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The Turkish Diaspora in Europe

Integration, Migration, and Politics

By Max Hoffman, Alan Makovsky, and Michael Werz December 2020

WWW.AMERICANPROGRESS.ORG

1 Introduction and summary 4 Key findings

Contents

9 Detailed findings and country analyses
34 Conclusion 37 About the authors and acknowledgments 38 Appendix: Citizenship laws and migration history in brief

44 Endnotes

Introduction and summary

More than 5 million people of Turkish descent live in Europe outside Turkey itself, a human connection that has bound Turkey and the wider European community together since large-scale migration began in the 1960s.1 e questions of immigration, citizenship, integration, assimilation, and social exchange sparked by this migration and the establishment of permanent Turkish diaspora communities in Europe have long been politically sensitive. Conservative and far-right parties in Europe have seized upon issues of migration and cultural diversity, oſten engaging in fearmongering about immigrant communities and playing upon some Europeans’ anxiety about rapid demographic change. Relations between the European Union—as well as many of its constituent member states—and Turkey have deteriorated dramatically in recent years. And since 2014, Turks abroad, in Europe and elsewhere around the world, have been able to vote in Turkish elections, leading to active campaigning by some Turkish leaders in European countries. For these and several other reasons, political and academic interest in the Turkish diaspora and its interactions with European society and politics has significantly increased in recent years.

e Turkish and Turkish-Kurdish diaspora feels at home in Europe overall, its members expressing high levels of satisfaction with their living circumstances and general contentment with host nations’ integration policies.2 Ethnic Turks and Kurds3 living in Germany, France, Austria, and the Netherlands feel their presence is generally accepted by their non-Turkish and non-Kurdish neighbors and colleagues, and they are pleased with the educational and economic opportunities the host nations offer. For most, these positives outweigh the still meaningful levels of discrimination they encounter in their daily lives.

e diaspora is largely uninterested in European politics, with few strong grievances against the authorities and litle involvement in party politics in the countries in question. Diaspora communities in France and the Netherlands appear more fully integrated into those societies than do communities in Germany and Austria. Nevertheless, across the board, most in the Europe-based Turkish diaspora continue to identify themselves first and foremost as Turks rather than as full members of the

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Center for American Progress | The Turkish Diaspora in Europe

societies they inhabit, and they remain more absorbed with developments and politics in Turkey than in their current countries of residence. In short, they strongly endorse, implicitly and explicitly, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s maxim that Turks in Europe should “integrate but not assimilate,” even as their precise understanding of that phrase is open to interpretation.4

ese findings, and many others, are revealed in a public opinion survey of Turkish diaspora communities in four European countries, conducted from November 2019 to January 2020 by the Center for American Progress, the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), the Foundation Max van der Stoel, and the Fondation Jean-Jaurès.5

is report builds upon previous CAP public opinion research on national identity in Turkey6 and casts light on how the Turkish diaspora feels about European host countries; how Europeans of Turkish descent identify with Turkey and the Turkish community; and how these communities feel about the European Union and crucial issues of integration, migration, and politics. e goal is to help readers beter understand the political dynamics within Turkish communities in Europe, where these communities get their information, how they interact with the non-Turkish community and the state, and how the diaspora interacts with Turkey’s politics.

By providing a foundation of data, the authors hope this research can contribute to the ability of policymakers, academics, and others to address linkages between developments in Turkey and the European Union and, potentially, produce ideas that can improve European policies vis-à-vis Turkey and the Turkish diaspora. e authors also hope the data will bolster research more broadly into the development of national, ethnic, and religious identification among first-, second-, and third-generation immigrants in Europe.

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Center for American Progress | The Turkish Diaspora in Europe

About the survey

The survey was conducted by the polling firm DATA4U from November 2019 to January 2020 using computer-assisted telephone interviews on landline and mobile phones in four countries: Germany (1,064 respondents), Austria (416 respondents), France (452 respondents), and the Netherlands (425 respondents). All respondents are over age 18. The survey is representative of the roughly 5 million people of Turkish origin in these four countries, of which around 4 million are over age 18.7 For the total sample, there is a margin of error of plus or minus 2 percent; for the German sample, there is a margin of error of plus or minus 2.9 percent; and for the Dutch, Austrian, and French samples, there is a margin of error of plus or minus 4.7 percent. The interviews were mainly conducted in Turkish: 84 percent were conducted exclusively in Turkish, and 90 percent were conducted at least mostly in Turkish. percent of the sample who were born in a host country. The overall sample comprises 43 percent of respondents holding only Turkish citizenship, 22 percent holding dual citizenship in their host country and Turkey, and 33 percent holding only host country citizenship.8 (For more on this, see the Appendix) The average age of the respondents was 41.

The German sample is intentionally larger to reflect the outsize presence of the German-Turkish community in the overall European-Turkish diaspora, with the 1,064 respondents representing slightly more than 45 percent of the total survey. The overall sample was 48 percent female and 52 percent male, with slight variations by country. Nearly half of the sample reported full-time employment, and the average reported net household monthly income was 2,520 euros—about $3,000 U.S. dollars—some 10 percent to 15 percent below the average for the wider population in each country.9 The average household size was 3.52 people, substantially above the average household size of the overall population in each country of 2.0 to 2.2 people. The French sample was significantly more educated than the other three,10 while the Austrian and Dutch samples were somewhat wealthier.
Respondents were screened to select for Turkish or Kurdish migration backgrounds. The sample is balanced by gender, age, and place of residence. Overall, about 60 percent of the sample was born in Turkey. Respondents reported living in their current country for an average of 27.5 years, with slight variation between countries; this includes 38

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Center for American Progress | The Turkish Diaspora in Europe

Key findings

One in five Turks living in the sampled countries say they plan to return to Turkey to live, while 72 percent want to remain in their current country of residence. e proportion of Germany-based respondents who say they plan to return or move to Turkey is slightly higher, at 24 percent, than in the other countries.

Most respondents identify primarily as a Turk—72 percent overall—and few identify primarily as a member of the host nation, though the French diaspora community is somewhat distinct in this regard, with a larger minority identifying primarily as French. ere is considerable diversity, variation, and nuance in respondents’ answers to the questions about what is important to them. Yet the concepts of “Turkishness,” religion, and passing down Turkish traditions to the next generation are all very important to respondents, with all of these being given significantly more importance than identification with the host nation.

FIGURE 1

Most of the Turkish diaspora intends to stay in Europe

In the future, do you plan to go back to Turkey, emigrate to another country, or stay in [Austria/France/Germany/Netherlands]?

TOTAL

Germany

Austria

France

Netherlands

Stay in host country

Go back to Turkey

71.8%

68.0%

72.7%

73.9%

77.4%

20.6%

24.4%

21.3%

15.7%

16.5%

0.9%

1.8%

2.5%

3.3%

1.7%

1.9%

4.0%

0.7%

1.9%

3.4%

4.0%

4.9%

1.5%

Live in both countries

Emigrate to another country

Other/no answer

1.9%

3.3%

Sources: Center for American Progress/Foundation for European Progressive Studies/Fondation Jean-Jaurès/Foundation Max van der Stoel telephone survey of the Turkish diaspora in Germany, Austria, France, and the Netherlands; conducted November 2019 to January 2020 by the polling ꢀrm DATA4U. For more information, see the methodology in Max Hoꢁman, Alan Makovsky, and Michael Werz, "The Turkish Diaspora in Europe: Integration, Migration, and Politics" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2020), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/?p=491951.

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Center for American Progress | The Turkish Diaspora in Europe

Responses on the use of language reveal a clear—and unsurprising—divide between the language used at home and that used at work: Most respondents speak the language of the host country at work but prefer Turkish at home. ey are fairly split in the language they use to get their news, but Turkish is clearly favored when it comes to entertainment. Respondents rate their knowledge of Turkish highly. (Only 6 percent of the respondents self-identify primarily as Kurds, and they likewise rate their knowledge of Kurdish highly, though not quite as highly as Turks rate their Turkish.) Not surprisingly, the younger generation reports being more proficient in the language of their host country than older members of the diaspora, who are less likely to have been immersed in it from an early age.

Respondents are divided in their sources of information. Television predominates over internet news, social media, and newspapers, but the media environment overall is fractured—a fragmentation that is also visible in Turkey itself.11 Turkish-language television is the most widely consulted, while very few respondents read Turkish-language newspapers. ere is a high degree of interest in news about Turkey, far more than there is in news about the country of residence. Younger respondents are somewhat less focused on news from Turkey than are older respondents, but they still register as much interest in news about Turkey as about their country of residence.

In general, respondents have positive views toward their own Turkish community in their host country, positive views of the local non-Turkish population, somewhat positive views of the Kurdish community, and only slightly positive views of non-Turkish migrants and refugees.

Members of the diaspora community say they perceive a fair amount of discrimination toward Turks in their host country, but few respondents report being personally insulted or physically atacked for their ethnicity. Many respondents feel that discrimination hurts their career prospects. Views diverge on whether the host country government treats the Turkish community equally with the majority community.

Respondents overwhelmingly say they are happy living in their current country, but a majority—albeit a somewhat smaller one—also say they would be happier in Turkey. Most respondents say their current country is more democratic than Turkey. Nevertheless, most respondents would like to see their host country be more supportive of Turkey. Beter bilateral relations, they seem to feel, would mean a beter situation for Turks in their current country. Somewhat contradictorily, respondents are divided on whether it is important to defend Turkish policies themselves—and, interestingly, very few say they feel pressure to do so from Turkish government representatives.

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Center for American Progress | The Turkish Diaspora in Europe

Responses are mixed on whether their current country has done a good job integrating Turkish immigrants. Although most respondents say they “feel at home” in their host country, a strong majority say that the Turkish community should be more connected to the non-Turkish community. But equally, a very strong majority of respondents say that the Turkish community should retain its separate identity. ese competing desires for connection and separate community affinity seem to reinforce a reflexive adherence to the idea of assimilation without integration—a notion promoted by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and explicitly embraced by a broad majority of respondents.

Turks who lack citizenship in their host country are more critical of the host country’s integration efforts than those who are already citizens. Indeed, those who have citizenship are more positive about virtually every aspect of life in the host country. is is perhaps to be expected, since citizenship is among the ultimate measures of full integration on an individual level.

ere is strong agreement that respondents’ children receive a good education in their current country. Respondents also feel strongly that the schools in their current country are beter than schools in Turkey. Few would prefer their kids to grow up and be educated in Turkey. A strong majority of respondents feel that Turks have a fair chance to atend university in their host country. Views are mixed on whether there is sufficient access to Turkish-language and Islamic education, but few would prefer that Islamic schooling replace public schooling for their children.

Perhaps because of this overall contentment with life in their current country, and despite most respondents reporting living in their current country for a long time— 27.5 years, on average, in the whole sample—most say they do not participate in the politics of their current country. Related to this, most even say they do not feel politically represented in their current country; citizens feel more represented than those who only hold Turkish citizenship, but even most citizens report a lack of a sense of representation.

Overall, there is litle interest in European politicians and, in general, limited engagement with European politics and political parties, visible in high nonresponse rates to questions about those topics. In general, across countries—and among the relatively limited number of respondents who express opinions on these maters—the Turkish diaspora tends to favor leſt-wing politicians and political parties, usually has a mixed view of the current leader of the country, has litle opinion of most other national and local politicians, and harbors understandable hostility toward far-right xenophobic leaders and parties.

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Center for American Progress | The Turkish Diaspora in Europe

Respondents are divided on whether they are proud to live in an EU country, divided on whether the European Union serves their economic interests, and divided on whether Turkey should become an EU member. But despite this ambivalence, respondents are generally more satisfied than not with the European Union.

When it comes to a football (soccer) match between Turkey and respondents’ current country—sometimes seen popularly as a measure of spontaneous identification—76 percent say they would support Turkey, 5 percent say they would support their current country, and 11 percent say they would support both. But when their current country plays a third country that is not Turkey, 79 percent say they would support their current country, while just 3.5 percent say they would support the other country.

e survey reveals mixed views on Turkish politics, including on President Erdoğan personally and on whether he cares about the welfare of Turks in Europe. But Erdoğan is more popular than any other Turkish political figure polled, including main opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, nationalist leader Devlet Bahçeli, and jailed Kurdish political leader Selahatin Demirtaş. Not surprisingly, respondents have very negative views of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, though almost half of the 6 percent who self-identify primarily as Kurds have a positive view of him.

FIGURE 2

Citizenship in the survey

Citizenship rates vary by country, and large numbers of residents only hold a Turkish passport

TOTAL

Germany

Austria

France

Netherlands

Citizenship of Turkey only

Citizenship of host country only

Citizenship of both Turkey and host country

Other/no answer

43.3%

33.4%

22.4%

54.8%

38.8%

42.5%

20.2%

35.0%

8.9%

59.5%

11.9%

26.4%

52.2%

1.7%

45.1%

0.9%

1.3%

0.0%

0.4%

1.2%

Sources: Center for American Progress/Foundation for European Progressive Studies/Fondation Jean-Jaurès/Foundation Max van der Stoel telephone survey of the Turkish diaspora in Germany, Austria, France, and the Netherlands; conducted November 2019 to January 2020 by the polling ꢀrm DATA4U. For more information, see the methodology in Max Hoꢁman, Alan Makovsky, and Michael Werz, "The Turkish Diaspora in Europe: Integration, Migration, and Politics" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2020), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/?p=491951.

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Center for American Progress | The Turkish Diaspora in Europe

Among the roughly 66 percent of the sample holding Turkish citizenship, a clear majority (roughly 56 percent) say they voted in the 2018 Turkish elections. eir self-reported preferences roughly mirror those in Turkey, although it is striking that the ultra-nationalist right wing seems to have minimal appeal in the diaspora: Among those who say they voted, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) took 51 percent, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) took 30 percent, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) took 10 percent, and other parties collectively took but 9 percent. eir self-reported votes in the 2018 Turkish presidential election followed a similar patern, and responses were roughly in line with the reported votes for the respective parties in parliament.

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Center for American Progress | The Turkish Diaspora in Europe

Detailed findings and country analyses

Identity, language, and citizenship

e survey captured differences in the composition of the diaspora communities in the four countries, including substantial variations in citizenship dynamics and subtle differences in language. But a clear finding across all four communities is the enduring power of Turkish identity and language.

Austrian respondents are more likely to report having been born in Turkey—at 75 percent—than those from the other countries surveyed (ranging from 50 percent to 64 percent). e German respondents, on the other hand, are more likely to have been born in Germany—at 45 percent—than respondents in the other countries; Austria was on the low end with 23 percent Austrian born, and France and the Netherlands were in the mid-30 percent range. e German respondents have also spent more time in Germany.

ere are also differences in the citizenship composition of the samples (Turkish vs. host country vs. dual); fewer than half the German respondents have German citizenship, the only country for which this was true. e Dutch respondents are the most likely to have citizenship, with 79 percent holding Dutch citizenship and 52 percent also holding Turkish citizenship. For more on the dynamics behind these citizenship figures and the migration history that defines them, please see the Appendix.

On the question of identity, respondents rated the importance of different aspects of their identity on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being the least important and 10 being the most important. Traditional sources of identity—including ethnic background, religion, and cultural traditions—are quite important to nearly all respondents, though relatively less so to those in the French sample. In general, across questions, younger respondents place less emphasis on the various components of Turkish identity surveyed, while less educated respondents and those with less knowledge of the local language place more emphasis. Respondents uniformly place a very high importance on their Turkish or Kurdish identity, with an overall weight of 8.70.

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Center for American Progress | The Turkish Diaspora in Europe

FIGURE 3

The diaspora strongly values its Turkish identity

On a scale of 1 to 10, how important are the following to you?

TOTAL

Germany

Austria

France

Netherlands

My Turkishness/Kurdishness

8.70

8.90

8.92

8.70

8.59

7.94

8.82

To maintain Turkish/Kurdish traditions and pass them on to my children

8.57

8.80

7.88

8.64

My religion

7.84

8.23

6.20

6.54

7.92

6.41

My Austrian/Dutch/French/German identity

5.92

5.37

5.92

Note: Average of scores by country on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being "not important at all" and 10 being "very important." Sources: Center for American Progress/Foundation for European Progressive Studies/Fondation Jean-Jaurès/Foundation Max van der Stoel telephone survey of the Turkish diaspora in Germany, Austria, France, and the Netherlands; conducted November 2019 to January 2020 by the polling ꢀrm DATA4U. For more information, see the methodology in Max Hoꢁman, Alan Makovsky, and Michael Werz, "The Turkish Diaspora in Europe: Integration, Migration, and Politics" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2020), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/?p=491951.

Religion is also deemed very important, given an overall weight of 7.84, ranging from a high of 8.59 in Austria to a low of just 6.20 in France. As with ethnic identity, older respondents place more importance on their religion than do younger respondents. Respondents say it is very important to maintain Turkish/Kurdish traditions and pass them on to their children, giving this an overall weight of 8.57, ranging from 8.80 in Germany to 7.88 in France. Again, the older generation cares more about passing on Turkish traditions than do the younger respondents.

Respondents place less emphasis on their host country identity—German, Austrian, French, or Dutch—with an overall weight of 5.92, with the French and Dutch respondents placing more emphasis, at 6.54 and 6.41, respectively. Here, the age breakdown is reversed, with younger respondents placing noticeably more emphasis on their European identity than their older counterparts, though still less emphasis than they place on their Turkish/Kurdish identity. Again, these results reveal a more integrated French diaspora community; French respondents place relatively more importance on their French identity, relatively less importance on being a Turk or Kurd, relatively less importance on their religion, and relatively less importance on passing on their traditions to their children, though these factors are still important to them.

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    CARIM INDIA – DEVELOPING A KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR POLICYMAKING ON INDIA-EU MIGraTION Co-financed by the European Union Working with the Diaspora for Development Policy Perspectives from India Alwyn Didar Singh CARIM-India Research Report 2012/25 © 2012. All rights reserved. No part of this paper may be distributed, quoted or reproduced in any form without permission from the CARIM-India Project. CARIM-India Developing a knowledge base for policymaking on India-EU migration Research Report Thematic Paper CARIM-India RR 2012/25 Working with the Diaspora for Development Policy Perspectives from India Alwyn Didar Singh Former Secretary Govt. of India, New Delhi © 2012, European University Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Any additional reproduction for other purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Requests should be addressed to [email protected] If cited or quoted, reference should be made as follows: Alwyn Didar Singh, Working with the Diaspora for Development – Policy Perspectives from India, CARIM-India RR 2012/25, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2012. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS PUBLICATION CANNOT IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES BE REGARDED AS THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION European University Institute Badia Fiesolana I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ http://www.india-eu-migration.eu/publications/ http://cadmus.eui.eu CARIM-India – Developing a knowledge base for policymaking on India-EU migration This project is co-financed by the European Union and carried out by the EUI in partnership with the Indian Council of Overseas Employment, (ICOE), the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore Association, (IIMB), and Maastricht University (Faculty of Law).
  • Turkmen of Iraq

    Turkmen of Iraq

    Turkmen of Iraq By Mofak Salman Kerkuklu 1 Mofak Salman Kerkuklu Turkmen of Iraq Dublin –Ireland- 2007 2 The Author Mofak Salman Kerkuklu graduated in England with a BSc Honours in Electrical and Electronic Engineering from Oxford Brookes University and completed MSc’s in both Medical Electronic and Physics at London University and a MSc in Computing Science and Information Technology at South Bank University. He is also a qualified Charter Engineer from the Institution of Engineers of Ireland. Mr. Mofak Salman is an author of a book “ Brief History of Iraqi Turkmen”. He is the Turkmeneli Party representative for both Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. He has written a large number of articles that were published in various newspapers. 3 Purpose and Scope This book was written with two clear objectives. Firstly, to make an assessment of the current position of Turkmen in Iraq, and secondly, to draw the world’s attention to the situation of the Turkmen. This book would not have been written without the support of Turkmen all over the world. I wish to reveal to the world the political situation and suffering of the Iraqi Turkmen under the Iraqi regime, and to expose Iraqi Kurdish bandits and reveal their premeditated plan to change the demography of the Turkmen-populated area. I would like to dedicate this book to every Turkmen who has been detained in Iraqi prisons; to Turkmen who died under torture in Iraqi prisons; to all Turkmen whose sons and daughters were executed by the Iraqi regime; to all Turkmen who fought and died without seeing a free Turkmen homeland; and to the Turkmen City of Kerkuk, which is a bastion of cultural and political life for the Turkmen resisting the Kurdish occupation.
  • Changing Notions of Diaspora

    Changing Notions of Diaspora

    Published in International Affairs 72 (3), July 1996, 507–20 DIASPORAS AND THE STATE: FROM VICTIMS TO CHALLENGERS Robin Cohen The notion of ‘diaspora’, used first in the classical world, has acquired renewed importance in the late twentieth century. Once the term applied principally to Jews and less commonly to Greeks, Armenians and Africans. Now at least thirty ethnic groups declare that they are a diaspora, or are so deemed by others. Why these sudden proclamations? Frightened by the extent of international migration and their inability to construct a stable, pluralist, social order many states have turned away from the idea of assimilating or integrating their ethnic minorities. For their part, minorities no longer desire to abandon their pasts. Many retain or have acquired dual citizenship, while the consequences of globalisation have meant that ties with a homeland can be preserved or even reinvented. How have diasporas changed? What consequences arise for the nation-state? ∗ Until a few years ago most characterisations of diasporas emphasized their catastrophic origins and uncomfortable outcomes. The idea that ‘diaspora’ implied forcible dispersion was found in Deuteronomy (28: 25), with the addition of a thunderous Old Testament warning that a ‘scattering to other lands’ constituted the punishment for a people who had forsaken the righteous paths and abandoned the old ways. So closely, indeed, had ‘diaspora’ become associated with this unpropitious Jewish tradition that the origins of the word have virtually been lost. In fact, the term ‘diaspora’ is found in the Greek translation of the Bible and originates in the words ‘to sow widely’.
  • The Other Diasporas - Western and Southern European Migrants in Charles Booth’S Life and Labour of the People in London

    The Other Diasporas - Western and Southern European Migrants in Charles Booth’S Life and Labour of the People in London

    The other diasporas - Western and Southern European migrants in Charles Booth’s Life and Labour of the People in London Article Accepted Version Renshaw, D. (2019) The other diasporas - Western and Southern European migrants in Charles Booth’s Life and Labour of the People in London. Journal of Migration History, 5 (1). pp. 134-159. ISSN 2351-9924 doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/23519924-00501006 Available at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/82689/ It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the work. See Guidance on citing . To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/23519924-00501006 Publisher: Brill All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in the End User Agreement . www.reading.ac.uk/centaur CentAUR Central Archive at the University of Reading Reading’s research outputs online 1 The Other Diasporas - Western and Southern European Migrants in Charles Booth’s Life and Labour of the People in London Introduction London in the Victorian period was not transformed by immigration as the great cities on the Eastern Seaboard of the United States were.1 However, the arrival of hundreds of thousands of economic migrants and refugees over a seventy year period acted as a catalyst for significant demographic change in parts of the capital. Fears about the consequences of migration were prominent in the discourse on British identity and the British Empire’s future in the second half of the nineteenth century.
  • PDF Fileiranian Migrations to Dubai: Constraints and Autonomy of A

    PDF Fileiranian Migrations to Dubai: Constraints and Autonomy of A

    Iranian Migrations to Dubai: Constraints and Autonomy of a Segmented Diaspora Amin Moghadam Working Paper No. 2021/3 January 2021 The Working Papers Series is produced jointly by the Ryerson Centre for Immigration and Settlement (RCIS) and the CERC in Migration and Integration www.ryerson.ca/rcis www.ryerson.ca/cerc-migration Working Paper No. 2021/3 Iranian Migrations to Dubai: Constraints and Autonomy of a Segmented Diaspora Amin Moghadam Ryerson University Series Editors: Anna Triandafyllidou and Usha George The Working Papers Series is produced jointly by the Ryerson Centre for Immigration and Settlement (RCIS) and the CERC in Migration and Integration at Ryerson University. Working Papers present scholarly research of all disciplines on issues related to immigration and settlement. The purpose is to stimulate discussion and collect feedback. The views expressed by the author(s) do not necessarily reflect those of the RCIS or the CERC. For further information, visit www.ryerson.ca/rcis and www.ryerson.ca/cerc-migration. ISSN: 1929-9915 Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 2.5 Canada License A. Moghadam Abstract In this paper I examine the way modalities of mobility and settlement contribute to the socio- economic stratification of the Iranian community in Dubai, while simultaneously reflecting its segmented nature, complex internal dynamics, and relationship to the environment in which it is formed. I will analyze Iranian migrants’ representations and their cultural initiatives to help elucidate the socio-economic hierarchies that result from differentiated access to distinct social spaces as well as the agency that migrants have over these hierarchies. In doing so, I examine how social categories constructed in the contexts of departure and arrival contribute to shaping migratory trajectories.