Two States in Need: the Recent Intensification of Turkey-Russia Relations

Two States In Need: The Recent Intensification of Turkey-Russia Relations

Master Thesis Political Science’

Name: Ferit Bahceci Professor: A. Freyberg-Inan Second Reader: Professor S. Rezaeiejan Title: Two States in Need: The Recent Intensification of Turkey-Russia Relations E-mail: [email protected] Date: 27 January 2017

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ...... 1 Research Question and Methodology ...... 2 The Syrian War ...... 3 Russian annexation of Crimea ...... 3 Turkish Stream ...... 4 Failed coup attempt in Turkey ...... 4 Structure of the thesis ...... 4

Chapter one: Historic overview of Turkey-Russia relations before 2011 ...... 6 1.1 Brief overview of Turkey-Russia relations before 1990 ...... 6 1.2 Russia’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era...... 7 1.3 Turkey’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era ...... 9 1.4 Turkey’s foreign policy under the rule of the AKP ...... 10 1.5 Turkey-Russia relations in the post-Cold War era ...... 11 1.5.1 Trade, Energy and Tourism ...... 11 1.5.2 The Caucasus ...... 12 1.5.3 Concluding remarks and possible threats ...... 13

Chapter two: Theoretical Framework ...... 15 2.1 Introducing neorealism ...... 15 2.2 Strategic Alliances ...... 17 2.2.1 Strategic Alliance Definition ...... 17 2.2.2 Establishment of Strategic Alliances ...... 17 2.2.3 Alliance Politics ...... 19 2.3 Propositions ...... 20 2.3.1 Empirical propositions...... 21

Chapter three: Analysis ...... 23 3.1. Part one: The formation phase ...... 23

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3.1.1 The Russo-Ukraine crisis ...... 23 3.1.2 Relations between Russia and the West after the Ukraine crisis ...... 24 3.1.3 Relations between Turkey and Russia after the Ukraine crisis ...... 26 3.1.4 The war in Syria ...... 27 3.1.5 The aftermath of the downing of a Russian military jet by the Turkish Air Force ...... 29 3.1.6 The Refugee crisis ...... 31 3.1.7 Conclusion ...... 33 3.2 Part two: Strategic partnership between Turkey and Russia ...... 34 3.2.1 The intensification of Turkey-Russia relations ...... 34 3.2.2 Relations between Turkey and the West after the failed coup ...... 35 3.2.3 Conclusion ...... 37 3.3 Part three: findings ...... 38 3.3.1 Conclusion ...... 40

Chapter four: Conclusion ...... 43

Literature List ...... 45

III

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Introduction

"Today's loss is linked to a stab in the back delivered to us by accomplices of terrorists. I cannot qualify what happened today as anything else, our plane was shot down on Syrian territory by an air-to-air missile from an F-16. It fell on Syrian territory 4 kilometers from the Turkish border. It was flying at 6,000 meters 1 kilometer from Turkish territory when it was attacked." (Putin, 2015)

Speaking at the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi on 24 November 2015, Russian president Putin reacted furious after Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet, near the Turkish-Syrian border. After decades of peaceful cooperation and economic integration, Turkey and Russia were on the brink of a new conflict. Yet, not one year later, on 10 October 2016, Turkey and Russia signed the strategic Turkish Stream pipeline and agreed to resolve the Syrian War (Onis and Yilmaz, 2016). A brief look at the bitter, and conflicting history of Turkey-Russia relations, teaches us how important good relations between Turkey and Russia are for stability in their perspective regions.

The purpose of this thesis is to provide an explanation of the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations, through the backdrop of the alliance theories brought about by neorealism. In this vein, neorealism is only used as an instrument to help answer the research question. Since security and assessing security plays a central role in the scholarly study of international politics, this study aims to contribute to the realm of alliance literature with a newly investigated case that examines the alternation of conflict and cooperation between Turkey and Russia.

The scope of this thesis is limited to the formation of an alliance on the premises that multipolarity has been the structural norm in contemporary international politics. Turkey and Russia are two of the countries that have developed themselves economic and political. Both countries are regional powers whose relation with the West is strained. In addition, both countries are dependent on one another in terms of trade in energy and regional stabilization. However, Turkey-Russia relations have historically been based on competition and great wars (Ozbay, 2011). For more than five centuries the two countries have maintained a complicated relationship. Their opposition during the Cold War is one of many examples of their hostile attitude towards one another. However, despite their differences, a transformation process is now bringing the two countries toward partnership and collaboration, as illustrated by the fact that both countries signed the agreement on Turkish Stream, the construction of an offshore pipeline from Russia to Turkey, on October 10 2016 and by the fact that Turkey and Russia agreed on draft nationwide ceasefire in Syria (Onis and Yilmaz, 2016). The current global economy is stimulating intensifying economic interaction among regional powers. Therefore, it is interesting to examine the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations to gain more insight on how emerging powers behave in a multipolar world. Therefore, the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations

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constitutes a useful case study for examining this transformation and for examining the conditions under which regional powers ally with each other to balance a potential hegemon or instead compete.

Research Question and Methodology What explains the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations?

The scope of the in-depth empirical investigation conducted in this thesis is limited to Turkey-Russia relations from 2011 onwards. There are several reasons for the application of this scope. Firstly, the literature already provides overviews and incentives that define Turkey-Russia relations through the ages. However, the literature does not provide explanations of the recent intensification of relations between both countries, which has had serious affects. It is therefore scientifically relevant to examine this case. Secondly, both countries are emerging regional powers whose policy is not necessarily based on Western values and both may seek to cooperate with each other to form a bloc against the West. This case, therefore, contributes to the debate on how emerging regional powers will formulate their grand strategies vis-à-vis with other major powers and with each other. Thirdly, analyzing the recent intensification of relations between Turkey and Russia, both key players in the Syrian War, will clearly highlight agreements that can contribute to promoting the Syrian peace process. It is therefore also of immediate social relevance to examine this case.

This study surveys the available literature on alliance formation and formulates propositions of alliance formation in multipolar systems. The theoretical framework, will draw heavily from Glenn Snyder’s (1984; 2007) assumption that the two main motives for forming an alliance are that (1) states will form alliances to increase their security position, and (2) states will ally in order to avoid isolation. Following from this principle, security benefits of alliances are determined by three factors: the intensity of threat posed by an adversary or its coalition, the urgency of prevention of an alliance between the partner and the opponent, and the elimination of the possibility of attack by the allied state. This theory will be used to help explain the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations. The empirical evidence in the chapter one and three will be drawn from empirical evidence reported in the existing studies of Turkey- Russia relations and other relevant sources of information, such as official documents coming from the Kremlin and Ankara, interviews with Russian and Turkish public servants, news articles, media reports, primary literature and secondary literature.

By using a systemic theory like neorealism, several other factors that could influence Turkey-Russia relations are excluded. The state or individual level do not count for neorealists. However, by examining Turkey-Russia relations from the period 2002 onward this problem can be circumvented. Since 2002 the AK-parti has held power in Turkey. Russia, in turn, did not experience a regime change in this period. This provides a set-up in which domestic politics can be deemed to have remained relatively

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stable as a possible source of explanation for foreign policy shifts. This allows us to focus more on external factors, as they stand in the focus on neorealist theory.

In order to answer the research question, this thesis will be divided into two parts. The first part will contain an overview of Turkey-Russia relations from the period 2002 onwards. The year 2002 is chosen since then the Adalet Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) took power. From this year on there was no regime change in Turkey nor in Russia. This means that changes in policy are less likely to have resulted from domestic power shifts and can more easily be attributed to external factors, such as those identified by neorealism. Analyzing Turkey-Russia relations from this period onward will therefore give a clear overview of the relations between both countries and their chosen policies from a structural realist perspective. When te theoretical framework has been clarified, a link can be made with the current relations. The second part, and main focus of this thesis, will contain an in-depth analysis from the period 2011 onward. Several important events mark this period that have had great influence on the recent evolution of Turkish- Russian relations; they will be laid out briefly below.

The Syrian War The emergence of the Syrian war marked as a significant obstacle in Turkey-Russia relations. While the Kremlin strengthened its relation with Syrian President Assad, the Turkish government supported the rebels by giving them financial and military aid. The policy of both countries resulted in a situation in which Russian aircraft were bombing Turkey backed rebels. The tension between both countries reached its boiling point when Turkey shot down a Russian jet after it violated Turkish airspace near the Turkish- Syrian border on 24 November 2015. Following the incident Russia rapidly approved a raft of severe sanctions. Russia banned the imports of Turkish fruit and vegetables, poultry and salt, holiday charters of Russians to Turkey and construction projects with Turkish firms in Russia . In addition, Russia suspended developments on Turkish Stream.

Russian annexation of Crimea Following the Ukrainian rejection of the Europe-Ukraine Association Agreement a great movement of protest against former president Viktor Yanukovych emerged, called the Euromaidan protests (Kuzio, 2015). The violent protests and Western pressure forced Yanukovych and his minister to flee Ukraine. This development sparked a political crisis in Crimea that resulted in the Russian annexation of the Peninsula. After the annexation, the West imposed sanctions on Russia, which had a negative effect on Russian relations with the West. Turkey opposed the Russian annexation because Crimea is home to a community of Tatars, who are ethnic and linguistic kin to the Turkish people and opposed potential Russian annexation of the peninsula (Paul, 2015). After the annexation Turkey has established close ties with the Ukrainian government (Paul, 2015). This has naturally led to tensions with the Russian government.

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Turkish Stream Energy is one of the main areas of cooperation between Turkey and Russia. Their geographical proximity and the lack of energy in Turkey along with Russian abundance of energy underline the importance of trade between the two countries (Onis and Yilmaz, 2016). On December 1 2014, during a visit of president Putin to Turkey, the Russian Gazprom and the Turkish company Botas Petroleum signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the construction of an offshore pipeline from Russia to Turkey, called Turkish Stream (ibid.). After Turkey downed a Russian jet near the Turkish-Syrian border on 24 November 2015, the project was stopped (Giuli, 2015).

Failed coup attempt in Turkey On 15 July 2016, a coup d’état was attempted in Turkey against state institutions, including the government of president Erdogan (BBC, 2016). During the attempt, carried out by a faction within the Turkish armed forces, president Erdogan urged the Turkish people to rise up against the coup. More than 300 people died and more than 2,100 people were injured during these events, due to the protests on the streets and its chaotic organization.

After the coup president Erdogan declared a state of emergency for a duration three months. The state of emergency allowed the government to bypass parliament when implementing new laws (ibid.). Because of this, thousands of people have been arrested or sacked. This has been the subject of criticism from both Western countries and domestic groups. The heavy-handed crackdown towards his opponents was strongly criticized by NATO, giving Erdogan the incentive to seek more cooperation with Russia, as Turkey expressed its satisfaction with the unconditional support president Putin lent to the Turkish government after the failed coup attempt. Turkey’s foreign minister Çavuşoğlu said on Haberturk TV on 25 July 2016: “We thank the Russian authorities, particularly President Putin. We have received unconditional support from Russia, unlike other countries,” highlighting the lack of Western support. As after the coup Ankara was eager to restore its relations with Moscow, president Erdogan wrote president Putin a letter in which he apologized for downing the Russian fighter jet. The apology was received in good order and both countries sought rapprochement, which resulted in lifting sanctions and continued talks on Turkish Stream.

Structure of the thesis Chapter one Historic overview of Turkey-Russia relations before 2011: The present-day relations between Turkey and Russia are the product of numerous developments in the past. Periodic occurrences of conflict and collaboration have alternated, which makes it important to gain knowledge of the fundamentals that marked Turkey-Russia relations until the period under thorough investigation here, which begins in 2011. Hence, this chapter will outline Turkey-Russia before this period, whereby the elements become clear that are of importance in Turkey-Russia relations.

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Chapter two Theoretical framework: The theoretical framework provides an in-depth analysis and discussion of the theoretical perspective used and the theoretical expectations guiding this study. On the level of the international system, neorealism will be used to theorize the behavior of states. Next, I will outline more specific literature on strategic partnership in keeping with neorealism. When this is outlined, I will translate neorealist expectations to provide explanations for the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations and formulate concrete propositions for my research.

Chapter three Analysis: This chapter describes the empirical findings. First, I will examine each individual event that had a major impact on Turkey-Russia relations from 2011 onwards. In doing so, I will outline all relevant facts that influenced Turkey-Russia relations, which ultimately led to their recent intensification. Second, I will look at the recent intensification, while examining the actions of all relevant actors. This in turn, enables me to examine the joint and unilateral process by which alliance members try to keep the partnership alive and advance their own interests with it. This enables me to develop valid explanations of the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations. Finally, I will discuss the findings and answer the research question

Chapter four Conclusion: The final chapter provides a short overview of the master thesis and attempts to discuss the findings. Furthermore, I will discuss the limitations of this thesis and make suggestions on further research.

Now that the purpose of this thesis, the research question, methodology and structure are outlined, I am ready to examine the historic overview of Turkey-Russia relations. Hence, the following chapter will outline the history of Turkey-Russia relations and discuss the elements that are of importance in Turkey-Russia relations.

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Chapter one: Historic overview of Turkey-Russia relations before 2011

A glance through history shows that Turkey and Russia are linked through a partnership with peaks and valleys. The historical, cultural, and ethnic bonds and geographical position of Turkey and Russia have always had a large impact on the stability in their perspective regions. Throughout the past 500 years, the Russians and Ottomans fought 13 bloody wars, exchanged tribes and developed cordial relations. The present day, relations between Turkey and Russia are the product of numerous developments in the past. Periodic occurrences of conflict and collaboration alternate, which makes it important to gain knowledge of the fundamentals that marked Turkey-Russia relations until the period under thorough investigation here, which begins in 2011. Hence, this chapter will outline Turkey-Russia relations before this period, whereby the elements that are of importance in Turkey-Russia relations will become clear.

1.1 Brief overview of Turkey-Russia relations before 1990 For more than 5 centuries the Turks and Russians fought wars and disputed the control over the Black Sea. The first conflict between Turkey and Russia dates from 1676-1681 and was sparked by Russia to establish a warm-water port on the Black Sea (Akturk, 2014). This was the beginning of a series of wars fought between the Russian empire and the Ottoman empire between the 16th and 20th century, and which to this day has left its traces in the Black Sea region. It is unquestionable that for the previous three centuries (1676-1991), Russia was the most important security threat for the Ottoman empire and post- Ottoman Turkey. The Russo-Ottoman wars led to the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, when in March 1878 Russia concluded the Treaty of San Stefano with Turkey. This treaty freed the Balkans from Turkish rule and created an autonomous Bulgaria under protection of Russia. It is interesting to notice that both sides used the war to protect their national interest. For example, once the Russian expansion in the early nineteenth century, Circassians, Crimean Tartars, and Nogai located on Russian territory, had to find refuge to save themselves from the Russian aggression. These tribes fled to the Ottoman empire and constituted a valuable source of human capital for a country that fought its wars, remained in a weak and vulnerable economic position and faced problems with separatist movements (Kaya, 2005). The newcomers contributed in two ways: as a source of manpower for the Ottoman army and as a buffer against separatist movements (Kaya, 2005). Russia, in turn, conquered the Caucasus, dominated the Balkan Peninsula and gained control of the Dardanelles and the Bosphurus. In doing so, Russia retained access to the world trade route.

The Russo-Ottoman Wars lay at the basis of a new conflict during the first World War. On 2 August 2014, the Ottoman empire signed a secret treaty of alliance with Germany (Taylor, 1974). The main objective for the Ottoman Empire was the repossession of territory in the Caucasus, which was conquered by the Soviet Union during the Russo-Ottoman Wars (Taylor, 1974). On 5 December 1917,

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an armistice was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Russians and the war between both sides ended with the Treaty of Kars signed in March 1921 (Taylor, 1974). During the Cold-War, tensions between both sides sparkled again, when Russia forced Turkey to allow Soviet shipping to flow freely through the Turkish Straits. With Turkey’s refusal to the Soviet Union’s request, tensions arose in the region leading Turkey toward the United States and NATO (Howard, 1970). Given three hundred years of rivalry and conflict, makes it even more interesting to examine the recent intensification of Turkey- Russia relations.

1.2 Russia’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era Russian expansionism focused on access to naval locations and after the integration of Central Asian, Caucasian and Siberian peoples, the state focused on the policy of Russification. However, everything changed since the Perestroika in the mid-1980s, and consequently the division between the Westerners and Eurasianists (Patomaki and Pursiainen, 2005). While the Westerners believed that Russia could become a European democracy, Eurasianists assert that Russia is inter-connected by geographical, historical and cultural independence that has formed its identity and territorial presence (O’Loughlin, 2001). With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Boris Yeltsin’s election as first president of the Russian Federation the relations between Russia and the West were generally considered to be quite warm. However, with Vladimir Putin’s election in 2000, who represents a moderate form of Eurasianism and continued distancing from the Westerners, who dominated Russian politics from 1991 to 1994, the Russian foreign policy underwent a major change. Putin clearly set out the problems Russian faced and acknowledged that Russia needed little assistance from the West, but instead should rely on Russians themselves to solve their problems.

“Russia is in the midst of one of the most difficult periods in its history. For the first time in 200- 300 years, it is facing a real threat of sliding to the second, and possibly even third, echelon of world states. We are running out of time to remove this threat.” (Putin ,2000)

Given the need for direct action, president Putin accepted the penetration of Western ideals of private ownership and universal democratic values. Building further on this, president Putin outlined three core values that define his policy: a strong state, patriotism and social solidarity (O’Loughlin, 2001). In doing so, Putin aimed to develop a strong state power in Russia that is built on democratic values that consequently will bring Russian prestige back in international politics (Goldman, 2008).

Since the election of president Putin, the Western world was concerned that the Kremlin aimed to rebuild the sphere of influence in what the Kremlin called ‘near abroad’ (Rutland, 2008). The fear of Russian democracy grew, seeing it as in retreat with the arrest of the wealthy oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky in 2003, and Putin’s unwillingness to withdraw troops from Georgia and Ukraine, and the Russian

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intervention in the Ukrainian presidential election in 2004 (Rutland, 2008). These developments were the first sign of a new East-West divide since the end of the Cold War.

In June 2000, Russia presented its official foreign policy doctrine. Surprisingly there was no mention of its energy-plan while the foundation of the Russian economy is built upon energy trade with its neighboring countries and the Western world. Russia’s energy concerns and the related security consequences can be divided in four categories: competition in the Caspian Basin and former Soviet republics, Russian policy regarding the Persian Gulf, emerging trade possibilities with East-Asia, and its energy exports to Europe (Jaffe and Manning, 2001). Russia’s determination in becoming an energy superpower are starkly unilateral, since Russia has not been willing to cooperate with OPEC. The given that Russia uses its energy sources as a tool to influence its role in international politics stoked anxiety and driven countries to seek alliances to counterbalance its dependence on Russian oil and gas (Rutland, 2008). From the scientific literature on international politics it appears that due to Russian foreign policy the country is isolated on the international stage without a strong power as it ally (Goldman, 2008; Rutland, 2008). However, with president Putin in power, Russia’s foreign policy proved to be effective. Russia’s oil-export earnings grew 130% in the first half of 2000 compared to the previous year (Rutland, 2008). Russia’s energy exports represent more than 20% of Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP), and about 55% of its total hard currency earnings (Rutland, 2008). Consequently, its annual GDP Annual Growth Rate showed positive numbers from 2000 to 2008. However, the economic crisis in 2008 hit the country’s energy sector and it became painfully obvious how dependent Russia is on its energy export.

In conclusion, after he came to power in late 1999, Vladimir Putin has sesignaled interest in developing a powerful and self-confident Russia. According to scholars like Tsygankov (2016), Secrieru (2006), Lo (2008), Rutland (2008), Mankhoff (2009), and Jaffe and Manning, (2001), president Putin’s foreign policy was aimed to reconstruct Russia’s identity and a strategy for restoring Russia’s power position in international politics. With Putin in power, Russia constructed a foreign policy based on economic recovery, international trade, modernization and a recreation of Russia’s identity (Tsygankov, 2016: 139). Furthermore, president Putin was keen to promote trade twith the European Union and the United States. And yet, despite the Russian objective to encourage relations with the West, president Putin cannot be typified as a pro-Western president. It is true that deepening economic cooperation with the West resulted in energy agreements and Western investments in Russia. But simultaneously, the economic growth resulting from this policy reflects Russia’s power position and has opened the path to defend Russia’s interests in international politics more forcefully (Tsygankov, 2016). Russia’s foreign policy, consequently, became more independent and self-assertive.

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1.3 Turkey’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of independent states in the Caucasus, Eastern-Europe and Central Asia presented the possibility for Turkey to increase its influence and signal its interest in becoming a regional power. As a result, Turkey expanded its power in states with people of common historical descent, like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Onis, 2001). The increasing interest of Turkey in this region resulted in the so called Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) (Aras and Akpinar, 2011). Evidently, this organization was supported by the West and came at the expense of Russia’s power position in the region. Despite Turkey’s increase in power at the expense of Russia and the remaining distrust and hostility inherited from the Cold War, the two countries came closer to each other in the 1990s. The main reason for this is that the perceived threat from Russia towards Turkey reduced because the Turkish economy grew stronger than the Russian economy throughout this period. The Turkish GDP contained in 1990 about ten percent of Soviet GDP, while in 1999 Turkish GDP contained about eighty percent of Russia’s GDP (Akturk, 2013). According to influential scholars on this topic, like Onis (2016) and Akturk (2013), this was a vital feature that contributed to Turkey-Russia relations throughout the post-Cold War period.

The Europeanisation process, whose foundations were laid back in September 1959 with Turkey’s application for associate membership of the European Economic Community, continued in the post- Cold War era after a chaotic period in the 1980s (Bardakci et al., 2016). Turkey applied for full EEC membership in April 1987, which was confirmed by the Commission in December 1989 and finalized in March 1995 by the Association Council (Bardakci et al., 2016). However, the decision of EU leaders at the Luxembourg Summit in 2007 to decline the candidate status, was a major setback for Turkey’s aspirations in becoming an EU member. Moreover, resulting from the war with Kurdish separatist groups, Turkey started a cross-border operation in Northern Iraq called Operation Steel between 20 March and 4 May 1995 (Muftuler-Bac, 1996: p.262). The European Parliament opposed this operation and passed resolutions against Operation Steel on 26 April 1995 (Muftuler-Bac, 1996: p.263). Overall, it can be said that during this period relations between the EU and Turkey stagnated.

However, after the AKP took power in 2002, the accession process continued and on 13 December 2002 the Copenhagen Summit decided to open accession negations with Turkey. Yet, Turkey had to improve its the rule of law, human rights including the protection of its minorities as described in the Copenhagen political criteria for membership (Bardakci et al., 2016). The AKP-government showed serious progress to satisfy these conditions whereby the European Council on 17 December 2004 decided to open accession negations with Turkey. Nonetheless, from this time on relations between Turkey and the EU have faced difficulties. Firstly, the EU had accepted Cyprus as a member, which is a setback in Turkish perspective. Secondly, the probability of EU membership for Turkey reduced due to critical voices from leading EU leaders, like Germany and France and further reinforced trough the rejection of the EU constitutional treaty by France and the Netherlands (Bardakci et al., 2016). Thirdly, the increased

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domestic problems in Turkey has given the EU more ground to criticize the accession progress which eventually led to the Commission’s decision to suspend talks with Turkey in December 2006 (Bardakci et al., 2016)

From this time on, relations between the EU and Turkey stagnated due to several reasons. Firstly, when the AKP was re-elected in 2007, its policy been undoubtedly the subject of serious criticism within the country as well as from outside. The criticism voiced concern that the party was undermining the secular constitution and trying to realize an Islamic state. Secondly, in October 2008 the Ergenekon trials started, in which 86 members of the military and security establishment stood accused of launching a military coup against the government (Bardakci et al., 2016). However, despite growing concerns the Europeanization process continued. The AKP government implemented changes in its policy against the Kurds and sought to cooperate with Armenia by signing a peace accord in Zurich, in October 2009. In addition, on 12 September 2010 the AKP won a landmark referendum on constitutional reform whereby the parliament increased its control over the army and judiciary (Bardakci et al., 2016). In sum, Ankara’s desire in becoming an EU member stagnated since the end of the second year of the AKP government. Although the country proved that it suited some of the EU requirements, the likelihood of accession is very small.

1.4 Turkey’s foreign policy under the rule of the AKP It is virtually impossible to discuss the foreign policy of Turkey since the AKP took power in 2002, without a reference to Ahmet Davutoglu. As one of the few academics in the government of AKP, Davutoglu played a central role in the development of Turkey’s new aspirations in international politics. According to Davutoglu (2001) Turkey is not a regional power but a central power due to its history and strategic position. He emphasizes that Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea country, and hence can exercise influence in all these areas and consequently claim a global strategic role. In his view, Turkey should develop a proactive policy corresponding to its historic and geographic depth, inherited by its Ottoman legacy (Grigoriadis, 2010). To achieve that objective, Davutoglu (2001) classifies two conditions. First, Turkey should solve its domestic problems by finding a solution for the Kurdish question, as well as the polarization between the Islamist and secularist movements in the country. In doing so, the social cohesion and the functionality of the state will be protected. Second, Turkey should resolve all the bilateral disputes that distorted its relationship with its neighbors. In what he calls the “zero-problem policy with neighbors”, Davutoglu (2001) contends that for Turkey to become a central power, it needs to develop cordial relations with all its neighbors. Furthermore, developing good relations with all rising global powers, such as China, Russia, and India, is of great importance to achieve this plan (Grigoriadis, 2010).

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1.5 Turkey-Russia relations in the post-Cold War era As argued, the start of the twenty-first century marked for both countries a period of political transformation and economic development. In line with the Davutoglu doctrine, the Turkish government made significant changes for improving relations with Russia after Erdogan took office in 2002. Economic trade between the two countries began to grow, and the AKP government pursued deepening economic and energy ties to open the way for cooperation also on political and security questions (Aras, 2009). The strong economic development of both countries, alongside with a shift in their foreign policy, resulted in buoyant relations between the two countries. Throughout this period several important events mark Turkey-Russia relations, as outlined below.

1.5.1 Trade, Energy and Tourism By the turn of the 21st century, after five centuries of war, rivalry and competition, Russia had become an important trading partner of Turkey. The number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey grew quickly and Turkish universities worked closely together with Russian universities. The most important feature of Turkey-Russia relations in this period is the deepening economic interdependence between both countries. The bilateral economic relations comprise three main aspects: trade, energy and tourism. The trade volume between Turkey and Russia expanded from 5.1 million dollars in 2002 to 34 million dollars in 2011 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2016). In addition, the two countries are interdependent on one another with respect to energy. In the period 2002-2011, Turkey and Russia agreed on two energy deals. First, the Blue Stream project, a gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey, on which Turkey is largely dependent due to international sanctions against Iran, another potential energy supplier (Onis and Yilmaz, 2016) In addition, on 12 March 2010, Turkey and Russia came to an agreement on the construction of a nuclear power plant Buyukcelli, Mersin province (Akkuyu Nukleer, 2011). With respect to tourism, Turkey is heavily dependent on Russian visitors (Onis and Yilmaz, 2016). The number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey in 2009 was more than 3 million, second only to the German tourists (WTTC, 2015). The contribution of the tourist sector to the Turkish GDP was about 11% and supported more than 8% of all jobs during the period 2002-2011 (WTTC, 2015). Turkey, therefore, is quite heavily dependent on Russian tourists (WTTC, 2015).

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Figure 1: Turkey’s exports and imports with Russia (in million dollars)

35000

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0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 imports exports

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2016

In a world of increasing energy demand, the global competition over access to and control of energy resources has been strengthening. On the hand, Turkey’s dependence on Russian gas and consequently the development of Blue Stream underlines that both sides are willing to cooperate on large-scale projects. On the other hand, Turkey’s desire in becoming an energy-hub as a transit country increased competition with Russia over energy issues (Onis and Yilmaz, 2009). For instance, when the United States organized a meeting in 1999 with Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan on the construction of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, who entered force in 2006, Russia was against the pipeline because it wanted to control all energy resources in the Caspian Sea through Russia (Bacik, 2006). The steps and choices made by the United States to develop a pipeline based on American perspectives, were therefore considered to be hostile by Russia. In contrast, the United States supported the pipeline because it would reduce Russia’s political influence in the Caucasus and would further isolate Iran (Bacik, 2006). In this vein, Russia is heavily dependent on cooperation with Turkey in order to sustain and further development of its energy policy. Especially when taking into account that Russian energy exports represents more than 20% of Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP), and about 55% of its total hard currency earnings (Bacik, 2006).

1.5.2 The Caucasus Throughout their history, the Caucasus always has been a sensitive issue in Turkey-Russia relations. Yet, since the AKP took office in 2002, both countries came closer than ever to reaching stabilization in the Caucasus. The main reason for this is the Davutoglu doctrine, in which the foreign minister of Turkey advocates for zero-problems with all neighbours. However, the conflict in Georgia in 2008 posed

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a problem for Turkey-Russia relations. Turkey was confronted with a critical test of its neutral stance on critical issues between Russia and the West when US warships passed through Turkish waters to aid the Georgian army (Devrim and Schulz, 2009). In addition, Turkey has supported Georgia on the political and economic level since the collapse of the Soviet-Union (Devrim and Schulz, 2009). Despite this, Turkey succeeded in remaining neutral and was involved in peace efforts. During the War, president Erdogan stressed the importance of Turkey-Russia relations: “America is our ally and Russia is an important neighbor. Russia is our number one trade partner. We are obtaining two-thirds of our energy- program from Russia. We act in accordance to our national interest. We cannot ignore Russia” (NTV, 2008). Therefore, Turkey launched an initiative for stabilization in the Caucasus called the Caucasus Stability and Corporation Platform (CSCP) (Devrim and Schultz, 2009).

From Turkey’s establishment of the CSPS the following can be deduced. First, the CSPS demonstrated Turkey’s engagement in the region without the involvement of the West (Cornell, 2012). Yet, the plan was welcomed by the European Union and widely supported by all member states (Cornell, 2012). In addition, Turkey’s authorization for US warships to sail through Turkish waters reveals that Turkey is still a reliable ally of the West. However, the proposed CSPS includes only three Caucasian states, Turkey and Russia; neither members of the European Union nor the United States are included within this program (Kaya and Cornell, 2012) Therefore, Turkey’s involvement in the Caucasus and the notion of the CSCP would seem to imply that Turkey is shifting from a pro-Western foreign policy to a more autonomous foreign policy in keeping with its neutral stance.

1.5.3 Concluding remarks and possible threats In conclusion, since Russian president Putin and Turkish president Erdogan came to power Turkey- Russia relations have improved. Both countries developed and became stable independent regional powers. In addition, it appears from the above analysis that both countries developed an independent and self-confident foreign policy since the appointment of president Putin and president Erdogan, respectively. Yet, despite their closer relation, some possible threats remain. First, with Putin in power, Russia’s growing economic, political and military strength is giving it a greater role in international politics. Turkey, therefore, has more reason to fear a powerful state like Russia. Second, a stronger Russia will seriously challenge the balance of power in Europe and gives the EU more reason to fear Russia. This might cause problems for Turkey-Russia relations, as, as the War in Georgia shows, it will remain very difficult for Turkey to take a neutral stance in conflicts between the EU and/or the US and Russia especially since it is of course NATO member. Moreover, following the global economic crisis in 2008, the economic growth stalled in both countries. It is, therefore, interesting to investigate how both sides developed their foreign policy from 2011 onwards.

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Now that the fundamentals of Turkey-Russia relations are clarified and the basics of Turkey’s and Russia’s foreign policy have been highlighted, I can outline the theoretical framework which I will use to guide my empirical research into the period from 2011.

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Chapter two: Theoretical Framework

This chapter provides an in-depth analysis and discussion of the theoretical perspective used and the theoretical expectations guiding this study. On the level of the international system, neorealism will be used to theorize the behavior of states. Next, I will outline more specific literature on strategic partnership in keeping with neorealism. When this is outlined, I will translate neorealist expectations to provide explanations for the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations and formulate concrete propositions for my research.

2.1 Introducing neorealism Neorealism has been one of the most influential theoretical schools in International Relations. The most cited scholar of this theory is Kenneth Waltz, whose Theory of International Politics (1979) has laid the foundation of neorealism. In this thesis, the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations will be studied from a neorealist theoretical perspective.

For Waltz (1979), a theory is a mental picture of a certain domain that explains which are the most important parts of the domain and which causal forces are at play between those parts. The function of a theory is to explain the causal mechanism(s) behind a correlation. Waltz (1979) asserts that a theory must be parsimonious and generate testable prediction. However, he rejects the idea that a theory is falsified if one case does not correspond to its predictions. Waltz (1979) states that a theory must be subjected to different empirical tests to examine whether it produces right predictions, arguing that these tests must be constructed in a difficult way to discover the limits of the theory.

In his work, Waltz (1979) describes that his theory is built on two simple assumptions. First, he argues that states are the key actors in international politics and they operate in an anarchic system, characterized by ‘the absence of a central authority to enforce states’ adherence to promises or agreements’ (Milner, 1991). The core assumption that anarchy is the defining characteristic compels states to make security their highest objective, and accumulating relative power is the means to accomplish this goal (Waltz, 1979). In this theory, states are rational actors who shape policy based on a cost-benefit analysis. Per this theory, strategic alliances can (but do not have to) emerge as nations form alliances to counterbalance against those who would accumulate preponderant power, in the most extreme case hegemony. In this vein, the changing balance (relative power) between countries can be seen as forcing states to change policy to maintain their relative power position.

Drawing on the core assumption that anarchy is the structure of the international system and self-help the modus vivendi resulting from this, neorealist scholars sketch strategies on how to survive in different situations of power polarity (Lebow, 1994). During the Cold-War, neorealist attributed the stability in international politics to its bipolar structure. According to neorealist thinking, a bipolar system is less

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war-prone because the two great powers are less likely to misjudge their relative strengths and reliability of opposing coalitions (Waltz, 1979). Consequently, the bipolar system reduces uncertainty and security calculations are easier to make. Therefore, the two regional hegemons will engage in internal balancing, which means that they will be concerned with domestic military build-up (Waltz, 1979). In contrast to the behavior of states in a bipolar system, in a multipolar or unipolar system states will engage in external balancing, which means that they will form alliances to counter a stronger power (Waltz, 1979). In a multipolar world, alliances need to be made to realize a stable balance of power. In a unipolar world, states will feel threatened by the unconstrained power of the hegemon and aim to balance it.

The end of the Cold-War posed a challenge for neorealist thinking, as neorealist had attributed the stability of international politics to its bipolar structure (Waltz, 2000). When in 1990 the international system of world politics shifted from a bipolar system to a unipolar (in Waltz’s perspective) system, without the emergence of a great war, neorealist assumptions came under pressure, as neorealism argues that without the outbreak of war the structure of international politics cannot be changed (Waltz, 1979). At first, Waltz (1993) denied that the world was shifting from a bipolar system to a unipolar system, arguing that Russia could maintain its power position due to its nuclear technology. However, in a later stage, Waltz (2000) recognized that the world had been shifted to unipolarity. He added that a unipolar structure is doomed to be short-lived, as in a unipolar system states will feel threatened by the unconstrained power of the hegemon and aim to balance it (Waltz, 2000). A multipolar system or possibly another bipolar stand-off are likely to result after a relatively short time.

In sum Waltz reasons that alliances will always be aimed at another state or alliance of states and the target is to gain relative power at the expense of the other to ensure one’s security position. Waltz (1979) defines power in terms of the distribution of capabilities, so that any actor’s power depends on the amount of power of the others. He argues that power can be measured based on a state’s territorial size, size of population, military strength, economic capability, resource endowment, and political stability. These factors in comparison with those of other states define the power position of a state or alliance. This balance of power theory has influenced the current debate on strategic alliances tremendously, as other influential scholars such as Glenn Snyder (2007) and Stephan Walt (1987) have based their work on the claims Waltz has made.

However, by defining the structure of international politics as anarchic, with states as like-units who only shape their policy in terms of security, several other factors are excluded. For explaining strategic alliances between countries, it is according to this perspective irrelevant what ideology states embrace, or which regime-type dominates, and aspects such as culture and religion are not considered. The domestic characteristics and politics of states and their potential allies are in other words considered largely irrelevant to their decisions regarding alliance-making and –breaking. This is clearly a simplification of reality. However, by examining Turkey-Russia relations from the period 2002 onward

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this theoretical limitation is to some extent neutralized. Since 2002 the AK-parti has held power in Turkey. Russia, in turn, did not experience a regime change in this period. This provides a set-up in which domestic politics can be deemed to have remained relatively stable as a possible source of explanation for foreign policy shifts. This allows me to focus more on external factors, as they stand in the focus on neorealist theory, and makes neorealist a more plausible theoretical perspective to apply to this case.

2.2 Strategic Alliances Forming strategic alliances is an interesting field of study in International Relations. The neorealist assumptions presented above present the overall incentives on which states are presumed to base their foreign policy and in which situations states may decide to enter a strategic alliance. However, to answer the research question there is additional need for more specific literature on what explains the timing and nature of specific strategic alliances.

2.2.1 Strategic Alliance Definition Before outlining theoretical claims on strategic alliances there is need to define the term ‘strategic alliances’. Despite the fact that the emergence of a strategic alliance is a prominent topic in the study of International Relations, there is no unifying definition. The two most commonly used definitions are those from Walt and Snyder. Walt (1990) defines strategic alliances as a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states. Snyder (2007) defines strategic alliances as formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own partnership. Even though Snyder (2007) describes in his definition that strategic partnership must be military-orientated, he does not rule out that strategic partnership can occur to achieve other purposes. Waltz (1979) points out that the concept of a strategic alliance implies that states have some but not all of their interests in common and emphasizes that alliance strategies are always the product of compromise, since the interests of allies and their notions of how to secure them are never identical. In this thesis, the definition of Walt and Waltz will be adopted, because cooperation between Turkey and Russia is of course not so much military as economic and political. By applying a broad definition like Waltz’s, the strategic alliance between Turkey and Russia can be best examined. Now that this issue has been clarified, I can describe and explain strategic partnership from a substantive point of view.

2.2.2 Establishment of Strategic Alliances “It is impossible to speak about IR without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name. For the same reason, it has always been difficult to say much that is peculiar to alliances on the plane of general analysis” (Liska, 1962). With this quote, George Liska starts his work Nations in

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Alliance (1962), in which he examines the formation of strategic alliances and which to date remains the leading treatment in the study of strategic alliances.

Liska (1962) argues that alliances evolve in order to reduce the impact of antagonistic power, perceived as pressure which threatens the independence of a state. He describes two characteristics that may promote strategic alliances. First, he argues that an alliance is a specific international relationship because it is an agreement for the achievement of a specific objective (Liska, 1962). Second, Liska (1962) contends that the emergence of an alliance is prompted by opposition to an outside party. Regardless of the type of alliance (military or non-military), cooperation between states exists to take a common stand on a variety of issues to form a bloc against opposed states, and in this way, generate more security. When the security of states is threatened and the plausibility of war becomes sufficiently intense, then states will form an alliance to ensure their security position. In sum, Liska (1962) argues that alliances are created for a state’s specific purposes and cooperation between states is a result of conflict with rival states. In addition, Liska (1962) points out that the power of factors related to trade is weaker for the emergence of an alliance, due to fears of economic interdependence, and therefore alliances are primarily formed against threatening states and not to gain economic advantages. By in this way emphasizing security concerns as the driving force for the establishment of strategic alliances, Liska’s argument has come to be popular and exert a strong influence in neorealist theory.

As it now has been clarified that Liska’s work is in line with basic realist tenets, it becomes necessary to explain the underlying factors which allow an alliance to exist and function, according to this theory. Liska (1962) presents three main explanations for the arising of an alliance: (1) The protection that comes from the formed alliance outweighs the external threat; (2) the opportunities that come from the formed alliance outweigh the political costs that emerge from the alliance; and (3) the status enlargement that comes from the formed alliance outweighs possible losses of independence resulting from the alliance. All three explanations have not necessarily to be the case, since the main argument holds that states will form an alliance to ensure their security position against an external threat. Liska’s analysis of the establishment of strategic alliances can be attributed to the nature of international politics in the 1960’s. In his work, he provides an in-depth analysis of the Warsaw Pact and Western alliances. His conclusion is that Western countries need to find premises for existence beyond the ideological status- quo because an alliance will be intensified when states follow the principle of the formation of strategic partnership: consistently allocate relative power. Because Liska is one of the first scholars who examined the establishment of strategic alliances based on neorealist claims, many other authors build upon his work (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Walt, 1990; Snyder, 2007). For the sake of better understanding this line of reasoning, the following section will outline the claims of Snyder (2007) made in his work Alliance Politics. By doing so, a broader picture of the establishment of strategic alliances will be provided which in a next step will enable this thesis to establish plausible neorealist propositions to explain the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations.

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2.2.3 Alliance Politics Drawing on the core assumptions that Liska made, Snyder (2007) asserts that alliances emerge in the pursuit of a common goal: the deterrence of conflict with an outside party. Snyder (2007) bases his predictions and presumptions on the neorealist model, as he argues that states act rationally and the primary interest of states is to survive in the international system. In addition, Snyder (2007) explains that his theory is based on neorealist theory but enlarges that theory by introducing a stronger focus on decision-making processes.

Just as neorealist theory more generally, the alliance theory developed by Snyder (2007) is based on the perceived primacy of the need for survival in the anarchical system. In such an anarchical system states, must be consistently concerned about their security, because they are surrounded by other states which have capabilities to attack and dominate them (Snyder, 2007). Thus, states have the need to protect themselves in several ways, one of which is the establishment of strategic alliances. By doing so, states remove the anarchic fear between the allies. In contrast, forming an alliance is perceived to stimulate anarchic fear in other states against which the alliance is directed. The formation of an alliance, therefore, is intended for mutual defensive purposes and is perceived to promote counter alliances due to the insecurity and fear originating from the anarchical system. Moreover, since in the anarchical system there is no central power that can force states to keep their side of the bargain, the existence of a strategic alliance will depend on the self-interest of the involved parties. Hence the value and survival of any alliance are sensitive to the possibility of the partner’s defection (Snyder, 2007).

The relationship between states in the anarchical system include their conflicts and their common interests. Snyder (2007) makes a division between strategic interests and interests. According to him, strategic interests are interests defined in power and are valued not for themselves but for their influence to the defense or advancement of other interest in the future. Examples of strategic interests are the protection of national territory, and energy sources, to the extent these possessions contribute to the relative power and security of a state. In contrast to strategic interests, particular interests are valued for their inherent and immediate material and military value (Snyder, 2007). In addition, strategic interests are strongly influenced by the polarity of the international system. In a bipolar system, the strategic interest of the two superpowers are mostly determined by the power structure itself. In the multipolar system, on the other hand, strategic interest differs with the formation of an alliance. In a multipolar system, which is the norm in this thesis, the balancing of perceived strategic threats forms the basis for an alliance and the matching of particular interests fosters alignment.

Now that it has been clarified based on which factors states generally form their foreign policy, according to neorealism, it is necessary to outline when and why states will enter an alliance. For Snyder (2007), states will establish alliances based on a rational cost-benefit analysis. The benefits are counted chiefly in terms of increased security. This broad concept is subdivided by Snyder (2007) into (1) enhanced deterrence of attack on oneself; (2) enhanced capability for defense against attack on oneself;

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(3) enhanced deterrence of attack on ally; (4) prevention of alliance or alignment between the partner and the opponent; (5) elimination of the possibility of attack by the allied state; and (6) increased control or influence over the allied state. In contrast, the principal costs of alliance are (1) the risk of coming to the aid of the ally; (2) the risk of entrapment in war by the ally; (3) the risk of counter alliance; (4) hindrance of alternative alliance options; and (5) general limits on freedom of action.

2.3 Propositions Based on the theoretical claims made in the work of Waltz (1979), Liska (1962) and Snyder (2007) on the emergence of strategic partnerships, the following propositions can be drawn up:

1. States will form alliances when there is a common external threat and forming an alliance is perceived to enhance deterrence of attack and enhance capabilities for defense against attack on oneself. 2. States will form alliances when there is a common external threat and forming an alliance is perceived to make the emergence of an alliance between the partner and the opponent less likely. 3. States will form alliances when there is a common external threat and forming an alliance is perceived to reduce the possibility of attack by the allied state.

In keeping with the theoretical framework, the main condition for forming an alliance is an external threat, the alternative explanations for the forming of an alliance are only of importance when there is an external threat and do not have to be the same on both sides. In other words, the formulated propositions do not have to count for both Turkey and Russia. The existence of an external threat lays the foundation for the alliance between states and the emergence of an alliance between the partner and the opponent may foster one side whereas the other was pushed by the possibility of attack by the allied state.

Now that the theoretical assumptions of neorealism and key neorealist literature on strategic alliances are clarified, we can translate those to the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations. The first proposition leads me to explore whether the West posed a substantial danger to the power position of both countries. By forming an alliance both Turkey and Russia might enhance the deterrence of a possible Western attack. The second proposition leads me to explore if the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations might have emerged due to the possibility of an alliance between the partner and the opponent. This possible alliance would undermine the power position of one of the partners and should, therefore, be prevented by forming an alliance with the other. The third proposition suggests that the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations might have emerged to eliminate a possible attack by the allied state. In this vein, due to Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet and opposed views on Ukraine and Syria, both countries might have engaged in a strategic partnership to avoid the possibility of attack by the allied state. Before the analysis can be done, the propositions need to be further specified for my empirical analysis.

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2.3.1 Empirical propositions 1. The recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations can be explained due to a clearly identifiable direct common threat coming from the West; the recent intensification of Turkey- Russia relations is perceived by one or both sides to enhance deterrence of attack and enhance capabilities for defense attack one itself.

To test this proposition, I need to define what constitutes a ‘clearly identifiable direct threat’. The level of threat facing a state depends on the distribution of power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and, most importantly, the perceived intentions of the other (Snyder, 2007). Therefore, I need to assess whether Russia and/or Turkey viewed the West as a direct threat. To examine this, I will analyze official documents coming from the Kremlin and Ankara, interviews with public servants, primary literature and secondary literature. If from the empirical research, it appears that one or both countries viewed the West as a possible threat seeking to take power or overturn the regime in their own territory then this proposition receives support as providing at least partial explanation of the recent intensification of relations between Turkey and Russia

2. The recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations can be explained due to fears of an alliance between the partner and the opponent which could undermine the relative power position of Turkey and/or Russia

To test this proposition, I need to examine whether one or both countries were eager to prevent an alliance between the partner and the opponent. Based on official documents coming from the Kremlin and Ankara, interviews with public servants, primary literature and secondary literature, I will describe how both countries viewed a possible alliance between the partner and the principal perceived sources of danger. In addition, I will analyze how partnership between the partner and the opponent could negatively influence the other partner. Moreover, I will examine if Turkey after the intensification with Russia withdrew its support for EU-membership and instead sought cooperation in pro-Russian alliances like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. If from the empirical research, it appears that an alliance between the partner and the other is refused by the other partner and would undermine the power position of the other, then this proposition receives support as providing at least partial explanation of the recent intensification of relations between Turkey and Russia.

3. The recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations can be explained due to the fact that forming an alliance would eliminate the possibility of attack by the allied state.

To test this proposition, I need to examine whether one or both countries wanted to prevent an escalation of conflict by forming an alliance. Based on official documents coming from the Kremlin and Ankara, interviews with public servants, primary literature and secondary literature, I will examine if the countries wanted to prevent escalation of problems and reduce the risk of a possible attack by forming

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an alliance. If from the empirical analysis, it appears that one or both countries viewed one another as possible threats applying the language of war, in the run up to the Turkish Stream agreement, and if there is also evidence that tying the other closer to oneself served the goal of reducing the likelihood of an escalation of this conflict, then this proposition receives support as providing at least partial explanation of the recent intensification of relations between Turkey and Russia. Notably, these propositions are not mutually exclusive, I might find support for all three, either on different sides of the relationship or also on the same side.

To examine these propositions, I will examine each individual event that had a major impact on Turkey- Russia relations from 2011 onwards: the Ukraine crisis, the Syrian war, Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter jet, the failed coup attempt, and ultimately the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations. In doing so, it becomes clear which incentives prove to be the most important and useful to explain the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations. Now that the assumptions of neorealism are outlined and the formulated propositions have been discussed, I can start with the analysis.

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Chapter three: Analysis

The analysis conducted in this thesis aims to examine the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations, from a neorealist perspective. To realize this, I will follow three paths of analysis. First, I will examine each individual event that had a major impact on Turkey-Russia relations from 2011 onwards. In doing so, I will outline all relevant facts that influenced Turkey-Russia relations, which ultimately led to their recent intensification. This is in line with Snyder’s (2007) claim that during the formation phase, prospective allies bargain over their strategic and particular interests. Thus, by examining the critical events and developments before the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations, it becomes clear which strategic and particular interests laid the foundations for their recent intensification. Following the examination of each individual event, the second path of analysis will include the analysis of the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations. This path will look at the recent intensification, while examining the actions of all relevant actors. This in turn, enables me to examine the joint and unilateral process by which alliance members try to keep the partnership alive and advance their own interests with it. This enables me to develop valid explanations of the recent intensification of Turkey- Russia relations. Finally, the last part of this chapter provides answers to the propositions developed in the previous chapter. Notably, all three paths of analysis are informed by neorealist theory, as set out in the previous chapter.

3.1. Part one: The formation phase As mentioned in the first chapter, Turkey and Russia came closer to one another after the Cold-War. The distrust between the two countries decreased, while both countries developed an independent and self-assertive foreign policy and became economic partners. However, in the period 2011 onwards, Turkey-Russia relations were confronted with substantial problems, as the Ukraine crisis and the Syrian War posed serious threats to Turkey-Russia relations. In the face of uncertainties caused by war, global security threats and economic problems, Turkey-Russia relations came under heavy pressure. This section provides an in-depth analysis of the events that influenced Turkey-Russia relations during this period.

3.1.1 The Russo-Ukraine crisis The first geopolitical crisis that negatively influenced Turkey-Russia relations is the Ukraine crisis, which started on 21 November 2013 (Kisacik and Kaya, 2016). Since the country gained independence on 1 December 1991, it has been one of the most fragile areas of the global geopolitical landscape, particularly, after eight CEE countries became EU members on 1 May 2004 and Ukraine became the new frontier of the EU (Kuzio, 2010).

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To ensure secure, stable and safe borders the EU developed the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Through this project, the EU works with its southern and eastern neighbors to accomplish close political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration (European Union 2016). As explained by, e.g., Hill (2002) and Smith (2005), efficient and secure borders are essential to protect the EU and stimulate trade. In addition, another major war at the European frontier, like the Balkan-War in the 1990s, would threaten the credibility, perhaps even the very existence of the EU (Smith, 2005). Through the ENP, the EU cooperates with Ukraine with the purpose of bringing Ukraine closer to the EU. However, given that Ukraine is divided in two groups: pro-Western and pro-Russian, its foreign policy has shifted from time to time. When pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych won the elections in 2010, relations between Ukraine and the EU became strained. November 2013 marked a series of events that led to the ousting of Yanukovych, a domestic war, and the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula.

First, Yanukovych refused to sign the European Association Agreement (EAA), choosing instead to follow a pro-Russian path by joining the Customs Union with Russia, whereby it was agreed that Russia would buy $15 billion of Ukrainian Eurobonds and lower the costs of Russian energy supplied to Ukraine (Kuzio, 2017). In response to the rejection of the EAA, thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets to protest this development. The so-called Euromaidan protests led to the eventual ousting of Yanukovych and his replacement with the pro-European Arseniy Yatsenyuk. The political shift from pro-Russian to pro-European led to tensions across the whole country. On the Crimean Peninsula, pro- Russian forces took over power, which resulted in a referendum on the status of Crimea on 16 March 2014. The official result of this referendum was a 99.7 percent vote for the integration of the peninsula into the Russian Federation (Kuzio, 2017). Following the Russian annexation of the peninsula, a new conflict between the West and Russia emerged.

3.1.2 Relations between Russia and the West after the Ukraine crisis By introducing the ENP, the EU has successfully entered the region which Russia considers to be the sphere of its vital national interests. To move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West has been a cause of tensions and jeopardizes the peace and economic cooperation between Russia and the West (Mearsheimer, 2014). Since the mid-1990s, Russia has expressed concern about NATO enlargement, and in recent years Russia has made it clear that it would inhibit Ukraine’s efforts to join the West (Mearsheimer, 2014). According to Charap and Darden (2014), whose arguments are based on neorealist theory, Russia’s annexation of Crimea can be explained by two main reasons. First, the regime change in Ukraine was perceived by Russia as a direct threat to Russian interests in Ukraine. Russia considered the regime change as a Western plot to install a loyal government in Kiev that included leaders who would rescind Russia’s basing agreement in Crimea and subsequently move Ukraine towards EU and NATO membership. Mearsheimer (2014) agrees and contends that the logic behind the annexation of Crimea is a rational one, since great powers are always sensitive for potential threats near their border. The second explanation is a far more threatening interpretation of Russia’s foreign policy

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towards Ukraine. The aggressive military moves of Russia that occurred in Crimea and eastern Ukraine suggest that we could been witnessing a shift in Russian foreign policy, in which Russia seeks outright territorial expansion and is sowing unrest in its neighborhood for geopolitical gains (Charap and Darden 2014).

The consequences of the Ukraine crisis had major influence on the whole region. In the words of European Council President Herman van Rompuy after the annexation of Crimea, ‘The world will never be the same again’ (European Council, 2014). The bilateral agreements between Russia and Ukraine also came under pressure, since President Putin effectively renounced all previous Russian bilateral agreements with Ukraine (Kremlin, 2014). Russia’s policy met with a strong negative response from the West. The relations between the EU and Russia became strained, while NATO froze its cooperation with Russia (Trenin, 2014). Furthermore, in a United Nations General Assembly vote on the Crimean referendum on 27 March 2014, 100 nations refused to recognize the result, against 11 nations that recognized them (United Nations, 2014). Faced with near-universal condemnation, Russia also witnessed the shut-down of its accession process to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Trenin, 2014). Moreover, as a response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the United States and the European Union imposed sanctions against Russian officials, companies, and the Russian energy sector (Whitehouse, 2014). According to the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Dmitri Trenin (2014), the aim of the sanctions is to hurt Russia politically and economically to achieve a regime change in Russia and its withdrawal from Ukraine. The imposed sanctions successfully isolated Russia politically, caused difficulties on the Russian stock market, and a further weakening of the Russian currency. And, even though to many EU member’s energy relations with Russia are too important to risk severing ties completely, there is now a much stronger desire towards energy diversification away from Russia (Trenin, 2014).

From the Russian perspective, the pro-western regime change in Ukraine, the condemnation of the Russian annexation of Crimea by the West, and the Western sanctions resulting from this, can be seen as a clearly identifiable threat coming from the West which, in accordance with proposition one, can help explain the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations. Ukraine’s desire to join NATO presented an additional external threat to Russia’s national security. The deputy secretary of Russia’s National Security Council expressed in an interview with RIA Novosti on 2 September 2014 that “NATO actions show that both US and NATO are trying to escalate a deterioration of Russia relations with the West”. He added that “the strengthening of NATO troops in the Baltic States, and their decision to transfer heavy weapons and military equipment to Estonia are undermining global stability”. In sum, Ukraine’s aspiration to join the West and NATO enlargement coming closer to the Russian border is considered by Russia as an external threat that is undermining the Russian power position in the region. Russia, therefore, views the West as a threat to its national interest.

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3.1.3 Relations between Turkey and Russia after the Ukraine crisis Although the Cold War is over, it is widely agreed upon in the literature that the Black Sea region remains a strategic border between the West and Russia (Phelan, 2007; Humphrey and Svirskaja, 2014; Akturk, 2015). During the Russo-Ottoman Wars, Sevastopol was the main Russian naval base in the Black Sea. In addition, the naval base was of great importance for the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Even when Ukraine became independent in 1991, the naval base remained the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea fleet. Prior to the annexation in 2014, there was nog clear hegemon in the Black Sea region. However, with the annexation of Crimea, Russia expanded its power and asserted itself as the hegemon of the Black Sea (Akturk, 2015). This is in line with the neorealist theory, as Waltz’s (1979) estimation of power includes the size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence. The potential Russian threat towards Turkey, therefore, increased with the annexation of Crimea. Besides, Crimea is also of high symbolic and cultural value for Turkey, as the Crimean Tatars, a Turkish ethnic group, make up about 12% of the Crimean population and were opposed to the annexation of Crimea by Russia (Akturk, 2015).

The annexation of Crimea posed a problem for Turkey’s neutral stance between Russia and the West. The power expansion of Russia in the Black Sea region and the fact that Crimean Tatars were considerably affected by the Russian annexation made the annexation undesirable from a Turkish perspective and amounted to undermining its power position in the region. Turkish president Erdogan, therefore, stressed that Turkey would continue to recognize the Crimea peninsula as Ukrainian territory (Ukraine Today, 2016). However, the Turkish reaction to the annexation of Crimea has been less vigorous than expected (Dimitrova, 2015). Given Russian assertiveness in Crimea, Turkey and Russia relations remained remarkably positive in this period. In December 2014, President Putin even visited Turkey, asserted that Turkey was one of Russia’s leading partners, and emphasized that talks between both countries were held in a friendly and cooperative atmosphere (Kremlin, 2014).

The moderate and soft response of Turkey can be explained based on neorealist theory. As outlined in the first chapter, the geographical position of Turkey is of great importance for both Russia and the EU. Therefore, Turkey made it its strategic interest to become an energy-hub. Because of the crisis between Russia and Ukraine, Russia is required to seek an alternative transit route to reach the European Union, which covered around 29% of its energy needs with imports from Russia in 2014 (Eurostat, 2014). Turkey could serve as a reliable alternative transit route to reach the Caspian region (Sonmez and Cobanoglu, 2016). In turn, Turkey would gain transit fees and other energy-related advantages. In the aftermath of the Russo-Ukraine crisis, U.S. vice president Joe Biden visited Turkey and underlined the importance of Turkey within the East-West energy corridor (Whitehouse, 2014). In addition, Turkey remains an enormously important market for Russia. Its strongly expanding economy consumed 47.5bcm of gas in 2013, of which 60% was sourced from Gazprom (Bechev, 2015). Moreover, the EU

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is limited in accomplishing a common regional energy policy. According to Sonmez (2015) this is mainly due to the diversity of individual member’s energy policies and their bilateral agreements with Russia. But one thing is clear: in order to limit energy dependence on Russia, the EU needs Turkey for realizing its long-pursued goal to establish a common regional energy policy (Sonmez, 2015; Bechev, 2015).

By making Turkey its main transit country for gas deliveries to Europe, Russia will completely bypass Ukraine. Russia, therefore, has come to value Turkey’s key role in the region. During President Putin’s visit in December 2014, Gazprom and Turkish company Botas Petroleum Corporation signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the construction of an offshore gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey across the Black Sea (Gazprom, 2014). Alexei Miller, the CEO of Gazprom, reported on 15 January 2016 that Turkey is the only option for Russia and that natural gas currently flowing from Russia to the EU through Ukraine will in the future only be delivered via Turkey through the construction of Turkish Stream (Hurriyet Daily News, 2016). For Snyder (2007), states will establish alliances based on a rational cost-benefit analysis. The benefits are counted chiefly in terms of increased security. As the analysis shows, from Russian perspective, there is clearly an external threat coming from the West. Bearing in mind that Russia is heavily dependent on its energy export, contributes to the rational decision to seek an alliance which offers a solution to its energy policy after the Ukraine crisis. Given that Turkey is the only option for Russia’s energy policy towards Europe, an alliance with Turkey counterbalances the imposed sanctions against Russia. Because of this fact, together with Russia’s conflict with the West over Ukraine, it can be concluded that the Western external threat towards Russia has been the most important driving force to account for intensified relations with Turkey, which is in line with proposition 1. As explained in this section, Turkey could benefit from the Ukraine crisis due to its geographic position. The benefits of cooperation with Russia, outweigh the costs of a conflict.

In conclusion, Turkey’s relative power position has increased and it is fulfilling its objective to become an energy hub while keeping all parties satisfied. The moderate response of Turkey towards the annexation of Crimea, therefore, was in its own interest and helped Turkey to increase its role and power position in the region. Turkey was aware of the possibilities the Ukraine crisis offered and used them to become an important energy hub. The benefits of a soft response, and consequently the construction of Turkish Stream, outweighed the costs of a conflict with Russia. However, from the Turkish point of view, since there was no question of a common external threat coming from the West, relations between Turkey and Russia were primarily based on economic and energy issues rather than security issues.

3.1.4 The war in Syria The second geopolitical crisis through which Turkey-Russia relations encountered serious problems and which eventually led to the postponement of Turkish Stream, is the Syrian War, which started in 2011. Following the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, the Arab Spring eventually reached Syria and

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resulted in a proxy-war between regional powers. Russia took a clear position early on and has not shifted away from its position, to the chagrin of Turkey and the West. Russia’s unyielding alignment with the Syrian government of Basher al-Assad is not due to the defense of the Syrian Orthodox Church nor due to the Syrian-Soviet solidarity during the Cold-War (Allison, 2013; Casula 2013). Instead, in line with neorealism, Russia’s view on the Syrian war can be explained in terms of its own security and power position. First, Islamic networks and the rise of new Islamic groups are a cause of concern for Russian national interest in the Caucasus. It fears that the Syrian conflict will lead to more Islamic radicalization which will spread further into Russian territory (Allison, 2013; Trenin, 2013). Second, Russia views the war as another case of Western society imposing standards of political legitimacy on a sovereign state in order to enforce regime change in its favor (Allison, 2013). Third, the uprising in Syria threatened Russian military bases in Tartous and Latakia. It is therefore in Russian national interest to fight rebel groups in Syria (Borshchevskaya, 2013).

In contrast to Russia’s policy, Turkey has adopted a policy with the aim of overthrowing the Assad- regime. The Government of President Erdogan was a supporter of political change in the period of the Arab-Spring revolutions. Taking a pro-revolution stance stood in contrast with the administration of Davutoglu, which emphasized zero problems with neighboring countries and the use of soft-power to gain political and economic advantages. In an article in 2010, the former Turkish foreign minister claimed that the wide-ranging cooperation between Turkey and Syria in the last decade is one of the best examples of the success of Turkey’s objective of zero problems with its neighbors (Davutoglu, 2009). Nonetheless, the decade-long intensification of Turkey-Syria relations ended following the Syrian government’s heavy-handed approach to political opponents and civilians.

The radical change in Turkey’s stance towards Syria has led to a scholarly debate. From a constructivist point of view, Turkey’s shift in policy towards Syria can be explained due to its neo-Ottoman ideology (Taspinar, 2014). From this perspective, Turkey’s sympathy for the Sunni majority in Syria is considered to be indicative of the government’s neo-Ottoman ideology. From the rationalist point of view, the most important reason for Turkey’s stance against the Syrian government is Turkey’s threat perception regarding Syria, and economic calculations involving the future of Turkey’s investments in the region (Taspinar, 2014). Furthermore, in line with the rationalist point of view, former Foreign Minister Davutoglu (2013) frequently underlined that all steps taken by Turkey regarding the Syrian War are in pursuit of Turkish national and security interests. In addition, scholars like Yesiltas and Telci (2013), Ayata (2015), and Onis (2016) argue that the new political environment of the post-Arab Spring presented an opportunity for Turkey to increase its influence and power in the region through assigning itself a key player role in the transformation process. This is in accordance with neorealist theory, in which security is considered to be the highest objective for states and power is the means to achieve this end.

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When the war in Syria intensified and the various interests involved came under increasing strain, the involved parties took a harder and less flexible line. On 6 May 2011, Bulent Arinc, the deputy Prime Minister of Turkey, called the Syrian Government “blood-thirsty” (Milliyet 2011). Turkish president Erdogan went a step further and asserted on 11 September 2011 that “We consider it our historical and ethical responsibility to be on the side of the Syrian people against the Assad regime”. He added that “the Assad administration, as if it where blood thirsty, does not refrain from attacking the lives of our (Turkish) citizens”. When on 22 June 2012, a Turkish F-4 Phantom reconnaissance jet was shot down by the Syrian Army after having violated Syrian airspace it became clear that the threat Turkey perceived from Syria further increased (The Telegraph, 2012).

The support by Turkey to the opposition and the Russian support to the Assad-regime did not stop at the level of diplomacy. In September 2015, the Russian Federation Council authorized President Putin to use armed forces in Syria (TASS, 2015). Turkey, in turn, started in October 2011 to supply the Free Syrian Army with weapons, ammunitions, and medical equipment and offered the group a safe zone and a base of operations (Henry, 2016). In this vein, the Syrian civil war turned into a proxy-war between Russia and Turkey that reached its boiling point on 24 November 2015, when a Russian Sukhoi-Su 24 bomber jet was downed by the Turkish air force over the border region between Syria and Turkey, near the Turkish province Hatay (Henry, 2016).

3.1.5 The aftermath of the downing of a Russian military jet by the Turkish Air Force It is an understatement to claim that the downing of a Russian Sukhoi-Su 24 military jet by the Turkish Air Force increased the tensions between both countries. Soon after, on 25 November 2015, violent demonstrations erupted in front of the Turkish embassy in Moscow (Henry, 2016). After decades of peaceful cooperation and economic integration, Turkey and Russia were on the brink of a new conflict. President Putin qualified the act as a “stab in the back” and underlined that the Russian jet had not crossed the Turkish border nor threatened Turkey’s security (BBC, 2014). In addition, president Putin asserted on 24 November 2015 that “Russia will never tolerate such crimes, like the one committed today” (Reuters, 2015). While the shoot down came as a shock to many observers and experts, those who have knowledge of the region interpreted the shoot down as a direct response to Russian continuing bombardment of Turkey backed groups in Northern-Syria (Williams and Souza, 2016). Prior to the downing of the jet, Turkish president Erdogan had warned Russia to stop the fight against the moderate opposition in Syria, adding that Russia is heavily targeting ‘our Turkmen brothers’ in the Latakia region (Williams and Souza, 2016).

While NATO and the UN called for calm in the wake of the shooting down of the Russian military jet, Russian president Putin personally vowed that he would take revenge. Following the incident, the Turkish newspaper Sabah reported on 25 November 2015 that seven drivers had been killed in the

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bombing of an aid convoy travelling from Turkey to Syria. On 29 November 2015, Russia followed up this bombing with a large-scale attack on several Turkish-backed groups in the Idlib province (Williams and Souza, 2016). Moreover, as further signs of deepening division between both countries, the Russian defence ministry cut off contacts with its Turkish counterpart and Moscow warned its citizens not to go on holiday in Turkey (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2015). The ministry added that it considered the action of the Turkish Air Force as an unfriendly act and that it was designing a complex of measures directed to respond to such incidents. On 4 December 2015, during his annual state-of-the- nation address, President Putin asserted that the shooting down of a Russian fighter jet was a ‘treacherous war crime’ (Al-Jazeera, 2015). The Russian president added that Russia was not planning to engage in military ‘saber-rattling’ with Turkey, but emphasized that Russia would impose more sanctions against Turkey (Al-Jazeera, 2015). Political analyst Bishara (2015) argued that President Putin did not give any signal of backing down, but instead was escalating the conflict between Turkey and Russia. As these developments show, there is clearly a conflict between Turkey and Russia, and Russia is using the language of war, which, in accordance with proposition three, can help explain the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations.

Turkish economist Erhan Aslanoglu pointed out in an interview with the BBC on 2 January 2016 that due to Russian sanctions Turkey risks losing 3.5 billion dollars in income from Russian tourists, and another 4.5 billion dollars annually through the cancelation of construction projects. In addition, the Turkish minister of agriculture said in January 2016 that Russia’s ban on imported Turkish food would mean losses of 765 million dollars. Collectively, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development estimated that Russian sanctions may reduce Turkey’s GDP growth in 2016 by 0.3-0.7 percentage points. But, most importantly, due to Turkey’s downing of the Russian fighter jet negotiations regarding Turkish Stream were halted (Press and Baku, 2016). This development was a cause of concern for both countries, since Turkey depends largely on Russian Gas and has the objective to become an important energy hub. Russia, in turn, needs Turkish Stream because its economy is driven mainly by its energy exports and it needs to by-pass Ukraine to supply European consumers (Press and Baku, 2016).

By mid-2016, Turkey’s policy in Syria was under much pressure. Due to intensified Russian interference Assad forces regained control over more and more territory (Mankoff, 2016). Moreover, the Kurdish People Democratic Party (PYD) gained more power in northern-Syria, which was a direct threat to Turkey, as the PYD is regarded to be an extension of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) (Mankoff, 2016). In the aftermath of the downing of the Russian fighter jet, Russia increased its support to Kurdish groups in Syria and deployed its S-400 air defence system to their Syrian base in Khmeimin. As a result, a de facto safe zone was created for Kurdish groups protecting them against the Turkish Air Force (Bacik, 2016). The cooperation between both parties became painfully obvious, when the leader

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of Turkey’s Kurdish HDP, Selahettin Demirtas, visited Russia on 23 December 2015 (Daily Sabah, 2015). The visit by Demirtas further damaged Turkey-Russia relations and increased the threat Kurdish groups were seen to pose for Turkey. From the Russian perspective, the support of the Kurds can be explained according two major reasons. First, having the Kurds and the Syrian army on its side, Russia became better able to fight radical groups and gain more power in Syria. This is in their own national interest, as they want to prevent the spread of the Syrian conflict. And second, since the disastrous decision by Turkey to shoot down the Russian fighter, Russian president Putin saw an opening to weaken the Turkish position in Syria. Due to Russian interference and the consequent strengthening of the PYD, Turkey’s national security was at stake. Therefore, Turkey shifted its policy in Syria from an anti-Assad an to anti-PYD stance.

The core of the problem for Turkey is clear: Russia’s increased role in Syria undermines Turkey’s capacity to be a central player in the Syrian war. After the downing of the Russian fighter jet, Russia updated its strategy in Syria, with the aim of thwarting Turkey’s strategic interests. In addition, Turkey’s objective to serve as an energy hub on the east-west corridor is under pressure due to the postponement of Turkish Stream. These factors, together with the fact that Turkey became a target for jihadist and Kurdish attacks, drove Turkey’s need for rapprochement with the Russian Federation. From a Turkish point of view, alignment with Russia was vital to serve its national interest. This is in line with proposition 3, according to which the recent intensification of relations between both countries can be explained (partly) due to the fact that forming an alliance can be useful because it can prevent a further escalation of conflict between both countries.

3.1.6 The Refugee crisis The Syrian war has generated a mass influx of refugees into Europe, North-America, and the Asia Pacific region. According to the UNHCR annual report on refugees in 2016, more than 4.7 million Syrians have fled the country. In December 2015, EU member states had received 1,349,638 applications for international protection (European Asylum Support Office, 2015). At the EU level, the immense influx of refugees has strongly affected European societies and politics. The Schengen treaty and the Dublin rules came under heavy pressure, and this in turn exposed the EU to criticism and risks undermining the trust of European citizens. Calls for a comprehensive solution intensified, and Turkey played a central role in the attempt to establish such a solution. On 18 March 2016, to put a stop to the refugee crisis, Turkey and Europe came to an agreement. Turkey agreed to take back all illegal refugees from Greece and in return other Syrian refugees would be resettled from Turkey to the EU (Serbos and Baxevanis, 2016). Besides Turkey received 6 billion euro in total to help implement this plan.

Due to the EU-Turkey refugee agreement, Turkey possesses an important tool to put pressure on Europe’s decisions on Turkey’s EU membership. On 16 October 2015, President Erdogan said in a conference in Istanbul that:

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"The West and Europe's security and stability is contingent on our security and stability. They have accepted this now. In the talks, I held in Brussels last week, they accepted all this. It can't happen without Turkey, why don't you take Turkey into the EU? The problem is clear but they are not open." (Reuters, 2015)

On 29 December 2015, the European Commission activated the Action Plan and committed itself to increasing political engagement with Turkey, providing financial support, acceleration of the visa liberalization process, and to re-opening the negotiation process for EU-membership (European Commission, 2015). In a joint statement both parties emphasized that they were ‘determined to confront and surmount the existing risks and threats in a concerted manner to reinforce the European Project’ (European Commission, 2015). Furthermore, on 24 November 2015, after Turkey’s downing of the Russian fighter jet, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said the allies ‘stand in solidarity with Turkey’ (NATO, 2015). Turkey’s ties with the EU appeared to be set on a better course since the refugee crisis, after having remained largely undeveloped over the past few years. Former foreign minister Davutoglu was high-spirited after the agreement was signed on 18 March 2016: “We today realized that Turkey and the EU have the same destiny, the same challenges and the same future” (European Council, 2016)

Nonetheless, it would be difficult to claim that the refugee deal and the re-opening of negotiations for EU membership have brought the two sides closer to one another. Instead, many observers in Turkey and the EU have criticized this agreement on the grounds that Turkey is considered as a strategic player rather than a potential EU member, whose support on key strategic issues is furthermore doubtful due to its worsening state of democracy and human rights (Aydin-Duzgit and Kaliber, 2016). In addition, Turkish public opinion has a negative attitude towards full EU-membership. According to Eurobarometer data (2015), a third of respondents in Turkey (33%) are in favor of their country’s accession, while 40% oppose it and 19% are undecided. In accordance with the Turkish public opinion, President Erdogan did not adopt the attitude that the refugee deal brought the two sides closer to one another. Since, president Erdogan has used every occasion to criticize the agreement and lash out at the EU. On 10 May 2016, at a meeting of the Turkish Union of Chambers and Bourses, Erdogan stated that the EU was ‘toying’ with Ankara, especially over the money it promised to support the costs of the agreement (Idiz, 2016). Yigit Bulut, the economic adviser of Erdogan, went further by stating on state broadcaster TRT Haber that “if the EU continues with its current approach, then the Turkish government may suspend all of its agreements with it”.

An important contribution to the growing distrust and fear between Turkey and the West is the support by the United States and its ally, the EU, for the Kurds in northern Syria and northern Iraq. Turkey

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considers the PYD as a terrorist organization, whereas the West has made clear several times that the PYD remains an important ally for Washington and the EU in the war against ISIS. As Turkey railed against the Syrian Kurds, the US-PYD coalition proved to be successful, as the PYD gained power at the expense of ISIS in northern Syria (Barkey 2016). Furthermore, since the disastrous decision of Turkey to shoot down the Russian fighter, Russian president Putin saw an opening to weaken the Turkish position in Syria. In this line of developments, Turkey faced serious problems regarding its national interests and needed to take immediate action to prevent its national security from being further damaged.

3.1.7 Conclusion In conclusion, after the Ukraine crisis, Russia was forced to find an alternative way of for its energy policy towards Europe, on which it’s economy and foreign policy is heavily dependent on. The analysis show that Turkey was the only option for Russia. As Snyder (1984) argues, states will form alliances for two main reasons: states will form alliances to increase their security position, and states will ally in order to avoid isolation. As the analysis described, Russia was faced with near-universal condemnation and needed Turkey to bypass the problematic territory of Ukraine as a transit country. Therefore, in line with neorealist theory, it was in Russia’s strategic interest to intensify relations with Turkey. Despite the illegal annexation of Crimea, the Turkish government welcomed the Russian plans for the construction of Turkish Stream. The analysis show that the benefits for cooperation with Russia outweigh the costs of a conflict. It was therefore in Turkish national interest to cooperate with Russia to promote the country as a global energy hub.

However, since the outbreak of the Syrian War, and consequently the shoot down of a Russian fighter jet, the relations between both countries strained. As the analysis described, Russia had the particular interest to support the Assad-regime. In contrast to Russia, the uprising of the Arab Spring offered the chance to Turkey, to increase its influence and power in the region through assigning itself a key player role in the transformation process. Consequently, the particular interests of Turkey and Russia clashed in Syria and reached their boiling point when Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet. As a counterbalance, Russia imposed sanctions against Turkey and collaborated with the PYD to weaken the Turkish power position. Subsequently, Turkey shifted its policy in Syria from an anti-Assad to anti-an PYD stance, since its core interest – security – the prime relevance of security interests is of course in line with neorealism, was at stake due to Russian and Western support for the PYD. As the analysis show, Turkey’s position in Syria weakened, and its economy and energy profits declined. Furthermore, due to Russian support for the PYD, the Kurdish rebellion group gained power in northern-Syria and formed a direct threat to Turkey’s security. It was therefore in Turkey’s general interest to normalize ties with Russia in order to protect its border, which is in support of proposition 3.

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In the following section, I will outline the recent intensification, while examining the actions of all relevant actors. This in turn, enables me to examine the joint and unilateral process by which alliance members try to keep the partnership alive and advance their own interests with it. This enables me to develop valid explanations of the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations.

3.2 Part two: Strategic partnership between Turkey and Russia

3.2.1 The intensification of Turkey-Russia relations The aforementioned cascade of problems contributed to President Erdogan’s decision to send a letter of congratulations to Russia on 12 May 2016, the Russian Independence Day. According to Turkish Prime Minister Numan Kurtulus, this was the first step in the normalization of relations between Turkey and Russia. Afterwards, Turkish president Erdogan and Russian president Putin exchanged messages, signaling their desire to restore relations (Hurriyet Daily News, 2016). However, Dmitry Peskov, president Putin’s spokesman, reported on 1 June 2016 that Turkey must apologise, offer an explanation, and a financial compensation for the lost jet, to normalize Turkey-Russia relations (TASS, 2016). On 27 June 2015, President Erdogan met the demands of President Putin and sent an apology letter. The Turkish leader explained on 4 August 2016, in an interview with Turkish broadcaster TRT, why Turkey and Russia relations are extremely important for the region:

“An undesirable incident involving an aircraft occurred between Russia and Turkey. The negative consequences of this incident lasted for eight months. We then wrote a letter and offered to put an end to this process, because relations between Turkey and Russia are very important for the region. The problem had to be solved. We also expressed our condolences for what happened and received a positive answer” (Erdogan, 2016).

Following the apology, the Russian and Turkish government started to cooperate on the Syrian conflict, while Russia recalled its sanctions against Turkey (Mankoff, 2016). The ISIS bombing of Istanbul’s Ataturk Airport on 28 June 2016 accelerated this process, with Russian foreign minister Lavrov and Turkish foreign minister Cavusoglu coming to an agreement on countering ISIS in Syria (Mankoff, 2016). However, it was Russia’s strong support for President Erdogan after the failed coup attempt that most significantly boosted Turkey-Russia relations (Mankoff, 2016; Sakwa, 2017). In response to the coup attempt, the Russian foreign ministry confirmed on 16 July 2016 its readiness to work intensively and constructively with the legally elected government of Turkey in the interest of promoting bilateral relations (Russian Foreign Ministry, 2016). As a result of the recent re-intensification of relations, Turkey and Russia on 10 October 2016 signed off on the construction of Turkish Stream (Gazprom, 2016). Based on this, it can be concluded that due to the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations, the likelihood of an escalation between Turkey and Russia is reduced, which, in accordance with proposition three, can help explain the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations.

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3.2.2 Relations between Turkey and the West after the failed coup In stark contrast to the response by Russia, the Western world little by little condemned the coup, but remained focused on the heavy-handed crackdown on the opposition and the imposition of a state of emergency in the wake of the coup attempt. Turkey accused the exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen of instigating the coup attempt, and threatened that it would be unable to continue its strategic partnership with the United States if it would continue to harbor Fethullah Gulen. In addition, President Erdogan said in an interview with Turkish broadcaster TRT on 2 August 2016 that the West is supporting terrorism and taking sides in coups (Al-Jazeera, 2016). With Gulen on United States territory, President Erdogan confronted Washington demanding the exile’s extradition. Indeed, Turkish officials did not shy away from publicly accusing NATO, and in particular the United States, of their possible roles in the failed coup. According to the Turkish minister of Justice, Bekir Bozdag, Washington would be sacrificing its alliance with Ankara to a terrorist, if it were to refuse to extradite him (Anadolu Agency, 2016). Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu even threatened that Turkey might look outside NATO for its defence industry and security cooperation (Daily Mail, 2016). In this context, it is significant that the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations is also beneficial for Iran, as it puts Ankara on the side of the Russian-Iranian coalition. Moreover, Turkey’s possible decision to reintroduce the death penalty further strained relations with the EU. In response, the EU’s foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini stated that if Turkey reintroduced the death penalty, it would not be joining the EU (European Union, 2016).

In line with neorealism, Turkey’s foreign policy approach involves establishing interest-based relations for the sake of its security (Brown, 2001). For Turkey, the Gulen movement is an internal and external threat to its national security. Therefore, Turkey has the aspiration to clear its apparatuses from, in the words of president Erdogan, “cancer cells” caused by the Gulen movement (Daily Sabah, 2016). In the same vein, Turkey’s position regarding the Kurdish question can be explained. Utilizing over 2,500 individual reports, Andrew Self and John Ferris (2016) conclude that NATO, the U.S and the EU are aware of the affiliation between the terrorist organization PKK and the PYD. It is therefore an urgent matter for Turkey’s national interest to prevent the PYD from gaining power in northern Syria. The alignment between the PYD and the West, therefore, is a threat to Turkey’s national interest. In addition, the unwillingness of the United States to extradite Gulen is considered by Turkey as support for the movement and subsequently a threat to Turkey’s national interest. In the line of these developments, the relations between the West and Turkey are strained, whereas Russia supported Turkey in achieving its objectives.

In the case of Turkey-Russia relations, as explained in the previous part, it was due to the Russian support to the PYD and the postponement of Turkish Stream, that forced Turkey to change its policy in Syria, and apologize for the shooting down of a Russian jet. As a result, after the intensification of Turkey-Russia relations, Russia stopped aiding the PYD. The earliest sign of the new reality between

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Russia and Turkey was the Assad regime’s bombardment of PYD-controlled territory in Hasakah (al- Araby, 2016). The Assad regime had never bombed PYD before. Since Erdogan recalibrated his Syria policy, preventing a PYD-zone has taken priority above his erstwhile goal of ousting the Assad regime, and relations between Turkey and Russia intensified, this is the first evidence that Russia and Turkey are working together in order to protect their interests in the region. In addition, on 2 December 2016, Russia and Turkey announced that they would cooperate to resolve the humanitarian crisis in Aleppo. Both sides agreed in principle to a ceasefire in Syria. The intensification of Turkey-Russia relations, therefore, illustrated Turkish urgency of prevention of an alliance between Russia and the PYD. After both sides came closer to one another, Russia supported Turkey in its fight with the Kurds which, in accordance with proposition two, can help explain the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations.

While the relations between Turkey and Russia deepened, the Europeanization process of Turkey looks slimmer than ever after the failed coup attempt in July. Due to Erdogan’s heavy handed crackdown the criteria of the EU Copenhagen Criteria receded even further into the distance. Turkey, however, had no intentions to move away from its policy. Instead, the Turkish president stressed that Turkey shares more common values with the Shanghai five: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Wang, 2016). Governed by Russia and China, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the largest non- Western organization in Eurasia (Wang, 2016). However, if Turkey wants to join the SCO it needs to leave NATO and the EU first. According to Leonid Ivashov, the director of Russia’s Geopolitical Studies Academy and one of the founders of the SCO, if Ankara wants to join the SCO, it should start the process to quite NATO as they do not for see the accession member of a NATO member to the SCO (Sputnik News, 2016). Even though the chance of Turkey leaving NATO and joining the SCO is very small, it can be concluded that after the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations, Turkey signaled its interest in joining other defence forces than NATO several times, which, in accordance with proposition one, can help explain the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations.

However, Snyder (2007) describes that in the second phase of the formation of an alliance the security dilemma takes on a different character. In this management phase, states have already ‘defected’ and subsequently their choices are no longer whether the ally or not, but instead how firmly to commit themselves to the partner and how much support to give that partner in specific conflicts with the opponent. As the analysis show, Turkey and Russia relations deepened, but for Russia to count on Ankara as a military and security partner in the long run, Turkey has to leave NATO. Russia’s real interest is not an alliance with Turkey, but dismantling the Western security system. From the neorealist perspective, security is the highest objective for states in the anarchical system and power is a means to achieve this end. With Turkey on its side, Russia strengthens its power position at the expense of the West and protects its economic potential in Turkey. It is therefore, a rational decision to seek alliance

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with Turkey, from the Russian perspective. This is in evidence with proposition two, accordant to which the alliance between two sides is explained to fears of an alliance between the partner and the opponent.

As the analysis shows, the deepening crisis of confidence between Turkey and the West, pushed Turkey into intensifying relations with Russia. According to defense industry researcher Oguz, Turkey’s decision to establish joint military, intelligence, and diplomatic mechanism could create new tension with the West (al-Monitor, 2016). This strategy, would be economically and political irrational for two main reasons. First, The EU is Turkey's number one import and export partner while Turkey ranks 7th in the EU's top import and 5th in export markets (European Commission, 2016). Turkey and the EU reached a high level of interdependence, even though the situation in Turkey creates uncertainty and distrust, a divorce would be mutually destructive (Paul and Seyrek, 2016). Moreover, Turkey also started to be aware of the limitations of its diversification policies. In the aftermath of the global economic crisis in 2008, Turkish companies sought to find potential markets in Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East. However, it turned out to be that these markets are unstable and unpredictable, and neither their importance nor their power reaches that of the EU markets (Gstohl, 2016). Second, the SCO is not considered to be a rational alternative for the EU since it is a security and political organization rather than an economic one. In addition, Turkey and Russia maintain to have opposite views in Ukraine, Syria and the Black Sea region. It is therefore, not in Turkey’s interest to seek alliance with Russia due to strained relations with the West. However, as the analysis described, Turkey needed Russia to fight similar threats (terrorism), to achieve economic purposes, and for enhancing stability at the Turkish borders. Whereas Russia and Turkey are developing closer cooperation there are no rational grounds for a strategic alliance, from the Turkish perspective.

3.2.3 Conclusion After the intensification of Turkey and Russia, the cooperation between both sides deepened in certain areas. However, as the analysis shows, there was still no grounds for a strategic alliance. Turkey is still a member of NATO and leaving NATO for the SCO would be irrational. It is therefore, that proposition one is not in evidence with Turkey’s policy. However, it is clear that Turkey is concerned about Western policy regarding the coup and its support for the PYD. In this vein, Turkey is threatening the West that it might split with from the West and subsequently strain relations in order to stop the Western support for the PYD and Gulen. For Russia, in turn, a possible strategic partnership is considered to be rational because this would undermine the power position of the West, and is therefore in correspondence with proposition one. Nevertheless, Turkey and Russia shared several interests that pushed Turkey into deepening its cooperation with Russia. First, Turkey needs Russia to find a solution for the Syrian War, whereby its border is protected from the PYD. Second, Turkey needs Russia in order to fulfill its objective in becoming an energy-hub, which increases its role in the region. Third, facing uncertainties in its domestic environment and difficulties with its NATO allies, Turkey finds itself increasingly

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desperate for friends. As Snyder (2007) points out the importance of friends in a multipolar world, Turkey needed to deepen ties with Russia. However, it is still too early and irrational to speak of a strategic partnership between Turkey and Russia against the West.

In the following section of this thesis, I will discuss the main points from this analysis and link those to formulated propositions. In doing so, I will answer the propositions and discuss the difference between theory and practice. This will allow me to answers to the propositions developed in the previous chapter, and develop valid conclusions.

3.3 Part three: findings In line with Snyder’s (2007) analysis of alliance politics, the in-depth analysis of this thesis focused on two phases: the formation of the alliance and its subsequent management. The main assumptions of Snyder (2007) are that states are rational and their primary interest is to survive, and derivatively, to maintain security against possible attacks. Snyder (2007) asserts that the two main motives for forming an alliance are that (1) states will form alliances to increase their security position, and (2) states will ally in order to avoid isolation. Following from this principle, security benefits of alliances are determined by three factors: the intensity of threat posed by an adversary or its coalition, the urgency of prevention of an alliance between the partner and the opponent, and the elimination of the possibility of attack by the allied state. The overarching condition is the need for alliance due to an external threat. In this section the results of the analysis are presented and the formulated propositions are discussed.

The analysis showed that the external threat coming from the West is the basis for the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations, from the Russian perspective. For Russia, the already existing external threat perceived from the West, significantly intensified since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis. This development pushed the country towards Turkey. The most important reason for this is the geographical position of Turkey, because it could serve as an alternative transit route to reach Europe. In the absence of a common threat both sides only cooperated in terms of economy and energy. However, their plans for the construction of Turkish Stream sowed the seeds for the recent and broader intensification of Turkey-Russia relations after the failed coup attempt. The analysis shows that after the Ukraine crisis, Russia was more dependent than ever on Turkey and needed Turkey to uphold its relative power position. The construction of Turkish Stream is, therefore, a strategic interest. According to Snyder (2007), these interests are valued not merely for themselves but for their contribution to the protection or promotion of other interests in the future. Energy sources are an important such strategic instrument (Snyder 2007).

After the shooting down of the Russian jet, Turkey was in a difficult financial and political situation. The imposed sanctions from Russia and the postponement of Turkish Stream hit the country in every sector, and consequently its power position was being undermined. In addition, the PYD received the

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full support of the West, so that it gained more power and territory in northern Syria. The analysis show that Turkey’s particular interest in Syria shifted from an anti-Assad to an anti-PYD stance, since its strategic interest – security - was at stake due to Russian and Western support to the PYD. Turkey knew that Turkish Stream was of great importance to Russia, and since its particular interest shifted from anti- Assad to anti-PYD, normalizing ties with Russia became the preferred solution.

However, it took the failed coup attempt to get Turkey to clearly start viewing the West as an external threat. According to Turkey, the West was supporting both the PYD and the Gulen movement, the two main external threats perceived by Turkey. The partnership between Turkey and Russia has grown considerably since. Both countries worked together in Syria, developed Turkish Stream, and Turkey even signalled its interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russia, in turn, granted its full support to Turkey after the failed coup. This in in line with Snyder (1990), who argues that in order to enhance commitments leaders of allied members may adopt a variety of alliance strategies: coordinating foreign policies and military plans, allocating preparedness burdens, and collaboration during adversary crises.

Yet, the analysis describes that a strategic partnership between Turkey and Russia against the West is irrational and destructive for Turkey’s power position in the region. The motivations for Turkey to deepen its relation with Russia are based on economic and other security purposes than the threat coming from the West. The below proposition one derived from the theoretical framework, therefore, only corresponds with the empirical evidence from Russian perspective.

1. The recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations can be explained due to a clearly identifiable direct common threat coming from the West; the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations is perceived by one or both sides to enhance deterrence of attack and enhance capabilities for defense against attack on itself.

With respect to proposition 2, I examined Turkey’s relation with the Western society and Russia’s support to the PYD after the shooting down its fighter jet. As the analysis described, even though the likelihood of Turkey becoming an EU-member is low, this would undermine the power position of Russia. Taking an opposite stance than the West, towards the PYD and the Gulen movement, is therefore a rational decision to stimulate a Turkish break-up with the West. However, after Turkey’s shoot down of a Russian fighter jet, Russia updated its Syria policy and started to aid the PYD. The possibility of a Kurdish-Russian coalition increased Turkish fears that the Kurds influence would grew in northern- Syria, near its border with Syria. Those fears heavily increased since Russia deployed its S-400 air defence system to their Syrian base in Khmeimin, on 28 November 2015. The intensification of relations between the PYD and Russia undermined Turkey’s power position. As Liska (1962) and Snyder (2007)

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emphasized that cooperation in alliances is in a large part the consequences of conflict with adversaries. In this vein, Russia intensified relations with the PYD to weaken the Turkish position in Syria and subsequently undermining its power position in the region. Turkey, therefore, has a vital interest in intensifying relations with Russia due to fears of an alliance between Russia and the PYD, which is in accordance with proposition two. As the analysis show, after the intensification of Turkey-Russia relations, Russia stopped aiding the PYD and supported Turkey in its fight against the Kurds. In this line, the recent intensification between Russia and Turkey can be (partly) explained due to Turkish fear of an alliance between Russia and the PYD which could undermine the relative power position of Turkey. The below proposition two derived from the theoretical framework, therefore, corresponds with the empirical evidence. Especially from the Turkish point of view.

After the shoot down of the Turkish fighter jet, the analysis pointed out that Russia attacked Turkey on several fronts. First, Turkey’s economy was seriously affected by the imposed Russian sanctions. Second, Turkey’s objective to become an energy hub was cut short after Russia’s decision to freeze Turkish Stream. Third, Turkey’s security was dealt a heavy blow since Russia updated its mission in Syria and started to aid Kurdish rebel groups. In other words, Russia was already attacking Turkey indirectly. The analysis described that Turkey’s relative power position was at stake vis-à-vis Russia, the PYD and other neighboring actors. As Snyder (2007) argues, states can increase their security substantially by allying with others. The analysis described that after the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations, Russia lifted its sanctions against Turkey, supported Turkey in its fight against Gulen and the PYD, and re-opened talks on Turkish Stream, which was signed 16 October 2016. Accordingly, by allying with Russia, Turkey restored its security position. The below proposition three derived from the theoretical framework, therefore, corresponds with the empirical evidence, from the Turkish perspective.

3. The recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations can be explained due to the fact that forming an alliance would eliminate the possibility of attack by the allied state

The following paragraph provides an answer to the research question and discusses the analysis.

3.3.1 Conclusion From the analysis, it can be concluded, that both countries were needed to form an alliance against an external threat. From the Russian perspective, the threat posed by the West, necessitated Russia to liaise closely with Turkey in order to preserve its role as an energy power. From the Turkish point of view,

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the cooperation with Russia led to the construction of Turkish Stream, which is considered to be an important step toward achieving its objective in becoming an energy hub. It was therefore, that Turkey welcomed the new partnership with Russia. This corresponds with Snyder’s (2007) assumption that alliances are more likely to form when their members have substantial interests in common, whereby the benefits of an alliance outweigh the costs. However, it has also become clear that not all their substantial interests are in common. The conflicting interests of Turkey and Russia stirred up a military confrontation, in which Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet. The disastrous decision by Turkey to shoot down a Russian fighter jet created an opposite situation, in which now Turkey is dependent on Russia. Turkey needed to find an answer to the threat posed by Russia and came to the realization that seeking an alliance with Russia is the most rational thing to do. This is in line with Snyder’s (2007) statement that the security benefits of alliances are determined by the intensity of threat posed by an adversary, the urgency of prevention of an alliance between the partner and the opponent and the elimination of the possibility of attack by the allied state.

At the same time, the analysis shows that the strained relation between Turkey and the West after the failed coup had a large impact on Turkey-Russia relations. In the aftermath of the failed coup attempt, Turkey needed support, not only against the Gulen movement, but also for its fight against the PYD. Because the West could not offer the requested support, it presented Russia the possibility to move Turkey out of NATO and the EU. Moreover, now that it has been proven by NATO’s annual journal that the PYD is an extension of the outlawed PKK, the distrust and consequently the anarchical fear between both sides increased. Turkey’s decision to threaten with leaving NATO in exchange for the SCO illustrates this point. However, as the analysis pointed out, it can be concluded that this is not in accordance with Turkey’s national interest. It is therefore, that the recent intensification of Turkey- Russia relations can be explained from two perspectives.

From the Russian perspective, the first need for seeking alliance with Turkey derived from the Ukraine crisis. Russia was desperate in need for seeking friends due to the near-universal condemnation of the annexation of Crimea, and subsequently the imposed sanctions by the West. After the shoot down of a Russian fighter jet, the anarchical fear between both sides increased and Russia aimed to increase its power position vis-à-vis with Turkey. After the Turkish apology and subsequently the normalization of ties between both sides, Russia had more reasons to intensify relations with Turkey. First, intensifying relations with Turkey increased the likelihood of its objective of becoming an energy superpower. Second, because Turkey was forced to shift its policy in Syria from an anti-Assad a to anti-PYD stance, this in turn enabled Russia to cooperate with Turkey in order to achieve its targets set in Syria. And third, due to the strained relation between Turkey and the West, Russia saw an opening to move Turkey out of the West. It is therefore, that the intensification of its relation with Turkey stems from the threat posed by the West. It is therefore, in accordance with neorealist theory, that the intensification of Turkey-

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Russia relations can be explained due to an external threat coming from the West and is perceived by Russia to enhance capabilities regarding its power position vis-à-vis with the West. For these reasons, the benefits of intensifying relations with Turkey outweigh the costs.

From the Turkish point of view, the recent intensification of its relation with Russia is based on other motives. After the Ukraine crisis, the partnership between both countries was solely economic not political. However, after Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet, the relationship between Turkey and Russia changed. Due to Russian sanctions and its updated policy in Syria, Turkey was faced with its severe consequences. The Turkish economy was seriously affected by the Russian sanctions, its desire to be an energy-hub was cut short by the Russian decision to freeze talks on Turkish Stream, and the PYD gained more control in northern-Syria due to Russian support. In addition, the seizure of Crimea and the Russian intervention in Syria have allowed Russia to significantly update its naval presence in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. In other words, Turkey’s power position vis-à-vis with Russia, and the PYD weakened and Turkey consequently needed to seek alliance with Russia to restore its power position. This is in line with Snyder’s (2007) assumption that states will ally to increase their power position and to form an alliance with the external threat is a possible means to achieve this ends. This has been the most important driving force to account for the recent intensification between Russia and Turkey. It is therefore, that proposition two and three helped explain the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations. The strained relationship with the West boosted this process, but was not the reason Turkey sought alliance with Russia. Faced with uncertainties at home and a strained relation with the West, Turkey found itself increasingly desperate for partners in the international system. Russia seemed happy to accommodate, since it maintained a strained relationship with the West and pulling Turkey out of the Western sphere of influence was in its own interest. However, Turkey is likely to find that the price of a strategic partnership with Russia is high, and the question is how much is it willing to pay while taking into account its own security position.

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Chapter four: Conclusion

In the foregoing, I examined the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations from the period 2011- 2016. In doing so, this thesis is one of the first scientific literature on this topic. The central question was: what explains the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations. To answer the research question, it was first necessary to outline Turkey-Russia relations before this period, whereby the elements that are of importance in Turkey-Russia relations became clear. Chapter one provided sufficient knowledge to understand the incentives that define Turkey-Russia relations before 2011. From this it can be concluded, that increasing interdependence between Turkey and Russia, in combination with their desire to become a central power, has garnered cordial relations. I argued in the theoretical framework that the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations can be analyzed systematically through the backdrop of the alliance theories brought about by neorealism. In this vein, neorealism is only used as an instrument to help answer the research question. The purpose was not to examine the theory intrinsically. By using a systemic theory like neorealism several other actors that could influence Turkey-Russia relations are excluded. The state or individual level do not count for neorealists. However, by examining Turkey-Russia relations from the period 2002 onward this problem is circumvented, since both Turkey and Russia did not experience a regime change in this period. This provided a set-up in which domestic politics can be deemed to have remained relatively stable as a possible source of explanation for foreign policy shifts. This allowed me to focus more on external factors, as they stand in the focus on neorealist theory.

However, as pointed out in the analysis, neorealism contributed to answer the research question, despite the fact that variables like identity and ideology are not taken into consideration by neorealist scholars. Nevertheless, there have been intense debates in recent years on whether Turkey is adopting a neo- Ottoman foreign policy. For a better understanding of Turkey’s foreign policy and a more comprehensive analysis, I appeal for more research on this aspect. In addition, another aspect not receiving enough attention is the coalition between Turkey, Russia, and Iran. As the analysis described, the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations is also beneficial for Iran, as it puts Ankara on the side of the Russian-Iranian coalition. For a more deeper explanation of the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations and its consequences and impact on the Syrian War, I suggest for future research to put more emphasis on the role of Iran in this process.

The analysis conducted in thesis focused on three parts. In part one, I examined each individual event that had a major impact on Turkey-Russia relations from 2011 onwards. The added value of this part is that the common interests and conflicting interests between Turkey and Russia became clear. As outlined in part one, Russia faced near-universal condemnation after the Ukraine crisis and became heavily dependent on Turkey in its search to an alternative transit route to bypass Ukraine. In this section,

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it has also become clear that the interests of both sides clashed in the Syrian War. In the aftermath of Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter jet, Turkey found itself in a desperate situation and was forced to change its stance in Syria from anti-Assad to anti-PYD. The posed threat coming from Russia, pushed the government of president Erdogan to apologize and subsequently intensify relations with Russia. In doing so, Turkey’s objective to become an energy hub received a boost, when both sides agreed on the construction of Turkish Stream on 12 October 2016. But most importantly, Russia stopped aiding the PYD and started to cooperate with Turkey in Syria and granted full support to the Turkish government after the failed coup, as outlined in the second path of analysis. The strained relation between Turkey and the West, offered Russia the possibility to move Turkey out of the Western society. which highlight the essential part the West played in the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations.

However, although the strained relation between Turkey and the West boosted the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations, the analysis described that this was not the reason Turkey sought alliance with Russia. Instead, the threat posed by Russia after Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter jet, has been the main reason behind the recent intensification of Turkey-Russia relations, from a Turkish point of view. In sum, Russia’s desperate position after the Ukraine crisis and consequently its new conflict with the West, pushed the country towards cooperation with Turkey. In the same line, Turkey’s desperate position after the shoot down of a Russian fighter jet, pushed the country towards alignment with Russia. For both sides, regarding their security position, this was the most rational thing to do.

All things considered, this research has demonstrated that the Turkish-Russian relations have a major impact on the stability in the region. Both states show great endeavors in becoming a central part of international politics and strive to increase their influence in the region. By aiming for this central part, both countries should cooperate in the future in order to deter possible rising tensions in The Balkans, The Middle East and The Caucasus. Turkey should find a solution in order to secure its neutral stance between the West and Russia. If Turkey wants to keep its relative position of power, it is of vital importance to maintain positive relations with the West. This can however be problematic because of the lack in Western support to Turkey in the fight against the PYD and the Gülen movement. How the newly elected president of The United States, Donald Trump, will handle American relations in regards to the PYD will define the relationship between The United States and Turkey. Furthermore, one can conclude that in order to become a proper alliance, both countries still have a long road ahead. Once the conflict is Syria is resolved, it will be extremely interesting to see how these countries will behave and how they will act on potential new conflicts.

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