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REPUBLICA DEMOCRA TICA DE TIMOR-LESTE DILl DISTRICT COURT THE SPECIAL PANELS FOR SERIOUS CRIMES CASE NO. 05/2003 WARRANT OF ARREST FOR WlRANTO TO THE PROSECUTOR-GENERAL OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR-LESTE, and TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF ALL STATES: THIS WARRANT AUTHORIZES THE ARREST OF THE DEFENDANT WIRANTO FOR: 1. CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY - MURDER 2. CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY - DEPORTATION OR FORCIBLE TRANSFER OF POPULATION 3. CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY - PERSECUTION PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ad7705/ I. Identification of the defendant as required by Section 19A.2(a) of UNTAET Regulation No. 2001125 Name: Wiranto Born: Y ogyakarta, Indonesia Date: 4 April 1947 Sex: Male Nationality: Indonesian Occupation: Retired from the Armed Forces of Indonesia; Former General of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI); Former Commander of the Armed Forces of Indonesia; Former Indonesian Minister of Defense and Security. 11. Jurisdiction of the Special Panels for Serious Crimes The Special Panels for Serious Crimes were established to ensure the existence of a forum where those responsible for the acts of violence in East Timor in 1999 can be brought to justice. See Section 10.3 of UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/11 and Section 1.1 of UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15. The Special Panels exercise jurisdiction with respect to the following serious criminal offenses: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual offences and torture See Section 10.1 of UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/11 and Section 1.3 of UNTAET Regulation No. 2000115, With respect to crimes against humanity, with which the defendant Wiranto has been charged, the Special Panels have universal jurisdiction pursuant to Section 2.1 ofUNTAET Regulation No. 2000115. All UNT AET Regulations pertinent to the jurisdiction of the Special Panels and the issuance of this Warrant of Arrest continue in force as provided in Article 2, Sec. 3(c) of Law No. 10/2003 (10 December 2003) of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. 2 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ad7705/ Ill. Summary of the facts alleged to constitute a crime as required by Section 19A.2(c) of UNTAET Regulation No. 2001125 The Deputy General Prosecutor has supported the charges against the defendant Wiranto with evidence contained in 21 volumes of documentation arranged in 39 binders amounting to over 15,000 pages and including statements from over 1500 witnesses. As required by Section 19A.2(c) of UNTAET Regulation No. 2001125 the evidence presented by the Prosecutor is summarized as follows: Background On 5 May 1999 the governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the United Nations agreed upon a process to conduct a popular consultation in which the people of East Timor could decide whether or not to accept autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia. The popular consultation was held on 30 August 1999. A total of 78.5% of those participating in the referendum supported independence and rejected autonomy. A. Chain of Command Summary At all times relevant to the charges, Wiranto held the posItIons of Commander of the Armed Forces (ABRI, later TNI) and Minister of Defense and Security of the Republic of Indonesia. In that capacity he was the highest officer in the chain of command for all military and police forces throughout Indonesia, including the region of East Timor. The military forces included the army, navy and air force. The chief of staff of each of those branches reported directly to the defendant Wiranto as Commander of the Armed Forces. Wiranto had command authority over all Indonesian uniformed personnel which was vested in him as a matter of law and which he exercised in fact. As the highest officer in Indonesia he exercised his authority both directly and through his subordinate officers. Similarly, Wiranto had command authority with respect to the militia over which he had effective control in fact. 3 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ad7705/ Military Forces Wiranto exercised his command authority in East Timor directly and through others. In large part he operated through Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim, who was in charge of the Special Team/Adjutant General's Task Force, a military authority established by Wiranto in March, 1999. Makarim was also a leading member of the Task Force to Oversee the Popular Consultation in East Timor. In July, 1999, Wiranto told Ian Martin, the Special Representative of the Secretary General for the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), that Makarim was his "personal representative" in East Timor. Moreover, he stated that Makarim sent him reports every day from East Timor and that they had become his daily "breakfast." Wiranto also exercised his command authority over the military through Major General Adam Rachmat Damiri, head of TNI Regional Command IX, which included East Timor and other sections of Indonesia. Damiri' s headquarters were located in Denpasar, Bali. Wiranto also exercised his command authority through Colonel Suhartono Suratman, head of TNI Sub-Regional Command 164, which consisted solely of East Timor. Suratman's headquarters were in Dili, East Timor. At a point, Suratman was replaced by Colonel Mohammad Noer Muis who similarly answered to Wiranto. Also operating in East Timor at this time as a subordinate of Wiranto was Lieutenant Colonel Yayat Sudrajat, Commander of the Intelligence Task Force in East Timor. Wiranto's exercise of his command authority was even more pronounced as of 7 September 1999 when martial law was declared in East Timor. This action followed the announcement of the results of the Popular Consultation and Wiranto's visit to East Timor on 5 September. Wiranto established the Martial Law Operations Command and appointed Major General Kiki Syahnakri as its commander. During the period 1998 to 1999, approximately 18,000 TNI soldiers were stationed in East Timor and were subject to the TNI command structure. Makarim, Damiri, Suratman, Muis, Sudrajat and Syahnakri are all named as defendants in the same indictment as Wiranto. Police Force Wiranto also exercised command authority over the Indonesian police force (POLRI), which was present in East Timor and responsible for 4 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ad7705/ maintaining law and order. The regional police chief in East Timor was Colonel Timbul Silaen who reported to Wiranto. His headquarters were in Dili. POLRI was part of the army until 1 April 1999 when the two institutions were separated. Nonetheless, even after that date, both the army and the police remained directly under Wiranto's authority as Minister of Defense and Security. Although they maintained separated command structures, in practice, POLRI forces in East Timor were often dominated by the TNI. With reference to both the regional police chief and the regional military commander, Wiranto testified before the Ad Hoc Tribunal in Jakarta that they "were chosen from the best people in the police and the army and they carried out the directives I had outlined." At the time of the Popular Consultation in August 1999, there were over 6000 police officers stationed in East Timor, a large portion of which was organized into an elite paramilitary unit called the Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB). Militia Groups The third force over which Wiranto exercised command authority was the pro-autonomy militia that was in large part recruited, organized, funded, trained, armed and directed by the armed forces under his command. Wiranto thus had effective control over the militia whose purpose was to intimidate the population of East Timor to support the autonomy option at the popular consultation and, later, to prevent the implementation of the results in which almost 80% of the voters rejected autonomy and decided for independence. The military and the police not only failed to prevent or stop the criminal actions of the various militia, but they planned, participated and assisted in the violence perpetrated by such groups. In some districts, TNI officers were appointed by their commanders to lead militia groups and in other districts, TNI commanders directly gave orders and support to militia groups. Militia leaders routinely traveled to Jakarta where they met with Wiranto and with high-ranking military leaders who worked directly under his control. On one occasion, Wiranto urged visiting leaders of various militia groups to unite in a common front and gave each of the Timorese large sums of cash. He also told them that Indonesia would never 5 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ad7705/ abandon East Timor regardless of the result of the referendum. Moreover, he said that the TNI would never leave East Timor. Markarim and Damiri also conducted meetings with militia leaders in Jakarta and Bali for the purpose of encouraging them to conduct military operations against pro-independence supporters in East Timor. Moreover, they provided militia leaders with money and guns for that purpose. On one occasion militia leaders entering a meeting with Wiranto were met at the entrance by General Makarim who promised to supply them machine guns. On another occasion, Syahnakri met with militia leaders in Jakarta and confirmed that firearms for the militia had been sent to East Timor where Suratman would arrange for their distribution. At different points, both Makarim and Suratman also met with militia leaders in East Timor concerning the possibility of a pro-independence vote in the Popular Consultation. At one meeting, Makarim stated that, if the pro-independence forces prevailed at the ballot box, the militia would be used to create disruption throughout East Timor. Similarly, Suratman met with pro-autonomy leaders and urged that they form a militia group, promising any form of assistance that they required. At a later point, he told a joint meeting of TNI and the militia that, if the voters rejected autonomy, a scorched earth policy would be pursued so that an independent East Timor would have to start with nothing.
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