impersonal phobias . . . point to similar sources of anxiety in the psychology of everyday
life" (p. 370).
Issues of scientific methodology aside, it seems clear that Beck's cognitive theory has
from the beginning been more closely joined to issues of psychopathology than normal
functioning, and this continues to be the case (Lazarus [1995a] has made essentially the
same point with regard to Rational Emotive Therapy [RET]). Questions concerning the
role of particular cognitions or cognitive processes in determining the quality or intensity
of individual emotions, for example, have never been fully explored by the theory. This is
important, because even if it is true that negative core beliefs can precipitate symptoms of
depression and anxiety, it does not follow (nor does clinical experience suggest) that
symptoms of depression and anxiety can only be precipitated by negative core beliefs, or that negative core beliefs (or errors in thinking) can account for all the difficulties people encounter. Survivors of trauma, for example, or those faced with a significant loss or a critical life transition may experience depression, or anxiety, or a host of other distressing emotions in the absence of any (relevant) negative core beliefs. Far from being
3 pathological, these responses can be seen as highly adaptive when they motivate steps
towards cognitive-affective reintegration and an eventual return to normal ftmctioning
(Greenberg & Safran, 1984; Lazarus, 1995a). What is needed is an empirically based,
cognitive-affective approach that offers a suitable framework for understanding and
working with emotional distress in the absence of psychopathology (see Costa & McCrae,
1990; Lazarus, 1989, 1991; Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). CT, as currently configured, does
not offer this.
The lack of a strong theoretical base for understanding cognitive-affective
interactions has given rise to the perception that CT and other forms of cognitive therapy
eschew affect (Martin, 1987). This has long been disputed by Beck (1976), Ellis (1962),
and others who have argued (somewhat ironically) that cognitive approaches to therapy
are and always have been primarily concerned with the alleviation of emotional distress
and suffering. Taking note of the apparent contradiction, Martin has observed that while
many leading cognitive therapists may themselves be quite attentive to affect in the therapy room, "it may be alleged that the cognitive theories from which cognitive therapists draw their more academic ideas are especially impoverished when it comes to questions of affective experience" (p. 78). A growing number of psychologists would appear to agree. Many, including many cognitive theorists (e.g., Barnard & Teasdale,
1991; Dyck, 1993; Greenberg & Korman, 1993; Lazarus, 1991b; Safran & Greenberg,
1988; Tausch, 1988; Watts, 1992), have recently begun calling for a more comprehensive theoretical formulation that attempts to describe the broader relationship between cognition and emotion, and that more fully acknowledges the central role of affective processes in psychotherapy. These developments may have been foreseen by Mahoney
(1988) who, over a decade ago, noted the beginnings of a movement away from cognitive primacy and toward phenomenological constructivism, which emphasizes subjective
4 knowing and the interdependence of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral systems. Hollon
and Beck (1994) have more recently noted the same trend.
There clearly is a need to develop better psychological theory concerning the
relationship between cognitive processes and emotion, not only to gain a broader
perspective on psychological functioning and a more solid empirical foundation for
cognitive-mediational approaches to therapy (see Lazarus, 1995a; Mathews & MacLeod,
1994), but also to advance the effort to develop more effective treatment interventions for
the relatively normal range of problems (e.g., developmental issues, life transitions,
difficulties with adjustment) many clients bring to therapy.
Earlv Work on a Tvpologv of Normal Emotions
Though never developed into a formal theory. Beck (1976, 1991) briefly outlined the formulation of a typology of normal emotions analogous to the profile of neurotic discussed earlier. The typology suggested a causal association between each of four kinds of thought (i.e., loss, gain, threat, and transgression) and each of four basic emotions (i.e., sadness, elation, anxiety, and anger). Unfortunately, few other details of the model were ever provided and no substantive discussion of its implications for either research or practice was ever offered by Beck. At least four independent tests of the model have been conducted to-date, all yielding mixed or negative results (see Wickless & BCirsch, 1988).
The Status of Current Research on Cognition and Emotion
Following their own independent line of inquiry, a number of other researchers
(working mostly from a social or social cognition perspective) have made repeated attempts to map the correspondence between specific kinds of cognitive activity and specific emotions (Smith & Lazarus, 1990). While certain trends have been found in the data from these studies, progress toward a more stable model has been slowed by theoretical confusion concerning the nature of the cognitive processes involved (Lazarus
5 & Smith, 1988). One group, led by C. A. Smith and R. S. Lazarus, has managed to
overcome these difficulties and advance a verifiable, mediational model of the cognition-emotion relationship. Though their model has received empirical support, it has only been tested once. No effort has been made to-date to replicate the original findings or extend the model in any way.
The Present Studv
Owing to the importance of developing a theoretically and empirically sound model of the cognition-emotion relationship, the present study was designed for the purpose of attempting to replicate the earlier work of Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, and Pope (1993, study
1 ), and to extend the model in ways that would increase both its generalizability and its explanatory power. Further details of the model and my planned replication and extension of it are offered in Chapter 2. Chapter 2
Literature Review
William James was among the first to set out a psychological theory linking cognitive processes with emotion (see Ellsworth, 1994; Hansell, 1989; Lang, 1994). Unlike Wundt, who believed that feelings were experienced directly and first in the emotion process,
James (1884/1969, 1890/1950, 1894/1994) held that emotional feelings were secondary phenomena, prompted by physiological and behavioral changes that occurred in response to perceived changes in the physical environment (Lang). In a fi"equently quoted passage that first appeared in a 1884 article written ïov Mind^ James writes, "My theory. . . is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception o f the excitingfact, and that our feeling o f the same changes as they occurIS the emotion" (1884/1969, pp. 247-248; emphasis in the original). Later in the same paragraph, he adds, "The hypothesis here to be defended says that. . . we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble. " Though a careful reading highlights the fact that an appraisal of some sort was needed to start the process (i.e., an appraisal leading to a perception of the exciting fact), it appears neither James nor his contemporaries were much interested in developing this idea further (Ellsworth). Instead, much of the early interest in James' theory (later renamed the James-Lange theory of emotion [James, 1884/1994]) was focused on the highly controversial claims it made regarding the physiological and behavioral bases of emotion.
The question of physiological specificity (i.e., whether or not particular patterns of physiological activity give rise to particular emotions) proved difficult to settle by means
7 of empirical tests (Lang, 1994). One of the problems was the theory itself, which offered
no real details of the physiological responses involved (see James 1884/1969, 1890/1950,
1884/1994). Garmon's (1927) ideas about undifferentiated physiological arousal fared
much better empirically and, in the minds of many, constituted an effective and decisive
rebuttal of James-Lange (Ellsworth, 1994). The issue remained far from settled, however,
and in the years following James and Garmon, research on emotion was reduced almost
entirely to the study of afreet and physiology (Lang). Interest in the cognitive processes
involved was lost for decades (Ellsworth).
Heider*s Theory o f Phenomenal Gausalitv
Though probably not intended as a response to James or Garmon, Heidefs (1944,
1958) theory of phenomenal causality (Lang, 1994) had the effect of redirecting attention
back to the perception of the exciting fact. For Heider though, it was not perceived
changes in the environment, but the perceived characteristics of the source of those
changes that gave rise to emotion. In the case of social environments, these were thought to include the abilities, wishes, feelings, and intentions of certain individuals (i.e., those associated with change). Heider believed that without some knowledge or understanding of these source characteristics, there could be no emotion. In a deeper analysis of the structuring of emotional antecedents, Heider further distinguished factors within the environment from those within the person (a precursor to Rotter's [1966] work on internal versus external perceptions of control (Weiner, 1985)).
The significance of Heider's views for the study of cognition and emotion was at least twofold. First, by breaking with the decades old tradition of thinking about emotion primarily in terms o f its physiology (Ellsworth, 1994), Heider was among those who helped legitimize intrapsychic approaches to the study of emotion. Also, by suggesting that emotions depended on an understanding of source attributes, Heider helped lay the
8 groundwork for future theoretical formulations directly linking cognitive processes and emotion (e.g., see Weiner, 1985). These, in fact, began to emerge during the decade of the 1960's in the form of theories of cognitive appraisal.
Appraisal Theorv
In a general sense, theories of appraisal are concerned with specifying the cognitions and the cognitive processes involved in various kinds of emotion. A key premise of all such theories is that emotions arise from an evaluative process (i.e., a process of cognitive appraisal) through which encounters with the environment are judged as to their implications for personal well-being (Smith & Lazarus, 1993). In this context, positive emotions are thought to result from the appraisal of various kinds of benefit, and negative emotions from the appraisal of various kinds of harm. Both kinds of appraisal (and emotion) are regarded as highly adaptive in that they tend to enhance the prospects for growth (Smith & Ellsworth, 1987; Smith & Lazarus, 1990).
A number of theories of appraisal have been proposed, some (e.g., Arnold, 1960;
Lazarus 1966; Lazarus & Folkman 1984; Schachter & Singer, 1962) emphasizing the process of appraisal, and others (e.g., Frijda, 1987; Roseman 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith
& Ellsworth, 1985; Reisenzein & Hofmann, 1990; Smith & Lazarus, 1993; Weiner, 1985) focusing, instead, on the ways in which appraisals are structured, and on their functional relationship to particular emotions (Lazarus & Smith, 1988). Each approach will be reviewed further.
Process-Oriented Theories of Appraisal
Arnold's Theorv. Like Heider, Arnold (1960) was among the first to break with the then well established tradition in psychology of thinking about emotion primarily in terms of physiological correlates and associated brain structures. Unlike Heider, whose main interest was the study of social perception, Arnold was mainly concerned with describing
9 the cognitive processes involved in mediating various kinds of emotional responses
(Mooren & Krogten, 1993; Stein & Oatley, 1992). In particular, she held that emotions are the result of a two-stage process through which an object or stimulus is first perceived
2nd then appraised for its personal relevance. To be capable of eliciting an emotion,
Arnold believed the object must be appraised by the individual as either suitable or unsuitable (Mooren & ECrogten, 1993). (Suitable object appraisals were further thought to be associated with what Arnold called a felt tendency [i.e., an impulse or an action tendency] towards the object, and unsuitable object appraisals with a felt tendency away from the object. Both kinds of felt tendency were believed to be accompanied by corresponding physiological changes that helped prepare the individual for action).
Following such an appraisal, the individual was believed to further classify the object as either present or absent, and as either easy or difficult to attain (or avoid). The resulting scheme o f three dichotomies, as Arnold called it, determined which of several emotions would be experienced. Hopelessness, for example, was thought to result from suitable object appraisals when the object was judged to be absent and difficult to attain.
Though it appeared to hold some promise, Arnold's (1960) system of classifying emotions was replete with contradictions and inconsistencies. Even so, the theoretical principles on wfiich it was based were revolutionary for their time (Mooren & Krogten,
1993). In contrast to James (1884/1969), who held that emotion could not occur without physiological change, Arnold held that neither emotion nor physiological change could occur without appraisal. It was, in fact, a reformulation of this cognitive-mediational view that was first tested by Schachter and Singer ( 1962).
Schachter's Two-Factor Theory. Schachter (1959; Schachter & Singer, 1962) proposed that it was the interaction of physiological arousal and appraisal (not appraisal alone) that gave rise to each of the basic emotions. In his view, the process began with
1 0 the perception-cognition of a relevant stimulus followed by a state of undifferentiated
physiological arousal (Schachter, like James, was unclear about how an individual got
from perception of the stimulus to arousal). Once aroused, the individual was thought to
be highly motivated to understand and label his or her bodily feelings in terms of what was
known about the precipitating factors at work in the situation. In the absence of any suitable explanation for what was happening, Schachter believed the individual would label his or her bodily feelings in accordance with the cognitions most readily available in the moment (e.g., as suggested by the situational context). In either case, it was the appraisal of physiological change that, according to Schachter, gave meaning to the undifferentiated state of arousal and determined which of several emotions would be experienced.
To test his theory, Schachter and Singer (1962) conducted a study in which subjects were given an injection of either epinephrine or a placebo (saline solution), and then placed in an experimentally controlled situation meant to induce either euphoria or anger.
Prior to being given the injection, subjects in the epinephrine condition were either informed or uninformed about the drug they would be given and its expected physiological effects (e.g., increased blood pressure, increased heart rate, palpitations, tremors, accelerated breathing). Immediately following exposure to the emotion-inducing situation, standardized observation and self-report measures were used to assess each subject's emotional state. As predicted, subjects in the uninformed-epinephrine condition scored significantly higher on measures of situationally induced euphoria and anger than subjects in the matching control conditions, whereas those in the informed-epinephrine condition scored approximately the same as controls. Similar results were reported in a follow-up study by Schachter and Wheeler (1962).
11 Schachter's two-factor theory was the catalyst for a number of subsequent
investigations, some of them replications of the original study (e.g., Erdmann & Janke,
1978; Marshall & Zimbardo, 1979; Maslach, 1979; Rogers & Deckner, 1975). Despite
the enthusiasm with which they were carried out, the results of these studies largely failed
to support Schachter’s claim that physiological arousal was a necessary condition for
emotion, or that unexplained arousal increased the effects of contextual cues on emotional
states (Manstead & Wagner, 1981; Reisenzein, 1983). Nonetheless, interest in studying
appraisal remained strong, helped in part by the work of Lazarus ( 1966) and others on
stress and coping.
Work on a Theory of Stress and Coping. Lazarus began his research career in the
early 1950's with the study of psychological stress and its relationship to various kinds of
dysfunction (Lazarus, 1993). During the mid 1960's, he and his colleagues conducted a
series of investigations to examine individual differences in response to stressful stimuli.
In these studies, subjects were shown visually graphic, potentially upsetting (stressful)
films, depicting, for example, a series of machine shop accidents, or a surgical operation
performed without anesthetic. Prior to seeing these films, subjects listened to one of
several pre-film introductions designed to influence (based on the precepts of ego-defense
theory) the way in which they would interpret what they were about to see. For example,
some subjects were told that the events they were about to see had been staged and did
not actually take place (the denial-defense condition), others were provided with factual
information about when, where, and why the film had been made (the intellectualization - defense condition), and still others were told that the events they were about to see were real, and that the individuals involved experienced significant pain and suffering (the open threat condition). Subjects' level of stress (measured by means of physiological markers and self-report) was then compared to a control group who saw the same films but heard
12 no pre-film introduction. The overall pattern of results (e.g., as reported by Lazarus &
Alfert [1964], and by Speisman, Lazarus, Mordkoff, & Davison [1964], and as summarized by Lazarus [1993]) suggested that the pre-film introductions had a powerful effect on recorded levels of stress. That is, as compared to controls, subjects in the open threat condition showed significantly higher levels of stress in response to the films, while those in both the denial-defense and the intellectualization-defense conditions showed significantly lower levels of stress. In attempting to understand the meaning of these results, Lazarus gradually abandoned ego defense theory explanations in favor of a more general concept of appraisal as the mediator of psychological stress reactions (linked here to subjects' capacity to identify with the protagonist in each of the films). He, like Arnold
(1960) and Schachter (1959; Schachter & Singer, 1962), came to regard appraisal as a
"universal process in which people . . . constantly evaluate the significance of what is happening for their personal well-being" (Lazarus, 1993, p. 7). Stress reactions were thus seen as a category of responses that occurred following the appraisal of loss or the threat of loss. These ideas were further elaborated by Lazarus and Folkman ( 1984) and incorporated into a comprehensive theory of stress, appraisal, and coping, which later served as a bridge to research on appraisal and emotion.
Lazarus and Folkman's Theory o f Stress. Appraisal, and Coping. The theory of stress, appraisal, and coping developed by Lazarus (1966; Lazarus, Averill, & Opton,
1970; Lazarus & Launer, 1978) and elaborated by Lazarus and Folkman (1984) emphasized both the relational and process-oriented qualities of stressful encounters
(Folkman, 1984). The individual was seen as an active participant in person-environment interactions, at all times motivated to advance and grow and, towards that end, continuously engaged in moment-to-moment appraisals of the ongoing person - environment relationship. Appraisals, in turn, were thought to consist of both a primary
13 and a secondary process.
In primary appraisal^ the individual determines whether and in what ways the person-environment encounter is relevant to personal well-being. If relevant, he or she then determines whether it is benign-positive or stressful and, if stressfiil, whether the stress is associated with a challenge, a loss, or the threat of a loss.
In secondary appraisal, the individual assesses his or her available coping resources and options with regard to the situation at hand (Folkman, 1984; Lazarus & Folkman,
1984). Secondary appraisal was thought to be followed by coping which, in this formulation, refers to ongoing cognitive and behavioral efforts (whether successful or not) to manage or adapt to the demands of the situation (Folkman; Lazarus & Folkman). The term problem-focused coping was used to refer to efforts to control or eliminate the external source of the problem, and emotion-focused coping to the effort to internally manage feelings of emotional distress. Coping was then followed by reappraisal.
Lazarus and Folkman (1984) held that stress was mediated by appraisal, and that appraisal (both primary and secondary) was shaped by the confluence of personal motives and situational demands. Primary appraisals, for example, were thought to reflect the closely held values and beliefs of the individual (collectively referred to by Novacek and
Lazarus [1990] as personal commitments to emphasize their motivational quality) in conjunction with certain situational characteristics such as ambiguity, or novelty, or the predictability of various outcomes (Folkman, 1984; Lazarus & Folkman; see also Paterson
& Neufeld, 1987; Thompson, 1981). Secondary appraisals were thought to mostly reflect beliefs about coping and the controllability (in self-efficacy terms) of various outcomes.
The model developed by Lazarus and Folkman (1984) allowed for a number of predictions regarding the interaction of stress, appraisal, and coping — unfortunately, not all easily verifiable. As expected, primary and secondary appraisal variables generally did
14 help to explain coping, as well as some kinds of emotional responses (Lazarus &
Folkman). However, stress proved ubiquitous and too undifferentiated to be of lasting
value as an outcome measure. Though he continued to work with other parts of the
model, Lazarus eventually came to regard stress as little more than a crude index of
emotionality (Lazarus, 1990). By the mid 1980's, he and others had begun calling for
more research on the role of appraisal in the emotion process.
Structural Theories of Appraisal
Along with the shift in focus from the mediation of stress to the mediation of
emotional responses came a shift in emphasis from process explanations to functional
descriptions of the appraisal-emotion relationship (Lazarus & Smith, 1988). The empirical
challenge, as many researchers saw it, was to map the correspondence between specific
appraisals (or sets of appraisals) and specific emotions (Smith & Lazarus, 1990). This led
to a number of distinct but overlapping theoretical formulations (Lazarus, 1993), the most
prominent of which will be summarized here.
Scherer's Appraisal Component Model. Scherer (1982, 1984, 1993) advanced what
may have been the most complex of all the appraisal component models. It was based on
a system of stimulus evaluation checks (SEC's), a fixed sequence of 16 appraisal
dimensions thought by Scherer to differentiate 14 emotions. According to the model,
each person-environment encounter triggers a fixed sequence of SEC's which serves to guide the individual through the process of determining, for example, whether a stimulus event had occurred and, if it had, whether its occurrence had been expected or unexpected
{novelty check)^ pleasant or unpleasant {intrinsic pleasantness check), relevant or
irrelevant to the attainment of personal goals {goal sigtiificance check), controllable or uncontrollable {coping potential check), and congruent or incongruent with personal and social norms {norm com patibility check:, Scherer, 1993). As in the earlier formulation by
15 Arnold (1960), the ways in which these questions were answered were thought to
determine which of several emotions would be experienced. Pride, for example, was
believed to result from appraisals of relatively high goal relevance, relatively high coping
potential, and relatively strong congruence with personal and social norms.
Though not researched extensively, Scherer’s (1993) appraisal component model was
tested using an innovative approach designed to measure the predictive power of SEC's.
In this study, subjects recalled a past experience in which they experienced strong
emotional feelings, then responded to a series of computer generated questions (the
SEC's) about the specifics of the situation. A computer program then analyzed the pattern
of each subject's responses and, using only this information and the assumptions derived
from Scherer's theoretical model, attempted to identify which of several emotions the
subject had experienced during the original encounter. Subjects responded "yes" or "no"
to indicate whether or not the correct emotion had been named and, if it had not, a second
attempt was then made to identify it. The results were expressed as a percentage of
correct hits (first, second, and cumulative) for each of the 14 emotions studied.
As reported by Scherer (1993), the findings yielded a cumulative hit rate ranging
from a low of 14.3% (for anxiety) to a high of 100% (for joy, sorrow, and grief), with an
overall mean of 77.9%. Despite these seemingly impressive results, Scherer's model has
from the beginning been criticized for its use of certain SEC's (e.g., pleasantness, which to
some is suggestive of a feeling state) as well as for its unwieldy complexity and its failure
to account for potentially extraneous or redundant appraisal dimensions (see Chwelos &
Oatley, 1994; Dalkvist & Rollenhagen, 1989).
Roseman's Structural Theory. Roseman’s (1984; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996) structural theory was based on a system of five appraisal dimensions, various combinations of which were thought to differentiate 13 basic emotions. The dimensions proposed by
16 Roseman included (a) motivational state (consistent versus inconsistent) which was thought to broadly distinguish positive emotions from negative emotions, (b) situational state (involving conditions of reward versus punishment), believed to differentiate joy and sadness from emotions such as distress and relief, (c) situational certainty, thought to help differentiate hope and fear from joy, (d) power (or control), believed to distinguish emotions such as guilt and anger from emotions such as sadness and regret, and (e) causal agency (self, versus other, versus circumstances), thought to distinguish pride and guilt
(self-caused) from anger (other-caused) and sorrow (circumstance-caused). As in other formulations of this kind, research interest was concentrated not so much on the appraisals themselves but on the ways in which they combined to create meaning and form the basis for each of the emotions under consideration. In Roseman's model, guilt, for example, was thought to occur in situations appraised by the individual as motivationally inconsistent (i.e., not what the person wanted), self-caused, and uncertain (ambiguous), involving the prospect of either loss or of punishment and leaving the individual with a weak sense of power or control.
Studies conducted by Roseman and others to test models such as this have usually involved the use of either retrospective reports (in which subjects rate the strength of various themes associated with a past experience) or experimental vignettes (in which subjects read carefully constructed stories and then rate the strength of various themes associated with the protagonist). The approach taken to data analysis in these studies has usually involved some form of principle components or primary factor analysis and hierarchical regression. A number of such tests of Roseman's model have been conducted over the past two decades (e.g., Roseman, 1984, 1991; Roseman, et al., 1996; Roseman,
Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Scherer, 1993; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), mostly of the retrospective kind and largely supporting its predictions, though there have been
17 exceptions. Ellsworth and Smith, for example, found no support for an association between self agency and guilt (1987), and Manstead and Tetlock (1989) found no evidence linking power (conceptualized by them as situational control) to the emotion process.
Smith and Ellsworth's Transtheoretical Model. Based on a review of previous research on emotion, including the component models of Scherer (1984) and Roseman
(1984), Smith and Ellsworth (1985) proposed a transtheoretical model of appraisal, one which they believed embodied the most relevant dimensions of the appraisal process. The model originally consisted of eight appraisal dimensions; however, only six were reliably supported in subsequent research (e.g.. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987; Ellsworth &
Smith, 1988a, 1988b; Tesser, 1990). Th& siyi \nc\ndQd {a) pleasantnesssituational certainty, (c) self-other agency, (d) attentional activity, thought to distinguish boredom and disgust from the other emotions, (e) anticipated effort, thought to distinguish challenge from happiness, pride, and surprise, and (f) situational control, thought to differentiate sadness from other emotions.
Smith and Ellsworth (1987; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a, 1988b) found through their research that certain of the appraisal dimensions in their model tended to be highly correlated with one another. Appraisals o f pleasantness, for example, tended to co-occur with appraisals of situational certainty (r = .40, g < .05) and, in the case of positive emotions, with self-agency (r = .26, g < .001) as well. They also found that positive emotions (such as hope, tranquillity, and love) were less clearly differentiated than negative emotions (such as guilt and anger), and that pleasantness, while important in distinguishing positive from negative emotions, was of little use in making further (within group) distinctions.
18 Frijda's Work on Appraisal. Frijda and colleagues (Frijda, 1987, 1993; Frijda,
Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989) embarked on a series of studies designed to investigate a
broad range of theoretically relevant appraisals, many drawn from the earlier work of
Scherer (1984), Roseman (1984), and Smith and Ellsworth (1985). In one such study,
using subjects' appraisal ratings of 32 emotions, Frijda et al. (1989) identified 11
dimensions relevant to the appraisal process (Karasawa, 1995), among them (a) valence
(or pleasantness), (b) humcm agency (or responsibility), (c) importance, (d)
interestingness, (e) expectedness (or novelty), (f) controllability, {g) familiarity, (h)
certainty, (i) effort, (j) focality-globality, thought to distinguish fear (arising from focused
events) from anxiety (arising from difiuse situations with a more global impact), and (k)
the time o f the event (past, present, or future), believed to differentiate anxiety and regret
from other emotions. The same group of researchers also found support for action
readiness (a concept quite similar to Arnold's [1960] notion of felt tendencies or felt
impulses) as a distinguishing response-side feature of some emotions. Self-protection and
avoidance, for example, were identified as two examples of an impulse to move away, and
were associated with both anxiety and fear.
Reisenzein's Studies of Appraisal and Emotion. The approach taken by Reisenzein
(Reisenzein & Hofmann, 1990; Reisenzein & Spielhofer, 1994) to the study of appraisal
and emotion was altogether different than that of his predecessors. Rather than develop a set of theoretically relevant appraisal dimensions a priori and then proceed to test it in the field as others had done, Reisenzein wanted instead to provide subjects with a way of telling him which appraisals they actually made use of in their day-to-day encounters.
Using a modified version of Kelly's (1955) repertory grid technique, Reisenzein and
Hofinann presented subjects with a series of pairwise comparisons of eliciting events common to each of 23 emotions, then asked them to suggest on their own an attribute
19 (i.e., a pair of opposing features) on which the two situations differed. Subjects' responses
were sorted and grouped by type, and the results compared with the appraisal dimensions
proposed by other theorists. The analysis yielded 10 distinct appraisal dimensions (or
clusters) of which 8 had been identified previously. The 10 included (a) valence o f the
elicitmg event, (b) importance o f the event, (c) causality, agency, intentionality, (d)
responsibility, blame, moral evaluation, (e) perceived control, (f) activity-passivity, (g)
temporal aspects o f the event, (h) expectedness, familiarity, (i) relationship quality (like
versus dislike), believed to distinguish gratitude, love, and pity firom jealously, envy, and
contempt, and (j) focus o f the eliciting event (self versus others), thought to differentiate
pity and remorse from anxiety and embarrassment. A series of follow-up studies by
Reisenzein and Spielhofer (1994) yielded 10 additional dimensions, among them (k) subjective evaluation, (1) self-evaluation, (m) interpersonal evaluation, (n) evaluation of others, (o) focality-globality, (p) stability, (q) suddenness, (r) anticipated effort, (t) certainty, probability, and (t) predictability o f the consequences.
Weiner's Attributional Theory. Based on an analysis of research on the ways in which individuals organize and structure their perceptions of success and failure, Weiner's
(1985; Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1979) attributional theory originally sought to highlight the role of causal attributions in achievement-related contexts, and was only later applied to the broader analysis of cognition and emotion. According to the theory, events and outcomes of importance to the individual gain affective meaning only through an analysis of the causal factors involved (note the similarity to Heidefs [1944, 1958] theory of phenomenal causality, discussed earlier). Faced with an emotionally evocative event, the individual first categorically labels the cause (i.e., attributes it to such things as luck, effort, or ability), generating one or more categorical attributions', then (perhaps simultaneously), he or she classifies the cause along several underlying dimensions,
2 0 creating a set of distinct but interrelated dimensional attributions (see Smith, Haynes,
Lazarus, & Pope, 1993). Weiner believed it was these dimensional attributions that
provided the underlying cognitive structure needed to differentiate achievement-related
emotions and, in the extended theory, other emotions as well. Among those he identified
as most important were (a) causal lociis^ a dimension that identifies the cause as either
internal or external to the individual, (b) stability, an indicator of its status as either
temporary and variable or long-lasting and constant, and (c) controllability, a dimension
that describes whether and to what extent the cause can be controlled (by anyone). Two
others identified by Weiner but thought by him to be of less importance, were (d)
intentionality, used to refer to the motives associated with the cause and thought to play a
role in anger, and (e) globality, used to refer to the generalizability of the effects of the
cause and thought (by Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale [1978]) to be associated with the
sadness found in depression (Smith, et al ).
Weiner (1985) formed a number of working hypotheses about the relationship
between specific attributions (both categorical and dimensional) and specific emotions,
though few have actually been tested. Guilt, for example, was thought by Weiner to be
associated with negative outcomes caused by factors under self-control; anger, with
negative (and intentional) outcomes caused by factors under the control of others; and
hopelessness, with negative outcomes caused by stable factors under no one's control. In
one study of the causal attributions associated with anger, guilt, and pity, Weiner,
Graham, and Chandler (1982) found support only for the predictions associated with
causal locus and controllability. Stability, while important, was seen as influencing the
intensity rather than the quality of emotional feelings. A number of other emotions, such as fear, sadness, and relief have not been extensively analyzed or studied in attributional terms (Smith et al., 1993).
2 1 Lazarus and Smith's Cognitive-Relational Theory. The cognitive-relational theory of
emotion proposed by Lazarus and Smith (1988; Smith et al., 1993; Smith & Lazarus,
1990, 1993) was developed with two clear goals in mind. The first was to attempt to
integrate the results of previous research on appraisal and emotion (cited above) with the
more general, process-oriented theory of stress, appraisal, and coping developed by
Lazarus and Folkman (1984). The second, was to distinguish appraisals (i.e., judgments
about the "facts" of a given encounter and what they imply for personal well-being) fi-om appraisal-related cognitions such as causal attributions and action tendencies (Smith &
Lazarus, 1993; Smith & Pope, 1992). At the center of the theory was a view of people and environments as dynamic and mutually determined, with appraisal-mediated emotion providing the necessary causal link connecting the two.
In their writings, Lazarus and Smith (1988; Smith et al., 1993; Smith & Lazarus,
1990, 1993) have used the term relational meaning to refer to the ideational (cognitive) representation of person-and-environment that underlies each emotion, and they have described it at two levels of analysis. The first is a description of the specific judgments people make in assessing relational harms and benefits. Lazarus and Smith have identified six such appraisal components, two of which correspond to primary appraisal (i.e., the assessment of whether and in what ways the encounter is relevant to personal well-being), and the remaining four to secondary appraisal (i.e., the assessment of available coping resources and coping options). The primary appraisal components include (a) motivational relevance, an assessment of the extent to which the encounter is relevant or irrelevant to personal goals and beliefs, and (b) motivational congruence, an assessment of the extent to which the encounter is consistent or inconsistent with the same goals and belief system. The secondary appraisal components identified by Lazarus and Smith include (c) accountability, an assessment of who or what (oneself or someone/something
2 2 else) is to be given credit or blame for the encounter, (d) problem-fociised coping potential, an assessment of the individual's ability to control or otherwise improve the
conditions of the encounter (i.e., make it more motivationally congruent), (e) emotion - focused coping potential, an assessment of the individual's ability to adjust or adapt to the
conditions present in the encounter, and (f) future expectancy, an assessment of the
prospects for change in the situation that could render it either more or less motivationally congruent. Smith and Lazarus (1993, Smith et al., 1993) have suggested that it is these
six appraisal components that in various combinations define the relational meanings that are thought to underlie each of the basic emotions. Anger, for example, has been thought to result from primary appraisals of motivational relevance and motivational incongruence together with a secondary appraisal of other-accountability; fear-anxiety, from primary appraisals of motivational relevance and motivational incongruence together with a secondary appraisal of low emotion-focused coping potential; and sadness, from primary appraisals of motivational relevance and motivational incongruence together with secondary appraisals of low problem-focused coping potential and low future-expectancy
(see Table 2.1).
The second way in which Lazarus and Smith (1988; Smith et al., 1993; Smith &
Lazarus, 1990, 1993) have described relational meaning is at the level of core relational themes. A core relational theme is an expression of the whole of the relational meaning.
It describes the essence of the relational harm or benefit as understood (appraised) by the individual. The core relational theme for anger, according to Lazarus and Smith, is other-blame-, for fear-anxiety, it is threat, for sadness, it is loss-helplessness; and for hope, it is effortfid optimism (see Table 2.1 for a summary of the appraisal components and core relational themes hypothesized for six basic emotions). Lazarus and Smith (Smith et al;
Smith & Lazarus) are careful to point out that while every core relational theme reflects a
23 lim otion Imnortant Anoraisal Comnonents" Core Relational llieme Primary Appraisal Secondary Ap]uuisal
A nger Motivationally Relevant Other-Accountability Other-lllaine Motivationally Incongruent
G uilt Motivationally Relevant Self-Accountability Self-lJIame Motivationally Incongruent
I'ear-Anxiety Motivationally Relevant (low or uncertain) liinotion-Pocnscd Coping Potential Danger-Threat Motivationally Incottgruent
Sadness Motivationally Relevant (low) Problem-l'ocused Coping Potential Irrevocable 1 ,oss, 1 lelplessnc Motivationally Incongruent (negative) future lixpectations
Uope-challenge Motivationally Relevant (high) Problem-focused Coping Potential litlbrtful tiptimism Motivationally Incongruent (positive) future lixpectations
1 lappiness Motivationally Relevant N one Success Motivationally Congruent
■‘Not listed are the tlicoreticully relevunt uppiaisul eoinponciils and core relational theme tor pride (Appraisal Components: Motivationally Relevant. Motivationally Congnicnt, SeU-Aeeoimtability; Appraisal Theme: Valued Achievement), and relief (Appraisal Components: Motivationally Relevant, Motivationally Congruent, Appraisal Theme: Rasing of llneat), also suggested by C, A. Smith (personal commtmieation, June 14, l‘J‘J7).
f rom "In search of the 'hot' cognitions: Attributions, and their relation to emotion," by C. A. Smith, K. N. Ilajiies, R. S. I.a/anis, and I,. K. I'ope, Journal of Rersonalitv and Social Rsvchologv. ()5(5t. p. 918. Copyright I99it by tlie American Rsychological Association, Inc, Reproduced willi pennission.
fable 2.1 Appraisal Com|X)uents and Core Relational fheines I ly|:othesi/ed for Six Rmotions particular set of appraisal components and vice versa, neither stands in a causal relationship to the other. Rather, each represents an alternate way of describing the same person-environment encounter — or, more precisely, the same relational meaning.
In a first test of their model. Smith and Lazarus (1993) used a vignette methodology to experimentally manipulate the appraisals hypothesized to produce anger, guilt, fear - anxiety, and sadness. The results supported the model's predictions for anger, guilt, and fear-anxiety, but not for sadness, presumably due to an ineffective manipulation of the relevant appraisals for that emotion. In a follow-up study, this time using retrospective reports. Smith, Lazarus, and Pope (reviewed in Smith & Pope, 1992) found the predicted pattern of appraisal-emotion covariation for anger, sadness, guilt, fear-anxiety, happiness, and hope.
The Theoretical Distinction Between Knowledge and Appraisal.
Table 2.2 summarizes the dimensions of appraisal associated with each of the structural theories discussed so far. The number and variety o f dimensions listed is suggestive of the divergence and even the theoretical confusion that has dominated much of the past research in this area (see Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Smith et al., 1993; Smith &
Lazarus, 1990, 1993). Though there can be little doubt that strong associations do exist between appraisal and emotion, the criteria used by researchers for including or excluding certain appraisal variables from their models have often been left unclear. Pleasantness, for example, has appeared in a number of models of appraisal despite its questionable status as a cognition (e.g., see Dalkvist & Rollenhagen, 1989; Lazarus & Smith; Roseman, et al., 1990). So, too, have other variables such as attentional activity, effort, and activity-passivity, many of which more closely resemble response-side features of emotion than emotional antecedents (see Lazarus & Smith).
25 Schcrcr Roseman Smith frijd a Reisenzein Weiner l.azanis and I'llsworili and 1 lofimmn and Sm itli
novelty motivational state pleasantness valance valance causal locus motivational suddenness im portance stability relexance luniiliarity situational state certainty human agency agency controllability predictubility responsibility intentionality motivational certainty human agency im portance control globality congruence pleasantness activity-passivity pow er attentional activity interestingness temporal aspects accountability goal significance exiiectedness concern relevance causal agency anticipated elVort expectedness relationship quality problem-focused outcome probability focus coping potential ex|rectation situational control controllability subjective evaluation K conducivcness self-evaluation emotion-focused urgency familiarity inteqrersonal evaluation coping potential evaluation of others coping potential certainty focality-globality future expectancy cause - agent stability cause - motive elTort suddenness control anticipated elTort pow er globality-focality certainty adjustm ent predictability time ol event nonn compiitibility iiUurnul cxteniul
Tiiblc 2.2 l'n)p)scil Appiitisal Dimensions In their discussion of the theoretical confusion surrounding appraisals and non -
appraisals, Lazarus and Smith (1988; Smith et al., 1993; Smith & Lazarus, 1990, 1993)
have drawn an important distinction between appraisal and knowledge, and have
suggested a number of ways in which the two might interact to create (cause) emotion.
Knowledge, they argue, is a representation of "the way things are and how they work"
(Lazarus & Smith, p. 282); it consists of the "facts" (i.e., the who, what, why, and where)
of a given encounter, as well as more general attitudes and beliefs about self and world.
Besides being either broad-based or context-specific, knowledge can be either abstract or
concrete, conscious or unconscious, and, of course, either accurate or inaccurate.
Appraisal, on the other hand, is the process by which such knowledge is judged for its relevance and its implications for personal well-being (i.e., its relational meaning).
Appraisal gives vitality and meaning to the otherwise mundane facts of human experience, and provides the emotional "heat" in all person-environment encounters. Similarly, knowledge without appraisal is "cold" cognition (Lazarus & Smith; Smith et al.).
Lazarus and Smith (1988; Smith et al., 1993) maintain that most researchers have failed to appreciate the distinction between knowledge and appraisal and, as a result, have tended to confuse the two in their theoretical formulations. Variables such as causal locus, agency, responsibility, legitimacy, stability, controllability, and intentionality — all long thought to represent theoretically relevant dimensions of appraisal, instead, they believe, represent various kinds of context-specific knowledge — the objects of appraisal.
The assumptions made by Lazarus and Smith (1988; Smith & Lazarus, 1990, 1993) concerning knowledge and appraisal fit nicely with their own cognitive-relational theory, and provide, for the first time, a testable and truly mediational model of the cognition - emotion relationship. Guided by the underlying hypothesis that appraisal mediates the relationship between knowledge and emotion, the model predicts relatively strong and
27 stable associations for appraisal and emotion that are unaffected by changes in knowledge,
and relatively weak and unstable associations for knowledge and emotion that are greatly
affected by changes in appraisal (Lazarus & Smith). These general predictions have been
tested only once, in a study by Smith et al. (1993).
The Study bv Smith, et al. (19931.
Knowledge variables in this initial study were represented by the set of eight
categorical attributions (i.e., subject's mood, physique, personality, ability, and effort, the difiSculty of the task, luck of any kind, and the personality or behavior or someone else), and five dimensional attributions (i.e., causal locus, stability, controllability, intentionality, and globality) previously identified by Weiner ( 1985) and others. Appraisal variables, as in Smith and Lazarus (1993), were represented by the set of theoretically relevant appraisal components and themes (see Table 2.1). The emotions chosen for study were anger, guilt, fear-anxiety, sadness, hope-challenge, and happiness.
Subjects were asked to complete a "Past Experience Rating Form" containing all of the measures used in the study. The rating forms were identical in all respects except the first page, which featured one of eight prompts designed to elicit recall of a different kind of past experience. Four of the prompts were written to elicit recall of a positive past experience (e.g., "you found out you had received an important honor," or "you and your parents had a meaningful discussion about something you cared about;"), and four to elicit recall of a negative past experience (e.g., "you received a low grade on an exam in a course that mattered to you," or "you felt a need to question whether you career plans were right for you"). Subjects were asked to focus on a single incident from their past and to write a brief open-ended description of exactly what took place. They were then asked to complete a series of measures designed to assess the causal attributions, appraisals, and emotions associated with the experience at the time it occurred (Smith et al., 1993).
28 Data from the study were analyzed through a three-part series of simultaneous and
hierarchical regression analyses, conducted for the purpose of isolating and comparing the
explanatory power of attributions and appraisals. In part one of the analyses, each
emotion was regressed first on the full set of attribution variables (without appraisal) and
then on the theoretically relevant set of appraisal variables (without attribution), and the
proportion of variance accounted for by each was noted. In parts two and three, the same
sets of variables were entered hierarchically (i.e., attributions were added to appraisals and
then appraisals were added to attributions) and the incremental increase in variance
accounted for was noted. Results at each level of analysis supported the hypothesis that
appraisals are more closely related to emotion than are attributions. A series of post hoc
analyses (based on the statistical and conceptual model of mediation proposed by Baron
and Kenny [1986]) provided support for the stronger claim that appraisal mediates the
relationship between attribution and emotion (Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Smith et al., 1993).
The mediational hypothesis was further supported in a follow-up study (reported as study
2 in Smith et al.) in which vignettes were used to systematically manipulate the attributions
thought to be associated with guilt and anger.
The Present Studv
If confirmed, the model of cognitive mediation tested by Smith et al. (1993) would
hold a variety of implications for the conceptualization and treatment of at least some
kinds of psychological disorders. At this point, however, little is really known about how
reliable or robust these findings are, or how well they generalize across other emotions or
across other domains of theoretically relevant knowledge (e.g., contextual knowledge).
With these considerations in mind, one of the goals of the present study was to replicate as closely as possible the original findings reported by Smith et al. A second goal was to attempt to extend the model by adding a new class o f variables (i.e., contextual
29 attributions) and testing the associations across a wider range of emotions (eight instead
of six).
The Extension to Other Emotions. As noted earlier. Smith et al. (1993) included six basic emotions in their study, four of them negative (anger, guilt, fear-anxiety, and sadness), and two of them positive (happiness, and hope-challenge). Given the under representation of positive emotions here and elsewhere in the research literature, and in light of at least one study suggesting they may not be as well differentiated by appraisal as negative emotions (see Ellsworth & Smith, 1988b), I resolved to add two positive emotions to the group of six in the Smith et al. study. To minimize difficulties with interpretation later on, I wanted to avoid complex mood states such as depression, and borderline emotions such as surprise, and to choose only fi'om among those that had appeared in at least two previous studies. A review of the literature led me to pride
(Ellsworth & Smith, 1988b; Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, 1984, 1991; Roseman et al.,
1990; Roseman et al., 1996; Scherer, 1993; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and re lie f
(Ellsworth & Smith, 1988b; Frijda et al., 1989; Reisenzein & Flofinann, 1990; Roseman,
1984, 1991; Roseman et al., 1990; Roseman et al., 1996), each of which has been included in a number of previous investigations.
The Extension to Contextual Knowledge. In laying out their views on the distinction between knowledge and appraisal, Lazarus and Smith (1988; Smith et al.;
Smith & Lazarus, 1990, 1993) also distinguished two types of knowledge relevant to the emotion process; Knowledge of the cause of an event (i.e., causal attributions), and knowledge of the context in which the cause and the event take place (i.e., contextual knowledge). Both were thought to provide the individual with information about the facts of an encounter, and both were believed capable (assuming motivational relevance) of contributing to relational meaning and, hence, to emotion. However, only causal
30 attributions have been studied to-date (i.e., by Smith et al., 1993). The number and kind of contextual variables thought to be relevant to emotion has, in fact, never even been specified. Given this, and given the theoretical importance of contextual knowledge variables in the larger model, I resolved to include them in the present study.
My strategy for assembling a set of theoretically relevant contextual attribution variables was fairly straightforward. I began by carefully sorting through a list of all the purported appraisal dimensions suggested by each of the major structural theories summarized earlier (see table 1). With regard to each, I asked (a) whether or not the variable in question could be considered a representation of the facts of a given encounter
(see Smith et al., 1993); that is, whether it could be considered the material of appraisal rather than the appraisal itself and if so, (b) whether it had appeared in at least two independent studies of appraisal and emotion. Any item meeting both criteria was included in the set of contextual attribution variables believed relevant to emotion. Only four did so. They were; agency, certainty, predictability, and familiarity.
AGENCY
Agency has emerged as an important factor in nearly every major study of appraisal and emotion reported to-date (see Table I). It generally refers to whether an event is seen as having been caused by the self by someone other than the self or by "chance" circumstances. The first of these, self-agency, has been found to be associated with reports of guilt, hope, and pride (see Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a, 1988b; Frijda et al., 1989;
Roseman, 1984, 1991; Roseman et al., 1990; Roseman et al., 1996; Scherer, 1993; Smith
& Ellsworth, 1985, 1987; Weiner, 1985); the second, other-agency, with reports of anger
(Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Frijda, 1987; Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, 1984, 1991;
Roseman et al., 1996; Scherer, 1993; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987; Weiner, 1985); and the third, circumstance-agency, with reports of fear-anxiety, sadness, joy, and relief (see
31 Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Roseman, 1984; Roseman et al., 1990; Roseman et al., 1996;
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985)
Because agency refers to the cause of an event, it has much in common with the idea of causal locus (one of the causal attributions proposed by Weiner [1985]) though, I will argue, important differences between the two do exist. One of these differences follows from the fact that causal locus is a dichotomous rather than a trichotomous variable that identifies a particular cause as either internal or external to the individual. It does not distinguish events that are caused by others from those that occur by chance (or are determined by fate or willed by God), althougfi, as already noted, the latter has been implicated in studies of fear-anxiety, sadness, joy, and relief. Another important difference between agency and causal locus involves the sense of passivity conveyed by causal locus
(i.e., the cause is merely located somewhere) as contrasted with the sense of action or the capacity for action conveyed by agency (i.e., the cause issues forth from a source with the capacity to act). The idea of agency does seem much more dynamic than the idea of causal locus and, for that reason, much more congruent with other theoretically relevant variables, such as intentionality and controllability (e.g., it is difficult to think of a locus as ever having intention). In light of these differences and given the prominence of agency in the research literature, I resolved to include it in the set of theoretically relevant contextual attribution variables under consideration in the present study.
CERTAINTY
Certainty has also appeared in a number of studies of appraisal, and has been applied to an analysis of events from both the past (i.e., expectedness) and future (i.e., predictability; see Karasawa, 1995; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). More often though, certainty has been used to refer to the degree of ambiguity associated with events as they occur, and has been found to be associated with reports of fear-anxiety, sadness, hope,
32 joy, and relief (see Ellsworth & Smith, 1988b; Frijda, 1987; Frijda et al., 1989; Reisenzein
& Spielhofer, 1991; Roseman, 1984, 1991; Roseman et al., 1990; Roseman et al., 1996;
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987)
PREDICTABILITY
Predictability has appeared in fewer studies than either agency or certainty (in part, perhaps, because of the conceptual confusions noted earlier), though it has been reliably associated with a number of different emotions. It most often refers to the reliability of future events or outcomes, and has been found to be associated with reports of anger, guilt, fear-anxiety, sadness, and hope (see Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a, 1988b; Manstead &
Tetlock, 1989; Reisenzein & Hofmann, 1990; Scherer, 1993; Smith et al., 1993). My own research on the factors underlying perceived stress [Blons, 1994] has also suggested a strong link between unpredictability and fear.
FAMILIARITY
Familiarity is the most tenuous and least studied of the four theoretically relevant variables identified here. It refers to the extent to which events in the present resemble events from the past, and has been found to be associated with reports of fear-anxiety and pride (see Frijda et al., 1989; Reisenzein & Hofmann, 1990; Roseman et al., 1996).
Table 2.3 summarizes the contextual attributions hypothesized for eight basic emotions.
33 Emotion Important Contextual Attributions
Anger Predictability, other-agency
Guilt Predictability, self-agency
Fear-Anxiety Uncertainty, impredictability, unfamiliarity, circumstance-agency
Sadness Certainty, predictability, circumstance-agency
Hope Uncertainty, predictability, sell'-agency^
Joy-Happiness Certamty, circumstance-agency
Pride Familiarity, sell'-agency'
Relief Certainty , circumstance-agency
Table 2.3 Contextual Attributions H\pothesized tor Eight Emotions
34 Chapter 3
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 280 undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in an introductory
psychology course at The Ohio State University during the spring of 1997. They were
acquired through a voluntary sign-up procedure and were given partial course credit in exchange for their participation. Data sets from 37 subjects were later excluded from data analysis, leaving a final sample size of 243.
Of the 243 subjects in the final sample, 117 (48.1%) were male and 126 (51.9%) were female; 190 (78.2%) identified themselves as White, Non-Hispanic, 25 (10.3%) as
Asian, 23 (9.5%) as African-American, 3 (1.2%) as Hispanic, and 2 (0.8%) gave no racial designation. Subjects ranged in age from 18 to 43, with a mean age of 19.7 (SO = 2.76) and a mode of 19.0 (frequency = 107, or 44% of the sample). The majority (63.8%) indicated they were in their freshman undergraduate year, followed by 20.6% sophomores,
9.1% juniors, 5.8% seniors, and .8% graduate students.
Overview
This study was designed for the purpose of attempting to replicate and extend the earlier work of Smith et al. (1993). Apart from slight modifications (to be discussed), procedures for data collection and data analysis closely followed those used in the original study. A draft of the measures originally used by Smith et al. and information about the later revision of some items was obtained directly from the principal investigator, Craig A.
Smith, and, with his permission, incorporated for use in the present study.
35 As in Smith et al. (1993), subjects in the present study were asked to recall and retrospectively report on the causal attributions, appraisals, and emotions associated with a variety of past experiences. In two planned extensions, current subjects were also asked to report on contextual attributions (i.e., inferences about the context within which these situations took place), and were surveyed across eight rather than six emotions (i.e., pride and relief were added).
Data from the present study were used to test the hypothesis that appraisals are more closely related to emotion than are either causal attributions or contextual attributions.
Specifically, I hypothesized that, for each of the eight emotions under consideration (a) causal attributions, contextual attributions, and appraisals would each account for a significant proportion of the variance in emotion, that (b) of these, appraisals would account for the greatest proportion of total variance, that (c) causal and contextual attributions alone (after controlling for the effects of appraisal) would fail to account for a significant proportion of the variance in emotion, but that (d) appraisals alone (after controlling for the effects of causal and contextual attributions) would continue to do so.
Also, in keeping with the second set of analyses carried out by Smith et al. which more closely examined evidence of a mediational role for appraisal in the cognition-emotion relationship, I hypothesized that (e) causal attributions and contextual attributions would each account for a significant proportion of the variance in appraisal. (As in Smith, et al., this last hypothesis was derived from the statistical and conceptual model of mediation offered by Baron and Kermy [1986]. If confirmed, it along with hypotheses (a) and (d) above would provide support for the view that appraisal mediates the attribution-emotion relationship).
36 Procedure
Subjects were scheduled to report to the test site in groups of 8 to 10 at a time.
Each was asked to complete a "Past Experience Rating Form" (a 20 page questionnaire)
containing all measures to be used in this study as well as all necessary instructions (see
Appendix A for the complete text of the preliminary instructions). Subjects were asked to
carefully read and respond to each of the items on the questionnaire, and were encouraged
to work at their own pace and not to hurry their responses. They were allowed 45
minutes in which to complete the questionnaire; most (88%) finished in 30 minutes or less.
The questionnaires were identical in all respects except the first page, which featured
one of eight prompts designed to elicit recall of a past experience associated with a
particular emotion (see Appendix B for the complete text of all prompts). Four of the
prompts were designed to elicit recall of an emotionally positive experience (one
associated with joy-happiness, hope, pride, or relief), and four were designed to elicit
recall of an emotionally negative experience (one associated with fear-anxiety, anger,
sadness, or guilt). Subjects were asked to focus on a single incident from their past and to
write a brief, open-ended description of what took place. They were then asked to
complete a series of measures designed to assess the causal attributions, contextual
attributions, appraisals, and emotions associated with the experience at the time it
occurred (see Appendix C for the complete text of all measures used). On the final page
of the survey, subjects were asked to provide descriptive data such as age, sex, race, and year in school. All questionnaires were randomly distributed in such a way that an equal number of subjects (n = 35 prior to screening) were assigned to each of the eight conditions just described, and no two physically adjacent subjects were assigned the same condition. Immediately after completing the questionnaire, subjects were debriefed with a written statement (see Appendix D for the complete text of the debriefing statement).
37 The procedures just described differ from those used by Smith et al. (1993) in
essentially two ways. First, in the original study, the questionnaires used by Smith et al.
were made part of a larger set of unrelated survey materials and were given to subjects to
be completed at home, rather than in a more controlled and uniform testing environment.
While take-home surveys of this kind are certainly not uncommon in psychological
research, they do carry the risk of occasionally exposing the data to unchecked sources of
measurement error. For that reason, data collection procedures of this sort were not used in the present study. Second, each of the eight prompts used by Smith et al. emphasized recall of a particular experience rather than an experience associated with a particular emotion. For example, subjects were prompted to recall a past situation in which "... you found out that someone you were interested in had a crush on you," or ". . . you felt a need to question whether your career plans were right for you" (Smith et al., p. 919).
Though the intent o f these prompts may have been to elicit recall of past experiences suggestive of a particular emotion, the approach could have produced self-reports of more complex, blended emotional experiences (see Reisenzein & Hofrnann, 1990). If so, then any data relative to the relationship between particular emotions and particular sets of attributions and appraisals may have been confounded to some extent. In order to minimize confounding of this sort, prompts used in the present study were designed to target particular emotions rather than particular kinds of events, and a manipulation check
(described below) was used to assess their effectiveness in doing so. To increase the clarity of the prompts without changing their intended meaning, "happiness" was re-labeled "joy-happiness," and "hope-challenge" was re-labeled "hope."
Measures
A total of 111 items were used to measure 41 variables. All items were rated on a nine-point scale and were presented in a fixed, random order. To facilitate cross
38 referencing to Appendix C, each of the individual items described below will be referred to
by a unique letter-number combination that describes its exact location on the original
questionnaire. For example, item 'Al' will refer to the first item in section A of the
questionnaire. Unless otherwise noted, all measures described below are the same as
those used by Smith et al. (1993; see Table 3 .1 at the end of this chapter for a summary of
methodological similarities and differences between the two studies).
Causal attributions. Causal attributions were examined using 24 items to measure 14
variables (Appendix C, Sections A, B, and C). Of these, 9 items (8 variables) were used
to assess categorical attributions and 15 items (6 variables) were used to assess
dimensional attributions. As a preliminary step in assessing categorical attributions,
subjects were first asked to list what they believed to be the major cause or causes of their
situation at the time it occurred. (As in Smith et al., [1993|, this list was not scored or analyzed in any way but was created for the sole purpose of helping subjects focus on the relevant cause or causes before reporting on them). Subjects were then asked to rate on a scale from I (not at all) to 9 (extremely much) the extent to which the relevant cause or causes were thought to be related to subject's mood (item B 1 ), subject's physique (item
B2), subject's personality (item B3), subject's ability (item B4), subject's ejfort (item B5), the difficulty o f the task (item B6), luck o f any kind (item B7), and the personality or behavior o f someone (itemselse B8 and B9, for which Smith et al. report an alpha coefficient of .82).
Dimensional attributions were originally assessed by Smith et al. (1993) using items based on a modified version of Russell's (1982) Causal Dimension Scale (CDS). The CDS was later revised by McAuley, Duncan, and Russell (1992) in response to concerns about the low internal consistency of scale items measuring controllability (e.g., Vallerand &
Richer [1988] reported alpha coefficients for controllability below .50). In the revised
39 version, the controllability dimension was re-conceptualized and the items rewritten to
create separate measures for personal control (three items, a = .19) and external control
(three items, a = .82), each of which was incorporated into the present study (items C2,
C4, CIO and C5, C8, C l2, respectively). Also included were items (unchanged from
Smith et al.) measuring causal locus (items C l, C6, and C9, a = .84), stability (items C3,
C7, and C 11, a = .67), intentionality (items C 14 and C 1 6, or = .80), globality (item C 15),
and justifiability (item C 13). (This last variable — justifiability — had originally been
thought by Smith et al. to play a role in emotions such as anger and guilt. However,
questions about its precise meaning and the differences between it and the concept of
intentionality later caused them to decide to drop this variable prior to data analysis [C. A.
Smith, personal communication. May, 1997|. Likewise, in the present study, justifiability
was assessed but dropped prior to analysis).
Contextual attributions. Contextual attributions were examined using nine items to
measure four variables (Appendix C, Section D). Each of the four variables was chosen
based on careful review of the research literature (see Chapter 2). Items used to assess
each variable were developed by me using a rationally-based approach. Subjects were
asked to indicate on a scale from one to nine the extent to which the recalled situation had
seemed certain to them (items DI and D4), predictable by them (items D6 and D8), familiar to them (items D2 [reversed scored prior to analysis] and D7), caused by them
(item D9), caused by others (item D5), or caused by circumstances (item D3). (These
last three items represent three levels of a single variable which I refer to as agency).
Appraisals. Appraisals were examined using 51 items to measure 15 variables
(Appendix C, Sections E and F). Of these, 15 items (7 variables) were used to assess
appraisal components and 36 items (8 variables) were used to assess core relational themes. 40 Appraisal components were assessed using a revised set of measures developed by
Craig A. Smith subsequent to the Smith et al. (1993) study. The revisions added 7 new
items to the original set of 8 and re-configured all items fi"om an 11-point scale to a
9-point scale. Using this revised set of measures, subjects in the present study were asked
to indicate the extent to which the recalled situation conveyed motivational relevance
(items El and Ell), motivational congruence (items E2 [reverse scored prior to data
analysis], E3, and E7), self-accoimtability (items E4 and E14), other-acconntability (items
E5 and E l 5), problem-focused coping potential (items E8 and El 2), emotion - focused
coping potential (items E9 and El 3), and future expectancy (items E6 and ElO). Though
published data regarding the alpha coefiBcients for these scale items were unavailable at
the time of this writing, unofficial estimates by C. A. Smith place them all at or above .70
(personal communication, April, 1997).
Core relational themes were assessed using the same multiple-item scales as in Smith et al. (1993), but with the addition of six new items to assess themes related to pride and relief. The new items were written by Craig A. Smith prior to the present study and have been incorporated here with his permission. (It should be noted that the wording of the anchors for these and all items in this section was modified slightly to re-emphasize the retrospective nature of the ratings. So, for example, instead of "not at all" and "extremely much," the anchors for the these items were "doesn't characterize my thoughts in the situation at all" and "characterizes my thoughts in the situation extremely well"). Using this slightly modified and extended set of measures, subjects in the present study were asked to indicate the extent to which the recalled situation conveyed other-blame (items
F2, F7, F12, F16, F 19, and F24), loss-helplessness (items FI, F6, F9, F13, F18, F20, F23,
F26, and F35), self-blame (items F4, F15, and F30), threat (items F5, F8, and FI 1, ), success (items F10, F29, and F32), effortfid optimism (items FI7, F21, F25, F27, F3 I, and
41 F36), valued achievement (the theme for pride; items F 14, F22, and F33), and easing o f
threat (the theme for relief; items F3, F28, and F24). As reported by Smith et al.,
reliability estimates for these items range from .71 (for loss-helplessness) to .95 (for
success).
Emotions. Emotions were examined using 27 items to measure 8 variables
(Appendix C, Section G). The scales used were the same as in Smith et al. (1993), but with the addition of four new items to assess pride and relief. The new items were written by Craig A. Smith prior to the present study and have been incorporated here with his permission. (It should be noted that the wording of the anchors for these and all items in this section was modified slightly to re-emphasize the retrospective nature of the ratings.
So, for example, instead of "not at all" and "extremely much," the anchors for these items were "doesn't characterize how I felt in the situation at all" and "characterizes how I felt in the situation extremely well"). Using this slightly modified and extended set of measures, subjects in the present study were asked to indicate the extent to which the recalled situation had elicited feelings of anger (items G l, G6, GIO, G14, GI9, and G22, ), sadness (items G5, G12, G 15), guilt (items G7, G21, and G25\fear-anxiety (items G3,
G9, and Gll) Joy-happiness (items G8, G13, and G24), hope (items G4, G 16, G20, G23 and G27), pride (items G2, Gll, and G26), and relief {item G 18). As reported by Smith et al., reliability estimates for these items range from .75 (for guilt) to .90 (for both anger and fear-anxiety).
Data Analvsis
Procedural checks. Before the data were analyzed, they were carefully screened to eliminate incomplete or ambiguous response sets. Following the screening procedure, a manipulation check was used to evaluate the effectiveness of the each of the eight prompts at eliciting recall of the targeted emotion.
42 Planned Analyses. Alpha coefficients were used to estimate the reliability of each of the 31 multiple-item scales. Means were then calculated for the full set of 41 variables and a standard t-test was used to test for differences by sex. As in Smith et al. ( 1993), the hypothesis that appraisals are more directly related to emotion than are attributions (causal or contextual) and the much stronger claim that appraisal mediates the attribution-emotion relationship were tested through a series of simultaneous and hierarchical regression analyses.
Post Hoc Analyses. In the current set of analyses (as in Smith et al. [1993]), individual variables were grouped together into theoretically relevant sets and used to test predictions about the relationship between categories of variables (i.e., causal attributions, contextual attributions, and appraisals) and emotion. One potential weakness of this kind of approach is that the individual variables themselves — variables that in some cases may contribute little or nothing to a particular emotion — are never closely examined. To more carefully study the role of these individual variables in the emotion process, an 8 (emotion) by 35 (independent variable) correlation matrix was developed and all statistically significant (and in this case, nonsignificant) correlations were noted. Variables accounting for little or none of the variance in any emotion were then singled out for closer examination.
By way of review. Table 3.1 summarizes the methodological similarities and differences between Smith et al. (1993) and the present study.
43 In Smitli ct al. (1993) In the i’rcscnl Sludv
Data Collection
Procedures Used Data collected as part of a take home siuvcy Data collected in a controlled testing environment
M ethod Retrospective approach used; subjects asked to report Same except contextual attributions also assessed on tlie causal attributions, appraisals, and emotions associated witli a variety of |)ast experiences
M eastires 82 items used to assess 32 variables 11 items used to assess 4 1 variables
Prom pts i'tnphasis on recall of a particular kind of past experience mphasis on recall of an experience associated with a articular emotion
Causal Attributions 21 items used to assess 13 variables 24 items tised to assess 14 variables
Preliniinur>’ Measures Subjects first asked to list what they believed to be tlte major Sam e cause or causes of tlieir situation at the time it occurred
Categorical Attributions 9 items used to assess 8 variables Sam e
Dimensional Attributions Measures based on a modified vei sion of Russell's Causal Measures based on a modified and revised version of Dimension Scale (CDS); 12 items used to assess 5 variables Russell's Causal Dimension Scale (CDS-11); 15 items used to assess 6 vaiiables
Contextual Attributions Not measured Measured using 9 items to assess 4 variables
fable 3.1 Summary of Methodological Similarities and Difl’erences Hetween Smith et al. (1993) and the Present Study
( fable 3,1 continued on next page) Table 3,1 (continued)
In Sinitli et al. (19^3) In the Present Study
Appraisals 3R items used to assess 13 variables 51 items used to assess 15 variables
Appraisal Components 8 items used to assess 7 variables; all items scored 15 items used to assess the same 7 variables; all items on an 11 -point scale items scored on a 9-point .scale
Core Relational nieines 30 items used to assess 6 variables 36 items used to assess 8 variables (themes Tor pride and relieT were added); wording oT tlte anchors was modified to re-emphasi/e the retrospective nature oT tlte ratings
Mniotions 23 items used to assess 6 variables 27 items used to assess 8 variables (pride and relief were added), wording oT the anchors was modified to re - emphasize the retrospective nature oTtlie ratings
Data Analysis
Procedural Checks None used Used to screen out incomplete and ambiguous response sets
Manipulations Checks None used Used to check tlte efiectiveness of the prompts at eliciting recall of the targeted emotion
Planned Analyses Simultaneous and hierarchical regression Same
Post 1 loc Analyses None reported 8 X 35 correlation developed to more closely study the role of individual variables in tlte emotion process Chapter 4
Resuits
Ail statistical tests were conducted using an alpha level of .05.
Procedural Checks
Before the data were analyzed, they were carefully screened to eliminate incomplete and ambiguous response sets. Following the screening procedure, a manipulation check was used to evaluate the effectiveness of the each of the eight prompts at eliciting recall of experiences associated with the targeted emotion.
To screen for incomplete response sets, each of the questionnaires was carefully examined, and any with one or more unanswered items was excluded from further analysis. Twenty-two of the original 280 questionnaires were eliminated in this way.
Although the problem of missing data could have been addressed in a number of other ways less destructive to the original data (e.g., by using the scale midpoint or the group mean in place of the missing item), priority was given to preserving the integrity of individual response sets.
For the purposes of this study, an ambiguous or undifferentiated response set was defined as one in which the remembered experience involved either (a) no clear emotional theme, or (b) two or more competing themes. Due to the presumed difficulties involved in interpreting diffuse or blended emotional experiences, an effort was made to identify and eliminate response sets of this kind prior to data analysis.
To screen for ambiguous response sets, two judges were chosen to independently read and evaluate each subject's written account of his or her past experience. (Judges
46 were selected based on evidence of their verbal skills and their ability to form clear judgments about written content. Each was instructed to look for the emotional theme or themes present in each story, and was encouraged to read through the narratives from the twenty-two incomplete response sets for "practice"). Any written account determined by either judge to contain either (a) no clear emotional theme or (b) two or more competing themes was excluded from further data analysis. An additional 15 of the remaining 258 questionnaires were eliminated in this way, leaving a final sample size of 243 (see
Appendix E for a representative sample of those that were excluded).
Despite the effort to reduce the number of blended emotional experiences (i.e., those involving two or more emotions) represented in the data, such experiences did occur and with some frequency: An analysis of the rating data on emotion indicates that 92.5% of all subjects (100% of those in the joy-happiness and pride conditions) gave at least two different emotions a rating of 6 or higher; 86.5%, (100% of those in the pride condition) a rating of 7 or higher; 67.8%, a rating of 8 or higher; and 36.2% of all subjects (68.7% of those in the pride condition) gave at least two different emotions a rating of 9. This pattern was confirmed by a correlational analysis of the same data, the results of which suggest strong positive associations among both the positive and the negative emotions
(mean r - .72 and .51, respectively; all £S < .0001). Clearly, even with the best controls, single-emotion experiences appear to be the exception rather than the rule, especially when it comes to positive emotional experiences.
As a final procedural check, the effectiveness of each of the eight prompts was assessed using the Dunnett test for pairwise comparisons (Keppel, 1991). For each comparison, a calculation was made of the difference between the mean rating for the targeted emotion in the prompted condition (e.g., the mean rating for anger in the anger-prompted condition) and the mean rating for the same emotion in each of the other
47 seven conditions, and the difference in means tested against a critical mean difference. A
statistically significant result was interpreted as an indication of an effective prompt
manipulation.
The results of the manipulation check are presented in Table 4.1. As the data
indicate, nearly all of the prompt manipulations were effective at ehciting recall of a past experience closely associated with the targeted emotion. Prompt failures when they did occur nearly always involved one of the four positive emotions. Ratings of hope, for example, were actually higher in the joy-happiness and pride conditions than in the hope-prompted condition, and ratings of relief were higher in the pride condition than in the relief-prompted condition. But, again, these were the exceptions. In all but 1 of the
28 comparisons involving negative emotions, mean ratings for the targeted emotion were significantly higher in the prompted than in the unprompted condition. These results together with the frequency and correlational data on emotion discussed earlier suggest that most subjects in the study had access to the attributions and appraisals associated with at least two different emotions but that, in most cases, the targeted emotion was the dominant one.
Primary Analvses
Unless otherwise noted, all primary analyses used the same analytic strategy as in
Smith et al. (1993). Items D2 and E2 were reverse scored prior to analysis.
Alpha Coefficients. Using guidelines proposed by Nunnaly ( 1978), multiple-item scales with reliability estimates of .60 or greater were left unchanged; those with reliabilities below .60 were modified (i.e., one or more items thrown out).
With one exception, the causal attribution scales yielded alpha coefficients ranging from .750 (for causal locus) to .866 (for personal control). The exception was stability
(items C3, C l, and Cl 1), which yielded a coefficient of only .415. The reasons for such a
48 Prom pt 1 2 3 4 5 () 7 8
Anger — 2.452* 1.468* 2.347* 3.804* 5.005* 4.679* 2.571* n = 27
G uilt 2.954* — 2.365* 3.154* 4.503* 5.480* 5.340* 3.681* n = 31
I'ear-Anxiety 3.022* 1.634* — 1.263 2.341* 4.361* 3.950* 1.541* n = 31
Sadness 2.464* 2.495* 2.656* — 4.896* 6.452* 6.525* 3.841* n = 28
Hope 1.774* 2 514* 1.069* 2.860* -0.663 -1.096 0 7 0 0 n = 30
Joy-1 lappiness 5.443* 5.463* 5.291* 5.693* 2 742* — 0.098 3.764* n = 34
Pride 5.831* 5.708* 5.783* 6.791* 3 0 4 1 * 0,5711 — 4,275* n = 32
R elief 3.877* 3.110* 2042* 5.076* 0 966 002 1 -0 879 n = 30
Note. Reading across, each enliy represents the dilVerence between the mean rating tor the targeted emotion in the prompted condition (e g., the tneati rating tor anger in the unger-protnpted cottdition) and the mean rating tor tire same emotion in each of the other seven coirditions *p < .05
Table 4.1 ivlTectiveness of ITompt Manipulations low rating for the three items measuring stability remain unclear. Russell ( 1982) had
earlier reported an alpha coefiBcient of .837 and McAuley, et al. (1992) found an average
reliability rating of .670 for the same three items over a series of four independent studies.
Whatever the reasons, some modification of these scale items was clearly indicated. After comparing the rehability estimates for all paired combinations of the three items (a = .482 for items C3 and C7; or — .341 for items C3 and Cl 1; and a - .089 for items C7 and Cl 1 ),
I resolved to drop C3 and C 11 and keep only item C7 as a measure o f stability (see
Appendix C, section C, item 7).
The contextual attribution scales yielded alpha coefiBcients ranging from .807 (for predictability) to .846 (for familiarity). Because agency was conceptualized as a trichotomous variable, the three items used to measure it were treated as independent single-item scales (no reliability estimates taken).
With two exceptions, the appraisal scales (components and themes) produced alpha coefiBcients ranging from .693 (for emotion-focused coping potential) to .957 (for other-acconntability). The two exceptions were fiiture expectancy (an appraisal component; items E6 and ElO, a = .364), and easing o f threat (a core relational theme; items F3, F28, and F34, a = .596). Because both multiple-item scales were developed after the Smith et al. (1993) study, published data regarding the reliability of these items
(for comparison here) were unavailable at the time of this writing.
To remedy the low reliability rating for fiiture expectancy^ 1 resolved to drop A6 and keep only item ElO (see Appendix C, Section E, item 10). After comparing the reliability estimates for all paired combinations of the three items measuring easing o f threat {a —
.327 for items F3 and F28; a = .241 for items F3 and F34; and a = .745 for items F28 and
F34), I resolved to drop F3 and keep only items F28 and F34 (see Appendix C, Section F, items 28 and 34).
50 Finally, the alpha coefficients for the eight emotion scales ranged from .81 (for hope)
to .94 (forfear-atrxiety).
Mean Scores Across Measures. Mean scores for the 41 variables and the results of a t-test for differences by sex are presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Because the attribution and appraisal component scores have been averaged across conditions (i.e., the eight emotions), they are not useful in understanding or mapping specific cognition-emotion relationsfiips. What they do provide is a way of assessing the relative importance of each of these variables in the emotion process more generally.
Looking first at the data on attributions and appraisals in Table 4.2, the indication is that appraisal components (M — 5.94, SD = 2.46) figured more prominently in the emotion process than either causal attributions (M = 5.17, ^ = 2.80) or contextual attributions (M = 5.00, SD = 2.68), in line with current predictions. Among causal attributions, the most important variables were subject's ability (M = 5.89, SD = 2.63), the personality or behavior of others (M = 5.84, SD = 3.03; rated significantly higher by males
[M = 6. II] than females [M = 5.60], p < .05), and subject's effort (M = 5.82, SD = 2.77), and the least important was subject's physique (M = 3.54, SD = 2.63; rated significantly higher by males [M = 3.95] than females [M = 3.16], p < .05). Among contextual attributions, the most important variable was certainty (M = 6.42, SD = 2.55) and the least important was agency-circumstances (M = 4.57, SD = 2.77). Other significant sex differences were found for luck of any kind (M = 4.76 for males, 4.00 for females, p <
.05), familiarity (M = 4.31 for males, 3.59 for females, p < .05), and motivational relevance (M = 7.98 for males, 8.50 for females, p < .05). The suggestion arising from these data that males attend more closely to the externalized influence of physique, luck, and the behavior of others, and that females attend more closely to the internalized influence of familiarity and personal relevance in the emotion process fits well with the
51 M e a n (S D )
V ariab le All Subjects Males Onlv Females Onlv N = 243 n = 117 n = 126
Causal Attributions 5.17 (2.80) 5.27 (2.80) 5.07 (2.87) Categorical Attributions 5.30 (2.81 i 5.47 (2.73) 5.14 (2.87) subject's mood 5.51 (3.00) 5.50 (2.90) 5.52 (3.10) subject's physique 3.54 (2.63) 3.95 (2.64)' 3.16 (2.58) subject's personality 5.76 (2.71) 5.59 (2.70) 5.91 (2.73) subject's ability 5.89 (2.63) 5.88 (2.53) 5.91 (2.73) subject's eftbrt 5.82 (2.77) 6.00 (2.73) 5.64 (2.81) the difficulty of the task 5.68 (2.81) 5.97 (2.65) 5.41 (2.92) luck of any kind 4.37 (2.86) 4.76 (2.81)' 4.00 (2.88) personality or behavior of others 5.84 (3.03) 6.11 (2.85)' 5.60 (3.17) Dimensional Attributions 4.98 (2.801 5.01 (2.72) 4.96 (2.87) personal control 4.92 (2.95) 5.10 (2.91) 4.75 (2.99) external control 5.36 (2.80) 5.57 (2.78) 5.16 (2.82) causal locus“‘’ 5.01 (2.72) 4.85 (2.55) 5.16 (2.87) stability* 4.56 (2.50) 4.52 (2.51) 4.59 (2.49) intentionality 5.42 (2.92) 5.74 (2.85) 5.12 (2.95) globality 4.65 (2.94) 4.27 (2.75) 5.00 (3.07)
Contextual Attributions 5.00 (2.68) 5.13 (2.59) 4.88 (2.76) certainty* 6.42 (2.55) 6.46 (2.43) 6.38 (2.64) famiharity* 3.94 (2.78) 4.31 (2.79) 3.59 (2.74)' predictability* 4.65 (2.52) 4.79 (2.41) 4.52 (2.63) agency - self 5.12 (2.78) 5.21 (2.60) 5.04 (2.95) agency - other 5.32 (2.68) 5.30 (2.70) 5.34 (2.68) agency - circumstances 4.57 (2.77) 4.71 (2.62) 4.44 (2.91)
Aopraisal Components 5.94 (2.46) 5.96 (2.38) 5.93 (2.51) motivational relevance 8.25 (1.42) 7.98 (1.62) 8.50 (1.15)' motivational congruence"* 4.61 (2.98) 4.73 (2.88) 4.50 (3.08) self-accountability 5.70 (2.89) 5.61 (2.76) 5.79 (3.01) other-accoimtability 5.75 (2.79) 5.70 (2.72) 5.79 (2.87) problem-focused coping potential** 5.30 (2.45) 5.39 (2.29) 5.21 (2.60) emotion-focused coping potential** 6.01 (2.34) 6.36 (2.07) 5.68 (2.53) future expectancy* 6.00 (2.33) 5.94 (2.28) 6.06 (2.37)
Note. DilTerences by sex were examined using a standard t-test. Where significant difierences exist, an asterisk marks the strongest of the two mean scores. “Denotes a bi-directional scale (i.e., the strongest scores are fiiose farthest away firom the scale midpomt of five). .»E < .05
Table 4.2 Mean Scores for Causal Attributions, Contextual Attributions, and Appraisal Components
52 Mean (SD)
Variable All Subjects Males Only Females Only N = 243 n = 117 n = 126
Core Relational Themes 4.33 12.911 4.52 12.841 4.26 (2.96) other-blame 3.14 (2.77) 3.41 (2.84) 2.88 (2.67) loss-helplessness 3.98 (2.95) 3.92 (2.84) 4.04 (3.05) self-blame 3.23 (2.82) 3.26 (2.73) 3.25 (2.91) threat 3.73 (2.81) 3.63 (2.68) 3 83 (2.93) success 4.97 (3.26) 5.01 (3.17) 4.93 (3.35) effortlul optimism 5.64 (2.61) 5.82 (2.56) 5.47 (2.64) valued achievement 4.8Ü (3.Ü1) 6.06 (2.92) 4.55 (3.07) easing of threat 5.Ü9 (3.04) 5.07 (2.98) 5.11 (3.10)
Emotions 4.62 13.081 4.57 13.011 4.65 (3.11) anger 4.01 (2.86) 4.01 (2.81) 4.01 (2.91) sadness 4.68 (3.21) 4.11 (3.09) 5.21 (3.24)** guilt 3.75 (3.00) 3.93 (2.77) 4.09 (3.18) fear-anxiety 5.80 (2.97) 5.25 (2.90) 6.30 (2.94)* joy-happiness 3.98 13.20) 4.35 (3.18) 3.64 (3.19) hope 5.45 (2.90) 5.66 (2.81) 5.25 (2.98) pride 4.50 (3.36) 4.84 (3.37) 4.18 (3.34) relief 4.75 (3.14) 4.98 (3.14) 4.54 (3.14)
Note. DilTerences by sex were examined using a standard t-test. Where signilicant differences e.xist, an asterisk marks the higher of the two mean scores. *E < .05 ** e <.01
Table 4.3 Mean Scores for Core Relational Themes and Emotions gender stereotypes common to western culture. Such differences may thus reflect at least
to some extent, the pressures of socialization and social desirability.
The data on core relational themes and emotions in Table 4.3 indicate that among
core relational themes, the most frequently and highly rated variables were eflfortflil
optimism (M = 5.64, SD = 2.61; the theme for hope), and easing of threat (M — 5.09,
SD = 3.04; the theme for relief), and the least fi'equently-lowest rated was other-blame
(M - 3.14, SD = 2.77; the theme for anger). Among emotions, the most frequently and high rated variables were fear-anxiety (M - 5.80, ^ = 2.97), hope (M = 5.45, SD
2.90), and relief (M = 4.75, SD = 3.14), and the least frequently-lowest rated was guilt
(M — 3.75, SD — 3.00). This overall pattern of results approximates the predicted one-to-one correspondence between appraisal themes and emotions but does not fully support it. Success, for example, was the third most highly rated appraisal theme, but joy-happiness was only the seventh most highly rated emotion. One explanation for this can be found in the clustering of mean scores: In the case of core relational themes, only
2.5 scale points separated the highest and lowest mean score and, for the emotion variables, only 2.1 points. Other, more sensitive tests of the hypothesized relationship between themes and emotions will be reported in the next section on simultaneous and hierarchical regression analyses.
Significant sex differences were found for sadness (M = 4.01 for males, 5.21 for females, p < .01) and fear-anxiety (M = 5.25 for males, 6.30 for females, p < .05), again reflecting the possible influence of gender stereotypes that favor expressions of sensitivity and vulnerability in females.
Simultaneous and Hierarchical Regression Analvses. As in Smith et al. ( 1993), the hypothesis that appraisals are more closely related to emotion than are attributions (either causal or contextual) was tested through a three-part series of simultaneous and
54 hierarchical regression analyses, the results of which are reported in Tables 4.4.
In part 1 of the analyses, each emotion was regressed separately on 3 sets of variables: (a) the fixed set of 14 causal attributions (eight categorical and six dimensional),
(b) the set of 2 to 4 theoretically relevant contextual attributions (see Table 2.3), and (c) the set of 2 to 4 theoretically relevant appraisal components and the appraisal theme (see
Table 2.1). The results, expressed as the proportion of variance accounted for by each set of variables, are presented in the first 5 columns of Table 4.4 (columns 1 and 4 show the results of the same analysis by Smith et al. [1993]). As the data indicate, each set of variables accounted for a substantial proportion of the variance in emotion (all ps < .05 with the exception of guilt, for which the set of contextual attributions produced an R- value of just I, (F [2, 240] = 1.74, p = .18). As expected, appraisals (mean R- = 61 ) accounted for a great deal more of the variance in emotion than either causal attributions
(mean R- = 27) or contextual attributions (mean R- = II), closely matching the pattern of results reported by Smith et al. and lending support to the hypothesis that appraisals are more closely related to emotion than are attributions (causal or contextual).
In part 2 of the regression analyses, attributions were added to appraisals, and the incremental increase in variance accounted for was noted. The results, which represent the proportion of variance in emotion uniquely accounted for by attributions (after controlling for appraisal) are presented in columns 6 through 8 of Table 4.4 (column 6 shows the results o f the same analysis by Smith et al. [1993]). As these data indicate, adding causal attributions (column 7) or the combined set of causal and contextual attributions (column 8) to the set o f theoretically relevant appraisals had little effect on the proportion of variance accounted for. Causal attributions, on average, accounted for a modest 4% of the additional variance in emotion (7% in Smith et al.), fully in line with expectations; however, contrary to expectations, the increases were significant for four
55 Proportion of Variance in lùnotion Accounlcd I'or by Incremental increase in Variance Accounted I 'or by (3) (!) (2) Appraisals AllribiUions Allribulions (Coinjxrnc'iits A dding 1 and 2 A dding 3 Mmolion (Cuusnll fConlextiial') and lliemcsl A dding 1 to 1 to 3 Adding 2 to 1 to I and 2 S PS PS S PS S PS PS S PS PS
A nger 3 0 '" 2 2 * " 4* 66*** 66**' 5 3 3 4 1 * " 4 7 " * 4 7 * " G uilt 2 S " * 1.3" 1 55*** 61*** 5 1 1 3 2 " * 4 9 " * 4 7 * " I'ear-Anxiety 2 3 " 21*** 18*** 40*** 37*** 1 4 " 8 " 1 1 " 30*** 24*** 19*" Sadness 2 6 * " 29*** 1 3 "* 59*** 64*** 4 4* 4 37"* 39". 3(3"* I lope 2 0 " 3 4 " * 1 5"* 5 0 * " 55*** 8 7*** 8*** 39*** 28*** 2 7 * " Joy-1 lappiness 48'" 3 3 " * 1 2 * " 6 6 " ' 7 4 " . 6* 2 2 2 5 " * 4 2 " * 4 1 * " Ulo\ M 29 25 11 56 60 7 4 5 34 38 36
Pride 4 2 * " 18*" 73*** 3 " 4 " 34*** 34*** R elier — 22*** 7 * " — 5 6 " * " 3 3 — 37*** 3 6 * "
M 29 27 11 56 61 7 4 5 34 38 36
Note. S = Smith et al. (1993); PS = Present Stud) * p < .()5 * * p < .01 ♦ * * p < .()()l
Table 4 4 Analysis of the Variance in limotion Accounted I 'or by Attributions and Apprai.sals out of the eight emotions under consideration (i.e., fear-anxiety [F ( 14, 224) = 2.42, ^ <
.01], sadness [F (14, 223) = 1.80, g < .05], hope [F (14, 223) = 2.81, p < .001], and pride
[F (14, 224) - 2.25, p < .01]). Contextual attributions, on average, added only 1% to the
proportion of variance accounted for.
In part 3 of the regression analyses, appraisals were added to attributions, and the
incremental increase in variance accounted for was noted. The results, which represent the proportion of variance in emotion uniquely accounted for by appraisals (after controlling for attribution) are presented in columns 9 through 11 of Table 4.4 (column 9 shows the results of the same analysis by Smith et al. [1993]). As the data clearly indicate, adding appraisals to causal attributions (column 10) or to the combined set of causal and contextual attributions (column 11) had a substantial effect on the proportion of variance accounted for (all ps < .001). Appraisals, on average, accounted for 38% of the additional variance in emotion (34% in Smith et al.), once more confirming expectations. These findings, together with the results of part 1 and 2 of the regression analyses, point to relatively strong and stable associations for appraisal and emotion that are little affected by changes in attribution, and relatively weak and unstable associations for attribution and emotion that are greatly affected by changes in appraisal. This pattern of results (seen here to include contextual as well as causal attributions, and to generalize across 8 rather than 6 emotions) adds further support to the hypothesis that appraisals are more closely related to emotion than are attributions (causal or contextual).
In the cognitive-relational theory of emotion outlined by Lazarus and Smith (1988;
Smith et al., 1993; Smith & Lazarus, 1990, 1993), appraisal components and appraisal themes are seen as alternate but (functionally) equivalent ways of describing the relational meaning of a given encounter (see Chapter 2). This being the case, it follows that the above stated hypothesis (i.e., that appraisals are more closely related to emotion than are
57 attributions) should hold equally well at both levels of analysis. To test this assumption,
another series of regressions analyses was carried out (just as in Smith et al ), this time
comparing the explanatory power of appraisal components and appraisal themes. The
results are presented in Table 4.5.
Columns 1 through 4 of Table 4.5 show the proportion of variance accounted for by
regressing each emotion on (a) just the set of 2 to 4 theoretically relevant appraisal components, and (b) just the theoretically relevant core relational theme (columns I and 3 show the results of the same analysis by Smith et al. [1993]). As the data indicate, both the appraisal components and the core relational themes accounted for a substantial proportion of the variance in emotion (all ps < .001). Appraisal components, on average, explained 47% of the variance in emotion (36% in Smith et al.) and proved more effective than core relational themes in the analysis of hope, joy-happiness, and pride (in Smith et al., appraisal components were uniformly less effective than appraisal themes). Core relational themes, on average, explained 51% of the variance in emotion (48% in Smith et al). One reason for the improved performance of appraisal components in the present study may have been the increased reliability and content validity of underlying scale items, many of which were not developed until after the Smith et al. study (see Chapter 3).
Columns 5 through 12 of Table 4.5 show the proportion of variance accounted for by adding attributions to appraisal components and to core relational themes and, conversely, by adding appraisal components and core relational themes to attributions
(columns 5, 7, 9, and 11 show the results of the same analysis by Smith et al. [1993]). As in earlier analyses, the data indicate that adding attributions to appraisal components or to core relational themes had no more than a modest effect on the proportion of variance accounted for. Attributions, on average, accounted for only 6% and 7% of the additional variance in emotion (10% and 11% in Smith et al.) beyond that accounted for appraisal
58 Proportion of Vuriaiice in I'motion Accomited I'or bv Incremental Increase in Vuriiincc Accounted I'or b\'
( 1 ) (2) A dding A dding
A ppraisal A ppraisal Attributions" Attributions" A dding I A dding 2
I'niotion C om ponents T hem es to I to 2 to Attributions" to Attributions" S PS SPS SPSSPS SPSSPS
Anger 42'" 45'" 5.1'" 5 6 " ' 6 5 12'" 6" 18'" 2 9 '" 1 5 '" 4 1 '" G uilt 27"' .19'" 48'" 52'" 11' 4 8 6 " 11'" 10'" 28'" 4 4 " ' Pear-Anxiety 14'" 26*" 1 9 '" 1 1 '" 1 9 " 1 0 " 1 4 " 9 " 1 0 '" 1 6 '" 1 0 " * 1 9 " ' Sadness 46"' 4 8 '" 5 2 '" 5 7 '" 4 6 " 7 7 ' " 24'" 26'" 11»" 1 5 '" 1 Io]rc 2 9 '" 4 7 '" .1 4 '" 11'" 8 8"» 19'" 18'" 16" 21'" 11'" 16'" Joy-I lappiness 55'" 6 9 '" 6 0 '" 6 2 " * 1 2 '" 1 8 ' 1 1 8 '" 1 8 '" 1 9 '" 1 2 '" M .16 46 48 49 10 6 II 7 17 27 10 11
Pride 6 5 " ' 6 1 '" 6 ' " 6 ' " 2 9 '" 2 7 '" R elief — 1 5 '" — 4 8 '" -- 5 ” 8 ' " ” 1 8*" — 1 4 '"
M .16 47 48 51 10 6 II 7 17 26 10 11
Note. S = Smith et al. (I99.T); PS = Present Study
“Refers to tlte set of causal attributions
*D < .()5 ** e < .()I *** p <.()()I
Table 4.5 Analysis of tlie Variance in limotion Accounted I'or by Attributions, Appraisal Components, and Core Relational lliemes components and core relational themes, respectively. The data further indicate that adding
appraisal components or core relational themes to attributions substantially increased the
proportion of variance accounted for (all £s < .001). On average, appraisal components
and core relational themes accounted for 26% and 31% o f the variance in emotion (17%
and 30% in Smith et al.) beyond that accounted for by attributions alone. Though
somewhat less than the 38% found for the combined set of variables (see Table 4.4),
these increases are comparable and each is substantially greater than the increase for
attributions, providing support for the twin hypotheses that (a) appraisal components and
core relational themes offer alternate and functionally equivalent ways of describing the
relational meaning of a given encounter, and that (b) both are more closely related to
emotion than are attributions.
A Test of the Coenitive-Mediational Hvpothesis. As noted by Smith et al. ( 1993 ),
the finding that appraisals account for substantially more of the variance in emotion than
do attributions is itself not enough to establish a mediational role for appraisal in the emotion process. In making this point and in discussing the conditions needed to show mediation. Smith et al. cite Baron and Kenny (1986) who suggest that a mediational account is justified for a given set of data when (a) the proposed cause (in this case, the set of causal and contextual attributions) demonstrates a close association with both the mediator (appraisal), and the outcome (emotion), and when (b) after controlling for the effects o f the cause, the mediator continues to demonstrate a close association with the outcome.
As in Smith et al. (1993), the data reported thus far indicate only that attributions
(causal and contextual) were closely associated with emotion (Table 4.4, columns one and two) and that, after controlling for attributions, appraisals continued to be closely associated with emotion (Table 4.4, columns 10 and 11). To determine whether
6 0 attributions were closely associated with appraisals (the third and final condition needed to
establish a mediational account), a final series of planned analyses was carried out in which each of the appraisal variables was regressed separately on the full set of attributions. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 4.6.
As the data in Table 4.6 suggest, the set of attributions (both causal and contextual) accounted for a moderate but mostly significant proportion of the variance in appraisal
(all ps < .05 with the exception of motivational relevance, for which the set of contextual attributions produced an R,' value of just 3, (F [6, 236] = 1.09, p = .37). Causal attributions, on average, accounted for 29% of the overall variance in appraisal (27% in
Smith et al. [1993]); contextual attributions, on average, accounted for 25%. Whereas
Smith et al. found no more than 8 of the 13 regression equations statistically significant at
P < .01, in the present study all of the equations involving causal attributions and all but two of those involving contextual attributions were significant at p < .01. These results clearly suggest a direct association between attributions and appraisal, and provide relatively strong support for the hypothesis that appraisal mediates the attribution-emotion relationship.
Post Hoc Analvses
In the current set of analyses (as in Smith et al. [1993]), individual variables were grouped into theoretically relevant sets and used to test predictions about the relationship between categories of variables (i.e., causal attributions, contextual attributions, and appraisals) and emotion. Though not uncommon in psychological research, this kind of approach can be criticized on the grounds that it fails to assess or screen out individual variables that may contribute little or nothing to a particular emotion. To more carefully examine the role of these individual variables in the emotion process, an 8 (emotion) by 35
(independent variable) correlation matrix was developed and all statistically significant
61 Proportion of Variance Accounted For bv the Set of
Appraisal Variables Causal Attributions Contextual Attributions S PS PS
Appraisal Components Primary Appraisals Motivational relevance NR 14***
Motivational congruence NR** 41*** 28*** Secondary Appraisals Other-accountability NR"* 51*** 58*** Selt-accountability NR»* 56*** 77***
Emotion-focused coping potential NR 17*** 17*** Problem-focused coping potential NR** 32*»* 29*** Future expectancy NR 14*** 7**
Core Relational Themes
Otlier-blame NR** 27*** 22* * * Self-blame NR** 24*** 24***
Danger-threat NR 18*** 13*** Irrevocable loss, helplessness NR** 26*** 23***
ElTorttuI optimism NR 18*** 11* * * Success NR** 35*** 18*** M 27 29 25
Valued Achievement 39*** 23*** Easing of Threat 13** 5*
M 27 28 24
Note. S = Smitli et al. (1993); PS = Present Study, NR = Not Reported. *P < .05 **E<.01 ***E<.0Ü1
Table 4.6 Analysis of the Variance in Appraisal Accounted For by .Attributions
62 (and in this case nonsignificant) correlations were noted. The results are presented in
Table 4.7 (pages 64 through 66).
Holding other factors constant, it can be expected that the large number of comparisons needed for this analysis (8 x35 - 280) will increase the probability of making one or more type I errors (i.e., rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true; Keppel, 1991).
To compensate, the region of rejection for this set of comparisons will be reduced from
.05 to .001. As recommended by Keppel, a decision to suspend judgment will be made for all test results with g values greater than .001 but less than .05.
Referring now to Table 4.7, the correlational data on causal attributions (page 64) indicate that (a) neither subject's ability, the difficulty of the task, nor globality (contrary to
Abramson, et al., 1978) was of much importance in any of the four negative emotions
(mean r — -.07, .01, and -.09, respectively), that (b) neither external control nor the personality or behavior of others played an important role in any emotion other than
(perhaps) anger (r = -.16, g < .05) and r = .22, g < .001, respectively), and that (c) luck of any kind did not play an important role in any emotion other than (perhaps) fear-anxiety (r
= . 19, g < .01). Contrary to expectations, causal locus was significantly correlated with anger (r = -.23, g < .001) but not guilt (r = -.03, ns), and intentionality was negatively rather than positively correlated with anger (r = -.27, g < .0001). A weak association was also found for stability and sadness (r - -. 12, ns).
Also contrary to expectations, the correlational data on contextual attributions
(covering the first 6 variables on page 65) indicate that predictability was not a significant factor in anger (r = .08, ns), and that neither predictability nor self-agency played an important role in guilt (r = -.08, and .08, respectively). Circumstance-agency and relief also showed a weak correlation (r = -. 1, ns), contrary to expectations (see Table 2.3).
Though it is tempting to try to interpret each of the remaining (statistically significant)
63 Variable Anger (iuilt I'ear-Anxiety Sadness Hope Joy-1 lappiness Pride Relief
Subject's Mood -.10 -.15* -.2 9 * "* .34**" .31**** .36**** .28"**
Subject's Miysitpie -.03 -.07 -.12 - .2 1 " .22*** .1 8 " .25**" .2 2 * "
Subject's I’ersonalily -15* -.07 -.23*" -.21*" 30**" .26"" 3 1 " " 2 0 "
Subject's Ability -.10 .01 -.06 -.12 .21*** .12 .1 9 " .15*
Subject's I'O'ort -.29**** - .1 9 " -.18" -.40*"* .46**** .43**** .50**** .37****
DilTiculty o f the Task -.01 .01 .07 -.05 .24*** .04 . 1 4 " " .15*
Luck of Any Kind .04 .00 .1 9 " -.02 .10 .07 .09 .07
Personality, Hehavior of Others .22"' -.04 -.12 -.03 .07 -0 1 -.04 -.06
Personal Control - 3 1 " " -0 1 - .2 0 " -.35**** .34**" .38*"* .43"** .34*"*
Lxtemal Control K)* -0 9 -.03 -.07 .07 .00 -0 3 -.01
Causal Locus" -.2 3 "* -.03 - 10 - .2 0 " 33**** 31*"* .34**" .25****
Stability -.18" - 14* - 15* -.12 07 15* 13* ,00
Intentionality -.27"" -.27"" -.29**" - 4 1 "* * 4 3 " " 43 "* * 49**** .31****
O lobaiity - 10 -0 8 -.09 -.07 .2 2 "* .21*** .22*** .13*
fable 4 7 Correlation Matrix of 43 V ariables
( l ablc 4.7 conliiuicil on next page) Tabic 4.7 (continued)
V ariable Anger Cniilt I'ear-Anxiety Sadness 1 lope Joy-1 la])piness Pride R elief
Certainty -.23'" -25**** -.32**" -.34**** .34**** ,34**** .38**" ,27****
Predictability -OK -0 8 -26**** - .1 9 " ,2 3 "* .20** ,22*** .12
I'amiliarity -,05 -16* -.30**** -.29**** .28**** .2 3 * " ,28**** .25****
Scll-Agency -,2K"" ,08 -.06 -23*** ,22*** .31**" ,35**** ,27****
Other-Agency ,17" - m -04 -.05 -03 -.07 -07 -.12
Os u, Circuinstance-Agcncy ,16* ,20** ,26**** .20** - 18** -.17** - 16* -.10
Motivational Relevance -,07 -.05 ,11 .13* 13* ,05 ,05 -.08
Motivational Congruence -.65"** -.50**" - 44**** -68**** ,65**** .83**** ,81**** .58****
Self-Acconntability -,31**** ,13* -.04 -24*** ,26"** ,35**** ,38**** ,32****
Other-Acconntability .22*** -11 - 0 9 -0 3 -0 6 -0 5 -.09 -.15*
Problem-1'ocnsed Coping Potential -.38**** -.25**** -.30**** -42**** ,52*"* .53**** ,54***» ,46****
I'lnotion-l'ocused Coping Potential -38**** -31**** -.40**** -.42**** ,28**** ,41**** ,43**** .32****
ITiture Pxpectations'’ - 16* - 12 -.14* - 16* 2 8 * " ' ,28**** ,27**** .27****
(Table 4,7 continued on next page) Table 4.7 (Continued)
Variable Anger (iu ilt T’ear-Anxiet\' Sadness 1 lope Joy-1 lappitiess Pride R elief
Olher-lJIaine .75*"* .24**** .22*** .39**'* - 30**** -.49**" -.48**" -.39""
SelT-Hlatne .32**** .72**** .24** .41**** -.35*'** -.36**" -..36**** -.22***
D atiger-'lltreat .49**** .4(1*'** .55**** .45**** -.3 4 * "* ..50"" -.49**" -.34"**
Loss-1 lelplessness 6.3**** .61**** .45**** .76**** -65**** -.70"** -.7 2 * * " -.55*"*
LtVortTul O ptim ism -.26**** -.21** -.09 -.29**** .57**** . 4 0 " " .41**** .50*"*
Sitccess -.57**** -.53**** -.36**** -.62**** .72**" ,79**** . 8 0 " " .68*"*
Valued Achievement -.49**** -4S**** -.34**** -.58**** 6 9 * * " .76**** .79"** .65****
basing oT Threat - 29**** - 36**** - 16* - 36**** 56**** .53**** .52**** 69* * "
"High |X)sitivc values indicule an inlenial (rather than an external) cati.sal locus,
''High jxrsilive scores indicate positive (rather than negative) Tuture expectations *P<.()5 **p< ()l ♦♦•p< ()Oi **"p< (XIOI correlations in these data, the already noted pattern of intercorrelations among both positive and negative emotions makes any such set of interpretations problematic at best.
The correlational data on appraisal components (covering the last 7 variables on page
65) suggest that motivational congruence, problem-focused coping potential, and emotion-focused coping potential were all positively correlated with the full range of positive emotions (mean r = .72, .51, and .36, respectively) and negatively correlated with the full range of negative emotions (mean r = -.57, -.34, and -.38, respectively), generally confirming expectations. As predicted, other-accountability played an important role in anger (r = .22, g < .001) but not in any other emotion except (perhaps) relief (r = -. 15, p <
.05). Contrary to expectations, self-accountability was only modestly correlated with guilt
(r = . 13, p < .05), and motivational relevance was not significantly correlated with any emotion other than (perhaps) sadness and hope (both fs = . 13, p < .05). The latter is especially surprising given that motivational congruence played a part in every targeted emotion (mean |r| - .64).
Finally, though the data on core relational themes suggest a wide variety of correlations with individual emotions (see page 66), it can be cautiously noted that with only one exception, each of the themes was more closely associated with its theoretically relevant emotion than it was with any other emotion (mean r = .71). The exception was success, which was more closely associated with pride (r - .80, p < .0001 ) than with joy-happiness (r = .79, p < .0001).
67 Chapter 5
Discussion
The cognitive-relational theory of emotion (Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Smith et al.,
1993; Smith & Lazarus, 1990, 1993) suggests that contextual knowledge and appraisal
function as distinct forms of cognition, that appraisal (relative to knowledge) is more
closely related to emotion, and that in all person-environment interactions, appraisal
mediates the knowledge-emotion relationship. Using the work of Smith et al. (1993) as a guide, these assumptions have been reformulated into a set of five working hypotheses and tested using data fi"om the present study. The hypotheses specified that, for each of the eight emotions under consideration, (a) causal attributions, contextual attributions, and appraisals would each account for a significant proportion of the variance in emotion, that
(b) of these, appraisals would account for the greatest proportion of total variance, that
(c) causal and contextual attributions alone (after controlling for appraisal) would fail to account for a significant proportion of the variance in emotion, but that (d) appraisals alone (after controlling for causal and contextual attributions) would continue to do so, and that (e) causal attributions and contextual attributions would each account for a significant proportion of the variance in appraisal (part of the test of the mediational hypothesis). As reported in Chapter 4, the results of the present study confirm each of these hypotheses and provide strong support for the cognitive-relational model as a whole.
The Attempt to Replicate Smith et al. (1993 )
The attempt to replicate the findings of Smith et al. (1993) was for the most part very successful. Data fi"om the present study were, in fact, somewhat more compelling in terms
68 of their general support of the model. When the explanatory power of causal attributions
and appraisals was compared, for example, the magnitude of the difference between them
was even greater in the present study than in Smith et al. (i.e., causal attributions on
average accounted for less of the variance in emotion and appraisals accounted for more).
Similarly, when appraisal components were compared to appraisal themes, the average
difference between them was smaller and more closely in line with predictions. And when
each of the appraisal variables was regressed on the full set of causal attributions, all 13 of
the resulting equations were significant at .05 (rather than the 8 reported by Smith et al ).
As noted in Chapter 4, one of the reasons for the model's improved performance in the
present study may have been the increased reliability and content validity of items used to
measure appraisal (components), many of which were not developed until after the Smith
et al. study. Another factor may have been the cumulative effect of the many slight design
changes introduced in the present study (e.g., the use of a controlled test site, the
rewording of certain prompts and anchors, the attempt to screen out ambiguous response sets), each of which was intended to help subjects generate clear, accurate, unambiguous responses.
The Extension to Contextual Attributions and to Other Emotions
The extension to contextual attributions and to other emotions was also successful, though in a more qualified sense. As predicted by the model, contextual attributions behaved much like causal attributions, accounting for a small but significant proportion of the shared variance and a small but mostly nonsignificant proportion of the unique variance in emotion. However, as a class of variables, they added little to the explanatory power of causal attributions alone. As the data indicate, only three emotions (fear - anxiety, hope, and pride) were influenced by the addition of contextual attributions, and even then the impact was only slight.
69 There are two likely explanations for this. One is that the set of contextual
attributions, though carefully chosen, was largely redundant with many of the causal
attributions already in the model (e.g., agency-causal locus, certainty-stability,
predictability-personal control). It seems likely that such redundancies, if they do exist,
have always been present in data from studies such as this. If so, they are worth knowing
about and worth exploring further, since they effectively reduce (simplify) the field of
theoretically relevant knowledge variables researchers must consider.
Another possibility is that one or more of the theoretically relevant sets of contextual attributions (outlined in Table 2.3) was put together incorrectly - that is, that important variables were left out or the wrong combination of variables used to describe a particular emotion (it is interesting to note that as a group, contextual attribution variables had their greatest impact when all four were included together). Each of these possibilities deserves further exploration. The extension to other emotions was closer to an unqualified success. As predicted, the pattern of results previously found for anger, guilt, fear-anxiety, sadness, hope, and joy-happiness extended to pride and relief as well, supporting the model across a broad range of both positive and negative emotions.
Inconsistencies. Unexpected Findings
Data from the present study also suggest a number of inconsistencies that merit further discussion. One o f these involves the predicted relationship between attributions and emotion; specifically, the hypothesis that causal and contextual attributions alone
(after controlling for appraisal) would fail to account for a significant proportion of the variance in emotion. In the first series of analyses comparing attributions to appraisals
(Table 4.4., columns five and six), this hypothesis was disconfirmed for four out of the eight emotions under consideration (two out of six in Smith et al., 1993). Contrary to 70 predictions, attributions alone demonstrated a direct link to reports of fear-anxiety, hope, joy-happiness, and pride. How can this be explained and how can support for the
hypothesis be justified in light of such findings?
In weighing these results, it is important to remember that when the effects of appraisal were factored out, the strength of the association between attributions and emotion was substantially reduced (e.g., compare columns two and seven of Table 4.4).
This pattern was found across a range of emotions, both in the present study and in Smith et al. (1993). According to Baron and Kenny ( 1986), this kind of reduction is sufficient to demonstrate the potency of a given mediator (in this case appraisal) even as it suggests that other mediating factors may be involved. The question to be considered here is what additional factors or processes might account for what remains of the attribution-emotion relationship after controlling for appraisal.
The answer may in fact involve both factors and processes. There is no reason to suppose, for example, that all of the emotion-relevant dimensions of appraisal have as yet been identified. It is entirely possible that the model has failed to capture one or more relevant appraisal dimensions and that it is these (unnamed) factors that are responsible for mediating at least some of what remains of the attribution-emotion relationship. Equally likely (and even more intriguing) is the possibility that the appraisals themselves operate at both a conscious and a preconscious (or unconscious) level where the connections between attributions and emotion are less explicit and less available to conscious self-report (see Lazarus, 1991a, 1995; to be discussed more fully in the section below on theoretical implications). What is still unclear with regard to pattern of data from the present study is why the correspondence between attributions and emotion was observed only for fear-anxiety, hope, joy-happiness, and pride and not for any of the other emotions. This remains an open question.
71 Many of the model's predictions regarding the mediational role of motivational relevance and the cognitive structuring of anger, guilt, sadness, and relief were also unsubstantiated by data from the present study. Clearly, the lack of a strong association between motivational relevance and emotion was entirely unexpected, especially given the strong involvement of motivational congruence (see Table 4.7, page 64). Subjects seemed to be saying that the experiences they were able to recall had been either very positive or very negative, but in either case, entirely unimportant! Theoretically, of course, motivational congruence (and incongruence) imply motivational relevance (and vice versa), so that appraisals of one without the other do not make much conceptual sense.
Subjects may have been trying to divest themselves of any current stake in what took place or they may have found it difficult to fully engage their past feelings. These, too, remain open questions.
With regard to guilt, the model predicted strong, positive associations for causal locus (Weiner, 1985), predictability (Smith et al. [Study 2], 1993), and self-agency
(Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, 1984, 1991; Roseman et al.,
1996; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Weiner, 1982), none of which were realized in the results of the present study (see Table 4.7, pages 60-61). Instead, it seems subjects disassociated themselves from the cause and future course of events linked to their feelings of guilt
(Smith and Ellsworth [1987] reported similar findings in their study of appraisal and emotion among students taking an exam). This sort of pattern suggests a defensive posture on the part of subjects, one in which psychological tensions and associated anxiety are reduced through a denial or divestiture of personal responsibility (one of several possible coping responses to be discussed more fully in the section below on implications for counseling). This deserves more careful attention in future research.
72 With regard to anger, the model predicted strong, positive associations for
predictability (Smith et al. [Study 2], 1993) and intentionality (Weiner, 1985), neither of
which was confirmed in data from the present study. Intentionality was, in fact, negatively
correlated with the frill range of negative emotions including anger (see Table 4.7, page
60). My own sense about intentionality is that it may be difficult to assess when referring
to the cause without inadvertently begging the question — that is, without seeming to ask
subjects whether they (or others) set out to cause the anger or guilt (something akin to
asking whether malice was involved). A better approach might be to try to focus subjects
more on the actions associated with the cause, and ask whether they were intended or
unintended.
Finally, the model predicted close associations for sadness, stability (Weiner, 1985)
and globality (Abramson et al., 1978), and for relief and circumstance-agency (Roseman,
1984; Roseman et al., 1996; Roseman et al., 1990) which were also unconfirmed in the present study (see Table 4.7, pages 60-61). With regard to the findings for sadness, it should be noted that in previous research by Weiner et al. (1982), stability demonstrated a similarly weak association to emotional feelings but a relatively strong association to emotional intensity which was not assessed in the present study; also that globality (i.e., the generalizability of the effects of a cause) was originally hypothesized as a correlate of the debilitating sadness found in depression and not necessarily the milder forms associated with loss or disappointment (Abramson et al ). With regard to the findings for relief and circumstance-agency, the lack of support is a bit more puzzling. Prior research has produced some evidence of an association between relief and 5e//'-agency (e.g., see
Ellsworth & Smith, 1988b; Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, 1991), and it may be that this link is more robust or that is occurs more frequently and would have surfaced had it been assessed in the present study.
73 Revisions to the Model
To summarize what has been said so far, it appears that data from the present study
provide relatively strong support for the cognitive-relational model as a whole, as
evidenced by confirmation o f the central hypotheses and the successful replication and
extension of Smith et al. (1993). Predictions for individual variables in the model (those
comprising the larger sets) met with more mixed results. Based on an analysis of the
correlational data in Table 4.7, it now appears that at least some of the variables in the
model may have played no significant role in the emotion process. Revisions to the model
are suggested wherever such data are supported by theoretical considerations — that is,
wherever they make theoretical sense.
Revisions to the Set of Causal Attributions. Subject's ability and the difiSculty of the
task are two seemingly interrelated variables, neither of which was significantly correlated
with any of the negative emotions. Moreover, each seems well represented in the more
inclusive concept of personal control (one of the dimensional attributions). For these reasons, it appears that both variables could probably be eliminated from the set of theoretically relevant causal attributions for anger, guilt, fear-anxiety, and sadness with no significant loss of explanatory power.
Luck of any kind was highly correlated with fear-anxiety and hope — two emotions that depend on (among other things) uncertainty and the interaction of chance factors.
Luck appears to have been of little importance in the remaining six emotions and could probably be eliminated from their corresponding antecedent structures with no real loss of explanatory power. Current data also suggest that neither external control nor the behavior of others was closely associated with any emotion other than anger. This, too, makes a certain amount of theoretical sense and suggests that both could be eliminated as predictor variables for the remaining seven emotions. As noted earlier, globality was
74 originally proposed as a causal attribution relevant only to the sadness associated with
depression. It was also not significantly correlated with any of the negative emotions and
could probably be eliminated from the set of theoretically relevant causal attributions for
anger, guilt, fear-anxiety, and sadness without a significant loss of explanatory power.
Other Revisions. There are currently no clear data on which to base revisions to the
set of theoretically relevant contextual attributions, appraisal components, or core
relational themes. More research is clearly needed to sort out which of these variables are unique and which are redundant with regard to the explained variance in emotion. It
seems likely, for example, that strong associations do exist between causal locus (a causal attribution) and agency (a contextual attribution), and between predictability (a contextual attribution) and future expectancy (an appraisal component). My own view is that accountability and future expectancy (both secondary appraisals) are strongly implied if not wholly determined by the interaction of other variables in the model, and could probably be eliminated without a substantial loss of explanatory power. These and other sources of shared variance need further study.
Methodological Concerns
Four methodological concerns of interest in the present study are (1) the unsuccessful attempt to isolate certain targeted emotions (intercorrelation of dependent variables), (2) the reliance on retrospective self-reports as the sole source of data, and (3) the use of an analytic rather than an empirical test of the mediational hypotheses (i.e., failure to manipulate appraisals as a test of their mediational influence), and (4) failure to control for possible order effects. Each will be considered in turn.
Intercorrelation of Dependent Variables. An effort was made in the present study to target specific emotions and to study their correspondence to specific cognitions (see
Chapter 3). This was done by asking subjects to focus on a particular kind of past
75 experience, one in which they felt angry, or fearful, or proud for example, and to report on just the thoughts and feelings they had at that time. Yet it seems clear from the analysis of
data presented in Chapter 4 that single-emotion experiences of the kind that had been
hoped for did not occur with much frequency. On the contrary; most subjects gave
accounts of past experiences that involved a number of related but distinct emotions and emotional themes. Though it can be argued that such data may provide a truer account of what really goes on in person-environment interactions than so called single-emotion experiences (and should therefore be studied more closely rather than avoided), the fact is that the intercorrelation among dependent variables makes it difiScult to say with any certainty which cognitions are associated with which emotions (there is somewhat less uncertainty involved in saying which are unassociated). This does not pose too great a problem for the broad form of the theory, which makes predictions only about the interactions among groups of variables, but it does seriously confound the mapping and testing of individual appraisal-emotion relationships. (It is interesting to note that the approach to mapping used here does not appear substantially different than the approach used by many researchers in previous studies of cognition and emotion).
This may be a difficult methodological problem to overcome. Alternate approaches in which individual emotions are experimentally manipulated so as to increase their intensity (e.g., inducing strong feelings of sadness or fear in the laboratory), for example, would likely give rise to ethical concerns. Still, other more effective ways of isolating and studying individual emotions are sorely needed.
The Use of Retrospective Reports. It can be said that emotions usually occur within the context of an ongoing person-environment encounter where events have a real and immediate impact on personal well-being. But it is also true that individuals can experience real emotions without the prompting of "real" events, as, for example, when
76 a person is moved to tears (or laughter) while watching a film or reading a book, or while
remembering an important experience from the past or anticipating one in the future.
These sorts of reactions, occurring in response to imagined scenarios, can be both powerful and complex, and can include not only emotional feelings but also related cognitions and physiological changes as well.
The problem for psychological researchers wanting to use remembered experiences as a source of data, is the uncertainty associated with retrieving them (see Parkinson &
Manstead, 1992). It is always possible, for example, that one or more of the subjects in a retrospective study will be unable to fully recall what took place or how they reacted in the moment, or will be unwilling to give a true and full account of their experiences, or (as also in the case of vignettes) will be influenced by their current feelings, or their own implicit theories of emotion, or their sense of what the experimenter is "looking for" in their responses. These are all potential hazards, all difficult to control. Yet, the use of retrospective self-reports has persisted over the years (e.g., see Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a,
1988b; Frijda et al. 1989; Manstead & Tetlock, 1989; Roseman, et al., 1990; Roseman et al., 1996; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tesser, 1990; Weiner et al., 1979), in part because it is a technique that allows subjects to focus on the experiences most sahent to them, the ones in which they themselves were involved and had a personal stake. Given its particular strengths and limitations, its most effective use may be as a supplement to other approaches, such as subject-rated vignettes and in vivo self-reports.
The Use of an Analvtic Test of the Mediational Hypothesis. In both the present study and in Smith et al. (1993, Study 1), the main test of the mediational hypothesis was carried out using the analytic approach suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986). Because the data in each case were collected retrospectively and neither attributions nor appraisals were experimentally manipulated, the causal ordering of variables (i.e., attributions -
77 appraisals-emotions) could not be directly established. As Smith et al. have pointed out, this leaves open the possibility (however unlikey from a theoretical perspective) that it is emotion that gives rise to appraisal rather than the other way around, or that both are mediated by yet a third set of variables (e.g., attributions).
Future research on cognitive mediation can and should include the systematic manipulation of attributions and appraisal (see Andersen, 1995; Ellsworth, 1995; Frijda,
1993; Reisenzein, 1995). This could be done through the use of experimental vignettes or with the help of structured in-lab interactions. Direct evidence from sources such as these of the causal priority of attributions and appraisals, and of their respective roles in the emotion process, would greatly strengthen current support for the mediational hypothesis.
Failure to Control for Possible Order Effects. As noted in Chapter 3, items used in the present study were presented to subjects in a fixed, random order (just as in Smith et al., 1993), with attribution measures coming first, followed by appraisals and then emotions. This leaves open the possibility, of course, that the order in which items were oresented within each category, as well as the ordering of categories, may have had a systematic effect on how subjects responded. Future studies should make use of counterbalancing to control for possible order effects, and item-by-item tests of between-group differences should be carried out before the data are merged.
Theoretical Concerns
The cognitive-relational theory of emotion has connections to a number of interesting and theoretically important questions, three of which will be considered here. They are:
( 1 ) how do personal beliefs impact the emotion process, (2) what role, if any, do unconscious or automatic processes play, and (3) under what conditions can emotion be said to influence cognition. Each will be discussed in turn.
78 The Impact o f Personal Beliefs. In the original cognitive-relational theory, an
individual's motives and beliefs were seen as casting a decisive influence on the outcome
of individual appraisals (see Lazarus & Smith, 1988). Holding other factors constant, the
impact of beliefs on the appraisal process was, in fact, thought to be highly deterministic and predictable, at least in principle. Attributions, on the other hand, were seen as a primary source of emotionally relevant but neutral information (like sight or touch) — information more or less equally available to anyone in the same environment, regardless of his or her beliefs.
A few moments of careful reflection seem to suggest, however, that the latter may not be the case. The appraisal-relevant information carried by attributions seems, on the contrary, quite open to any of a number of interpretations based largely on the characteristics (i.e., the motives and beliefs) of the observer. The individual with relatively low self-regard, for example, might bemore likely than someone else to make and report attributions of uncontrollability, uncertainty, or unpredictability in all kinds of situations.
This would not be too surprising, and might even be expected if it is assumed that such beliefs can influence both "the way things are" and "what they mean to me" (i.e., what they imply for personal well-being). This idea that negative beliefs can impact and negatively influence a person's perception of the way things are is not new of course, and is a key principle of CT (Beck, 1976; Beck & Weisharr, 1989).
This likely correspondence between attributions and beliefs further complicates an already complex theoretical picture. As Lazarus (1991b) has pointed out, the difficulty in studying beliefs at all lies in first determining which are most relevant to emotion and under what conditions. Certain attitudes about self-efficacy and sense of mastery are almost certainly involved, but what about other beliefs (e.g., about the self as active - passive, engaged-isolated, trusting-cautious, or the world as fair-unfair, accepting -
79 rejecting, forgiving-vengeful)? Where do they fit it? Complex though they are, these
belief structures and the ways in which they interact to shape both attributions and
appraisals are vitally important and must carefully examined if researchers are to gain a
deeper understanding of cognitive-affective processes.
The Role of Unconscious or Automatic Processes. The idea that appraisals can
occur automatically, with or without conscious involvement, fits well with the principles of psychoanalytic theory according to which threatening impulses are routinely blocked from awareness (or transformed into benign symbols or messages through the dynamic unconscious) as a form of ego defense (see Lazarus, 1995c). Anecdotal evidence of a covert process of appraisal-mediated emotion can also be found in clinical case studies of clients who, for example, report spontaneous episodes of crying while being unaware of feeling sad, or who experience sudden fits of anger or rage, or intense anxiety in situational contexts that seem entirely non-threatening. Just what is going on here?
Appraisal theorists disagree, but some might argue, as Lazarus (1991a, 1995c) and
Andersen (1995) have, that in threatening situations where the individual lacks the necessary resources to cope effectively, one course of action may be to deny to awareness that the crisis is occurring at all. In so doing, the individual finds that he or she is able to repress the process and the contents of appraisal, but not the resulting emotion (the reasons for this are theoretically obscure, but seem to have to do with the awkwardness involved in suggesting that emotional feelings can exist without the conscious experience of affect (see Ellsworth, 1995; Lazarus, 1991a). The result, according to Lazarus (1991a) and others, is a lack of continuity between conscious thought and feeling — the person looks and feels as if there is a "hidden" emotional agenda of some kind. The adaptational advantage of this kind of defensive maneuver is not easily apparent (since the unwanted emotion is felt anyway), unless, perhaps, it has to do with repressing as much of the
80 experience as possible until more resources can be brought to bear on the problem or until the situation changes on its own.
Another way in which unconscious activity is thought to be involved in emotion is through a kind of short-circuiting system where strong and reliable person-environment connections are fused together to form an almost singular response (Lazarus, 1991a; see also Leventhal, 1984). In the language of behaviorism, each of these fusions would be referred to as a conditioned response of either the classical (paired association) or the operant (punishment-reward contingency) type. In the conceptual framework of appraisal theory they are regarded as a special (evolved) class of unmediated cognitive-affective associations, usually requiring (from an adaptational perspective) either a rapid response or none at all (examples might include the acute anxiety felt by some at the sight of blood, or the joy felt a child at the sound of his or her mother's voice)
The mediating influence of unconscious appraisal is of clear theoretical importance in the present context, especially in light of the fact that its impact may be masked or even contradicted by subjects' own self-reports (see Lazarus, 1995c). A case in point is the lack of self-involvement claimed by subjects reporting past episodes of guilt in the present study. As noted earlier, those in the guilt recall condition reported no significant associations with either self-agency, causal locus, predictability, personal control, or motivational relevance, all contrary to theoretical expectations and to the findings from a number o f previous studies (an exception is Smith & Ellsworth [ 1987]). One way of accounting for these "missing" attributions and appraisals is to assume that they were present, but only to the dynamic unconscious (I currently regard this as a plausible partial explanation of the results). Unconsciously formed appraisals could also help to account for the unexplained variance in each of the remaining emotions, and for the unexpected correspondence between attributions and emotion discussed earlier.
81 There are, of course, a number of methodological difficulties associated with the direct study of unconscious processes in emotion, not the least of which is the problem of how to recognize and differentiate ego-defensive and non-defensive (conditioned) responses (Salovey & Sanz, 1995). Lazarus (1995b, 1995c) has suggested, as a general approach, the use of in-depth psychoanalytic interviewing and observation to identify contradictions that would indicate unconscious, appraisal-related activity, while Scherer
(1995) has proposed a more focused study of facial expressions, including the use of electromyographic recordings of certain facial muscles, to uncover hard to detect signals of unconscious activity. Both of these approaches are interesting in their own way, but as
Ellsworth (1995) has noted, each is open to errors in interpretation (e.g.,experimenter bias) that cannot easily be checked or verified. An alternate approach might be to measure certain physiological changes (e.g., in heart rate, galvanic skin response, electrical brain wave activity, body muscle tension) accompanying the subliminal presentation of a list of stimulus and non-stimulus words (i.e., theoretically relevant attributions and appraisals together with nouns and nonsense syllables). Significant changes in measured activity following words like "self-caused" (for guilt), or "uncontrollable" and "stable" (for sadness) could be interpreted as an unguarded response, and an indication of an unconsciously formed association (see Lazarus & McCleary, 1951; McGinnies, 1949).
How ever it is carried out, research of this sort should definitely go forward.
The Impact of Emotions on Cognition. Do the causal pathways linking cognition and emotion run in only one direction? It would seem counter intuitive and also a bit odd to suppose that emotion has no impact on cognition; yet, it seems there is little room in the cognitive-relational model for this kind of reciprocal interaction. Cognitions (attributions and appraisals) clearly hold the causal high ground.
82 Many of the features of the model proposed by Lazarus and Smith (1988) can be
traced to the earlier work of Lazarus and Folkman (1984), and in that earlier work,
negative emotional feelings (i.e., psychological stress) were linked to appraisal by means of coping and reappraisal (see Lazarus, 1990). Applied to the current model, the causal pathway would consist of; attributions, - appraisal - relational meaning - emotion - coping
- attributions^ - reappraisal. From this theoretical vantage point, it is plain to see that emotions can impact appraisal and relational meaning, but only through coping behaviors that alter the interaction and give the individual something new to appraise. The "causal sequence" is in that sense relative, and depends (as Lazarus [1991a] has pointed out) on which segment of the loop one chooses to examine.
Under most circumstances, negative emotions such as sadness and fear do elicit a coping response which is, in theory, guided by secondary appraisals (e.g., of problem - focused and emotion-focused coping potential), and powered by the motivational qualities of the emotion itself (see Folkman, 1984). And there are often a great number of response options to choose from; some, of course, with very negative implications for emotional health and future coping. One of these is the individual's decision to deny with awareness that the crisis is taking place. In theoretical terms, he or she may choose to ignore attributional data and/or suppress relevant appraisals in a symbolic attempt to disassociate from the relational meaning of the interaction. Just as in the case of unconsciously formed appraisals, this sort of conscious denial can be very difficult to detect and verify.
Implications for Counseling
In the opening pages of Chapter 1, I argued that cognitive theory had so far failed to address a number of important questions regarding the correspondence between cognitive processes and emotion. It is probably also true that any press for a more comprehensive theoretical formulation has been forestalled by the past successes claimed by many
83 cognitive therapies (including CT), even for the relatively normal range problems clients bring to therapy. There is no disputing the fact that CT can be broadly effective, and it is, at some level, with some clients, under some circumstances. The problem, as I see it, is that its successes and its failures are not well understood from a theoretical perspective. It is difBcult to see in the absence of any real (diagnosable) psychopathology, for example, where errors in thinking come from (i.e., what prompts them), or why some clients can be persuaded to give them up while others cannot; or how the cognitive-mediational process works when things are going well (i.e., the desired state of affairs) and where it can fail; or how and why certain kinds of emotional distress are elicited and not others in a particular case. It is here where I believe cognitive-relational theory can be useful, both in helping to establish a broader theoretical perspective on cognitive-affective interactions, and in pointing the way to specific kinds of treatment interventions. I turn now to a more detailed discussion of each.
The Applied Theorv. Consider again the causal loop discussed earlier; attributions, - appraisal - relational meaning - emotion - coping - attributions- - reappraisal. When things are "going well" for the individual (in terms of his or her overall adjustment and level of functioning), the relational system as a whole can be thought of as well integrated and synchronous; there is in that case a kind of working correspondence between person and environment; something counseling psychologists like to refer to as "a good p-e fit."
Relational problems, when they do occur, tend to break this synchrony and create what
Lazarus (1989, 1991b, 1994) has referred to as disconnections^ which can be expressed in a variety of ways. The individual may persist, for example, in making inferences of self-agency — or in not doing so, regardless of the circumstances (an attributional disconnection); he or she may assess threat when none is apparent — or may fail to assess it when the danger is real (a disconnection of [primary] appraisal); his or her affect may be
84 blunted or exaggerated (an emotional disconnection), or it may fail to motivate effective coping, or the effort to cope may persist long after resolution of the difiSculty (a reappraisal disconnection). In most kinds of adjustment disorders, these points of disconnection would be seen not as isolated episodes, but as part of a stable and persistent relational pattern. From a diagnostic perspective, it would be important to understand not only the kind of disconnection involved, but also its etiology and meaning. Restating what has been said earlier, it is possible to imagine a case, for example, in which attributions and/or appraisals have become the target of coping (e.g., such that attributions of self-agency or appraisals of motivational relevance are repressed or suppressed as an ego-protective measure), or where long standing beliefs about low self-efBcacy have come to undermine coping and reappraisal, or where certain attributions
(e.g., of uncertainty) or appraisals (e.g., of motivational incongruence) are enough to trigger an earlier, unrelated cognitive-affective response (see Lazarus, 1989).
Applied Treatment Interventions. The preceding is suggestive of a theoretical framework for thinking about client problems from a relational perspective. It does not point to (or strictly limit) any one treatment approach. Data from the present study and from Smith et al. (1993), however, do suggest certain patterns of interaction among attributions, appraisals, and emotion that may carry more direct implications for treatment.
These can be described at the level of both cognitive-medational interactions and theme-centered associations.
At the cognitive-mediational level, data from the present study indicate first that causal and contextual attributions can have an impact on emotion and that even minor changes in the way they are formulated can be meaningful. This is consistent with a little-known therapeutic approach called attributional retraining (Heppner & Frazier,
1992) in which individuals are encouraged to re-attribute the outcome of important events
85 to factors such as effort (an internal, unstable, and controllable cause) rather than luck or
ability. To-date, attributional retraining has been used with some success in the treatment
of a variety of adjustment disorders, including low self-esteem, procrastination, and social
anxiety (see Heppner & Frazier for a review).
Current data related to the cognitive-mediational hypothesis also suggest that
appraisals are involved in mediating the impact of attributions on emotion, and so provide
an alternate, perhaps even more potent target for therapeutic change. As a general
approach, for example, reassessing with the client his or her primary appraisals of
motivational relevance or motivational incongruence (when appropriate), or re-examining
secondary appraisals of low problem-focused or low emotion-focused coping potential
may open the way to more realistic and flexible appraisals and associated relational
meanings.
At the level of theme-centered associations, data from the present study are consistent with certain correlational patterns linking specific cognitions with specific emotions, and suggesting a variety of related points of intervention. Sadness, for example, appears to be centered on a relational theme of loss-helplessness and associated with a cognitive pattern that includes attributions of uncertainty, unpredictability, unfamiliarity, low personal control, and circumstance-agency, and with appraisals of low motivational congruence, low problem-focused coping potential, and low emotion-focused coping potential. Clients may come to therapy with some awareness of their feelings but not of the relational meanings or the pre-affective attributions or appraisals that "got them there;" or they may have some understanding of certain inferences or appraisals without knowing what feelings they imply (see Smith & Lazarus, 1993). In either case, exploring these
"missing" associations, or focusing, instead, on the meaning of certain recurrent themes may create openings that can be used therapeutically.
86 Applications to Cross-Cultural Counseling. Research to-date on cross-cultural
counseling suggests that culture may play an important if not crucial role in the etiology
and expression of many psychological disorders (Sue, Zane, & Young, 1994). Little is
known at this point about how effective traditional (western) approaches are when applied
cross-culturally, or what modifications might be needed to make them more effective. As
efforts are made to research this question, practitioners from all disciplines are being urged to increase their own awareness of cultural differences and to develop and use conceptual systems and therapeutic approaches that are culturally sensitive (see Sue, et al.).
Cognitive-relational theory is rooted in assumptions about what Lazarus calls "... both biological universals and cultural sources of variability in the way emotions are . . . regulated" (1995c, p. 187). The biological universals he refers to have to do with the theoretically invariant correspondence between attributions, appraisals and relational meaning on one hand, and emotion on the other. The theory makes clear that certain configurations of attributions and appraisals (i.e., the correlational patterns discussed earlier) always give rise to the same relational meaning and the same corresponding emotion, regardless of age, gender or culture. The sources of variability (cultural and otherwise) are the motives and beliefs that support the appraisal process and, in a real sense, determine what is or is not motivationally relevant and/or congruent, as well as what the prospects are for coping with it. If these assumptions hold, cognitive-relational theory could play an important role in helping to bridge the cultural gap between therapist and client by providing a common relational language both can speak.
Research is currently underway on cross-cultural variations in patterns of appraisal and emotion, with preliminary results indicating relatively high consistencies across both emotions (e.g., Roseman, Dhawan, Rettek, Naidu, & Thapa, 1995) and dimensions of appraisal (e.g., Mauro, Sato, & Tucker, 1992). Many more studies of this kind are clearly
87 needed to fully assess the usefulness of cognitive-relational theory in cross-cultural counseling interactions.
Suggestions for Future Research
Much of what takes place in therapy, including the experience many refer to as insight, involves the fuzzy boundary that separates (and connects) cognitive and affective experience. And yet, just what this boundary is and what goes on there remains theoretically obscure; outside the purview, it seems, of the very theories that might otherwise seek to explain it. I continue to believe there is a need to develop more integrated and theoretically precise ways of thinking about cognitive-affective interactions.
Cognitive-relational theory offers not only a relationally based, mediational model of the cognition-emotion relationship, but also a relational system that suggests certain cormections to coping and adaptation (i.e., adjustment). Yet, as this discussion makes clear, there is still much left to do to develop the model further. The mediational hypothesis must still be tested and verified experimentally; a better way must still be found to isolate and study individual emotions and the unconscious processes involved in appraisal; the model itself must still be thoroughly tested to identify and eliminate redundancies; the motivational and belief systems that direct the appraisal process must still be described and studied; and evidence of cross-cultural variations in patterns of appraisal and emotion must continue to be searched out and carefully examined. Future research of this kind should also make use of a variety of approaches to data collection
(e.g., retrospective, experimental, in vivo) and measurement (self-reports, clinical interviewing, physiological and behavioral observation), and should examine an ever widening range of emotions and eliciting conditions. It is through efforts such as these, 1 believe, that we can deepen our understanding of cognitive-affective processes and their role in psychological health and dysfunction.
88 APPENDIX A Text of the General Instructions Given to All Participants
In this questionnaire, you will be asked to recall, describe, and answer questions about an experience from your past. Please read the instructions for each set of questions carefully before you respond. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers. I am interested in vour responses.
Each booklet has been numerically coded for data analysis. No other identifying information will be collected that could link you with your responses or identify you as a participant in this study.
You have 45 minutes to complete this questionnaire, so please relax, take your time, and answer each question as fully as you can. When you've finished, please bring your booklet up to me.
Thanks.
Please begin.
89 APPENDIX B Text of the Eight Prompts Used
Prompt 1 Please take a few moments to focus on a past incident in which you experienced strong feelings of anger. Try to choose a single incident from your past; one which you can remember clearly and which, for you, was associated with strong feelings of anger.
Try to remember the details of what happened as clearly as possible. Where were you? Who were you with? How did the situation unfold? Think back and try to re-experience your thoughts and feelings during the original encounter. When you think you have recalled the situation as clearly and completely as you can, please briefly describe what took place in the space below. What happened? Wfliat were the most important aspects of the situation to you? How did you feel while the situation was unfolding? Please write clearly and legibly. WTien you've finished, please turn to Page 2.
Prompt 2 Please take a few moments to focus on a past incident in which you experienced strong feelings of sadness. Try to choose a single incident from your past; one which you can remember clearly and which, for you, was associated with strong feelings of sadness.
Try to remember the details of what happened as clearly as possible. Where were you? Who were you with? How did the situation unfold? Think back and try to re-experience your thoughts and feelings during the original encounter. When you think you have recalled the situation as clearly and completely as you can, please briefly describe what took place in the space below. What happened? What were the most important aspects of the situation to you? How did you feel while the situation was unfolding? Please write clearly and legiblv. When you've finished, please turn to Page 2.
90 Prompt 3 Please take a few moments to focus on a past incident in which you experienced strong feelings of anxiety. Try to choose a single incident from your past; one which you can remember clearly and which, for you, was associated with strong feelings of anxiety.
Try to remember the details of what happened as clearly as possible. Where were you'’ Who were you with? How did the situation unfold? Think back and try to re-experience your thoughts and feelings during the original encounter. When you think you have recalled the situation as clearly and completely as you can, please briefly describe what took place in the space below. What happened? What were the most important aspects of the situation to you? How did you feel while the situation was unfolding? Please write clearly and legibly. When you've finished, please turn to Page 2.
Prompt 4 Please take a few moments to focus on a past incident in which you experienced strong feelings of guilt. Try to choose a single incident from your past; one which you can remember clearly and which, for you, was associated with strong feelings of guilt.
Try to remember the details of what happened as clearly as possible. Where were you? Who were you with? How did the situation unfold? Think back and try to re-experience your thoughts and feelings during the original encounter. When you think you have recalled the situation as clearly and completely as you can, please briefly describe what took place in the space below. What happened? What were the most important aspects of the situation to you? How did you feel while the situation was unfolding? Please write clearly and legiblv. When you've finished, please turn to Page 2.
91 Prompt 5 Please take a few moments to focus on a past incident in which you experienced strong feelings of joy or happiness. Try to choose a single incident from your past; one which you can remember clearly and which, for you, was associated with strong feelings of joy or happiness.
Try to remember the details of what happened as clearly as possible. Where were you? Who were you with? How did the situation unfold? Think back and try to re-experience your thoughts and feelings during the original encounter. When you think you have recalled the situation as clearly and completely as you can, please briefly describe what took place in the space below. What happened? What were the most important aspects of the situation to you? How did you feel while the situation was unfolding? Please write clearly and legiblv. When you've finished, please turn to Page 2.
Prompt 6 Please take a few moments to focus on a past incident in which you experienced strong feelings of hope. Try to choose a single incident from your past; one which you can remember clearly and which, for you, was associated with strong feelings of hope.
Try to remember the details of what happened as clearly as possible. Where were you'’ Who were you with? How did the situation unfold? Think back and try to re-experience your thoughts and feelings during the original encounter. When you think you have recalled the situation as clearly and completely as you can, please briefly describe what took place in the space below. What happened? What were the most important aspects of the situation to you? How did you feel while the situation was unfolding? Please write clearly and legibly. When you've finished, please turn to Page 2.
92 Prompt 7 Please take a few moments to focus on a past incident in which you experienced strong feelings of pride. Try to choose a single incident from your past; one which you can remember clearly and which, for you, was associated with strong feelings of pride.
Try to remember the details of what happened as clearly as possible. Where were you? Who were you with? How did the situation unfold? Think back and try to re-experience your thoughts and feelings during the original encounter. When you think you have recalled the situation as clearly and completely as you can, please briefly describe what took place in the space below. What happened? What were the most important aspects of the situation to you? How did you feel while the situation was unfolding? Please write clearly and legiblv. When you've finished, please turn to Page 2.
Prompt 8 Please take a few moments to focus on a past incident in which you experienced strong feelings of relief. Try to choose a single incident from your past; one which you can remember clearly and which, for you, was associated with strong feelings of relief.
Try to remember the details of what happened as clearly as possible. Where were you? Who were you with? How did the situation unfold? Think back and try to re-experience your thoughts and feelings during the original encounter. When you think you have recalled the situation as clearly and completely as you can, please briefly describe what took place in the space below. What happened? What were the most important aspects of the situation to you? How did you feel while the situation was unfolding? Please write clearly and legiblv. When you've finished, please turn to Page 2.
93 APPENDIX C Text of All Measures Used
Instructions
The questions that follow have to do with your thoughts and feelings about the situation you've just described. It is very important that vou respond to these questions based on the thoughts and feelings vou had during the original encounter. If your thoughts and feelings have changed since the situation ended, please respond based on how you felt while vou were in the situation.
Section A. While vou were in this situation, what did you think was causing it? Please list anything you may have thought was causing this situation to occur.
1 .
j .
4.
5._
6.
7.
94 Section B. While vou were in this situation, how much did you think the cause or causes were related to each of the following. Circle your response to each item.
1. Mv mood
not at all----- 1------2------3------1------5 -----6------7------8------9 extremely much
2. Mv Physique
not at all----- 1------2------3------1------5 -----6------7------8------9 extremely much
3. Mv personality
not at all------1------2------3------1------5 -----6----- 7------8------9 extremely much
4. Mv ability (or lack of it) to deal with the situation
not at all 1------2------3------1------5 -----6----- 7------8------9 extremely much
5. The amount of effort I put into the situation
not at all 1------2------3------1------5 -----6----- 7------8------9 extremely much
6 The difficulty of what needed to be done
not at all 1------2------3------1------5 -----6----- 7------8------9 extremely much
7. Luck f good or bad)
not at all 1------2------3------1------5 -----6----- 7------8------9 extremely much
8. The actions of someone else
not at all 1------2------3------1------5 -----6----- 7------8------9 extremely much
95 9. Someone clsc's personality
not at all 1----- 2----- 3------1------5------6------7----- 8------9 cxtrcmclv much
96 Section C. While vou were in this situation, how did you evaluate the cause or causes? Circle your response to each item.
I. Was the cause(s) something that:
reflected an aspect I 2- -7----- 8------9 reflected an aspect o f the situation of vourself
2. Was the causetsl:
not manageable by you I ----- 2 3------1------5----- 6------7------8------9 manageable by you
3. Was the causefs):
temporary I ----- 2 3------1- -7----- 8------9 permanent
4. Was the causefs) something:
you could not regulate I ----- 2 3------1- -7----- 8------9 you could regulate
5. Was the causetsl som ething:
over which others I ----- 2 3------1- -9 over w hich others had no control had control
6. Was the causetsl:
outside of vou I- 4----- 5------6------7----- 8------9 inside o f vou
7. Was the causetsl:
variable over time I ----- 2 3------1- 5----- 7----- 8------9 stable o \cr time
8. Was the causefsl:
not under the power l- under the power of other people o f other people
97 9. Was the cause(s):
something about others ----- 1 2------3------1------5------6------7------8------9 something about you
10. Was the causctsi something:
over which you I ----- 2 3------1------5------6------7------8------9 over which you had no power had power
11. Was the cause(s):
changeable I 2----- 3------1------5------6------7------8------9 unchangeable
12. Was the causets) something:
other people could not I ----- 2 3------1------5— 6------7------8------9 other people could regulate regulate
13. Was the causefs):
completely unfair ----- 1 2------3------1------5------6------7------8------9 completely fair not at all justifiable extremely justifiable
14. Was the causets):
unintended by you ----- 1 2------3------1------5------6------7------8------9 intended by you or other people or other people
15. Was the causefs):
relevant to just I ----- 2 3------1------5------6------7------8------9 relev ant to all this situation areas of vour life
16. Was the cause(s):
completely accidental ----- 1 2------3------1------5------6------7------8------9 completely intentional
98 Section D. While vou were in this situation, what were your thoughts about what was happening? Circle your response to each item,
I. To what extent were vou certain about what was happening in this situation:
not certain about what I ----- 2 3------1----- 5------6------7----- 8------9 completely certain about was happening at all what was happening
2. To what extent was this situation new to vou:
situation not new to I ----- 2 3------1----- 5----- 6------7------8------9 situation completely me at all new to me
3. To what extent was this situation eaused bv chanee cireumstances:
not caused by ehance ----- 1 2------3------1------5------6------7------8------9 completely caused by circumstances at all chance circumstances
4. To what extent did vou understand what was happening in this situation:
didn't understand what 1----- 2----- 3------1----- 5------6------7------8------9 completel) understood was happening at all what was happening
5. To wliat extent was this situation caused bv others:
not caused by others ----- 1 2------3------1------5----- 6------7 8 9 completely caused at all bv others
6. To what extent were vou able to predict the futime course of events in this situation:
not able to prediet I 2----- 3------1----- 5------6----- 7------8------9 completely able to future events at all predict future e\ ents
7. To what extent was this situation Familiar to vou:
situation not familiar I ----- 2 3------1----- 5-----6------7------8------9 situation completely to me at all familiar to me
99 8. To what extent were vou able to foresee how things would tiim out in this situation:
not able to foresee I ----- 2 3------1------5------6----- 7----- 8------9 completely able to foresee how things would turn out at all how things would turn out
9. To w hat extent was this situation caused bv vou:
not caused by me I 2----- 3------1------5------6------7----- 8------9 completely caused at all bv me
100 Section E. While vou were in this situation, how did you evaluate what was happening? Circle your response to each item.
1. How important was what was happening in this situation to vou:
not at all-----I----2------3------1-----5------6------7-----8------9 extremely much
moderately
2. To what extent were there negative aspects to the situation — things that vou didn't want, or were displeased about:
not at all 1----- 2------3------1------5----- 6------7------8------9 extremely much
moderately
3. To what extent were there positive aspects to the situation — things that vou did want, or were pleased about:
not at all 1----2------3------1-----5------6------7-----8------9 extremely much
moderately
4. To what extent did vou consider YOURSELF responsible For this situation:
not at all 1----2------3------1-----5------6------7-----8------9 extremely much
moderately
5. To what extent did vou consider SOMEONE OR SOMETPUNG ELSE to be responsible for this situation:
not at all 1----2------3------1-----5------6----- 7-----8------9 extremely much
moderately
101 6. Think about how vou wanted this situation to turn out. When vou were in the situation. how consistent with these wishes (for anv reason) did vou expect this situation to turn out:
not at all-----I------2----- 3------1------5------6-----7------8------9 extremely much
moderately
7. When vou were in this situation, how consistent was what was happening with w hat vou wanted to happen:
not at all 1------2----- 3------1------5------6-----7------8------9 extremely much
moderately
8. When vou were in this situation, how certain were vou that vou would be able to do something to make tor keep) the situation the wav vou wanted it to be:
completely certain 1------2------3------1----- 5------6----- 7------8------9 completel) certain 1 would not be able I would be able
9. When vou were in this situation, how certain were vou that vou would be able to deal emotionallv with what was happening, however it turned out:
completely certain ----- 1 2------3------1------5----- 6------7----- 8 9 completely certain 1 would not be able I would be able
10. At the time vou described, how, if at all, did vou expect this situation to change in the future:
expected it to ------1 2------3------1----- 5------6---- 7------8------9 expected it to get much worse get much better
11. How much did vou care about what was happening in this situation:
not at all 1----- 2------3------1------5------6------7------8------9 extremely much
moderately
102 12. When you were in this situation, how much did vou think that vou would be able to do something to make things better (or keep them good):
completely certain I ----- 2 3------1----- 5----- 6------7-----8------9 completely certain I would not be able I w ould be able
13. When vou were in this situation, how much did vou think that vou would be able to accept things and adjust to the situation no matter how it turned out:
completely certain ----- 1 2----- 3------1----- 5------6------7------8------9 completely certain I would not be able I would be able
14. To w hat extent did vou consider YOURSELF accountable for this situation:
not at all I 2----- 3------1------5——6-----7----- 8------9 c.\trcmelv much
15. To what extent did vou consider SOMEONE OR SOMETHING ELSE to be accountable for this situation:
not at all I 2----- 3------1----- 5----- 6------7----- 8------9 extremely much
103 Section F. While vou were in this situation, how did you interpret the meaning of what was happening? Circle your response to each item.
1 ■ This situation is hopeless:
doesn't characterize my I ------2 3- -8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughls in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
2. Someone else is to blame For the bad situation I'm in:
doesn't characterize my I ----- 2 3------1------5------6------7------8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
3. A threat or harm has been remo\ ed from the situation:
doesn't characterize my I ------2 3- -7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
4. I am to blame for this bad situation:
doesn't characterize my I ----- 2 3------1------5------6------7------8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
5. I am feeling threatened bv an uncertain danger:
doesn't characterize my I 2- -7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremeh well
6. t feel helpless:
doesn't characterize my I 2 3 ------1------5 — ^ ----- 7 ----- 8------9 characterizes m\ thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
7. I've been dealt with shabbily:
doesn't characterize my I ------2 3- -7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
104 8. f am in danger and might not be able to handle it: doesn't characterize my I ----- 2 3------1------5------6----7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremeh well
9. This bad situation is never going to improve: doesn’t characterize my ----- 1 2----- 3------1------5------6------7------8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremely w ell
10. l'\ e gotten w hat I've wanted in this situation: doesn't characterize my 1------2- -7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremeh well
11. 1 don't know w hether I can handle w hat is about to happen: doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2------3- -7----- 8------9 characterizes m> thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremeh well
12. Some jerk is trving to take advantage of me: doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2------3------1----- 5------6------7------8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremeh well
13. 1 Feel a sense o f loss: doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2------3------1------5------6------7------8- —9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremeh well
14. I'm very satisfied with what I'm accomplishing here: doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2------3— —7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremeh well
105 15. Things arc bad because of me: doesn’t characterize my ------1 2- -8----- 9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
16. Some ierk is interfering with mv goals: doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2- -9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremeh w ell
17. I feel that things are going to get better in this situation: doesn't characterize my I ------2 3- -7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
18. 1 don't see anything I can do to improve this bad situation doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2------3- -7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
19. This bad thing would have been prevented if the other person had been worthy of respect: doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2----- 3------1------5------6------7------8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
20. Just now I seem to be powerless to make things right in this situation: doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2------3------1----- 5------6------7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
21. Somehow things might work out in this situation: doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2- — j ------1- -7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
106 22. Things are turning out well because o f what I'm doing: doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2----- 3------A- -7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thouglits in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
23. Something important to me has been destroyed: doesn't characterize my 1------2- -7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
24. I'vebeen cheated or vvTonged: doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2------3- 5----- 7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
25. IF I try hard enough I can get what 1 want in this situation: doesn't characterize my I ----- 2 3------4- -7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
26. Something 1 cared about is gone: doesn't characterize my 1------2- -8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
27. I can handle this difficult task: doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2------3- -9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
28. Things are working out after all: doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2------3- -7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
107 29. Things turned out great:
doesn't characterize my I ------2 3- -7----- 8------9 characterizes m> thoughts thoughts in the situation at ail in the situation extremelv well
30. 1 have done something bad
doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2------3------1------5------6------7------8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremeh well
31. With some efTort I can make things better in this situation:
doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2------3- -7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
32. Things have gone wonderfiillv well in this situation:
doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2------3------1- -7----- 8------9 characterizes m> thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
33. I'm responsible for how well things are going:
doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2------3- -5----- 6------7------8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
34. A burden has been lifted From mv mind: doesn't characterize my ----- 1 2------3- -7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
35. Nothing can ever be done to fix this bad situation: doesn't characterize my 1------2- -7----- 8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
108 36. [n the end, there’s a chance that e\er\thing will be OK: doesn't characterize my I ----- 2 3------1------5------6------7------8------9 characterizes my thoughts thoughts in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
109 Section G. While vou were in this situation, how did you feel about what was happening? Circle your response to each item.
I. Angrv:
doesn't characterize 1------2— -7----- 8------9 characterizes how I felt how I felt in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
2. Triumphant
doesn't characterize 1------2— -9 characterizes how 1 felt how 1 felt in the situation at all in the situation extremeh well
3. Scared:
doesn't characterize 1----- 2------3- -7----- 8------9 characterizes how I felt how 1 felt in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
4. Challenged:
doesn't characterize I 2----- 3- -9 characterizes how I felt how I felt in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
5. Downhearted:
doesn't characterize 1----- 2------3- -7----- 8------9 characterizes how I felt how I felt in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
6. Annoved:
doesn't characterize 1----- 2------3- 5----- 7------8------9 characterizes how I felt how I felt in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
7. Guiltw
doesn't characterize 1----- 2----- 3------1- -8----- 9 characterizes how 1 felt how I felt in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
110 8. Joyful: doesn't characterize 1------2— -7----- 8------9 characterizes how I felt how I felt in the situation at all in the situation extremeh well
9. Frightened: doesn't characterize 1----- 2------3------1- -9 characterizes how I felt how 1 felt in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
10. Resentful: doesn't characterize 1----- 2------3- —D----- 6------7------8~ -9 characterizes how 1 felt how I felt in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
11. Pleased: doesn't characterize 1----- 2------j -9 characterizes how I felt how 1 felt in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
12. Sad: doesn't characterize 1------2— -7----- 8------9 characterizes how 1 felt how 1 felt in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
13. Lighthearted: doesn't characterize 1----- 2------3- -9 characterizes how 1 felt how 1 felt in the situation at all in the situation extremeh well
14. Scornful: doesn't characterize 1----- 2------j -9 characterizes how 1 felt how 1 felt in the situation at all in the situation extremelv well
11 15. Sorrowful doesn't characterize 1----- 2------3- -9 characterizes how 1 felt hovv [ felt in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
16. Hopeful: doesn't characterize 1----- 2------3- -5----- 6- -9 characterizes how 1 felt how 1 felt in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
17. Afraid: doesn't characterize 1----- 2------3 - -9 characterizes how 1 felt how 1 felt in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
18. Relieyed: doesn't characterize ----- 1 2------3- —7----- 8------9 characterizes how I felt how 1 felt in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
19. Contemptuous: doesn't characterize 1----- 2------3- -9 characterizes how 1 felt how I felt in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
20. Optimistic: doesn't characterize 1----- 2------3- -9 characterizes how 1 felt how I felt in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
21. Regretful: doesn't characterize 1----- 2------3- -7----- 8------9 characterizes how I felt how I felt in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
112 11 . Disdainful:
doesn't characterize I 2------3 - - 5------6- -9 characterizes how 1 felt how [ felt in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
23. Determined:
doesn't characterize 1----- 2------3 - -9 characterizes how I felt how I felt in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
24. Happy: doesn't characterize 1----- 2------3- -5----- 6------7----- 8------9 characterizes how 1 felt how I felt in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
25. Remorsefiil:
doesn't characterize 1----- 2------3- -0—— —7-—-8- -9 characterizes how I felt how 1 felt in the situation at all in the situation e.xtremeh well
26. Proud:
doesn't characterize 1------2— — 5------6- -9 characterizes how 1 felt how I felt in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
27. Eager: doesn't characterize 1----- 2------3- -9 characterizes how I felt how I felt in the situation at all in the situation extremely well
113 Section H. Please fill in the blank or make a check mark in the appropriate space below. The information you provide is valuable and important to this study.
Age;
Sex: male female
Student Status: freshman sophomore junior
senior graduate student
Race - Ethnicity: African-American Asian Hispanic
Native American White (Non-Hispanic)
Other (please specify):
Thank you for participating in this study!
114 APPENDIX D Debriefing Statement
You have taken part in a study concerning the ways in which our thoughts and appraisals of a situation interact and influence how we feel emotionally. No deception was used. Each person in this study was asked to recall, describe, and answer questions about a past experience involving one of eight emotions (joy - happiness, hope, pride, relief, fear - anxiety, guilt, anger or sadness). Questions were designed to assess various kinds of thoughts, appraisals, and feelings you may have had about the experience you described. Information from studies such as this may help psychologists develop more effective ways of helping people who are emotionally distressed.
If you have any questions or would like information regarding the results of this study, please contact Chuck Blons at 292-5303.
Thanks again for participating.
115 APPENDIX E Representative Sample of Written Accounts Judged to be Ambiguous (Questionnaires Excluded From Data Analysis)
1. One subject, asked to recall and write a sad experience, wrote;
"I was eight years old and my dog died. I do not remember that many details about the incident. I did not actually see the dog dead or how it happened. I was just told that he was hit by a car and that was the end of it."
2. Another subject, asked to recall and write about hope, wrote:
"I remember my dream of earning my black belt in martial arts. My first day, I was alone in one end of the room. I felt tension due to the strange environment. By the end of the one hour class, I was tired, worn out really, and I felt great. I was tired every time I went. It seemed harder, then I quit smoking which helped a lot. After two years, I was actually teaching the class. I had made new friends, gone to martial arts tournaments, and won a few trophies. Unfortunately, I got into a car wreck and my hopes of earning my black belt were shot. I never made it, yet. . . I felt hopeful to become a great martial artist, but I felt robbed after the accident that took my dream away. . . temporarily."
3. Another, asked to recall and write about an experience involving fear or anxiety, wrote:
"The past incident that I strongly remember was when I was struck by lightning. I was with my friends on the neighbor's patio. I can vividly remember the color of the sky and the smell of the summer evening. It all 116 happened so fast that time wise but it seemed like hours, everybody was around me and it was a little confusing. I was not really frightened I guess, but a little unclear of what just happened. Of course, if anybody else that has been struck by lightening probably would feel the same way. Nothing happened to me physically which was a miracle, I guess."
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