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NO. 10 JANUARY 2021 Introduction

Greenland’s Project Independence Ambitions and Prospects after 300 Years with the Kingdom of Michael Paul

An important anniversary is coming up in the Kingdom of Denmark: 12 May 2021 marks exactly three hundred years since the Protestant preacher set sail, with the blessing of the Danish monarch, to missionise the of . For some Greenlanders that date symbolises the end of their : not a date to celebrate but an occasion to from Denmark, after becoming an autonomous in 2009. Just as controversial as Egede’s in the capital was US President ’s offer to purchase the island from Denmark. His arrogance angered Greenlanders, but also unsettled them by exposing the shaky foundations of their independence ambitions. In the absence of governmental and economic preconditions, leaving the Realm of the Danish would appear to be a decidedly long-term option. But an ambitious new prime in Nuuk could boost the independence process in 2021.

Only one political current in Greenland, tice to finances. “In the Law on Self-Govern- the populist Partii of former Prime ment the granted us the right to take Minister , would like to over thirty-two sovereign responsibilities. declare independence imminently – on And in ten years we have taken on just one (21 June) 2021, the anniver- of them, oversight over resources.” Many sary of the granting of self-government people just like to talk about independence, within Denmark in 2009. Most of the popu- he says, but not to work for it. Kleist fears lation would prefer to see a more gradual that the next generation will remain trapped process of separation. Greenland does not in a mindset of dependency. yet appear ready for independence. That , prime minister since 2014, opinion is shared by , the first underlines the long-term goal of independ- prime minister from the Ataqatigiit ence. Significant electoral losses in 2018 party, who led the territory into self-govern- notwithstanding, the governing ment in 2009. Kleist notes that Denmark party’s victory and his re-election were re- only wanted to retain control over foreign garded as affirmation of the political leader- and security policy, and Greenlanders have ship’s cautious course in the independence long had the opportunity to take control of process. The main reason cited for restraint all internal affairs, from policing and jus- is the island’s financial dependency. Kielsen

sees strengthening the economy and fur- and America can dependably ther reducing its reliance on Denmark as , namely . Rather than the central concern. But on 29 November repairing damage to the runway there 2020 he lost the Siumut (“Forwards”) leader- caused by thawing , Greenland’s ship to Erik Jensen. Jensen intends to cam- government plans instead to extend the paign more energetically for independence runways at the two regional airports – and is also likely to replace Kielsen as prime near Nuuk and at the attractive coastal minister when parliament reconvenes for tourist destination of – to allow its first session of 2021. international flights to land there from Achieving Greenlandic statehood is a 2023. in southern Greenland, tricky process. But national borders in the which like most of the territory’s airstrips also transect the transnational settle- currently handles only helicopters, is also ment areas of indigenous populations. The to be turned into a regional airport. Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) for exam- This unspectacular airport project is a ple represents groups in , , highly sensitive matter in several respects: Greenland and Chukotka. Greenland’s domestically as an important step towards population is 56,081 (as of 1 January2020), the economic development required for in- almost 90 percent of whom are Inuit. Green- dependence; externally as a warning sign land’s self-government is thus part of the of impending dependency on China; and transnational Inuit community, while at in terms of security as a symbol of defence the same time Greenland is striving to be- cooperation with the . While come a state in the traditional sense with naturally wants to retain full formal – and thus also foreign policy – Greenland in the , it must also . The latter is an important fund the territory’s steps towards independ- factor for Nuuk, because enhanced inter- ence. Denying assistance would cost Den- national status is associated with the ability mark the support of Greenland’s population, to attract external investment. Copenhagen and ultimately its geopolitical status as an has to tolerate this ambivalent stance, while Arctic state. The issues are broader than at the same time attempting to influence simply promoting and developing elements the separation process. Much will therefore of Greenlandic statehood. Denmark needs depend on whether and how the conflicts to find ways of dealing with its intractable of goals on both sides can be resolved. security dilemma: it cannot preserve the island’s sovereignty on its own – but ced- ing effective control to the United States Infrastructure and Foreign Policy would be the end of Denmark as Arctic state. The latter appears particularly un- Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmus- palatable at a juncture where great power sen visited Greenland’s capital in person rivalry in the is growing and the in September 2018, to present a financial security situation deteriorating. package to expand the airports at Nuuk and As a major infrastructure project, the Ilulissat and otherwise promote the domes- airport projects fall under the auspices of tic economy. Rasmussen hoped to resolve the regional government, which controls two problems simultaneously, i.e. providing most aspects of political and economic life Nuuk with the funding required for these under the Act on Greenland Self-Govern- projects and allaying Washington’s fears ment of 2009. Copenhagen retains control that excessive Chinese investment could only over foreign and security policy – and leave Greenland overly dependent on Bei- regarded the project as security-relevant. jing. The issue of concern was the China Com- Greenland has no railways, few roads, munications Construction Company (CCCC), and currently only one international air- which appeared on the Greenland Interna- port at which wide-body jets from , tional Airports shortlist of possible partners

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for financing and building the airports. ing – which represents about 95 percent of CCCC is involved in Belt and Road projects Greenland’s exports – and tourism making through which Beijing seeks to expand its up the shortfall. But resource extraction global influence. Denmark fears that Chi- could do so. Greenland’s reserves of rare nese engagement could endanger its Green- , which are vital for a range of high- land-related defence cooperation with the tech applications, are sufficient to meet United States. Earlier, in 2016, Copenhagen current global demand for 150 years. The blocked an attempt by the Chinese General island also possesses metal ores and hydro- Nice Group to acquire the former US naval deposits. base in Grønnedal, following an interven- Although external investment is vital tion by Washington. for independence, Nuuk wishes to avoid The Greenland government sees the air- excessive dependency on foreign firms. A ports as a question of infrastructure rather government strategy document seeks to than security. Economic diversification and improve conditions for mining companies investments are vital if they are to achieve while maximising socio-economic benefits independence. While Nuuk possesses the for the population. right to independence under the autonomy When tourists and investors land at the agreement, it cannot yet afford to exercise new airports in a few years time, the rev- it. Denmark funds almost half of Green- enues and capital they bring could help to land’s public budget, through an annual realise independence. But numerous - grant of almost €500 million; that stacles remain to be overcome. For example would cease in the event of independence. resource extraction is a responsibility of the There is no prospect of revenues from - Greenland government, but where

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3 is involved there are implications for the they are required for cutting-edge technol- Kingdom as a whole. and ogies such as motors for electric vehicles, Chinese investment raise fundamental ques- for high-performance magnets and for net- tions over what “security” means in and for worked Industry 4.0 applications. All these Denmark, and thus touch on Copenhagen’s technologies also have applications, residual rights. Copenhagen finds itself in making them crucial for the functioning of the tricky position of having to balance and modern networked armed forces. stabilise the relationship with its former Major rare reserves are believed to – which is already historically bur- exist in Kringlerne and Kvanefjeld in south- dened and complicated by the independ- ern Greenland. The Australian Greenland ence issue – in the context of interest- and Energy (GME), in which the driven rivalry between great powers. Chinese Shenghe Resources holds a stake, also intends to mine uranium there. But the signing of a cooperation agreement Greenland and the between Shenghe and the China National Sino-American Rivalry Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) in 2019 led the opposition party to raise Nuuk has proactively encouraged a Chinese critical questions concerning the content of presence in Greenland; like his predecessor the agreement, the environmental impact , Prime Minister Kielsen has and Chinese interests. Currently three suc- tried to attract foreign involvement in Green- cessive environmental impact assessments land’s mining industry, while other political have rejected rare earth and uranium min- forces expressed reservations over – and in ing although a majority of Greenland’s par- the case of uranium mining rejected – liament supports mining. The aforemen- such investments. In October 2017 he led a tioned General Nice Group also holds the delegation to Beijing, presumably lobbying rights to a mine at Isua in the west, and a for investments. mine is planned at Citronen in But Beijing is interested in Greenland the extreme north, for which the Australian for both economic and strategic reasons. It firm Ironbark has signed an agreement regards the island as a potential hub in its with China Nonferrous Metal. Belt and Road project. A paper by Chinese The island’s rich resources and strategic Arctic researchers discussed the prospect location have led the United States to make that the “small and weak Greenland ” formal purchase offers several times, in 1867, could become “the most important link 1946/47 and 1960. So President Trump’s for successful realisation of the Polar Silk idea of buying Greenland and its popula- Road”. In this context US Secretary of State tion from Denmark in “a large real estate Mike Pompeo – like Danish Prime Minister deal” was not entirely new. Alongside its Rasmussen – pointed to China’s actions in major reserves of rare earths, Greenland’s the Indo-Pacific region, where governments strategic significance for the United States became “ensnared by debt and corruption”. has been underlined by Russian missile de- But such a strategy is not yet discernible in velopments, specifically hypersonic weapons. the Arctic. Danish Prime Minister , Greenland possesses large reserves of who took over from Rasmussen in June rare earths. The global market is dominated 2019, rejected Trump’s proposal as by China, which possesses a market share “absurd”. Greenland’s Prime Minister of more than 80 percent and controls practi- Kielsen declared that Greenland was not for cally the entire supply chain in an “extreme sale, a sentiment echoed on the Twitter example of Western reliance on Chinese account of the territory’s foreign ministry: production”. The United States currently “We’re open for business, not for sale.” imports most of its rare earths from China. Quite apart from the intricacies of interna- Global demand for these metals is rising; tional law, under the Act on Greenland

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4 Self-Government it would be for Nuuk tained by local firms from 2024), the agree- (rather than Copenhagen) to decide whether ment is of great value to Nuuk because it Greenland should become part of the treats Greenland as a foreign policy actor. United States. Despite her firm rejection, In 2020 Washington opened a diplomatic Frederiksen assured Washington that representation in Nuuk after a hiatus of al- Denmark would welcome “increased most seven decades, and offered a financial strategic cooperation in the Arctic”, which package worth US$12.1 million to develop can be read as an open admission of secu- Greenland’s resources, tourism and educa- rity dependencies on Washington. tion (although most of the money is ear- Greenland and specifically the Air marked for American consultancy services). Base are indeed exceptionally important The US offers met with little support for the United States. From the geostrategic and tended to be regarded as an attempt perspective Greenland forms one of North to undermine Danish-Greenland relations America’s extremities; the importance rather than a genuine offer of support. of the island’s dominant dimension in the Trump’s offer to buy Greenland ultimately for Washington has only spurred the Danish parliament to think grown as Greenland seeks independence about creating a better future for Greenland and China’s presence expands. Additionally within the Danish realm. almost all Russian reconnaissance flights over the North pass across or close to Greenland, which lies on the shortest Lost Homeland or Treasure Island? flight path from ’s Western Military Ambivalent Consequences of District to the American East (the same Change applies to missiles). The facilities located at Thule include the largest and most northerly The loss of the polar sea ice has multiple glo- of America’s ballistic missile early warning bal impacts of its own. Even more dramatic installations, part of its global satellite con- will be the consequences of the melting of trol network and its northernmost deep-sea the that covers about 80 percent of port. Greenland also forms the western end Greenland’s land surface; more than three of the “GIUK Gap”, the choke point between kilometres thick in places, it represents one Greenland, and the northern extrem- of the world’s largest reservoirs of fresh ity of the United Kingdom through which water. Between 2002 and 2016 Greenland ships and submarines of the Russian North- lost ice at an average rate of about 280 bil- ern Fleet have to pass to enter the Atlantic. lion tonnes/year, and the speed of loss Crucial civilian and military maritime infra- has quadrupled since then. Greenland’s ice structure (undersea cables) lies south of the sheet is currently the largest single contribu- GIUK Gap and the Sea. tor to the global rise in . A further In 2017 Greenland’s Foreign and Indus- acceleration was reported in 2020. try Minister Vittus Qujaukitsoq demanded A survey in August 2019 found that about renegotiation of the agreement that grants 92 percent of Greenlanders believe that Washington sovereignty over Thule Air is real, and 76 percent said Base (); it was time, he said, for Green- they noticed the effects in their everyday land to regain its “security autonomy” life. Three out of four families said they (which it never actually had). In a trilateral lived from , and more than half agreement in October 2020 the United States, feared that climate change would harm their Denmark and Greenland declared that the livelihood; almost half thought security and prosperity of all three parties would also be affected. Some Inuit feel fear will continue to depend on strong transat- and sadness when confronted – sometimes lantic cooperation, for which the Thule daily – with the habitat losses. In that sense, base is of central importance. As well as the environmental harm has triggered a cul- economic benefits (the base is to be main- tural catastrophe: The preservation and

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5 long-term protection of the living resources Cruise ship visits are also expected to con- on which life in the Arctic has always tribute to growth, but must exhibit “the depended lies at the heart of . utmost consideration for the fragile, natu- It is paradoxical that some fear and ral environment, local cultures and cultural others even welcome the effects of global remains”, as the Association of Arctic Ex- warming: “The faster the melt, the pedition Cruise Operators (AECO) puts it. more attention our gets”, said for- On the other hand Greenland can probably mer industry minister Jens-Erik Kirkegaard, thank its small visitor numbers for its cur- declaring the island a beneficiary of en- rently relatively low incidence of Covid-19. vironmental change. Climate change, he Finance Minister Qujaukitsoq wishes says, is like free advertising because it is to see investment and tourism promoting getting easier to attract capital. Halibut and Greenland’s development regardless where cod mature more quickly in the warming the funds come from: China, the United waters, and the grass-growing season in the States or Canada. The important , he south of the island is longer, reducing the says, is better training and more jobs. Ulti- need to import sheep feed. Global warming mately, he adds, an independent Greenland is causing change already, even if it is likely will remain a member of NATO and not – to be decades before Greenland becomes like Djibouti in – host military bases the “green land” the dreamt of. for rival powers like China. Alternatively, a “green growth” strategy could develop environmentally sustainable economic sectors. Greenland’s Industry and Rights for Greenland and Security Energy Minister Jess Svane (since May 2020 for the Whole Kingdom Minister for the Labour Market, Research and Environment) announced plans to turn Greenland and the Faroe still belong meltwater from the ice sheet into drinking to Denmark. But both already enjoy exten- water for export. The power of the melt- sive self-administration and remain by their water could also be harnessed to generate own choice outside the EU. While they are clean electricity for energy-intensive com- not entitled to pursue absolutely autono- puting centres. The Arctic climate makes mous foreign and security policies, they can the High North as a whole an ideal location maintain their own international contacts for innovative technologies and services, providing these do not contradict the offi- as the recognised cial Danish line. Erik Jensen, new leader of in 2016: “Harsh climatic conditions and Siumut and probably the next prime minis- the fragile environment require specialised ter from 2021, intends to plough more en- technology and know-how to meet high ergy into independence than his predeces- environmental standards. Opportunities in sor Kielsen. He also plans to take more re- the ‘Green Economy’, such as sustainable sponsibilities from Copenhagen; concretely multi-source energy systems, eco-tourism that means veterinary controls, immigra- and low-emission food production, could tion, shipping and greater responsibility for be developed further.” The Commission foreign policy. wants to support the search for sustainable As a Greenland could economic alternatives, naming explicitly still continue cooperation with Denmark in “‘Blue Economy’ sectors such as aquacul- questions of defence and foreign policy, as ture, fisheries, offshore renewable energy, well as financial policy. Copenhagen would maritime tourism and marine biotechnol- have an interest in that, because Greenland ogy”. Energy can be a growth sector in is the key to Denmark’s access to the Arctic Greenland (as in Iceland); the availability with all its resources and attributes: miner- of geothermal and hydro power back up als, fishing grounds, oil and gas, power and that expectation. international recognition. In order to main- tain the status associated with this, Copen-

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6 hagen will have to invest more in protect- European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). ing and defending its rights. While EMSA data allows identification of As the Arctic polar sea ice melts shipping oil spills for example, it cannot locate a sur- traffic has been increasing. Since 2006 there face vessel or submarine determined to con- has also been a growing number of vessels ceal its presence. entering Danish-controlled waters without Growing Russian military activity in the observing the usual protocols. In August region has led a number of states to demon- 2017 the Chinese ice-breaker Xue Long (Snow stratively expand their presence in support Dragon) appeared unannounced off the capi- of the Nordic NATO members. In August tal Nuuk. Cases of piracy, illegal fishing or 2020, the USS Thomas Hudner became the terrorism have not yet come to light. But first Arleigh Burke class destroyer to enter how should maritime security be ensured the deep fjord behind Nuuk; in the same as shipping traffic increases? month Danish and French warships con- The possesses three ducted joint exercises with a USCG vessel ice-breakers and serves as Greenland’s coast- off Greenland’s west coast. In September guard. The forces in Greenland currently Denmark conducted joint manoeuvres in operate one aircraft, four helicopters and the Barents Sea with the United States, the four ships (as well as the legendary Sirius United Kingdom and . In the first Dog Sled Patrol) – to guard the world’s such operation for twenty years, naval largest island with 44,000 kilometres of forces demonstrated freedom of navigation coastline. With these personnel and re- above the . On 1 October 2020 sources, they also have to defend the sover- an operational coordination arrangement eignty of the realm, monitor fisheries, pro- came into effect between NATO’s Maritime vide maritime services, transport patients Command (MARCOM) and the Danish Joint and assist with other social services, and Arctic Command (JACO) in Greenland; its conduct search and rescue (SAR) missions. purposes include exchanging situation The SAR deficits in the Arctic are consider- reports and enhancing cooperation. JACO able. What had been less well known until was founded in October 2012. It functions recently was how weak the land, air and sea as the connection point between the Danish reconnaissance capabilities are, despite the armed forces and the Greenland authori- US base in Thule. “Things start to get pretty ties; its headquarters is in Nuuk. dark once you get up higher than 72 de- Denmark has to pursue a delicate balance grees north,” said former U.S. Coast Guard between its own scarce military resources Commandant Admiral Paul Zukunft. A and the comprehensive support offered by patrol had “stumbled upon a joint exercise its allies. An independent Greenland will between Russia and China”, of which the not be able to defend itself on its own. Co- intelligence services had remained unaware penhagen relies on support from Washing- on account of the lack of satellite surveil- ton but has to avoid any appearance that lance. A proposal to resume the “Greenland it is allowing its policies to be dictated by Patrol” established by the US Coastguard in Washington. Trump’s offer exacerbated 1941, made in a blog of the U.S. Naval Insti- that problem because his idea is a “abso- tute, is certainly justifiable. Future US aid, lutely radical break” with the post-1945 the author recommends, should be ear- status quo. “When small wake up marked for port infrastructure to enable to the world’s superpower threatening to them to receive US Coast Guard (USCG) unroot that relation, it’s not something vessels if the need arises. to take lightly,” the Danish expert Martin Copenhagen intends to increase its mili- Breum explained. tary spending in Greenland, beginning with 1.5 billion Danish crowns for maritime surveillance in 2019. Possessing no satellites of its own, Denmark uses the services of the

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7 Outlook significant repercussions for Denmark’s foreign and security policy. But the decision Greenland will remain in some form of will ultimately be made in Nuuk. union with Denmark for the foreseeable future. One reason for Copenhagen to sup- port granting Asian states observer status in the was to make it easier to find investors for Greenland and the . That in turn improves its relation- ship with the two autonomous © Stiftung Wissenschaft and weakens the centrifugal forces. These und Politik, 2021 intentions are subsidiary to Denmark’s cen- All rights reserved tral foreign policy objective: avoiding harm to its relationships with the United States This Comment reflects and with the , and to its the author’s views. own privileged position in the Arctic. The The online version of new trilateral agreement for the US base this publication contains in Thule is suited to further these interests. functioning links to other Additionally to the ambitions of the SWP texts and other relevant “near-Arctic state” China and established sources. Arctic power Russia, Denmark’s problems SWP Comments are subject ultimately include the associated reawaken- to internal peer review, fact- ing of US interest in Greenland. Copenhagen checking and copy-editing. has to balance conflicting internal interests For further information on and – for all its understanding of the our quality control pro- desire for independence of its territories – cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- safeguard its own foreign policy and secu- berlin.org/en/about-swp/ rity interests. Trump’s initiative increased quality-management-for- the price of continuing security coopera- swp-publications/ tion. But the success of the Thule Agree- ment indicates the possibility that an inde- SWP pendent Greenland could continue defence Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik cooperation with the United States without German Institute for that country (or Canada) necessarily sup- International and planting Denmark as protector. Security Affairs Nuuk (and Torshavn) are in the comfort- able situation of being courted from mul- Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin tiple quarters. Erik Jensen, the likely next Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 prime minister of Greenland, also wants to Fax +49 30 880 07-100 promote independence by trading with all www.swp-berlin.org nations, including both the United States [email protected] and China. Denmark will seek to control

ISSN 1861-1761 the centrifugal forces, allowing Nuuk to doi: 10.18449/2021C10 become more independent while remaining part of the Danish realm. Copenhagen knows Translation by Meredith Dale it depends on Greenland for its seat on the Arctic Council, and the associated interest (English version of the major powers. Further progress to- of SWP-Aktuell 2/2021) wards independence would therefore have

Dr. Michael Paul is Senior Fellow in the International Security Research Division at SWP.

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