TM Jan. 28 2020 Issue

THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION JANUARY 28, 2020 VOLUME XVIII, ISSUE 2 p.1 p.4 p.6 p.8 Brian Perkins Jacob Zenn Brian M. Perkins Animesh Roul BRIEFS Is the ‘Bakura Al-Qaeda in Indian Subconti- Magufuli’s Reign Faction’ Boko nent’s Propaganda Campaign and Tanzania’s Continues Despite Digital Haram’s New Force Creeping Radicaliza- Disruptions and Stiﬂed Enhancer Around Operational Capability tion Issue Lake Chad? OMAN’S ABILITY TO BALANCE COM- PETING PRIORITIES WILL HELP SHAPE continuing Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) blockade THE GULF IN COMING YEARS against Qatar, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s designs in the region, external actors are likely to view the tim- Brian M. Perkins ing as an opportunity to overtly and covertly sway the country’s political stances. During the fraught aftermath of the airstrike that killed The UAE, in particular, has long been involved in at- Major General Qasem Soleimani, another key develop- tempts to exert influence over Oman and was caught ment with broad implications for the Middle East was operating spy rings in 2010 and 2019. The most recent unfolding. The death of Oman’s Sultan Qaboos bin Said incident resulted in five Emiratis and one Omani citizen on January 10 comes at a pivotal moment for both in the strategic Musandam governorate being arrested Oman and the region. The longstanding question of and imprisoned (Middle East Monitor, April 10, 2019). succession was answered quickly and smoothly when The UAE has increasingly pursued controversial and ag- the late ruler’s cousin, Haitham bin Tariq al-Said, was gressive policies in Oman’s strategic border areas, most confirmed as the sultanate’s new leader. While the ruling notably in Musandam, which is Oman’s peninsular prov- family announced his appointment with little debate or ince that lies on the strategic Strait of Hormuz and is cut turmoil, tensions in the region coupled with the coun- off from the rest of Omani territory by the UAE. Emirati try’s declining economy will undoubtedly test the new land purchases in Musandam and other strategic loca- sultan and his ability to fulfill his predecessor’s legacy of tions were a major factor in the decision to issue a 2019 peaceful neutrality. Royal Decree banning “ownership of real estate and Oman has long positioned itself as “friend to all, enemy land for non-Omanis in Musandam, Buraimi, Dhahirah, to none,” deftly managing to maintain close and largely Al Wusta, Dhofar (except Salalah), Liwa, Shinas, Masirah, cordial ties to Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the Unit- Jebel Akhdar and Jebel Shams” (Oman Observer, No- ed States. Haitham has vowed to continue along this vember 28, 2018). path, but with Iran-US tensions at an all-time high, the 1 Outside of Musandam, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have the economy and failure to reform government policies. engaged in highly controversial activities in Yemen’s al- The stability and balance of power in the Gulf will un- Mahra governorate, which shares a border as well as doubtedly have much to do with how well Oman is able deep tribal and cultural ties with Oman’s Dhofar gover- to persist in the diplomatic role it has held for decades norate. Al-Mahra has been insulated from the war in while staving off any domestic unrest due to its poor Yemen and the Saudi and Emirati presence in the region economic performance and rising youth unemployment. is largely seen as an attempt to develop a pipeline through al-Mahra to the Indian Ocean. Their presence Brian M. Perkins is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor. undermines Oman’s security along its border (Terrorism Monitor, March 21, 2019). For Iran, Oman is a longstanding and essential partner as the country shares control over the Strait of Hormuz, counterbalances Saudi and Emirati power, and is a grow- ing economic partner. Thus far, Oman and Iran have demonstrated an interest in maintaining this relationship as Omani and Iranian diplomats have traveled to Muscat and Tehran, respectively, for multiple meetings since the start of the year. Iran will likely attempt to pull Oman closer while seeking to prevent deepening ties with Saudi Arabia or the UAE. The United States cannot afford for either Iran or Saudi Arabia and the UAE to find a way to gain undue influence over the sultanate as it could mark the unraveling of a key counterbalance in the region. In 2019, the Unit- ed States won an important strategic port deal with Oman that will allow the U.S. Navy increased access to its ports, most notably the large Duqm port, several hundred miles south of Muscat (Middle East Eye, March 24, 2019). While this deal is essential to the United States’ ability to project strength and respond to hostili- ties in the region, the Trump administration has seemingly slighted Oman on several occasions in the past few years and could increasingly attempt to push Oman to choose a side, which could alter the country’s diplomatic approach. Haitham will have to balance the competing priorities of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, and the United States, all of which hold some form of political or economic leverage over the sultanate. For instance, in an extreme case, Oman has been forced into a bind over the GCC blockade of Qatar and could be similarly punished, but with even more devastating effects. Meanwhile, the country’s budget deficit continues to grow each year, and with little prospect for drastic improvement, the population will continue to grow increasingly unsettled as they look to the new sultan for answers. Oman has not experi- enced prolonged or substantial unrest recenty, but protests in 2015 demonstrated rising discontent over 2 WHAT THE DEATH OF THE IRANIAN COMMANDER Shahlai is far from the only Iranian training and advising IN YEMEN WOULD HAVE MEANT the Houthis in Yemen, and conflicting reports suggest another Quds Force operative, Mohammad-Mirza'i, was Brian M. Perkins killed in the attempted strike on Shahlai (Middle East Monitor, January 13; FARS, January 5). It is unclear ex- The United States’ bold airstrike on Iranian Quds Force actly how many Iranian operatives are currently in Commander, Major General Qasem Soleimani, was por- Yemen, but some estimates suggest upwards of a hun- trayed as a response to an imminent threat in Iraq. The dred Iranian and Hezbollah personnel have been de- attack, however, came on the same day that the United ployed to the country. [1] Iran and Hezbollah have estab- States attempted to kill Abdul Reza Shahlai, the Quds lished firm communications, training, and smuggling Force commander responsible for Iranian involvement in networks that would not be undone by the death of a the war in Yemen. The unsuccessful strike is likely to be single commander. In fact, the Houthis seemingly have a viewed as a significant missed opportunity, but even if it direct line to Hezbollah, which has clearly advised the had been successful, it would likely have had little effect group on its media-related affairs and has even benefit- on the situation on the ground. ted from Houthi-led fundraisers (Al Arabiya, July 7, 2019). The attempted strike in Sanaa could prove to be the United States’ last, best chance to remove Shahlai from The benefits already derived from Shahlai and the rest the equation for two primary reasons. First, the attempt of the Iranian/Hezbollah personnel would persist even if on his life will likely result in a tightening of his opera- the Quds Force commander were to be killed, and the tional security. Second, the United States has played a Houthis who have been trained have already gone on to diminishing role in the war in Yemen and does not have train their own cadres. The technological and strategic forces in Houthi controlled territory. The likely calculus capabilities will likewise continue unless there is a con- was that the attack on Solemeini would overshadow the certed effort to drive a wedge between the Houthis death of Shahlai, who the United States has been track- from Iran or push tenuous ceasefire talks forward. A fu- ing for years, and would elicit a different response as a ture, successful strike against Shahlai, however, would coordinated effort than a more prolonged series of tar- result in another flare up that would likely have more geted attacks on Iranian figures. The aftermath of Sole- significant ramifications outside of Yemen, such as retal- maini’s death has prompted both sides to err toward de- iatory incidents against U.S. interests in Iraq. escalation, and another attempt on Shahlai any time soon would certainly cause another flare up. Brian M. Perkins is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor. Shahlai remains alive, and for the time being, will continue to manage Iran's complex relationship with the Houthis while interfacing with other allied Iranian proxies elsewhere, namely Hezbollah in Lebanon, where the Houthi media outlet al-Masirah is based. If the strike had been successful, it would not have been a decidedly devastating blow to the Houthis’ capabilities as the networks he helped build are already firmly established. Further, few believe Shahlai, or Tehran for that matter, is entirely directing Houthi operations. The Houthis, while closer to Iran than ever, have never shown a proclivity for taking actions that do not primarily serve their own unique agenda. Unlike Iranian proxies in Iraq, the Houthis have less of an appetite, and would have had fewer avenues, to retaliate against the United States aside from punishing Saudi Arabia if Shahlai had been killed. 3 lamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), ISWAP has Is the ‘Bakura Faction’ Boko been the most active group operating around Lake Haram’s New Force Enhancer Chad.

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