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Democratic Transformation and the Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition in East and Central Europe

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Democratic Transformation and the Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition in East and Central Europe Veröffentlichung der Abteilung Institutionen und sozialer Wandel des Forschungsschwerpunkts Sozialer Wandel, Institutionen und Vermittlungsprozesse des Wissenschaftszentrums Berlin für Sozialforschung FS m 94-201 Democratic Transformation and the Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition in East and Central Europe Bernhard Wessels Hans-Dieter Klingemann Berlin, July 1994 Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH (WZB) Reichpietschufer 50, D 10785 Berlin, Telefon (030) 25 49 1-0 Zusammenfassung Demokratie unterscheidet sich von kommunistischer Herrschaft durch die Existenz und Garantie politischer Opposition. Dieser Beitrag untersucht vergleichend für zehn Länder Mittel- und Osteuropas und die ehemalige DDR verschiedene Aspekte, die notwendige, wenn auch nicht hinreichende Bedingung für die Existenz und Garantie demokratischer Opposition sind. Es zeigt sich, daß sich bereits bei den ersten freien Wahlen pluralistische Parteiensysteme etabliert haben, deren Struktur der Differenzierung politischer und so­ zialer Interessen in den Gesellschaften entspricht. Die Unterstützung demokratischer Grundprinzipien, die die Existenz von Opposition garantieren, war in dieser frühen Phase des Übergangs relativ hoch und auch relativ resistent gegenüber Einflüssen wie negativer wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung. Für negative Entwicklungen verantwortlich gemacht wurden Akteure (Regierungen, Parteien), nicht das neue System. Mit Ausnahme einiger GUS- Staaten war die Ausgangslage für die Konsolidierung der Demokratie bei den ersten freien Wahlen relativ gut. Heute können wir mit größerer Sicherheit sagen, daß in den meisten mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern die Konsolidierung vorangegangen und wahrschein­ lich irreversibel ist. Abstract One of the most important differences between democratic and communist rule is the existence and legal guarantee of a political opposition. This paper analyses some aspects that are necessary, though not sufficient conditions for the existence and guarantee of political opposition in ten East and Central European countries and the former GDR. Results demonstrate that party systems were already emerging during the first free elections in 1990, their structure being in correspondence with the political and social differentiation of interests in these societies. Support for democratic principles that guarantee the existence of a political opposition was quite high in this early transition period and also quite resistant to the ups and downs of economic development. Not the new system was blamed if things went badly, but the actors (governments, parties). With the exception of some of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, chances for the consolidation of democracy were quite high in this early period of transition. Today one can say on more secure ground that consolidation is under way and probably irreversible in most of the countries. Bernhard W essels/H ans-D ieter Klingem ann Democratic Transformation and the Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition in East and Central Europe 1. Introduction Transition to democracy in East Europe has many faces. Historical, political, and economic conditions of East European countries differ enormously. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that there were also variable pathways to system change and democracy. Communist rule was brought to an end by different dynamics in 1989, the "year of avalanche" (Brown 1991). In Hungary and Poland the transition was gradual. Hungary experienced a "negotiated revolution" (Bruszt 1991), and Poland's communists compromised with Solidarity. In other countries such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, and the German De­ mocratic Republic the transformation was more eruptive (Szabo 1991). In Bulga­ ria and Romania change was brought about by a coup. In the former Soviet Union perestroika paved the way to democratic government (Beyme 1991: 623). However, it has now become clear that transition from Communist rule does not automatically lead to a democratic, liberal and efficient social and political sy­ stem (Arato 1991: 3). Clearly, there have been attempts to simply imitate Western democracies or to restore past democratic traditions. Everywhere there was the expectation that transition to democracy could be achieved quickly. East Germans in particular seemed to believe that a simple transfer of West German institutions would solve all problems. However, the difficulties of a simultaneous transforma­ tion of the society, the economy, and the political system illustrate the fact that certain prerequisites must be met which are difficult to come by. Economic con­ ditions are certainly important. However, social and organizational conditions as well as legal structures and their acceptance by citizens are equally important. A growing market economy, civil society, and the rule of law seem to describe a pattern which is supportive of a smooth transformation from communist rule to democracy. There is an obvious and most important difference between democracy and Communist rule: democracy entails a contest for political power, i.e. it allows for 2 WesselslKlingemann political opposition. Robert Dahl (1975) highlights this aspect as one of the three great milestones in the development of democratic institutions (the right to parti­ cipate politically, the right to be represented, and the right of an organized oppo­ sition form the basis of a democratic political system). Of these organized opposi­ tion is the most modem and distinctive feature. "Today one is inclined to regard the existence of an opposition party as very nearly the most distinctive characteri­ stic of democracy itself (Dahl 1975:116). What makes opposition such an outstanding element of democracy, such a discriminating characteristic when compared to communist rule? It is the function that the institutionalized opposi­ tion performs. From a system-theoretical point of view, institutionalized opposi­ tion serves as a means to contest the performance of the government. It is a kind of institutionalized self-observation of the system, offering an opportunity to cor­ rect insufficiencies of the system as such (Luhmann 1986). In terms of political legitimacy this means that only if contestation is institutionalized, it is likely that the majority rule can, in general, be accepted. In this sense democracy is a unique system of processing and terminating intergroup conflicts (Przeworski 1986:56). Here democracy is primarily seen as a means to intermediate between a diversity of interests. This implies that citizens can organize to promote their interests and possess an institutionally guaranteed opportunity to compete for political power. One of the most challenging aspects of the transition processes in East Europe is that these countries appear to lack almost all preconditions for political compe­ tition and pluralism in contrast, for example, to the new democracies of Southern Europe (Beyme 1992:271). In the research on transformation it is argued that this problem not only exists with respect to institutional and legal structures but also with respect to the social structure and political culture of East and Central Euro­ pean societies (Offe 1991; Ost 1991). Because democracy is not only a means to intermediate diversity but also depends on it (Offe 1991), certain prerequisites must first be met: it can be observed that modem democracy only exists in con­ junction with civil society, i.e. a sphere of autonomy, situated between the citizens and the state and comprised of a range of associations, organisations, parties, mo­ vements, and the like (Bernhard 1993:308). Self-constitution and self-mobiliza­ tion are essential and generating elements (Arato 1991:5). Some authors see the problem of the generating of pluralistic interest structures as a challenge to the "flattened societies" of post-communist regimes. The que­ stion is whether this observation is equally true for all countries or whether it is path dependent upon the way in which transformation took place, i.e. the deve­ lopment of civil society before the system change. A crucial indicator of these The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition 3 structures is the degree to which first tendencies of sociostructural alliances and coalitions (Stinchcombe 1975) between social groups and political parties occur. Given some diversity and conflict of interest, the question arises as to what de­ gree the representation of plurality and diversity occurs. According to Dahl, there are two central dimensions in regard to party systems: "public contestation" (liberalization) and "the right to participate" (inclusiveness). In other words, to what extent is there support for free political competition and participation by many actors? Dahl calls political systems with neither liberalization nor inclusi­ veness "closed hegemonies", while the ones with full liberalization but no inclusi­ veness are characterized as "competitive oligarchies". Those with full inclusiven­ ess but no liberalization are named "inclusive hegemonies", and, last but not least, those with full liberalization and inclusiveness "polyarchies" or democracies (Dahl 1975:120ff.). Differences in the view of the role of political opposition and political competition indicate a preference for a particular kind of a political sy­ stem. It is obvious that public support of transition processes might largely depend on the performance of the political actors and the economy. A showing down or pos­ sible reversal of democratic development
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