How Evangelical Churches Became Republican and What It Means for Politics and Religion

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How Evangelical Churches Became Republican and What It Means for Politics and Religion Unsustainable Evangelical Politicism: How Evangelical Churches Became Republican And What it Means for Politics and Religion Patrick Lines Professor Blouin November 16, 2017 Lines 1 Unsustainable Evangelical Politicism: How Evangelical Churches Became Republican And What it Means for Politics and Religion For the last 50 years, the Republican Party has increasingly relied on white, primarily Evangelical, voters to win regional, state, and national elections. In an era where the demographics of the U.S.A. are shifting dramatically, the Republican Party continues to lean on the same demographic. How was this relationship between Evangelical Christians and the Republican Party born, and how do these past events create the political situation we see today? Perhaps more importantly, how will this relationship change in the future? Today’s connection between Evangelicals and the Republican Party was formed through intentional political and social processes. This relationship will fail without major changes from both institutions. The term “Evangelical” can have many different connotations. In a broad sense, an Evangelical is simply a person who spreads the Gospel of Christ. However, I will follow the thread of author Frances FitzGerald, who defined “American Evangelical” as the religious descendants of the First and Second Great Awakenings of the 1700s and 1800s1. Today, “Evangelical” is an umbrella term for many Protestant denominations, including Southern Baptist, Mennonite, Methodist, evangelical Anglican, and some Christian and Presbyterian churches. The majority of Evangelicals in America are located in the Bible Belt of the American South and Midwest. 1 Frances FitzGerald, The Evangelicals: The Struggle to Shape America (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017), 2. Lines 2 I: History Evangelical Christians rose to prominence in the political world only a few decades ago in the 1960s and 70s, perhaps in support of Ronald Reagan or in opposition to Jimmy Carter. To view Evangelical influence in politics as a recent phenomenon, however, is to ignore centuries of political involvement from Evangelical religious groups and their predecessors. The Evangelical movement we see today evolved out of religious revivals in the early United States, namely the Second Great Awakening of the late 18th and early 19th centuries2. The religious fervor that swept this new nation was strongly influenced by elements of Romanticism taking hold in the minds of philosophers, poets, and public speakers around the Western world. Romantics of this age strongly believed in the overwhelming beauty of nature and the significance of feelings and emotions over the mind and logic that was so strongly advocated for by Enlightenment thinkers of previous generations. As such, the religious ideals of these born-again Christians emphasized the evangelism of the Gospel, or the duty of Christians to spread the Word of God to all who would listen. At the time of the Second Great Awakening, nearly all Christians in the new United States would have likely considered themselves “Evangelical”3. Among different groups of Evangelicals arose social movements such as temperance, health reform, and abolitionism that would have major political impacts until the mid-20th century4. Northern Evangelicals, including individuals such as Charles Finney and William Lloyd Garrison, were outspoken abolitionists 2 FitzGerald, The Evangelicals, 2. 3 FitzGerald, The Evangelicals, 3. 4 FitzGerald, The Evangelicals, 41. Lines 3 and assisted in the founding of both the American and the New England Anti-Slavery Societies5. From the very beginning of the Evangelical movement, members have been outspoken in their social and political stances in ways that shaped the political conversation in the United States. More recently in the 20th century, Evangelical voters played increasingly significant roles in shaping the political arena. The rise of Soviet Communism and the Cold War in the 1940s and early 1950s led to a resurgence of nationalistic Evangelicalism. No individual better embodies this union of patriotism and religious fervor than Billy Graham. An outspoken anti-Communist, Graham stated, “Either communism must die or Christianity must die because it's actually a battle between Christ and Anti-Christ.”6. In addition to being an outspoken Southern Baptist minister and preacher, Graham also served as a spiritual advisor to a number of U.S. presidents, including Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon7. Graham’s nationalist rhetoric in response to a perceived Communist threat to Christianity led to extremely high levels of American patriotism in Evangelical churches. Graham would often in his rhetoric divide the world into two spiritual camps, a Western culture-based camp led by the Bible and a Communist-controlled side influenced by Satan himself8. Graham’s self-proclaimed crusades against immorality and Communism swept across the country, and was seen by politicians as a tool that could be properly utilized for public approval. Graham began meeting with U.S. senators (from both parties), and gave public devotionals in Congress9. Graham’s rhetoric found its way into 5 FitzGerald, The Evangelicals, 40-41. 6 Bill Adler, Ask Billy Graham: The World's Best-Loved Preacher Answers Your Most Important Question (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Inc., 2007), 25. 7 William Martin, With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America (New York: Broadway Books, 2005), 34. 8 FitzGerald, The Evangelicals, 174. 9 FitzGerald, The Evangelicals, 177. Lines 4 Evangelical (primarily Southern Baptist) churches across the United States, and invariably politicians who appeared close to Graham in the media were often perceived as upright and just in the eyes of many conservative Evangelicals10. Graham laid the groundwork for modern political Evangelicalism, but a glance at the political situation of his time shows that things were not yet fully evolved into what we see today. Most strikingly, the Democratic Party of Graham’s years still appealed to social conservatives and Graham, a Southern conservative, was a registered Democrat for most of his career11. Richard Nixon, who was considered a close friend of Graham’s, would be heavily responsible for molding the Republican Party into today’s conservative bloc, and drawing Evangelicals who agreed with Graham’s political stances. Pulitzer Prize-winning author Frances FitzGerald views the 1960s as the pivotal decade for American Evangelicals. FitzGerald attributes the swing of conservative Evangelicals to the Republican Party to Richard Nixon’s Southern Strategy and fellow Republican leaders like Senator Barry Goldwater12. Nixon’s Southern Strategy was an electoral strategy used to gain white, Southern voters who were traditionally Democrats for the Republican Party. This strategy was not explicitly religious, although the majority of individuals it was directed toward were Evangelicals. Richard Nixon and the Southern Strategy solidified the Republican Party as the party of discontented white Evangelicals who may have feared the civil rights movement and the apparent “culture wars” as a threat to their traditional lifestyle. In the 1964 presidential election, Republican candidate Barry Goldwater won the then-traditionally Democratic states of Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Mississippi13. Although Goldwater ultimately lost the election by a wide margin to Democrat Lyndon B. Johnson, his fiery anti-Communist rhetoric 10 Martin, With God on Our Side, 40. 11 Martin, With God on Our Side, 41. 12 FitzGerald, The Evangelicals, 233. 13 FitzGerald, The Evangelicals, 244. Lines 5 and opposition to federally mandated desegregation drew the interest and votes of many Southern Evangelicals14. The Southern Strategy came into bloom in the 1968 presidential election, where Democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey lost every Southern state to Republican Richard Nixon and Independent candidate George Wallace15. President Nixon had succeeded in drawing Evangelical voters away from the Democratic Party into his own Republican camp, and the majority of white Evangelicals (across the country, not just the South) have remained with the GOP ever since. Televangelist Jerry Falwell was the natural successor to Billy Graham and his Evangelical politicism. Falwell, also a Southern Baptist pastor, solidified the connection between the Republican Party and Evangelicals. A major political figure throughout the 1970s and 80s, Falwell founded Liberty University, a megachurch in Virginia16, and the Moral Majority17. Falwell’s organization, the Moral Majority, was established to advocate for Christian conservatism in American politics and oppose views that at this point were championed by Democrats, including abortion, homosexuality, and the Equal Rights Amendment18. Falwell himself was quick to distinguish the connection he was making between Evangelicalism and conservative politics, once stating, “The war is not between fundamentalists and liberals, but between those who love Jesus Christ and those who hate Him.”19. Many of the Moral Majority’s policies are still looked on favorably by Evangelicals. For example, supporting prayer in public schools was a distinct issue for which the Moral Majority pushed. In 2013, sociology professor 14 FitzGerald, The Evangelicals, 243. 15 FitzGerald, The Evangelicals, 247. 16 Michael S. Winters, God’s Right Hand: How Jerry Falwell Made God a Republican and Baptized the American Right (New York: HarperOne, 2012), 47. 17 Winters, God’s Right Hand, 113. 18
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