Greenland's Project Independence
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NO. 10 JANUARY 2021 Introduction Greenland’s Project Independence Ambitions and Prospects after 300 Years with the Kingdom of Denmark Michael Paul An important anniversary is coming up in the Kingdom of Denmark: 12 May 2021 marks exactly three hundred years since the Protestant preacher Hans Egede set sail, with the blessing of the Danish monarch, to missionise the island of Greenland. For some Greenlanders that date symbolises the end of their autonomy: not a date to celebrate but an occasion to declare independence from Denmark, after becoming an autonomous territory in 2009. Just as controversial as Egede’s statue in the capital Nuuk was US President Donald Trump’s offer to purchase the island from Denmark. His arrogance angered Greenlanders, but also unsettled them by exposing the shaky foundations of their independence ambitions. In the absence of governmental and economic preconditions, leaving the Realm of the Danish Crown would appear to be a decidedly long-term option. But an ambitious new prime minister in Nuuk could boost the independence process in 2021. Only one political current in Greenland, tice to finances. “In the Law on Self-Govern- the populist Partii Naleraq of former Prime ment the Danes granted us the right to take Minister Hans Enoksen, would like to over thirty-two sovereign responsibilities. declare independence imminently – on And in ten years we have taken on just one National Day (21 June) 2021, the anniver- of them, oversight over resources.” Many sary of the granting of self-government people just like to talk about independence, within Denmark in 2009. Most of the popu- he says, but not to work for it. Kleist fears lation would prefer to see a more gradual that the next generation will remain trapped process of separation. Greenland does not in a mindset of dependency. yet appear ready for independence. That Kim Kielsen, prime minister since 2014, opinion is shared by Kuupik Kleist, the first underlines the long-term goal of independ- prime minister from the Inuit Ataqatigiit ence. Significant electoral losses in 2018 party, who led the territory into self-govern- notwithstanding, the governing Siumut ment in 2009. Kleist notes that Denmark party’s victory and his re-election were re- only wanted to retain control over foreign garded as affirmation of the political leader- and security policy, and Greenlanders have ship’s cautious course in the independence long had the opportunity to take control of process. The main reason cited for restraint all internal affairs, from policing and jus- is the island’s financial dependency. Kielsen sees strengthening the economy and fur- Europe and North America can dependably ther reducing its reliance on Denmark as land, namely Kangerlussuaq. Rather than the central concern. But on 29 November repairing damage to the runway there 2020 he lost the Siumut (“Forwards”) leader- caused by thawing permafrost, Greenland’s ship to Erik Jensen. Jensen intends to cam- government plans instead to extend the paign more energetically for independence runways at the two regional airports – and is also likely to replace Kielsen as prime near Nuuk and at the attractive coastal minister when parliament reconvenes for tourist destination of Ilulissat – to allow its first session of 2021. international flights to land there from Achieving Greenlandic statehood is a 2023. Qaqortoq in southern Greenland, tricky process. But national borders in the which like most of the territory’s airstrips Arctic also transect the transnational settle- currently handles only helicopters, is also ment areas of indigenous populations. The to be turned into a regional airport. Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) for exam- This unspectacular airport project is a ple represents groups in Alaska, Canada, highly sensitive matter in several respects: Greenland and Chukotka. Greenland’s domestically as an important step towards population is 56,081 (as of 1 January2020), the economic development required for in- almost 90 percent of whom are Inuit. Green- dependence; externally as a warning sign land’s self-government is thus part of the of impending dependency on China; and transnational Inuit community, while at in terms of security as a symbol of defence the same time Greenland is striving to be- cooperation with the United States. While come a state in the traditional sense with Copenhagen naturally wants to retain full formal – and thus also foreign policy – Greenland in the Danish realm, it must also sovereignty. The latter is an important fund the territory’s steps towards independ- factor for Nuuk, because enhanced inter- ence. Denying assistance would cost Den- national status is associated with the ability mark the support of Greenland’s population, to attract external investment. Copenhagen and ultimately its geopolitical status as an has to tolerate this ambivalent stance, while Arctic state. The issues are broader than at the same time attempting to influence simply promoting and developing elements the separation process. Much will therefore of Greenlandic statehood. Denmark needs depend on whether and how the conflicts to find ways of dealing with its intractable of goals on both sides can be resolved. security dilemma: it cannot preserve the island’s sovereignty on its own – but ced- ing effective control to the United States Infrastructure and Foreign Policy would be the end of Denmark as Arctic state. The latter appears particularly un- Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmus- palatable at a juncture where great power sen visited Greenland’s capital in person rivalry in the region is growing and the in September 2018, to present a financial security situation deteriorating. package to expand the airports at Nuuk and As a major infrastructure project, the Ilulissat and otherwise promote the domes- airport projects fall under the auspices of tic economy. Rasmussen hoped to resolve the regional government, which controls two problems simultaneously, i.e. providing most aspects of political and economic life Nuuk with the funding required for these under the Act on Greenland Self-Govern- projects and allaying Washington’s fears ment of 2009. Copenhagen retains control that excessive Chinese investment could only over foreign and security policy – and leave Greenland overly dependent on Bei- regarded the project as security-relevant. jing. The issue of concern was the China Com- Greenland has no railways, few roads, munications Construction Company (CCCC), and currently only one international air- which appeared on the Greenland Interna- port at which wide-body jets from Asia, tional Airports shortlist of possible partners SWP Comment 10 January 2021 2 Map for financing and building the airports. ing – which represents about 95 percent of CCCC is involved in Belt and Road projects Greenland’s exports – and tourism making through which Beijing seeks to expand its up the shortfall. But resource extraction global influence. Denmark fears that Chi- could do so. Greenland’s reserves of rare nese engagement could endanger its Green- earths, which are vital for a range of high- land-related defence cooperation with the tech applications, are sufficient to meet United States. Earlier, in 2016, Copenhagen current global demand for 150 years. The blocked an attempt by the Chinese General island also possesses metal ores and hydro- Nice Group to acquire the former US naval carbon deposits. base in Grønnedal, following an interven- Although external investment is vital tion by Washington. for independence, Nuuk wishes to avoid The Greenland government sees the air- excessive dependency on foreign firms. A ports as a question of infrastructure rather government strategy document seeks to than security. Economic diversification and improve conditions for mining companies investments are vital if they are to achieve while maximising socio-economic benefits independence. While Nuuk possesses the for the population. right to independence under the autonomy When tourists and investors land at the agreement, it cannot yet afford to exercise new airports in a few years time, the rev- it. Denmark funds almost half of Green- enues and capital they bring could help to land’s public budget, through an annual realise independence. But numerous ob- block grant of almost €500 million; that stacles remain to be overcome. For example would cease in the event of independence. resource extraction is a responsibility of the There is no prospect of revenues from fish- Greenland government, but where uranium SWP Comment 10 January 2021 3 is involved there are implications for the they are required for cutting-edge technol- Kingdom as a whole. Uranium mining and ogies such as motors for electric vehicles, Chinese investment raise fundamental ques- for high-performance magnets and for net- tions over what “security” means in and for worked Industry 4.0 applications. All these Denmark, and thus touch on Copenhagen’s technologies also have military applications, residual rights. Copenhagen finds itself in making them crucial for the functioning of the tricky position of having to balance and modern networked armed forces. stabilise the relationship with its former Major rare earth reserves are believed to colony – which is already historically bur- exist in Kringlerne and Kvanefjeld in south- dened and complicated by the independ- ern Greenland. The Australian Greenland ence issue – in the context of interest- Minerals and Energy (GME), in which the driven rivalry between great powers. Chinese Shenghe Resources holds a stake,