Veröffentlichung der Abteilung Institutionen und sozialer Wandel des Forschungsschwerpunkts Sozialer Wandel, Institutionen und Vermittlungsprozesse des Wissenschaftszentrums Berlin für Sozialforschung

FS m 94-201

Democratic Transformation and the Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition in East and Central Europe

Bernhard Wessels Hans-Dieter Klingemann

Berlin, July 1994

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH (WZB) Reichpietschufer 50, D 10785 Berlin, Telefon (030) 25 49 1-0 Zusammenfassung

Demokratie unterscheidet sich von kommunistischer Herrschaft durch die Existenz und Garantie politischer Opposition. Dieser Beitrag untersucht vergleichend für zehn Länder Mittel- und Osteuropas und die ehemalige DDR verschiedene Aspekte, die notwendige, wenn auch nicht hinreichende Bedingung für die Existenz und Garantie demokratischer Opposition sind. Es zeigt sich, daß sich bereits bei den ersten freien Wahlen pluralistische Parteiensysteme etabliert haben, deren Struktur der Differenzierung politischer und so­ zialer Interessen in den Gesellschaften entspricht. Die Unterstützung demokratischer Grundprinzipien, die die Existenz von Opposition garantieren, war in dieser frühen Phase des Übergangs relativ hoch und auch relativ resistent gegenüber Einflüssen wie negativer wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung. Für negative Entwicklungen verantwortlich gemacht wurden Akteure (Regierungen, Parteien), nicht das neue System. Mit Ausnahme einiger GUS- Staaten war die Ausgangslage für die Konsolidierung der Demokratie bei den ersten freien Wahlen relativ gut. Heute können wir mit größerer Sicherheit sagen, daß in den meisten mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern die Konsolidierung vorangegangen und wahrschein­ lich irreversibel ist.

Abstract

One of the most important differences between democratic and communist rule is the existence and legal guarantee of a political opposition. This paper analyses some aspects that are necessary, though not sufficient conditions for the existence and guarantee of political opposition in ten East and Central European countries and the former GDR. Results demonstrate that party systems were already emerging during the first free elections in 1990, their structure being in correspondence with the political and social differentiation of interests in these societies. Support for democratic principles that guarantee the existence of a political opposition was quite high in this early transition period and also quite resistant to the ups and downs of economic development. Not the new system was blamed if things went badly, but the actors (governments, parties). With the exception of some of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, chances for the consolidation of democracy were quite high in this early period of transition. Today one can say on more secure ground that consolidation is under way and probably irreversible in most of the countries. Bernhard W essels/H ans-D ieter Klingem ann

Democratic Transformation and the Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition in East and Central Europe

1. Introduction

Transition to democracy in East Europe has many faces. Historical, political, and economic conditions of East European countries differ enormously. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that there were also variable pathways to system change and democracy. Communist rule was brought to an end by different dynamics in 1989, the "year of avalanche" (Brown 1991). In Hungary and Poland the transition was gradual. Hungary experienced a "negotiated revolution" (Bruszt 1991), and Poland's communists compromised with Solidarity. In other countries such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, and the German De­ mocratic Republic the transformation was more eruptive (Szabo 1991). In Bulga­ ria and Romania change was brought about by a coup. In the former Soviet Union perestroika paved the way to democratic government (Beyme 1991: 623). However, it has now become clear that transition from Communist rule does not automatically lead to a democratic, liberal and efficient social and political sy­ stem (Arato 1991: 3). Clearly, there have been attempts to simply imitate Western democracies or to restore past democratic traditions. Everywhere there was the expectation that transition to democracy could be achieved quickly. East Germans in particular seemed to believe that a simple transfer of West German institutions would solve all problems. However, the difficulties of a simultaneous transforma­ tion of the society, the economy, and the political system illustrate the fact that certain prerequisites must be met which are difficult to come by. Economic con­ ditions are certainly important. However, social and organizational conditions as well as legal structures and their acceptance by citizens are equally important. A growing market economy, civil society, and the rule of law seem to describe a pattern which is supportive of a smooth transformation from communist rule to democracy. There is an obvious and most important difference between democracy and Communist rule: democracy entails a contest for political power, i.e. it allows for 2 WesselslKlingemann

political opposition. Robert Dahl (1975) highlights this aspect as one of the three great milestones in the development of democratic institutions (the right to parti­ cipate politically, the right to be represented, and the right of an organized oppo­ sition form the basis of a democratic political system). Of these organized opposi­ tion is the most modem and distinctive feature. "Today one is inclined to regard the existence of an opposition party as very nearly the most distinctive characteri­ stic of democracy itself (Dahl 1975:116). What makes opposition such an outstanding element of democracy, such a discriminating characteristic when compared to communist rule? It is the function that the institutionalized opposi­ tion performs. From a system-theoretical point of view, institutionalized opposi­ tion serves as a means to contest the performance of the government. It is a kind of institutionalized self-observation of the system, offering an opportunity to cor­ rect insufficiencies of the system as such (Luhmann 1986). In terms of political legitimacy this means that only if contestation is institutionalized, it is likely that the majority rule can, in general, be accepted. In this sense democracy is a unique system of processing and terminating intergroup conflicts (Przeworski 1986:56). Here democracy is primarily seen as a means to intermediate between a diversity of interests. This implies that citizens can organize to promote their interests and possess an institutionally guaranteed opportunity to compete for political power. One of the most challenging aspects of the transition processes in East Europe is that these countries appear to lack almost all preconditions for political compe­ tition and pluralism in contrast, for example, to the new democracies of Southern Europe (Beyme 1992:271). In the research on transformation it is argued that this problem not only exists with respect to institutional and legal structures but also with respect to the social structure and political culture of East and Central Euro­ pean societies (Offe 1991; Ost 1991). Because democracy is not only a means to intermediate diversity but also depends on it (Offe 1991), certain prerequisites must first be met: it can be observed that modem democracy only exists in con­ junction with civil society, i.e. a sphere of autonomy, situated between the citizens and the state and comprised of a range of associations, organisations, parties, mo­ vements, and the like (Bernhard 1993:308). Self-constitution and self-mobiliza­ tion are essential and generating elements (Arato 1991:5). Some authors see the problem of the generating of pluralistic interest structures as a challenge to the "flattened societies" of post-communist regimes. The que­ stion is whether this observation is equally true for all countries or whether it is path dependent upon the way in which transformation took place, i.e. the deve­ lopment of civil society before the system change. A crucial indicator of these The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition 3

structures is the degree to which first tendencies of sociostructural alliances and coalitions (Stinchcombe 1975) between social groups and political parties occur. Given some diversity and conflict of interest, the question arises as to what de­ gree the representation of plurality and diversity occurs. According to Dahl, there are two central dimensions in regard to party systems: "public contestation" (liberalization) and "the right to participate" (inclusiveness). In other words, to what extent is there support for free political competition and participation by many actors? Dahl calls political systems with neither liberalization nor inclusi­ veness "closed hegemonies", while the ones with full liberalization but no inclusi­ veness are characterized as "competitive oligarchies". Those with full inclusiven­ ess but no liberalization are named "inclusive hegemonies", and, last but not least, those with full liberalization and inclusiveness "polyarchies" or democracies (Dahl 1975:120ff.). Differences in the view of the role of political opposition and political competition indicate a preference for a particular kind of a political sy­ stem. It is obvious that public support of transition processes might largely depend on the performance of the political actors and the economy. A showing down or pos­ sible reversal of democratic development is not unlikely to occur in a situation where the old system appears to have achieved more than the new system can provide. This aspect is of crucial importance: Who is blamed if things do not work out as expected - the system, the actors or both? It would be a ominous for de­ mocratic development if citizens would blame the new system instead of the rele­ vant actors. This chapter will examine these important aspects of democratization, i.e. the development of party systems, the social dimensions of partisanship, support for basic democratic rules and its dependency on political and economic performance. The institutionalization of party systems and party competition, the channeling of socially based heterogeneity of interest, the support of rules which guarantee po­ litical competition and political liberty, and the impact of performance are pro­ bably necessary though not sufficient conditions for democratization.

2. Founding Elections and the Emergence of Party Systems

Although the routes to democracy vary quite strongly, one basic "milestone" (Dahl 1975) was rapidly attained: In all of the 11 "countries" in our sample free elections were held in 1990. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and 4 Wessels/Klingemann

East Germany held parliamentary elections. This is also true for Slovenia, alt­ hough at the time of the survey it was still a member of the Yugoslav federation. Poland held free presidential elections. In the republics of the former Soviet Union elections to the Republican Supreme Soviet took also place in 1990 (see figure 1).

Figure 1: "Founding Elections" in Central and Eastern Europe and Date of Survey

Free Elections Date of Survey Remarks/ <—> Other Elections

Bulgaria June 1990 —> Nov. 1990 Czechoslavakia June 1990 —> Nov. 1990 East Germany Dec. 1990 —> Nov. 1992 Federal Elections of unified Germany. First free Elections in April 1990 (GDR). Estonia March 1990 —> June 1991 Republican Supreme Soviet Elections Hungary March 1990 —> Nov. 1990 Lithuania March 1990 —> July 1991 Republican Supreme Soviet Elections Kraj Krasznoyarszk* (March 1990) —> Jan. 1991 Republican Supreme (Russia) Soviet Elections Poland Oct. 1991 <— Jan. 1991 Semi-free June 1989 Presidential Dec. 1990 Romania May 1990 —> Dec. 1990 Slovenia April 1990 —> June 1991 Ukraine March 1990 —> Jan. 1991 Republican Supreme Soviet Elections

* Kraj Krasznoyarszk is a region of the Russian federation in south Sibiria. The adminstrative region has about 3 million citizens.

Elections in 1990 served as the first and major stimulus to self-organize mediation between citizens and the state. It was an incentive for political entrepreneurs, both new and old political elites to compete and struggle for power. However, the in­ teresting fact is that in most of these countries the founding elections generated party systems, i.e. not just competition but competition fought by parties. Even in The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition 5

those countries where candidates rather than political parties competed for seats in the elections, e.g. for the Supreme Soviets of Estonia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, and Russia, candidates were endorsed by parties or party-like movements which de­ monstrably had an effect on their election chances. The founding elections formed rather different party systems, ranging from Bulgaria with only four parties elec­ ted to parliament to Poland, where 29 parties were represented. While the number of parties represented in the parliaments depended to a large extent on the election laws chosen, the "super-issue" which structured the party systems in all countries revolved around the cleavage between the (reform-) communists on the one hand and supporters of liberal democracy on the other. Government formation then followed the elections. Thus two basic new roles emerged in the political systems of post-communist societies: the roles of de­ mocratic government and opposition. The "super-issue" was also reflected in the roles of government and opposition, with the most prominent conflict being the conflict between the forces of liberal democracy and (reform-) communists. There were also other issues and cleavages in which the positions of the parties in go­ vernment differed from those of the parties in opposition. Most prominent among these "other" conflicts is the issue of unity vs. national independence. In Czechoslovakia the first free election took place in June 1990. Civic Forum and Public against Violence together won about 57 percent of the votes. They formed a coalition with the Slovak Christian and Democratic Union, a historical socio-cultural party. This coalition had the necessary two-thirds majority for an effective process of law making and constitution building (Babst 1992). The big­ gest party in opposition were the Communists. Government and opposition mainly stood against one another on the conflict line liberalism vs. communism (for an overview see Figure 2). East Germany, the German Democratic Republic, experienced its first free election in decades in April 1990. Only five months later the GDR was no longer in existence and Germany unified. Then in December 1990 Federal elections were held. The governing coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Liberals (FDP) won 54.8 percent of the votes in East Germany and 60 percent of the seats in united Germany. The Social Democrats (SPD) as well as the Alliance 90/The Greens are in opposition. The same is true for the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the successor party of the communists, which was able to overcome the five-precent-hurdle in East Germany. In terms of conflict between government and opposition we find conflicts between 1) Market Economy vs. Welfare State; and 2) Religiosity vs. Secularism. 6 WesselslKlingemann

In Estonia the year 1990 may be characterized as the beginning of party forma­ tion. Nevertheless, important parties or especially movements such as the Popular Front had already been formed in 1988. The elections of March 1990 resulted in a constellation of government and opposition which was clearly characterized by the conflict over secession and independence versus status as a Soviet republic. Popular Front gained the relative majority of votes and its leader Edgar Savisaar became Prime Minister. The second largest group were the communists (CPSU), which supported the status of Estonia as a Soviet republic and mostly represented the Russian part of the population. Free Estonia, the third largest group, consisted of communists and former communists who favoured Estonian independence but with some kind of connection with the Soviet Union (Dellenbrant 1991:98f.). Other parties like the Greens, agrarians, and liberals were also in opposition. The cleavage between government and opposition in Estonia is therefore a three-fold one with large overlaps: 1) secession us. SU-unity; 2) communists vs. democrats; 3) Estonians vs. Russians.

Figure 2: Conflict Constellations between Government and Opposition after "Founding Elections"

Country Government Opposition

Czechoslovakia liberal democracy vs. communism

East Germany market economy vs. welfare State religiosity vs. secularly Estonia secession vs. SU-unity liberal democracy vs. communism Estonians vs. Russians Hungary liberal democracy vs. communism rural vs. urban fte W zn°yarszk’ liberal democracy vs. communism Poland social catholizism vs. secularization liberal democracy vs. reform-communism Romania liberal democracy vs. communism Slovenia liberal democracy vs. communism Ukraine communism vs. liberal democracy unity vs. secession

* Kraj Krasznoyarszk is a region of the Russian federation in south Sibiria. The adminstrative region has about 3 million citizens. The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition 7

In Hungary a coalition government was formed two months after the election in May 1990. It consisted of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), the Indepen­ dent Smallholders (FKgP), the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) and independent candidates. The communist Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (MSZP) failed to reach the four percent threshold need to receive seats. The re­ form-communist Hungarian Socialist Party (MSP) went into opoosition. In terms of government and opposition Markus (1991:7) calls this cleavage "debolshevization vs. rebolshevization". It is probably the most important clea­ vage dimension. Seiler and Hottinger (1992:6) also describe an urban-rural clea­ vage. Although Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary had important agrarian parties only the Hungarian Kisgazdapart (Smallholders) survived Communist rule and became the third largest political group in the 1990 elections as well as part of the government coalition. After examining the programmatic profile which places heavy emphasis on reprivatization of land, low taxation to encourage entrepre­ neurship and adherence to Christian values (Szajkowski 1991:161), one might doubt whether the urban-rural dimension is strong enough to create conflicts. Ne­ vertheless, government and opposition in Hungary are divided by a conflict bet­ ween liberal and communist forces, and probably also by an urban-rural clea­ vage. We have no information concerning election results from Kraj Krasznoyarszk (Russia)1. In the Russian Federation the reformist Democratic Russia party won 55 of the capital's 65 Supreme Soviet seats. "However, the results from outside the major cities reportedly had a more traditional complexion" (Keesings 1990: 37322,3). But Democratic Russia gained 20-23 percent of the votes in the republic as a whole (Szajkowski 1991: 260). A large variety of parties are in opposition, the largest being the Democratic Party of Russia, which is also a reform party ori­ ented towards liberalism. The second largest is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The conflict between government and opposition is not exacly clear. But with the Democratic Russia in government and the CPSU in opposition the major conflict is undoubtedly Liberalism vs. Communism. In Poland no truly free parliamentary elections took place before the date of the survey. In the elections to the Sejm which took place as early as June 1989 only few seats were actually contested. Most seats were pre-allocated to political grou­ pings as a result of negotiations between the communists and Solidarity. By this procedure communist dominance was ensured. Taking place at the same time, the

1 Kraj Krasznoyarszk can be considered an example for measuring the effects of founding elections in Russia. It is an administrative region of the Russian federation in South Sibiria with about 3 million citizens. The capital is Krasznoyarszk (700.000 inhabitants). 8 WesselslKlingemann

elections to the Polish Senate were free and brought a complete victory for Solida­ rity. The first free parliamentary elections for the Polish lower house did not fol­ low until October 1991. But free presidential elections were held in December 1990 which one could consider as a surrogate for the analysis of the effects of founding elections. The two most important candidates, Walesa and Mazowiecki were both from the Solidarity movement. Mazowiecki became Prime Minister in 1989, strongly supported by Walesa, the Seijm members of Solidarity, the Polish Peasent Party and the Democratic Party. But in July 1990 conflict within Solida­ rity led to an organizational split organized around Walesa and Mazowiecki. Lea­ ding figures of Solidarity founded the Centre Agreement (PC) to support Walesa in the presidential elections. As a reaction the Democratic Union (UD) was crea­ ted to support Mazowiecki. The two groups of the former Solidarity attacked each other rather strongly, especially in the later stages of the election campaign. In the opinion of Walesa and the PC, Prime Minister Mazowiecki had only replaced the red with a pink nomenklatura and - together with the UD - still wanted to suppress a multi-party system. On the other hand, Mazowiecki and the UD prophesied chaos in Poland in case of Walesa's victory. Walesa then won the presidential elections, but only after competing against Tyminski in the second round. Mazo- wiezki resigned and a new government was formed under Prime Minister Bielecki in late December 1990 (Babst 1992). The resulting picture of government and op­ position is quite unclear. The government of Bielecki is formed by a coalition of the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD), the PC, the Christian National Union (ZCh-N), the UD, and independents. Nevertheless, a fairly strong cleavage pattern exists in the party system which cannot be reproduced by the candidates compe­ ting for presidency (ex-communists vs. solidarity, rural-urban, propertied- workers). In terms of government and opposition, related to the presidential can­ didates, the pattern of government and opposition is clearly Walesa (PC) against Bartoszcze (Peasant Party PSL), Cimoszewics (PUWP), Mazowiecki (UD), and Tyminsky, the Canadian-Polish business men. In terms of conflict this might be conflicts between 1) social Catholicism vs. secularism; 2) liberalization vs. re­ form-communism. In Romania the National Salvation Front (FSN) won about two thirds of the seats in the lower and upper house. The FSN is anti-Ceausescu and hostile to the old communist regime. It is opposed by the rather unsuccessful old communist Romanian Socialist Democratic Party (PSDR), the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR) and the Romanian Unity Alliance (PUNR). Beside these parties in opposition, two environmental parties and three "historical" parties The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition 9

(liberals, Christians, social democrats) joined the opposition. So there are two major conflict lines within the party system: Liberalism (FSN) against Commu­ nism (PSDR), and an ethnic conflict between Magyars (UDMR) and nationalist Romanians (PUNR). In terms of government and opposition, the main cleavage exists between Liberalism and Communism. In Slovenia the first free election was held in April 1990 and brought the De­ mos coalition into government. This coalition is composed of Christian De­ mocrats (SKD), Peasant League (SKZ), Democratic League (SDZ), Greens (ZS), Social Democrats (SDSS), and Craftsmen League (SOS). It is opposed by two li­ beral parties (LDS, LS), and ex-communist or reform communist parties like the SDP and SSS. The conflict between government and opposition thus relates mainly to Liberalism vs. Communism. In the Ukraine the pattern of government and opposition is just the opposite of Slovenia. The Communists were successful and presently govern the Ukraine. They are opposed by a variety of other parties, most of them united in the Popular Movement of the Ukraine for Perestroika (RUKH). However, the Communist Party is not totally integrated but is instead divided over the major issue of inde­ pendence. Thus the main conflicts in the Ukraine between government and oppo­ sition are 1) Communism vs. Liberalism; and 2) Unity vs. Secession. The story of victory of the governing parties and coalitions is different in every country as is the constellation of government and opposition. They do, however, have one thing in common. The newly emerging party systems offer quite a num­ ber of choices to the voters. This resulted from political actors using the opportu­ nity to struggle for power by offering different programmes with differing aims and goals. However, the question is whether these political "supplies" were only created by elites and that the degree of differentiation of elite political positions is dissi­ milar to the degree of differentiation of political "demands" of the electorate. A powerful measure for generalized political positions is the left-right dimension. It is an abstract principle for political orientation and political communication. In Western democracies this spatial metaphor has a very prominent role for the ad­ aptation to quickly changing political environments and reduction of complexity (Fuchs and Klingemann 1989). Even now in Central and Eastern Europe results indicate that "significant Western European meaning elements of left-right can be found" (Hofrichter, Weller 1993:21). The question then is to which degree voters of different parties differ with respect to their left-right selfplacement. 10 WesselslKlingemann

If large differences can be found, one can argue that the current supply of the different parties indeed matches different citizen demands in terms of generalized political preferences. If the opposite occurs and voters do not differ to a certain extent in their generalized positions then the supply by party elites is artificially differentiated. A brief look at the results shows that voters of different parties indeed strongly differ with respect to their general political position (for voting behaviour indica­ tors and response rate see table A1 in the appendix; for classification of party fa­ milies table A2). Voters of the communist parties are more to the left while voters of liberal parties in nearly all of the countries are more to the right than the aver­ age population (see table 1).

Table 1: Left-Right Selfplacement of Voters: Deviation of Party Voters from Left-Right Mean of Population

Deviation from Czecho­ Esto­ Hungary Poland Roma­ Slove­ East Kraszno- Ukra­ Left-Right Mean slovakia nia nia nia Germany jarszk ine

Voters of:

Communist parties -2.5 -.7 -1.2 -1.1 -.5 -.5 -1.5 +1.1 +.5

Socialist parties -1.0 - - +.5 - - -3 -.8 -

Ecologist parties -.5 +1.1 - + 3 -.2 -.8 - -.4

Liberal parties +.6 +.3 +.1 -.1 +.9 +.2 +.4 -.2 -1.5

Religious parties +.6 - +.5 - - - +.6 - +.4

Conservative parties - - +.1 ------

Farmer's parties -.9 - +.1 -.2 +13 +1.6 - - -.7

Nationalist parties -.6 - - - +.9 +.7 - - -.4

Ethnic parties +1.0 - - - +.8 - - - -

Other parties - -.5 -.2 -.4 - -.2 - - +.0

Measurement: Scale point differences from mean position of the population on a 10-point left- right selfanchoring scale. Negative values: deviation to the "left"; positiv values: deviation to the "right". -) Party family not existent or minor. The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition 11

But there are two exceptions: Krasznoyarszk and the Ukraine. In both countries communist voters are most right and voters of the liberals are more left than the average. The left-right schema therefore works as expected in all countries but Krasznoyarszk and the Ukraine. In these two the political coordinates are rever­ sed. This is a finding also found by others (Hofrichter, Weller 1993: 20). Whereas in Central and Eastern European countries the meaning of left and right seems to be in line with the Western meaning, in these two former republics of the Soviet Union our results indicate that "left" means reform, free market and democracy and "right" means status quo and communism. Despite this difference in meaning, the differences between political positions of voters of different parties can be no­ ticed in all party systems (see table 2).

Table 2: Mean Difference on Left-Right Scale between Voters of Different Party Families

Mean Czecho- Esto- Hungary Poland Roma- Slove- East Kraszno- Ukra- Difference Slovakia nia nia nia Germany jarszk ine

Between all parties 1.3 1.2 .7 .8 .7 1.0 1.1 1.3 .9 Between Communists and other parties 2.3 1.4 1.5 1.2 13 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.0 Between Socialists and other parties 1.1 - 1.0 - - .8 1.3 - Between Ecologists and other parties 1.0 1.3 - .7 .8 1.0 - .6 Between Liberals and other parties 1.3 .9 .5 .6 .5 .7 .9 1.0 1.4 Between religious and other parties 1.3 .8 1.2 1.0 Between Conservatives and other parties - - .5 ------Between farmers' and other parties 1.0 - .5 .6 .8 1.6 - .8 Between Nationalists and other parties 1.0 - - - .5 .8 - - .6 Between ethnic and other parties 1.6 .5

Measurement: Absolute mean scale point differences on a 10-point left-right selfanchoring scale. -) Party family not existent or minor. 12 Wessels/Klingemann

The differences are on average highest in Czechoslovakia and lowest in Hungary and Romania. But the mean difference between all parties on the left-right 10- point scale is always higher than .7 scale points. On average the largest differen­ ces exist between communists and other parties. They are further away from the other parties especially in Czechoslovakia (2 scale points) and more than one scale point from other parties in the remaining countries. But for all other party families quite large distances on the left-right scale exist (see table 2). It is obvious that the party systems in Central and Eastern Europe do not only provide a highly differentiated supply of programmatic political positions but that there is also a large variety of political preferences within the electorate. This de­ monstrates that in political terms the party systems are already strongly structured along the left-right dimension. Supply is not artificially diverse due to elite inven­ tions only, but meets with the variety of general political preferences already exi­ sting during this early period of transition. The basic positions between (reform-) communism on the one hand and liberal democracy on the other hand are well re­ flected both at the level of the party systems and at the level of the voters.

3. Social Structure, Parties, Government and Opposition

We have demonstrated that the issue of (reform-) communism against liberal de­ mocracy as well as unity against national independence has had a major structu­ ring effect on both voters' opinions and the newly emerging party systems. These lines of conflict are genuinely political. They also tend to be ones which can be regarded as established after a relatively short while. In the long run, however, the crucial question whether and to what degree partisanship is socially structured will arise. If the main characteristic of post-communist societies is their "flatness" and the inability of citizens to define their political interests in relation to their lo­ cation in the social structure, then the relationship between citizens and parties is unstable. Ost concludes that social self-representation is markedly absent in post­ communist societies and that social groups have no sense where their interests lie: "the generation of social interest groups looms today as perhaps the most pressing task" (Ost 1991:1). For Offe the social structure of post-communist societies lacks the "requisite degree of differentiation" for democracy. The forcibly homogenized East European societies show a considerable lack of social complexity (Offe 1991:11). This diagnosis is also shared by East European social scientists. For Hungary Markus states that "not interests, but cultural politics determines voting The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition 13

and attitudes in the first stage of system transformation" (Markus 1991:1). Agh emphasizes the necessity of the birth of middle classes in East Central Europe (Agh 1993: 16f). Staniszkis (1991: 337) even argues that new political parties might only articulate "theoretical interests" of social groups which do not yet exist. Still almost without exception the location of individuals in the social structure is determined by the state as the largest and practically only employer. If this is true, any social class independent of the state which could serve as a base for pluralistic and liberal policy is missing (Bruszt and Simon 1992: 179f.). However, social groupings which operate independently of the state are one of the main characteristics of civil society. They represent the plurality or diversity which is mediated by democratic organizations and which gives meaning to repre­ sentative democracy. Alliances between groups of citizens and organized political actors allow for structured forms of interest intermediation and management of conflicting interests (Stinchcombe 1975). Of course, clearcut boundaries between political actors regarding the social composition of their clients or supporters do not always exist. However, the general patterns that can be observed in Western democracies are by no means accidental. This "structuralist" view (Bruszt and Simon 1992) on the preconditions of democratic politics emphasizes the question of whether or not the specific interests of the voters and the programmatic profiles of specific political parties do match. According to Western experiences there is a fundamental set of social characte­ ristics which are related to particular alliances between parties and voters. Major cleavages, i.e. politicized social structures, exist with respect to economic and re­ ligious cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1961). A new cleavage related to ecological issues has emerged with the educational revolution (Allardt 1968). To test whether voters of different parties differ with respect to social interests (in the sense of "crystallization" of interest and sociopolitical alliances) four indi­ cators of the location of individuals in the social and demographic structure are utilized. To infer interests from an individual's location in the social structure is an often criticized method. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that education, income, and class location have a strong influence on the life chances ("Lebenschancen", Weber 1972) of people and are therefore related to interests. Age indicates socia­ lization effects (including value orientation). Religion is directly related to value- interests ("Wertinteressen"), while union membership is an expression of socio­ economic interests. Another aspect is that location in social structure, especially socio-economic status, indicates different levels of political sophistication and political invol- 14 WesselslKlingemann

vement (see Barnes in this volume). This is an additional perspective on the de­ mocratization process. However, the question we address here is whether the ap­ peals of political parties related to social interests and the social interests of voters do meet. If they do we can conclude that what we observe is not only elite-indu­ ced but also signals alliances between social groupings and political parties. With respect to class politics, it is important to observe whether there is a diffe­ rence between voters identifying themselves as belonging to the working class and those identifying themselves as middle or upper class. In the 1989 Hungarian elections Bruszt and Simon found a negliable figure for class voting, while in March 1990 it was slightly higher but still very low compared to Western de­ mocracies. These findings again point to the problem of "flattened societies", at least with respect to economic interests. Our data indicates that workers in the countries in our sample except Poland and Slovenia favour parties that do not be­ long to the left wing of the party system, i.e. the parties of the Communist and So­ cialist party family. On the contrary, more than the average percentage of workers in the population in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Krasznoyarszk, the Ukraine, and especially in Hungary voted for Christian parties, i.e. the Christian-Democra­ tic Union in Czechoslovakia, the Christian Democrats in East Germany, the small Christian Democratic Parties in Krasznoyarszk and the Ukraine, and the FgKP and the KGNP in Hungary, which formed the government coalition together with the MDF. Class was not a strong predictor of voting behaviour or party affiliation during the founding elections. However, this is not very surprising. Where should a worker go when the socialist utopia has just collapsed? In this situation it was probably not economic issues that divided groups of potential voters as Bruszt and Simon argue regarding Hungary (Bruszt and Simon 1992:199). Other social characteristics demonstrate more relation to the vote. For example, in all countries the communist parties gained less votes from younger people (less than 29 years). As in Western society, ecologist parties gained relatively more votes from the young. More than the average percentage of respondents with hig­ her education voted for the liberal-democrats in most of the countries (except Czechoslovakia, Krasznoyarszk and the Ukraine). However, the Communist par­ ties also profited from the higher educated with the exception of Romania and Slovenia. Union membership is more related to class-based voting behaviour than class itself. Union members voted for Communist and Socialist parties more often than the average. But it is doubtful that this is an expression of class awareness. It is most likely an indicator of the integration of people in the old system. In most The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition 15

countries the old unions were and are quite strong compared to the new ones (Politikinfonnation Osteuropa 1993; Wessels 1994). This view is supported by the fact that union members show no clear social profile. Membership ranges from working to upper class - to a comparable degree in all classes. This is not surpri­ sing taking into consideration the function of unions as a "transmission belt" un­ der communist rule. However, there is a strong relationship between religiosity and voting beha­ viour. In all countries where there is some kind of Christian or religious party, those saying that they are religious and follow the teaching of the church tend to vote for these parties to a high degree. And they vote notably less for the Com­ munist parties as well. Results indicate that there is not yet an entirely clear relationship between so­ cial structure and the vote, especially not with respect to class. And if a relation­ ship exists, it does not always fulfill the expectations derived from Western expe­ rience. On the other hand, parties of the same party family do have some distinct profiles. The Communist parties gain above-average support among the older, higher educated, secularized and unionized voters; the Socialist parties from among non-religious voters, union members and non-workers; the Ecological parties from the young, higher educated and secularized voters; the Liberal parties especially from the younger generations and non-religious voters; the Christian and religious parties from the older and religious voters; the farmers' and nationa­ lists' parties from the less educated, religious voters and workers, and the ethnic parties from the non-workers, the more religious and less educated (see Table 3). There is no general pattern for the main dimensions of social differentiation of voters of particular parties. But for every country at least one of the characteristics under consideration differentiates between the voters of different parties. Thus the general conclusion is clear. Post-communist societies are not yet as clearly struc­ tured as Western societies. However, patterns of alliances seem to emerge in East Europe which are quite similar to Western patterns, especially as far as the new program parties (Klingemann 1994:181) and the confessional socio-cultural par­ ties are concerned. A problem exists, however, with respect to the political left: Communists and Socialists as yet have no particular socially-defined group to rely on. 16 Wessels/Klingemann

Table 3: Social Structure and Party Affiliation

1. The Young (-29 years) Czecho­ Esto­ Hungary Poland Roma­ Slove­ East Kraszno- Ukra- % of all slovakia nia nia nia Germany jarszk ine voters: 22.9 17.1 18.8 13.0 * 173 11.7 31.4 24.9

Percentage point difference from voters'’mean for party families Communists -11.0 -4.1 -7.7 1.3 -73 -0.2 -16.4 -5.0 Socialists -8.0 - - -1.4 - -2.6 4.1 20.5 Ecologists 18.9 2.1 - - 11.9 13.0 - 7.6 Liberals 2.5 1.0 10.2 -0.7 3.9 -3.2 3.9 25.1 Christians -123 - -10.4 - - -03 -1.4 16.0 Conservatives 17.1 - -2.0 - - - - - Farmers -73 - - -2.7 -0.3 - -2.0 11.5 Nationalists 0 3 - - - -1.4 - - 2.1 Ethnics 0.6 ------Other - -23 -10.4 4.0 0.1 - 9 3 -3.0

2. The Higher Educated Czecho- Esto- Hungary Poland Roma- Slove- East Kraszno- Ukra- % of all Slovakia nia nia nia Germany jarszk ine voters: 12.4 * 13.6 12.2 21.4 12.2 19.4 31.0 21.6

Percentage point difference from voters'mean for party families Communists 4.2 10.2 4.9 -53 -5.1 12.5 7.5 1.7 Socialists 2.5 - -4.0 - - -2.4 2.0 14.8 Ecologists -3.1 - - 12.6 2.5 11.4 - 3.1 Liberals -0.2 0.6 12.4 12.8 3.1 7.8 -1.2 -4.9 Christians 5.0 -9.1 - - - -6.7 9.0 5.7 Conservatives 7.6 3.1 - - - - - Farmers -12.4 - • -5.3 8.1 -8.8 -19.2 -3.4 Nationalists -2.9 - - -0.9 -0.9 - -6.6 Ethnics -3.6 - - 7.2 - - - Other - -5.3 -3.4 17.5 2.8 -6.0 -3.4 3. Workers Czecho- Esto- Hungary Poland Roma- Slove- East Kraszno- Ukra- % of ah Slovakia nia nia nia Germany jarszk ine voters: 49.5 23.1 60.0 18.9 12.7 143 55.9 10.6 16.4

Percentage point difference from voters'mean for party families Com m unists 1.6 -6.0 -16.5 10.5 3.9 5.5 -3.5 -2.6 -0.2 Socialists -9.0 - - -0.1 - - 1.4 -3.5 -7.3 Ecologists -3.5 8.9 - - -8.3 0.4 -16.2 - 5.0 Liberals -2.4 -0.7 -5.8 -4.0 -8.2 -3.3 -11.6 -.3 11.8 Christians 4.0 - 18.4 - - - 6.1 10.5 2.6 Conservatives - - - -3.2 - - - - - Farmers 9.2 - - 4.2 -10.2 3.5 - - -16.4 Nationahsts 5.8 - - - 1.2 5.0 - - -3.6 Ethnics 14.5 - - - -10.8 - - - - Other - -0.2 17.1 1.1 -0.2 -4.2 - 21.2 -0.8 continues The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition n

4. Religious People Czecho- Esto- Hungary Poland Roma- Slove- East Kraszno- Ukra- % of all Slovakia nia nia nia Germany jarszk ine voters: 15.4 3.0 17.8 58.8 19.6 253 7 5 3.4 8.1

Percentage point difference from voters1'mean for party families Communists -10.9 -3.0 -13.0 -21.6 0.8 -10.0 -4.7 0.1 -1.6 Socialists -9.1 - - 8.6 - - -3.6 -3.4 -8.1 Ecologists -8.5 0.9 - - -11.1 -13.6 -2.8 - -2.9 Liberals -5.8 0.8 -8.1 -13.9 -12.7 12.4 -4.6 -5 11.0 Christians 27.1 - 25.2 - - - 5.9 16.6 10.1 Conservatives -55 - -2.4 - - - - - Farmers -9.2 - - 10.2 11.5 29.9 - -3.4 1.0 Nationalists 5.5 - - - 11.2 0.5 - - 3.2 Ethnics 58.1 - - 17.9 - - - - Other - -3.0 1.0 -2.2 -19.6 -4.4 4.0 -2.2

5. Union Members Czecho- Esto- Hungary Poland Roma- Slove- East Kraszno- Ukra- % of all Slovakia nia nia nia Germany jarszk ine Voters: 40.4 60.2 37.3 24.8 34.2 36.2 28.5 66.1 77.4

Percentage point difference from voters'mean for party families Communists -1.0 2.8 21.5 -1.9 .3 4.5 3.1 1.1 -.2 Socialists 6.4 - - 3.0 - - 6.0 -6.1 - Ecologists 3.8 -17.9 - - 14.8 7.8 .8 - 8.5 Liberals 1.2 .0 2.9 -2.3 2.6 -3.6 -1.7 .8 1.2 Christians -2.9 - -14.8 - - - -4.1 -24.9 -13.8 Conservatives - - 2.7 ------Farmers -7.1 - - -21.3 -7.5 -22.5 - - - Nationalists 6.1 - -4.7 - 1.7 .8 - - -4.3 Ethnics -15.8 - - - -12.8 - - » - Other 16.7 2.8 -6.0 -.9 -23.1 1.6 - -4.2 -.9

-) Either party family not existing in the respective country or number of respondents smaller than 15; *) Variable missing for the respective country; Left: values 1-4 on a 10-point left-right selfpla­ cement scale; Higher Education: at least some post secondary school; Worker: Self location in the working class after been asked: "To which social class would you say that you belong?; Religious: Those saying "I am religious and follow the teaching of the church.

This might be due to the fact that socially defined left politics are facing difficul­ ties finding a niche in those societies where the institutionalized system defined itself as left and has become untrustworthy, and where the need is not to bring the state back in but to get the state out. Social-structurally defined interests are cle­ arly present in post-communist society. However, these interests - which are also reflected in the party systems - are much more related to socio-cultural (religious, ethnic) than to socio-economic interests. The hypothesis of "flattened societies" is supported, if at all, when it comes to socio-economic interest. 18 Wessels/Klingemann

4. Support for Institutionalized Opposition

We have discussed political and social interest formation and socio-political al­ liances between voters and parties which have already formed during the founding elections. A third and most important question remains: How secure is the ground for political contestation and institutionalized opposition? Dahl defines two di­ mensions which are central to the establishment of democratic opposition: the de­ gree to which public competition is institutionalized and the degree to which the right to participate is institutionalized (Dahl 1975: 119f.). With respect to party systems, the question therefore is: To which degree are free elections and a multi­ party system supported by citizens? The two dimensions are used by Dahl to differentiate political systems on the basis of the degree to which they establish a democratic political opposition. This differentiation leads to four types of political systems. On the one hand, there are two types of hegemonies: closed hegemonies in which neither political competi­ tion, i.e. free elections, nor a multi-party system is institutionalized; and inclusive hegemonies which have a multi-party system but no free elections. On the other hand, there are competitive oligarchies which permit elections but only one party; and polyarchies (which we normally refer to as democracies) which allow for free elections and multi-party systems (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Liberalization, Inclusiveness, and Democratization (Dahl 1975)

Inclusiveness One-party system Multi-party system

Libera- against free elections Closed Inclusive lizationl Hegemony Hegemony free com- petition for free elections Competitive Polyarchy Oligarchy (Democracy)

A first look at the distribution of individual preferences on these two dimensions show some interesting results. First, there is a great variation in support for de­ mocratic principles sustaining political opposition. The portion of the population supporting both free elections and a multi-party system ranges from 60 to 90 per­ The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition 19

cent. The group of countries in which support is lower than 70 percent belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States, while Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and Slovenia belong to the group of countries where support ranges between 70 and 80 percent. It is greater than 80 percent in the other countries, with the highest le­ vels in Bulgaria, Estonia and Hungary (see Table 4). Despite the great difference between Krasznoyarszk and the Ukraine in comparison with the other Central and East European countries, no further systematic explanations can be offered con­ cerning country differences. For example, the existence of a civil society in Czechoslovakia and Hungary before the change of the system does not lead as one would expect to a higher level of support as compared to the other Central and Southern countries. More systematic results can be found if one looks at the level of support for these basic democratic rules by voters of particular party families. If one makes a distinction between reform communist parties, new programme parties and socio­ cultural parties (Klingemann 1994: 19), voters of the new programme parties (i.e. socialist, ecological, liberal, and conservative parties) are most supportive, second come voters of the socio-cultural parties (i.e. ethnic, religious, nationalistic, and farmers' parties), and least supportive are the voters of the reform communists.

Table 4: System Preference by Country

closed inclusive competitive polyarchy N = 100% hegemony hegemony oligarchy

Bulgaria 0.7 2.1 6.1 91.1 869 Czechoslovakia 2.4 16.5 6.0 75.1 752 East Germany 1.2 13.2 3.4 82.2 951 Esthonia 0.9 2.8 9.9 86.4 777 Hungary 1.3 4.2 10.8 83.7 1088 Krasznojarszk 5.7 11.9 13.6 68.8 1070 Lithuania 2.4 8.9 12.3 76.4 763 Romania 0.9 4.6 12.9 81.5 1078 Slovenia 5.2 5.9 12.8 76.1 522 Ukraine 5.2 16.2 18.3 60.3 1165

Derived from support for democratic rules (&ee elections and multi-party system).

On average more than 80 percent of the voters of new programme parties support both free elections and a multi-party system. For the socio-cultural parties this fi­ gure is about 75 percent. Only 64 percent of the voters of reform communist par­ 20 Wes seist Klingemann

ties support both legal rules that guarantee political opposition, whereas more than one fifth of the voters of communist parties favour a competitive oligarchy, i.e. a system with free elections but only one party. This is in congruence with the mode of the first semi-free elections in the Soviet Union: There was free choice between candidates of the Communist party. Voters of the remaining parties, especially those of ethnic parties, make much more restrictive choices. If they do not support democratic rules they most favour inclusive hegemonies (see table 5). In sum, it is obvious that support for democratic rules is not as widespread as one might have thought. There are two countries in which one third of the popu­ lation support a system which is not democratic (Krasznoyarszk, Ukraine) and three other countries where one quarter of the citizens do not support democratic rules (Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and Slovenia). In five out of nine countries un­ der observation a considerable part of the population opposes democratic deve­ lopment. Cautiously speaking, one could state that the proportion is large enough to be regarded as a critical mass challenging democratization. The same is true with respect to voters of specific parties. An affiliation with communist and socio­ political parties, which received a large number of votes, is also related to a relati­ vely high proportion of preferences for a political system that cannot be regarded as democratic.

Table 5: System Preference of Voters of Party Families

Party closed inclusive competitive Polyarchy Family hegemony hegemony oligarchy

Communist 5.8 8.7 21.8 63.6 Socialist 1.4 10.8 3.6 84.1 Ecological 0.8 10.0 4.6 84.6 Liberal 1.4 9.9 5.9 82.9 Christian/ReJigious 0.8 12.2 5.8 81.2 Conservative 1.6 3.1 9.0 86.3 Farmer 3.3 11.7 10.0 75.0 Nationalist 2.7 13.1 9.5 74.7 Ethnic 2.2 20.9 1.1 75.8 Other/non-classif. 4.7 7.4 10.1 77.7

Classified according to support for democratic rules (free elections and multi-party system)

However, this may not be a problem for democratic development provided that these forces are not dominant. It would be a challenge to democratic development The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition 21

if the majority of the voters of the parties either in power or in opposition would prefer a non-democratic system. Fortunately this is not the case for most of these countries. In other words, there is little danger that political opposition will be ab­ olished by the ruling parties or if a change in power occurs. Nevertheless there is an exception to this general result: In the Ukraine the majority of the voters for the communist government favour a political structure which is not democratic. 40.6 percent of these voters support a one-party system, an additional 12.7 percent a multi-party system without free elections, and 10.2 percent a closed hegemony, i.e. one party, no free elections. Only 36.5 percent support democratic rules which permit an institutionalized democratic opposition (see Table 6).

Table 6: System Preference of Voters of Government and Opposition

closed inclusive competitive polyarchy hegemony hegemony oligarchy Czechoslovakia - government 2.4 13.3 3.2 81.1 - opposition 2.2 18.6 9.0 70.2 East Germany - government 0.6 13.9 3.7 81.8 - opposition 1.3 11.4 2.6 84.7 Estonia - government 0.0 4.2 3.5 92.3 - opposition 0.7 3.7 5.2 90.3 Hungary - government 1.1 4.3 9.2 85.4 - opposition 0.8 3.6 7.7 87.9 Krasznoyarszk - government 2.2 9.4 9.9 78.5 - opposition 9.2 12.6 15.5 62.6 Romania - government 1.2 4.7 15.0 79.1 - opposition 0.5 9.1 3.2 87.2 Slovenia - government 2.8 6.3 10.5 80.4 - opposition 4.5 6.1 11.0 78.4 Ukraine - government 10.2 12.7 40.6 36.5 - opposition 3.2 18.9 6.5 71.4

Classified according to support for democratic rules (free elections and multi-party system) 22 WesselsjKlingemann

In general it appears that the level of support for free elections and a multi-party system is quite typical for newly established democratic political systems. In the early 50s in West Germany, for example, about one fifth of the population belie­ ved it was better to have only one party. It was more than a decade before more than 80 percent supported a multi-party system (Fuchs 1989: 190). Using Ger­ many as a reference point, one can argue that the proportion of support in most Central and East European countries in our sample is a normal feature of the early period of democratic consolidation of democracy. The same might not be true for the very low level of support in the republics of the Commenwealth of Indepen­ dent States.

5. Support for Democratic Rules, Actors and Performance of the System

Support for rules which guarantee an institutionalized political opposition are af­ fected both by country context and partisanship. What is more important however - at least when trying to understand processes of transition to and consolidation of democracy - is to what degree support for democratic rules and procedures is af­ fected by the performance of the political and economic system. Here one can ar­ gue that support and stability of democratic political systems rests to a large ex­ tent on the citizens' awareness that not the structure of the system as such but the actors are to blame if things do not work out well. This is why political competi­ tion and free elections are crucial to democracy. Competitive party systems are designed to correct political decisions and their related outcomes by providing the ability to elect an alternative government. To oppose this basic logic of de­ mocracy means to block the ability to vote the rascals out. It is essential for the democratic system to have different mechanisms for the generation of support for specific authorities and for overall system support. Ori­ entation towards authorities should be primarily instrumental. Citizens must eva­ luate the responsiveness of authorities towards citizens' demands and the effi­ ciency with which authorities transform demands into outputs (Fuchs 1989: 27). Generalized system support, on the other hand, "refers to an attitude towards the democratic process as a whole and to the structures that control this process. The extent of generalized support is therefore a criterion for the realization of the basic democratic norm... it does in principle act as a buffer against everyday and con­ crete dissatisfaction..." (Fuchs 1993: 92-94). I

The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition 23

Thus support of general democratic rules should not be very affected by actual developments of the system, whereas support for political actors should be much more sensitive to actual performance. If these conditions are necessary for the sta­ bility of established democratic political systems then they are obviously even more important for political systems under transition. Only when some kind of buffer exists that shields support for democratic rules against actual political out­ comes does democratization has a chance. Empirical analyses of the impact of performance on support for actors and the system should offer some insights into the development of support generating me­ chanisms. Poor performance should lead to decreasing support for the authorities or the responsible actors (and vice versa) while support for democratic rules should not be affected. This would be the best situation for a democratic transi­ tion. If poor performance affects both, support for actors and rules, then democra­ tic development is threatened, because beliefs in basic mechanisms of democratic government are missing or these mechanisms are not well understood. For this analysis the following indicators measure support for political actors (authorities): (1) trust in the government, (2) trust in the leading party and (3) trust in the largest opposition party. Trust in government varies quite strongly between countries. It is comparably high in Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and Romania. More than half of the population trust their present government. Trust levels are somewhat lower in Bulgaria and Slovenia (over 40 percent). Governments are less trusted in Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and East Germany (between 30 and 40 percent). The worst situation is encountered in Krasznoyarszk and the Ukraine. No more than one fifth of the citi­ zens trust their governments (see Table 7). The pattern is somewhat different regarding trust in the leading party in the go­ verning coalition and the largest opposition party. In general, confidence in politi­ cal actors is affected by the voters' own political choice. Voters of the governing parties trust the government and the leading political party of the government coalition more than the opposition parties, and vice versa. But there is also a basic level of mutual trust. Trust in political actors is thus affected but not determined by political preference. Especially with regard to government and the leading party in government, trust should be largely dependent on perceptions of how political and economic affairs are handled. This is true for most Western democracies and should be even more true in societies under transformation. 24 WesselslKlingemann

Table 7: Trust in Government, the Leading Party, and the largest Opposition Party

Country/Respon- Government3 Leading Partyb Opposition0 dent Group % trust4 n=100% % trust4 n=100% % trust4 n=100% Bulgaria all respondents 44.1 1018 32.8 991 49.7 986 Czechoslovakia all respondents 56.4 960 42.8 718 30.4 935 Estonia in opposition 35.2 145 24.6 134 18.8 138 in government 47.7 151 37.4 147 0.7 147 all respondents 36.3 898 24.9 807 7.1 832 Hungary in opposition 32.0 412 18.6 377 56.0 382 in government 49.2 415 49.2 372 33.0 358 all respondents 38.2 1224 32.3 1072 42.1 1052 Lithuania all respondents 60.6 878 8.6 833 21.8 726 Poland in opposition 31.7 334 23.2 267 21.7 277 in government 52.1 307 17.0 235 59.7 263 all respondents 38.0 813 19.1 639 37.2 681 Romania in opposition 47.5 198 32.5 194 36.4 195 in government 71.6 712 65.1 704 23.2 681 all respondents 63.3 1185 54.8 1147 25.9 1115 Slovenia in opposition 43.7 295 14.8 263 29.5 268 in government 56.8 162 37.7 151 16.2 154 all respondents 44.9 650 22.0 567 22.7 572 Ukraine in opposition 17.1 385 5.4 367 21.3 291 in government 39.6 442 59.7 412 7.5 334 all respondents 21.5 1591 22.8 1436 13.0 1097 Krasznoyarsk in opposition 23.4 508 17.5 485 21.8 450 in government 25.0 180 6.4 235 35.3 232 all respondents 20.3 1393 10.2 1318 19.1 1175 East Germany in opposition 28.6 405 14.4 395 52.7 395 in government 54.1 381 45.5 367 38.1 362 all respondents 38.2 1065 27.3 1018 42.2 1009

a Q33B ("national government"), dichotomized: 1,2=1 (trust totally and trust somewhat); 3,4=0 (trust a little or do not trust). b Q33N ("the leading party in the governing coalition, or the governing party"), dichotomized: 1,2=1 (trust totally and trust somewhat); 3,4=0 (trust a little or do not trust). c Q33O ("the biggest opposition party"), dichotomized: 1,2=1 (trust totally and trust some­ what); 3,4=0 (trust a little or do not trust). d Percentage "trust totally" and "trust somewhat". The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition 25

Here the government is responsible for establishing almost everything necessary for democracy such as the legal system, free markets and the reduction of state activities. We can define two elements of political performance-, a moral dimension and a generalized performance dimension. The moral dimension relates to the question of whether corruption and the selling of influence have declined under the present government. The generalized political performance dimension is measured by the level of satisfaction with the present government. There are two indicators of economic performance. The first measures the eva­ luation of retrospective economic performance, the second the evaluation of pro­ spective economic performance. Retrospective economic performance refers to the country's economic development during the period the present government was in power. Prospective economic performance refers to whether one expects economic improvements in the coming year. In order to test whether (1) trust in the government, (2) trust in the leading go­ verning party, or (3) trust in the largest opposition party (as dependent variables) depends on political preference for parties of the government or parties of the op­ position on the one hand and economic and political performance on the other hand (as independent variables), all effects of the independent variables will be te­ sted simultaneously. Thus we will also learn something about the role parties play in this process. Results indicate that trust in political actors, especially in the government, is to a high degree dependent on the perception of performance. There are four diffe­ rent patterns. In Krasznoyarszk only economic performance has a reasonable im­ pact on trust in government. In Estonia, trust in government is almost solely de­ pendent on political performance. In Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Lithua­ nia, Romania and Slovenia trust in government is mainly dependent on political performance. In East Germany, Poland, and the Ukraine both economic and poli­ tical performance determine trust in government. In none of these countries has preference for governmental parties or opposition parties as strong an influence as the performance indicators. This means that evaluations of the government are strongly based on the criteria of effectiveness and efficiency, that is, the mode of orientation is largely instrumental (see Table 8). The same general pattern of results can be reported for trust in the leading go­ verning party. However, in contrast to the results reported above a preference for this particular party weighs heavily in some countries. Its effect is sometimes al­ most as strong as the perception of performance. 26 Wessels/Klingemann

Table 8: Party Role, Economic and Political Performance and Trust in Government and Opposition3

Country/ Effects uncontrolled (eta) Effects controlled (beta) Trust in Party Performance Party Performance Role Economic Political Role Economic Political retro- prospec- moral genera­ retro- prospec- moral genera­ spective tive lized spective tive lized R2 b c d e f

Bulgaria - Government .11 .22* .16 .50* .05 .08* .06 .46* .26 - Leading Party - .05 .14 .16* .42* - .06 .02 .08* .40* .19 - Opposition .11* .09* .10* .14* - .11* .11* .12* .20* .06 Czechoslovakia - Government .26* .26 .28* .21 .51* .11* .08 .12* .06 .41* .31 - Leading Party .07* .05 .10* .09 .09 .08* .03 .10* .08 .08 .03 - Opposition .10* .09* .06* .06 .08 .10* .10* .09* .04 .07 .03 East Germany - Government .27* .27* 37* .49* .11* .09* .19* .36* .30 - Leading Party 32* .18 .27* - .40* .22* .04 .14* - .28* .22 - Opposition .14* .06 .07 - .06 .16* .05 .08 - .06 .04 Estonia - Governments .06 .28 .20 .28* .49* .06 .06 .03 .17* .49* .41 - Leading Partyh .15 .32 .13 .16 .48* .08 .14 .14 .02 .43* .27 - Opposition’ .28* .10 .04 .33* .24 .18* .09 .05 .24* .15 .17 Hungary - Government .18 .30* .34* .23* .50* .05 .10* .15* .10* .40* .31 - Leading Party .31* .28* .29* .20 .40* .21* .11* .12* .09 .26* .24 - Opposition .23* .06 .08 .09* .06 .25* .06 .09 .10* .07 .08 Krasznoyarszk - Government .04 .12 .20* .04 .22 .01 .09 .17* .04 .22 .09 - Leading Party .16* .06 .08 .08 .09 .15* .08 .08 .07 .07 .05 - Opposition .16* .18* .10 .10 .18* .14* .14* .07 .08 .15* .09 Lithuania - Government .36* .41* .32* .53* .15* .14* .10* .37* .34 - Leading Party .10 .06 .10 .14 - .06 .05 .05 .12 .03 - Opposition - .09 .10 .01 .04 - .07 .10 .04 .05 .02 Poland - Government .16 .21 .25* .17 .24* .10 .06 .15* .05 .18* .12 - Leading Party .05 .24* .10 .19 .30* .08 .16* .01 .09 .23* .13 - Opposition .34* .19 .34* .18 .14 .27* .11 .22* .09 .08 .21 Romania - Government .21 .35 .44* .22 .60* .05 .07 .17* .06 .47* .40 - Leading Party .29* .36* .36* .16 .55* .14* .13* .09* .02 .43* .35 - Opposition .10 .10 .17 .11 .30* .03 .07 .07 .05 .29* .10 Slovenia - Government .10 .21* .23 .18 .57* .01 .12* .04 .08 .53* .34 - Leading Party .22* .08 .18 .11 30* .18* .04 .07 .07 .23* .13 - Opposition .16* .11 .14 .04 .09 .14* .07 .10 .05 .04 .05 Ukraine - Government .29* .16 .25* .10 .34* .22* .04 .16* .06 .24* .19 - Leading Party .60* .05 .18* .12 .17 .57* .05 .11* .05 .04 .37 - Opposition .22* .07 .07 .13 .12 .20* .09 .09 .10 .10 .08

a) Results from MCA-analysis (ANOVA, SPSS); b) Voters of governing parties versus voters of parties in opposition; c) Q13; d) Q14; e) Q16; f) Q23, trichotomized: 1,2,3 = 1; 4,5,6,7 = 2; 8,9,10 = 3; g) Q33B ("national government"), dichotomized: 1,2 = 1; 3,4 = 0; h) Q33N ("the leading party m the governing coalition, or the governing party", dichotomized: 1,2 = 1; 3,4 = 0; i) Q33Ö ("the biggest oppositional party", dichotomized: 1,2 = 1; 3,4 = 0; *) Significance >.05 (F-Test). - Variable not available. The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition 27

With respect to trust in opposition, the affiliation with opposition parties has al­ most always the strongest impact on trust in opposition. It should be stressed, ho­ wever, that in almost all of the countries in our study trust in government is better explained by performance variables than by trust in the leading party in govern­ ment and trust in opposition parties. On average the percentage variance explained amounts to 28 percent for trust in government, 18 percent for trust in the leading governing party, and 8 percent for the leading party in opposition. This indicates that citizens in East Europe are able to apply quite differentiated logics when evaluating political actors. These logics are mainly based on instrumental considerations with respect to the evaluation of the government. Instrumental and partisan criteria mingle with respect to the evaluation of the leading party in government. Partisanship weighs most heavily with respect to trust in the largest opposition party. In other words: citizens praise or blame those actors who bear functional political responsibility. This finding is very much in line with what one would expect for established democracies. For the analysis of support for democratic rules (support for free elections and a multi-party system) the same indicators are used: individual affiliation with a party in government or opposition, and the measures for economic and political performance. The results demonstrate that there are only few countries where performance indicators have a significant impact on support for democratic rules. Only in Estonia and Krasznoyarszk do the effects of particular performance indicators such as economic performance have a larger effect when compared to trust in go­ vernment. In none of the countries do the variables party role and economic and political performance lead to a high level of variance explained. On average, this level reaches 5.5 percent (see Table 9). This is not very satisfactory and is far be­ low the proportion of variance explained in the case of trust in government. Thus support for the two central democratic rules which guarantee an institutionalized democratic opposition seems to be quite resistant to effects of economic and poli­ tical performance. "Buffers" which shield democratic structures against the effects of the positive and negative effects of the authorities' day-to-day politics already appear to exist in these countries. 28 WesselslKlingemann

Table 9: Party Role, Economic and Political Performance and Support for Democratic Rules

Country/ Effects uncontrolled (eta) Effects controlled (beta) Trust in Party Performance Party Performance Role Economic Political Role Economic Political retro- prospec- moral genera­ retro­ prospec­ moral genera­ spective tive lized spective tive lized R2 b c d e f

Bulgaria - .08 .05 .09 .05 .08 .04 .09 .04 .02 Czechoslovakia .09 .04 .07 .07 .17* .06 .05 .07 .06 .16* .04 East Germany .02 .08 .09 - .14* .07 .05 .04 - .14* .03 Estonia .04 .14* .17* .16 .20 .02 .20* .26* .13 .17 .11 Hungary .03 .05 .09 .16* .09 .06 .02 .07 .15* .06 .04 Krasznoyarszk .15* .11 .22* .08 .17* .13* .05 .20* .10 .13* .10 Lithuania - .08 .19* .16* .16 - .05 .15* .13* .10 .07 Romania .03 .03 .07 .07* .08 .06 .03 .09 .10* .09 .02 Slovenia .06 .05 .08 .06 .21* .02 .02 .08 .08 .22* .06 Ukraine .21* .02 .08 .09 .07 .21* .02 .07 .08 .07 .06 a) Results from MCA-analysis (ANOVA, SPSS); Support for Democratic Rule: support of free elections and support of multi-party system combined (1 = closed hegemony; 2 = inclusive he­ gemony; 3 = competetive oligarchy; 4 = polyarchy, democracy). For Poland, this variable is not available; b) Voters of governing parties versus voters of parties in opposition; c) Q13; d) Q14; e) Q16; f) Q23, trichotomized: 1,2,3 = 1; 4,5,6,7 = 2; 8,9,10 = 3; *) Significance >.05 (F-Test); -) not asked/data not available.

6. Conclusion

Four questions have been discussed in this chapter: 1. What were the structuring cleavages in the formation of the East European party systems during the founding elections? 2. What is the relationship between social structure and party politics? To put the same question more precisely: What is the degree of congruence between po­ litical differentiation on the one hand and socially based interest differentia­ tion on the other? 3. What is the degree of support for legal rules which guarantee political opposi­ tion? 4. What is the degree to which support for legal rules of the democratic system is affected by evaluations of the performance of the authorities? Pluralistic party systems have been established in all countries under considera­ tion. New "program parties" as well as "socio-cultural parties" have entered the political arena and now compete for votes. We have demonstrated that "(reform-) The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition 29

communism" against "liberal-democracy" has been the "super-issue" which has structured the emerging party systems in the first phase of democratization. We also know that this differentiation has gone further. The relatively large anti­ communist "liberal-democratic" movements and coalitions have started to disin­ tegrate into relatively distinct "program parties". However, our concern in this analysis concentrates on the phase of the founding elections. These founding elections were followed by the formation of governments and oppositions. In all of these countries political actors had to come to grips with filling the roles of go­ vernment and opposition. Empirically we can state that political parties offered a basic choice: the choice between the "old" (reform-) communist and a "new" libe­ ral-democratic regime. This option was not elite created. Rather, it was anchored in the political preferences of the citizens involved. The second question is related to congruences between social cleavages and party system formation, a question which has been prominent in the historical re­ construction of West European party systems. Our analysis of social structure and party preference demonstrates that class politics is not a dominant feature of these new democratic political systems. The newly emerging social classes are still weak and are just beginning to organize themselves. For the vast majority of citi­ zens economic subsistence is still largely dependent on the state. However, other social characteristics have a greater impact on voters' choice, in particular age co­ hort, education, union membership and, above all religiosity. The strongest differentiation between voters is related to the (reform-) commu­ nist vs. liberal democracy, "left-right" dimension. There is evidence that the sup­ ply of the parties has met some demands based on political structures. That is, the new parties are not fighting for "theoretical interests"; they are instead fighting for interests based on experience. Of course post-communist societies are not yet structured like Western societies which have strong social and political cleavages and social and political alliances between voters and parties. However, as we have demonstrated patterns do emerge in East Europe which can serve as a basis for such institutionalized con­ flict structures. Support for the democratic rules that are a precondition for the presence of in­ terest plurality in the party system is quite high in most countries. Some of the re­ publics of the Commonwealth of Independent States are an exception in this respect. They demonstrate a very low level of support of democratic rules. For the other countries, including East Germany, support may still be growing. Conside­ ring the proportion of citizens supporting democratic rules one is reminded of the 30 Wessels/Klingemann

West German situation in the early fifties. During this time period about one quarter of the population did not support a multi-party system. It took more than a decade before an acceptable level of support was reached in West Germany. Viewed at from this perspective the level of support for democratic rules does not seem to be untypically low for emerging democracies. At the time of the surveys support for democratic rules was seriously challen­ ged by economic and political performance effects. However, this support was not endangered because actors or authorities were blamed and not the new system. This finding is of crucial importance. If support for general democratic rules de­ pends on performance alone, it might decrease rapidly. The problems of transition faced by these new democracies are very serious and cannot be solved in the short run. However, the citizens of these new democracies have demonstrated that they evaluate political actors, particularly the government, mostly in an instrumental way and they appear to support the new structures of the political system for ge­ neral reasons. In this respect citizens of East Europe meet the expectations for democratic government. In conclusion, the evidence indicates that in the early phase of transition there were good chances for a consolidation of democracy. Pluralistic party systems have been established which were structured in accordance with political and so­ cial interests of the electorates. Support for democratic rules had reached a suffi­ cient level and proved to be quite resistant to the ups and downs of the perfor­ mance of the political actors. Three years later we know more about the actual de­ velopment. Our current knowledge indicates that consolidation is under way and probably irreversible in most of these countries even if post-communist forces be­ come stronger (and considering that of all eleven countries under observation five are governed by former communist parties). It may well be that it is this very in­ tegration of the former communist parties into a competitive party system which was the key to the consolidation of representative democracy in East Europe. The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition 31

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Appendix

Table Al: Strength of Government and Opposition in the Surveys and Portion of Valid Party-Related Response

% of valid answers % valid total sample Government Opposition (n = 100%) answers (n = 100 %)

Bulgaria - - - - 1074

Czechoslovakia3 52.0 41.2 (935) 93.2 1003

Estonia3 50.7 49.3 (304) 32.2 943

Hungary3 50.5 49.5 (853) 66.8 1277

Lithuania - - - - 918

Poland0 48.8 51.2 (723) 78.7 919

Romania3 78.2 21.8 (936) 75.9 1234

Slovenia3 35.2 64.8 (474) 69.1 686

Ukraine0 54.4 45.6 (880) 50.6 1739

Krasznoyarszk0 32.4 67.6 (784) 52.7 1488

East Germany3 48.7 51.3 (794) 73.0 1087

- Data not available. a Recall, Q41B. b Recall, Q41B, but Presidential elections, c Vote intention, Q43. 34 WesselslKlingemann

Table A2: Parties and Party Family Classification

Party Party Party Party Family Family

Czechoslovakia: NAT REP NAT DVU COM Democratic Party NAT NPD COM Communist Party of Czechoslovakia OTH ODP COM Czechoslovak Democratic Forum Estonia: SOC Czecho-Slovak Socialist Party COM Estonian Communist Party SOC Social Democracy COM CPSU COM Council of Work Collecti- ECO Party of the Green ves LIB Movement for Civic Free- ECO Rural Centrist Party dom ECO Green Movement LIB Public Against Violence ECO Green Party LIB Civic Forum LIB Movement for Self-Admi- T.TR Democratic Union "Free nistrative Democracy Estonia" LIB Christian-Democratic T.TR Popular Front Union CHR Christian Democrats CON Free Block CON Entrepreneurs' Party FAR Alliance of Farmers/Rural FAR Rural Union Population NAT National Independence NAT Freedom Party Party NAT Slovak National Party NAT Czecho-Slovak Under- OTH Democric Party standing OTH Interfront movement OTH Citizens' Committees ETH EgyOttel Coexistence OTH Others ETH Hungarian Christian-De- OTH Congress of Estonia mocratic Movement OTH Association of Individuals OTH All People Democratic Party Hungary: OTH Election Assembly of In­ terest Unions in the Czech COM MSZP Republic OTH Friends of Beer T.TR SzDSz T.TR FiDeSz East Germany CHR FgKP CHR KGNP COM PDS CON MDF

SOC SPD OTH other

ECO BOnd90/GrOn Krasznoyarszk: LIB FDP COM Socialist Party CHR CDU COM United Workers of the CHR DSU USSR COM Communist Party The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition 35

Party Party Party Party Family Family

COM Communist Party of the ECO PER (Partidul SU Ecologist Romän) soc Social Democratic T.TB PNL (Partidul Na­ Party/Fed. tional Liberal) soc Republican Party soc Confederation of the An­ FAR PNT-cd (Partidul Na­ archo-Syndicalists tional Taranesc - c.d.) FAR PDA (Partidul De­ LIB Democratic Russia mocratic Agrar) T.TB Democratic Party of Rus­ sia NAT PUNR (Partidul LIB Liberal-Democratic Party Unitatii Nationale Ro- T.TB Constitutional Democrats mäne) LIB Constitutional Democratic Party ETH UDMR (Uniunea T.TB Democratic Union Democrata Maghiara din Romänia) CHR Christian Democrats CHR Christian Democratic Mo­ OTH other vement CON Orthodox-monarchistic Union Slovenia:

FAR Peasants' Party COM Democratic Renewal COM Socialist Party OTH Marxist Peasants OTH Unity of Leninism and ECO The Greens Communist Ideals OTH National-Patriotic Front LIB Small-Scale Industry Party OTH others T.TB Christian Democrats LIB Liberal Democratic Party Poland: FAR Farmer Alliance COM Cimoszewicza NAT Social Democratic Al­ liance SOC Walesa NAT Liberal Democratic Al­ liance T.TB Mazowiecki OTH other FAR Bartoszoze OTH Different candidates

NAT Moczulskiogo Ukraine'. OTH Tymlasklege OTH edmowa odpow. COM Communist Party COM Party of Democratic Revi­ val Romania: soc Social Democratic Party COM FSN (Frontul soc United Social Democratic Balvarii Nationale) Party COM PSDR (Partidul So­ cialist Democratic Ro­ ECO Green Party män.) T.TB Liberal-Democratic Party SOC PSD (Partidul So­ LIB Ukrainian Republican cial Democrat) Party LIB Republican Party of the ECO MER (Miscarea Ukraine Ecologista din Romänia) continued 36 WesselslKlingemann

Party Party Family continues Ukraine

CHR Christian Democratic Party CHR Constitutional Democrats

FAR Peasant Democratic Party NAT Democratic Party NAT National Party of the Ukraine NAT Ukrainian National Party

OTH other The Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition 37

Summary A3: Question Wording

Q13 Considering the situation of (country) during the period that the present government has been in power (since 198_), would you say that the economic situation of the country has improved, gotten worse, or remained the same? (1) Improved, (2) the same, (3) gotten worse, (8) DK, (9) NA

Q14 And regarding the future, do you expect that in the next year the economic situation of the country will improve, get worse, or remain the same? (1) Will improve, (2) the same, (3) get worse, (8) DK, (9) NA

Q16 Would you say that under the present government corruption and selling of influence have increased, remained the same, or have declined? (1) Increased, (2) remained the same, (3) declined, (8) DK, (9) NA

Q23 Taking everything into account, in general, are you satisfied, or not satisfied with the present government? (Interviewer: show card)

Not satisfied Very satisfied DK NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 88 99

Q33 In order to get ahead, people need to have confidence and to feel that they can trust themselves and others. To what degree do you think that you trust the following totally (1), to a certain point (2), little (3), or not at all (4)?

B) National government; N) T he .....(The leading party in the governing coalition, or the governing party); O) The .... (The biggest oppositional party)