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SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO and HIS GENERALS by Leonard C

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SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO and HIS GENERALS by Leonard C SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO AND HIS GENERALS by Leonard C. Sebastian EXECUTIVE SUMMARY a civilian government where the to provide the military with an special position of the armed forces adequate budget. Third, if a The Indonesian National Military allowed it autonomy to reserve civilian government is unable to (TNI, Tentera Nasional Indonesia) power enabling the TNI to play a maintain national stability and unity. may no longer be the most dominant leading role in politics or mediate Particularly in the third scenario, player in Indonesian politics but between political contenders. The the likelihood that the TNI will has pragmatically incorporated a TNI’s preeminent position was a temporarily re-enter the political strategy that enables it to play a reflection of its special entitlement arena in partnership with other like- significant “behind the scenes” role. owing to its role in the war of minded social and political forces The situation in Indonesia today independence (1945-48) where its to stabilize national politics cannot has closer parallels with the state defence of the Republic ensured be discounted. The mindset of of civil military relations in Germany that the returning Dutch colonialists the officer corps has not changed between the two World Wars or would not be able to subdue the drastically despite the abolition France in 1958.1 In analysing the TNI independence movement by military of its Dual Function role in 2000. relationship with the Yudhoyono means. There remains a deep contempt for presidency, this paper argues that civilian rule and a belief that only the Dr Yudhoyono enjoys the loyalty and The situation in Indonesia since TNI is capable of rising above the trust of the TNI elite. The current 1998 is delicately poised where petty rivalries and self-interested relationship can be defined as civilian leadership throughout the behaviour characteristic of post- partnership where the President archipelago is weak and divided Suharto era civilian politicians. Such protects the institutional interests allowing the military the possibility thinking will prevail for sometime. of the TNI while insulating it from to grab some measure of power. Presently, those assuming pivotal excessive reform measures that There are three possible scenarios command positions were middle might impede its effectiveness for military intervention in politics. ranking officers in 1998 holding and in return benefits from the First, civilian intrusion in matters ranks of Colonel or Lieutenant assurance that the TNI will secure considered within the realm of Colonel and serving either as Chiefs his Presidency. internal military autonomy and of Staffs in sub-region military BACKGROUND prerogative. Second, prolonged commands (Korem); Assistants to conditions which compromise the Regional Military Commander Indonesian society since 1945 was the welfare of a TNI soldier due to (Kodam); in middle management either under military rule or under an elected government’s inability positions at the Armed Forces 1 See Leonard C. Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use of Military Force (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006): p. 350. Policy Brief 1 Policy Brief: No 1/2007 January 2007 or Army Headquarters; or as self perception and despite its process; the territorial structure If East Timor was the stepping stone extending Gen Sutarto’s term of 1974 to 1976 still hold the largest Commanders of District Military withdrawal from politics, the officer allowed the Army considerable for an older generation of officers office with the intention of having percentage of strategic positions at Commands (Kodim). In 1998, these corps retains a mindset that they latitude at the regional level and from the mid-1970s to the late him oversee the TNI’s withdrawal the TNI Headquarters, Army central officers were in their forties and will are entitled to assume leadership if facilitated its involvement in local 1990s, then service in Aceh had now from Aceh. This action had the and regional commands. Most of the be expected to be in active service civilians cannot effectively protect business leading to the expansion become an important testing ground added benefit of allowing the officers in Class 1977 are currently until they reach the age of 58 years. the national interest. Note then of informal business activities; there the emerging TNI elite. All officers three service chiefs, one of whom, colonels and Korem Commanders. TNI commander General Wiranto’s were few if any serious efforts to promoted in the May 2004 reshuffle earmarked to become the Armed Many are expected to be promoted Indonesia today is a proto- carefully worded statement during root out the military personnel that took up their new appointments one Forces Commander time to gain to the rank of brigadier generals. democracy2 while employing Armed Forces Day in 1998 when were involved in the human rights year after the declaration of martial enough experience in order to be processes that preserve its he introduced the TNI’s “new violations; and there was also no law in the province. An Ambonese presented as a credible candidate. For the time being, President democratic image, in reality the paradigm” stating that the “TNI signal that the TNI would abandon officer, well regarded in intelligence Yudhoyono has managed to avert current political model is fraught would shift its role in politics and the security approach to conflicts, circles B.G. George Toisutta, the Djoko Santoso’s appointment as a possible dispute by ensuring that with disadvantages that encourage the national development process consequences of which were evident head of the Military Operations the Army Chief of Staff was the the number two spot in the Armed new forms of military participation. by not always being at the front of in recent violence in Papua and the Command in Aceh became first indication of the President’s Forces hierarchy stays with the For example, military officers still leadership, not to occupy but to general obstruction of government Commander of Kostrad’s First strategy to reshape the TNI elite. Army. Since the collapse of the hold prominent positions in cabinet; influence, not in a direct way but attempts to solve the Aceh conflict Infantry Division. Also promoted in The new service chiefs of the Navy, Suharto regime, the position of intelligence agencies are poorly indirectly, based on the willingness by peaceful means from 2000- a minor reshuffle in January 2005 Admiral Slamet Soebijanto, and Air Kasum TNI has consistently been regulated; military officers manage for political role sharing with other 2003 until the Tsunami struck in were two Aceh Korem commanders, Marshall Djoko Suyanto of the Air given to non-Army officers. Endang considerable economic resources; national groups in Indonesia”. The December 2004.1 Col Gerhan Lantara and Col A.Y. Force were Yudhoyono’s classmates Suwaryo’s appointment as Kasum populist nationalist causes are military’s withdrawal is tactical and Nasution currently commanding in the military academy (Class TNI ensures that while an Air Force also espoused by military leaders; we can safely assume conditioned ANALYSIS units in Kostrad. With the cessation 1973). Apart from the new service officer, Air Marshall Djoko Suyanto paramilitary forces continue to be or predicated on the state of national Officers that will figure prominently of hostilities in Aceh, it is likely that chiefs, the Aceh Commander Maj may be Armed Forces Commander, instruments for social control; the security in Indonesia. President within the TNI over the next Papua will become the next proving Gen Endang Suwaryo (Class 1973), the Army retains supreme control military’s presence in the provinces Yudhoyono then Chief of Territorial five years are products of three ground for a new generation of TNI became Deputy Army Chief of of all sections of TNI Headquarters. has been enhanced by strong Affairs (KASTER) under Wiranto will reshuffles, in October 2003, leaders. Staff. Yudhoyono’s brothers in law Those who implement policy at TNI patrimonial ties with local elites continue to support such a role for February 2004 and February-March – Maj Gen Erwin Sujono and Brig Headquarters from echelon II level and coupled with poor conditions the TNI. 2005. Prominent in the October 2003 The most significant reshuffle took Gen Pramono Edhie Wibowo were on down are predominantly from of public administration in the promotions were the top performers place in February-March 2005 which promoted a month later. During this the Army. As initiators of the Aceh provinces allow them significant Proof that the TNI still retained its of the military academy classes involved the replacement of the three period newly promoted Maj Gen peace process, both Yudhoyono and latitude to manipulate local political substantial autonomy and influence 1974 and 1975 some earmarked to service chiefs. The removal of hard- George Toisutta assumed command his Vice President Jusuf Kalla have processes. Such advantages allow in the Yudhoyono era is irrefutable: be future leaders of the TNI. Class line Army Chief of Staff Ryamizard of the strategically significant a vested interest in supporting an the military considerable leverage there were five senior officers as 1975 graduate Major-General Djoko Ryacuddu and the promotion of Lt Trikora Kodam in Papua. A further Air Force officer as TNI Commander to weaken democracy by steering cabinet ministers; a prominent Santoso, Kodam Jaya Commander Gen Djoko Santoso as his successor two officers were handpicked for convinced that a potential flare-up social forces in directions that number in political parties, became the new Army Chief of signaled a resolve of the new service in the Presidential Palace or there would be more likely with an benefit their interests. The TNI sees Yunos Yosfiah, Andi Ghalib, Amir Staff placing him in line to become administration to develop a new Istana. Col Kurdi Mustofa became Army officer in that position.
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