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Populism and Electoral Politics in New Zealand

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Populism and Electoral Politics in New Zealand A POPULIST EXCEPTION? THE 2017 NEW ZEALAND GENERAL ELECTION A POPULIST EXCEPTION? THE 2017 NEW ZEALAND GENERAL ELECTION EDITED BY JACK VOWLES AND JENNIFER CURTIN Published by ANU Press The Australian National University Acton ACT 2601, Australia Email: [email protected] Available to download for free at press.anu.edu.au ISBN (print): 9781760463854 ISBN (online): 9781760463861 WorldCat (print): 1178915541 WorldCat (online): 1178915122 DOI: 10.22459/PE.2020 This title is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). The full licence terms are available at creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode Cover design and layout by ANU Press Cover photograph: Deputy Prime Minister Winston Peters, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and Green Party leader James Shaw standing in ‘unity’ at the stand up after the ‘Next steps in Government’s Plan for NZ’ speech at AUT, Auckland. © Stuff Limited. This edition © 2020 ANU Press CONTENTS List of Figures and Tables . vii Acknowledgements . xiii Jennifer Curtin and Jack Vowles The Populist Exception? The 2017 New Zealand General Election . 1 Jack Vowles, Jennifer Curtin and Fiona Barker 1 . Populism and Electoral Politics in New Zealand . 9 Fiona Barker and Jack Vowles 2 . Populism and the 2017 Election—The Background . 35 Jack Vowles 3 . Measuring Populism in New Zealand . 71 Lara Greaves and Jack Vowles 4 . Populism, Authoritarianism, Vote Choice and Democracy . 107 Jack Vowles 5 . Immigration and Populism in the New Zealand 2017 Election . 137 Kate McMillan and Matthew Gibbons 6 . Gender, Populism and Jacinda Ardern . 179 Jennifer Curtin and Lara Greaves 7 . Māori and the 2017 General Election—Party, Participation and Populism . 213 Lara Greaves and Janine Hayward 8 . The Unexpected Coalition—Challenging the Norms of Government Formation . 247 Jack Vowles 9 . New Zealand Populism in the 2017 Election and Beyond . 271 Jennifer Curtin and Jack Vowles LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES Figures Figure 2.1: Political polls (March–September 2017) ..............38 Figure 2.2: Content analysis (most important issue) ..............42 Figure 2.3: Real GDP and real GDP per capita in New Zealand (2007–2017) .......................................45 Figure 2.4: Parties closest to voters’ positions on different issues .....47 Figure 2.5: Change in number of effective parties in OECD countries (2016–2007/2007–1990). .49 Figure 2.6: Change in electoral volatility in OECD countries (2016–2007/ 2007–1990) .............................49 Figure 2.7: The urban–rural divide and major party voting (1972–2017) .......................................52 Figure 2.8: Variance explained by the urban–rural divide on the electorate vote (1972–2017) ............................54 Figure 2.9: The Alford Index of class voting in New Zealand (1963–2017) .......................................55 Figure 2.10: Probabilities of party vote for the National Party ......58 Figure 2.11: Probability of Labour Party vote ...................60 Figure 2.12: Probability of vote for the Green Party ..............61 Figure 2.13: Probabilities of party vote for New Zealand First ......62 Figure 3.1: The components of populist attitudes ................73 vii A POPULIST EXCEPTION? Figure 3.2: Five-factor structure underlying the CSES questions in the NZES .......................................83 Figure 3.3: Relative probabilities of being populist and authoritarian by social groups .....................................89 Figure 4.1: Populism, authoritarianism and the left–right scale .....112 Figure 4.2: Populism, authoritarianism and vote choice in 2017 ....113 Figure 4.3: Populism conditioned by time of government formation. 115 Figure 4.4: Satisfaction with democracy in New Zealand (1996–2017) ......................................117 Figure 4.5: Satisfaction with and support for democracy in New Zealand. .118 Figure 4.6: Generational comparisons of support for democracy ...120 Figure 4.7: Satisfaction with democracy, support for democracy and authoritarianism ................................121 Figure 4.8: Satisfaction with democracy, support for democracy and income .......................................122 Figure 4.9: Democratic satisfaction, support for democracy and external efficacy .................................123 Figure 4.10: Democratic satisfaction, support for democracy and populism. .124 Figure 4.11: How populism and age affect democratic support .....124 Figure 5.1: Percentage of people who want immigration reduced ‘a lot’ or ‘a little’ in New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom .............................150 Figure 5.2: Percentage of voters who agree or strongly agree that immigration is good for the economy. 152 Figure 5.3: Percentage wanting immigration reduced by views on economic benefits. .153 Figure 5.4: Percentage of voters who agree or strongly agree that migration is a threat to their country’s culture .............154 Figure 5.5: Percentage wanting immigration reduced by views on whether immigration harms culture .....................154 viii LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES Figure 5.6: Percentage of voters who think immigrants increase crime rates ........................................155 Figure 5.7: Decomposing the effects of populist attitudes on preference to reduce immigration ....................158 Figure 5.8: Decomposing the effects of authoritarian attitudes on preferences to reduce immigration ...................158 Figure 5.9: Probabilities of wanting migration reduced ...........160 Figure 5.10: Percentage of voters wanting immigration reduced in 2017, by party vote ...............................161 Figure 5.11: Percentage of voters wanting immigration reduced a lot or a little by party preference ......................162 Figure 6.1: Likeability of Jacinda Ardern and Bill English. 188 Figure 6.2: Gender and attitudes to leadership qualities ..........189 Figure 6.3: Likeability for Ardern and English by gender and generation. 190 Figure 6.4: Populist and authoritarian attitudes in relation to the likeability of Jacinda Ardern ...........................191 Figure 6.5: Average scores for the likeability of Ardern by demographics ...................................192 Figure 6.6: Average scores by gender and generation for ‘On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do’ ....193 Figure 6.7: Average scores by gender to the statement ‘Society would be better off if women stayed home with their children’ (over time). .195 Figure 6.8: Average scores by gender and generation to the statement ‘Society would be better off if women stayed home with their children’. .195 Figure 6.9: Gender gap, voters and non-voters (2014–2017) ......198 Figure 6.10: Agree or strongly agree that ‘The law should be strengthened to reduce pay differences between women and men’ (%). .199 Figure 6.11: Interest in politics by gender .....................200 ix A POPULIST EXCEPTION? Figure 6.12: Views on the statement ‘Abortion is always wrong’ across years. .202 Figure 6.13: Gender-generational differences on abortion ........202 Figure 7.1: The proportion of the party vote in the Māori electorates by party across elections ..............................221 Figure 7.2: Mean likeability ratings by party in 2017 (from 0 [strongly dislike] to 10 [strongly like]) across Non-Māori, Māori on the general roll and Māori on the Māori roll .......222 Figure 7.3: Mean likeability ratings for party leaders (0 [strongly dislike] to 10 [strongly like]) ..........................222 Figure 7.4: Average populism scores for Māori on the Māori roll, Māori on the general roll and non-Māori .................229 Figure 7.5: The percentage of people opposed to the Māori seats/ electorates ........................................233 Figure 7.6: Attitudes towards the abolition of the Māori electorates ..235 Figure 8.1: Preferences for a National- or Labour-led government ....252 Figure 8.2: Party, alternative government and respondent right–left positioning and distance from the average and median voters ...254 Figure 8.3: Jacinda Ardern and Bill English—how trust and competence can be used to describe them ................256 Figure 8.4: The state of the economy over the last 12 months prior to the 2014 and 2017 elections ........................256 Figure 8.5: Associations between populism, authoritarianism and left–right position on preferences for single party or multi-party governments. 260 Figure 8.6: Coalition versus one-party government summary scale (2014–2017) ......................................260 Figure 8.7: Satisfaction with democracy (2014–2017) ...........261 Figure 8.8: One-party versus multi-party government and party votes. 261 Figure 8.9: Coalition/one-party government preferences and age cohorts ....................................262 Figure A8.1: Reported and validated votes (before and after government formation) ..............................266 x LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES Figure 9.1: Public opinion polling and party vote intentions (2017–2020) ......................................281 Figure 9.2: Public opinion polling regarding preferred prime minister (2017–2019) ...............................282 Tables Table 2.1: The 2017 and 2014 elections—party votes and seats .....39 Table 2.2: Estimated flows of votes (2014–2017) ................40 Table 2.3: Issue salience (by word count and codes) ..............43 Table 2.4: The social and demographic structural correlates of voting choice .....................................56 Table A2.1: Estimated
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