u Ottawa l.'Un/vcrsiltf i'.innrlicn;K- Ginacln's university FACULTE DES ETUDES SUPERIEURES mn FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND ET POSTOCTORALES U Ottawa POSDOCTORAL STUDIES

L'University eanadierme Canada's university

Tracey Parker AUTEUR DE LA THESE / AUTHOR OF THESIS

M.A. (Education) GRADE/DEGREE

Faculty of Education "FAcOlTiTFcoLTbT^

Education, Conflict & Development in : Historical Precedents & Modern Dynamics

TITRE DE LA THESE / TITLE OF THESIS

Richard Maclure DIRECTEUR (DIRECTRICE) DE LA THESE / THESIS SUPERVISOR

CO-DIRECTEUR (C0-D"|RECTRICE) DEIATHESE /THESIS CO-SUPERVISOR

EXAMINATEURS (EXAMINATRICES) DE LA THESE / THESIS EXAMINERS

Cheryll Duquette

Martin Barlosky

Gary W. Slater Le Doyen de la Faculte des etudes superieures et postdoctorales / Dean of the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies Education, Conflict & Development in Nepal: Historical Precedents & Modern Dynamics

Tracey Parker

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the MA degree in Education

Faculty of Education University of Ottawa

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While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. Canada Acknowledgements I would like to thank my supervisor, Richard Maclure, for his invaluable assistance in the production of this thesis. Thank you also to the members of my thesis committee, whose comments on the initial drafts were very helpful. I also greatly appreciate those individuals who participated in interviews for sharing their time and expertise.

11 Abstract This thesis discusses the relationship between educational development, foreign aid, and socio-political conflict in Nepal, and explores how Nepal's donors have been responding to the country's escalating Maoist insurgency. It explores whether Nepal's donors have considered the role of education in socio-political conflict, or have reexamined their support to education in light of the violence. The study is guided by two seemingly contradictory perspectives on education. One perspective, espoused by development agencies and global movements, is that education is a benign force of social progress and modernization, while the other perspective, made evident by the role of schools in situations of violent conflict worldwide, is of education as a vehicle for hegemonic control by autocratic ruling groups and/or the transmission of the values and prejudices underlying social grievances. The dichotomy between these two perspectives is evident in Nepal. While it has not directly instigated Maoist violence, education has contributed to the perpetuation of socio­ political discord and has in effect become positioned at the centre of Nepal's protracted socio-political struggle. Donor-funded education reform programs in Nepal, however, have largely ignored the country's entrenched socio-political power balance and other contextual constraints, and have therefore merely obscured the continuance of traditional structures of elite dominance while doing little to improve education quality. Even with the onset of Maoist violence, Nepal's donors do not appear to have examined the contribution of education to social discord, nor the suitability of current vehicles of educational support in the context of conflict. Although these agencies have endeavored to respond to the conflict and make their overall programs conflict-sensitive, these efforts have generally circumvented the education sector. This thesis argues that conflict has helped to illuminate in Nepal what Bush and Saltarelli (2004) refer to as the "negative face of education". The case of Nepal serves as further substantiation of the importance of considering the role of schools in the perpetuation of discriminatory social practices. It also underscores Davies' (2005) exhortation for an increased research emphasis on conflict-sensitivity in education, a mainstreaming of conflict analysis within education planning, as well as a reconsideration of the purpose and methods of education in an increasingly interconnected and violent world.

111 Table of Contents List of Acronyms, Tables & Figures viii Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Chapter 2: Education, Development & Conflict: A Literature Review 7 2.1 Education & National Development: Assumptions, Limitations & Contradictions 2.2 Education & National Development in Conflict & Post-Conflict Circumstances 2.2.1 Education During Conflict 2.2.2 Educational Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Societies 2.3 International Aid in Contexts of Conflict & Host Government Fragility 2.3.1 Rationale for Foreign Aid 2.3.2 Critiques of Foreign Aid 2.3.3 Typology of Aid Agencies 2.3.4 Development Aid in Conflict Zones 2.3.5 Aid to Fragile States 2.3.5 (a) Challenges in the Provision of Aid to Fragile States 2.3.5 (b) Definitions of State Fragility 2.4 International Aid for Emergency Education in Zones of Conflict & State Fragility 2.5 Summary of Literature Review 2.6 The Case of Nepal: An Overview 2.7 Research Questions Chapter 3: Methodology 37 3.1 Project Outline 3.1.1 Document Collection & Analysis 3.1.2 Interviews 3.1.3 Data Analysis 3.2 Anonymity 3.3 Scope & Limitations of the Study 3.4 Verifiability 3.5 Dependability Chapter 4: Nepal: Political & Educational Developments up to the Early 1990s 43 4.1 Political Developments

IV 4.1.1 The Shah Period 4.1.2 The Rana Period 4.1.3 The "Democratic Experiment" 4.1.4 The System 4.2 Nepal's Slow Economic Development & Socio-Cultural Constraints 4.3 : Stages & Dynamics of an Emerging National System 4.3.1 Earliest forms of Education in Nepal: The Shah & Rana Periods 4.3.2 Education during the "Democratic Experiment" of the 1950s: The Vision of the National Education Planning Commission 4.3.3 Education During the Panchayat Years 4.3.3 (a) The Role of Education in Nation Building during the Panchayat Years 4.3.3 (b) Access & Enrollment in Panchayat Era Schools (1960-1990) 4.3.3 (c) The New Education System Plan (NESP) 4.3.3(d) Student Politics 4.4 Conclusion: The Interconnections of Political & Educational Development in Nepal Chapter 5: The Maoist Insurgency & Education in Nepal: Dynamics & Implications 72 5.1 Development of the Maoist Insurgency 5.1.1 Antecedents of the Insurgency: Governance, Discrimination & Endemic Poverty Post-1990 5.1.2 The Emergence of the of Nepal - Maoist 5.1.3 The Escalation of the Insurgency 5.2 Impacts of the Insurgency on Nepalese Society 5.3 Education & the Underlying Dynamics of the Maoist Revolt 5.3.1 Critiques of Education in Modern Nepal 5.3.2 The Maoists & Education: Ideology & Strategy 5.3.2 (a) Maoist Agitation against Private Schools 5.3.2 (b) Maoist Ideology vis-a-vis Public Schooling 5.3.2 (c) Critiques of Maoist Educational Initiatives 5.4 Effects of the Maoist Insurgency on Education in Nepal

v 5.4.1 Effects of the Insurgency on the Education System: Document Analysis 5.4.2 Effects of the Insurgency on the Education System: Interviews with INGO Representatives 5.5 Conclusion: Cause-Effect Dynamics between Education & Conflict in Nepal Chapter 6: Foreign Aid & Education in Nepal Prior to the Insurgency 107 6.1 Historical Overview of Aid to Nepal 6.2 Shifting Trends & Five Year Plans: Mixed Results 6.2.1 Development Trends in Nepal 6.2.1 (a) Growth Maximization: 1950s-1960s 6.2.1 (b) Rural Development: 1970s 6.2.1 (c) Basic Needs: 1980s 6.2.1(d) The 1990s 6.2.1 (e) The Tenth Plan & Other Recent Initiatives 6.2.2 Development Outcomes 6.3 The Politics of Foreign Aid in Nepal 6.4 Aid to Education in Nepal: An Overview 6.4.1 Aid to Education before 1990 6.4.2 Aid to Education during the 1990s 6.4.3 Aid to Education after 2000: The Education For All (EFA) Agenda 6.4.3 (a) Components of the EFA Program in Nepal 6.4.3 (b) Outcomes of EFA to Date 6.4.3 (c) Community School Management 6.4.3 (d) Conflict-Sensitivity of the EFA Program in Nepal 6.5 Conclusion: The Implications of the Maoist Insurgency on Foreign Aid to Education Chapter 7: Bilateral & Multilateral Aid to Education in the Context of Insurgency: Diverse Policies & Approaches 129 7.1 Impact of the Maoist Insurgency on Bilateral & Multilateral Agencies 7.2 Policy Responses of Bilateral & Multilateral Agencies in the Context of Conflict

7.2.1 Joint Responses: The Basic Operating Guidelines (BOGs) & OECD

vi Principles 7.2.2 Individual Agency Responses to Conflict 7.2.3 Summary of Policy Responses of Bilateral & Multilateral Agencies 7.3 Approaches to Educational Aid in the Context of Conflict 7.3.1 Individual Agency Activities in Education 7.3.2 Summary of Bilateral & Multilateral Aid to Education during the Insurgency 7.4 Conclusion: Bilateral & Multilateral Responses to the Maoist Insurgency: Assumptions & Contradictions Chapter 8: The Work of I/NGOs during the Maoist Insurgency 173 8.1 Impacts of the Insurgency on I/NGOs 8.1.1 Document Analysis 8.1.1 (a) The Space for Development 8.1.1 (b) The Code of Conduct for Social Service Organizations 8.1.1 (c) The Role of I/NGOs during the Insurgency 8.1.2 Interviews 8.2 Policy Responses of I/NGOs to the Insurgency 8.2.1 Document Analysis 8.2.2 Interviews 8.2.2 (a) Adaptations to the Insurgency 8.2.2 (b) Factors Facilitating Work during the Insurgency 8.2.2 (c) Continuity of Work during the Insurgency 8.2.3 Summary of Policy Responses of I/NGOs to the Insurgency 8.3 Educational Programming of I/NGOs during the Insurgency 8.3.1 Document Analysis 8.3.2 Interviews 8.3.3 Summary of Education-Specific Responses of I/NGOs to the Insurgency 8.3.3 (a) Formal Education 8.3.3 (b) Non-Formal Education

vn 8.4 Conclusion: I/NGOs & Conflict-Sensitive Education in Nepal: Possibilities & Limitations Chapter 9: Conclusion: Effects & Implications of Aid to Education in Conflict: The Lessons of Nepal 196 9.1 Answers to Research Questions 9.2 Enhancing Conflict Sensitivity in Education: Lessons from Nepal References 214 Appendix 1: Map of Nepal 236 Appendix 2: The Maoists' Demands 237 Appendix 3: Interview Outline 241 Appendix 4: Educational Growth in Nepal: Figures 244 Appendix 5: The Maoist School Curriculum for Classes 4 & 5 246 Appendix 6: The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 248 Appendix 7: OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States 249

List of Acronyms, Tables & Figures Acronyms ADB Asian Development Bank AHRC Asian Human Rights Commission AIN Association of International INGOs in Nepal ANNIFSU-R All Nepal National Independent Free Students' Union - Revolutionary BOGs Basic Operating Guidelines BPEP Basic and Primary Education Program CAP Country Assistance Plan CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CSSP Community School Support Program CWIN Child Workers in Nepal DAC Development Assistance Committee DANIDA Danish International Development Agency DEO District Education Office DFID Department for International Development (United Kingdom)

vni EC European Commission EDK Embassy of Denmark, Kathmandu EE Emergency Education EFA Education for All EU European Union GTZ German Agency for Technical Cooperation HMGN His Majesty's Government of Nepal IDP Internally Displaced Person INGO International Non-governmental Organization JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency LICUS Low-income Country Under Stress MDG Millennium Development Goal MFAF Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland MOES Ministry of Education and Sports (i.e. Nepalese Government) NEPC National Education Planning Commission (Nepal) NGO Non-governmental Organization NHRC National Human Rights Commission (of Nepal) OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper RNA Royal Nepalese Army SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SESP Secondary Education Support Program SLC School Leaving Certificate SMC School Management Committee SNV Netherlands Development Organization swc Social Welfare Council UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

IX USAID United States Agency for International Development

Tables Table 1: Percentages of Educational Attainment by Caste & Ethnicity, 2003 114 Table 2: Basic Operating Guidelines for Bilateral Donor Agencies in Nepal 170 Table 3: Policy Responses of Bilateral & Multilateral Agencies to the Maoist Insurgency 205 Table 4: Responses to Insurgency: Common Themes in Agency Documents 208 Table 5: Bilateral & Multilateral Aid to Education in the Context of the Maoist Insurgency 216 Table 6:1/NGO Policy & Programmatic Responses to the Insurgency 239 Table 7: Educational Programming of I/NGOs during the Insurgency 247 Table 8: Educational Programming of I/NGOs by Theme 248

Figures Figure 1: Literacy in Nepal (Percentages) According to Gender 311 Figure 2: Number of Primary & Secondary Schools in Nepal 311 Figure 3: Net Primary School Enrollment in Nepal 312

x Chapter 1: Introduction Nepal is an ancient kingdom at the foot of the , with a diverse geography and a highly heterogeneous population comprised of a multiplicity of ethnicities and cultures.1 It is, however, one of the poorest countries in the world, and this poverty is entrenched by centuries of political instability, developmental constraints, and the fierce inequities of its hierarchical caste system, amid numerous other social disparities (Wan, 2003; Nepali, 2003). Despite decades of development endeavors by successive governments, which were supported by significant influxes of financial and technical assistance from foreign donors, only provisional successes have been seen in terms of the amelioration of poverty and economic growth (Whelpton, 2005). This failure to provide tangible benefits to the majority of the population, particularly to those groups historically marginalized due to ethnicity, caste, gender, and geography, coupled with allegations of rampant corruption, nepotism, and incompetence, has led to increasing mistrust and contempt among the people for the government. Public unrest has escalated to a critical mass at several pivotal points during the country's history, and succeeded in unseating, or at least unsettling, unpopular governing regimes. The latest incarnation of counter-hegemonic resistance, born out of a complex conglomeration of political ambition and social grievances, was incited by a radical rebel faction known as the - Maoist (hereafter referred to as "the Maoists"). On February 4, 1996, one of the leaders of the Maoists, , presented Nepal's Prime Minister Deuba with a list of 40 demands related to "nationalism, and livelihood" (Thapa, 2002: 82). These included limitations on the privileges of the royal family, the creation of a new constitution through a constituent assembly, the declaration of Nepal as a secular nation, freedom of speech and publication, and the introduction of village development projects, among several others. (The full list is provided in Appendix 2). Bhattarai included a cover letter containing an ultimatum that unless the government began work towards meeting the demands by February 17, the party would be forced to begin an armed insurgency. At first everyone dismissed the threat as a minor one,

1 A map of Nepal is provided in Appendix 1. 1 and Deuba was in fact on a state visit to India when the Maoists made their first attack, on February 13, four days before the official deadline. The insurgency was greeted initially with a degree of empathy from many segments of the Nepalese population: impoverished rural communities, wealthy urban dwellers, and young people alike, all of whom were angered by the corruption and failures of Nepal's succession of governments, and their inability to raise the standard of living of Nepal's poor (Stevenson, 2001; Wadlow, 2005). Although the Maoists' use of violence has been denounced by all, the majority of their ostensibly championed causes are the very same concerns highlighted by development agencies and the government as critical issues, such as racial, sexual and caste discrimination, land reform, access to drinking water and other necessities for the poor, and Nepal's poor quality education system (WCAC, 2005). Unfortunately, the difficulty of ameliorating issues such as poverty and discrimination in Nepal has been demonstrated by the ineffectiveness of generations of governmental and donor development initiatives. Moreover, despite the Maoists' rhetoric, the reality of their war has seen the deterioration of the already fragile developmental, economic, educational, and political climate of the country. Thousands of people have been killed or displaced, infrastructure has been destroyed, and social services disrupted (OHCHR, 2006). On the other hand, by shining a harsh light upon some of the most pervasive concerns of the Nepalese people, and offering at least a degree of opportunity, however provisional, for marginalized groups to raise their voices (largely by joining the Maoist ranks), the conflict has served to re- emphasize crucial elements of social justice. At the time of writing, a ceasefire is currently in effect, and has been since mid-2006. The ceasefire was called by the Maoists, and agreed to by King Gyanendra only after an escalation of public protest forced his capitulation. A coalition government is in place, comprised of eight political parties including the Maoists, and parliamentary elections are scheduled for November 2007 ("Dissolution of Parliament", 2006; "Interim government", 2006; Tripathi, 2007). Despite incidents of sporadic violence and other militaristic activities on the part of the Maoists and the army, the peace process appears to be progressing (Panthi,

2 2007; "Maoist strike...", 2007; Subedi, 2007; "Welcome UN", 2006; "Peace process...", 2007). The social tensions that percolated through the centuries, eventually to take shape in the Maoist insurgency, had their origins within the very foundation of the Nepalese state. They were, however, aggravated more or less consistently by the hegemonic policies of the government, as Nepal's elite rulers sought to consolidate their hold on power and expound their particular vision of the country, often to the detriment of the majority2. One of the mechanisms employed by Nepal's governments to propagate and solidify the discriminatory status quo, and which has thus inadvertently incited and exacerbated social discord, has been the national education system. As noted by numerous scholars studying foreign assistance to education, such as Aguilar and Retamal (1998), Bethke and Braunschweig, (2004), Sinclair (2002), Buckland et al. (2005), Bush and Saltarelli (2000), and Smith and Vaux (2003), education systems play a multifaceted role in societies beset with conflict. While the destructive impact of conflict on schools is well known, education systems themselves also have the potential to play a part in the consolidation of the values, attitudes, and social relations of a society. This potential is a dualistic one: depending on the inclusiveness of a school system, its relevance to its socio-economic context, and the nature of its curriculum and pedagogy, education may serve to either facilitate peace, foster egalitarianism and social justice, or conversely, to perpetuate the intolerances, discriminations, and social grievances underlying conflict (Buckland et al., 2005; Smith, 2005). Davies (2005) argues that the global community is in a crisis because of an inadequate examination of how and what young people around the world are learning. She warns that unless we critically question the myth that formal education automatically brings peace and prosperity, the world will continue to witness an intensification of violence and destruction. This thesis aims to discuss the relationship between education, foreign aid, and socio-political conflict in Nepal, and to explore how the country's donors have been responding to the escalating Maoist insurgency. It examines how the development of education in Nepal has been influenced by, and how it in turn has influenced, the tumultuous political and social context of Nepalese society, and what this relationship means for

2 A detailed portrayal of Nepal's and its tumultuous history is provided by Gregson (2002). 3 Nepal's donors. It will also explore whether Nepal's donors have considered the role of education in socio-political conflict, or reexamined their support to education in light of the increasingly contentious environment. The dual potential of education in regard to conflict is but one of several paradoxes or tensions guiding this study. One additional issue is the tension between the explicit role of education in imparting skills and knowledge, versus its more implicit role in socialization. The "hidden curriculum" of the latter is not easily accessible to reform efforts, and its existence begs the question of whose values and norms are underpinning the socialization process. The ultimate purpose of education is also a matter of potential debate: should education involve such broad goals as the development of critical thinking, skills in collaboration, co-operation, and citizenship, or instead focus on technical training to meet the immediate needs of employers and the economy? The tendency for education to have become synonymous with formal schooling is a further issue, which itself raises questions as to the benefits of standardized national education systems versus diversity and decentralized local control. The question of centralization generates debate over minority language rights, cultural erosion, insufficient or dubious resource allocation, and contextual relevance, and has fueled class divides by inadvertently encouraging the establishment of elitist private schools. An additional fundamental paradox, which links educational dilemmas with those of foreign-assisted development more broadly, occurs when the heralded promise of Western- modeled education to serve as a socio-economic "equalizer" is curtailed by the realities within an impoverished or non-egalitarian society, where education may not be correlated with social or economic betterment, or where access to quality education may be inequitably distributed due to geographic, gender, ethnic, or caste discrimination. The dichotomy between the idealistic view of education espoused by development agencies versus the often intractable socio-economic and political realities of recipient countries is symptomatic of a broader dichotomy inherent to the process of planned development, i.e., the tension between the values and strengths of established tradition versus the attraction of the modern and the urgency of socio-economic progress. The former may be sacrificed, or branded as "backward", in favor of the untested promise of the latter. This faith in the ideology of

4 development has often been detrimental to recipients on both individual and national levels, when the presence of foreign agencies and funds has served to exacerbate rather than ameliorate financial constraints as well as existing divides between ethnic groups, the rich and the poor, and rural and urban areas. There is also the question of motivation on the part of development agencies, and the degree of self-interest present in their initiatives in low- income countries. Even genuine attempts to help may be viewed with suspicion by recipients, if allegations of corruption or a history of failed projects have darkened the reputations of foreign organizations within disillusioned communities. The choice of topic for this study was motivated in part by my personal interest in and connection to Nepal. I spent four months in Nepal in 1998-1999 as a volunteer with a British/Nepalese NGO called Volunteer Nepal, working in elementary schools both in a rural village and in Kathmandu. During this period the Maoist presence was largely limited to the remote far-western districts, and aside from some mention of the Maoists ordering a strike in Kathmandu (which never in fact materialized), I personally witnessed no evidence of the rebels nor the impending violent conflict. My interest and concern for Nepal continued after I returned home, particularly when news of the escalating violence emerged, and I wondered how the individuals I had met, including teachers, students, and development workers, were coping. While I approached this project with previously formed impressions of the education system, I did not, at least intentionally, incorporate my own experiences into the study, although the potential for bias in this regard is acknowledged. It bears mentioning, however, that the information I uncovered pertaining to the state of education in Nepal did resonate closely with my own recollections of Nepalese schools. The methodology of the study comprised two segments. The first involved the analysis of documents pertaining to several topics: the political and educational , current events and opinions as expressed through the Nepalese media, and information pertaining to donor activities in Nepal past and present. Documents included published books, journal articles, newspaper articles, websites, and the documents and position statements of donors and development organizations active in Nepal. The second section of the project involved semi-structured interviews with representatives of five development agencies and a member of the Nepalese media.

5 This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 is composed of a literature review concerning education and development, aid to fragile states, emergency education, and the roles of various development actors in relation to education. The chapter concludes with a statement of the research questions. Chapter 3 discusses the methodology of the study. Subsequent chapters will discuss the relationship of political and educational development in Nepal, throughout history to the present day context of the Maoist insurgency, followed by a discussion of Nepal's development endeavors more broadly. The final chapters will discuss the activities of bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental organizations during the insurgency, and explore whether these agencies have questioned the potential relationship of education with socio-political conflict in Nepal.

6 Chapter 2: Education, Development & Conflict: A Literature Review This chapter will discuss literature pertaining to the topics addressed in this thesis, i.e., the relationships between educational development, foreign aid, and socio-political conflict. In doing so, it will provide a backdrop for the exploration of these issues in the Nepalese context. 2.1 Education & National Development: Assumptions, Limitations & Contradictions It is often suggested that a country's educational status acts as a barometer of that society's social, political and economic development (Sabourin, 1977; Mundy & Murphy, 2001). The less literate a population, the less chance it will be able to participate in national decision-making processes and make use of available resources, such as agricultural services, credit programs and health care. Young people and their families often demand education, as they relate it to the realization of social and economic aspirations (Dhesi, 2001). It has thus generally been assumed that industrializing or newly independent countries can only reach their maximum development potential with the establishment of a universally accessible formal education system (Alvi, 2003; Morris, 1996). Since the 1960s, the result of this assumption, in numerous countries, has been a rapid expansion of educational facilities at all levels, from primary, secondary and tertiary education to technical and professional schools (Duggan, 1996). The provision of education for all children, both as a human right and as an investment in the shared future of humanity, remains a worldwide imperative. In reference to Afghanistan, for example, Alvi (2003) states: "The country's reconstruction and short- and long-term development profoundly depend on the ability to establish and secure secular educational institutions" (p. 13). In many countries past and present, the belief in the urgency of educational development was and is interwoven with the recognition of the need for, and acceptance of, large amounts of foreign assistance in order to fulfill these aspirations (Alvi, 2003; Duggan, 1996). Foreign influence in education has increased over the years as bilateral donors have taken a greater interest in the education sector, and particularly when agencies such as the World Bank became influential in determining the agenda of educational development in many Southern countries (Sabourin, 1977; Doftori, 2004). Yet, despite a common refrain among Southern countries to develop systems with relevance to their cultural, political and

7 economic contexts, the majority of education systems created with the assistance of foreign aid have been virtual replicates of those from the North (Godoy et al., 2007). The impact of foreign educational methodologies upon the societies in which they have been implanted has often been less than ideal. As noted by Doftori (2004), the history of education is very different in industrialized as compared with developing countries, primarily in relation to the purposes of schooling. In Northern countries, school systems generally developed after a period of industrialization (Grigorenko, 2007), whereas in Southern countries, education has often been considered a pre-requisite for industrialization (Morris, 1996; Alvi, 2003). The neo­ classical theory of the positive correlation of formal education with improved human capital and economic development has been borne out in the cases of some countries, including South Korea and Taiwan (Morris, 1996), but not, for example, in the case of many African nations and areas of south-east Asia (Grigorenko, 2007). In the latter cases, education has been associated more with gaining credentials for white-collar employment than with fostering the skill development needed to make a living in a particular context (Grigorenko, 2007). The industrial sector in many countries did not grow as expected, and was not nearly large enough to absorb the increasing number of graduates, creating a pool of educated but unemployed or underemployed youth (Doftori, 2004; Grigorenko, 2007). In addition to the disillusionment that may arise when education is not reliably linked, due to the socio-economic realities within a country, with individual or societal benefit, the rigid structures of formal school systems also have the potential to alienate students from their cultural surroundings (Tharp & Dalton, 2007; Serpell, 2007; Grigorenko, 2007). Quist (2001) points out that some African countries, for example, remain under the influence of the imported education systems that were introduced during the colonial period: "Western-patterned secondary education in both Ghana and Cote d'lvoire has provided a curriculum that is basically foreign...[Secondary school students find themselves imbibing cultural characteristics, mannerisms and attitudes that undermine the promotion, development and sustenance of African culture and traditions" (p. 306). Sabourin (1977) and Grigorenko (2007) note that while education during the colonial period tended to train individuals to work in the colonial administration, even during the period of post-colonial

8 educational expansion neither the foreign curricula nor the philosophical bases upon which education systems were built were suited to national and local contextual realities. Rather than learning how best to utilize their country's natural resources, for example, many students graduated with a sense of condescension toward rural life, and a desire to join the modernized and urban segments of society and the economy (Doftori, 2004; Quist, 2001; Sabourin, 1977; Grigorenko, 2007). Formal schooling along the Western paradigm may also fail to meet the needs of many children. School may be inaccessible to marginalized groups, as little attention may be given to meeting different learning needs, or to offering the support necessary to help these children remain in school, many of whom may need to engage in labour or have families that are unable or unwilling to pay associated fees (Grigorenko, 2007; Daun, 2000). Religious beliefs may also impact upon the availability of formal schooling, and the willingness of parents to send their children to school (Daun, 2000). Furthermore, formal school systems are difficult for governments to maintain, in that they are expensive and non- profitable, and may not be appropriate within the economic situation of a country, particularly when the burden of financial support begins to fall upon communities (Daun, 2000). As is the case with aid to all sectors, the presence of an undue degree of donor influence, real or perceived, brings with it several complications, constraints and criticisms. Because education is highly symbolic in terms of the sense of prestige and privilege with which it may be associated, and necessarily linked with its socio-political context, the potential for misalignment and criticism is high when its methods and structures are imported from industrialized countries, or when donors are accused of designing projects befitting their own self-interest (Serpell, 2007; Tharp & Dalton, 2007; Vaux et al., 2006). The overarching effect of multiple donor projects may also undermine government accountability, increase confusion and inequalities across schools, and even lead to an inappropriate disbursement of funds, such as when donors follow global trends rather than take a broad view of a country's needs (Vaux et al., 2006; Duggan, 1996). Foreign aid to education also brings with it potentially inappropriate foreign ideologies, when decisions regarding pedagogy, assessment, financing, and other structural and policy issues are made

9 under the influence of donors. One example noted by Dixit (2002) is the global campaign for free and compulsory education, which in some countries may be contextually inappropriate and thus serve merely as a diversionary political slogan. Carney (2003) also mentions the debatable value of modern "managerialist" practices in education, such as quantitative school effectiveness research, in certain Southern contexts (p. 88). Tabulawa (2003) notes that, while aid agencies may regard their assistance as purely technical and "value-free", this is generally not the case. Some theories often championed by Western agencies, such as democratic education or learner-centred pedagogy, contain an ideological underpinning that encourages the development of the liberal democratic perspectives associated with capitalist societies, which may clash with embedded socio- cultural realities in other societies. One example is the case of Russia following the end of the Cold War in 1989. Elliott and Tudge (2007) note that despite Russia's long tradition of high educational standards, the country was inundated in the 1990s by Western agencies encouraging numerous reform measures. The adoption of these changes was highly contentious, and many people in the country blamed them for the subsequent deterioration of Russian schools. Tabluawa argues that while reform tenets may be couched in educational terminology, many are in fact political and amount to the utilization of education as a means by which to foster democracy or other ideologies within a particular society. The capacity of formal education to transmit values and ideologies has also been exploited at times by newly established governments, which have viewed education as a hegemonic tool through which to consolidate their authority. Lentner (2005) defines hegemony as the exercise of power through non-violent methods such as rhetoric and persuasion, in order to yield a system of domination. Government education can be a convenient vehicle by which a state may disseminate particular ideas and thereby enhance its legitimacy and the dominance of a desired socio-political structure. In post-colonial sub- Saharan Africa, for example, a "key feature of state domination was the expansion of public school systems" with standardized curricula designed to facilitate the economic priorities of governments and inculcate a sense of loyalty to the state (Maclure, 2000: 26).

10 Hegemonic forces are generally in a continual state of flux, however, as they are contested by those in civil society3 with "an alternative conception of political order that is opposed to the prevailing hegemonic system" (Lentner, 2005: 748). In order to prevent these oppositional forces from coalescing into a coherent counter-hegemonic revolt, the "discourse of potential opposition", such as the language of democracy or progressive slogans, may be co-opted by oppressive rulers, in order to obscure the persistence of exploitive power systems (Maclure, 2000: 29). In education, for example, a government may adopt the rhetoric of education reform espoused by its donors, while the traditional practices and power structures within the education system remain intact. As noted by Maclure (2000), donors have often been complicit in this process, when in their efforts to establish the forms and processes of democracy they have ignored deeply rooted, cultural traditions. Despite the risks of contextual misalignment and undue foreign influences, the expansion of formal education along the Western paradigm continues to be encouraged on a worldwide scale. Initiatives such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989, and the World Conference on Education for All in 1990, fostered a global consensus that basic education, especially primary schooling, is a fundamental tool for achieving development goals. Targets for universal primary education and gender equality in education were more recently established in the Dakar Framework for Action and the Millennium Development Goals (see Appendix 6) (Grigorenko, 2007). The agenda behind this push for formal education by development agencies, as well as the demand for formal schooling among parents and their children, continues to rest on the crucial conceit that schooling provides students and societies with observable benefits (Serpell, 2005). Given the historically poor performance of formal education systems in many parts of the world, however, there is a strong consensus among scholars that for education to actually provide benefits to a country and its citizens, its ideological and practical bases must be attuned to the country's culture and economic situation (Clarke, 2003; Elliott &

3 The Centre for Civil Society in London defines "civil society" as "the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between...[these] are often complex, blurred and negotiated" (CSS, 2004: 1). Civil societies often consist of organizations such as charities, NGOs, community groups, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, business associations, coalitions, and advocacy groups. 11 Tudge, 2007; Sternberg, 2007). Cole (2005) argues that because formal schooling is inherently value-laden it needs to be considered in the socio-cultural context of a society, as one among several forces that have an "enculturating" impact upon children (p. 211). Cole (2005) also notes that as of yet, there is no "agreed-upon" way to account for the disparities between the multitude of cultural variations and what is generally considered "universal school content" (p. 213). Accordingly, while formal school systems play obviously important roles, groups like UNESCO and many scholars have argued that education in many countries needs to be re-examined and broadened to include new approaches beyond the confines of formal schooling (Doftori, 2004; Grigorenko, 2007). An increasing number of initiatives in this regard are currently underway, such as the multinational Molteno Project in Africa, which aims to improve mother tongue and English literacy through alternative educational approaches (Grigorenko, 2007). Wickens and Sandlin (2007) caution, however, that even the non-formal literacy projects of groups such as UNESCO and the World Bank are based upon Western models of education, generally promote a neo-liberal vision of education as congruent with economic growth, and remove control of education from local governments. While an education system misaligned with its contextual surroundings may be a waste of resources and student ability, certain manifestations of education also possess a more nefarious potential to contribute not only to socio-political tension, but also to violence, as will be discussed in the following section. 2.2 Education & National Development in Conflict & Post-Conflict Circumstances 2.2.1 Education during Conflict As Colletta and Cullen (2000) note, internal conflicts weaken a country's social stability. People lose trust in other individuals and other communities, and the underpinnings of community cooperation and sense of collectivity are thus destroyed. In this situation, the role of the education system is often highly significant. Many scholars argue that education may benefit societies beset by conflict by helping bolster peacemaking activities and fostering peace, provided it is practiced in an inclusive, facilitative, and democratic learning environment with appropriate materials (Tidwell, 2004; Sinclair, 2002; Pigozzi, 1999; Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Buckland et al., 2005). Smith and Vaux (2003) note that education may

12 be considered one of the institutions that can promote social cohesion by conveying the norms, values and social roles that bind a community together, and also facilitating the relations between citizens, civil society organizations, and the state. It has been noted by many commentators (e.g. Buckland et al. (2005); Smith & Vaux, (2003); Smith, 2005)), however, that education has a particularly complicated and multifaceted relationship with conflict. One aspect of this relationship is the destructive impact of conflict upon education systems. Education tends to be intricately interwoven with the politics and social forces of a country, and schools are thus often deliberate, strategic targets of military and/or rebel forces. This has occurred in Afghanistan, where three million children have been deprived of education, and education for girls was entirely prohibited, during the country's decade-long war (Ayalon, 1998; Alvi, 2003), as well as Mozambique, Indonesia (Tidwell, 2004), Thailand (Mydans, 2005), and elsewhere (Ayalon, 1998). Even if left intact, schools may be subject to cooptation and looting by troops, or school areas may become combat zones. Education quality may be further eroded due to the stresses placed upon teachers, who may face overcrowded and multi-grade classrooms, threats to their safety, and reduced or revoked monetary compensation. Government allocations to education may also decline as resources are diverted to military purposes, leaving schools under funded and poorly equipped. Further factors that take children out of school during conflict include: forced migration, the need to contribute to their family's income, the exacerbation of poverty, early marriage for girls, recruitment as child soldiers, and fear for safety (Benthke & Braunshweig, 2004). While the destructive impact of conflict on schools and education systems has been extensively documented, education systems themselves also possess the potential to play a part in the perpetuation of the values, attitudes and social relations underlying conflict. An understanding of this negative potential is necessary if education is to play a positive role in supporting social cohesion, or in helping to repair it after conflict (Buckland et al., 2005). The potential of schools to contribute to conflict, rather than foster peace, is referred to by Bush and Saltarelli (2000) as the "negative face" of education. While the politicization of education often comes to the fore during conflict, education may itself be directly contributive to the underlying patterns that give rise to the violence. Unequal access to

13 education, segregation in schools, as well as the consolidation of power imbalances through discriminatory curricula, may indirectly contribute to conflict via the perpetuation of inequitable access to resources and associated poverty (Buckland et al., 2005; Smith & Vaux, 2003; Sinclair, 2002). The language of instruction may also be a contentious issue, as well as the explicit and implicit messages conveyed by teachers (Buckland et al., 2005). The ability of education to help instill particular values and norms, and the dangers inherent within this ability, is an issue that has raised controversy not only in Southern countries, but in the North as well (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Gatto, 1992). Mehr Khan writes, in the foreword to Bush and Saltarelli (2000): "In short, education reflects the society around it. The attitudes that flourish beyond the school walls will, inevitably, filter into the classroom" (p. v). Scholars such as Davies (2005) argue as well that formal schooling, through its emphasis on individualistic competition, cognitive ability, standardization, and international achievement studies, promotes aggression and militaristic qualities. The scope of modern schooling is too limited, Davies argues, for a critical pedagogy, citizenship education, or to develop students' sense of responsibility to others. As noted above, while education is often heralded as a social equalizer and a pre­ requisite for economic growth, the modern reality in many countries has proven to be far more complicated when the expectations engendered by education are not fulfilled. Boyden and Ryder (1996) argue that the disillusionment of many young people around the world may often be traced to the importation of modern formal education systems, whose expense in terms of time and money and curricular content may not be appropriate for a country with limited resources or a non-conducive socio-cultural context. The potential for conflict arises when the provision of education is insufficient or unequal due to resource constraints, and also when education is associated with promises of employment in modern sectors that are not borne out by the country's economic and political reality. As Boyden and Ryder note, participation in education may be perceived as prolonging childhood. Moreover, if a student is not guaranteed employment upon graduation, he or she may choose anti-social and illegal occupations that generate immediate social and economic rewards. Objections to the manner in which education is run may also add fuel to a simmering social conflict (Gersony, 2003; Boyden & Ryder, 1996).

14 The structure of education systems and their resources may also be exploited by those with a political agenda, into vehicles to serve their own purposes. While the hegemonic potential of education was noted above, education systems have also been employed as explicit conduits of repression and discrimination by authoritarian regimes in many countries, such as South Africa, Namibia, Turkey, Cambodia, Peru, and Chile (Boyden & Ryder, 1996). One modern example is the case of Afghanistan. Alvi (2003) notes that the concept of jihad and the conflict in Afghanistan are generally linked to ultra- conservative Islamic schools, madrassas, along the Pakistani border because many Taliban leaders and Mujaheddin commanders have been graduates of these schools. She argues that these individuals are not taught rational or critical thinking, politics, science, or other important subjects, but receive only rigorous ultra-orthodox religious study. Some madrassas focus particularly upon jihad and skills of military combat (Alvi, 2003). The relationship of education and conflict has, thus far, tended to be treated in a rather cursory manner in international protocols concerning global education, such as the Dakar Framework for Action and the EFA monitoring reports (Smith & Vaux, 2003). Smith and Vaux (2003) note that while other issues such as gender sensitivity have been integrated throughout education models, conflict is generally singled out as a "special case" rather than a crosscutting issue (p. 18). The same is the case in the EFA Monitoring Report 2006 (UNESCO, 2005). This report discusses the effects of conflict upon education systems, the educational initiatives of several organizations during conflict, and the importance for reconstruction efforts to consider education's potential for facilitating social cohesion and economic recovery. However, there is little attention given to education's potential to incite conflict, nor any suggestion that conflict prevention issues be included in curricula before violent conflicts arise. 2.2.2 Educational Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Societies Paradoxically, the need to recreate an education system destroyed by conflict may actually offer the opportunity for innovation, improvement, and a consideration of how to increase gender, geographic, and ethnic equity for students (Aguilar & Retamal, 1998: 10; Pigozzi, 1999; Tidwell, 2004; Chand, 2003; Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; BEC, 2003; Sinclair, 2002). Changing education in this fundamental way, however, is very difficult as it often

15 challenges pre-existing structures of authority and control (Clarke, 2003). The education sector does not operate in isolation from other sectors of society, moreover, and the faults within education may be indicative of broader social ills. Bush and Saltarelli (2000) therefore argue that sustainable change to education needs to be broad based: it requires attention to both educational structures as well as the political structures that underpin them, and needs to include informal and formal dimensions of education, and both the content and delivery of the curriculum. As noted by Pigozzi (1999), civil unrest results from long-term historical processes, often involving power imbalances and discrimination. It is clear therefore that simply arguing for "more and better" education is a limited approach; it is not enough to add more elements to education, more textbooks, more resources, more inclusiveness, as this will be of little value if the destructive practices, the "underpinning logic and structures of behaviour", are not deconstructed and transformed (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000: 32). It is widely acknowledged that merely expanding education is not sufficient to prevent conflict. Smith (2005) notes, for example, that many high-income countries with well-developed education systems have experienced violent conflict. Many argue, therefore, that when an education system has been destroyed, particularly through ethnic conflict, educational reconstruction efforts should not ignore education's role as an instiller of values, attitudes and knowledge, as this may merely serve to re-institute discriminatory practices (Buckland et al., 2005; Sinclair, Aguilar & Retamal, 1998; Smith, 2005; Pigozzi, 1991). As is suggested by these writers, the construction or reform of an education system is a complex and long-term undertaking, particularly in the midst of or following conflict, and involves the coordination and participation of international aid agencies, civil society, and government. Such challenges are of course not limited to the education sector. The following section will contextualize the topic of educational development during conflict through a discussion of foreign aid to fragile or failed states, i.e., countries experiencing various degrees of governmental collapse, as well as aid to states that have descended into conflict.

16 2.3 International Aid in Contexts of Conflict & Host Government Fragility 2.3.1 Rationale for Foreign Aid International assistance has been a crucial element of foreign policy since the 1950s. The international importance of development aid has been reiterated in recent years through high-level commissions such as the UN Millennium Project, international meetings such as the G-8 summit, and other high-profile publications and activities (Klotzle, 2006). These events have conveyed the message that a massive increase in foreign aid is critical in order to eliminate poverty, improve security, and encourage sustainable development for the poor. The UNDP's Human Development Report 2005 (UNDP 2005b) argues that properly targeted aid improves human development without leading to aid dependency, and modern research has also indicated that aid increases growth in recipient countries (McGillivray, 2006). Development initiatives have been adapted over the years to respond to the changing global climate. Modern development programs, for example, tend to be more holistic and comprehensive in their approach than those of past decades, and they place human development as a primary concern of public policy. Also, the focus has been shifted from country-specific issues to a broader global perspective, with increased attention given to global concerns such as communicable disease and environmental threats (Picciotto, 2004). The emphases upon human development and international security, particularly after September 11, 2001, has also brought international focus onto the need to address the problems of weak and failing states, and this topic now comprises an important element of the policy-making undertaken by many international actors (Klotzle, 2006; Picciotto, 2004; Baranyi & Powell, 2005). While the presence of weak government institutions within a recipient country has on occasion prompted a cessation of foreign assistance, commentators now argue that this is not the best course of action. Picciotto (2004) states, "To suspend aid efforts in low-income countries that are not performing, because they labour under the handicap of poor governance and a fragmented social order, is to play Russian roulette with peace and stability. The instruments of aid can and should be adapted to the operating environment" (p. 551). Similarly, UNICEF (2005) argues in its State of the World's Children 2006 report that while fragile states require extra vigilance due to the

17 complications caused by dysfunctional governments, it is necessary to maintain engagement with the state and non-state actors within these countries in order to safeguard children and not penalize them for the actions, or inactions, of their countries' rulers. Picciotto (2004) and McGillivray (2006) suggest that donors should also consider the risk that fragile states will descend into civil warfare, as low income and growth have been linked with greater risk for conflict. They argue that well-targeted and contextually appropriate aid to fragile states is only prudent, in that it may militate against state failure and its consequences, such as increased poverty, conflict, deteriorating HDI ratings, displacement, and terrorist activity. Further, there is evidence that aid can increase growth in fragile states, in terms of improving a country's chances for reform (McGillivray, 2006). Chauvet and Collier (2004) argue that some types of aid, including support to secondary education systems, had significant positive impacts upon economic reform in fragile countries. Even when a country has descended into conflict, many argue that continuing development work and foreign assistance are critical. According to Berry et al. (2004), it is essential to continue service delivery initiatives during conflict for numerous reasons. It is imperative from a humanitarian perspective, services such as health and education institutions are necessary to ensure global commitments regarding the MDGs, and service delivery projects can provide an entry-point for longer-term initiatives (Berry et al., 2004: 9). Further, the maintenance of what Armon et al. (2004) call social "connectors", such as education, markets, and health services, may contribute to social cohesiveness and a reduction in conflict (p. 9). Development work that helps alleviate poverty and contributes toward the egalitarian distribution of resources and social justice may in the process help address the root causes of conflict, and thus prevent future recurrences (Berry et al., 2004: 9). 2.3.2 Critiques of Foreign Aid Despite the arguments cited above, there remain many criticisms regarding the provision of foreign aid. Many of these critiques focus on the deleterious impacts of foreign aid on recipient countries, and suggest that aid causes more problems than it solves. Klotzle

18 (2006) points out several common criticisms that caution against further aid distribution. These include the argument that weak state institutions are often overwhelmed by and unable to absorb inundations of aid from numerous donors, that aid inadvertently supports corrupt regimes and autocratic politicians who divert development funds to their own personal use, that aid devalues local industries through the distortion of markets and exchange rates, and that the structure of incentives fostered by aid may not be conducive to political or economic reforms or good governance. Further, Klotzle (2006) notes, donors are frequently criticized for lack of coordination, and for pursuing agendas driven by their own interests that do not sufficiently consider the needs and capacities of recipient countries. While the above critiques allege that excessive aid may be detrimental to recipient countries, other scholars argue that aid allocation to fragile states has been insufficient to meet these countries' needs. According to McGillivray (2006) and Picciotto (2004), contemporary methods of aid allocation have, in general, led fragile states to receive too little aid, and also experience twice the degree of aid volatility (i.e. fluctuating levels of aid allocation), as have other low-income countries. McGillivray argues that many fragile states are disqualified from foreign assistance because of the adherence of the majority of donors to the "selectivity" approach to aid allocation, in which donors give preference to countries that have demonstrated certain positive characteristics, such as better policies and institutions, and are thus expected to use aid more effectively (McGillivray, 2006). There are drawbacks to this selectivity approach, however, including cases where countries score poorly on assessments, and thus receive little aid, but are in serious need of foreign assistance (McGillivray, 2006: 4). Further, because of the risk entailed in providing aid to fragile states, some risk averse donors may avoid these countries without considering the other risks entailed in inaction. Klotzle (2006) states that although criticisms continue in regard to the value of large provisions of aid, there is a general agreement among commentators, which has been documented in the Paris Declaration of 2005 for example, that more emphasis needs to be placed upon issues of state fragility and failure, and that greater coherence and coordination are needed at the national and international level in order to improve aid effectiveness.

19 2.3.3 Typology of Aid Agencies There are three primary categories of organizations involved in development work around the world: bilateral agencies, multilateral agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These will be discussed briefly below. Bilateral development agencies, such as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), provide direct government-to-government loans, grants, and technical assistance. The motivation for bilateral aid is often based upon political and historical connections between countries (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2004). Multilateral agencies are organizations that are supported by several countries and act in areas of widespread global concern. Such organizations include: i) international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank; ii) United Nations development organizations such as UNICEF and UNESCO; iii) numerous global funds and partnerships, such as the Global Environment Fund and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS; and iv) humanitarian agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the World Food Program. These agencies serve numerous functions including the mobilization and provision of development assistance and humanitarian aid, as well as the setting of normative guidelines pertaining to such worldwide concerns as health, human rights, agriculture, and economic development (CIDA, 2006). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) began to emerge as a visible presence within the international development scene in the 1970s (Zaidi, 1999). Many have associated the rise of NGOs with the apparent failure of state-based foreign aid to significantly ameliorate the development problems of Southern countries (Doftori, 2004). This group of "first generation" NGOs, which focused most on service delivery to vulnerable populations, was characterized by their "alternative development paradigm", i.e., the view of development as being just, participatory, democratic, cost-effective, and the embodiment of good governance: principles that were held in contrast to the top-down, bureaucratic, paternalistic view of the state and bilateral and multilateral aid agencies

20 (Tandon, 2000; Zaidi, 1999). Over the subsequent decades, NGOs have proliferated in terms of number, diversity, and influence. "Second generation" NGOs focused upon empowering and building the capacity and self-reliance of local people through small-scale community development projects, while the "third generation" began to act on a broader scale, by advocating for policy change and development at local, national and global levels (Doftori, 2004). Further development of an "anti-state, anti-interventionist, New World Order" accorded the non-governmental sector a larger role in development, a trend now known as the New Policy Agenda (Zaidi, 1999: 261). Bilateral and multilateral aid agencies have increasingly employed NGOs as implementing partners for social service projects (Maclure, 2000). "Fourth generation" NGOs have now become involved with global social movements and coalitions, engage in large-scale mobilization and consciousness raising, and have become associated with issues such as the natural environment, gender equity, and sustainable development (Dofroti, 2004; Tandon, 2000). Although NGOs are a very heterogeneous group in terms of mandates and activities, development NGOs have tended to share an emphasis upon local-level, small-scale, participatory development efforts, livelihood improvements for the poor, and the mobilization of marginalized populations (Tandon, 2000; Edwards, 1999; ICHRP, 2002; Schloms, 2003). Many international actors commend NGOs' abilities to target the needs of the poor, develop community-based organizations, offer sustainable benefit, as well as their increasing role in advocacy work, the promotion of more democratic and accountable governance, as well as human rights (Zaidi, 1999: 262; ICHRP, 2002; Van Tuijl, 2000). In some regions, sub-Saharan Africa for example, NGOs have also been helping to build the potential for political resistance and grassroots democracy within local populations (Maclure, 2000). Nonetheless, as Zaidi (1999), warns, some proponents of NGOs go too far by viewing them as a "panacea" and endowing them with exceedingly high expectations. Despite the abundance of official support for NGOs, therefore, there is substantial criticism of these organizations as well. Many argue, for example, that NGOs' dependence on project- bound, external funding may restrict their programming, and lead them to become vehicles

21 for donor-driven policy agendas, reducing their legitimacy, flexibility, and independence (Tandon, 2000; Zaidi, 1999: 264; Fyvie & Ager, 1999; Fowler, 2000). Also, some argue that NGOs often do not live up to their reputation as participatory, innovative organizations, and have become overly bureaucratic (Fyvie & Ager, 1999; Edwards, 1999; Zaidi, 1999; Kirkby et. al., 2001). Another criticism of NGOs is that the influence of donors and local elites has led them to become hegemonic agents of and , and that NGOs have served to "depoliticize the discourse of potential resistance" (Maclure, 2000: 26). In the education sector, NGOs have most been often associated with the creation of non-formal programs that are more diverse and accessible than formal education systems, with strategies to meet the needs of particular groups of children, youth, or adults, that may provide some individuals with their only chance at education (Doftori, 2004). Mundy and Murphy (2001) note, however, that the global emphasis upon education for all has had a complicated and contradictory impact on the role of NGOs in education. While bilateral and multilateral agencies now officially recognize NGOs as integral actors in educational development, the prevalent view of NGOs at global education conferences has largely been limited to their role as assistant providers of services within the traditional development paradigm of North to South education delivery, and NGOs as a group continue to lack a clearly articulated educational strategy of their own. Also, while a large number of INGOs have become engaged in educational projects and advocacy initiatives since the Jomtien Conference on Education for All in 1990, these Northern-based INGOs have thus far tended to focus on uncontroversial issues such as increased expenditures on education, as opposed to challenging existing models of schooling and education governance. On the other hand, Mundy and Murphy note, there has been a recent emergence of an "increasingly strong and complex array of international nongovernmental actors and new nongovernmental organizational forms" active in the field of education, many of which are fostering a degree of transnational organizational networking not seen previously (p. 85). These authors suggest that if these NGO coalitions continue to evolve in the direction of increased contention, they have the potential to significantly alter the decision-making process in educational development.

22 2.3.4 Development Aid in Conflict Zones The challenges faced by development actors to design and implement participatory, sustainable programs suited to their particular contexts take on a significant added dimension when these contexts descend into violent conflict. One of the most critical concerns for organizations working in conflict zones is the safety of their staff and those they work with. Rogers (2001) notes that an agency working in insecure areas must be able to demonstrate, in court if necessary, that it exercises great care in regard to safety. If not, it "exposes itself to serious liability, and the financial and public relations cost...could be enormous" (Rogers, 2001: f 21). This shift towards greater vigilance often entails a radical change in organizational culture. As Rogers (2001) says, "Gone are the days when semi- autonomous 'lone rangers' operating on wit and intuition can respond to humanitarian emergencies. Today's world requires a culture of corporate responsibility in which security issues are paramount"(^[22). Of further concern during conflict are the issues of neutrality, impartiality, and advocacy (ICHRP, 2002). Although the principle of neutrality may seem straightforward in theory, it can be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain in practice. This is particularly the case when organizations favour one side in a complex political emergency or are associated with a particular country (Hollants Van Loocke & Philipson, 2002; Kirkby et al., 2001). Osa (2003), for example, cites a comment by Tony Vaux, co-ordinator of Oxfam's emergency programs, in relation to the issue of neutrality in Kosovo: The problem beginning to emerge for Oxfam was that the attempt to express its views impartially and objectively was impossible because it operated from Britain, and Britain was part of NATO... Basically, I think the cause of the problem was that Oxfam could not disentangle itself from its position as a British charity, and was unable to escape from the fact that it was part of a British establishment that was engaged in war (Vaux, 2001:23,25; cited in Osa, 2003: 263). A strict position of neutrality may also on occasion favour an existing power balance, and in this way fuel repression and conflict (Kirkby et. al., 2001). Rather than espousing neutrality, therefore, some organizations choose to emphasize impartiality (Kirkby et. al., 2001). Impartiality involves an "equal readiness" to respond to

23 all persons in need, regardless of nationality, politics, or religion (ICHRP, 2002: 22). Also, while many organizations consider it to be their responsibility to engage in advocacy on behalf of threatened populations, some suggest caution in this regard, as the findings they report may be manipulated (ICHRP, 2002). Some organizations, such as small NGOs, may also be seen as lacking in sufficient political understanding and policy-making experience to be able to comment constructively upon a complex situation (Schloms, 2003; ICHRP, 2002; Tandon, 2000). In a crisis situation, cooperation with other national and international organizations, while challenging, also becomes particularly important for development aid agencies (Edwards, 1999; ICHRP, 2002; ADB, 1999; Sinclair, 2002; Needham & Ellinger, 2004; Kobek & Thapa, 2004; Schloms, 2003; Stewart, 2005). One question often faced by aid organizations is what type of relationship to pursue with a host government (ICHRP, 2002). Schloms (2003) notes that while agencies generally strive to avoid taking sides in a conflict, today more emphasis is placed on cooperation with government, because "it is governments (whether recognized or not) that form the only authority that can ultimately ensure security" (Stewart, 2003: 340; Zaidi, 1999). Others, however, argue that NGOs in particular should remain independent of government during conflict, since an NGO's position may be misinterpreted or misrepresented (ICHRP, 2002). Development organizations in conflict zones may also find themselves working alongside military operations (Kofi Abiew, 2003; ICHRP, 2002). While military support may be necessary if agencies are to be able to function at all, such alliances are often politically sensitive. They may reduce an agency's control over its operation, and can create mistrust on the part of the local population (ICHRP, 2002). relationships with and among local and international NGOs are also critical in a crisis situation (Edwards, 1999; ICHRP, 2002; ADB, 1999; Sinclair, 2002; Needham & Ellinger, 2004; Kobek & Thapa). NGOs described as "international" (INGOs), tend to operate in countries outside those in which their headquarters are located. INGOs are often expected to monitor and report globally on issues of concern (ICHRP, 2002). National NGOs, by contrast, tend to operate domestically. Whereas larger national NGOs may be headquartered in a major city, local NGOs or Community Based Organizations (CBOs) are

24 usually smaller agencies located in the communities they serve. The labeling of NGOs as "international" or "national" is often reflective of power issues, however. "International" can simply translate to Northern NGOs, who are usually better financed than "national" NGOs, and may also have better access to powerful governments, media and the UN (ICHRP, 2002). Bilateral or multilateral organizations often choose to work through NGOs as implementing agents, particularly during conflict situations, because NGOs may be better situated to reach target populations (Klotzle, 2006). National NGOs, particularly those working at community level, may also provide invaluable sources of input to international organizations regarding numerous issues of concern during conflict, such as the root causes of social discord, and suggestions for how the international community may contribute most constructively during the conflict (ICHRP, 2002). Further, the issue of institutional interest also comes particularly to the fore during conflict. As noted by the International Council for Human Rights Policy (ICHRP), "Crises are opportunities for international human rights and humanitarian NGOs. They generate income, they raise the organizations' media profile, they strengthen public support, they develop the skills of staff etc. This raises difficult issues within organizations, which need to act disinterestedly, even though they derive material and political benefits in consequence" (ICHRP, 2002: 39). The ICHRP therefore stresses that in conflict situations in particular, INGOs should make great effort to consult and inform local NGOs, and use their additional resources and higher political profile to strengthen the capacity of local organizations, as this will both improve the accountability of international NGOs, as well as improve the ability of a society to recover sustainably from a conflict (ICHRP, 2002: 40). 2.3.5 Aid to Fragile States 2.3.5 (a) Challenges in the Provision of Aid to Fragile States According to Francois and Sud (2006), the provision of aid to fragile states is a relatively undeveloped and evolving domain, in terms of both experience and the development of strategies, yet several development agencies are developing or have already created policies in this regard (Baranyi & Powell, 2004). The role of aid is somewhat unclear and contested in fragile states and in countries affected by conflict, however,

25 because the effectiveness of different types of aid in conflict prevention or mitigation has not been thoroughly studied. Further, McGillivray (2006) points out that while several research studies (e.g. Hansen & Tarp, 2000; Beynon, 2002; McGillivray, 2003, 2004) have demonstrated that aid is clearly beneficial in terms of helping to increase growth and reduce poverty, it has also been made clear that aid's contribution to growth varies from country to country. Addison and McGillivray (2004) and McGillivray (2006) therefore caution that donors need to consider additional factors when working in fragile states. One issue several scholars agree upon is that the sequencing of aid instruments is particularly important in fragile states (Chauvet & Collier, 2004; McGillivray, 2006; Buckland et al., 2005). McGillivray (2006) states that while early involvement in the social sectors and the provision of technical assistance may help lay the foundations for reform, other types of aid such as infrastructure construction are effective only once a certain level of capacity is reached. There is some disagreement, however, in regard to the relative value of various types of aid. Addisson and McGillivray (2004) and Picciotto (2004) point out the benefits of project support delivered through alternative providers, such as NGOs, particularly in countries with poorly functioning institutions and policies. Francois and Sud (2006), however, argue that bypassing governments does nothing to strengthen the state and may in fact damage what capacity does exist, and they thus advocate budget support to fragile states (i.e., financial support to a country's national government) as opposed to financing individual projects. Chauvet and Collier (2004), Addison and McGillivray (2004) and Klotzle (2006) also note that other types of international assistance, including security initiatives such as military operations, are imperative for fragile and conflict-affected states in addition to traditional aid, and that these additional approaches need to be incorporated alongside existing tools. Klotzle (2006) similarly notes that because of the recognition of the interdependence of security and development in fragile states, international actors are increasingly emphasizing policy coherence in their responses to situations of state fragility

26 or collapse, stressing in particular "policies that address the nexus between security, development, and diplomacy" (p. 10). Further suggestions for donors working in fragile or conflict-affected states include a focus on broad-based recovery, getting involved before the end of the conflict, and a focus on poverty without "wish lists" (Addisson & McGillivray, 2004: 363).4 Francois and Sud (2006) add that even "massive external assistance" is not enough to strengthen a weak state, and suggest focusing on a small number of basic reforms (such as building the capacity of a government to design and implement a sound budget), as opposed to attempting fundamental changes (p. 142). Francois and Sud also argue that local government and civil society need to be more comprehensively involved in development initiatives, and that the ultimate goal of aid to fragile states is building the capacity of the government to improve the lives of its citizens (p. 142). Further, because there is in reality no clear distinction between war and peace, it may take a country many years to emerge from a conflict, and thus, donors need to commit to long-term involvement (Francois & Sud, 2006; Addisson & McGillivray, 2004). While Picciotto (2004) argues that the risks involved with aid to fragile states "need to be taken for peace" (p. 560), he notes that significant re-evaluations need to be made in aid policies and methods in order to accommodate the "full range of economic, political, and institutional antecedents of turmoil and violence" threatening these countries (p. 549). According to Klotzle (2006) and McGillivray (2006) some of the issues in need of further exploration include the optimal timing of aid to fragile states, the types and sequencing of instruments, realistic goal-setting for nation building, donor coherence and coordination, issues of absorptive capacity in fragile states, and issues of over- and under-funding and aid volatility. An important first step, noted by McGillivray (2006) is to reach international agreement regarding the criteria of defining a country as a fragile state. 2.3.5 (b) Definitions of State Fragility Francois and Sud (2006) note that despite the volume of literature on the subject of state failure and fragility, there is yet to be a clear consensus regarding the definitions of these terms. Certain general assumptions prevail, however. The most common definitions of

4 Addison and McGillivray (2004) also state that for fragile states are to become stronger, the global trade environment needs to be supportive of the efforts of developing countries. 27 state fragility and failure refer to the inability or unwillingness of a state to uphold essential responsibilities and improve the lives of its citizens. These definitions suggest a continuum from relative degrees of functionality to complete state collapse (Baranyi & Powell, 2005; Francois and Sud, 2006). McGillivray (2006) adds that fragile states are defined as those with "critically poor policies or poorly performing institutions or both" (p. i). The OECD's Development Aid Committee (DAC) has specified that fragile states are those in the bottom two quintiles of the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) scale,5 as well as others that the Bank has not rated (McGillivray, 2006). Baranyi and Powell (2004) note that the countries referred to as LICUS (low income countries under stress) by the World Bank tend to exhibit weak policies, institutions, and governance, and are often at risk of, or are emerging from, conflict. The World Bank assigns three grades of LICUS: severe, core, and marginal, based upon a country's per capita income and assessments of governance capacity6 (World Bank, 2007a). While fragile states are at greater risk of descending into conflict, they are distinguished from states referred to as post-conflict countries. The latter are those states recently emerging from periods of conflict. They may or may not also be considered fragile depending on the strength of their governance structures and institutions (World Bank, 2007a). Francois and Sud (2006) note that the approach to aid is different in the two situations: post-conflict countries are often seen as "windows of opportunity" to facilitate peace through large influxes of aid, while aid to fragile states tends to be more restrained and modest until institutions and the policy environment improve (p. 154). As in post- conflict countries, however, aid to fragile states also tends to rely less upon direct service delivery, and more upon alternative methods such as NGOs, to channel aid more directly to target groups. Also, because poor governance is often seen as a root cause of state fragility, donors often emphasize initiatives to strengthen civil society, and have begun to focus on improving civilian-military and interdepartmental coordination as well (Klotzle, 2006).

5 The World Bank's CPIA is a sixteen-criteria diagnostic tool that is "intended to capture the quality of a country's policies and institutional arrangements", and "the extent to which a country's policy and institutional framework supports sustainable growth and poverty reduction, and consequently the effective use of development assistance" (World Bank, 2007a). 6 The World Bank's 2006 list of "severe" LICUS includes: Afghanistan, Central African , Comoros, Myanmar, Somalia, and Zimbabwe (World Bank, 2007a). 28 2.4 International Aid for Emergency Education in Zones of Conflict & State Fragility Education does not cause wars, nor does it end them. It does, however, frequently contribute to the factors that underlie conflict, but it also has the potential to play a significant role both directly and indirectly in building peace, restoring countries to a positive development path, and reversing the damage wrought by civil war (Buckland et al., 2005: 86). Foreign assistance to education during or after situations of emergency, including natural disasters and violent conflict, is today known as Emergency Education, or EE. The recent recognition of EE as a field in its own right may perhaps be attributed to the increased visibility, throughout the 1990s, of the devastation caused by intra-national and ethnic conflict, in combination with increased global advocacy for universal basic education (Sinclair, 2002). The need to meet the educational needs of all people, including those "affected by conflict, natural calamities and instability", was stated among the mandates of the World Education Forum in 2000, and the right to education is explicated in numerous other international conventions (Sinclair, 2002: 8; Aguilar & Retamal, 1998; UNESCO, 2005). In the midst of crises, however, these obligations may be especially difficult to uphold (Sinclair, 2002). The attention given to EE also reflects the fact that the accessibility and quality of education are often particularly damaged by conflict, as noted earlier (see, for example, Aguilar & Retamal, 1998; Ayalon (1998); Benthke & Braunshweig, 2004; and Boyden & Ryder, 1996). While some may view EE as a luxury, therefore, as Benthke and Braunshweig (2004) argue: [0]ne must stop to consider the impact on millions of children and youth who are denied educational opportunities. Children and youth who miss out on years of schooling may never become literate adults and will be less able to contribute to the rebuilding of their countries. The results lead to continued under-development and make the affected individuals more vulnerable to a future based on illegal and dangerous activities (p. 8). The cessation of education also has impacts far surpassing the loss of formal learning. As Ayalon (1998) argues, "It shreds a child's connection and continuity with its

29 community and culture, further perpetuating and exacerbating the already existing cycle of illiteracy, poverty, despair and violence". Kuterovac Jagodic and Kontac (2002) argue that EE support may thus be the key intervention for children in terms of psychological well- being, in that educational activities may provide a child's only support system if his or her family is dysfunctional or absent. A school may also provide physical protection and be a convenient place for the conveyance of survival messages (Sinclair, 2002; Chand et. al., 2003). Further, the fact that the "complex emergencies" occurring in many places today are long-term means that ignoring education can have tragic consequences upon a society (Joyner, 1996; BEC, 2003). Stewart (2003) argues that the objective of aid "should not simply be to help people survive in the short term.. .but to reduce medium-term vulnerability and dependence" (Stewart, 2003: 341). Education may obviously play a pivotal role in this regard, by developing the skills and confidence necessary for reconstruction and development, and also by facilitating community cohesiveness (Sinclair, 2002; Pigozzi, 1999). The most telling case for EE, however, is perhaps the fact that crisis-effected populations often specifically request it (Sinclair, 2002). In their Global Survey of Education in Emergencies, Benthke and Braunshweig (2004) note that "[c]hildren, youth and their families value and want formal education. From the forests of eastern Burma to the IDP camps outside of Monrovia, Liberia, families seek out and communities support educational activities with the hope that one day their children will have a better life and the opportunity to contribute to the rebuilding of their countries" (p.iii). A good deal has been written in terms of EE programming, advocacy, and standards development, particularly the specific characteristics necessary for a quality EE program (Benthke & Braunshweig, 2004; Sinclair, 2002). Pigozzi (1999) notes that while EE must include the same set of skills, knowledge, values and attitudes laid out in the Education for All mandates, certain principles, such as contextual relevance, non-discrimination, and equity, become particularly important in the midst of a crisis. Many scholars also agree that EE programs should include special features such as psychological healing, extra measures to ensure access, curriculum enrichment with such topics as conflict resolution and health

30 issues, as well as teacher training and adult education (Sinclair, 2002; Aguilar & Retamal, 1998; Benthke & Braunshweig, 2004; Pigozzi, 1999; Joyner, 1996; Chand et. al., 2003). Certain organizational issues are also essential within an EE initiative. These include: inter­ agency communication and harmonization, the need for flexibility, and speed of assessment and delivery (Chand et. al., 2003; Sinclair, 2002). A joint alliance of several organizations including CARE International, UNESCO, UNICEF and others, known as the Inter-Agency Network on Education in Emergencies (INEE) has also undertaken the task of defining a set of minimum standards for EE, while the UNESCO Institute for Educational Planning (HEP) conducts research and training on EE (Smith, 2005). The predominant view of EE is that it should not be conceptualized as a "stop gap" approach; it should not be limited to short-term interventions, but aim to facilitate longer- term educational transformation and post-conflict reconstruction (Boyden & Ryder, 1996; Sinclair, 2002; Pogozzi, 1999; Smith, 2005). EE is therefore considered both a relief and development endeavor, i.e., it occurs in a "grey area" between humanitarian and development work (Smith & Vaux, 2003). Smith and Vaux (2003) argue that because of the complex interrelationship between education and conflict, education should "be included in a comprehensive analysis of the causes of conflict and [as] a factor in its dynamics, uniting relief responses with developmental approaches...", and conflict analysis should in turn be integrated into education planning (p. 44). Berry et al. (2004) suggest that to improve the linkages between relief and development efforts during conflict, coordination among humanitarian agencies, as well as between humanitarian and development actors needs to be improved. As Baranyi and Powell (2004) note, it is important that foreign assistance, particularly during or following a conflict, take into account important socio-political issues, even those that are deemed particularly sensitive. Although Baryani and Powell were writing in regard to gender issues, their point seems relevant for education as well, given its intrinsic complexity and political nature. The right to education is, in principle, associated not only with access, but with an education that is based on equality, inclusion, and non­ discrimination, and is consistent with human rights.

31 Boyden and Ryder (1996) and Weinstein et al. (2007) add that a further challenge to implementing democratic, learner-centred education during or after conflict is the fact that the education systems of many countries are based upon teacher-centred approaches, and formalized curricula. Boyden and Ryder suggest that non-formal approaches such as those offered by NGOs may be more flexible and thus more suitable in certain conflict contexts. In recognition of the responsibility of the state, however, and to avoid creating parallel education systems, the best long-term approach may be to focus on adapting formal education systems to enable them to accommodate more flexible methods and to cooperate with NGOs and other partners. Weinsten et al. (2007), however, caution that EE programs continue to be constrained in numerous ways, and that research into the potential contribution of schools to social reconstruction remains in its infancy. These writers argue that more input is needed in reconstruction efforts from local stakeholders, education scholars and developmental psychologists. Further, these initiatives suffer from untested assumptions, a dearth of focused research in such areas as post-conflict curriculum revision, a lack of coordination among the agencies involved, and a disjunction between academic concept and practice in the field. Weinstein et al. (2007) argue that program developers need to move beyond a focus on schools as "islands of safety", and recognize the integration of the education system within its cultural context (p. 49). Case studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, and Sri Lanka, have demonstrated that "the ambitious goal of building tolerant societies within schools is doomed to failure if the sociopolitical environment is not supportive of these endeavors" (p. 49). These authors' work in Rwanda, Kosovo, and elsewhere further emphasizes the importance of examining the lived realities of the people involved in the conflict, and the need to view schools as only one element, albeit a critical one, within a comprehensive, contextualized reconstruction program. 2.5 Summary of Literature Review The establishment of formal education systems is often encouraged by donor agencies, and demanded by populations, based on the assumption that education is associated with socio-economic benefits on both individual and societal levels. Foreign aid to education is often considered an unqualified "good" by donor agencies, yet critics have

32 demonstrated over the past decades that excessive, aid-driven educational expansion and/or the unquestioned adoption of institutionalized education systems in the South may create socio-economic conflict if these systems are not aligned with the contextual realities into which they are imported. If a country's economy and employment possibilities are not strong, the expectation that education will bring socio-economic benefit may lead to disillusionment. Education systems may also be used as instruments of elite hegemony by governments, when policy and curricula are designed to inculcate students with the particular world-view favored by those in power. Further, if education systems are discriminatory in terms of gender, ethnic, or other barriers to access and achievement, and/or utilize curricula that teach stereotypes and foster socio-cultural divisions, education can serve to consolidate social grievances and perpetuate conflict. This "negative face" of education is thus an important consideration for aid agencies involved in educational development. Educational reform efforts during or following conflict in particular need to address the inseparability of education from its socio-political realities, lest they be ineffectual at best, or perpetuate harm at worst. This need for caution is also expressed in the literature concerning aid to fragile states. Criticisms pertaining to the impacts of excessive aid notwithstanding, many scholars argue that continued foreign assistance to fragile or conflict-affected states is necessary and can be effective. Because of the extra risks and challenges involved in the provision of aid to fragile states, however, scholars emphasize the importance of such issues as long-term engagement, in-depth contextual analysis, capacity building for state institutions, inter-donor coordination, and policy coherence. Scholars also, however, note the difficulty of translating such considerations into practice. Comparing the literature regarding educational development and EE thus reveals an apparent contradiction between two quite distinct perspectives on education. One perspective, generally lauded by development agencies and global movements such as the EFA, is that education is a benign force of social progress and modernization. This view has been at the root of large-scale education expansion efforts, and the construction of institutionalized formal public school systems in numerous Southern countries. The other interpretation, evident in countries in which education has helped to lay the foundations for

33 conflict, is of formal schooling as a political entity, inextricable from its socio-cultural context. In this latter perspective, education can be seen as a vehicle for hegemonic control by autocratic ruling groups and/or the transmission of the values and prejudices underlying social grievances, which when contested, may serve as a pivot point for counter-hegemonic resistance. As noted by Weinstein et al. (2007), the reconciliation of this disparity in educational reconstruction programs, i.e., how to balance the undisputed need for education for all with the socio-political realities of education in conflict-affected countries, is an ongoing dilemma in need of further focused study. 2.6 The Case of Nepal: An Overview Many of the themes that emerge from the above literature review in regard to foreign assistance, educational development, and conflict, are evident in the case of Nepal. Foreign aid and the concomitant influence of foreign organizations has been an integral element of Nepal's development. Nepal began to welcome foreign aid in the 1950s, and despite some clear successes in the intervening decades, in such areas as infrastructure construction and telecommunications, the general consensus among scholars is that aid has largely failed to stimulate a significant amelioration in the quality of life of the majority of Nepal's population, many of whom continue to live below the poverty line and suffer various forms of discrimination (UNESCO, 2007). The condition of the education sector is reflective of this general trend. In Nepal, a situation of scarce resources and overall aid dependency, combined with politicians' zest for modernization, has meant that not only has the planning and implementation of a national education system been contingent upon foreign funding, but it has been accompanied by the adoption of Western methods and ideologies (Doftori, 2004). For decades, education has consistently been considered a cornerstone of development, and the rapid construction and maintenance of public schools throughout the country has been fueled by large inflows of bilateral and multilateral aid (Dixit, 2002). Despite several large-scale reform initiatives, however, education in Nepal has been, and continues to be, plagued by poor quality, politicization, a lack of contextual relevance, and insufficient links to productive employment.

34 When the Maoists declared the beginning of their insurgency in 1996, the political and contentious nature of education was brought to the fore. Issues relating to the poor quality and inequity of education were among the many demands raised by Maoist leaders as justification for the impending violence, and the Maoists have since demanded that the system be destroyed and rebuilt to accommodate their own vision for Nepal's future. The involvement of education in Nepal's conflict, therefore, has brought into question the notion of educational development as a benign force for good. There is a consensus evident in the literature that assistance to education during conflict must take into consideration the potential of education to itself contribute to conflict. Continuing to fund the expansion or reconstruction of a school system without questioning its underlying socio-cultural and political dynamics is not only a waste of resources, but may inadvertently add fuel to simmering grievances. This begs the question of whether donors to Nepal's education sector have addressed what amounts to a critical issue, the conflict-sensitivity of education in Nepal, and how they have adapted their programming to suit the increasingly violent context. As noted above, there is in many countries a dichotomy between the view of education espoused by development agencies, versus the reality of education as a ground of socio-political contention, which in Nepal's case has escalated into an insurgency between state and rebel forces. This thesis aims to explore the development and modern manifestation of this educational contradiction in Nepal. 2.7 Research Questions This thesis will discuss the potential linkages between education, foreign aid, and conflict in Nepal, as well as how external aid to education in Nepal has adjusted to the realities of increasing state fragility and violence, and specifically whether donor agencies have taken into consideration the importance of education in the perpetuation and mitigation of social tension. The four research questions for this study are the following: 1. What is the historical relation between educational development and socio-political conflict in Nepal? 2. How has foreign aid affected the course of educational development in Nepal? 3. What have been the different policy and program responses of aid agencies to the political change and escalating Maoist conflict in Nepal?

35 4. What have been the corresponding aid agency changes to assistance for education in the context of the Maoist insurgency? These questions are addressed through a qualitative, mixed methodology study that entails a combination of document analysis and semi-structured interviews. The findings will be presented as follows. Chapter 4 discusses the various phases of Nepalese political and educational history from 1768 to 1990, illustrating the power structures, political machinations and instability that were endemic to Nepal from its inception, and which underlay the educational policies adopted by successive governments. Chapter 5 provides an outline of the changes brought by the restoration of democracy in 1990, and a discussion of the growth of the Maoist movement, as well as the impacts and ideologies of the insurgency upon Nepalese society in general and upon education specifically. Chapter 6 will discuss Nepal's history of development endeavors, within which the education sector has figured prominently by being both impacted by and reflective of the socio-political contexts in which it has been situated. The information presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 was obtained through document analysis. Chapters 7 and 8 will discuss the programming of several of Nepal's bilateral and multilateral donors, and national and international non-governmental organizations (I/NGOs), during the conflict. This discussion contains information obtained from documents as well as interviews with agency representatives, and includes the specific initiatives and accommodations that have been made to their programs in light of the conflict, and explores whether the potentially contentious role of education is considered amongst these. The conclusions of the thesis are discussed in Chapter 9.

36 Chapter 3: Methodology The following chapter will discuss the research methodology for this thesis. It will provide an outline of procedures and the sources of data, discuss issues of anonymity, the scope and limitations of the study, and the verifiability and dependability of the research. 3.1 Project Outline 3.1.1 Document Collection The first phase of the project was comprised of background reading and the search for pertinent documents related to the political, educational and developmental history of Nepal, as well as information relating to the Maoist conflict and current donor activities in Nepal. Documents included: published books, academic literature, various types of donor country plans and assessments, reports of non-governmental organizations, Nepalese newspapers and online journals, and the information available on numerous websites of such multilateral organizations as the United Nations and the World Bank, the Government of Nepal and Ministry of Education website, as well as the sites of many bilateral donor agencies. Additional information regarding the situation in Nepal was obtained during a presentation given in Ottawa by a Nepal-based journalist and academic. I used the documents to answer research questions 1 and 2, i.e., the relationship of education, social tensions, and foreign aid in Nepal, as well as questions 3 and 4 pertaining to the response of donors to the Maoist conflict. Further information pertaining to the latter two questions was obtained through interviews, as discussed below. 3.1.2 Interviews The subsequent phase of data collection consisted of interviews with representatives of 4 non-governmental organizations, a member of the Nepalese media, and a representative of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The interviews were semi- structured, using a template of questions (provided in Appendix 3) but allowing for individuals to take the discussion in directions they felt most relevant to their own experience or organization. Two interviews were conducted face-to-face, one by telephone, and the remainder by email. In the latter case, a message was sent to each participant with an initial set of questions (Appendix 3), and follow-up questions were then asked regarding the

37 participants' responses. The main themes addressed in the interviews pertained to the 3r and 4th research questions of this thesis, i.e., the responses of aid agencies to the conflict and whether these responses took into consideration issues of conflict sensitivity in education. 3.1.3 Data Analysis The data for this study, from both documents and interviews, was analyzed in a similar manner. First, I read the documents and interview responses with the research questions in mind, and highlighted passages that corresponded to one of the questions. I then typed and referenced each of these passages into several large general databases according to theme, such as "history of education", "history of development", "modern education", "INGOs", etc. I subsequently re-read each of these general databases looking for more specific themes that emerged from the data, assigning each passage a code for further categorization. I then grouped the passages according to these sub-themes, and continued this process until each sub-group consisted of passages that asserted a specific point in regard to one of the research questions. This information was then translated into paragraph form, condensed, and organized into chapters. 3.2 Anonymity Most of the documents used for this thesis, i.e., all of those pertaining to bilateral and multilateral organizations and several pertaining to I/NGOs, are readily obtainable from public sources, and thus the names of the respective organizations are provided in the discussion of these documents. The interview participants, however, requested anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the information, and the fact that the interviews occurred in 2005, while the insurgency was still highly active. Therefore, the chapter that discusses the effects of the conflict on these INGOs does not contain references as to their identity, other than their country of origin, nor are the names of any interviewees included. The INGO representatives also provided documents related to their organizations' work in Nepal, and no names are given in relation to information obtained from these. 3.3 Scope & Limitations of the Study Many researchers have stressed the difficulties involved in obtaining accurate information in regard to the effects of the conflict. Gersony (2003), for example, states that, in his study in Nepal, interviews could not be conducted in rural villages because of the

38 threats to safety for outside visitors (who the Maoists discouraged), and the fact that "village residents who met privately with a foreigner would be exposed to questions, if not harassment or reprisals, principally from the Maoists and possibly from Government sources" (p. 3). Gersony further notes that during the period of his research, several other international assessment teams were either refused entry by the Maoists or were monitored with such vigilance that the already tense environment was exacerbated for all involved. The government's repressive actions and scare tactics have also likely had some impact upon the nature of conflict-related reporting. Thapa (2001), for example, describes one of many instances in which newspaper offices were searched and journalists arrested, drawing the condemnation of many throughout society. Similar constraints upon the media were imposed by the Maoists, who have often barred journalists from entering their stronghold areas. According to Thapa (2002) there is thus little consistency or comprehensiveness in regard to the reporting of Maoist activity in remote areas, and much of the information that has surfaced is of a second-hand nature. The geographical and social disparities inherent in the Nepalese context further exacerbate the challenges involved in obtaining an accurate portrayal of life in the rural villages through the use of documents, even if these originate from sources based in Nepal. The utilization of "Nepalese sources" does not in and of itself ensure validity, given that such material is likely to be Kathmandu-based, and as will be discussed in this thesis, Kathmandu is quite literally worlds apart from Nepal's remote regions, in several respects. As Murphy et al. (2005) note, the official positions of those at the centre do not necessarily clearly represent the ground-level reality. The use of multiple sources of information, as many as was possible given the nature of this study, has nonetheless helped to allow some degree of balance to the portrayal of the insurgency and its effects. Although approximately 15 organizations responded to my requests for interviews, I found it rather challenging to enlist participants. The stated reasons for declining to participate in the study included: a lack of time, a policy for not participating in this type of study, the perception that their organization was not involved closely enough with education, or an unwillingness to discuss the topic of the insurgency in any forum, due to its sensitive nature and because of concerns for the safety of staff.

39 Nepal receives foreign assistance from a large number of bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental organizations, and this thesis is not intended to provide a comprehensive presentation of all of their initiatives during the conflict, but rather discusses as large a selection as possible based upon the information available at the time of writing. The degree of detail with which individual donors are discussed is also not suggestive of the size or efficacy of a particular donor's program in Nepal. Some donors are discussed in much greater depth than others, but this reflects the amount of information I was able to find. Canada, for example, is not among Nepal's largest donors, yet because it was possible for me to interview a representative from CIDA, a greater amount of information is provided in regard to CIDA's work in the country. Other donors, notably the UK, the United States, and Switzerland, are discussed in particular depth; while these countries are among Nepal's largest donors, the development agencies of these countries were also very prolific in terms of their documented responses to, and analysis of, the situation of conflict in Nepal. Other donors are dealt with quite briefly, due simply to the limited amount of information I was able to access. Also, despite the rather broad perspective of this thesis (taken in the effort to situate education in Nepal amidst the country's development and the Maoist conflict), many elements of the conflict were necessarily not addressed, or were mentioned only briefly. Some background information is provided, in order to contextualize the dynamics of education, foreign aid, and conflict in Nepal, yet specific issues such as economics, human rights, the financial and technical aspects of foreign assistance and development, the role of the media and private sector, and the complex relationships of Nepalese political life were beyond the scope of this thesis. In spite of these limitations, the information I was able to access pertaining to the conflict, which included multiple perspectives and opinions from varying angles, and the work of aid agencies vis-a-vis education in the context of Nepal's conflict, was sufficient to yield answers to the research questions of this thesis. 3.4 Verifiability The "verifiability" of qualitative research suggests that the interpretation of the data and evidence may be verified, or corroborated, through alternate means (Simon, 2005).

40 Verifiability within this study therefore pertains to the degree to which the document analysis and interview data paint a clear and accurate picture of the occurrences in question, as far as is possible given the secondary nature of the data. Verifiability in document analysis refers to the extent to which the discussion of the documents accurately represents the intended meanings of the individuals and groups who produced them (Brouillard-Coyle, 2004). In terms of the interviews, verifiability concerns the quality of the information obtained from the participants, and whether it can reasonably be said to be a true indication of their experiences and opinions. The verifiability of document analysis may be problematic due to the issue of subjectivity on the part of both the researcher, in terms of the interpretations made of a document, as well as on the part of the authors of a document, i.e., how accurately past events are represented in their text. Interviews also possess potential threats to verifiability, such as issues of researcher bias, researcher characteristics (i.e. traits that inhibit the interviewee from expressing honest or complete views), and the location of the interview (e.g. the comfort level of the interviewee in a particular location). The trustworthiness of interviewees is also important for verifiability, in terms of the depth of their knowledge and the honesty and clarity with which they share it with the researcher (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003). Threats to verifiability intrinsic to this study in particular include the difficulty of obtaining first person accounts of happenings in rural Nepalese villages (Gersony, 2003), disparities in reports emanating from Nepalese reporters and foreign researchers (e.g. Gersony, 2003 compared to Thapa & Sijapati, 2003), repressive action on the part of the government and the Maoists towards Nepalese media outlets (Thapa, 2001; Thapa, 2002), as well as an unwillingness among some development organizations to discuss conflict-related issues openly (Murphy et al., 2005). However in order to mitigate problems of verifiability in this study I explored as many sources of information as possible, which provides an element of triangulation, i.e., the authentication and elaboration of material through the use of multiple instruments (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2000).

41 3.5 Dependability The "dependability" of qualitative research suggests the degree to which the methods used may be depended upon to yield data that would have been similarly generated by others (Simon, 2005). One method by which to increase dependability is to document the procedures used in the methodology in as detailed and accurate a manner as possible, and thus make clear how and upon what rationale the choices were made by the researcher (Sutdhibhasilp, 2000). The document analysis and questionnaire of this study provide an inherent degree of dependability, as the data may be cited directly and is available for examination by others. In the interview phase, however, threats to dependability include the possibility of researcher bias and the difficulty of data interpretation (although the latter was minimal in this study, because interview responses were fairly straightforward). To improve the dependability of the interview data, care was taken to ensure that the questions were understood by interviewees, that the person being interviewed had the expertise to answer them, and that the interviewees understood the purpose of the interview (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003).

42 Chapter 4: Nepal: Political & Educational Developments up to the Early 1990s The first research question for this study is: What is the historical relation between educational development and socio-political conflict in Nepal? This question will be addressed in the following two chapters, through a discussion of the various phases of Nepalese political history and the education systems and ideologies that have run concurrent with them. Through the years, education in Nepal has reflected the ambitions of Nepal's leaders as well as the evolving international development discourse, and has served to both consolidate drives toward modernization as well as perpetuate age-old discriminations. The first section of this chapter will provide an overview of Nepal's political history prior to 1990. The second part provides an overview of Nepal's struggles to develop during this period, and the third section focuses on the development of education. 4.1 Political Developments The political history of Nepal is generally considered as comprising five eras: the Shah (monarchical) period, the Rana period of autocratic rule, the brief "democratic experiment" of the 1950s, the Panchayat era of "guided democracy", and the democratic period from 1990 onward. The first four of these periods will be discussed below. 4.1.1 The Shah Period Nepal is said to have been born as a nation-state in 1768-69. Prior to this time, the central Himalayan area was a disparate region consisting of dozens of kingdoms and principalities, with many unique languages, religions, and cultures (Pradhan, 2002). The unification of these hitherto independent nations into one kingdom that would eventually become known as Nepal was the lifetime achievement of , the ruler of the small kingdom of Gorkha (Whelpton, 2005; Thapa & Sijapati, 2003). Prithvi Narayan Shah and his descendants, who were Parbatiyas ("people of the hills") ethnically, and Hindu in religion, faced the challenge of ruling over the 60 or so diverse communities that now comprised one kingdom. Some form of framework was necessary in order to organize the country and to establish Prithvi Narayan Shah's vision of a "pure and true Hindu land" (Pradhan, 2002: 7). Conveniently, a model was available that was amenable to this goal: the caste system, which comprised a legal and social framework within which to organize Nepal's heterogeneous groups into one hierarchical, Hindu order

43 (Pradhan, 2002). Communities were ranked depending on how similar they were to the cultural norms as defined by those of the "upper-caste", Nepali speaking Hindus. According to Pradhan (2002), this original system was amenable to cultural diversity and allowed its constituent groups more autonomy than did later governments. Politically and economically, Nepal was an isolated nation during this period in terms of politics and economy. It was heavily engaged in the agricultural sector, due in part to a surplus of arable land. According to Khadka (1991), however, Nepal's traditional economy was maturing satisfactorily, with food surpluses and a thriving export industry. The aggressive isolationist policy of Nepal's rulers however, in combination with multiple other factors (which will be discussed in section 4.2), constrained the country from moving forward. 4.1.2 The Rana Period Prithvi Narayan Shah was said to have been a uniquely talented military general, and possessed of a degree of strength and competency that unfortunately was not passed on to his successors. The failings of subsequent generations of Shah kings, combined with escalating family feuds, culminated in a bizarre and violent series of events in the mid-19th century that led to a virtual collapse of their family's reign. In 1856, Jang Bahadur Rana, who was a favoured courtier but not a member of Nepal's royal Shah family, managed to have himself declared "prime minister" and become de facto ruler of Nepal. Control over all of Nepal's executive affairs then became invested in the Rana family (Whelpton, 2005). Jang's usurpation of power launched a century-long era that Thapa and Sijapati (2003) refer to as a "dark blot on the history of Nepal" (p. 15). The prime minister was vested with all state power, and the subsequent generations of Ranas exploited the country's resources for their own benefit while allowing poverty to increase so dramatically that many people migrated to India. The Ranas' schemes to control Nepal's land resources eventually led to the emergence of a semi-feudal system. Further, the Rana's penchant for the British lifestyle, initiated when Jang Bahadur Rana made a historic trip to England early in his tenure, encouraged such a flow of British goods into Nepal (via colonial India) that Nepal's

44 own industrial sector virtually collapsed. According to Khadka (1991) and Whelpton (2005), the seizure of power by the Ranas, their repressive and isolationist policies, and the entrenchment of centralized, autocratic control over the country's political and administrative structure had long-term negative impacts on Nepal's economy. The Ranas also sought to consolidate the existing ruling structure of Nepal by forging a unified, Nepalese cultural identity with themselves as the focal point. The Ranas named the country "Nepal" in the 1930s, and gave the name "Nepali" to the principal language (replacing Gorkha and Gorkhali, respectively). This official insistence upon a homogenous Nepalese identity and the strict use of Nepali, and the resistance it engendered amongst ethnic activists, would continue long after Rana rule came to an end (Whelpton, 2005). The hegemonic process of cultural homogenization and rejection of plurality in Nepal is often referred to as "Hinduization", and was enacted into law with Nepal's first civil code, the Muluki Ain, which explicated the caste system more thoroughly than had Prithvi Narayan Shah's framework. The Muluki Ain incorporated all of Nepal's linguistic and ethnic groups alongside the existing castes into one five-tiered hierarchy, at the top of which were the "high caste" Parbatiya Hindus. Their language (Nepali) and culture thus became the dominant paradigm to which other groups were pressured to conform, at least publicly (Gurung, 2005; Pradhan, 2002). Bhattachan (2001) argues that the Muluki Ain in effect destroyed the egalitarian social structures of the majority of Nepal's indigenous groups by compelling non-Hindu groups with no tradition of caste hierarchy to practice untouchability, a "very deplorable and unfortunate outcome of the process of Hinduization and Sanskritization" (p. 76).8 The Ranas' isolation policy, designed to prevent the infiltration of radical ideas and the generation of resistance to their weakly legitimate regime, was somewhat successful at

The British supported and strongly manipulated the Ranas, as they had the Shahs before them. While Nepal was never colonized like other South Asian nations, therefore, Nepal became what some have referred to as a "semi-colony" of the British Empire (Macfarlane, 1994, cited in Teal, 2004: 26). 8 Others take a more forgiving view, however. Sharma (1997), and Shah (1993), for example argue that while the Code promulgated one national hierarchy, this should be understood as only a broad framework within which ethnic groups had enough space to live freely according to their own traditions. However, it was also the case that tax exemptions were offered to ethnic groups who opted to conform to some of Hinduism's most fundamental practices.

45 least initially. However, while they forbade as much as possible the entry of outsiders, they could not prevent Nepalese people from going to India for education or employment, and the influence of Indian nationalism was inevitable (Gellner, 1997). It was among these Nepalese expatriates that the first anti-Rana activity began, beginning with the end of World War I and gaining momentum following Indian independence after World War II (Whelpton, 2005). In the 1940s, various political groups composed of Nepalese expatriates based in India joined to form the , the group that would eventually launch a successful armed rebellion against the Ranas. The Nepali Congress had the support of Nepal's King Tribhuvan, who had been reduced to a figurehead during the Rana period, and was eager to regain the power he had lost. The Nepali Congress' violent uprising began in November 1950. After three months of fighting between the Congress rebels and government troops, Prime Minister Mohan Shamsher capitulated, and a peace accord was debated in Delhi. On February 7, 1951, the "Delhi compromise" as it has become known was signed by King Tribhuvan, the Ranas and the Nepali Congress. The agreement restored the king's ultimate authority over Nepal, in practice as well as theory (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003; Whelpton, 2005). 4.1.3 The "DemocraticExperiment" On February 18, 1951, King Tribhuvan made the proclamation that "our wish and decision is that the government of our people will henceforth be carried out according to a democratic constitution prepared by a constituent assembly elected by them..." (cited in Thapa & Sijapati, 2003: 15). With the fall of the Ranas, Nepal's first quasi-democratic government was thus established. An Interim Constitution was promulgated in April 1951, which contained provisions for an independent judiciary, and limited the king's role to that of a constitutional monarch. To govern the country until the promised elections were held, a coalition government was established between the Ranas and Congress. This situation was virtually doomed from its inception, however, and the interim government was beset with problems including sporadic revolts by Congress extremists and peasant groups (Whelpton, 2005). The monarchy was able to exploit the ensuing instability and the king began to assert more decision-making authority.

46 King Tribhuvan's reign ended with his death in 1955. His four years of rule had seen some developmental successes, yet the rapid social and economic progress hoped for in 1951 had not occurred (Whelpton, 2005). The frustration this engendered among Nepalese, as well as the power struggles between political parties, further exacerbated the atmosphere of instability. The new king, Mahendra, also soon demonstrated a penchant for control and an ability to use the parties' bickering to consolidate his power (Whelpton, 2005). After eight years of arguments, King Mahendra finally announced on February 1, 1958, that a constitution would be drafted and a parliamentary election held (Khadka, 1991). The Constitution of the 1959 reasserted the king's powerful position as the seat of authority, and contained several clauses that greatly reduced the role of the cabinet (Whelpton, 2005). Nepal's first democratic elections, held in February 1959, resulted in a clear win for the "democratic socialist" Nepali Congress Party (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003; Whelpton, 2005). The new government adopted several radical policies including steps towards the provision of free education and a health care system, innovative administrative and fiscal reforms, and the beginnings of land reform that would reduce the monopoly of the elite classes. Development assistance was accepted from India, China, and the United States (Whelpton, 2005). The Congress government was said to have achieved some of the most significant advances of any government in Nepal's history, however its assertive populist approach and dramatic reforms were not appreciated by landlords or others within the traditional elite, including the king (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003; Khadka, 1991). Party in-fighting, inter-party confrontations, as well as ethnic disputes and peasant revolts, contributed to an atmosphere of escalating political instability. On December 15l 1960 the king made the controversial decision to restore order by exploiting his emergency powers under the constitution; he dissolved parliament and arrested the prime minister and prominent politicians, citing the decline of law and order, corruption, and the encouragement of "anti-national elements" (Whelpton, 2005: 98). The king assumed complete control of the nation, declared political parties illegal, and brought Nepal's first attempt at democracy to an end (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003).

47 4.1.4 The Panchayat System Mahendra did not agree with the parliamentary form of government, and was eager for the monarchy to resume its place at the centre of power. In 1961, therefore, he introduced a new party-less form of government in Nepal called "Panchayat Democracy", which was promulgated in the new constitution of December 1962. The Panchayat system was the king's interpretation of the "guided democracy" practiced in several developing countries at the time, in which villages elected their own councils (panchayats), who chose district-level representatives, which in turn selected from among themselves the majority of members of the national legislature, the remainder of whom were largely nominated by the king. According to Khadka (1991), while couched in modern political tenets for the sake of legitimacy and the appearance of progress, the party- less system was in actuality merely a revival of the traditional Hindu monarchy. Political parties were banned, press freedoms were strictly limited, and parliamentary activity was closed to the public. The Panchayat years corresponded with a concerted undertaking to establish Nepal as a unified nation-state, through a process of homogenization and modernization. The prominent Panchayat slogan was, "one language, one culture, one country", and the unity they imagined revolved around the culture and values of the historically dominant high-caste Parbatiya elite (Whelpton, 2005).9 This process was enforced by a highly centralized government, with the king at the pinnacle. The was further established as Nepal's economic, employment and industrial epicentre, a process that was reinforced by a rapid and substantial influx of international aid (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 1997). The nationalization effort was temporarily facilitated by the burgeoning employment opportunities offered by the expanding government and development organizations (Pradhan, 2002). Also, the opening of Nepal to wider global influences did inspire the government to make some egalitarian proclamations. This was reflected in the new Civil Code promulgated in 1963, which, while it did not explicitly outlaw the caste system, did withdraw state support for it. Yet the centuries-old, culturally-embedded hierarchical system did remain virtually intact in the realm of social interactions (Pradhan, 2002; Whelpton, 2005).

9 According to Shah (1993), this was a modification made by the Panchayat elites of an ancient Nepalese poet's phrase: "our king, our country, our language, our customs" (p. 9). 48 Progressive minded individuals among Nepal's educated population, particularly members of the Congress party, were distressed by the repressive Panchayat regime from its inception. Those with liberal ambitions were initially given a degree of hope by the succession of King Birendra in 1972, who was educated at Eton and Harvard and established early-on a good rapport with the Nepalese people. Birendra planned significant modernization initiatives, yet the rapid social changes associated with the influx of foreign assistance and foreign media, combined with the government's nationalization drive (discussed further in section 4.3.3 (a)), and escalating political and economic tensions made the environment less than conducive to sustainable development. In fact, one of the regime's most evident successes, the campaign to expand access to education, also had the unintended side-effect of increasing the number of potential dissidents. This was particularly the case once the expansion of the bureaucracy, driven by foreign aid, ceased to be able to offer educated youth the adequate employment opportunities they expected (Whelpton, 2005). Nepal's population became increasingly dissatisfied with the Panchayat system; the economic situation of the country was deteriorating, Panchayat leaders were accused of immoral behaviour, and the system itself contained inherent structural weaknesses. While allegations of corruption had long been an element of politics in Nepal, Whelpton (2005) notes that this type of activity took on new dimensions after the rapid social and political change of the 1950s. As the government expanded markedly, and foreign funds began to pour in, there was far greater opportunity for public funds to be diverted for personal use, and public resentment grew (Whelpton, 2005). During the 1960s and 1970s, popular protest outbursts occurred in the tarai (i.e., the southern plains of Nepal), among other places, as underprivileged social groups began to express their frustration with the feudal-style status quo. Some argued at the time that if poverty and discrimination were not soon ameliorated, the unrest would eventually become more organized and pervasive (Thapa and Sijapati, 2003). The frustration of the people was encapsulated in a student protest in April 1979, which escalated to such an extent that King Birendra was eventually motivated to declare a national referendum for the following year (Khadka, 1999). People would be given the option of choosing multiparty democracy or a "reformed" Panchayat system. Although the

49 Panchayat government won the referendum, allegations of vote tampering and the fact that multi-party democracy won a majority in all major urban centers, foreshadowed the coming end of the regime (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003; Whelpton, 2005). Panchayat dissenters appeared, and criticisms, violent incidents, and even an assassination attempt were leveled at King Birendra. This dissatisfaction, combined with the thirst for power of democratically-minded politicians, the concurrent upheaval in Eastern Europe, and an ongoing trade embargo with India, conspired toward the ultimate collapse of the system. Several political parties, including Communist groups and the Nepali Congress, eventually decided to form an alliance to fight for a : the resultant "People's Movement" uprising of February 18th, 1990 eventually forced the king's hand (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003). Political parties were once more deemed legal, and democratic elections were planned. The return of democracy and the challenges it has brought, including the emergence of the Maoists and the eventual descent into violent conflict, will be discussed in Chapter 5. 4.2 Nepal's Slow Economic Development & Socio-Cultural Constraints Despite the tumultuous nature of Nepalese politics as discussed above, its leaders have expressed a shared aspiration towards modernization and growth, at least since the first period of democracy in the 1950s. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, it was during this period and the decades following that development became a top national priority, as Nepal began to welcome large influxes of foreign aid (Whelpton, 2005). The growth process has not been an easy one, however, and Nepal has faced numerous significant challenges throughout the years, from the launching of formal planned development in the 1950s, to the present day. According to Gyawali (2002) and Khadka (1991), Nepal's long period of isolation prior to 1951 left it ill-prepared to achieve the rapid modernization it hoped for in the 1950s. The economic base was primarily agricultural, the administrative system was antiquated, the governance system weak, the topography rugged, rural areas lacked such basic services as health posts, and there was a lack of capital and trained personnel (Khadka, 1991). Some of Nepal's most forbidding development challenges were unfortunately those about which little could be done. Nepal's topographical structure, with its vast mountains,

50 deep valleys, and tropical plains, has been notoriously difficult to accommodate. Despite the country's small size, massive inputs of capital and technical expertise have been required to install communication and transportation networks and deliver services across the diverse and jagged landscape. Severe environmental degradation and land constraints, partly the result of population pressure but related as well to natural processes, have further hampered growth and productivity. Nepal is also a landlocked country, with larger and more powerful neighbours to the north and south (China and India respectively), a situation yielding numerous economic consequences, including the competition this entails for Nepal's industries and the taxation of import and export goods that must travel via India (Whelpton, 2005). Socio-cultural challenges have persisted as well. Nepal's population is remarkably diverse linguistically, ethnically, and culturally, and yet social differences have for centuries been marred by discriminatory, hierarchical social and caste structures prescribed by the dominant Hindu religion.1 Access to education, employment, decision-making opportunities, and resources in Nepal have for centuries thus been determined by one's placement within the pyramid of social status. (Khadka, 1991; ADB, 2004; Hollants Van Loocke & Philipson, 2002; Subedi, 1997; ADB, 2004; Pyakurel, 2001). The situation has historically been particularly harsh for the lowest-caste group known as Dalits, the so-called "untouchables". Dalits have traditionally practiced occupational roles such as tailors, blacksmiths, shoemakers, entertainers/sex workers, and others. Many Dalits live isolated in separate villages (ACHR, 2005, May; Gersony, 2003). Nepal's 2001 census found 14 percent of Nepalese people to be officially categorized as Dalit, while Dalit organizations argue that this figure should be upwards of 20 percent (ACHR, 2005, May). Dalits may not enter Hindu temples, touch water taps used by other castes, enter upper-caste homes, and upper-castes may not eat food Dalits have touched or prepared. Dalits generally own few assets, and have limited access to development programs, job opportunities, and resources

10 The caste system, for example, considers labour the role of the lowest castes (Gyawali, 2002). Gyawali argues that the devaluing of labour amongst the higher castes discouraged the development of technology and efficient and democratic markets. The hierarchical structure of society also facilitated economic inequalities, and constrained rural development. Khadka (1991) notes that the same groups that dominated politics and the social pyramid also began to dominate rural economies through land accumulation, and fostered the creation of a land tenure system in which the cultivator had no personal incentive to increase production.

51 (Shrestha, K., 2001). According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2004), Dalit people tend to earn less than half the income of upper-caste groups. The human development index rankings are also almost 50 percent lower for Dalit populations, and their life expectancy is 13 years lower, than upper-caste groups (ADB, 2004). Nepal's donors have also continued to express concern regarding the government's ability to manage development. Despite some positive steps taken by Nepal's government over the past two decades towards the aim of building an administration amenable to development, challenges remain. These include: weak and slow communication and cooperation between government organizations, weak implementation and monitoring capacities, human resource constraints, and lack of capacity among civil society organizations, all of which have been exacerbated by Nepal's political instability (World Bank 1989,2005a; USAID, 2005a; Khadka, 1991; Upadya, 2002; Buckland et al., 2005b; World Bank, 2003a; GTZ, 2005). Nepal's development has been further limited by its history of gender discrimination. Despite a provision in the constitution of 1990 guaranteeing gender equality, continue to be subordinated through mutually reinforcing socio-cultural, economic, legal and political means, and are afforded very limited opportunity for participation in decision-making and employment positions (OHCHR, 2006; Doftori, 2004; Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004; USAID, 2005a; Tamang, 2002). Subedi (1997) notes as well that many development initiatives, which gained momentum during the Panchayat years, compounded the myriad inequalities faced by women. She argues, for example, that projects aiming to assist groups of marginalized women according to caste or ethnicity have inadvertently served to strengthen the divisions between these groups.11 One particularly important constraint upon sustainable development in Nepal over the decades has been the scarcity of quality education. Functioning schools were few prior to the 1970s, particularly in rural areas, and the population was largely illiterate (Khadka, 1991). Moreover, the political upheavals, entrenchment of discrimination, and continuing

11 Tamang (2002) argues further that the "patriarchically oppressed, uniformly disadvantaged and Hindu, 'Nepali woman' as a category did not pre-exist the importation of development ideology. She had to be constructed by ignoring the heterogeneous forms of community, social relations, and gendered realities of the various peoples inhabiting Nepal" (p. 163). 52 poverty throughout Nepal's history naturally pervaded all aspects of society, and were clearly reflected in the development of the education sector. 4.3 Education in Nepal: Stages & Dynamics of an Emerging National System The development of education in Nepal has followed a course closely related to the country's political development, as the leaders of each subsequent historical stage attempted to create an education system amenable to their particular visions and goals for the country and for themselves. The following section will thus be structured similarly to that above, with a discussion of education during each of Nepal's first four historical phases. 4.3.1 Earliest Forms of Education in Nepal: The Shah & Rana Periods The earliest forms of education on the Indian subcontinent, including the regions that would become Nepal, were provided by Buddhist monasteries, which could be considered the area's first mass schools. By the time of the Shah kings, however, the prevalence of Buddhism had declined in the Himalayan region, due to the influence of migrating Hindus from the south (NEPC, 1956). Unlike Buddhism, the Hindu religion as practiced in India and Nepal did not advocate in favor of education for any who desired it, but for the upper castes alone. In Hinduism, one's caste was the determinant of one's vocation, and few individuals would seek to transgress their inherited role. Aside from full-fledged monasteries, the first schools in Nepal were operated by individual families or through guru relationships, followed in time by slightly larger community schools. Religion maintained its influence well into the modern era, and the curricula of schools until colonial times remained predominantly faith-based, as was the case in much of South Asia. The goal of such education was not to impart practical life-skills, but rather to develop character and the appropriate elements of cultural and religious ideology. Students learned certain skills, such as reading, writing, and mathematics, necessary for the performance of religious rites (Thapa, 2004). Such education was particularly limited to Brahmin males (Doftori, 2004). The right to education during the Shah and Rana periods was not merely a political issue, therefore, but was predestined along with the other privileges and limitations of one's place in the social strata (Doftori, 2004). Nepal's National Education Planning Commission (NEPC) notes that because statistical records of education provision (or any census information for that matter) were meager or non-existent in Nepal

53 prior to the mid-1950s, the percentage of the population that was educated during the Shah and Rana periods is only speculative. It was certainly small, however (NEPC, 1956). A further constriction upon public education during this period was the use of Sanskrit as the language of learning throughout the Indian subcontinent, given that with its strict grammatical rules it was inaccessible to the majority of people. Doftori (2004) points out that the use of Sanskrit and other religious languages throughout South Asian education systems formed an impenetrable barrier between the elites and the common people, whom in Nepal comprised the upper and lower castes, respectively. It was not until the 1950s that South Asian countries began to incorporate their own languages (as well as English) into their education systems (NEPC, 1956). The coming of the Ranas, as noted above, was associated with a consolidation of Nepal's hierarchical class structures and national isolation, by which the Ranas sought to entrench their hold on power. Accordingly, the Ranas forbade education for the masses, for fear a literate public would question their authoritarian, quasi-legitimate regime. The Ranas' fear of education was curiously articulated by Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher Rana in 1918 during the inauguration of Tri-Chandra College in Kathmandu, when he prophesized that the opening of this school would prove to be the ultimate death knell of the Rana regime. The reason Chandra went ahead and established the school (which was affiliated with Calcutta University) despite this premonition was that he thought it safer to have students take exams in Kathmandu, rather than expose themselves to the radical atmosphere on Indian campuses (Whelpton, 2005). It is also said that one Rana leader told King George V that the reason the British were facing the scourge of Indian nationalism was because they had mistakenly endeavored to educate Indians (Whelpton, 2005). Despite their disdain for public education, the Ranas did, on the other hand, encourage their family and others within the elite to pursue formal education, particularly the Western-style, English-medium education that had taken root in India with the arrival of the British in the 1850s (NEPC, 1956; Thapa, 2004; Doftori, 2004; Subedi, 1997). The Ranas' aversion to public schooling notwithstanding, some degree of educational expansion did occur during this period. Several English middle and high schools were established in the 1940s and 50s, as were a high school and college for women

54 (Whelpton, 2005). Some of the more liberal among the Ranas also sanctioned various types of public and vocational education, including schools modeled after Indian "Basic Schools", which were established by Ghandi and emphasized handicraft skills. Because of the vocational nature of such schools, however, and their use of Nepali as opposed to English, they were generally seen as means to maintain existing power differentials by reinforcing language and labour divisions between castes (Whelpton, 2005). Public schools in the Rana period also charged tuition or secured "donations" by means of social pressure, and this, combined with the academic nature of most curricula, caused education to remain largely the purview of the elite (NEPC, 1956). Despite some small-scale gains during the Rana years, by the time the regime was overthrown in 1950-1, Nepal's educational infrastructure remained meager: there were approximately 310 primary and middle schools, eleven high schools, two colleges, one teacher's college, and one technical school. The literacy rate in the early 1950s was only 5 percent (10 percent among males and less than 1 percent among females), and only 1 percent of children attended school (Savada, 1993).12 Nevertheless, as noted by Whelpton (2005), awareness of and interest in education gradually grew in Nepal throughout the Rana years, even in rural areas, in large part due to the influence of returning soldiers, many of whom learned to read and write while serving in the British army during World Wars I and II. Meanwhile, it was common during the Rana period for members of high-caste and elite families to send their children to India for higher education or technical training. Interestingly, it was this population of Indian-educated students, who had experienced the oppressive Rana regime through new eyes, that would initiate the anti-Rana campaigns, fill the ranks of rebel groups, and begin the that would lead to the ultimate collapse of the regime in 1951 (Subedi, 1997).

12 The NEPC's estimates for enrollment in the mid-1950s were higher, although their definition of "school" included any venue of instruction, formal or informal. They estimated that 72,291 children were enrolled in 1320 schools, which represented 3.5 percent of children of school-going age, or 3.7 percent of primary school age, 3.3 percent of middle school age, 3.9 percent of high school age, and 0.2 percent of the college age (NEPC, 1956: 36). 55 4.3.2 Education during the "Democratic Experiment" of the 1950s: The Vision of the National Education Planning Commission Because the Ranas had not constructed a national education system or even encouraged education among the public, the subsequent government was left with a virtual "blank slate" upon which to construct its own system (NEPC, 1956). Along with the adoption of democracy came a sense of urgency among Nepal's leaders to provide education to their virtually illiterate electorate, and the government stressed the importance of the rapid provision of, as a minimum, primary education for children and literacy programs for adults as a crucial first step in their country's modernization (NEPC, 1956). Education, the rulers decided, was to play a foundational and utterly critical role in Nepal's development, and in its transition from isolation to participation in the global economy. Accordingly, in 1952 the government established an Education Board that was charged with expanding Nepal's educational system, with the assistance of an American advisor and American funding. The Board met in November 1953, when it was decided that a National Education Planning Commission (NEPC) would be appointed to research the current state of education in the country (which the NEPC subsequently declared woefully insufficient), and to devise a national plan for education (NEPC, 1956; Doftori, 2004). While the NEPC's plan by and large failed to be implemented due to political instability and the ultimate collapse of democracy as well as the sheer grandiosity of the plan itself,13 the document is nonetheless illustrative of the perspectives of Nepal's elite at the time in regard to the place and purpose of education within Nepalese society. In their Report of the National Education Planning Commission of 1956, the NEPC stated unequivocally that education comprised an integral element of Nepal's hope for the future. The NEPC asserted that the Nepalese people "simply cannot survive without education" (NEPC, 1956: 74). What is also glaring in the NEPC's report, however, is the

1 Some of the details of the Commission's plan include a target of 300,000 children in primary school by 1965, and universal, free and compulsory primary education by 1985. Education was to be adapted to meet children's individual needs, to include vocational elements, help develop citizenship, develop students culturally, aesthetically, and physically, and enable them to find more enjoyment in their lives and improve their communities. Secondary schools were to be constructed to offer both general and vocational education to an increasing number of students who were suitable for vocational leadership training. Higher education was to be established under the auspices of a National University. Adult education was to be universally available. Village libraries were to be available for all by 1965, and literacy classes for all who desired them by 1965 (NEPC, 1956). 56 degree of remove between the lives and perspectives of its authors, who were certainly among the Kathmandu-based elite and also in close cooperation with American advisors, and the vast majority of Nepalese peasants, who were barely eking out a subsistence livelihood in Nepal's remote hills and valleys. This dichotomy between the already educated and modern urbanites, and the rural folk stumbling about in the "darkness", was what the NEPC took upon itself to overcome. The new educational system was intended to help the youth of Nepal "become better integrated into their society" (p. 190). Yet, the NEPC's insistence upon the use of the Nepali language, of teachers taught in Kathmandu, and government-issue standardized textbooks, reflects the government's intention of assimilating all of Nepal's cultures and languages into one homogenized national standard. The 1956 Commission's views concerning language were perhaps the most illustrative of the nature of the nationalist ideology of the time. The use of Nepali was to be strongly emphasized and enforced in primary school while local dialects "should be vanished from the school and playground as early as possible in the life of the child"... so that "other languages will gradually disappear, and greater national strength and unity will result" (NEPC, 1956: 96-97). While some form of gender equality was asserted, and education for girls was advocated because "girls are homemakers and citizens and need education as much as boys" (NEPC, 1956: 92), no mention was made of education for Dalits, ethnic minorities, or other marginalized populations.14 One particularly evident link between the education sector and national development during the 1950s was forged by the urgent ambition of the authorities to embrace democracy. The NEPC in its 1956 education plan clearly articulated the belief that universal education was both a potent symbol of a democratic nation as well as the vehicle by which a nation could consolidate nascent democratic practices: Democracy cannot flourish in a country where 98% of the people are illiterate.. .Illiteracy is wastage; people continue in their old ways, knowing nothing of the advances made elsewhere, the better life that could be had through knowledge of improved methods, facilities, and ideas (NEPC, 1956: 151).

14 The Commission's view of girls' education was also suggestive of their Kathmandu-centric worldview. They stressed, for example, that "even girls" should learn about agriculture, including nutrition and methods for raising small livestock (NEPC, 1956: 115). As pointed out by Subedi (1997), however, in many rural Nepalese communities the women are in fact responsible for a great deal of heavy agricultural labour. 57 Not only was universal education necessary, according to the NEPC, it was needed immediately. This was particularly the case for adults, upon whose allegedly unprepared shoulders the responsibility of the nation had now been placed. Lest Nepal collapse into "dictatorship or civil war due to misuse of the right to vote", universal literacy and "the total liquidation of ignorance" for the masses of adults currently "quite incapable of exercising independent judgment" was imperative (NEPC, 1956: 1, 152). The linkages made in the NEPC's report between education and democracy were highly idealistic and ambitious, and perhaps demonstrative of the hopeful political climate in 1950s Nepal. As articulated in the NEPC report: Every individual of society should also feel that his education is a necessity, not only for his own good, but also for that of the society.. .If industrial education is properly organized we can.. .banish, in a few years, our country's misery and poverty (NEPC, 1956: 57-58). Alongside the new movement among Nepal's elites to embrace democracy came the desire for modernization, and this served as a further demarcation between the classes. Pfaff- Czarnecka (1997) notes that with the opening of Nepal to foreign aid in the 1950s and 1960s, the culture of the dominant groups took on the entitlement of being the "language of modernization" (p. 435), because it was individuals from these groups who secured positions within the development organizations, which also tended to be based in urban areas. The concept of modernization clearly encapsulated the primary dualism between those who were "modern", progressive and global in orientation, or at least aiming to be, and those who were "traditional", or stagnating and "backward". As in many other countries at the time, in Nepal the paradigm of modernization was strongly linked with a functionalist approach to education (Doftori, 2004). As Rostow (1960) posited in his five stage model of development, the responsibility of education was to impart the skills necessary for growth; people were not considered particularly worthwhile in and of themselves, but only in terms of how they could contribute to the national development agenda (Doftori, 2004). The NEPC's functionalist interpretation of education is evident by its view of education as an instiller in children (and in Nepal's case, illiterate adults) of the values and skills deemed appropriate by those in positions of power within the social hierarchy. In Nepal, children

58 were already largely "sorted" into caste, class, and gender roles. The role of education during these years was thus to enable them to be the best farmer, the best potter, the best mother, the best civil servant, and above all the best Nepalese citizen they could be; there appears to have been little intention of challenging the status quo (Doftori, 2004). In July 1956, Nepal's First Five Year Plan (1956-61) was created, the education component of which was largely based upon the Commission's report. The Plan heralded universal literacy, and primary education was imbued with the responsibilities of nation- building, the creation of opportunities for social betterment, and the formation of citizens loyal to the monarchy, through Nepal's first national and centrally-controlled school system. The curriculum was also expanded beyond its traditional focus on the study of Sanskrit to include the Nepali language, mathematics, social studies, and physical education, with the addition of Sanskrit, English, Science and Health, and moral education in higher grades. Unfortunately, centralization and standardization meant that education could no longer be adapted to the needs of individual communities, which reduced its practical relevance, and thus its attractiveness, for rural populations (Doftori, 2004). The NEPC, for better or worse, never had the opportunity to see the full realization of its extensive education plan. Nepal's "first democratic experiment" was not to last, and thus neither was the NEPC. With the king's usurpation of control and the dismantling of parliament, education reform was no longer a top priority. Following a few years of little national-level activity, however, educational development was initiated once more with fervor shortly after the establishment of the Panchayat government. Picking up the NEPC's Western-inspired vision that education would meet the needs and wants of Nepal's diverse peoples while simultaneously propelling the country towards modernization, the Panchayat leaders enlisted education into service as an integral element of an explicit hegemonic strategy of homogenization. 4.3.3 Education during the Panchayat Years Following the political upheaval of 1960 when King Mahendra overthrew the parliament, banned political parties, and assumed direct rule of the country with his Panchayat system, the painstakingly articulated national education plans of the NEPC and the democratic government's policy of universal literacy were abandoned. No new coherent

59 education policy was introduced during the first years of the Panchayat regime, and community-led education continued at the local level in the form of private schools, which received grants from the government but operated independently. According to Subedi (1997), although this system was sparse in terms of capacity, the schools that existed tended to be well integrated into their respective communities, because control over education was in local hands. The Panchayat government did, however, eventually draft its own vision for education to suit its political goals for Nepal. The educational administration was firmly centralized, and control over the new policy was to be strictly maintained (Doftori, 2004). The relationship between the government's political ideology and its educational strategy will be discussed below. The primary link between politics and education during the Panchayat years was the government's exploitation of the latter as a vehicle for cultural homogenization and the development of a sense of Nepalese nationhood amenable to the mores of the ruling elite. Education also became increasingly politicized, and students began to participate actively in political debate. 4.3.3 (a) The Role of Education in Nation Building during the Panchayat Years Nepal, as described by Gyawali (2002) is a "human mosaic of diverse communities, essentially a country of minorities" (p. 213).15 After the conquest of the Gorkhas brought political unity to Nepal, therefore, the rulers faced significant barriers in their quest to create a sense of nationalism among the people, and provide the binding forces to sustain Nepal as a state. The means by which successive regimes undertook the project of nation building, while these varied from era to era, generally involved an insistence upon one particular vision of national unity, and the repeated promotion of the "three pillars of nationalism", i.e., the Nepali language, the Hindu religion, and the institution of the monarchy. Of course, the

15 The dozens of ethnic and linguistic groups of Nepal, which together comprise 35 percent of the population, have been partitioned into three main groups according to their location of origin, although there is much diversity within them. Some of the largest groups include the Parbatiyas, "people of the hills", who have historically been the dominant ethnic group of Nepal, groups of Tibeto-Burman origin, the Newars of the Kathmandu Valley, the Madheshis ("people of the plains"), and groups indigenous to the Tarai known collectively as Tharus (Whelpton, 2005). 60 state's endeavors in this regard were highly contentious for those many groups whose language and culture they invalidated.1 The place of education within this dynamic became increasingly important, especially as Nepal began to receive foreign aid and undertake development initiatives in earnest in the mid-20th century. As discussed above, by the 1950s, the national education system was seen as a vehicle to bring all of the diverse together under the auspices of nation-building. According to Whelpton (1997), while a limited sense of national unity had likely existed in Nepal before the 1950s, the education system took this much further. The various elements of Nepalese nationalism had also existed for many years prior to the advent of the Panchayat system: the Ranas declared Nepali the official language of Nepal in the 1930s, and Nepal had been considered Hindu long before the religion was made official in King Mahendra's 1962 constitution. The Panchayat education system brought these elements together into one conveniently disseminated form, however, and ensured their comprehensive propagation throughout the country. Nepali was mandated as the sole medium of instruction in 1959, and a set of national textbooks and curricula were designed. Nepalese students across the country were taught about their history, geography, culture and economics according to the particular version of events and images preferred by the state. Whelpton (1997) has accredited the efficacy of school in regards to nation-building primarily to the manner in which history was taught: all children were told that Nepal's past was their own, and that they were all members of one national community. The national anthem was to be sung daily, and textbooks were filled with so-called "national symbols", as well as stories of heroes and mythical figures from Nepalese history designed to instill a strong sense of patriotism among Nepal's young people, while eliminating aspects of history that did not fit with this image (Onta-Bhatta, 2000). Shah (1993) argues that the national education system brought the general population together for the first time under one "politico-territorial" conceptual umbrella (p. 9). Although the notion of creating a sense of common heritage and unity among differences may appear benign, the process was in fact highly divisive. This is because the

16 See Shah (1993) for arguments justifying the state's promotion of Nepali, Hinduism, and the monarchy as "pillars of nationalism". Table 1 in Chapter 5 depicts educational attainment disaggregated by ethnic group for 2003; I was unable to locate corresponding data for earlier periods. 61 characteristics of the so-called commonality and identity were drawn strategically from, and accorded particular status to, the symbols and practices of the already dominant, high-caste groups, and education thus became a vehicle of elite hegemony (Maclure, 2000). There was a new notion that national identity was something to create and assert, and the identity asserted by the Panchayat leaders was one of national homogeneity mirroring the particular cultural characteristics of the ruling elite. Assertion of ethnic identity was tantamount to political subversion. The discriminatory practices of the state generated increasing resentment among ethnic minorities, who perceived the government's acculturation efforts as unjust attempts at assimilation. Ethnic representatives from the tarai region, for example, first mobilized in protest in the 1950s when the Congress government declared an end to the use of Hindi, the lingua franca of the region, in local public schools. This was seen as abject discrimination against the culture of the people of the tarai (Whelpton, 2005). The Hindu status of Nepal was also underlined through the school curriculum by several means, including the use of Sanskrit and the incorporation of Hindu scriptures into textbooks. No other religious-themed stories were used, even the Buddhist Jataka Tales, which may have been appropriate given that some of Nepal's ethnic groups are Buddhist. Also, the celebration of the Hindu festival Dasain further enmeshed the Hindu religion with Nepalese society. Moreover, those who objected to Hindu-related aspects of the curriculum, such as the teaching of Sanskrit, were considered to be criticizing the Hindu religion itself. (This was so even though there were valid objections to Sanskrit unrelated to Hinduism, such as its lack of relevance to modern society) (Sharma, 2002). In terms of the monarchy, the primary metaphor employed to generate a sense of unity among the people of Nepal was that of the family, with the king and queen as "father" and "mother". Onta-Bhatta (2000) states that Nepal's monarchy has historically appropriated this metaphor in order to portray Nepal an "imagined community" of diverse peoples and cultures brought together by shared allegiances, and family as a vehicle for nationalist propaganda was employed conspicuously in national school textbooks. The role of children within this project was to represent the Nepalese people as one unified group: the numerous cultures and ethnicities of individual children were subsumed within one symbolic collectivity, i.e., "Nepalese children". Further, Onta-Bhatta (2000) argues that the family

62 image was appropriated as a means to neutralize and sanction the social differences and discriminations that existed within the so-called "unity" by presenting them as natural fact (p.103). One further example of the development-education interface involves the Panchayat state's insertion of population control messages into school curricula via normative values lessons, which attempted to redefine the family and the value of children. These messages promoted the so-called "norm" of a nuclear family with two educated children. This was in spite of the fact that the Nepalese context, with its inadequate state support for education and public health, high infant and child mortality rates, and its cultural traditions favoring large families, starkly contradicted the state's image of the ideal nuclear family. In the government's effort to complement its argument, lessons from textbooks upheld the position that formally educated children were superior to their uneducated peers (Onta-Bhatta, 2000). This process of homogenization became increasingly noxious to its opponents, however, particularly as the failure of the state, in terms of its inability to provide the promised economic growth and social services, became apparent in the 1970s. Although the project of the school system was to craft identical Nepalese children, the actual opportunities afforded to these children upon graduation were by no means justly distributed, as employment and higher education institutions remained dominated by traditional elite groups. There also remained many children who, for reasons of caste or economic circumstance, were not able to attend school, and were thus vulnerable to further discrimination (Doftori, 2004).17 4.3.3 (b) Access & Enrollment in Panchayat Era Schools (1960-1990) The Panchayat years were associated with a significant opening of the country to foreign assistance and ideas. This social change was reflected in the education system, as the elitism and traditional biases constraining educational opportunity began to diminish, albeit very slowly at first. Thanks to a proliferation of school construction efforts, with funding

17 As pointed out by Doftori (2004) this situation presented an interesting counterpoint to the reproduction theory of education. Cultural reproduction, or the transmission of status and social roles from generation to generation, is certainly an integral component of hierarchical societies such as Nepal's, however, the "locus of discourse on educational and cultural reproduction" did not lie so much within the classroom in terms of curricula or teaching methods, as in the basic criteria of school attendance or nonattendance (p. 44).

63 assistance from an expanding number of donors, schools and colleges were accessible to an increasing number of students. In 1987, Nepal had 12,491 primary schools and 5,325 high schools, a significant growth compared with the 310 primary and 11 high schools present in 1950. Adult literacy increased to 24 percent in 1981, and to 33 percent in 1990 (Savada, 1993). Primary enrollment rates increased rapidly over the subsequent decades, including for girls and women, yet not as quickly as the government would have liked. Enrollment increased to 52 percent in 1984 (30 percent for girls), and to 64 percent (girls 37 percent) by the end of the Panchayat period in 1990, a significant improvement but well below Nepal's target of universal primary education. Nepal also had one of the highest dropout rates in the world: while figures vary, it is estimated that in 1990 between 50 and 70 percent of students would not finish primary school (Khaniya & Williams, 2004; Wan, 2003; World Bank, 2007b). Enrollment also varied a great deal from region to region. Tables depicting Nepal's growth in terms of school infrastructure, literacy rates, and enrollment are provided in Appendix 4. Therefore, despite the increased awareness and increased access to primary schools, in reality education, particularly that of good quality, was still the arena of the privileged. It was only the elite who could afford to keep their children in school beyond the primary level; secondary school and university were not free, particularly the higher quality institutions. Those who could afford it also often sent their children abroad for university, because foreign degrees tended to offer higher status than those from Nepal, and greatly improved the employment possibilities for those who managed to obtain them (Whelpton, 2005). Also, for many children, access to formal schooling remained limited by the economy and culture of the country. Children were often needed by their families to contribute to work in the fields and the home. As a result, many began school late, and more than 50 percent abandoned school after only one year (Savada, 1993). Outside of formal government rhetoric, education for girls was often considered unnecessary, and many continued to face impenetrable barriers to enrollment. (As late as 1984, total school enrollment was 72 percent male) (Savada, 1993).

64 Although there was a nominal increase in the percentage of literacy, the relevance and quality of basic education remained low. The difficulty of transportation to remote regions also inhibited management and supervision. Teachers often received little access to resources or supervision, had meager or no support, and less than 40 percent were trained, while those who were had often only completed a 150 hour course (Khaniya & Williams, 2004). Poorly motivated teachers, combined with a lack of suitable resources, very large classes, and discipline that varied from severely harsh to woefully lacking, combined to create a poor learning environment. Cheating was often rampant, particularly during examinations, and schools were known to tamper with the results to improve their standing. Nevertheless, failure was far more common than passing grades on examinations, particularly in rural areas. Also, although the government attempted to impose uniform textbooks and teacher training methodologies, the starkness of regional variations undermined the expected benefits of these policies (Whelpton, 2005). 4.3.3 (c) The New Education System Plan (NESP) Subedi (1997) argues that the Panchayat curriculum was inherently flawed from the start, in that it was orchestrated to produce "service holders", rather than the skilled workers Nepal needed. The government elites were also not pleased with the education system of the 1960s, as it did not fulfil Nepal's need for trades-people and mid-level managers to propel economic development. This labour shortage provided the impetus for the "New Education System Plan" (NESP) of 1971, which comprised an integral part of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1970-75). The NESP was influenced to a large extent by models from the United States, and was created in collaboration with UNESCO. The idea behind the plan was to bring the majority of schools and colleges into one government-controlled, integrated national structure. Primary education was declared free in 1975, and the government took responsibility for providing school facilities, teachers, and learning materials, while the construction and maintenance of school facilities was the responsibility of communities (Savada, 1993). Although the NESP greatly increased government financing for education, the increase in centralized control had the effect of decimating the relationships that had previously existed between schools and their local communities, because schools that had

65 been founded and/or run by individual communities were now taken over by the government or closed down (Subedi, 1997). Whelpton (2005) and Dixit (2002) discuss examples of innovative and well-functioning schools that were overwhelmed by the homogenizing forces of the Panchayat's national system. These include the Hillary schools in the Sherpa region of Solukhumbu, the Luitel school in Gorkha, and the UNESCO Seti initiative. The NESP was highly centralized in terms of planning and implementation. Each district in Nepal was dispatched a District Education Officer from the Education Department in Kathmandu, who was placed in charge of decisions regarding curriculum, the hiring of teachers, the school calendar, financing and other matters. The freedom for adaptation to meet local needs, for example to accommodate religious festivals or harvest periods, was no longer available. Subjects such as social science and history were also re-interpreted as vehicles for Panchayat propaganda, and history was designed to paint a flattering picture of the monarchy (Subedi, 1997). Other elements of the NESP, which were extremely unpopular with high-school students, included a plan to raise the minimum qualifications needed to enter university, and an attempt to revise the curriculum to make it more vocationally oriented (which led students to refer to the plan disparagingly as shiska niyojana, literally "education limitation") (Whelpton, 2005). Vaux et al. (2006) write that the Nepalese people they spoke with during a study on the state of education in Nepal referred to the superior quality of education prior to the implementation of the NESP, when communities ran their own schools, and Subedi (1997) notes as well that many people associate the government's centralization policies during the Panchayat years with a decline of education in the country, because communities lost the control to adapt their schools to local needs. 4.3.3 (d) Student Politics Student politics also began to play an increasingly important role during the Panchayat era. Students have long played an important role in Nepalese politics, and student demonstrations even occurred during the Rana period (Gurung, 1997). One of the most important effects of the democratic period of the 1950s, brief though it was, was the arousal of political awareness among the educated population and elite groups. Of these newly politically active constituencies, perhaps the most troubling from the government's perspective was the students. After the dissolution of the first parliament, students began to

66 organize themselves politically and became the most serious internal challenge to the Panchayat system. Although party politics were banned during the Panchayat regime, they lived on, and thrived, through student unions, while the parties, now officially underground, courted new members from among these student groups (Whelpton, 2005). Students were in a privileged position in terms of their ability to engage in activism. They were comparatively free in terms of financial burdens, given that the majority of those who made it to university were from middle- or upper-class families, and their energy and idealism made opposition politics an attractive outlet. The students gradually became more organized and more knowledgeable about politics, and by the early 1970s they were committed in their fight against the Panchayat system (Khadka, 1991). Similarly, the increasing availability of education during the Panchayat years, combined with the increasingly contentious political atmosphere, allowed marginalized populations to begin to coalesce into activist groups with more broadly based identities (Whelpton, 2005). The Panchayat era also corresponded to an opening of Nepal to myriad outside influences. Foreign media and political ideas began to flow into the country, and competed with the state's attempts to homogenize Nepal's student population and the socio-cultural environment in general (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 1997). These multidirectional forces in Nepalese society, in combination with the simmering grievances of ethnic groups and other marginalized people, escalated throughout the final years of the Panchayat system until it was overturned in the People's Movement of 1990. The new excitement of democracy extended into the classroom to some extent, although more in rhetoric than practice. According to Onta-Bhatta (2000), one important change, however, was the addition of issues pertaining to citizens' rights into textbooks, including lessons on the fundamental human rights to food, clothing, shelter, education, security and health. Also mentioned were civil rights such as the rights to freedom, equality, justice, religion, culture, the right to vote and to be elected, among others, and even the right to criticize the government. According to Whelpton (2005), over and above its obvious low quality (the specifics of which will be discussed in Chapter 5), the biggest problem with the education system in Nepal is the fact that it has tended to instill ambitions among the young that cannot be

67 fulfilled by an impoverished society beset with socio-economic discrimination in myriad forms. Barriers to employment have been most extreme for Nepal's many marginalized groups, including ethnic minorities and "low-caste" groups, who have been excluded or driven from positions of power and participation in decision-making (Thapa & Sijapati, 2004). A common refrain among scholars of Nepal is that one of the precipitating factors behind the rise of violent conflict was that the hopes and expectations of the country's youth and marginalized groups were not met (Gellner, 1997; Gurung, 1997; Sharma, 1997). 4.4 Conclusion: The Interconnections of Political & Educational Development in Nepal As noted in Chapter 2, education systems have frequently been employed as hegemonic tools by governments seeking to instill a particular worldview and allegiance to the state among their populace. This exploitation of education has occurred in Nepal, as well, as educational development in Nepal from 1768 to 1990 followed a course largely determined by the whims, ambitions and constraints faced by Nepal's successive rulers. The forces of political governance in Nepal, dominated by ruling elites, have been reinforced throughout the country's history by the hegemonic educational policies and directives during their respective reigns. Unfortunately for Nepal, the manipulation of the education sector to suit the purposes of the ruling elite was generally not associated with the welfare of the population or of the country as a whole, but rather served to exacerbate the negative impacts of whatever blend of prejudices and power seeking was most prevalent within the government of the day. During the Shah and Rana periods, education was feared by Nepal's rulers for its potential to foment organized resistance. Unable or unwilling to create a system commensurate with their purposes, the ruling elite determined instead to restrict education to a sparse, elitist arrangement inaccessible to the general public. With the advent of democracy in the 1950s, however, this position was largely reversed, under the auspices of modernization, democracy and development. Education for all was championed, but this was to be a stridently homogeneous education, intended to eradicate cultural differences and to craft Nepalese citizens with the same desires and values as the elite. Bemoaning the historical suppression of the Nepalese citizenry, the democratic government recognized that literacy and mass education were necessary for the progression of the country. The

68 development of a unified, centralized system, while embedded in the tenets of democracy, was an effort to guarantee that this progression was in a direction amenable to those with decision-making power. Whether Nepal's American advisors recognized this hegemonic interpretation of education or not, the result of their collaboration, the report of the NEPC (1956), suggests that it was not questioned. It was during the following period, the Panchayat years from 1961-90, that the process of modernization and development truly began to accelerate, including in the education sector. Nepal's politicians, as did those of many other nations as noted in Chapter 2, along with their Western donors, believed that formal education was a prerequisite for modernization and economic growth. Unfortunately, the zeal with which donors and politicians approached the expansion of the education system was not balanced by a comparable insistence upon quality, contextual appropriateness, or accountability. As discussed in Chapter 2, importing Western-style formal education systems into impoverished countries has the potential to yield an array of negative effects, several of which are evident in Nepal. Many commentators, both Nepalese and foreign, have made allegations of misuse of funds and undue donor influence in the education system. The result of this has been the creation of an education system ill-suited to the Nepalese context, that has not taken socio-economic constraints into sufficient consideration, has produced graduates will little chance of satisfactory employment, and has exacerbated existing socio- cultural discrimination and rural-urban divides. The justifiable grievances of disillusioned students have been cited as an integral element of socio-political tension in Nepal. In addition to the contextual misalignment of Nepal's donor-funded school system, the Panchayat government also continued the self-serving manipulation of education begun by its forebears. The monarchy's attempt to buttress its hold on power through the vehicle of nationalism was facilitated through the construction of a national, homogenized education system that sought to unify Nepal's diverse children by teaching them the language, culture, and values of the dominant Parbatiya class. Throughout the Panchayat years, the chasm between state rhetoric and reality became increasingly contentious to the people of Nepal, as the government continued to demonstrate itself unable to provide tangible benefits to the people or to address issues of

69 corruption and discrimination. The state's attempt to subjugate Nepal's minorities through education was also contested by ethnic activists, adding a further dimension to the escalating tensions in Nepalese society. The role of education as a ground of political struggle was exemplified when, with political parties banned, student politics began to play an increasingly contentious role in the dynamic of organized resistance, particularly as student groups became a significant threat to the state. The contribution of education to socio-political conflict in Nepal, from 1768 to 1990, was thus two pronged. On the one hand, the rapid expansion of formal education, particularly from the 1960s onward, added a further dimension to existing conditions of discrimination and disillusionment. Nepal's impoverished and caste-based society did not afford opportunities commensurate with the promises of education as a harbinger of upward social mobility, particularly since education was generally of poor quality. Education thus further stoked the public grievances caused by the government's unfulfilled promises of development in general. On the other hand, distinct from its ostensible role in the provision of literacy and social betterment, the education sector has always been a highly political entity in Nepal. It has served as a venue for government hegemony and some degree of counter-hegemonic resistance, the latter, prior to the 1990s, largely in the form of ethnic activism and student politics. The depth of education's relationship with the tumultuous socio-political context of Nepalese society could in turn only have served to constrain efforts to improve its quality and accessibility, particularly if these dynamics were not understood by donors (discussed in Chapter 6) or acknowledged by the government. The contradiction mentioned in Chapter 2, between the view of education as a benign good, and the reality of education as a platform for political hegemony and resistance, is thus evident in Nepal. If the case of Nepal's poor quality education system (discussed further in Chapter 5) may be considered representative, the presence of this dichotomy is a serious constraint to the implementation of educational reform efforts. Unfortunately for Nepal, these competing dynamics have only become more acute in the present. Despite the high hopes brought by the success of the 1990 rebellion, which overthrew the Panchayat system, political infighting and corruption would continue after

70 1990. Disillusionment would be exacerbated, particularly among the educated urban population, thwarting the development efforts that remained the government's professed goal. Nepal's development challenges were then further compounded and have taken on a new dimension of urgency with the onset and escalation of the insurgency. The state of education in Nepal following the reinstatement of democracy in 1990, as well as the rise of the Maoists and the relationship of their movement with the education system, comprise the subjects of the following chapter.

71 Chapter 5: The Maoist Insurgency & Education in Nepal: Dynamics & Implications The previous chapter discussed the relationship of political and educational development in Nepal, and described the role of education as a ground of socio-political struggle between the hegemonic forces of the state and the ethnic activists, politicians, intellectuals, and student groups, which covertly or explicitly opposed them. This chapter will place this dynamic in a more recent context, through a discussion of the development of Nepal's education system following the reinstatement of democracy in 1990, and the concurrent emergence of a new form of violent counter-hegemonic resistance, the Maoist insurgency. The chapter first discusses the antecedents of the insurgency, in order to explicate the socio-political atmosphere in which the education sector has been functioning since the 1990s, followed by a more explicit discussion of education's connection with the insurgency and with the Maoists' ideology. As noted in Chapter 2, education is both impacted by and indicative of the society in which it is situated. This chapter will discuss how the roots of the Maoist insurgency in fact mirror closely the obstacles to educational development in Nepal, and how the insurgency has been intertwined with education from its inception. 5.1 Development of the Maoist Insurgency [M]ost insurgencies are politically motivated, sustained by social grievances, and mobilized through appeal to ethnic identity or religion. Horizontal inequalities, social fragmentation, corruption, and criminality make up the combustible combination of factors that leads to violent unrest (Picciotto, 2004: 546). 5.1.1 Antecedents of the Insurgency: Governance, Discrimination & Endemic Poverty Post-1990 As discussed in Chapter 4, the Nepalese public grew increasing frustrated with the perceived ineptitude and corruption of the Panchayat government, and its inability to ameliorate Nepal's poverty and discrimination. There was a great deal of hope, therefore, that the ensuing People's Movement of 1990 would usher in a new era of democracy and social justice. The People's Movement was considered a milestone in Nepal's history, given that it was the first time all segments of Nepalese society, as opposed to elite groups alone, rose up in protest to bring down the traditional power system (Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004).

72 When the Panchayat system was overthrown, however, the interim government that took its place was charged with governing an economically devastated nation, and commentators have argued that Nepal's political leaders were not adequately prepared for the challenges they faced (Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004; Poudel, 1991). In 1989, Nepal's per capita GDP was US$160, life expectancy was 54 years for males, 51 for females, and infant mortality was 111 per 1000, putting Nepal amongst the world's least developed countries (World Bank, 1989). The agriculture sector, critical to Nepal's economy, was stagnating, as were foreign trade and manufacturing (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003; Poudel, 1991). One of the primary tasks of the interim government of 1990 was the creation of a new constitution, a task assigned to a Constitution Recommendations Committee composed of governmentally appointed ministers. Activist groups, hopeful that the plurality of Nepal would at last be officially sanctioned, demanded constitutional recognition of all languages and religions of Nepal, through equal representation in the legislature or the division of the country into ethnic autonomous units. The government, however, perceived these grievances as threats to national unity, and dismissed them (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003). The only suggestion of diversity made in the new constitution was in the definition of Nepal as "multi-ethnic" and "multi-lingual", and the recognition that while Nepali was the official "language of the nation", there did exist other (and by implication, lesser) "national languages", which could be taught in schools at the primary level only (Gurung, 2005). The chorus of demands that Nepal be declared a secular state also went unheard, due in part to the vigorous opposition put forth by orthodox Hindu organizations (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003). Gurung (2005) argues that the reference to Nepal as a Hindu state in the constitution makes the document inherently contradictory.18 Maintaining traditional religious practices by definition involves perpetuation of inequality towards the lower- castes, as this is an inherent element of Hinduism as it has been practiced for centuries in Nepal. Therefore, in spite of the new ideological perspective and official declarations of pluralism and equality, the 1990 constitution entrenched the continuation of traditional

18 Article 11.3 of the 1990 constitution, regarding the right to equality states: "The State shall not discriminate the citizens on the basis of religion, colour, sex, caste, ethnicity or conviction or any of these". Article 19.1, however, states that: "Each individual will have the right to follow and practice one's ancient religion by maintaining the dignity of prevailing tradition" (Gurung, 2005: 2-3). 73 discriminatory power relations by offering the formal trappings of parliamentary democracy, through the hegemonic co-option of the "language of democracy, human rights, and participation", but little in the way of true representation (Maclure, 2000: 29). Despite the perfunctory degree of egalitarian measures contained in the constitution, however, many argue that the document was nonetheless highly significant for its symbolic value. It also provided, at least on paper, for fundamental human rights (Shah, 1993; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 1997). When the Nepali Congress was elected in 1991, they promised to usher in "a new order" in Nepal, involving a unified progression of democracy and development through grassroots participation.19 While the following few years did witness growth in the agricultural sector, GDP and per capita income, the benefits were felt largely in urban areas, and growth decelerated again quickly in 1995 in response to poor governance and political instability. Scandals pertaining to corruption and other illegal acts, combined with accumulating charges of inefficiency, nepotism, lack of representation, apathy, and the demonstrated inability of the government to bring about reforms to Nepal's old feudal practices, led to a decline in public trust in the new administration (Nepali, 2001; Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004; Thapa & Sijapati, 2003; Upreti, 2001). The twelve years from 1991 onward witnessed eleven changes of government (USAID, 2005a). Therefore, despite the opportunities and freedoms brought by the new political system, which allowed individuals and organizations to speak out about Nepal's future, there was yet a growing sense that the democratic state was not living up to its promises. This failure of Nepal's leaders to bring tangible benefits to the majority was among the primary justifications given by the Maoists for the initiation of their insurgency.20 Poverty continued particularly acutely in the mid- and far-west regions of the country, such as Rolpa and Rukum, areas that were largely neglected by the government, and would in

Twenty parties contested the 1991 elections. The Nepali Congress Party won with 110 of 205 seats in the House of Representatives, and the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) placed second with 69 seats. A coalition of three other communist parties won 13 seats. The conservative National Democratic Party, which comprised two separate factions, won a total of four seats. The Nepal Sadbhavana Party, which represents the Madhesi ethnic community of the tarai region, was one of several regional and ethnic parties (Savada, 1993). 20 For a fuller picture of the role of the perceived failure of governance in Nepal in the instigation of the conflict, see Nepali (2001), Gersony (2003), Thapa (2002), and Thapa and Sijapati (2003). 74 later years serve as the Maoists' stronghold region. The Maoists, along with other commentators, do not place the blame for Nepal's poverty entirely upon the government, however, but also upon the actions of foreign development organizations, particularly the influence these agencies have had upon Nepal's development and governance (Pradhan, 2006). As will be discussed in Chapter 6, several decades of foreign assistance have done little to ameliorate the quality of life for many people in Nepal. One of the grievances comprising the Maoists' platform is the amount of money allegedly spent on "soft" activities such as training and workshops in Kathmandu, while the remote areas are in dire need of the most basic services (Armon et al., 2004). Many of Nepal's peripheral areas lack not only government services such as potable water, health services, and education, but through the years have also been largely neglected by development organizations. This is, of course, understandable to some extent, given the virtual inaccessibility of some far-western regions. Yet the residents of these areas have felt the injustice in social distribution acutely (Nepali, 2001). Specific criticisms in the far-west regions include allegations that a large proportion of funds raised ostensibly for them do not reach local communities, but are rather absorbed by implementing institutions as staff expenses, or diverted by corruption, as well as the presence of myriad donor-funded "chicken, goat and advocacy" initiatives, which are allegedly unsustainable (Gersony, 2003). As Thapa and Sijapati (2003) note, it is therefore not a coincidence that the Maoist movement originated within these impoverished areas, nor that its leaders found willing support by promising changes to the government structures that had allowed their residents' suffering to continue. The remote areas became fertile ground in which the Maoists could propagate their "anti-government, anti-system, anti-donors, and anti-development" ideology (Chand, 2001: 218). 5.1.2 The Emergence of the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist According to Whelpton (2005) and others, beyond poor governance, poverty, and popular grievances, an additional and crucial catalyst in the development of the insurgency was the historical position of in Nepal, particularly in the west of the country, as well as the place of communist parties in the complicated power balance of the Nepalese political sphere of the 1990s.

75 The violent insurgency that has been besieging Nepal for the past decade was instigated by a rebel political group known as the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M), generally referred to as the Maoists. (See Whelpton (2005) for a discussion of the long and rather complex in Nepal and the origins of the Maoists). One of many leftist parties of the Nepalese political landscape of the 1990s, the Maoists were originally involved in mainstream politics through their political wing, the United People's Front (UPF). In the early 1990s, the Maoists began to allege that the Nepali Congress government was persecuting their candidates, citing incidences of violence, unwarranted arrests, and election tampering, particularly in the far-western regions, and argued that their party was effectively being shut out of electoral politics. Although the veracity of the Maoists' claims of persecution is contested (Gersony, 2003), the party decided in any case to boycott Nepal's 1994 national elections, went underground, and began outright opposition to the multi-party system of government. They initiated a campaign in Nepal's far-west region to build public support for their cause, which was ostensibly based upon Chinese Maoist philosophy. The history of government neglect and the growth of communism in the western regions were crucial for the Maoists from a mobilization perspective (Gersony, 2003; Thapa & Sijapati, 2003).21 The Maoists launched their first violent attack upon a government target, a police post, in February 1996, shortly after Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai presented then Prime Minister Deuba with the Maoists' list of 40 demands (Appendix 1). Like rebel factions such as the Khmer Rouge and Peru's Shining Path movement, with whom they have been compared and from whom they have claimed to draw inspiration, the Maoists are led by a group of well-educated individuals (Gersony, 2003). Their political platform revolves around three central demands: an end to the monarchy, the creation of a republican constitution, and an interim government in which they would hold major influence (Stevenson, 2001). In the words of one party official from Kalikot district: "We have learned many things from the experiences of the successful people's revolution in China. Like the great proletarian cultural revolution in China we are trying to destroy the

Another often-mentioned, but debated, instigator of the conflict was a brutal police action known as "Operation Romeo", which was the government's response to the escalation of violence of Rolpa and Rukum between Maoists and local politicians in September 1995 (Thapa, 2002; Gersony, 2003). 76 traditional agricultural system, education, culture, manners and behaviour as this is necessary to pave the way for new progressive thinking. Progress is made through struggle" (Nepal, 2005: 6). The Maoists' military strategy was based upon the principles of Mao Tse- tung, which include stipulations to capture arms from the enemy, encircle the cities from the countryside, and engage in a "protracted war" involving a series of six stages with various slogans and objectives demarcating each one (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003: 101).22 Despite initial limitations involving meager cadre numbers and old-fashioned ammunition, the Maoists eventually succeeded in carrying out a significant campaign of rebellion that extended through many regions of the country, and included attacks on several police posts, the theft of large cashes of weapons, regular extortion of food and money from civilians, and incidences of public torture (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003; Gersony, 2003). The escalation of the insurgency is attributed to several factors in addition to the issues of poor governance, poverty, and the Maoist leaders' own ambitions. 5.7.3 The Escalation of the Insurgency Perhaps one of the major factors behind the continuation and escalation of the insurgency was the lack of serious attention paid by the authorities in the first years of the conflict, whether this was due to honest ignorance or deliberate neglect (Thapa, 2002). Many commentators state that the Maoists were able to gain control in rural areas simply by default, that they were able to gain a foothold and develop their strength and abilities due to the absence of the government and development agencies from remote regions (Srestha, 2001; Gersony, 2003; Gautam, 2001; Murphy et al., 2005). When government action was finally taken it also tended to be incoherent or needlessly violent, particularly upon rural civilians, which only added fuel to the Maoists' cause (Thapa, 2002). An additional element contributing to the proliferation of the Maoist movement has been the willingness of Nepal's youth to join the Maoist ranks. K.M. Dixit traces the development of disillusionment among young people to the Panchayat era. He states: "Ironically, the seeds of the Maoists insurgency had been sown in the Panchayat years, when Nepal evolved an education system capable of churning out literate, but under-educated,

22 The Maoists issued a 75-point manifesto in November, 2001 that reiterated their ideological connection to Chinese . The document called for the nationalization of property, the banishment of Indian industries from Nepal, a ban on prostitution, an end to Gurkha recruitment, and a cessation of the funding of INGOs (Nepali Times, 2003, April 25 - May 1). 77 school graduates who had a highly developed sense of nationalism but got little in the form of job opportunities" (Dixit, K.M., 2002: 67). According to Thapa and Sijapati (2003), the proliferation of both roads and literacy during the Panchayat years opened up opportunities for Nepal's youth. After 1990 in particular, youth could openly read about and discuss politics and the world outside Nepal. Young people's expectations were generally not matched by reality, however; they were frustrated by an education that offered them few vocational skills, they often had great difficulty finding employment, and felt their villages had been abandoned by the government. The alienation of Nepalese youth has been further demonstrated, according to Whelpton (2005), by the escalation of alcohol, drug abuse, and suicide in recent years. The Maoist rhetoric has provided hope for the future, and offered these discontented youth something different. B.K. Shrestha (2001) notes that when a poor village youth or worker joins the Maoist ranks, "a major transformation" takes place in him or her (p.22). New recruits, most often used to hard manual labour and insufficient food, would receive a regular salary perhaps for the first time in their lives, as well as a sudden surge in their power and influence within the community. Given the degree of Nepal's socio-economic, gender, ethnic, geographical, and caste disparity, as well as unequal representation, discrimination is often said to have added further impetus to the instigation and escalation of the insurgency (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003). B.K. Shrestha (2001), in explaining the continuation and escalation of the insurgency, argues: "With the kind of widespread poverty and deprivation, inter-class and inter-caste disparities and discriminations and sustained perpetuation of the exploitative socio­ economic structure, it would be a world wonder if Nepal were to remain a peaceful country, its cravings for tranquility notwithstanding" (p. 12). According to Gersony (2003), in their strategy for conquering the Kham-Magars' territory in the remote west for use as a base area, the Maoists skillfully exploited long­ standing ethnic grievances to their benefit. The Maoists knew the locals' history of antagonism with the government, and tapped into this well of discontent to build support for their cause. A similar appropriation of grievances has occurred among other marginalized groups as well. In a leaflet distributed at the start of their "people's war" in 1996, the Maoist leadership stated: "To maintain the hegemony of one religion (i.e. Hinduism), language (i.e.

78 Nepali), and nationality (i.e. Khas), this state has for centuries exercised discrimination, exploitation and oppression against other religions, languages and nationalities and has conspired to fragment the forces of national unity that is vital for proper development and security of the country" (cited in Thapa & Sijapati, 2003: 78). Nepal's political and bureaucratic positions are highly dominated by traditional elite groups. High-caste Brahmans, Chhetris and Newars combined hold over 80 percent of civil service and other important bureaucratic positions, though they comprise only about 38 percent of the population (USAID, 2005). In line with their proclamations concerning ethnic autonomy, the Maoists have, according to some reports, focused their recruitment in certain areas on ethnic minorities and lower-caste members (Gurung, 2005). Maoist organizations also have greater ethnic representation than do other political structures, although like the majority of political groups, their leadership ranks are still highly Brahmin-dominated (Gurung, 2005). Of the 36 members of the Maoists' United Revolutionary People's Council in 2005,17 were from ethnic minority groups, and two were Dalit. 15 of the 23 People's Government chairmen were ethnic minorities, and one Dalit (Gurung, 2005). Ethnic fronts, such as the Tharuwan Liberation Front and the Nepal Dalit Liberation Front, have also been formed during various stages of the insurgency (Gersony, 2003; Thapa & Sijapati, 2003). Despite the multiple discriminations and disadvantages with which Dalit groups have suffered throughout Nepal's history, a study conducted by Gurung (2005) found that Dalits did not actually join the Maoists in large numbers. Gersony (2003) also reports that the majority of Dalits interviewed for his study believe that although the Maoists have portrayed their situation accurately, and have brought their cause a degree of public attention, the Maoists' "solution" is not a good one, given their frequent use of violence, intimidation, and destruction of property. Nepal (2005), however, notes that many Dalits do believe the Maoists have significantly contributed to their empowerment, by attempting to prohibit discrimination in the areas under Maoist control. In addition to its somewhat greater proportion of ethnic minorities, the Maoist party is unique in its number of women members compared with the majority of other political and bureaucratic settings in Nepal. According to Thapa and Sijapati (2003), women comprise almost a third of the Maoist forces, but this varies from region to region. The

79 Maoists claim to champion the cause of gender equality, and some aspects of their platform, including combating alcoholism, polygamy, child marriage, and wife battery, have successfully appropriated long-standing grievances among women (Gautam, 2001). Also, joining the Maoists has been an escape route for women constrained in submissive roles, and women in Maoist-affected areas are also more likely to be involved in their region's politics, social and other activities than women elsewhere (Gautam, 2001). The female Maoists themselves have expressed a great deal of enthusiasm in regard to the movement's benefits to women (Nepal, 2005). According to one female member of the Maoist militia, one of the primary objectives of the party is to achieve equal rights for women in every sector and to fight the state that has "taken away" women's rights (Gautam, 2001). While the Maoists call their recruitment of women "empowerment", Thapa and Sijapati (2003) argue that increased women's participation is simply related to the fact that the majority of men have fled certain regions in fear of Maoist recruitment or reprisals. Many women also disagree with the Maoist's coercive and violent tactics and forced recruitment, despite whatever benefits they have ostensibly brought. Also, many question the degree to which the Maoists' activities and forced complicity to their cause could actually foment true social change in regard to gender equality (Gautam, 2001). Therefore, although the Maoists claim that theirs is a struggle to liberate the oppressed and champion minority rights, this assertion has been widely critiqued. According to many commentators, the fact that the Maoists have recognized the need to integrate the causes of women and ethnic and Dalit groups into their platform in order to establish a support base does not necessarily mean, however, that the needs of these groups are their true priority, nor that their enforced social changes will be sustainable (Thapa, 2002; Gersony, 2003; Nepali, 2003). Armon et al. (2004) argue that the Maoists' use of ethnicity and caste as demarcating characteristics could in fact entrench horizontal inequalities and exclusion over the long-term, by reinforcing traditional divisions between castes and ethnic populations. Even if the changes brought by the Maoists are not to prove long-lasting in terms of a fundamental shift in the nature of ethnic, caste, or gender relations, they have raised many issues that perhaps were not prevalent in remote regions prior to the conflict, and brought

80 them more sharply into mainstream focus. More people have developed the willingness and confidence to express their own frustrations, even if the only means by which this has seemed possible has been to join the Maoists (Upreti, 2001). Pyakurel (2001), for example, notes that public denouncements of corruption, caste discrimination, and ethnic identity have grown more vociferous as the conflict has intensified. The insurgency has also brought politics to the grassroots level for the first time in the history of the country (Upadyay, 2001). While the Maoists have had certain technical advantages, therefore, such as a terrain amenable to guerilla warfare, untrained and unprepared opponents, and plenty of opportunity to hone their skills, it is unlikely that their movement would have succeeded to the degree it has were it not for their ability to tap into the grievances of the Nepalese people. As Upreti (2001) and C.B. Shrestha (2001) argue, the Maoists have offered people what may have seemed a viable "last resort", and the only hope to seek justice for their cause, whatever that cause may be.23 It is quite clear that once the movement began many people saw it as a means by which to express their own anger over very significant social problems. As one commentator said, "The Maoist problem appears to be everyone's platform to gain something" (Upreti, 2001: 19). 5.2 Impacts of the Insurgency on Nepalese Society While many people seem to have viewed the Maoist movement as an opportunity for liberation, the impact often years of violence on Nepalese society has nonetheless been turbulent and destructive. Douglas (2005), for example, questions whether the Maoist cadre's dedication would withstand the realization "that instead of launching an economic transformation, the People's War has sent Nepal's rural economy lurching into reverse" (p. 65). In a study conducted in the Maoist-controlled far-west, Douglas found through interviews that the young and enthusiastic Maoist rebels seemed unable to perceive the larger picture of the insurgency, and the destructive consequences it was having on the country as a whole. As in many countries affected by conflict, the Maoist insurgency has been associated with a deepening of poverty and worsening of quality of life, particularly in its most-affected

23 The Maoists also apparently made assurances of future remuneration; for example, they promised the poor that if they joined their ranks, their debts would be absolved (Gautam, 2001). 81 areas and for vulnerable populations, including children. Since 1996, over 13,000 people have been killed, 300,000-400,000 rural families displaced, infrastructure facilities worth an estimated $400 million destroyed, the economy and food security have been threatened, and health and education services curtailed (ADB, 2004; DFID, 2004; Murphy et al., 2005; Gautam, 2001; Dixit, 2005; OHCHR, 2006; USAID, 2005a). Despite a ceasefire called in 2006, violence between Maoists and government forces has continued sporadically into 2007, and thus the total number of casualties, including among civilians, has continued to grow ("Twenty-nine killed", 2006; Panthi, 2007).24 The Maoists and government forces have also been accused of serious human rights violations upon civilians, largely conducted in an environment of impunity (Shrestha, K., 2001; Bose, 2005; AHRC, 2005, May 12 a,b,c). The conflict has also exacerbated existing political instability in Nepal. The most striking events in this regard were the government's decision in July 2002 to allow the tenure of local governing structures to lapse, rather than hold an election amidst the conflict, and King Gyanendra's dismissal of parliament and assumption of unilateral control on February 1, 2005.25 Political instability left many areas with no functioning government, a void that the Maoists were able to fill with their own initiatives, although largely through the use of violence and intimidation. Maoist groups have taken over some state functions, and have implemented development initiatives ostensibly to improve local livelihoods and social justice, yet the actual existence and scale of the Maoists' structures is debated (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003; Gautam, 2001; Nepal, 2005; Gautham, 2001; Gersony, 2003; Shrestha, 2001). The Maoists have also attempted to impose social policies, with varying degrees of efficacy, such as a prohibition against alcohol, a ban on gambling, prohibitions on polygamy, the revoking of traditional marriage rites and restrictions, and a prohibition on discrimination against Dalits (Gersony, 2003; Thapa & Sijapati, 2003; Gautam, 2001; Nepal, 2005).

Detailed accounts of the major events of the insurgency, the various rounds of ceasefire and periods of escalating violence, are provided by Thapa and Sijapati (2003) and Whelpton (2005). A thorough investigation into the effects of the conflict upon children in particular is provided by CWIN (2003). 25 Via an emergency clause in the constitution, the king dismissed the political parties and placed some high- ranking politicians under house arrest, citing their inability to deal constructively with the Maoists. This threw the government into disarray and also caused a great deal of difficulty for government-donor relations (SDC, 2005). 82 The OHCR (2006) notes that there is credible evidence that children have been forcibly recruited into the Maoists' student union, and that some have been used as informants, porters, cooks, and in other forms of labour and combat activities (AHRC, 2005, May 12c). In addition, the conflict is said to have eroded tenuous gains in literacy, child mortality and other key indicators, and has led to a general deterioration of the quality of life of Nepal's children, who were growing up in an environment "shaped by guns, bombs, bandhs (strikes), killings, the sight of dead bodies and the fear of war" (WCAC, 2005: 11). Thapa and Sijapati (2003) have observed many children who were familiar with guns and expressed the desire to take revenge against their enemies. The variability of reports pertaining to the Maoists' activities is perhaps explainable both by the heterogeneity of the Maoist party in its many local incarnations throughout Nepal, as well as by the difficulty researchers have faced extracting accurate information from remote regions. While the extent of damage done to Nepalese society in terms of infrastructure destruction and loss of life is uncertain, it is clear that the myriad impacts of the conflict, including the dissolution of local-level democratic institutions, the breakdown of three ceasefires, eventual parliamentary collapse with its associated suspension of legislative and oversight functions, migration, violence, and widespread fear and insecurity, have caused a great deal of suffering and greatly compounded Nepal's myriad previous development challenges. As of mid-2006, the insurgency appears to be waning. After over a year of highly contested direct monarchical rule, King Gyanendra finally capitulated to escalating criticism and popular protest, accepted a ceasefire initiated by the Maoists, and declared on April 21, 2006 that "power would be returned to the people". Parliament was reinstated on May 19, 2006 with a coalition government comprised of eight political parties, the Maoists included. Nepal has also been declared a secular state, ending its centuries-long status as a Hindu Kingdom, and elections to a constituent assembly, originally scheduled for June 2007, have now been planned for November ("Dissolution of Parliament", 2006; "Interim government", 2006; Tripathi, 2007). As of May 2007, however, complications remain as to the incorporation of the Maoist Party into Nepal's new government, and the parties continue to be charged with

83 bickering and disunity ("Mahara for unity...", 2007; Satgainya, 2007). Despite the declaration of a new ceasefire, Maoist cadres also continue to be charged with arson, violence, the calling of strikes, and other militaristic activities (Panthi, 2007; "Maoist strike...", 2007; Subedi, 2007). There are, however, some signs of progress in terms of political stability. On July 2, 2006, Prime Minister Koirala sent a letter to the UN requesting it become involved in the process of decommissioning Maoist combatants, monitoring the human rights situation and the ceasefire, and observing the actions of the Maoists and the army ("Welcome UN", 2006). The involvement of the UN has been welcomed by the general public, and the Chief of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), Ian Martin, said in May, 2007 that the peace process was "firmly on track" despite the postponement of the election ("Peace process...", 2007). 5.3 Education & the Underlying Dynamics of the Maoist Revolt The rhetoric of Education for All and the expansion of schooling have engendered high expectations among Nepal's people. In their study concerning the diverse expectations held in regard to education in rural Nepal, Acharya et al. (2003) concluded that students and their parents hold an idealized image of education. Similar findings have been demonstrated by other researchers. As Carney (2003) and Doftori (2004) have both concluded, a majority of Nepalese people, particularly in rural areas and among marginalized populations, view schooling as an opportunity to be free from the restrictive socio-cultural traditions in which they find themselves. Unfortunately, the reality of public schooling in Nepal does not often warrant positive appraisals. The problems and inadequacies attributed to Nepal's modern education system are legion, and despite occasional inspirational success stories presented in the Nepalese media, the general outlook tends to be bleak. Commentators do not place blame for the failure of the system upon the government alone, however. One Nepalese scholar has argued that all stakeholders, including government, policy makers, teachers, the bureaucracy, and communities have let down Nepal's children (Rai, 2002). When people's expectations of the socio-economic benefits of schooling are juxtaposed against the poor quality of education in Nepal, its lack of relevance and tenuous association with productive employment, it is clear why the school system's failings are

84 often cited as an integral cause of the disillusionment attributed to Nepal's youth (Whelpton, 2005). Many of these youth, as noted above, have been provided an outlet for their frustration in the form of the Maoist movement, and the Maoists, in turn, have seized upon the grievances related to education, and exploited them for their own benefit. The myriad contributory factors underlying the Maoist insurgency, such as poor governance, poverty, discrimination, and disillusioned youth, are also issues of integral concern for Nepal's education system. Just as years of development endeavors have largely been unsuccessful in ameliorating the root causes of the conflict, the education system remains impoverished and widely criticized, successive reform initiatives notwithstanding. (These reform efforts will be discussed in Chapter 6). Dixit (2002) argues that Nepal's poor state of democracy and its long stagnant economy, both of which contributed to the development of the insurgency, are also reflective of Nepal's history of poor quality schooling. Some of the specific problems attributed to the education system of present-day Nepal, by Nepalese as well as foreign commentators and researchers, are described below. This is followed by a discussion of the Maoists' appropriation of education related issues as elements of their manifesto. 5.3.1 Critiques of Education in Modern Nepal Shortly after its election in 1991, the Nepali Congress government renewed Nepal's commitment to education, soon after the endorsement of the Jomtien Declaration on Education for All. (The Jomtien Declaration was written in 1990 at the World Conference on Education for All in Jomtien, Thailand, at which delegates from 155 countries and approximately 150 organizations determined to strive for universal primary education and greatly improved literacy by the end of the decade). The government's Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-97) accorded a high priority to basic and primary education, and set a goal for 90 percent of children aged 6-11 to be enrolled in primary school, while the subsequent Ninth Five Year Plan (1997-2002) established as its primary long-term objective the provision of equal educational opportunity for all segments of society (Doftori, 2004). Education in Nepal is officially free for children ages 6-12, yet it is not compulsory and Nepal's constitution does not contain a provision regarding the right to education (NHRC, 2003).

85 (The specific educational reform measures undertaken with international assistance will be discussed in Chapter 6). Due to the efforts of successive governmental and non-governmental campaigns over the past several decades to improve school accessibility, Nepal's enrollment rate has increased substantially. The government's most recent estimates (which are for 2004) indicate a net enrollment rate of 84.2 percent for primary school, and 32 percent for secondary school (MOES, 2004).26 UNESCO's most recent figures indicate 86 percent primary enrollment in 2005 (89 for boys and 82 for girls) (UNESCO, 2007). Despite ambitious goals and an "enormous" monetary investment in primary education (KJhaniya & Williams, 2004: 317), the school system continues to struggle with numerous weaknesses and has been much criticized by the Nepalese media. Many of the challenges facing Nepal's education system are shared with those of other Southern countries: poor retention rates, limited resources, lack of teacher motivation and training, socio-cultural and economic barriers to school attendance, geographical and rural/urban inequalities, and politicization. Access / Retention The past decade has seen improvements in school access and retention, yet figures in this area are somewhat contradictory, and challenges remain. Despite recent improvements in enrollment, Nepal's literacy rate remains only approximately 55 percent for women and 80 percent for men (MOHP, 2007). A more pressing current concern, therefore, is not lack of attendance but lack of completion. Official government records state the dropout rate to be less than 15 percent (MOES, 2004), while others estimate it as being far higher. According to Newar (2003), despite a great deal of investment in primary education, only around 40 percent of students who enroll in grade one are likely to finish primary school. The World Bank (2007b), however, lists Nepal's 2005 primary completion rate at 74.8 percent, which suggests a significant improvement since 1990 when just half (50.9 percent) of enrolled students finished primary school. Geographic and urban/rural disparities persist, particularly for secondary and tertiary education, with children in the far-west least likely to receive an education (MOHP, 2007).

The World Bank's estimate is lower: it indicates a primary net enrollment rate of 78 percent for 2004 (World Bank, 2006). 86 There remain many forces constraining primary school completion in Nepal, particularly among girls and other marginalized groups. One prevalent issue is poverty. Nepal's Ministry of Health and Population stated in a 2007 report that "educational attainment is directly related to the economic status of respondents", as wealthier families are more able to pay fees for school materials and uniforms, and are less likely to require children to engage in domestic or paid labour (MOHP, 2007: 37). Further issues such as caste taboos, gender discrimination, ethnic discrimination, unsupportive home environments, corporal punishment in schools, the poor quality of teaching and learning, and the lack of practical skills training in the curriculum, are commonly cited reasons for dropping out (Dhakal, 2005; Doftori, 2004; Acharya et al., 2003). A further issue, of course, has been the security risks associated with the insurgency, which will be discussed in section 5.4. The Issue of Quality & Relevance One of the most fundamental problems accorded to Nepal's education system is the assertion that it has tended to produce large quantities of graduates poorly prepared to meet the needs of Nepalese society (Dixit, S., 2002; Subedi, 1997; Whelpton, 2005). Hundreds of thousands of these diploma-holding yet allegedly under-qualified youth descend each year upon an employment market unable to absorb them, and are frustrated by the lack of available opportunities (Lai, 2003). As Wagley (2006) observes, teachers spend too little time actually teaching, the government offers students insignificant financial support, examinations test only rote memorization skills, and the education system has not sufficiently promoted reading. Wagley states that schooling in Nepal also tends to undermine the indigenous knowledge base and inherent possibilities for creativity among students. Others have decried the lack of productive class time available and the exam- oriented system (which will be described below), both of which tend to foster lecture-style teaching (Acharya et al., 2003). In a 2003 survey, students themselves identified the following as among the constraints contributing to a poor learning environment: irregular classes, scarcity of learning materials, crowded classrooms, low teacher motivation, teacher absenteeism, lack of textbooks, inappropriate pedagogy, and exam oriented teaching (Acharya et al., 2003).

87 Governance The Ministry of Education and Sports (MOES) is responsible for educational policies and planning, and administrative oversight of more than one hundred thousand teachers. Although its budget is supported by bilateral and multilateral donors, the educational administration is fraught with difficulties relating to technical capacities and resource allocations (Dixit, 2002; Carney, 2003). One common complaint concerning MOES is that it is highly centralized, with officials at the centre too often out of touch with the realities of life in the schools, and that local people have little input in educational decision-making (Dixit, S., 2002; Vaux et al., 2006). Decisions tend to be made at the centre and mandated in a top-down fashion, without democratic participation of teachers or school management committees. In early 2006, for example, MOES enacted additional regulations pertaining to the hiring of uncertified teachers. These regulations were unpopular with teachers' unions, and MOES was criticized for its continued assumption of unilateral control of the system (Kantipur Online, 2006, February 21). Hierarchical control is also exerted over the recruitment and promotion of teachers, a situation that often contributes to difficulties between a community and its school. Teachers appointed from Kathmandu are often not familiar with the cultures of villages to which they are appointed, and rarely feel a sense of fealty or accountability toward village residents. There is no formal system of rewards or incentives for teachers, and communities and teachers are often mistrustful of each other (Dixit, S., 2002; Acharya et al., 2003). Teaching as a career is accorded little prestige or remuneration, and tends to attract only those who are poorly educated or cannot find alternate employment (Dixit, S., 2002). Issues of funding also plague the education system. Despite large influxes of aid and large-scale reform initiatives, expenditures on the education sector are not sufficient to maintain a system of adequate quality (Rai, 2002). With the vast proportion of the educational budget allocated to teachers' salaries, funding shortages are felt acutely within public schools (Acharya et al., 2003). In such circumstances, the government's policy of "free education for all" is regarded by some critics as vacuous, because it avoids dealing with the reality that resource shortages are impairing education quality (Dixit, S., 2002).

88 Other criticisms of the government's management of the education system include its monopoly over all sector funding, its insufficient attention to the potential benefit of NGO involvement, particularly in remote regions and with marginalized populations, and its heavy focus on basic and primary education, without corresponding attention to the generally poor quality of higher education (Dhakal, 2005; Dixit, S., 2002). Caste & Ethnic Discrimination in the Education System Children from Nepal's ethnic minority populations and Dalit castes continue to be underrepresented in the education system. Table 1 delineates primary and secondary school attendance in 2003 disaggregated by caste or ethnic group as well as geographic location. Janajati refers to ethnic groups other than the historically dominant Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar; tarai refers to Nepal's southern plains, and hill to the geographic area between the tarai and the mountainous region. The capital Kathmandu is located in the hill region. Table 1: Percentages of Educational Attainment by Caste & Ethnicity, 2003 Group Never Grades 1-4 Grades 5-10 SLC and Attended Above Hill Brahmin / Chhetri 31.6 24.6 33.7 10.1 Tarai Brahmin / Chhetri 26.6 25.6 29.6 18.2 Tarai Middle Castes 56.8 22.0 17.4 3.8 Hill Dalits 43.3 31.9 23.1 1.7 Tarai Dalits 76.4 14.9 7.5 1.2 Newars 28.5 20.8 27.6 23.0 Hill Janajatis 44.6 27.2 25.2 3.0 Tarai Janajatis 47.2 24.1 24.2 3.0 Muslims 47.2 24.1 24.2 4.5 Nepal Total 44.0 24.7 24.6 6.7 Source: World Bank & DF1 D (2006). The figures above indicate that Nepal's traditional elite groups, the Brahmin, Chhetri, and Newar, continue to demonstrate the highest levels of educational attainment, while the historically marginalized Dalits (particularly in the tarai region where discrimination remains more prevalent than in the hills) demonstrate the lowest. USAID (2005) notes further that disadvantaged castes and ethnic groups comprise only 3.1 percent and 6.2 percent respectively of graduate level students, although they comprise approximately 60 percent of the total population (USAID, 2005).

89 King Mahendra's Civil Code of 1963 officially banned the practice of untouchability, or the conventional discrimination against Dalit populations. However, as Gersony (2003) points out, "Nepal is a country led in this regard more by social customs than by laws" (p. 31). Prejudice against Dalit children continues in schools, and hampers their access to and success in education. Discrimination manifests itself in various forms, including documented cases of physical and mental abuse by teachers, the provision of separate seating and other segregation of Dalit children, and denied access to school facilities (AHRC, 2004). The AHRC has also documented cases of "bans" imposed upon Dalit families by upper-caste villagers, including one in Bhagawatpur village where Dalits were prohibited from entering public institutions or sending their children to school (AHRC, 2004). The Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) has also documented a case in which Badi children (a sub-population of Dalits) were denied entry to schools in the city of Chainpur, and a case in Dhading district in which upper-caste groups attempted to close a Dalit school, even though the school had been sanctioned by the government, because they claimed that the school was creating problems for the village's education system (ACHR, 2005, May 20). Among ethnic activist groups, minority language use in schools has been a highly visible and vocalized issue.27 The Nepal Federation of Nationalities, which is a coalition of activists representing various ethnicities, as well as activists from Newari, Maithili, and other ethnic groups, began to campaign for language rights in the 1990s, demanding, for example, the provision of mother tongue primary education. The government initially denied this demand, yet some groups, such as the Newar activists, took action themselves and opened their own private schools. A Commission on Minority Languages in 1993 later recommended the introduction of mother-tongue or bilingual teaching in primary schools (Gellner, 1997; Gurung, 1997; Whelpton, 2005). In 1994, the election platforms of all three major parties included a provision regarding mother-tongue education, and some work on textbook translation was done, however few people were optimistic that the commission's recommendations would be implemented further (Whelpton, 1997).

Activists also campaigned to allow Newar and Maithili to be used as working languages in the government, however this was denied as being unconstitutional (Welpton, 2005). 90 Vaux et al. (2006) note, however, that many minority groups are in fact more concerned with issues such as overcrowding in schools than they are with access to mother tongue education. Language debates in the past decade have also shifted away from minority language rights and toward the increasing preference of English as opposed to Nepali education, a trend that has even led some government schools to start to use English (Vaux et al., 206; Gellner, 1997). Politicization Schools in Nepal have also become highly politicized, a trend which took shape during the Panchayat years, but gained further momentum following the re-introduction of multi-party democracy in 1990. According to Dixit (2002), the rampant government turnover since 1990, which saw twelve governments in as many years, brought a succession of education ministers who each filled the school system with party loyalists. Given Nepal's rugged landscape, and the remoteness and inaccessibility of many of its regions, it is not common for representatives of political parties to campaign in the far reaches of the country. Instead, politicians rely on civil servants, largely teachers, who are dispatched to these remote regions to provide partisan representation (Dixit, S., 2002). Partisan loyalty, however, does not correlate with teaching qualifications or ability and yet teachers are frequently chosen according to political credentials alone. B.K. Shrestha (2001) argues that the "mindless politicians... have totally politicized the teachers who basically represent the political parties in the villages far and near, move around as kingmakers and pay little attention to teaching" (p.20). Perhaps the most dramatic example of the interrelations between education and politics in Nepal is the institution of Tribhuvan University (TU) in Kathmandu, which has gained notoriety both for its poor quality of education and also its political activism. With each change of national government, key TU staff positions tend to be reassigned to individuals who have declared loyalty to the political party newly in power (B.K. Srestha, 2001). With the advent of the insurgency, the politicization and poor education quality of the university were exacerbated as demonstrations occurred virtually every day (Nepal News, 2006, January 13).

91 Private Schools & Two-Tiered Education Good quality private schooling has always greatly enhanced student prospects in Nepal, and throughout the country's history, students from well-off families have often been sent to India or elsewhere for this purpose (Whelpton, 2005). Nepal's own private sector proliferated in the 1990s, stimulated by numerous factors that included: the general liberalization of government policy, the global discourse of efficiency, choice, and minimizing state influence in education, the government's financial pressures, the low and deteriorating quality of public schools in Nepal, and over-emphasis on the School Leaving Certificate (SLC) (Carney, 2003). As noted earlier, while educational development in Nepal has been successful in terms of infrastructure construction, the increase in school quantity has not been matched by improved education quality. According to one estimate, the school construction and awareness-raising initiatives that began in 1991, and were supported by several multilateral and bilateral donors, helped to raise primary school enrollment by 70 percent within ten years (Newar, 2003, April). Nepalese people across the country have begun to demand access to education, yet the public system, particularly when faced with increased enrollment and inadequate financial resources, has been unable to provide all of these children with the type of education they and their parents demand. One result of this has been an exodus of children from better-off families from public to private schools. Quality education is available, but only for those who are able to pay (Newar, 2003, April; Whelpton, 2005). Because there has been no comprehensive government policy to guide the function of private schools, each has determined its own regulations, student fees, teacher salaries, and management systems, leading in many cases to exploitive practices and an education largely based upon SCL preparation (Doftori, 2004). Private schools are regularly charged with "over-commercialization", in that they have in large part placed profit over social responsibility (Rana, H., 2002, June). Rana (2003, January) argues similarly that private schools often have unethical policies for enrolments, exorbitant fees, and dubious extra charges.

92 While some private schools have aimed solely for profit, others have developed as high quality institutions, and today offer an education far superior to their public counterparts (Dixit, S., 2002). The student population of most private schools, particularly those with the best reputation, tends to emanate from a wealthier and elitist demographic compared to that of the average public school. This, in combination with the higher concentration of these schools in urban areas, reinforces Nepal's socio-economic and urban- rural divides (Dhakal, 2005; Rai, 2002, June). The fact that the majority of government employees and other elites send their own children to private schools reinforces the two-tier system. As Vaux et al. (2006) note, this trend has resulted in a situation in which none of those at the decision-making level have a direct personal stake in the quality of public schools, with deleterious consequences for the public system. The government has taken tentative steps towards regulation and reform of private schools, due in many cases to pressure from the Maoists. Some have argued, however, that these have amounted to little more than efforts to maximize tax extraction from the schools, and have been inappropriately restrictive (Rana, 2003; Dixit, 2003). As of December 2005, however, only 1,200 out of 8,500 private schools had been approved by the Department of Education (Kantipur Online, 2005, December 10). Despite the myriad criticisms leveled at private schools, the general consensus among commentators seems to be that the private sector is nonetheless necessary. Rana (2003) argues that for a poor country like Nepal, it is virtually impossible for the government to shoulder the entire cost of education. Further, as Dixit (2003) notes, it is only befitting a democracy that every citizen has the right to pursue a quality education for their children, commensurate with what they can afford. Whelpton (2005) argues that adding restrictions to private schools in the name of equality will only hurt the middle class as opposed to the true elites, because the wealthiest will still afford to send their children to Indian private schools. Rai (2002, June) also argues that such regulations would only be harmful, in that they might force the best schools in Nepal to close. The School Leaving Certificate No aspect of Nepalese education, aside from the vagaries associated with the insurgency, is profiled by Nepalese media and academics with such vitriol as is the current

93 system of School Leaving Certificate (SLC) examinations. Not only is the SLC often held by the media to be symbolic of the failure of the system as a whole, as represented by the repeatedly dismal student performance on the annual test, but the existence of the test itself is said to feed back upon the ruination of the system and perpetuate substandard education quality (Rana, H., 2002). The failure rate of the SLC is generally very high. In 2005, only 39 percent of the total examinees passed the test (Dhakal, 2005). Many schools have even been closed for scoring zero several years in a row (Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004). The high rate of SLC failure is blamed largely on the poor quality of public schooling in Nepal (Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004). The SLC is also employed to great effect by those seeking to illustrate the disparity between Nepal's public and private education systems. In 2005, for example, while only 29 percent of students from government schools passed, over 80 percent of those from private schools did (Dhakal, 2005). In addition to the sense of "hopelessness" this engenders in the public system, the vast disparity in SLC results between the public and private sectors has been used by the Maoists to justify their disruptions of the education system (Rai, 2002). A more unfortunate aspect of the SLC, however, is not so much the failure rate, but what the SLC signifies for the thousands of young students who take it each year. Out of every 1000 children in Nepal, 700 will enroll in grade one, only 70 will reach grade 10, and only 14 will pass the SLC (Lai, 2003). Regardless of these statistics, the SLC holds, in the words of one Nepali Times columnist, "mystic importance as the gate to future career options", given that securing a government job is impossible without passing the test (Lai, 2003). Perhaps worst of all, according to commentators, is the fact that the SLC is by no accounts a satisfactory measurement of educational achievement, as it is designed to test rote-memory skills. As Dixit (2002) argues, the SLC-focused school system prepares students to become low-level government workers and nothing else. The SLC not only encourages schools to teach to the test, but also has "created a culture where people fail to take their work seriously, as the evaluation is not based on the work done or the capacity to do work" (S. Dixit, 2002: 202).

94 5.3.2 The Maoists & Education: Ideology & Strategy Put the paper and pencil in the bag, and target the palace with the gun. Maoist slogan (Nepal, 2005). The relationship of education with the conflict has by all accounts been multifaceted. Not only have the insurgents inflicted various types of damage upon the system, but the Maoists have exploited the system's faults as justification for their rebellion, and education has functioned as a convenient symbol upon which they have been able to project their disdain for the state and the monarchy. 5.3.2 (a) Maoist Agitation against Private Schools The Maoists' most clearly articulated grievance with education in Nepal is the presence of the flourishing and, from their perspective, elitist, exploitive and vastly over- commercialized private school system, and its contrast in terms of quality with the rather dilapidated government public system. According to Pradeep Oli, Maoist student leader of the All Nepal National Independent Free Student Union-Revolutionary (ANNIFSU-R), his group's destructive actions have been motivated by the fact that Nepal's education system is "rotten to the core" and needs to be completely destroyed, and then rebuilt anew (Rijal, 2003, July 18-24). The ANNIFSU-R insists that education is the responsibility of the government to provide, that private schools must be closed, and all government schools be made free (Smith & Vaux, 2003; Sharma & Khadka, 2003). The abolition of Nepal's 8,500 private schools is one of the forty demands that Babburam Bhattarai presented to the government in February 1996 at the start of the insurgency (ACHR, 2005, May 12c). By the end of 2000, it was estimated that 90 percent of private schools in the Kathmandu Valley were being forced to pay "taxes" to the Maoists in order to remain open (Whelpton, 2005). Agitation against private schools has largely been carried out by the ANNIFSU-R in ostensible protest of the commercialism of education, but also to press various demands such as the release of Maoists detained by the security forces. Hundreds of private schools have been reportedly shut down, bombed, locked, or otherwise interfered with. The worst hit have been those in rural areas, particularly in Maoist strongholds. Some private schools in district headquarters or urban areas have come under attack as well, but have for the most part continued to function. In the Maoist-controlled mid-western region, for example, over

95 80 percent of private schools have reportedly been damaged. The state has had little capacity to intervene. Instead, principals have been calling on parents and civil society to exert pressure on the conflicting parties to allow the schools to function, and to create international awareness of the state of politicization of Nepal's schools ("Nepali kids...",

2005, April 19). As discussed above, criticisms of private schools abound, and some of the Maoists' arguments are justified. Commentators such as Lai (2002), Whelpton (2005) and Nepal (2005) however, have taken a more cynical view of the Maoists' anti-commercialization campaign. Lai notes, for example, that action against private schools has only served to alienate the middle class, and will in no way serve to establish an egalitarian education system in Nepal. The most wealthy and elite groups have not been affected by the Maoists' educational campaigns any more than by the government's regulations regarding private schools, as they are able to send their children abroad. Lai argues that the Maoists' actions concerning private schools have been motivated merely by power politics, and have little to do with the improvement of education.

5.3.2 (b) Maoist Ideology vis-a-vis Public Schooling In line with their philosophy to tear down the old regime, the Maoists have also made statements emphasizing the need to a recreate the public education system, and that this comprises an integral element of their "people's war". The Maoists' theoretical objective in regard to education, according to Nepal (2005) is to inculcate a rejection of some or all aspects of the government system, which they call "bourgeois, unscientific, and impractical", through intimidation of teachers, students, and parents, and replace some or all of this system with initiatives of their own (p. 12). One member of the student wing of the Maoists has justified the party's approach to education by arguing that education is itself a political concept, and that the Maoists' educational theory, founded on the communist credo that "the unit is the strength and education is one of the main units", is instrumental for the Maoists' defeat of the old regime (Nepal, 2005: 14). The Maoists' educational rhetoric illustrates the dynamic in Nepal between socio­ political conflict and education. The Maoists' Department of Education regional coordinator, Meghraj Gyawali Bhasker, has stated: "The liberation of the people from

96 slavery shall be the main purpose of our education policy. The policy must help to restore human integrity and self respect" (Nepal, 2005: 14). Education's historical role in Nepal in the recreation of discriminatory social norms has, for the Maoists, served as a symbol for the elitism of the government and the autocracy of the Nepalese monarchy. In a Nepali Times article from August, 2005, a teacher undergoing training through the Maoist-affiliated All Nepal Teachers' Association in Rukum stated that the "old education is fatalistic, it glorifies the kings and the knowledge it provides is just good enough to become clerks" (Shahi, 2005, Aug 19-25). In accord with this position, aside from the focus on military training, the Maoist curriculum has also emphasized vocational training such as agriculture and carpentry, health education, and the need to assist the poor and underprivileged. When asked whether they perceived a contradiction between the Maoists' violent tactics and community-based education, the teachers insisted that they themselves were neither Maoists nor terrorists; they were only teachers who had been forced underground because the government ignored their demands to improve the education system (Shahi, 2005, Aug 19-25). Some particular changes seem to have been enforced in many regions throughout the country, wherever the Maoists have had influence. In early 2005, for example, the Maoists began a campaign to tear out portraits of the monarchy from textbooks. They also canceled official school holidays, which are largely connected with the royal family and religion, and incorporated their own holidays such as "People's War Day", and the "Foundation Day of the ". National flags were also replaced with flags of the ethnic "autonomous regions". As with the actions against private schools, these types of policies have been enforced by the Maoists' radical student group, the ANNIFSU-R ("Education vs education", 2005). The Maoists have also created their own Janavadi Sikchhaya, the "people's curriculum", and planned the establishment of full-scale Maoist schools. Some commentators, including Sharma and Khadka (2003), write that the rebels have harassed school officials to cease the standard government curriculum and replace it with their Maoist material, and that students and teachers who protest have been threatened or killed. The Maoists' ultimate goal seems to be the establishment of special schools for the purpose of

97 instilling Maoist doctrine; these are known as KAJO (Kalikot-Jumla) schools, the first of which, a mobile school, was founded in Kalikot district in 2005. The main subjects taught at the school are supposedly "Introduction to the People's War", "Communist Philosophy", "Scientific ", and "Books on Revolution". The Maoists claim that such KAJO schools have been introduced in Jumla, Kalikot, Bajura and Mugu (Nepal, 2005). An outline of the "people's curriculum", as published by the Maoists' education department, is provided in Appendix 5. 5.3.2 (c) Critiques of Maoist Educational Initiatives As with many of the Maoists' activities, reports of their strategies and intentions in regard to education, as well as the actual geographical distribution and comprehensiveness of their interference with public schools, lack consistency. Whether this is due to differences of opinion or biases on the part of commentators, or a lack of ideological cohesiveness among the Maoist leadership, is unclear. In contrast to Maoist claims regarding their educational initiatives, some scholars insist that Maoist education programs have rarely been implemented, if at all (Vaux et al., 2006), and that these programs are in any case quite rudimentary (Nepal, 2005). Vaux et al. (2006) state that it is unlikely that the Maoists have actually developed a comprehensive curriculum, let alone successfully established their KAJO schools, as there is little evidence of the implementation of these institutions. While the Maoists have published training schedules for primary school children and others, Vaux et al. suggest that these are not intended to comprise full substitutes for standard education. They perceive that the Maoists have not been particularly aggressive in imposing any curriculum of their own, and reason that this is perhaps because they find the government program, as it has recently been reformed under the Education for All agenda (discussed in Chapter 6), acceptable. Other writers suggest that the Maoists have in fact implemented some educational projects, but that their intentions in this regard are highly suspect. As Sangroula (2004) argues, it is impossible that any education of value could be imposed by the threat of violence. Maoist education has nothing to do with free will or the aspirations of the students, he states, and thus the Maoists' insistence upon teaching "compassion, knowledge and dignity" is ridiculous. A study conducted by Nepal (2005) in Jumla and Kalikot, for

98 example, found that the Maoist system was not living up to its professed goals, and that parents in these regions were justifiably frustrated. Even in the Maoists' stronghold area of Rolpa, where they seem to have had, at least at one time, full control of the education system, many people were so unhappy with the situation that the majority of children and teenagers fled the district (Nepal, 2005). Nepal notes as well that another reason the Maoists have been so intent upon educational reform is to clear the way for the enforced indoctrination of students with their own ideology, a practice incompatible with the notion of "liberation". Despite whatever educational initiatives the Maoists have managed to implement, therefore, and the degree to which their agitation has highlighted issues pertaining to educational quality in Nepal, the general consensus among commentators is that the overall effect of the Maoists' interference in education has been far more destructive than useful. Some of the negative impacts the conflict has entailed for the education system will be discussed in the following section. 5.4 Effects of the Maoist Insurgency on Education in Nepal Information pertaining to the effects of the insurgency on education was obtained from documents, and also from interviews with INGO representatives. 5.4.1 Effects of the Insurgency on the Education System: Document Analysis Despite attempts by INGOs and other organizations to declare schools "zones of peace", they have in fact been negatively impacted by the conflict, and education has been used as a pawn in a political game between rival ideologies. While the extent of the damage done to education in Nepal as a result of the insurgency is difficult to gauge, and perhaps will not be evident in its entirety for some time, certain effects have been clearly and repeatedly articulated by numerous observers. These include: the abduction of children either for recruitment or indoctrination, violence against teachers, combat on school premises, taxation of teachers' salaries, interference with school curricula and functioning, and school closure (Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004). Parents, students and teachers have been caught between the violence and threats of the Maoists and the security forces, the disruption by student unions, and the lack of response by district education officials (Rijal, 2003, July 18-24).

99 The frequency of violent incidents and the extent of infrastructure damage done to the education system are portrayed in different ways from source to source. According to Gersony (2003), reports of school destruction have been greatly overstated, and the worst effects have been the threats and harassment leveled at private schools. He states that at the time of his 2003 study only a few government schools had been damaged, and that schools do not appear to have been particularly targeted. Nonetheless, the sheer number of reports of school-ground violence issued by human rights organizations and the Nepalese media indicate that a significant degree of damage has been done (e.g. Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004; Rijal, R.H., 2004; Rijal, S., 2005; Sangroula, 2004). Nepalese and other Asian human rights groups reported many incidents of school bombings and other destructive activities by both the Maoists and the security forces. The ACHR, for example, recorded 23 school attacks by Maoists alone between February 1 and May 9, 2005, which resulted in a great deal of destruction and injury (ACHR, 2005, May 12c). The majority of these incidents involved private schools. Some human rights organizations, such as the ACHR (2005, May 12c), have claimed that the education system had virtually collapsed in the 75 percent of the country controlled by the Maoists at the time of writing. The ACHR even asserted that as of 2005 two systems were functioning: the government schools and the Maoist schools, known as Janabadi Sikshya (people's education). Much has also written about the abduction of school children from their classrooms at the hands of the Maoists, and the numbers of such cases have often been listed in the thousands (OHCHR, 2006). Pradhan and Tuladhar (2004), for example, state that between January and June of 2004 alone, almost 7000 children were taken. In the majority of cases, these students were said to have been forced by the Maoists to leave their schools in groups to attend indoctrination programs, and were released unharmed when the programs were over. Other students have apparently been ordered to form Maoist student unions, or to travel briefly to other districts to join in student meetings (Gersony, 2003). The effects of the conflict on teachers are also somewhat difficult to ascertain. Teachers are often the target of particular violence in conflicts, as they may be considered the representatives of a government whose authority is contested by a rebel group (Smith &

100 Vaux, 2003). In Nepal, however, the reports regarding teachers vary greatly. Teachers have supposedly been deemed "enemies of the people" by the Maoists, and there are reports of gruesome acts of violence being meted out on teachers by the rebels. There are numerous cases of teachers being abducted, or even pulled from their classrooms and shot, or having their hands chopped off for being suspected government loyalists (e.g. Douglas, 2005; Thapa & Sijapati, 2003; ACHR, 2005, May 12c). In many instances the Maoists have regarded students and teachers as integral elements of their cause, both in ideological terms and also as labour: many have been conscripted to dig bunkers and trenches around their schools. Teachers have also been required to ask permission to travel outside their villages, have been forced to pay a 5-10 percent tax on their salaries, and their personal property has sometimes been confiscated. The Maoists also began insisting in 2004 that their "people's education" be included in the national curriculum, and that the new teachers be trained in it before being placed. In June of 2004, over 60 teachers in one district were reportedly abducted by the Maoists for training in their curriculum, and their schools were shut down indefinitely (ACHR, 2005, May 12c). Many teachers have also been arrested by the security forces, in particular during the state of emergency in 2001-2002, and several of them were kept in confinement for years (Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004). According to Dhakal (2005, June 24) there were 30,000 government teaching posts left vacant as of 2005. According to other accounts, however, the effect of the conflict on teachers has merely been reflective of the treatment meted out upon Maoist opponents throughout the community (Gersony, 2003). Gautam (2001) also notes that while a few individual teachers were targeted and fled, most have continued on in their villages. Vaux et al. (2006) similarly argue that, in contradiction to the vast majority of reports, teachers in general have not been seen as symbols of state power, and only those with a past political affiliation or who committed a specific act of malpractice have been particularly targeted. According to teachers themselves, the conflict has engendered a great deal of fear and frustration in attempting to continue their jobs, and some argue that it will take decades to restore what has been destroyed in the education sector (Douglas, 2005; "Nepal: Decades of damage", 2006).

101 The displacement of students has also had a noticeable effect on the education system, particularly in the more remote, conflict-affected regions of the country. Fear of recruitment has induced many students to leave their villages and attend schools in district headquarters, leading to overcrowding in urban schools (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003; ACHR, 2005, May 12c). Many displaced children have been left without any access to education, as the small stipend offered by the government to these students is not enough to cover fees. Pradhan and Tuladhar (2004) note that many displaced children will also require counseling and medical attention to alleviate the effects of past trauma, before being able to return to school. Some children have received medical and financial help from NGOs, or have been able to obtain permission from school principals to attend on scholarship (Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004). The effect of migration has naturally been easier on students from wealthier families, many of whom have been sent to private schools in India or in the larger urban areas ("Nepali kids", 2005).

Although the extent of damage the conflict has inflicted upon Nepal's educational infrastructure, and the degree to which the Maoists have been able to implement their "people's education", are quite unclear, the statements made by the Maoists and the ANNIFSU-R in regard to education, in combination with the critiques made by mainstream education commentators, are indicative of the linkages between education and social grievance in Nepal. The many roles education has played in the conflict as well as the increased visibility accorded to its shortcomings have brought the need for substantive and appropriate educational reform, already a heated topic in Nepal, into even more acute and urgent focus. 5.4.2 Effects of the Insurgency on the Education System: Interviews with INGO Representatives The INGO representatives noted that the education sector in Nepal has been weakened by many factors over the course of the insurgency, including: the general instability of the country, the migration of teachers and students out of conflict-affected regions, the fact that the "survival instinct" tended to trump the completion of one's education, infrastructure destruction, and the loss of the funds and attention needed from the government to re-build or rehabilitate schools. There has been a huge migration of young people, especially boys, out of villages to work in Kathmandu or other countries in order to escape the conflict, and the INGO representatives considered the chance these youth would have to access education in the cities to be quite low, particularly if they are poor. The representative from INGO A noted that schools in villages have been in "bad shape", and have faced "problems of strike and rumor of the abductions and kidnapping" (Personal Interview, 2005, October 20). While one representative mentioned that she had directly witnessed the deleterious affects of school strikes, destruction of schools by Maoists or government troops, forced recruitment of students into Maoist activities, extortion of teachers' wages, and student drop out due to the conflict, the others stated that they had heard about such occurrences, but had not witnessed them in their respective working areas. The representative for INGO A stated for example that in one of their working areas, Rasuwa/Nuwakot district, "some students were forcibly recruited into Maoists activities. Similarly, in current working area of Shindhupalchock and Shankhuwasava District also children are taken for the training. But no such forced recruitment in valley areas (sic)" (Personal Interview, 2005, October 20). None of the INGO representatives had direct knowledge of whether or not the Maoists had instituted their own system of education. The Nepalese media representative I interviewed, however, stated that 75 percent of schools had been destroyed (as did the documents mentioned above) and that if any schools were in fact running in these areas, they were doing so according to Maoist principles (Personal Interview, 2006, January 15). The INGO representatives suggested that schools were facing problems akin to the rest of society, and were in turn being affected by the impact the conflict had had on people generally. As the representative of INGO A stated, "the political trauma of war has mentally crippled the villagers" (Personal Interview, 2005, October 20). Accordingly, the education- related projects of the INGOs were affected by the conflict, but only in similar proportion to other activities. All four INGO representatives stressed the importance of schools for the welfare of Nepalese communities. The representative for INGO A stated, for example, that "without education development of [a] new society is not possible and thus the maintaining of education is always necessary" (Personal Interview, 2005, October 20). The representative

103 of INGO C stated that education was the most important part of the community, and a "top most priority" during the conflict, and that community members and local administration needed to work together to maintain it (Personal Interview, 2005, November 2). 5.5 Conclusion: Cause-Effect Dynamics between Education & Conflict in Nepal As discussed in Chapter 2, education is not generally a direct cause of violent conflict, but its characteristics can facilitate the grievances underlying conflict. This has been true in Nepal for generations, but has manifest in particularly acute form during the Maoist insurgency. Many of the interwoven and contentious factors within Nepalese society that eventually precipitated as the emergence of the Maoists and the escalation of their "people's war" are unmistakably evident in the education sector, including elite dominance, discrimination, poverty, rural-urban disparities, and poor governance. By citing education as a cause of their revolt, using it to symbolize general government ineptitude and authoritarianism, and by themselves attempting to exploit the education system to serve their own agenda, the Maoists have served to further entrench, in a particularly severe and unfortunate fashion, the role of education as a platform for socio-political conflict in Nepal. Reports regarding the dynamics between the conflict and Nepal's education system have been diverse among different stakeholder groups, in accordance with the uncertainties pervading reports of the insurgency in general, yet it is clear that the shortcomings of the education sector have provided the Maoists with significant and valid rhetorical ammunition in their struggle against the state. Further, the conflict has unquestionably interfered with the functioning of this already weak system, and in doing so has drawn greater attention across Nepalese society to the perilous state of schools in their country. The literature concerning education and conflict notes that one way an inappropriate education system may contribute to conflict is through the creation of a population of educated but unemployed, disillusioned youth. In Nepal, while the disillusionment engendered by poor quality and discriminatory education has been a contributory factor to social unrest on a small scale in the past, as discussed in Chapter 4, the rise of the Maoists has brought this dynamic to an entirely new level. The Maoists have provided many frustrated youth with an opportunity to earn a livelihood, and also express their anger at a state that has proven itself unable to bring development benefits to Nepal's impoverished

104 population. In doing so, these youth have, consciously or not, contributed to the escalation of a conflict with grave impacts on their society. As discussed in Chapter 4, hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces have long been evident in Nepal's education sector, and this dynamic has also been amplified by the Maoists. While schools have served as venues of surreptitious resistance in the past, such as through the use of student political groups as covert mechanisms of oppositional politics during the Panchayat years, the Maoists have brought this dynamic to dramatic fruition. The Maoists have explicated the hegemonic nature of education in Nepal by incorporating their conviction that the education system has served as a vehicle for discrimination and autocratic control into their 40-Point Agenda, which they presented to Prime Minister Deuba at the initiation of their insurgency in 1996. Schools, in turn, have become an integral element of the rebels' counter-hegemonic struggle. Maoist leaders have campaigned schools for recruits, demanded changes to the curriculum and functioning of individual schools to purge them of references to the government and monarchy, and threatened to destroy the entire system and recreate it along Maoist lines. As noted in Chapter 2, the education system is a convenient tool for the transmission of the values and ideals of those with the power to exploit it, a fact long recognized by the Nepalese government, and in recent times by the Maoist leaders as well. The poor state of Nepal's education system is reflective of the conditions within the country as a whole, and of the inability of its rulers to implement truly sustainable reforms of benefit to the majority or achieve healthy progress in development endeavors. A large portion of the blame for education's faults in Nepal, and indeed for Nepal's entrenched poverty as well, has been placed upon the inappropriate use of foreign aid and the influence of external development models. In education, foreign involvement in education has led to the establishment of a formal education system quite ill-suited to the country's socio­ economic context, as evidenced by the profound difficulties faced by the system today. As pointed out in Chapter 2, Nepal shares this condition with numerous poor countries whose leaders believed the promises, which soon proved untenable, that conventional formal education would bring economic growth and social stability.

105 Both this and the previous chapter made note of the fact that neither the Nepalese government nor the Maoists have related to education merely as a benign force for socio­ economic welfare, but rather as a tool, respectively, of hegemony and counter-hegemonic struggle. This view of education is in contrast to the prevailing notion of education that has been espoused by Nepal's donors. One reason education in Nepal has remained stubbornly resistant to decades of foreign-assisted reform endeavors is that these initiatives, and the donors that have funded them, have been unwilling or unable to confront the contentious nature of education or the socio-political power structures with which it is embedded, features that the Maoist insurgency has further highlighted. The development of the education system in Nepal, as well as the social, political, and cultural context in which it has arisen, will be discussed in the following chapter.

106 Chapter 6: Foreign Aid & Education in Nepal Prior to the Insurgency Observers and analysts... think that one of the main reasons for the ongoing conflict is foreign intervention. Powerful countries and organizations backed by them have been directly or indirectly influencing national policies relating to development, security and governance of the country (Pradhan, 2006). The previous two chapters discussed the development of education in Nepal, and specifically the relationship of education with conflict in Nepalese society. Education has contributed to socio-political conflict in Nepal, both throughout history but with particular acuteness during the Maoist conflict, in two primary ways. First, the poor quality of education, its contextual inappropriateness, social divisiveness, and the engenderment of false hopes deriving from these inadequacies, have been a source of grievance underlying socio-political resistance.28 The disillusionment arising from the dichotomy between the promise, propounded by the government and aid agencies, that education would bring employment and upward mobility, versus the reality of the Nepalese context, has created a pool of disenchanted youth who have been willing to join the Maoists. Second, distinct from the conventional view of education as a benign force for individual and social progress, education in Nepal has always been stridently political, and has served as a ground for hegemonic and counter-hegemonic struggle. This dynamic has also been greatly amplified by the Maoists, as they have appropriated education as a symbol of government malfeasance. The following chapter focuses upon the role of Nepal's donors in this dynamic, and thus addresses the second research question of this study, i.e., the impact of foreign assistance upon educational development in Nepal. In doing so, it is necessary to examine the situation of education within its broader social context. The relationship of development with social conflict in Nepal has not been limited to the education sector alone, and criticisms such as those pertaining to poor governance and undue foreign influence span many segments of society. Donor agencies have long played an integral role in many sectors of Nepalese society, sometimes positive and sometimes criticized, and their activities today

28 This point is made by numerous writers, including Whelpton, (2005), Subedi (1997), Caddell (2005), Carney (2003), S. Dixit (2002), Khaniya and Williams (2004), N. Newar (2003), Pradhan and Tuladhar (2004) and H. Rai (2002). 107 are informed by several decades of development history. This chapter will first discuss Nepal's overall development, including the rationale, extent and critiques of foreign aid, Nepal's development plans, the influence of global trends and foreign influence, and development outcomes. This is followed by a discussion of educational development and foreign assistance to education in Nepal. 6.1 Historical Overview of Aid to Nepal Planned development began in Nepal in 1951. Given the country's many development constraints, or perhaps in spite of them, the government eagerly sought foreign assistance from the very beginning. Nepal, Khadka (1991) writes, lacked everything except land, people, and forests. Internal revenue was barely sufficient to maintain basic government expenditure, and there was a dearth of technology and skilled workers, thus any development initiative was necessarily contingent upon foreign assistance (USAID, 2005a; Poudel, 1991). Fortunately for Nepal's leaders at the time, their ambitions aligned nicely with the political interests of competitive neighbours India and China, which were both eager to enter into trade partnerships with Nepal, as well as the interests of the United States, which was determined to exert its own influence in order to thwart the spread of communism to developing countries (Khadka, 1991). Aid has contributed substantially to the implementation of nearly all of Nepal's major public sector development projects (ADB, 2004). Nepal's First Five Year Plan (1956-1961) relied on foreign aid for 100 percent of development expenditures. Subsequent plans have also been financed to a substantial extent by foreign funds, regularly constituting more than half of the government's development budget, but averaging 48 percent of total expenditures from 1975-1990 (peaking at 80 percent in the late 1980s), and 49 percent during 1999-2004 (World Bank, 1989; Whelpton, 2005). While some have stated that Nepal has received a high level of aid in comparison with other developing countries, particularly those in South Asia (ADB, 2004; Whelpton, 2005), others have suggested that Nepal's total share of development aid has actually been insufficient (Poudel, 1991; Khadka, 1991). Nepal's leaders in the 1950s welcomed foreign aid rather indiscriminately, and expected that aid would continue and increase (Khadka, 1991). This tendency, combined

108 with the low rate of financial return, the failure of many projects (as a result of numerous factors including logistical, labour, and bureaucratic constraints, as well as poor planning), and the increasing proportion of aid received as loans as opposed to grants, resulted in a rapid generation of aid dependency (Khadka, 1991; Whelpton, 2005; World Bank, 1989; ADB, 2004; USAID, 2005a). The imperative for the government to follow international trends also increased, regardless of their contextual appropriateness in Nepal, and further aid was continually required even to maintain the current level of capacity (Khadka, 1991). Nepal's dependence on aid continues today as well. The ADB (2004) recently predicted that because of its many development needs, low income levels, limited domestic tax base, limited private sector, and the present-day security situation, Nepal would continue to need a substantial degree of external assistance in the years to come. 6.2 Shifting Trends & Five-Year Plans: Mixed Results As the years have passed, Nepal has received assistance in increasing volume and diversity, charting a course determined in large measure by the shifting fashions and philosophies of the international development community, as well as the priorities of its donors. A broad outline of these trends is provided below, followed by an overview of the results of Nepal's developmental endeavors. (Detailed accounts of Nepal's development progress are provided by Khadka (1991), Poudel (1991), and the World Bank (1989 & 2003)). 6.2.1 Development Trends in Nepal 6.2.1 (a) Growth Maximization: 1950s-1960s The strategies under which most countries provided aid in the 1950s were based upon an assumption that aid was critical in order to spur an economy such as Nepal's into growth. In the 1950s and 1960s, Rostow's "take-off theory stated that foreign aid would facilitate development provided certain preconditions were met, and that initial investment should be channeled into social overheads. In Nepal, this translated into the pursuit of infrastructural development projects, particularly road construction, power, irrigation facilities and village development schemes (Poudel, 1991). The government's development goals for this era were explicated in Nepal's first Five-Year Plan (1956-61).

109 Questions began to arise in the global community, however, regarding the effectiveness of aid and contemporary aid policies. One of the most obvious negative effects of foreign aid in many countries, including Nepal, was the exacerbation of social inequality between urban and rural areas and between the rich and poor. The "trickle-down" effect, by which aid was expected to flow from the modern sectors of the economy to the traditional sectors (in which the majority of the population was active), did not occur as expected. Other concerns that began to be voiced during the 1950s and 1960s included the employment of expensive expatriate technical experts to assist with project implementation, as well as the financial difficulties the large capital-intensive initiatives entailed for Southern governments (Khadka, 1991). 6.2.1 (b) Rural Development: 1970s As the increasing social and economic inequalities engendered by an urban-focused, growth maximization development strategy made themselves known, development economists and aid institutions of the 1970s began to reorient their theories in favor of rural development and poverty alleviation (Poudel, 1991). In Nepal, this change was reflected in the popularity, among donors, for integrated rural development projects (IRDPs), which attempted to develop various sectors simultaneously, such as education, agriculture, irrigation, forestry, and health, under the auspices of a single initiative (Khadka, 1991). Whelpton (2005) notes, however, that many of these projects were not appropriately planned,29 and IRDPs also tended to exacerbate economic inequalities between the richer and poorer farmers. These initiatives did not in the end bring about a general rise in living standards (World Bank, 1989). 6.2.1 (c) Basic Needs: 1980s The high priority given during the first decades of development to sectors such as transportation and communication meant that only a limited amount of foreign aid was channeled to the social sectors. However, the growing problems in these sectors led the government to change its priorities with the formulation of the Sixth Plan (1980-1985), and increase the share of funds to education, health, drinking water, as well as agriculture

29 Many roads were constructed, for example, despite unaffordable maintenance costs and indications that roads alone were unlikely to improve agricultural output nor offer significant economic benefits (Whelpton, 2005). 110 (Khadka, 1991). This shift in emphasis towards the social sectors was in line with the global focus on "basic needs" popular at the time.30 Despite modest improvements, literacy and health indicators remained poor overall, and the World Bank (1989) noted that the education and health sectors were both beginning to "show signs of institutional stress" from their period of rapid growth (p. 7). According to Whelpton (2005), the initiatives in the Sixth and Seventh Plans did not significantly lessen the incidence of poverty in Nepal. This was due to a combination of overly broad objectives and poor project design, as well as the appropriation of village level benefits by the local elite, and the resistance toward inter-caste cooperation at the local level. The 1980s also witnessed the emergence of socially conservative governments in several powerful donor countries, and thus a return towards strategies of neo-liberal market- led growth. Donors encouraged reforms centering on privatization, decentralization of state- controlled institutions, and new fiscal policies (Fowler, 2000). Khadka (1991) argues that these structural adjustment strategies were encouraged as "the only solution" despite the fact that several Southern countries did not possess the institutional or economic capacities needed to make such endeavors viable (p. 87). Nonetheless, at the behest of the World Bank, as part of its Seventh Plan the Nepalese government undertook a structural-adjustment program that included measures such as decentralization, minimization of state control, and improving bureaucratic efficiency. Local authorities were to be given some power to design and implement certain types of development projects such as drinking water, roads and irrigation. However, the power structures at local level remained intact (Khadka, 1991). Hollants Van Loocke and Philipson (2002) state that the failure of development programs to transform local level power relations in Nepal is explained by a combination of age-old feudal ties, the perpetuation of class divisions, and a lack of measures for accountability, which led to a trend among politicians to exploit the powers of government for the benefit of themselves and their relations (Hollants Van Loocke & Philipson, 2002).

The "basic needs" approach, which suggested targeting the poor as opposed to overall growth, was introduced at the International Labour Organization conference in 1976. The trend was officially appropriated in Nepal in 1987, following a 1985 speech by King Birendra in which he declared that Nepal would be brought to a standard of living "in accordance with Asian standards" by 2000 (Whelpton, 2005: 127), and named six basic needs that were to be met: food, clothing, shelter, health, education, and security (World Bank, 1989).

Ill The fact that Nepal's government has historically been composed virtually exclusively of members of the wealthier elite has often been associated with their apparent inability to understand, or even attempt to understand, the needs of the majority. Policies and goals also tended to be unrealistic, and not take into sufficient account the limited resources of the government, or potential implementation constraints such as insufficient local funds or delayed shipments of foreign goods (Khadka, 1991; Subedi, 1997). 6.2.1 (d) The 1990s In Nepal, the 1990s corresponded with a move towards democracy, the development goals related to which were articulated in its Eighth Five-Year Plan (1992-1996). This plan set out three major objectives: sustainable economic development, poverty reduction, and reduction of regional disparities (JICA, 2003). Assessments of the Eighth plan reveal mixed outcomes: some industries, such as transport, communications, finance, and the social services expanded, yet the agriculture and forestry sectors, so critical to Nepal's economy, performed far below the targets set by the plan (JICA, 2003). In 1990, the government also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, following which a national plan of action was formulated addressing issues of child health, nutrition, and education (Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004). 6.2.1 (e) The Tenth Plan & Other Recent Initiatives According to Aditya (2001), by the year 2000 the development trends in Nepal had shifted from traditional discrete and fragmented donor-implemented initiatives, which tended to lead to unsustainable projects with limited national ownership, towards more "integrated, long-term, holistic, and multilateral" approaches (p. 162). This was a reflection of the concurrent global movement towards geographically concentrated or sector-wide approaches to aid, resulting from the increased pressure on development agencies to demonstrate tangible results (Fowler, 2000).31 Nepal's government also responded to the development of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000 (see Appendix 6) with its own series of targets (Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004). According to the UNDP, although Nepal is making good progress toward meeting some of the goals, such as the reduction of poverty

Globally, the 1990s also witnessed a reduction in the amount of foreign aid provided by Northern countries According to Fowler (2000), aid dropped by approximately 21 percent in real terms between 1991 and 1998. 112 and child mortality, it is unlikely that the target for universal public education by 2015 will be met (UNDP, 2005c). The government's most recent development emphases and initiatives are explicated in the Tenth Five Year Plan (2003-2007), which was followed by a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). In education, the plan's goals involve improved access to and quality of primary education, as well as an improved availability of secondary, vocational/technical, and tertiary education, in the effort to improve Nepal's human resource base. Scholarship programs have been planned for poor women, Dalits and other marginalized populations (ADB, 2004). While some commentators (e.g. Shakya, 2002) allege that the Tenth Plan merely continues Nepal's trend of unrealistic goal setting, the majority of Nepal's donors (i.e., those cited in Chapter 7) have expressed overall support for the government's latest strategy.32 6.2.2 Development Outcomes Some development progress, albeit limited to certain sectors, has been made since Nepal began the process of modernization over five decades ago. Improvements have included dramatic achievements in the infrastructure sector, particularly the road network, a proliferation of communication networks, and some success in industries such as garment and carpet manufacture, and tourism (USAID, 2005a; Khadka, 1991; Whelpton, 2005). Successes have also been seen in the health sector, in terms of increased access to basic health care, and steady progress in various health indicators.33 A large amount of educational infrastructure has also been constructed, and the number of schools, students and teachers has expanded remarkably in the years after 1950. By 1989-90 there were over half a million students enrolled in higher secondary or tertiary education compared with less than 2000 in 1950. Around 3 million were now in primary

32 See ADB (2004), JICA (2003), Pradhan and Tuladhar (2004), and World Bank (2005a) for examples of other initiatives and reform measures recently undertaken by Nepal's government, including measures to ameliorate donor coordination, government accountability, and children's rights, and reduce child labour and trafficking. 33 Between 1990 and 2002, the number of health workers tripled, the prevalence of underweight children under 5 years of age was reduced, life expectancy rose from 54 to 60 years, infant mortality fell from 102 to 66 per 1,000 live births, maternal mortality declined from 850 to 540 per 100,000 births, and the share of the population with access to drinking water increased from 66 to 72 percent. Since 1985, the fertility rate has been gradually declining and the proportion of the population using birth control has increased to 39% (ADB, 2004; UNDP, 2002). 113 school. Primary school net enrollment increased from 61 percent in 1990 to 80.4 percent in 2002. The adult literacy rate increased from approximately 5 percent in 1952-4 to 39 percent in 1990, and to 48.6 percent in 2004 (ADB, 2004; Whelpton, 2005; UNDP, 2006b). The general consensus in regard to the overall impact of aid, however, is that despite a few clear and dramatic changes, aid has done little to improve Nepal's economy or agricultural sector, or to relieve the country's widespread and grinding poverty (Whelpton, 2005; Khadka, 1991; Poudel, 1991; Murphy et al., 2005; Thapa & Sijapati, 2003; Lak, 2003, April 25 - May l).34 Moreover, the benefits of aid have been visible largely in urban areas. While the elite and middle-class have rapidly gained access to consumer goods, Tamang (2001) argues that most aspects of the development process, including conditional aid, structural adjustment loans and programs, privatization, and increasing globalization, have been detrimental to the agrarian poor. Further, any improvements have been overshadowed by accelerating population growth rates in the latter half of the 20th century. Nepal is currently ranked 138 out of 177 countries on the UN's Human Development Index, which places it in the bottom quarter of the "medium human development" category (UNDP, 2006b).35 Gross Net Income per capita is US $270 (World Bank, 2007b). Development progress on the whole has also slowed since 1995, largely due to political instability and the onset of the conflict (USAID, 2000). 6.3 The Politics of Foreign Aid in Nepal As discussed in Chapter 2, critics argue that foreign aid is far from benign. Criticisms of aid include arguments that it undermines the role of the private market economy, encourages politicization, and promotes state power, corruption, and inequality (Klotzle, 2006). Detractors of foreign assistance in Nepal have made similar allegations, and argue that, in addition to demonstrations of the failure of aid to meet its articulated goals, there have been additional negative side-effects exerted by external assistance (Khadka, 1991). Some within Nepal's popular media have even proposed the existence of a linear relationship between excessive foreign interference, development failure, socio-political instability, and the development of the Maoist insurgency.

34 The World Bank states that the incidence of poverty fell from 42 percent in 1996 to 31 percent in 2004 (World Bank, 2007b). According to the UNDP (2005a), in 2004 poverty remained at 40 percent. 35 Detailed information regarding Nepal's most recent human development index markers may be found in the United Nation's Human Development Report 2006 (UNDP, 2006b). 114 One effect of aid with particular relevance to the emergence of the Maoists has been the exacerbation of Nepal's rural-urban disparities by the failure of the neo-classical "trickle down" theory of the 1950s (Gyawali, 2002). Thapa and Sijapati (2003) argue that his trend led to a vast geographical disparity between urban and rural development, which is particularly stark in the remote regions of the mid- and far-west. Power of all types has historically been centred in the Kathmandu Valley, and aid has helped to consolidate this further. Foreign aid also fueled an increasing disparity in cultural practices between the rural poor and the wealthy urbanites, as the latter began to adopt elements of the modern life­ styles of the development community. The rural majority grew increasingly disillusioned as it became clear that, for them, the rhetoric of development was not being matched by tangible benefits (Whelpton, 2005). As discussed in Chapter 5, it was among these impoverished communities that the Maoists built their primary support base. Further negative impacts of aid have been attributed, in part, to the latitude the Nepalese government yielded to donors, beginning in the 1950s, which has allowed them to design projects befitting their own self-interest (Khadka, 1991). Fowler (2000) notes that, because "the covert purpose of aid was to help win the Cold War" (p.592), the result was an uncoupling of the actual performance of foreign aid, in terms of growth and poverty reduction, from the amount and distribution of aid. The aid establishment that followed from this agenda was one that favored short-term projects, and utilized aid as a vehicle of bilateral relations, and as a means to promote the domestic private sector through tied aid, and exhibited a lack of coordination and efficiency (Fowler, 2000; World Bank, 1989; 2005a; Khadka, 1991). Donor influence in Nepal has led to several inappropriate projects with long- term detrimental effects, such as expensive hydroelectric dam and road construction initiatives, and the introduction of chemical fertilizers (Khadka, 1991; Subedi, 1997; Poudel, 1991). Foreign aid has also served to facilitate the entrenchment of the existing hegemonic power balance in Nepal, whose heavy reliance on aid is perhaps partly attributable to the authoritarian Panchayat political system. The Panchayat government, which was in power during Nepal's first three decades of planned development, was first and foremost concerned with its own perpetuation and maintenance of the status quo. It was thus antithetical to the

115 change and reform necessary for healthy development, and demonstrated a lack of commitment and dedication to the welfare of the majority. By taking on the language of development and modernization shared by its donors, however, the government cloaked itself with a veneer of progress and pre-empted overt dissent, at least until the public recognized the shallowness of its rhetoric. At the same time, the employment opportunities offered by a proliferating number of development organizations helped to temporarily placate the educated population from fomenting revolt and advocating for democracy (Khadka, 1991; Whelpton, 2005). It is broadly accepted in Nepal's media and by donors that Nepal's poverty, inequity, and mal-governance have contributed significantly to popular anger and disillusionment in general, and to the initiation and propagation of the Maoist movement in particular (Gyawali, 2002). Moreover, these conditions have persisted, and are in fact rampant, despite forty years of foreign assistance. This process of public disillusionment, as noted earlier, has been facilitated by an education system that has itself been heavily supported by external aid. The following section will discuss the history and present situation of aid to education in Nepal. 6.4 Aid to Education in Nepal: An Overview 6.4.1 Aid to Education before J 990 Education came immediately to the fore of Nepal's development priorities when the country was opened to foreign assistance after the fall of the Rana regime. Like many countries beginning development efforts, Nepal's politicians realized that major constraints to meeting their goals included a lack of skilled labour, entrepreneurs, and efficient institutions. Educational reforms were thus important components of the aid strategies espoused by Nepal's major donors including the United States and the World Bank (Khadka, 1991). As mentioned in Chapter 4, Nepal's first official development project in the 1950s was a program funded by USAID to train teachers and develop curriculum. In the years since, Nepal's education system has received aid from numerous donors, including Japan, West Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, France, Denmark, New Zealand, and the Soviet Union. The bulk of this aid was in the form of scholarships, technical assistance, bilateral

116 financial support, training programs, and school construction (Khadka, 1991; Whelpton, 2005). 6.4.2 Aid to Education during the 1990s As discussed in Chapter 4, Nepal's new democratic government of 1990 requested international assistance in developing and implementing reform of its primary education system. With technical assistance from UNDP, a reform framework called the Basic and Primary Education Master Plan 1991-2001 was developed (Khaniya & Williams, 2004). The government also created a High Level Education Commission, whose policy research report laid the foundations for the MOES' Basic and Primary Education Project (BPEP), which began in 1992, funded largely by the World Bank and other donors.36 The "National Goals of Education", articulated with the introduction of the BPEP were lofty: education was meant to "assist each individual actualize his/her potential, develop his/her personality and live a balanced life in the modern age; assist in the development of a social being given to human values; help in strengthening the social unity of the country; help in the modernization of the society and preservation of the natural environment and national heritage; and help bring to the national mainstream all the people that have been socially deprived" (Dixit, S., 2002: 200-201). According to Thapa (2004), BPEP was the most ambitious and expensive project undertaken by the government after the reinstatement of democracy in 1990. The project was intended to increase access to primary education, improve the educational standard of Nepal, reduce drop-out rates, and increase awareness about education. BPEP's inputs included a large (some say excessive) amount of infrastructure construction, curricular reform, attempts to increase the number of female teachers, and encouragement of the enrolment of ethnic minorities. Alongside BPEP, the government also implemented a Primary Education Development Project 1992-1999 with US $20 million in support from the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Khaniya and Williams (2004) note that for such a poor country as Nepal, the amount of money channeled into these reform initiatives comprised an "enormous investment in primary education" (p. 317). Total governmental expenditures in the education sector also grew throughout the 1990s, reaching 15 percent of the total budget in 2004 (Dhakal, 2004).

BPEP II (1999-2004) has since been implemented as well. 117 Not all of the planned initiatives were implemented, however, nor did they reach all schools, and many have been criticized. Thapa (2004) states that BPEP was disorganized and effectively sidelined local communities and stakeholders, and therefore did not produce significant or sustainable results, while others such as Dhakal (2005) are critical of the macro-level, sector-wide focus of BPEP, and the fact that it was not child-centered. Carney (2003) argues as well that the narrow approach to "quality" pursued through BPEP allowed for a series of donor-funded studies of primary school achievement (as measured by test scores) that effectively distracted attention from the Nepalese government's overall objective of democratic, inclusive schools, and toward the inputs needed to improve students' cognitive development. Carney (2003) argues that the voices of the majority have not been heard in Nepal's educational debates in any case, "and the neo-liberal tendencies that drive educational policy in Nepal are serving to silence them more" (p. 98). Despite such criticisms and the apparent limitations of sector-wide reforms, the majority of government funds for education, as well as the majority of foreign funds have, for the past several decades, been channeled into the formal public system (S. Dixit, 2002). 6.4.3 Aid to Education after 2000: The Education for All (EFA) Agenda Education for All (EFA) 2004-2009 is Nepal's predominant national plan in the area of basic and primary education, and was designed by the government in consultation with many national and international stakeholders, as the continuation of BPEP II (1999-2004). The emphasis is on an integrated sector-wide approach, and a great deal of effort has been made to promote district and local level participation (Caddell, 2005). A reform program for secondary education, known as the secondary education support program (SESP) was also initiated with assistance from Denmark and the ADB (EDK, 2006). Nepal's education reform agenda was re-named Education for All following the Dakar Forum in 2000, in line with the global EFA initiative, and is aimed towards achievement of the MDGs in education. The EFA initiative is the primary contemporary vehicle for donor support, and is thus the program mentioned most often by donor agencies in the documentation that will be explored in Chapter 7.

118 6.4.3 (a) Components of the EFA Program in Nepal The primary targets for the most recent phase of the EFA program are: to increase the primary net enrolment rate (NER) from 81 to 96 percent, reduce the grade one dropout rate from 39 to 10 percent, and increase the gross enrolment rate (GER) of early childhood classes from 13 to 51 percent by 2008 (Vaux et al., 2006). Nepal's EFA program has been supported by numerous donors including Denmark, Finland, Norway, and the UK (who are contributors to a sector-wide pool fund) and also the World Bank/ID A, ADB, Japan, the World Food Program, and UNICEF (Vaux et al, 2006). The influence of donors continues to permeate Nepal's education sector, as the content of the EFA agenda is closely aligned with international standards (Caddell, 2005). The EFA program is funded separately from Nepal's national education program, which is responsible for the bare minimum of resource provision. In practice, approximately two-thirds of EFA funding is directed to meeting ongoing expenditures, such as teachers' salaries and benefits, although it was intended to offer flexible support above and beyond such basic necessities. Approximately 25 percent of the $160 million yearly EFA budget is supplied by the EFA donor group, while other donors such as Japan make additional contributions. EFA and SESP are monitored through an independent process called the Technical Review of School Education (TRSE), which was established by donors (Vaux et al., 2006). Once amounts for teacher salaries are deducted, the remaining $45 million annual fund is allocated to activities in six categories, while a seventh objective of mother tongue education is intended to be integrated into the six primary areas (Vaux et al., 2006). The rationale and goals of the six primary areas are described briefly below, along with the percentage of EFA funding received by each. (The source of the following information is Vaux et al. (2006)). Early Child Development (6%): Government-funded pre-schools are a recent phenomenon in Nepal, and the sector is not well developed. This aspect of EFA, therefore, intends to expand ECD availability as rapidly as possible. Vaux et al. (2006) suggest that ECD centres may have a potential conflict-mitigation role, because they offer marginalized children the opportunity to prepare for school, and free their mothers and older siblings to work or attend

119 school. To date, however, there have been only a few ECD centres established, and the majority of these are in or around urban areas. The centres are also face stark shortages of resources, and thus parents are often required to pay substantial additional fees. Vaux et al. (2006) suggest that rather than facilitating inclusion, therefore, the government has incited further grievances among the traditionally excluded, by promising to establish accessible ECD centres but failing to deliver them. Access to All: Scholarships (21%): When the EFA program began, approximately 20 percent of school age children in Nepal had never entered school. Initiatives to increase access consist of scholarships for Dalit children and poorer girls, school feeding programs for disadvantaged children, and food distribution, as incentives to the families of poorer girls. While scholarships for Dalits have been ubiquitous across the country in recent years, these tend to be largely insufficient to procure all the necessities for school, not to mention cover the opportunity cost to a child's family. Moreover, the government budget provides for far fewer scholarships for Dalit students than are needed. Scholarships for girls are also readily distributed, despite Nepal's relatively good female enrolment rate of 48 percent (Vaux et al., 2006). It is not uncommon, however, for recipients to be chosen for academic achievement or social connections, although scholarships are supposed to be allocated according to need. Scholarships for ethnic minorities (janjati) are not common, given the difficulty of determining selection criteria and the degree of need within any one group. The EFA program does include a provision for textbook translation into minority languages, however, and this process is apparently underway as of 2006, although Vaux et al. (2006) could find no evidence of the actual existence of the books. Moreover, representatives of minority groups often assert that parents prefer their children to be taught in Nepali. Also, while the issue of inclusion of ethnic minorities is a pertinent issue in regard to the conflict, this is more related to political representation as opposed to a demand for separate education. Meeting the learning needs of all: Vocational education (1%): There is little evidence of activity in regard to this sector, which ostensibly focuses on the provision of non-formal and vocational education, and making the curriculum more practical.

120 Adult Literacy (2%): The focus here is on women's literacy, but this aspect of the program is not yet well integrated with other larger literacy initiatives. Eliminating gender disparity (20%): This aspect of EFA is devoted to the creation of a gender-sensitive curriculum and the recruitment of more female teachers, who currently comprise only 25 percent of the total primary school teaching force. Quality education: Block grants (46%): Block grants are provided to schools on a per student basis, and also in response to School Improvement Plans drafted by SMCs. This basket fund also includes bonuses for well-performing schools, and for schools taking part in the Community School Support Program (described below). In practice, the majority of the annual block grants have been allocated to teachers' salaries, and any extra requirements such as regular repairs or equipment have to be covered by fees charged to parents. Vaux et al. (2006) note that one unintended, though ironically positive, outcome of the under- funding of primary schools is that there is little possibility of corruption or elite capture, and the increasing migration of wealthier children to private schools has perhaps also decreased the level of discrimination within government schools. 6.4.3 (b) Outcomes of EFA to Date As of 2006, the EFA program has yet to make significant improvements in several key aspects of Nepal's education sector. For example, despite the official "free" provision of education through grade 5, government schools are so financially constrained that in practice they are forced to charge their students. Vaux et al. (2006) note that this is not usually a result of corrupt activity, but because extra teachers often need to be hired or extra classrooms built to compensate for shortages. Rural schools also continue to suffer disproportionately due to a lack of supervision. While DEO-based officials are expected to visit schools regularly, according to Vaux et al. (2006), they fulfill this requirement by repeatedly checking in on nearby schools, sometimes never making it out to remote schools for a decade or more. While the insurgency provides a good excuse for such behaviour, school officials have reported that this neglect predates the beginning of the conflict (Gersony, 2003; Whelpton, 2005; Vaux et al., 2006). Organizations such as UNICEF have expressed concerns about the EFA initiative, arguing that the greater challenge in Nepal is not enrollment, but rather retaining children

121 once they are enrolled, which has a direct relationship to school quality (Rana, 2003, Jan 24- 30). Vaux et al. (2006), Whelpton (2005), and others have similarly argued that the most critical issues at the moment include school overcrowding, particularly in the tarai and district centres, shortages of trained and motivated teachers, and under-funded rural schools. Government schools must also contend with what Vaux et al. (2006) call the "gross inefficiencies" in the education system. Faulty practices that lead to basic errors, such as delayed textbook delivery, "make nonsense of any attempt to fine-tune the EFA program" (p. 18). Examples of such administrative glitches are commonly publicized in Nepal's media. The use of English in the majority of private schools is another issue untouched by the EFA, although it serves to exacerbate their perceived superiority to the Nepali-medium government system. This trend has commentators concerned that the traditional social divisions between castes and genders, which have slowly been abating with increased school access, are now being replaced by a new language-based hierarchy (Vaux et al., 2006). The majority of employers, particularly the government and development organizations, have stipulations regarding English ability. According to Vaux et al. (2006), the EFA program "exposes problems of governance rather than resolving them", as its difficulties have resulted in large part from traditions of top-down and exclusive political structures, which do not facilitate information sharing or accountability. While they argue that the program itself is sound, its implementation has however been constrained by the Nepalese context, which will not likely change in the near future. 6.4.3 (c) Community School Management The poor and deteriorating state of Nepal's schools, in combination with the effects of the insurgency, has led to a strong public perception that the government is not able to support and supervise schools on its own, particularly in remote areas (World Bank, 2007c). In consultation with donors, the government announced in 2002 that it would transfer management of public schools to communities, in the effort to improve the educational standard (Thapa, 2004). The idea initially seemed promising, and was met with a degree of hope. One commentator, for example, stated that the "rot" within the system had begun with

122 the nationalization of community-owned schools with the ill-planned and ill-fated NESP in 1971, and that the only solution was to give schools back to communities (Newar, 2005). With schools under community control, it was assumed that accountability, local involvement, and teacher motivation would increase, and also that Maoist interference would diminish. The program to decentralize the education system, entitled the Community School Support Program (CSSP) is supported by the World Bank and UNICEF. It provides grants of approximately US$1430 to communities that accept management of their local school (Newar, 2005). By the end of December 2005, the government had devolved the management of 2,266 of Nepal's 25,000 public primary schools to communities ("Nepal to transfer", 2006; Newar, 2003, April 1-7). Many schools and communities have been wary of the new scheme, however. A study by Thapa (2004) found that many communities have opted not to participate in the CSSP, primarily because of the inadequacy of the information they had received from the government regarding the purpose and content of the program, how it was supposed to improve education, and what costs they would have to bear themselves. Teachers and teachers' unions have also been concerned; after many years of poor professional morale and perceived disrespect, teachers do not believe that the government would protect their rights once schools were managed by communities. Accordingly, a common criticism of the CSSP project, and EFA on the whole, has been the poor nature of information sharing. Decisions concerning budgets continue to be top-down and devolve little real power to district and school authorities, and teacher appointments are still vulnerable to corruption and partisan loyalties (Thapa, 2004; Vaux et al., 2006). The program has also met with difficulties due to the conflict. Displaced children, for example, have not always had access to school in their host community, due to overcrowding or higher fees. A representative of the Nepal National Social Welfare Association (NNSWA) notes that when schools are community managed, the NNSWA cannot force them to provide free education for displaced children (Rijal, 2005, Oct 23). Also, as it turns out, the Maoists have in fact objected to the CSSP; they argue (as has the president of the Teachers' Union) that it is merely an attempt by the government to absolve itself of its responsibilities. In January 2006, the government was forced to take back the

123 management of several schools after intense pressure by the Maoists, and schools were continuing to assert their desire to abort CSSP agreements as of early 2006 (Bohara, 2006, January 17). In an effort to save the program, the government proposed that the terminology be changed from "management transfer" to "community involvement", and insisted that it would continue to support schools technically and financially (People's Daily Online, 2006, Feb 12). In December 2006, Nepal's Parliament decided that the principle of community- managed schools would be upheld, despite ongoing resistance from teachers' unions (World Bank, 2007c). 6.4.3 (d) Conflict-Sensitivity of the EFA Program in Nepal Researchers such as Vaux et al. (2006) and Smith and Vaux (2003), who note the importance of assessing Nepal's reform efforts in terms of conflict sensitivity, find the EFA program to contain both strengths and weaknesses. Vaux et al. (2006) note that the historically exclusionary nature of the school system is frequently cited as a cause of social tension; when the tension erupted into violence, the issue demanded particular attention by donors to programs such as the EFA. While the effects of the conflict on the education sector are for the most part not open to mitigation by donor activity, the impact of education on conflict, on the other hand, is something that can be addressed. Programs such as the EFA, therefore, offer potential scope for facilitating conflict-sensitive education. Vaux et al. (2006) examine the EFA program in light of the DAC Principles regarding aid to fragile states, and note that four principles are reflected in the program. These are: Principle 3 (Focus on state-building), Principle 6 (Promote coherence between donors), Principle 7 (Agree on practical coordination mechanisms), and Principle 12 (Avoid pockets of exclusion). Vaux et al. argue that the EFA program is (inadvertently, but nevertheless) conflict-sensitive: its sector-wide approach helps improve the government' capacity, the donor pooling mechanism improves coherence, there is a joint review process and an independent monitoring system, and the program contains an overarching theme of tackling exclusion. Although the EFA is clearly influenced by donors, Vaux et al. (2006) note that this influence may be positive, in some respects, if it amounts to the promotion of global themes of inclusion and participation, and education as a right. Unfortunately, these notions are

124 somewhat out of line with the elitism within the Nepalese government itself. Although the EFA may have significant potential to facilitate conflict transformation, there are few high- ranking officials in Nepal with the motivation to exploit this capacity. With the majority of government elites sending their children to private school, few have any true stake in the outcome of the EFA, other than the desire to please their superiors and donors. The concept that education is a right, which is integral to global mandates, also contrasts with the tradition in Nepal of education as an elite privilege, or a "gift" to those less fortunate. As Vaux et al. note, the government does not appear to have the capacity to deal with even minor problems, let alone a profound readjustment in the attitudes and practices of its officials. In short, the participatory planning processes envisioned by the EFA have not been able to overcome traditional power structures or exclusionary practices, and hierarchical methods of communication, decision-making, and control of resources remain prevalent. There are other criticisms of the EFA program itself, however, which are not limited to the Nepalese context. Caddell (2005), for example, notes that target-oriented types of initiatives like EFA and the MDGs are based upon the assumptions that there is one common global vision for education reform, and that indicators towards these ends may largely be measured quantitatively, both of which notions have been debated. Caddell suggests that there is an "arena of potential disjuncture" between global targets and the rhetoric of decentralization and listening to "local voices" (p. 457), and that questions need to be asked regarding the power differentials that exist within real-life education systems that may constrain authentic local participation. In Nepal, Caddell (2005) argues, decentralization amounts to little more than the top-down delegation of central-level responsibilities and pressures to lower levels, as opposed to providing an authentic opportunity for local input or the raising of local concerns. The concerns of the central government (i.e. the generation of certain types of data), moreover, are in response to the conditions stipulated by donors. While the collection of school-level data may be undertaken with the ostensible purpose of facilitating local participation, it may actually constrain the discussion to those issues that can serve as the basis of statistical comparison and that can be addressed through the EFA's inputs. Schools thus have no venue for raising issues arising

125 from contextually specific occurrences, such as the Maoist insurgency or the politicization of schools, that fall outside the purview of EFA. Smith and Vaux (2003) similarly suggest that the EFA program (in general, not specifically in Nepal) is inherently limited in terms of its conflict-sensitivity because of its restriction to quantitative data for assessment and determining outcomes. Numerical development targets are unable to address those aspects of education which are most important in terms of education's potential relationship with conflict, as access to education alone is not sufficient to ward off conflict or ameliorate poverty. Therefore, these writers argue that EFA programs need to also examine the qualitative nature of education, and that the challenge "is to develop methods of tracking whether 'progress' in the education field might also be creating tensions that could lead to or exacerbate conflict" (p. 18). Interestingly, while Smith and Vaux's report was commissioned by DFID, this type of examination was not evident in documents pertaining to DFID's ongoing programs in Nepal. Considering the EFA agenda as a whole, therefore, Vaux et al. (2006) conclude that the continued deterioration of education in Nepal indicates that the program, while in their view the most appropriate vehicle for bilateral aid to education for the time being, is not however sufficient to meet all of the needs of Nepal's education system. Although they advocate for continued funding of the program, they stress that the program's donors must consider how it can be aligned more closely to the present circumstances in Nepal. 6.5 Conclusion: The Implications of the Maoist Insurgency on Foreign Aid to Education Nepal's growing dependence upon foreign assistance and methodologies has led to several unforeseen and negative impacts upon the country's socio-economic well-being. Aid has contributed to the worsening of disparities between urban and rural areas, the entrenchment of an exploitive class system and ruling structure, and economic stress caused by an inappropriate degree of donor influence on project selection. The exacerbation of Nepal's existing socio-economic constraints, in turn, has had significant impacts upon education, as it has made attempts to build a well-functioning system, and provide job opportunities for graduates, all the more difficult. Foreign influence is also directly visible in the shape and function of the education system itself, and unfortunately, in the system's misalignment with Nepal's contextual

126 realities. As noted in Chapter 2, many countries beginning planned development operated under the assumption that education was a critical prerequisite for socio-economic progress, a belief that often led to the acceptance of significant amounts of foreign assistance to assist with the establishment of a school system. The school systems that have resulted from this belief, moreover, have tended to adhere to foreign models that are often contextually inappropriate. This tendency has clearly manifested in Nepal, where educational expansion began with the opening of the country to foreign assistance, and educational development and reform have been closely aligned with global trends ever since. Donors have not only influenced the course of educational development in Nepal, therefore, but have in effect been co-creators of the education system alongside a willing Nepalese government. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the government's eagerness for educational expansion was motivated in part by the modernist notion of human capital and economic development, but also by the usefulness of schools as vehicles of elite hegemony. This process was quite explicit in the 1950s, when the NEPC's education plan documented the state's intention to annihilate Nepal's minority languages and cultural diversity, but continues today, albeit more tacitly, through the EFA program. The EFA program champions equal access for all, however, the means by which it does so in effect constrains the ability of local populations to advocate for changes to the system. The collection of standardized data, for example, limits the reporting of local concerns that fall outside the purview of those deemed important by the EFA, while the language and shallow mechanisms of "local participation" mask what is in reality an entrenchment of established power structures and top-down control. The inability of Nepal's succession of foreign-funded reform initiatives to bring about significant improvement in the country's education system, or to disturb embedded elite systems of control, is suggestive of the limitations of Western-model reform efforts in education. The fact that these reforms have continued for generations suggests that Nepal's donors have not deeply considered the politicization of education in Nepal or how significantly education is influenced by its socio-cultural context. Rather, the conventional wisdom of education as a force for socio-economic welfare appears to have continued

127 largely unquestioned. The following chapter will explore whether Nepal's present donors have, in light of the conflict, begun to challenge this assumption. As noted in Chapter 2, recent scholarship has widely criticized the view of education as a contextually insulated or benign entity, and highlights its dual potential to both contribute towards and mitigate conflict. Given the historical politicization of education and its association with social grievances in Nepal, discussed in Chapter 4, the Maoists' appropriation of education-related issues discussed in Chapter 5, combined with the contentious nature of foreign assistance in general and the limitations of the current EFA program discussed above, it seems that analyses of the conflict-sensitivity, suitability, and comprehensiveness of Nepal's education reform efforts should comprise pertinent issues for consideration among Nepal's donors and I/NGOs. The following chapter will discuss the policy responses of several of Nepal's donors to the Maoist insurgency, and explore whether these agencies have indeed examined the contentious nature of education in Nepal, and its potential contribution to the conflict.

128 Chapter 7: Bilateral & Multilateral Aid to Education in the Context of the Maoist Insurgency: Diverse Policies & Approaches The previous chapter discussed the role of foreign donors in Nepal's development, including the pivotal influence these agencies have had, and continue to have, in the form and function of the education system. As discussed in Chapter 2, while the potential hazards of excessive or inappropriate foreign aid are well known, recent scholarship has tended to argue in favor of the value of aid, as well as the critical importance of assistance for countries deemed fragile or those in the midst of conflict. There is also a consensus concerning continued support to education during or after conflicts, although the ideal form such initiatives should take is a subject of ongoing debate. One strong point of accord in the literature, however, is that aid to conflict-affected states in general, and to the education sectors of these states in specific, must be in alignment with the socio-cultural dynamics of the countries in question. In education, this includes the recognition that schools do not operate in isolation, but are inextricably linked from the broader context in which they operate. In Nepal, while foreign aid has by no account been entirely successful in helping the country meet its development goals, donors will remain an integral element of Nepal's functioning for the near future. The Maoist insurgency has entailed significant additional constraints for development agencies, yet most have elected to remain engaged in Nepal despite the risks involved. This chapter will discuss the programs and public statements of several of Nepal's major bilateral and multilateral donors during the insurgency, in consideration of the literature pertaining to aid to fragile states and education during conflict. (The work of Nepal's I/NGOs will be discussed in Chapter 8). The information has been gathered primarily through document analysis, with the addition of an interview with a representative of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The chapter will be divided into four sections: the impact of the insurgency on bilateral and multilateral aid agencies; policy responses of aid agencies in the context of the conflict, both collective and individual; and the approaches to educational aid taken by these organizations during the conflict.

129 7.1 Impact of the Maoist Insurgency on Bilateral & Multilateral Agencies The following section will discuss the impact of the conflict on Nepal's bilateral and multilateral development agencies in terms of issues raised by the literature review (Chapter 2), i.e., the ability to continue development projects in conflict-affected areas, issues of neutrality, and the shift from development to humanitarian assistance. This will provide a context for the subsequent discussion of the responses of Nepal's aid agencies to the conflict. Development organizations have been constrained in several ways during the conflict. The ability of agencies to provide basic services and development initiatives has depended a great deal on the willingness of the security forces and the Maoists, particularly the latter, to allow these initiatives to function. The "space for development" has varied from region to region, and has been sensitive to changes in military activity, the political environment, the changing strategies of the conflicting parties, and the opinions of individual military leaders (Gautam, 2001; Hollants Van Loocke & Philipson, 2002). The conflict has also had a large impact upon the planning, monitoring and staffing capabilities of agencies (ADB, 2004). The migration of young people from rural villages to the relative safety of urban areas has left many regions with insufficient labor power to implement development projects (Armon et al., 2004). Project staff members have also faced pressure or even outright harassment from both sides in the conflict, and a small, but indeterminate, number of development workers have been injured or killed (FES, 2006; Gersony, 2003). For many organizations, therefore, safety considerations have become a determining factor in the choice of new project locations (Murphy et al., 2005). The overall extent of the negative impact of the conflict upon development activity in Nepal is somewhat difficult to gauge, however, given the variability of the conflict's intensity from region to region, and the consequent inconsistency in reports from different sources. Some reports argue that development work in the country has continued largely unchanged (e.g. JICA, 2003). Others state that numerous donors have been suspending their work and withdrawing staff from conflict-affected areas, and allege that this "abandonment" of rural communities is reinforcing the inequalities that are perpetuating the conflict itself (e.g. Hollants Van Loocke & Philipson, 2002; Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004). Murphy et al.

130 (2005) report, for example, that in 2004, escalating threats by the Maoists prompted ten bilateral donor agencies working in the far and mid-west to announce a temporary suspension of their programs. In addition, there has been a large loss of development potential resulting from the delay or cancellation of projects and the destruction of development-related infrastructure (Gersony, 2003; Thapa & Sijapati, 2003; "UN condemns", 2006). There are few explicit discussions within agency documentation regarding the specific challenges faced by development agencies. (The interviewees were more forthcoming). In their study on INGOs, Murphy et al. (2005) also found it difficult to obtain first-hand accounts of organizational constraints. She notes that few individuals were willing to discuss such matters openly, while those who did agree to interviews focused almost exclusively on the positive. The overall impression the researchers received, however, was that Nepal's development community was "greatly impacted" by the insurgency (p. 20). The difficulties associated with presenting an appearance of neutrality have also clearly been in evidence in Nepal. For example, Murphy et al. (2005) note that agencies that have maintained a strict position of neutrality have been subject to suspicion by both sides, i.e., the conflict parties assume that if they are not supporting the Maoists, they must be sympathetic to the government, and vice versa. It has also been the case that official policy, such as a decree of not cooperating with the Maoists, has on occasion been impossible to uphold due to the reality on the ground (Murphy et al., 2005). Research reports pertaining to the potentially contentious issue of country affiliation are also somewhat contradictory. Hollants Van Loocke and Philipson (2002) state that the Maoists' acceptance or rejection of the initiatives of particular organizations has been decided on a project by project basis, and seems to have little to do with nationality. Murphy et al. (2005), however, have found that the Maoists (at least in some areas) consider organizational affiliation and/or funding source as a criterion for rejecting or accepting a project. Thapa and Sijapati (2003) state that the Maoists have found projects funded by the UK or USA particularly objectionable, because these countries have, in the early stages of the insurgency at least, supported the Nepalese government in their fight against the Maoists, and have provided support to the Nepalese military (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003).

131 The traditional distinction between relief and development work has also been blurred in Nepal throughout the insurgency, as many regions have experienced situations somewhere between the two. Agencies engaged in the long-term, gradual process of capacity building inherent to development work have also needed to navigate the more immediate impacts of the conflict, such as infrastructure destruction, forced migration, and the presence of Maoist or government soldiers, in their communities. Agencies have thus begun to incorporate humanitarian principles, such as an emphasis on impartiality, the rapid delivery of tangible results, and needs based, short-term projects, into their development programs (Armon et al., 2004). Armon et al. (2004) believe that Nepal's situation offers the opportunity for an exploration of the linkages of humanitarian and development programming, and the examination of "hybrid approaches" (p. 25). Despite the myriad challenges associated with the conflict, the majority of Nepal's donors have, according to their published documentation, made the decision to continue to work to the best of their ability and maintain programs in Nepal. Several donors in fact, including Danida, DFID, SDC, USAID, ADB and the World Bank, have stated that they remain in Nepal because of the belief that the destruction and instability caused by the conflict have made their work all the more necessary. The responses of Nepal's bilateral and multilateral donors to the conflict will be discussed in the following section. 7.2 Policy Responses of Bilateral & Multilateral Agencies in the Context of Conflict 7.2.1 Joint Responses: The Basic Operating Guidelines & OECD Principles The year 2003 began positively for Nepal, with the declaration of a ceasefire in January between the Maoists and the Nepalese army. The peace was not to last, however, and hostilities resumed in August of that year. The wave of mass violence and killings that followed was the worst the country had seen in the conflict to date. In light of the increasingly dangerous context, representatives of Nepal's bilateral donors and the UN worked collaboratively to create a set of Basic Operating Guidelines (BOGs), which were made public in October 2003. The BOGs were adapted from the established humanitarian principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Armon et al., 2004). They set out the principles for donor activity in Nepal, the standards that are to be met by projects and staff, and the minimum conditions necessary for donors to continue to work.

132 They are undersigned by Canada, Denmark, the UK, the European Commission, Finland, Germany, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (UN, 2006).37 The BOGs (and associated preamble) are listed in Table 2 below. Table 2: Basic Operating Guidelines for Bilateral Donor Agencies in Nepal (UN, 2006) Based on principles agreed internationally and in Nepal, we the undersigned have adopted the following Basic Operating Guidelines for all development and, if necessary, humanitarian assistance in Nepal. 1. We are in Nepal to contribute to improvements in the quality of life of the people of Nepal. Our assistance focuses on reducing poverty, meeting basic needs and enabling communities to become self-sufficient. 2. We work through the freely expressed wishes of local communities, and we respect the dignity of people, their culture, religion and customs. 3. We provide assistance to the poor and marginalized people of Nepal, regardless of where they live and who they are. Priorities for assistance are based on need alone, and not on any political, ethnic or religious agenda. 4. We ensure that our assistance is transparent and we involve poor people and their communities in the planning, management and implementation of programmes. We are accountable to those whom we seek to assist and to those providing the resources. 5. We seek to ensure that our assistance tackles discrimination and social exclusion, most notably based on gender, ethnicity, caste and religion. 6. We recruit staff on the basis of suitability and qualification for the job, and not on the basis of political or any other considerations. 7. We do not accept our staff and development partners being subjected to violence, abduction, harassment or intimidation, or being threatened in any manner. 8. We do not work where staff are forced to compromise core values or principles. 9. We do not accept our assistance being used for any military, political or sectarian purposes. 10. We do not make contributions to political parties and do not make any forced contributions in cash or kind. 11. Our equipment, supplies and facilities are not used for purposes other than those stated in our programme objectives. Our vehicles are not used to transport persons or goods that have no direct connection with the development programme. Our vehicles do not carry armed or uniformed personnel. 12. We do not tolerate the theft, diversion or misuse of development or humanitarian supplies. Unhindered access of such supplies is essential. 13. We urge all those concerned to allow full access by development and humanitarian personnel to all people in need of assistance, and to make available, as far as possible, all necessary facilities for their operations, and to promote the safety, security and freedom of movement of such personnel. 14. We expect and encourage all parties concerned to comply strictly with their obligations

Humanitarian principles include the provision of assistance without adverse distinction, based on need, with respect to religion and culture. Communities are involved in the planning and management of programs and agencies are accountable to those they assist (Armon et al., 2004). 133 under International Humanitarian Law and to respect Human Rights.

The BOGs have been extensively publicized in national and local media, with printed cards widely distributed and promoted across Nepal. During 2005, first the Nepalese government and then the Maoists publicly endorsed the BOGs. On December 22 of that year, Maoist Chairman Prachanda issued a statement recognizing the BOGs, and noted that Maoist cadres had been instructed to adhere to them "as per the specific situation of the place" ("UN hails", December 22, 2005). In the same statement, Prachanda appealed to development agencies and the international community to cooperate and work in consultation with the Maoist party. In addition to the BOGs, major agencies working in Nepal have also unofficially adopted the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States (SDC, 2005). The OECD is a Paris-based forum in which the governments of 30 "market " discuss issues and experiences, determine best-practice policies, and seek answers to problems of global concern (OECD, n.d.). The OECD's Principles stipulate that donors should not disengage from fragile states, but should on the contrary engage for the long-term (Baranyi & Powell, 2004). The OECD states that while international engagement cannot end state fragility on its own, the adoption of its principles "can help maximize the positive impact of engagement and minimize unintentional harm" (OECD, 2005). The OECD Principles are listed in Appendix 7. According to the Swiss Development Agency (SDC), while Nepal could have been classified as a fragile state during the conflict, the support it received from large donors made it unlikely that it would collapse completely. Of particular importance to the Nepalese context, according to the SDC, were the OECD's principles of democratic state building, recognition of the relationship between politics, security and development, donor coherence, "Do No Harm" principles, long-term engagement, and the need to ensure support was inclusive. The SDC maintained that international actors could offer a meaningful contribution to peace-building if they operated within these guidelines, as well as those

134 offered by the MDGs, Nepal's Poverty Reduction Strategy , and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness39 (SDC, 2005). Despite the Maoist leaders' public acknowledgement of the BOGs, the rebel cadres have not always abided by them. DFID (2006) notes that breaches of the guidelines have been dealt with through joint donor action, including private letters and public statements. DFID (2006) states, "In some serious cases, in agreement with other donors, we have unfortunately been compelled to suspend all donor activities in a district. In virtually every case, these responses have produced assurances from the conflict parties that has allowed us to continue to deliver support to the most vulnerable people in rural Nepal" (p. 21). One such incident occurred on May 14, 2005, when Maoist rebels beat two staff members of an NGO working with Germany's development organization (GTZ) in Kalikot district. The BOG Group issued a joint statement stating that this action seriously contravened the BOGs and that, as a result, the World Food Program, DFID, GTZ and SNV had decided to suspend their work in Kalikot. The donors indicated that they expected an apology from the Maoists (FES, 2005). 7.2.2 Individual Agency Responses to Conflict The following section will delineate some of the specific responses of Nepal's various bilateral and multilateral agencies. The bilateral agencies are discussed first, in alphabetical order by country of origin, followed by multilateral agencies. The information presented below was obtained through document analysis, with the exception of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), for which the information was obtained through an interview with an agency representative as well as through documents. CIDA is thus discussed after the other agencies.

Nepal's Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) is a plan the Nepalese government created in 2003 with the aim of poverty reduction and improved pubic services, and is unique in its acknowledgement of social exclusion as a fundamental development challenge in Nepal. It is build around the following four pillars: (i) broad-based economic growth; (ii) social sector development; (iii) social inclusion; and (iv) good governance. In implementing it, the PRS stresses decentralization, rationalization of central government functions and transparency (World Bank, 2003b). 39 The Paris Declaration, which was endorsed on March 2, 2005, is an international agreement among over one hundred officials to commit their nations and organizations to improve aid effectiveness through increased harmonization, alignment and management, and provides a set of actions to be taken and indicators (OECD, undated b). Danish International Development Assistance (Danida) As of 2004, Denmark's programming in Nepal has focused on poverty reduction, access to education, the replanting of forests, support to democratization and human rights through the strengthening of democratic institutions and civil society (DANIDA, 2004; UNDP, 2005a). Danish engagement with Nepal has been two-pronged: it is comprised of a) political dialogue with the government and other key players to the conflict; and b) the aid program, which aims to address the root causes of the conflict, and respond to the changing conflict situation (DANIDA, 2004). Denmark is also a signatory to the BOGs. On November 18, 2004, the Danish minister for integration and for development cooperation explained why Denmark continued to support Nepal amidst its conflict situation: We stay because we want peace, poverty reduction, and promotion of human rights for the people of Nepal...If we leave, we would have no influence on the parties to the conflict, and the people of Nepal would be left in the hands of the Maoists. If we leave, there is a genuine risk that Nepal would become a failed state. This would provide good opportunities to groups on a constant lookout for safe heavens from where they can plan and operate terror activities. By staying we can add pressure on the parties to the conflict.. .By staying, we can continue to address the underlying causes of the conflict, preparing the ground for the time where peace again prevails in Nepal (DANIDA, 2004). In 2004, Danida stated that they would continue to provide assistance as long as it continued to reach Nepal's poor. In response to the conflict situation, more emphasis was to be placed on implementation through CBOs and NGOs. They noted, however, that support via government institutions had advantages as well, because it provides access to policy dialogue, and possibly offers the opportunity to exert pressure on the state apparatus and the government to continue to implement reform and poverty reduction initiatives (DANIDA, 2004). Immediately following the king's coup of February 1, 2005, however, the Danish government released a statement indicating that several initiatives were being suspended, and no new project or program agreements would be signed with the authorities in Nepal

136 pending further notice. A review of other ongoing bilateral activities was planned (UNDP, 2005a). In 2006, Danida stated that while future cooperation with state and government institutions was still possible, it was considered likely that future Danish support would be focused upon civil society (EDK, 2006). Denmark has stated that Nepal is currently facing a "governance and rights crisis". Accordingly, projects and special initiatives have strongly emphasized the improvement of human rights and good governance, including the systemic issues of accountability and transparency. Danida's program focuses on the disadvantaged sections of Nepalese society. Various components are intended to improve inclusion, participation and representation, by supporting human rights organizations, women's, Dalit and Janajati groups, media organizations, the judiciary, and the Election Commission. (The latter was suspended following the events of February 1, 2005, however). Danida has stated that their program is inherently conflict-sensitive and has the capacity to adapt and adjust to the changing political, social, and security context (EDK, 2006). Danida is one of several donors that has created scenarios to guide their programming through the highly uncertain conflict environment. These are as follows: 1) "Peace scenario ": The enactment of a peace process and national reconciliation. This would allow Danida to scale up their assistance to sectors such as education. In this situation, donor support of civil society actors would be crucial, as would enhanced support for democracy, good governance, decentralization, and measures to ensure that the government has popular support and provides peace dividends quickly. 2) "Muddle through": The continuation of low intensity conflict and political instability. In this scenario, Danida recommends that assistance be continued as much as possible. 3) "Conflict escalation ": State collapse and an evolving humanitarian crisis. Should this situation occur, Danida recommends "strong and concerted pressure from the international community" towards the restoration of democracy and peace. This scenario would see development assistance (i.e., ongoing support to Nepalese organizations), being replaced by humanitarian assistance, perhaps delivered through NGOs, to help mitigate the direct effects of the conflict upon civilians (DANIDA, 2004).

137 Finland As of 2005, the majority of Finnish bilateral assistance to Nepal was directed to the education (BPEP II) and environmental sectors. However over the past two decades the energy sector has received the largest proportion of aid. Finland's overarching goal is poverty reduction, and it has also established a Fund for Local Cooperation, which supports micro-projects run by local NGOs to promote democracy, human rights, and good governance (MFAF, 2005). The Embassy of Finland in Kathmandu states on their website that Nepal is one of Finland's two long-term development partners in Asia. Even in the current unstable conditions, therefore, Finland has been committed to continuing its development cooperation (EDK, 2006). Finland is also a signatory to the BOGs. While existing projects and programs, even those in Maoist-affected areas, are slated to continue, no new contracts will be signed until political stability improves (UNDP, 2005a). Similarly, although Finland's development policy dictates an increase in bilateral aid to long-term partner countries in 2005, so far this has not been justified (MFAF, 2005). German Technical Cooperation: GTZ As of 2005, Nepal has been considered one of Germany's "priority partner countries" for development cooperation, and efforts since 2004 have focused on three main areas in line with Nepal's PRSP: health care and family planning (including health education), local self-government and civil society, and renewable energy. As do many donors, Germany prioritizes rural development and the crosscutting theme of poverty reduction (GTZ, 2005; JICA, 2003). GTZ (2005) has reported that the Maoist conflict has had direct impacts upon German development cooperation, and GTZ was therefore compelled to temporarily suspend its activities in some regions, one example of which was noted above. In cooperation with the UK, Germany has established a Risk Management Office to provide advice to field workers regarding the continuation or cessation of their projects, and Germany is a signatory to the BOGs (GTZ, 2005).

138 Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Japan has been Nepal's top bilateral donor since 1980 (except for 1988), and its assistance is focused upon the improvement of living conditions, the promotion of industry, and environmental conservation (JICA, 2003). Japan has supported Nepal's pro-poor growth strategy by encouraging local development initiatives, including support to the education sector, and by promoting coordination with other donors (JICA, 2003). JICA has given security top priority in terms of the selection of its project sites, but acknowledges that security concerns have existed in most areas of Nepal. There has also been a correlation between the degree of poverty in an area and the intensity of the insurgency, i.e., the more in need an area is, the more dangerous it is likely to be. JICA has attempted to increase safety by employing Nepali staff and local community organizations as much as possible and limiting the degree and number of activities by Japanese staff. JICA has also considered the establishment of a safe base area for Japanese staff, and the planning of security methodologies to enable quick responses to changes in the security situation. Frequent correspondence and a degree of coordination with other donors are also suggested, to help ascertain risk levels and learn from the responses of other organizations (JICA, 2003). In consideration of the general consensus that poverty, inadequate governance, and socio-economic disparities among regions and ethnic groups were underlying causes of the insurgency, JICA made the following three "peace considerations" in terms of the planning and implementation of Japan's development assistance: 1) to prioritize poor areas in terms of planning and implementing projects, improve access of ethnic minorities, low-caste groups, women and the poor to social services and involve these groups in decision-making, and ensure that assistance would not exacerbate existing regional and ethnic disparities. 2) to support improved governance, particularly the prevention of corruption and capacity building for local government institutions to facilitate decentralization. 3) to emphasize donor coordination and information sharing (JICA, 2003).

139 JICA has also noted the particular importance of community participation and transparency during the conflict. It has stated that Maoists rarely interfere with projects that are participatory and transparent (JICA, 2003). Japan is also a signatory to the BOGs. Norwegian Development Agency: NORAD Nepal is one of Norway's main co-operating partners. As of 2004, Norway has elected to concentrate its assistance on basic and primary education, good governance, and private sector development, in line with the Nepalese government's priorities (NORAD, 2004). On July 20th, 2005, however, the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Kathmandu issued a press statement indicating its intention to reduce bilateral development assistance to Nepal by 10 percent in 2006. This decision was based on the king's actions on February 1st, 2005, which the Government of Norway considered a serious setback to multiparty democracy, human rights, and to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. Norway has also decided to immediately terminate an agreement regarding bilateral support of Nepal's Melamchi Water Supply Project, and to forego any new bilateral agreements between the two countries. The reduction in financial support, however, does not extend to Norway's ongoing commitments with the EFA program. Norway also decided to focus its development cooperation on efforts to promote democracy and human rights. The press release noted as well that development assistance would be reconsidered if "concrete efforts" were made to re-establish multiparty democracy, to improve the human rights situation, and to engage in a peace dialogue (NORAD, 2005). Norway is a signatory to the BOGs. Under the auspices of the "Peace and Development" pillar within its Nepal country plan, Norway has continued to support the government's Tenth Plan goal to address the root causes of conflict. It has prioritized endeavors to combat social exclusion and discrimination, support labour intensive infrastructure building, and increase social services and social mobilization (NORAD, 2004). NORAD's activities include: support to NGOs engaged in peace-building initiatives, a cross-Nepal "Peace Concert Tour" in 2003, support for local NGOs assisting child victims of conflict, and strengthening the "children as zones of peace" and "schools as zones of peace" advocacy campaigns through Save the Children Norway. NORAD has also been supporting children through a feeding program, providing girls with cooking oil as an incentive to go to school, and distributing resources to schools.

140 Support to NGOs is channeled through 12 Norwegian NGOs that support partner organizations in Nepal (NORAD, 2004). The Netherlands (SNV) The Netherlands has not been among Nepal's largest donors in the past, but it has extended assistance to several sectors, primarily environmental sustainability (biodiversity, forests and energy) and governance (decentralization). Activities in the latter sector stagnated for some time due to the conflict and political instability, and it appeared (at the time of a 2004 statement) that there was little prospect that the situation would improve. Given the limited scope of the Dutch program, the modest contribution that the Dutch government envisioned they could make towards improving governance in Nepal, as well as the political developments that were constraining aspects of the program, the Netherlands planned to phase out its bilateral cooperation with Nepal (NMFA, 2004). As of 2006, Nepal is no longer listed among The Netherlands' 36 partner countries, however SNV is a signatory to the BOGs (UNDP, 2005a). Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) Switzerland has long had a positive reputation as a development partner in Nepal because it is seen to operate from a position of neutrality and to be motivated by goodwill rather than political concerns (Khadka, 1991; SDC, 2005). As of 2005, SDC's main program priorities in Nepal include transportation infrastructure, natural resource management, occupational skills training and entrepreneurship, and governance and peace building. SDC is not involved in the formal education sector, but its documented response to the conflict has been among the most comprehensive of Nepal's donors (UNDP, 2005a). According to SDC (2005), Switzerland has determined to continue its work in Nepal "because of the conflict and not despite of it" (p. 29), but notes that successful program implementation and a meaningful contribution towards conflict resolution will take many years of dedicated and patient efforts. SDC argues that a shift is needed from an approach that "copes with a conflict situation" to one that is engaged "in the process of conflict transformation", through dialogue (SDC, 2005: 13). Conflict transformation, as opposed to poverty reduction, comprises the primary emphasis of their cooperation strategy, based upon the conviction that peace is a prerequisite for development (SDC, 2005).

141 SDC argues that the Maoist insurgency has, in effect, been composed of two, parallel, conflicts. One is the political struggle between the hegemonic government elites and the counter-hegemonic resistance of the Maoist leaders, while the other is the social conflict involving the long-standing grievances of the Nepalese people, i.e., poverty, discrimination, and poor governance. SDC argues that the political aspect of the conflict has become a self-sustaining process that will not be mitigated by simply addressing the so- called "root causes" that comprise the social conflict. They argue that "development cooperation has no immediate impact on the military motivations of the parties to the conflict" (p. 10), because the fight for control of the state apparatus is an independent phenomenon and needs to be addressed as such (SDC, 2005). In this difficult context, SDC has argued that aid to Nepal needs to consist of a combination of development work, humanitarian aid, as well as political initiatives. SDC argues that despite the many challenges they have been facing, development agencies can offer a significant conflict mitigation contribution at the local level, provided they are committed and their projects produce tangible benefits. SDC has also developed a comprehensive set of guiding principles to ensure conflict-sensitive implementation of their programs. These include measures to facilitate their ability to operate in the conflict, flexibility in planning and execution, knowledge-management and networking, monitoring, and harmonization with international actors (SDC, 2005). SDC is also a signatory of the BOGs. The most recent Swiss plan document, the 2005 SDC Cooperation Strategy (for the period 2005-2008), delineates the significant adaptations that SDC has made to their program in light of the conflict (SDC, 2005). For one, SCD has introduced a new category within its plan that covers issues of governance, human rights protection and anti-corruption. An internal reporting mechanism (MERV) has also been established, as well as a research and analysis project (FAST) to examine data gathering in regard to conflict-related incidents. Finally, a conflict transformation strategy has been developed which includes a plan to facilitate the sensitization of Maoist leaders to development issues. According to SDC, by 2005, donor agencies had unofficially taken over many state functions in rural areas. To facilitate their own work in villages, SDC has established strong

142 partnerships with local citizens groups, community-based organizations and NGOs. These groups have been instrumental in dealing with the necessary interactions with Maoists representatives, and have enabled SDC to act directly in communities, to address sensitive conflict-related issues such as the effect of the violence and fear on civilians. SDC stresses the importance of the strong relationships and social and political acceptance that they have developed at the local level (SDC, 2005). As with other donors, SDC has included issues such as decentralization, human rights, anti-corruption, inclusiveness, transparency, accountability, and participation throughout its programs. SDC's goals include the facilitation of negotiations among the conflict parties, the protection of populations affected by the conflict, particularly IDPs, the reinstatement of democracy, and the improvement of the quality of life of disadvantaged groups. Donor coordination and staff security are also strongly emphasized. Also, in recognition that conflict has been shown to affect women and men differently, SDC has begun to incorporate gender issues into their conflict mitigation and peace building work. An approach entitled conflict-sensitive project management (CSPM) has also been established, which involves close monitoring of the political and security situation, and reviewing reports by INGOs and Nepalese experts (SDC, 2005). Similar to Danida, SDC has developed scenarios to help plan appropriate alternative responses to possible future developments. Their two scenarios are as follows: Scenario A: Humanitarian crisis: This would consist of a situation of suspended civil liberties and continued deterioration of the security, human rights, and economic situations. A humanitarian emergency would see projects being implemented directly through CBOs and user groups, increased funding for protection and to maintain access, allowances for reduced project effectiveness, loosening of direct linkages with Nepal's PRS, preparations for a suspension of activities if the BOGs are not respected, as well as to support or initiate humanitarian aid if needed. Transparency will be facilitated through public auditing. To help address local tensions, sporting activities or cultural events are suggested, and women's participation is encouraged.

143 Scenario B: Meaningful dialogue: This scenario would materialize with the acceptance of a ceasefire, the initiation of peace talks, and the reinstatement of democracy. International actors would support the peace building process and assistance would be increased. While these two scenarios comprise the outer edges of future outcomes, SDC notes that it is most likely that the political context in Nepal will remain unstable for several years. Sometimes the environment will move closer to A and sometimes to B (and will likely continue to vary geographically). Their plan includes a group of objectives, activities, partners and issues that are compatible with both A and B, as well as particular activities unique to each (SDC, 2005). Taking these possibilities into account, SDC's program in Nepal is comprised of three components: Coordination and Harmonization: This component involves the fostering of effective coordination and harmonization among bilateral and multilateral development partners and humanitarian agencies, to facilitate aid coherence in the unstable context.40 Livelihood and Inclusion: In cooperation with partners, SDC intends to strengthen the capacity of rural people to maintain and improve their livelihood, by continuing projects such as resource management, rural infrastructure, provision of health and skill development services, and empowering local groups and organizations. Meaningful Dialogue and Conflict Transformation: Swiss actors intend to contribute to conflict resolution through "non-interventionist and non-partisan support", by supporting dialogue (with the Maoists as well if necessary), the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance (SDC, 2005: 25). UK: Department for International Development (DF1D) The UK is one of Nepal's largest donors, and DFID has written a great deal in regard to the Maoist conflict and its own conflict mitigation and sensitization measures. Several conflict monitoring tools and conflict-specific projects have been developed, and detailed alterations and additions have been made to their Country Assistance Plan over the course of the conflict (DFID, 2006). DFID has also conducted assessments and reevaluations of its

40 SDC notes that inter-donor consultation would "logically lead to a critical dialogue with the World Bank, which has so far, by and large, chosen to ignore its influence on the conflict, be it through the volume of its financial support, the large budgetary lending or the design of its operations" (SDC, 2005: 31). 144 program and position during the years of the insurgency, in the effort to improve accountability and transparency, as well as determine the merits and drawbacks of its various types of projects in light of the conflict situation (DFID, 2006; Armon et al., 2004).4' DFID (2005a) has also created a new Monitoring Framework that is designed to improve overall program monitoring as well as address the particular monitoring needs for countries undergoing conflict (DFID, 2005a). DFID's response to the conflict, in terms of procedural adaptations, is summarized in the following statement extracted from its Country Assistance Plan 2004: To deal with [the] situation, we will have to be flexible, responding to political and security related threats and opportunities. Staff safety will be our overriding concern. Opportunities could arise unexpectedly or close quickly, and we must be able to respond rapidly. For example, it may be necessary to move more to rapid impact projects and/or working through CBOs...We will deal with risks to field staff and NGO partners through daily monitoring and assessment of the situation, extensive staff training on working in conflict areas, establishing crisis management systems and procedures, and mainstreaming conflict sensitive development (DFID, 2004: 18). DFID's work in fragile states is based upon its perspective that appropriate aid can positively impact security, health, education, and environment situations. DFID also stresses the importance of obtaining a comprehensive understanding of the political context in which their projects are operating (Baranyi & Powell, 2005). DFID's policy for fragile states involves a pragmatic approach known as "good enough" governance, which argues that these countries should be supported to improve their ability to meet basic responsibilities in order to lay the foundation for more ambitious reform later (Francois & Sud, 2006).42 Although DFID has not considered Nepal a fragile state over the course of the conflict

41 See Armon et al. (2004) for a discussion of the pros and cons of working with the government, working with NGOs, and working directly with communities in Nepal. These writers conclude that the best degree of flexibility and ability to adapt to changing contexts can be achieved through a range of approaches and entry points, while the challenge is to discover the appropriate combination in any particular set of circumstances. 42 Francois and Sud (2006) suggest that DFID's "good enough" approach is more practical than that of aid conditionality based on significant improvements in governance, while Baranyi and Powell (2004) are concerned that it may ignore critical issues of social relations and that this may undermine the effectiveness of aid in fragile states. 145 (Francois & Sud, 2006), the adaptations it has made to its program are in accord with its fragile state policy, in terms of the stress upon context analysis and the continuance of service delivery. DFID's Country Assistance Plan (CAP) 2004 was created during the ongoing conflict in Nepal, and issues pertaining to the conflict are thus integrated throughout. In its plan for Nepal, DFID states that its overarching purposes are to reduce poverty and social exclusion, improve governance, and work towards lasting peace, by focusing on areas that address the underlying causes of the conflict. It is felt that because Nepal is at a pivotal point in its history and risks becoming a failed state, continued assistance is in the best interest of the country (DFID, 2004). The CAP's consists of several focal issues: Peace Building, which is considered essential to the attainment of the program's other objectives; Growth for the Rural Poor; Basic Services; and Social Inclusion, which involves the mainstreaming of social inclusion issues and initiatives emphasizing caste, indigenous and other ethnic groups. DFID notes that to reach the poorest people, some projects might occasionally necessitate working outside the government, especially in conflict-afflicted areas. However, it prefers to work with the government as much as possible, and would take care in any case to ensure that DFID's work did not undermine the capacity of the government (DFID, 2004). DFID also points out that its goals of peace-building and poverty reduction will entail a greater involvement in the mid- and far-western regions, where conflict intensity has been high. Working in these areas, however, necessitates that the parties to the conflict view DFID as neutral (DFID, 2004). DFID stated in 2004 that while the volume and pattern of assistance it would be able to deliver was uncertain, it determined to withdraw from operating areas only when absolutely necessary, i.e., due to threats to staff safety or significant limitations to project success (DFID, 2004). The situation became more challenging in 2005, however, following King Gyanendra's declaration of a State of Emergency and assumption of direct rule on February 1 of that year, after which DFID undertook a review of its Nepal program in order to assess the impact of the king's actions on development work.

146 As of 2005, DFID states that decisions regarding programs will be made on the grounds of safety of DFlD-funded personnel and on judgments regarding the capacity of DFID to continue to deliver effective interventions (DFID, 2005b). The 2005 review determined that although the space for development has deteriorated, development assistance can still be affective, and thus DFID will maintain "a substantial program" in Nepal (DFID, 2005b). While three projects that had been supporting the police, the Prime Ministers Office, and the Prison Service were discontinued based on ineffective performance, all other components of the CAP program have continued (DFID, 2005c). Some of the CAP's priorities have been shifted, however, towards the possibility of humanitarian activities, and its support will be reviewed and adjusted according to context (DFID, 2006). DFID's Minister for Asia notes that due to the security context, the CAP's intention to significantly increase levels of assistance has been reconsidered, and scaled back (UNDP, 2005a). Continued support will be provided to education and health through government systems, although individual payments will require DFID approval in accordance with the high level of risk. It has been determined that financial aid, i.e., resources through the government budget, should stop, and be replaced by direct support (DFID, 2005b). DFID also continues to support several human rights organizations, civil society peace-building initiatives, INGOs engaged in peace activities, as well as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (DFID, 2006). DFID is also a signatory to the BOGs. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) The United States has been an important donor to Nepal over the past half-century in terms of both policy influence and the extent of aid provided. In fact, American influence has been so prevalent that some have suggested that certain American programs in the Rapti district in the remote western region of Nepal led directly or indirectly to the onset of the insurgency. Others dispute this assertion, however (Whelpton, 2005; Gersony, 2003). The contestable reputation of the United States, at least as far as the Maoists are concerned, was exacerbated by the American Ambassador Michael Malinowski's likening, in February 2002, of Nepal's Maoists with hard-line terrorists. The Ambassador stated:

147 Nepal is currently plagued with a terrorism that is shaking its very foundation as a nation. These terrorists, under the guise of Maoist or the so called 'people's war,' are fundamentally the same as terrorists everywhere - be they members of the Shining Path, Abu Sayaf, the Khmer Rouge, or Al Qaeda.. .They are radicals who seek to impose their narrow views and beliefs on others, despite the popular will of those they seek to influence or convert.. .Having failed to receive the popular support of the Nepali people at the ballot box, the Maoists now seek to achieve their aims through the use of force, violence, extortion, intimidation, and murder (cited in: Gersony, 2003:81). This position was subsequently formalized on April 30, 2003 when the US government included the Maoists on its international terrorist watch list. According to Gersony (2003) this action by the United States prompted the Maoists to declare an "All Americans out of Nepal" campaign. According to USAID and American INGOs, however, many American projects continue to function with little if any significant disturbance (USAID, 2005b; Personal Interview, October 3, 2005). USAID has been very explicit about its desire for economic and political stability in Nepal, in the form of multiparty democracy. A USAID report of 2005 states: "Nepal serves as a geographic buffer between the world's two most populous nations in a volatile region. By supporting efforts to resolve the Maoist insurgency and addressing the underlying causes of poverty, inequality, and poor governance in Nepal, the United States is making an important contribution to fighting terrorism, promoting regional stability, and diminishing the likelihood of a humanitarian crisis" (USAID 2005b). In 2000, USAID noted that one of the primary targets for Maoist violence was "high profile international development agencies", and that direct involvement of the US government in conflict negotiation would not be appropriate, given that the American government was "not viewed as neutral or objective by the parties in conflict or by our donor colleagues" (USAID, 2000: 3-4). Therefore, USAID expected to be able to play only a limited role in terms of conflict mitigation, by making sure its programs operated in accord with the principles of good governance, thereby supporting local government mechanisms.

148 According to USAID, US assistance to Nepal focuses on the overarching goals of promoting peace via good governance and addressing the causes of the insurgency, through improved incomes, improving health care, curtailing population growth, improving democracy and governance, developing the economy, and promoting the growth of the hydropower sector. While USAID continues to work in cooperation with the government, its programs are implemented mainly through INGOs, which work either directly or through local NGOs. This is considered a useful strategy in light of the volatile context, deteriorating governance, as well as USAID's own budget limitations (USAID, 2005b). Some of USAID's programs are as follows: Improving Family Health: Education-related components include: increasing the number of skilled family planning providers, expanding literacy and reproductive health programs, strengthening pre-service curriculum in family planning, life skills and literacy programs for young women and out-of-school girls, training for outreach volunteers in the health sector, and support for a revised national curriculum incorporating HIV prevention. USAID and UNICEF also plan to develop and institutionalize inclusive school enrollment and teacher hiring policies for people living with HIV/AIDS, among other initiatives (USAID, 2005b). Strengthening Accountability and Citizen Participation: This component is intended to strengthen the capacity of the judiciary and other legal entities, strengthen anti-corruption organizations, and promote advocacy and transparency among civil society organizations (USAID, 2005b). Promoting Peace: Initiatives include the implementation of small rural infrastructure such as roads and irrigation systems designed to provide income and employment, assistance with longer-term infrastructure and dispute resolution training, the provision of assistance to conflict victims, and work to strengthen the government's "ability to manage the peace process" (USAID, 2005b). Increasing Incomes in Rural Areas: USAID provides assistance to farmers (50 percent women) in selected communities to help them produce and market valuable non-timber forest products and farm crops (USAID, 2005b). Conflict Mitigation Initiative: USAID's overall objective in regard to conflict mitigation is to address its root causes by supporting democracy, good governance, and political and

149 economic reforms to improve the state's responsiveness to Nepalese citizens, in order to make the Maoists a less attractive alternative. The conflict mitigation initiative aims to provide rapid and visible benefits to marginalized and conflict-affected populations, and support the peace process. It is comprised of the several aspects including: employment generation, skills and literacy training, psychological and legal support for victims of the conflict, educational supplies and scholarships, strengthening of the government's planning, implementation, monitoring and policy forming capacity, support for civil society networks, and strengthening "community capacity for peace" through training for community survival skills such as local dispute resolution and negotiation, as well as support for community development projects (USAID, 2005b). Although it is not made evident in the documentation whether USAID has considered Nepal a failed state during the conflict, its program is in accordance with its Failed States Strategy. The elements of this strategy are: enhancing context-based monitoring and analysis of state failure; setting clear priorities; focusing their programs on the causes of instability; and streamlining procedures to enable rapid and effective responses (Baranyi & Powell, 2005). Asian Development Bank (ADB) The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is a Manila-based multilateral financial development institution. It was established in 1966 with a mandate to work for poverty reduction in Asia and the Pacific. It provides loans and technical assistance to governments for specific, high-priority development projects and programs (UNDP, 2005a). The ADB states that Nepal's most important priorities currently are the restoration of peace and security and a resolution of the political impasse, and that that the continuation of development assistance is critical, even in the midst of the conflict, where it is possible to do so. The ADB states that assistance can help facilitate peace by improving equitable access to the benefits of development, by addressing issues of inclusion and other important constraints to poverty reduction (ADB, 2004, 2006). According to the ADB (2004) some of challenges associated with working during the conflict can be mitigated by supporting projects that: i) incorporate decentralized and participatory design and management, ii) are implemented through NGOs and CBOs, iii) are

150 transparent in design and implementation, iv) deliver visible benefits as quickly as possible, and v) are planned and formulated in a manner that ensures that the majority of project benefits are realized by the poor and excluded groups (ADB, 2004). The ADB's most recent Country Strategy and Program (CSP) 2005-2009, consists of loans (noting that a higher level of assistance will be required should the conflict be resolved), institutional strengthening and capacity building to improve Nepal's institutions, as well as inter-donor coordination (ADB, 2004). The strategic priorities for the CSP are: promoting pro-poor and broad based economic growth; supporting inclusive social and human development through improved basic social infrastructure and education; and promoting good governance by strengthening the civil service, supporting anti-corruption institutions and supporting decentralization. The CSP also emphasizes participatory processes that are hoped to reveal the actual needs of people at the local level, and tap local knowledge and initiative (ADB, 2004). The ADB states that its response to the conflict comprises a crosscutting theme of its programs, in that certain aspects of project design and implementation associated with risk mitigation are emphasized throughout. Also, the focus on poverty reduction and inclusion throughout the CSP means that all programming can be said to be conflict-sensitive, as well as addressing the root causes of the conflict and mitigating its effects upon the most vulnerable (ADB, 2004). Recently approved projects also focus more on the conflict- affected mid- and far-western regions (UNDP, 2005a). A new feature of the ADB's latest country strategy with particular conflict- mitigation potential is the Social Protection component. This includes "quick impact" initiatives that are incorporated within existing projects to strengthen institutions and strengthen the voice of women and marginalized castes. An example of a quick impact project involves the provision of incentives for the ultra-poor, which are designed to improve their food security and ability to send their children to school (ADB, 2004). The European Commission (EC) The European Union and Nepal opened diplomatic relations in 1975. The European Commission began assistance to Nepal in 1977, and over the years has provided aid to various sectors including irrigation, watershed management, livestock, reproductive health,

151 primary education, refugees, and institutional capacity building. In the education sector, the EC supported the BPEP II (2000-2004) initiative (EU, 2006). In 2002 a delegation from the European Commission conducted a comprehensive assessment of the conflict situation in Nepal, making note of the causes and effects of the insurgency as well as the potential role the EC could play in its mitigation. According to the study, the root causes of the insurgency, such as social exclusion, can only be addressed at the design stage of projects and through the selection of appropriate partners. Also, the importance of building upon existing projects is stressed, given that an area of particular difficulty within conflict contexts is creating entry points to development work. According to the researchers, organizations entering an area after the onset of a conflict are at a comparable disadvantage to others who have already developed relationships in the area. In one region of Nepal, for example, it was found that the relationships between EC personnel and the community were strong enough that the population compelled the Maoists to retract their intention to expel a project. The researchers also argue that completing existing projects, despite the increased challenges and delays posed by the conflict, is critically important to maintain local relationships. A particularly important need, it is argued, is the development of a mechanism for a nuanced and up-to-date conflict analysis that would be available on a regular basis (Hollants Van Loocke & Philipson, 2002). After the king's takeover in February 2005, and the subsequent deterioration of the human rights situation, the EC has re-assessed its assistance framework for both existing and planned programs. The EC has elected to continue the implementation of ongoing projects, provided the development context remains viable and the BOGs are respected. New projects that have been planned to address conflict mitigation, human rights, and humanitarian activities are also to continue, as are regional programs. All other pending bilateral projects and appraisal missions have, however, been suspended indefinitely (EU, 2006). The EC Country Strategy Paper for Nepal 2002-2006 identifies three primary assistance areas: long-term support for rural poverty reduction focused in the mid-western regions, renewable energy development for areas without access to electricity, and a preventive conflict mitigation strategy designed to support conflict mitigation and the consolidation of democracy via the judicial sector and human rights promotion. The

152 immediate goal of this strategy is to reduce social unrest, promote reforms, and strengthen civil society (EU, 2006). The EU also employs a Rapid Reaction Mechanism, a program that was created to allow for rapid and flexible short-term assistance to contribute towards the stabilization of countries in the midst of political crises. In Nepal, this program is designed to expand upon the existing EC development assistance in conflict-affected areas, and prepare a foundation for implementing the EU Country Strategy, which has a strong focus on ameliorating the negative effects of the conflict. The EC notes that most of its specific projects have been designed during the course of the conflict, and are thus inherently adapted to pertinent conflict-related issues. These include: • Livelihood support in the mid-west, through training and education, income support, discussion of issues pertaining to good governance, social justice, and human rights; • Economic empowerment activities for areas surrounding Bhutanese refugee camps (in eastern Nepal);43 • Radio program development regarding conflict management and resolution; • Appointment of an advisor for community development and conflict mitigation, to ensure continuous conflict analysis at the local level; • Conflict Mitigation Package II: This project builds upon the strategy introduced with the EC's Rapid Reaction Mechanism projects, by adding other elements which link security concerns with the desire to promote human rights, through the promotion of judicial reform and access to legal representation; • European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR): Nepal has been one of 68 target countries for the EIDHR since 2001, an initiative designed to combat discrimination, provide assistance to human rights defenders, support media freedoms, and increase respect for the rule of law;

43 The camps themselves were noted by the conflict assessment mission of 2002 to be an area of potential concern, due to their sizeable young populations, who had little in the way of future prospects. While there did not at the time seem to have been a Maoist (or other rebel group) campaign to recruit from the camps, the group of disillusioned and resentful youth would prove a fertile ground should such a campaign occur. The assessment had consulted with the UNHCR who were cognizant of this risk and were working to establish activities for the young people (Hollants Van Loocke & Philipson, 2002).

153 • Other: The EC also co-funds projects through NGOs which include women's literacy and maternal health, support to street children in Kathmandu, trafficking prevention, rural livelihoods and poverty alleviation. The EC also supports legal institutions in the effort to improve "peace research capacities" and programs designed to assist victims of the insurgency (EU, 2006). The World Bank (WB) The World Bank Group was founded in 1944, and today is one of the largest sources of development assistance in the world, and is the largest source of funding to the education sectors of Southern countries. The Bank's main policy focus is assisting poor countries in developing "stable, sustainable and equitable growth", and thereby fighting poverty and improving the living standards of the poor (Smith & Vaux, 2003: 56; UNDP, 2005b). Critics have alleged, however, that the scale of the World Bank's resources causes it to dominate and exert undue influence upon borrowers (Smith & Vaux, 2003). The World Bank published a report in 2002 to guide its activities in Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) (an older term for "fragile states") (Francois & Sud, 2006). Because the governments of fragile states tend to "lack the will and/or capacity to use finance effectively for poverty reduction", the Bank argues that donors need to adopt different strategies, and make long-term commitments (Baranyi & Powell, 2004: 9). The Bank advocates modest reforms to eventually improve policies, institutions and governance, as well as capacity building and service delivery in the short-term, all based in substantive contextual analysis. Similar to DFID, the Bank argues that controversial issues should be avoided in the early stages of engagement in fragile states (Baranyi & Powell, 2004). Also in accord with DFID, the World Bank has not considered Nepal a fragile state during the conflict, yet its programs in Nepal have been reflective of its fragile states policy, in terms of the stress placed upon such issues as governance and contextual analysis (World Bank, 2007a). For the past several years, the World Bank's main underlying objective in Nepal has been poverty reduction, and it has provided assistance in the form of funding as well as analytical and advisory work. The Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) is based upon supporting the four pillars of Nepal's Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS): economic growth,

154 human development, social and economic inclusion, and good governance (UNDP, 2005a). According to the Bank (2003b), despite striking improvements in its portfolio's status in 1999 and 2000, its program was adversely affected the following year with the declaration of the state of emergency and escalation of violence in November 2001, particularly in the remote regions of the west. Despite the "formidable" challenges to reform, however, the Bank warns that failure would entail the escalation of internal conflict to such a degree that the development process would eventually collapse (World Bank, 2003b: 34). It is stressed that continuing development work is essential, therefore, as waiting for conflict de-escalation would be counter-productive. The Bank, in accordance with other donors, also notes that "truly community-owned" projects tend to be the least affected by the conflict (World Bank, 2003b: 28). Other important considerations during the conflict include the maintenance of flexibility and an open mind, in order to identify and support new opportunities for reform. Donor coordination is also said to be critical, although it is not often easy in practice (World Bank, 2003b). In a move that drew criticism from some other donors (e.g. DFID), the World Bank decided to take a "firm position on governance" and significantly reduce its funding projections for 1999-2002 (World Bank, 2003b: 16). This was justified by the argument that doing so highlighted the Bank's assessment that poor governance was Nepal's primary development constraint, and that the action was supported by the more reform-minded among Nepal's officials. The government was also given the clear message that the Bank was strongly committed to poverty reduction, and would not be motivated by "lending pressure". This would allow the Bank to discuss policy matters "from a position of considerable credibility" (p. 16). The World Bank has adjusted its funding projections in more recent plans, however. Because of Nepal's financial pressures, the Bank has intended to increase its financial support as part of its 2004-07 CAS to assist with the country's reform efforts. The Bank states that Nepal is, in many respects, "at a critical juncture in its development process", and that support provided by the Bank to facilitate its reform program will greatly improve the

155 chances the program will succeed and that the lives of Nepalese people will thereby be improved (World Bank, 2003b: ii). The World Bank's position relative to the continuance of its work amidst the conflict has been a proactive strategy, with the intent to adjust to the changing circumstances. There has been little if any mention of withdrawal of projects, but the Bank has suggested the strong possibility that the conflict will compel it to scale down its endeavors. In order to plan for divergent contingencies, the Bank describes three potential scenarios. These are the "base case": limited violence that did not seriously constrain development work or reform; the "low case": escalation of hostilities or slow reform implementation leading to deteriorating development progress; and "high case": a peace agreement and/or improvements in reform implementation. The goals and content of the reforms will remain the same regardless of which scenario materializes; the difference will consist in the speed with which the goals can be expected to be achieved. The Bank plans to significantly alter its lending levels to reflect the development context, and in doing so reiterate its position that financial support is tightly coupled to reform progress (World Bank, 2003b). The United Nations (UN) The UN's development agency is the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). As with the majority of Nepal's donors, the main objective for the UNDP's Country Cooperation framework (CCF) for Nepal has been to contribute to the government's poverty reduction goals (specifically, to reduce poverty incidence to 10 percent by 2017), and to the equitable allocation of development benefits. Some of UNDP's main activities in Nepal have included: poverty mapping, support to biodiversity conservation, mainstreaming of human development concepts, developing institutional capacities at the local level, and support for gender issues (UNDP, 2002). In May 2002, the UNDP's Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) examined all of UNDP's Nepal programs in light of the conflict, and offered suggestions in regard to how to make the projects more conflict-sensitive. The report has led, for example, to increased emphasis upon social inclusion and conflict mitigation, as well as service delivery and participation, particularly for vulnerable groups. The UNDP also intends to highlight ethnic minorities more strongly within their activities (Neupane et al., 2005).

156 The UNDP's report notes that conflict mitigation efforts need to be considered as part of a broad array of initiatives that address the economic and social situation of the country. Experience in Nepal has demonstrated the importance of social mobilization and decentralization in stimulating development, and thus the majority of UNDP programs integrate these elements into their various approaches (UNDP, 2002). One program called the Support for Peace and Development Initiatives (SPD1) was launched in 2002 (and continues as of 2006) in response to the increasing impact of the conflict upon civilians, with funding support from several bilateral donors. This program aims to facilitate the involvement of community-based organizations and Nepalese NGOs in the peace building process. Some of these projects include scholarships for children, as well as skills training, human rights and conflict transformation training, and the establishment of micro-enterprises (Neupane et al., 2005). The UNDP Village Development Program is another initiative that helps open service centers in villages to compensate for the lack of health, agriculture and other services in many rural areas. The program also involves sending individuals to district centres to undergo various training programs at technical schools and become "village experts" (UNDP, 2006a). An additional program entitled the UNDP Rural Urban Partnership Program (RUPP) supports IDPs through small-business loans, and helps improve the urban landscapes in which IDPs are living, as well as facilitate their integration into their new communities (UNDP, 2006a). An Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was established in Nepal in 2005, with the mandate of playing an advisory and supportive role to several partners. Some initiatives undertaken to date include the planning of human rights training at the Police Academy, cooperative activities with NGOs such as presentations on human rights issues, and the issuing of statements in regard to reports emanating from the Prime Minister's Office (OHCHR, 2006). Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) From the early 1990s, CIDA's focus in Nepal has been on supporting equitable growth via poverty reduction, gender equality, good governance, and environmental sustainability (UNDP, 2005a). CIDA's aid is channeled through several Canadian, Nepali,

157 and international partner organizations. Current initiatives include: irrigation projects benefiting small farmers, livelihoods activities in the tarai, community environmental management projects, capacity-building for Nepalese organizations, strengthening of the NHRC through UNDP, a rural community infrastructure food-for-work project through the World Food Program, and a local development facility, which supports small initiatives involving income generation, human rights, and health interventions (UNDP, 2005a). A Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of all CIDA's programming was planned for early 2004, in order to help ensure that projects were well adapted to the conflict environment, and were having either a positive or at least a neutral impact on the conflict dynamics. Peace-building has not been a focus of CIDA's bilateral program, yet small-scale conflict-related initiatives, i.e., not exceeding 10 percent of CIDA's annual budget for Nepal, have been considered a possibility. Participation in decision-making of all marginalized groups has been stressed in order to address the root causes of the conflict (UNDP, 2005a). CIDA is also one of the signatories to the BOGs. According to the C1DA representative with whom 1 conducted a telephone interview, the guidelines were proving to be quite useful, although it took some time for them to be implemented. The representative added that some donors (e.g. Danida and GTZ) had pulled out from certain areas after instances in which the guidelines were transgressed, and then returned later after the Maoists made amends and the problems were corrected (Personal Interview, 2006, January 12). The representative stated that because CIDA's projects have been developed during the insurgency, a conflict-sensitive approach has been incorporated from the start. The official noted, however, that CIDA is currently engaged in examining its existing projects with regard to how to reconfigure them to include ex-combatants, in addition to other issues pertaining to conflict-sensitivity. The majority of CIDA's projects have been established in areas that have since fallen under Maoist control, but the representative stated that the insurgency has not affected them to a great extent. One difficulty, however, was the fact that project staff are not able to work with their counterparts in local government as much as they would like, particularly after the king seized control of the country on February 1, 2005, as the insurgency has largely prevented government extension work into remote areas.

158 The representative noted that some NGOs have also been finding it difficult to work in Maoist areas. The representative also stated that following the royal coup, contact ceased between C1DA staff and some government planners and representatives at central and district levels. C1DA did not want "to carry on business as usual" because the situation was not business as usual. The aim was to demonstrate CIDA's political position with respect to the government's actions, without freezing the relationship. Some interaction has thus continued, but is limited. Training activities, for example, are no longer aimed at government officials. The representative was also asked whether he was aware of any planning that was being done for post-conflict reconstruction. He replied that such activity was perhaps premature at the present time. There has, however, been a degree of discussion in the donor community regarding reconstruction, such as how donors could support a mutual ceasefire, and the need for programs that would address the needs of disarmament, such as reintegration for ex-combatants (Personal Interview, 2006, January 12). 7.2.3 Summary of Policy Responses of Bilateral & Multilateral Agencies Nepal's donors have differed in terms of their responses to the conflict, according to their mandate, resources, and size of program in Nepal, and due to the political and financial directives and concerns emanating from their own governments. In terms of the overarching goals of Nepal's bilateral and multilateral donors, however, there have been, overall, far more similarities than differences. While agencies vary in terms of the emphasis and attention placed upon certain programmatic priorities, donors express the same needs in regard to meeting the root causes of the conflict, i.e., addressing poverty, caste, ethnic and gender discrimination, human rights, and poor governance. Many donors thus stress the need to work "on" the conflict as opposed to around it. The bilateral and multilateral donors that have decided to continue most or all of their work in Nepal (and these comprise the majority) exhibit similar conflict-sensitivity adaptations. These include: the employment of national and international NGOs as implementing partners, a strong advocacy for donor coordination, increased transparency, the maintenance of neutrality, measures to enhance staff safety that include: increased

159 devolution of responsibilities to local staff, a pro-poor focus and emphasis upon tangible results, capacity building for central and/or local institutions, and the encouragement of participation and inclusion at the local level. As noted by SDC (2005), such measures and emphases reflect a tacit adherence to the OECD's Principles for Engagement in Fragile States. The provision of tangible benefits and the existence of community support have also been key factors determining the acceptability of projects to the Maoists. Several donors, such as the World Bank and SDC, have also emphasized the fact that sustainable progress and poverty reduction in Nepal will necessitate political reform as much as traditional development work. A summary of the policy responses the bilateral and multilateral agencies discussed above have made to the conflict is provided in the following tables. Table 3 summarizes the response of each agency individually, and Table 4 groups the responses of the agencies according to some of the most prevalent themes in the documentation studied. Table 3: Policy Responses of Bilateral & Multilateral Agencies to the Maoist Insurgency Agency Response to Insurgency Continuation of Adaptations to Program Adaptations to Codes & Program Principles CIDA No mention in Focus on poverty reduction, equality, BOG signatory; documents or good governance, and environmental representative stated in interview of scaling sustainability; aid channeled through interview that CIDA down CIDA's several partner organizations; projects intended to demonstrate involvement; some were said to be inherently conflict- its political position limitation of training sensitive as they had developed regarding the activities involving during conflict; an assessment was government's actions government officials planned in 2004 to ensure projects without freezing the were adapted to conflict environment relationship Danida Determination to Increased emphasis on human rights BOG signatory maintain program to and good governance, NGO mitigate conflict and partnerships, and planning utilizing prevent decent into scenarios; refocus of attention failed state; some towards strengthening civil society suspension of programs following 2005 coup Finland Continuation of Adaptations to conflict not clear; BOG signatory existing programs, focus is on support to NGOs, and the but deferral of new education, environment and energy agreements & sectors funding GTZ Suspension of some Adaptations to conflict not clear; BOG signatory;

160 activities focus is on health and energy sectors, establishment of Risk local self-government and civil Management Office society with DFID JICA No mention of Move towards addressing causes of BOG signatory; reduction of program conflict via prioritization of poor & measures to enhance or funding marginalized populations; good staff security such as governance; and encouragement of use of Nepali staff inter-donor coordination NORAD 10% reduction in Addressing causes of conflict through BOG signatory funding; suspension prioritization of inclusion, job of some initiatives creation & social services; promoting democracy & human rights; support to NGOs' peace-related initiatives SNV Phase-out of Nepal is no longer listed as a partner BOG signatory programming in country; information pertaining to Nepal due to conflict adaptations made prior to phase-out & other of programs not found circumstances SDC Determination to Focus on conflict transformation and Stresses importance of continue activities integration of conflict analysis into utilizing a combination "because of the program; projects emphasized of development work, conflict and not inclusion, donor coordination, human humanitarian aid & despite of it" (SDC, rights, good governance, and local political initiatives; use 2005: 29); stresses partnerships; new monitoring & of guiding principles to necessity of long- research mechanisms were created; ensure conflict- term commitment utilization of scenarios to plan future sensitivity; BOG and need for endeavors signatory significant programmatic adaptations DFID Majority of Focus on peace building, poverty Emphasis on need for programs continue alleviation, governance, community flexibility and despite conflict; mediation & "rapid impact" projects; "opportunistic" decisions made on conflict monitoring tools developed approach; program to be grounds of staff continually re-assessed safety and in light of conflict; efficaciousness of consideration of individual projects; potential humanitarian plans to increase needs in future; BOG funding in 2005 signatory were scaled back USAID Determination that "Conflict mitigation initiative" Recognition of geo­ continuation of focuses on addressing root causes of political sensitivity of programs addressing conflict, support to victims, conflict & operational poverty, inequality community strengthening, building difficulties faced by and poor governance national capacity for peace, and high-profile agencies; integral to mitigation improved rural incomes; programs declaration by American of conflict, yet largely implemented through INGOs ambassador that the USAID's role in Maoists were terrorists

161 direct conflict prompted the Maoist mitigation seen as leadership to declare an limited "All Americans out of Nepal" campaign (Gersony, 2003) ADB Continuation of Conflict comprises crosscutting theme Several risk-mitigation development in portfolio; emphasis on poverty measures undertaken assistance, in as reduction, inclusion & socio­ including: focus upon much capacity as economic development; "quick decentralized and possible, seen as impact" initiatives of benefit to ultra- participatory projects, critical, despite poor and excluded to be incorporated utilization of NGOs and negative impact of into existing projects CBOs, and working to conflict on ADB's ensure benefits felt by programs poor and excluded groups EC Re-assessment Focus on poverty alleviation, energy Comprehensive conflict following 2005 coup distribution, and conflict mitigation analyses undertaken; led to indefinite via support to human rights & pro- researchers stress suspension of democracy initiatives; radio importance of building planned projects programs; "rapid reaction" projects on existing projects, (other than those involving short-term and flexible designing projects with pertaining to initiatives; support to NGOs involved the conflict's causes in conflict-mitigation), in several sectors mind, and continuing while existing (by extending timelines projects continue if necessary) existing projects to fruition WB Emphasis upon Utilization of scenarios to plan for WB states that their necessity of divergent contingencies; possibility of strategy regarding work continuing scaling down but goals and priorities amidst the conflict is development support to be maintained: these include intended to be proactive lest the conflict supporting Nepal's Poverty Reduction in order to adjust to the escalate and the Strategy through poverty reduction, changing circumstances; development process economic growth, inclusion & recognition that support collapse; funding governance strengthening from the Bank was levels were necessary given that nonetheless Nepal was at a "critical temporarily reduced juncture in its in line with a "firm development process" position on (World Bank, 2003b: ii) governance" (World Bank, 2003b: 16) UN No mention was Main goals in Nepal include poverty Conflict-sensitivity found in UN reduction and equitable allocation of assessment led to documentation benefits; recognition of need for emphasis upon suggesting projects multi-pronged approach; various inclusion, participation or funding would be projects aim to help mitigate impact & service delivery; goal scaled down or of poverty & conflict upon vulnerable was to provide withdrawn; populations, including IDPs, and to "catalytic" support to programs were strengthen the functioning of Nepalese institutions

162 assessed to Nepalese NGOs and CBOs (UNDP, 2002); Office determine how to oftheUNHigh improve their Commissioner for conflict-sensitivity Human Rights established in Kathmandu in 2005

Table 4: Responses to Insurgency: Common Themes in Agency Documents Theme Organizations Importance of Continued Assistance to Prevent DFID, USAID, ADB, Danida, Finland, World Bank State Failure / Humanitarian Crisis Importance of Addressing "Root Causes" of Danida, JICA, Norway, SDC, DFID, USAID, ADB, Conflict, i.e., Poverty, Governance, Social EC, UNDP, World Bank Exclusion & Human Rights Analysis &/or Adaptation of Programs to CIDA, UNDP, World Bank, EC, ADB, USAID, DFID, Enhance Conflict-Sensitivity SDC, JICA, Danida Importance of NGO/CBO Partnership SDC, Danida, Norway, DFID, USAID, ADB Importance of Maintaining Cordial DFID, USAID, Danida, World Bank, CIDA Relationship with Government Importance of Neutrality DFID, SDC, USAID (i.e., USAID notes their role is limited due to lack of perceived neutrality) Flexibility / Combination of Approaches DFID, World Bank Importance of "Peace Building" Through Danida, Norway, SDC, DFID Dialogue with Conflict Parties Importance of Local Relationships &/or EC, SDC, ADB, World Bank, UNDP, CIDA Participatory Projects Suspension of Existing Programming &/or Danida, DFID, GTZ, SNV, Norway Funding Reductions to Send Political Message or Due to Breaches of BOGs Suspension of New Contracts or Projected Finland, Danida, Norway, DFID, EC, World Bank Funding Increases Consideration of Role of Humanitarian Danida, SDC, DFID Assistance Importance of Donor Coordination Danida, JICA, SDC, ADB, World Bank Increased Project Monitoring Established or SDC, GTZ, DFID, JICA, EC Suggested

7.3 Approaches to Educational Aid in the Context of Conflict As discussed in Chapter 6, the primary contemporary vehicle for bilateral and multilateral assistance to education in Nepal is the EFA program. The viability of EFA during the context of conflict, and the question of whether it may be contributing to, or helping to mitigate, the conflict, are thus important concerns. As noted in Chapter 6, there are several limitations of EFA regarding its applicability to the Nepalese context. The

163 following section will discuss the country plan documents of Nepal's donors in terms of references pertaining specifically to education. The primary donors to Nepal's formal education sector include Denmark, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom, the Asian Development Bank, the European Commission, and the World Bank, although additional agencies such as USAID, CIDA, and the UN, are also discussed below. Those agencies absent from the following discussion made no mention of education in their plan documents. 7.3.1 Individual Agency Activities in Education Denmark (Danida) Denmark began assistance to Nepal's education sector in 1992, and has been one of the principal donors to Nepal's educational development for several years. Danida currently supports basic education, including pre-school, non-formal education, the EFA 2004-2009 program, and secondary education through the SESP 2003-2009 program (EDK, 2006). According to Danida's most recent country plan, 80 percent of Danish assistance is channeled to the government through a joint donor financing arrangement, and the remaining 20 percent is used for capacity building and for piloting new approaches within the education sector (EDK, 2006). Details in regard to the relationship of the conflict with education, or adjustments to Danish educational assistance in light of the conflict, however, were not found.

Japan (JICA) Japan does not provide direct support to Nepal's EFA program, yet its initiatives in this sector are very much in line with the EFA agenda. According to the latest country plan document available, JICA's resources in the education sector are channeled towards improvements in access and facilities, raising parental awareness, the establishment of appropriate qualifications for teachers, expanded teacher training, improved curricula and teaching materials, and a more reasonable regional distribution of teachers (JICA, 2003). Initiatives to reduce educational disparities include: activities aimed exclusively at students from marginalized groups, increasing the number of female teachers, and the installation of more restrooms for girls. The overall goals of JICA's assistance to primary education are to raise the percentage of students who complete the full course of primary education, and improve the academic achievements of children. Other educational focal areas (again very

164 much in accord with EFA) include: ECE programs; school management improvement to reflect local needs; adult literacy and non-formal education; and improvements in secondary, vocational, technical, and tertiary education, as part of a long-term sustainable growth strategy (JICA, 2003). The impacts of the conflict on education or education reform efforts, or the conflict-sensitivity of sector-wide educational assistance, were not discussed in JICA's most recent country plan document. Norway Norway is one of the primary donors for EFA 2004-2009. It also supports the World Food Program's School Feeding Program, as well as UNICEF and Save the Children Norway's programs in education (NORAD, 2004). No mention was found regarding the conflict-sensitivity of education or changes to Norway's educational support in light of the conflict. United Kingdom (DF1D) DFID is one of the donors supporting Nepal's EFA program, and conflict-specific responses to education are considered only in terms of their inclusion within the crosscutting themes of their Country Assistance Plan (CAP) (e.g. inclusion and gender sensitivity), and only within the bounds of the existing EFA agenda. It is suggested that the targets of EFA, such as inclusion and increased enrollment, are in and of themselves worthwhile. No mention is made in DFID's country plans of the potentially contentious nature of the EFA or the current state of education in Nepal as a whole. DFID plans to continue assistance to the education sector despite the conflict, provided they are certain that their funds are being used effectively, and that the government remains sufficiently committed to poverty reduction to warrant continued financial support (DFID, 2006). DFID does not single out education as an area of concentration in its CAP, but education is included amongst its broad goal of improving basic services in general, which also includes health, water supply, and sanitation. The education component is simply to "improve basic and primary education", by assisting with its development (DFID, 2004: 15). United States Agency for International Development (USAID) USAID does not seem to be directly involved in the education sector aside from the provision of some scholarships. It is involved in numerous non-formal initiatives, however,

165 such as the health education and adult literacy programs discussed in 7.2.2 Issues pertaining to conflict-sensitivity in the education sector are not addressed in the program documentation available. Asian Development Bank Documentation studied from the ADB states that they plan to provide holistic sector- wide support to education through investment and assistance with the improvement of policies, planning, and management (ADB, 2004). The ADB also plans to assist the government in the improvement and expansion of skills-development programs for unemployed youth, women, and poor and disadvantaged groups. Such initiatives are intended to help foster inclusive development by increasing the productivity of marginalized groups, improving the mobility of the labour force, reinforcing tolerance, and increasing the level of youth employment (ADB, 2004). While these latter projects do seem intended to address some of the important grievances underlying the conflict, the available documents do not discuss conflict-sensitivity within the formal education system itself. European Commission The EC announced in July 2005 that it would suspend approximately US $30 million in planned aid to Nepal's EFA 2004-09 program, following a review motivated by the political upheaval resulting from the king's takeover in February of that year (EU, 2006). Although ongoing projects have continued, new ones including EFA were put on hold indefinitely. This action was in alignment with the EU-Nepal Cooperation agreement (1996), which states explicitly that respect for human rights and the principles of democracy are the foundation for cooperation. The EC's last contribution to the education sector was US $20 million for the BPEP program. The deputy director of Nepal's Department of Education, Ram Balak Singh, was quoted in the Nepalese media questioning the reason for the EC's suspension of aid (Timsina, 2005, July 19). World Bank The primary educational initiative receiving World Bank support in Nepal over the past few years is the EFA program, (the "access and inclusion" focus of which is said to be inherently conflict-sensitive), with particular support to the Community School Support Project (CSSP) (World Bank, 2005b). According to the Bank, implementation of EFA is in

166 danger of being significantly hampered for several reasons, including: the inability or unwillingness of government representatives to visit schools, the inability of the government to implement policy reforms, and the risk that the government will not provide an adequate budget for the program. A further concern the Bank notes is whether local level administrators have the capacity to manage the block grants, which are an aspect of EFA. Teacher unions have also been agitating, and the Bank notes the possibility that they will oppose attempts by SMCs to appoint temporary teachers during the conflict. There has also been the danger that EFA funds will be diverted from schools by the insurgents or security forces. Interestingly, the Bank does not mention the opposition of the Maoists to the CSSP initiative; the Nepalese media has reported that Maoist pressure has caused many schools to avoid registering or to demand the government retake control (Bohara, 2006). In order to facilitate its work in the midst of the conflict, the Bank has been implementing several risk mitigation measures including audits, training programs for officials, and program reviews. Because the school block grants have been found to be useful mechanisms by which to continue service delivery to conflict-affected areas, these grants have been expanded and their distribution process simplified (World Bank, 2005b). Two important crosscutting priorities within the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Nepal that impact the education sector are gender and capacity building. Gender is an aspect of inclusion that is mentioned by most all donors, in addition to caste and ethnicity. Capacity building initiatives, the Bank argues, have largely failed to have any significant benefit. This is indicated by the continued poor state of institutional capacity in Nepal despite the millions of dollars spent per year by donor agencies and INGOs on such initiatives. It is argued that capacity building is not primarily related to financial support, but rather has more to do with "creating space for the Nepalis to think for themselves and act on their own", with inputs of information only when requested (World Bank, 2003b: 22). In line with the EFA agenda, the World Bank's overall goal in the education sector is to improve the quality of and access to primary, secondary, and tertiary education. The specific outcomes listed in the Bank's CAS include: 25 percent of public schools under community management; the provision of socially inclusive and high quality education; the establishment of an efficient and timely textbook distribution system, i.e., all primary school

167 children should have books at the beginning of the school year; and progress made towards financial sustainability of public universities (World Bank, 2003b: 20). As with other donors to the EFA, the possible shortcomings of the program itself, as it has been unfolding in Nepal, are not discussed in the documents studied. The United Nations (UN) The largest UN agency with a focus on education is the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which has historically been associated with issues concerning formal education such as policy and curriculum development. In terms of education in emergencies, however, the largest UN agency, and largest international actor overall, is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but 1 found no evidence that this organization has been engaged in such activities in Nepal (Smith & Vaux, 2003). The UNDP has not been directly involved in the formal education sector, although it has been implementing several non-formal education projects as mentioned above. Its program documentation does not address issues of conflict- sensitivity in education. CIDA Education is not one of CIDA's current focus areas in Nepal, and thus the documentation I was able to access makes no reference to conflict-sensitivity within the education sector. The official with whom I spoke was also not aware of the details of CIDA's involvement in education in the past (Personal Interview, 2006, January 12). 7.3.2 Summary of Bilateral & Multilateral Aid to Education during the Insurgency Nepal's donors are very similar in terms of the absence of explicit consideration of the role of the education sector in the conflict, or the efficacy or impact of Western-model education reform in Nepal. The majority of donors do mention issues such as access to education for marginalized groups and gender parity, as these are elements of EFA. Many donors also include amongst their programs several non-formal education components, such as workshops for civil servants, civil society organizations and service providers, and skills and entrepreneurship training for local people. Mention of the formal education sector, however, is limited to direct or indirect support for the EFA agenda; the conflict-mitigation potential of EFA's access and input-oriented approach to education seems to be

168 unquestioned. The World Bank is the only donor to mention the difficulties of implementing EFA in Nepal, but does not suggest that these difficulties point to the need for additional alternative approaches in education, or a reconsideration of EFA to make it more viable in the Nepalese context. While several of Nepal's donors, particularly the World Bank (Buckland et al., 2005) and DFID (Smith & Vaux, 2003) have published extensive material pertaining to the potential of education to contribute to conflict, and the sensitivity thus needed in regard to education reform, these issues are not dealt with to any significant extent in these organizations' respective country plans for Nepal. The conflict itself and the need to tackle its "root causes" (all of which have some relevance for education), however, were found to be integral and crosscutting themes within the majority of country plans and other documents. Therefore, although education is relegated in these documents to one among many sectors affected by the conflict, and the unique potential for education to contribute to conflict is not explicitly addressed, the fact that responses to the conflict have tended to be multi-sectoral and crosscutting means that education is included within all such measures, if only indirectly. A summary of the approaches to educational aid undertaken by bilateral and multilateral agencies during the conflict is provided in the following table. Table 5: Bilateral & Multilateral Aid to Education in the Context of the Maoist Insurgency Agency Involvement in Education Education-specific Responses to Insurgency CIDA Limited if any current involvement No information available Danida One of Nepal's principal education Continuation of funding to EFA & SESP donors; supports EFA & SESP Finland Donor to BPEP II No information available GTZ Health education No information available JICA Numerous initiatives in accord with Continuation of initiatives to reduce EFA goals & priorities educational disparities & improve quality NORAD A primary donor to EFA; support to Continuation of EFA funding WFP & INGO education initiatives SNV Limited if any current involvement No information available SDC Limited if any current involvement No information available DFID Support to EFA program Continuation of support to EFA USAID Limited involvement in education No information available sector; some provision of scholarships and health education

169 ADB Support to education policy, Continuation of existing initiatives management & planning; skills development initiatives EC Support to BPEP initiative; planned Planned support to EFA was suspended based support to EFA on deteriorating human rights and democracy situation WB Support to EFA program Continued support to EFA with risk- mitigation measures undertaken to facilitate successful implementation; crosscutting issues of gender and capacity building UN Involvement in non-formal education Initiation of various non-formal training including skills & employment initiatives aimed at poverty reduction & training; scholarship provision conflict-mitigation

7.4 Conclusion: Bilateral & Multilateral Responses to the Maoist Insurgency: Assumptions & Contradictions As the above discussion illustrates, Nepal's donors have on the whole been significantly impacted by the Maoist insurgency, but have responded to the escalating violence and political instability in a manner largely in accord with the thrust of recent scholarship. Most donors have committed to remain in Nepal due specifically to the belief that the conflict has made their assistance all the more necessary, a clear reflection of the literature on aid to conflict-affected states discussed in Chapter 2. Many donors have undertaken reevaluations of their programs to assess their conflict-sensitivity, have stressed donor coordination and contextual adaptation, have incorporated ongoing conflict analyses into their projects, and have established additional initiatives to mitigate the effects of the conflict. Again, these responses are in accord with the scholarship and with the OECD's Principles for foreign aid to fragile states. Certain organizations have also determined to engage the conflicting parties directly through dialogue, reflecting the argument cited in Chapter 2 that development assistance to conflict-affected states should be accompanied by political and/or additional interventions. Given the many similar policy adaptations made by Nepal's donors, which exhibit a generally comprehensive adherence to recent scholarship concerning aid to fragile states, one might expect a similar acknowledgement of those issues most often stressed in literature pertaining to education and conflict. However, this does not appear to have been the case in Nepal. Absent from donor documents is mention of the potential for education to contribute 170 to or help mitigate conflict, or evidence of reconsideration of assistance to the education sector in light of the conflict. As discussed in Chapter 2, the role of education in perpetuating the underlying socio-cultural and political tensions that can lead to conflict has been well articulated by many scholars. The need for educational reform measures to recognize the influence of socio-political and economic contexts on education, particularly during or after conflict, is made similarly clear in the literature. The lack of explicit consideration of these issues among Nepal's donors is therefore notable. While several donors have mentioned the need for education in Nepal to be more accessible and of higher quality, the issue is taken no further than this "more and better" approach (Bush & Saltarelli: 32). In Nepal, the tradition of rapid educational expansion largely divorced from context, which began in the 1960s, appears to be persisting despite abundant warnings in the literature, and obvious cautionary signs within the country itself. The education system in Nepal clearly suffers from the maladies common to systems based upon Western-style models: it is plagued by low student success rates, low teacher motivation, and insufficient financial resources. Obviously the many years of donor-funded initiatives in education, while they have assisted in improving educational access, have not been successful in creating an education system well-suited to the Nepalese context. Further, the prevailing, if implicit, assumption that the latest foreign-driven reform initiative, the EFA program, is sufficient to address the education system's needs, is not borne out by research demonstrating the weaknesses of this program in the Nepalese context. There is also no suggestion by Nepal's bilateral or multilateral donors that they conducted their own assessments of the suitability of EFA in Nepal. Again, considering the comprehensive conflict and contextual analyses that donors incorporated into their overall programs, the lack of discussion of these issues in regard to education is striking. As discussed in Chapter 6, while the EFA program, even if it could be successfully implemented despite economic and political constraints, is conflict-sensitive in terms of its focus upon access for marginalized populations, it does not touch upon the other critical issue facing education in Nepal: its history of politicization and role as a ground of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic struggle. This aspect of education in Nepal, prevalent throughout its history but brought into acute focus by the Maoists, is consummately ignored

171 by the EFA initiative, and thus by Nepal's donors. As mentioned in Chapter 2, donors to education and other sectors have oftentimes been complicit in the co-optation of the language of dissent by local elites, and thus the formation of local resistance movements. This phenomenon was present in Nepal in the 1950s through the NEPC project, which couched ethnic discrimination in the tenets of democracy, continued through the BPEP initiatives in the 1990s, and now appears to be occurring through the EFA program. Although the language of the EFA initiative extols local participation, decentralized control, and inclusiveness, thus far these notions have amounted to little real change, but rather have served only to obscure the further entrenchment of traditional power structures. In Nepal, therefore, the view of education as a benign force for social betterment appears, despite copious critiques to the contrary, to be largely intact insofar as Nepal's bilateral and multilateral donors are concerned. One factor behind this is the trend among donors of funding sector-wide initiatives based upon standardized, Western-derived educational reform initiatives. The following chapter will discuss organizations often said to comprise a potential alternative to the constraints posed by programs such as EFA, and by formal education systems in general, in an exploration of the role of I/NGOs in Nepal, and their activities during the Maoist conflict.

172 Chapter 8: The Work of INGOs during the Maoist Insurgency The previous chapter discussed the programming of bilateral and multilateral donors during the Maoist conflict. It was found that these agencies have been continuing what has become a long-standing tradition in Nepal, by funding an externally-derived education reform initiative without explicit questioning of its applicability to the Nepalese context, despite the centrality of education to socio-political conflict in Nepal. This chapter will discuss the role of I/NGOs during the conflict, to examine the similarities and differences of I/NGOs' education-related work in comparison with that of Nepal's other donors. As noted in Chapter 2, I/NGOs by reputation have the ability to target the needs of marginalized and rural populations, and are known to develop alternative approaches well adapted to local contexts. This chapter will explore how these qualities have been expressed in Nepal. The chapter will begin by describing some of the impacts of the conflict upon I/NGOs, as well as some general responses these organizations have been making to the conflict, according to agency documents and interviews with four INGO representatives. This will be followed by a discussion of some of the education-related programming of I/NGOs that has continued during the conflict, as well as new projects that have been initiated in response to the conflict. 8.1 Impacts of the Insurgency on I/NGOs 8.1.1 Document Analysis 8.1.1 (a) Space for Development I/NGOs have experienced similar challenges during the conflict in Nepal as have organizations working in conflict zones around the world, including threats to staff safety, logistical difficulties, and questions regarding their neutrality. For example, intimidation and demands for "taxes" by the Maoists have compelled many NGOs and INGOs to withdraw from rural districts to Kathmandu and other urban centres. In October of 2004, the Maoists announced an NGO "moratorium" in some districts. The thoroughness with which this edict has actually been carried through is contradicted by some reports (e.g. Gersony, 2003), yet the Maoist leadership appears to greatly oppose particular organizations, at least in certain districts ("Ground to a halt", 2005). A spokesperson for one large agency, CARE International, states that the general strategy for their staff in Nepal is to "shut up and stay

173 low", while endeavoring to protect the organization's core values (Needham & Ellinger, 2004: 1). Kobek and Thapa (2004) note that program success often "depends on how much such activities are tolerated by the Maoists", and stress the importance of making and upholding contacts with Maoist representatives (p. 6). Despite the difficult and dangerous situation in Nepal, the majority of 1/NGOs have endeavored to continue their work as best they can. The Association of INGOs in Nepal (AIN) states that INGOs have been focused on improving the understanding of the causes of poverty, exclusion, and conflict, and that risk management has become a priority (Regmi, 2005, April 24). AIN argues, in fact, that the contribution of its members to poverty reduction in Nepal is not only very significant, but is highly necessary, particularly during the conflict. For example, a 2005 report by AIN states that while Nepal's development budget shrank due to a lack of donor confidence and reduced absorptive capacity caused by the conflict, the budgets of AIN's 50-odd members had, on average, increased in response to the conflict. (Of the proposed development budget for 2004/2005 of Rs. 111.7 billion, the government of Nepal initially planned to realize Rs. 32 billion from foreign aid. However, this was reduced to Rs. 20 billion). The report argues that the government should therefore endeavor to create an environment that facilitates the work of I/NGOs (AIN, 2005). 8.1.1 (b) The Code of Conduct for Social Service Organizations Further complications arose for INGOs in December 2003, when the government adopted more restrictive visa controls and registration procedures (Poudel, 2003). These restrictions were followed in 2005 with the introduction of a new Code of Conduct for Social Service Organizations that placed limitations upon the activities of NGOs and INGOs. The Code was officially launched on November 10, 2005. All organizations were mandated to submit reports and financial statements to government agencies, to inform local bodies prior to implementing any program employing foreign assistance, and to clearly demarcate the portions of their budget used for administrative and program expenses ("SWC introduces new Code of Conduct", 2005). According to the Social Welfare Council (SWC), the act was designed to bring all NGOs under one umbrella in order to coordinate their activities, increase transparency, accountability, and effectiveness, and also to ensure that money destined for social organizations did not end up in the hands of the Maoists. The

174 SWC also argued that the regulations would prevent NGOs and INGOs from leaking national security information ("SWC starts homework", 2005).4 While the full enforcement of the Code has not yet occurred, its emergence generated waves of protest among national and international civil society. The Code has been denounced by many, including Amnesty International, the UN, and the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) as contravening human rights standards, and for being a vehicle through which the government can exert undue control over I/NGOs ("Nepal: UN rights official", 2005; OHCHR, 2006; "NGOs next", 2005; "Proposed code for NGOs", 2005; AHRC, 2005, Nov 9). 8.1.1 (c) The Role ofl/NGOs during the Insurgency I/NGOs in Nepal are accorded similar potentials and comparative advantages, as well as similar criticisms, as are I/NGOs worldwide. They are praised by some for their ability to reach vulnerable populations and institute innovative programs well adapted to local needs (Doftori, 2004 - others). On the other hand, the ADB (1999) notes that many small Nepalese NGOs are perceived as corrupt, while INGOs are resented by national NGOs because of the competition they pose for funding. INGOs also face allegations of imperialism and social interference (Regmi, 2005). Other commentators argue that while I/NGOs have the potential to make a valuable contribution to conflict mitigation, certain conditions need to be met if they are to be successful (Srestha, 2001; Siwakoti, 2001; Kobek & Thapa, 2004). Some argue, for example, that it is imperative for INGOs to work closely with local organizations, in a supportive as opposed to directive role (Srestha, 2001; Siwakoti, 2001). Kobek and Thapa (2004) add that INGOs should ensure the presence of specially trained staff, transparency regarding project activities and finances, the maintenance of neutrality, and the special importance of active support from the local population. While strict adherence to these principles has enabled some INGOs to be active in areas of conflict, Kobek and Thapa (2004) also note that there is still much need for caution, particularly in regard to the support of human rights NGOs, which are strongly persecuted in Nepal by both the government and the Maoists. The OHCHR-Nepal noted in early 2006 that the operating

The Code is available in its entirety from Nepal News ("Code of Conduct", 2005). 175 space for human rights workers, particularly outside the Kathmandu Valley, remained challenging. Rights workers reporting specific concerns have been threatened and interrogated by the military, police, and civilian authorities about their sources, and have occasionally been arrested (OHCHR, 2006). Also, despite the fact that many I/NGO projects include the ostensible goals to "target the cause of the conflict" and contribute to democracy initiatives, some commentators argue that they are in general not adequately positioned to organize and articulate significant social change (Wadlow, 2005; Dahal, 2004; Kobek & Thapa, 2004; Needham & Ellinger, 2004). While I/NGOs may indeed be limited in certain regards, they comprise an integral element of Nepal's development community, and their role has become particularly important in light of the conflict. AIN (2005) points out that when government support was withdrawn from rural areas, due to the presence of the Maoists or the lapse of local governance structures, NGOs may have been the only support system for many communities. Kobek and Thapa (2004) argue that, "it is now almost exclusively due to the work of NGOs that people in remote or rural areas and minority populations find the minimum support and services necessary for survival, let alone improve their living conditions" (p. 6). The documents discussed in Chapter 7 also repeatedly state that I/NGOs have taken on an even more responsibility during the conflict as implementing agencies for bilateral and multilateral organizations. I/NGOs have themselves been impacted from myriad directions over the course of the conflict, however, from Maoist pressure, government restrictions, and media criticism. While the degree to which I/NGOs have been specifically targeted during the conflict by Maoists who perceive them as agents of capitalism and imperialism or by the government which suspects them of colluding with the rebels, has varied from region to region and from report to report, the insurgency has certainly exacerbated the difficulties inherent to working in Nepal. Some specific examples of the impact of the conflict upon I/NGOs, as learned through interviews, will be discussed in the following section. Subsequent sections will then discuss some of the programmatic and methodological responses of various I/NGOs to the conflict. It will be noted that some organizations (those for which all information was

176 obtained from publicly available documents) are referred to by name, while others (whose representatives participated in interviews and/or provided unpublished documents) are referred to as INGO A, B, C or D. 8.1.2 Interviews The paramount concern among the 1/NGO representatives interviewed was generally asserted to be staff safety. The representatives differed somewhat, however, in regard to their perceptions of the actual degree of danger faced by staff, perhaps due to different levels of violence in their respective project areas. None of the representatives spoke of direct violence or abductions of members of their own staff. There is, however, a heightened sense of security concomitant to the knowledge that other development personnel have been harmed. A representative from INGO A stated, for example: Current political climate to our staffers are safe and secured. However, there is always chance of risk as a result of the street demonstrations and strikes, not only by the Maoists but also the political parties since the time that the King Gyanendra took over the direct rule since February 1, 05 (sic) (Personal Interview, 2005, October 20). One of the most conspicuous impacts of the conflict upon 1/NGO activity, according to each representative interviewed, has been the need for increased vigilance and planning prior to travel. Strikes and blockades have impaired the mobility of individuals within NGOs' target communities, making it difficult for people to make it to school or markets, or to take part in training or community activities. This has led in some cases to the scaling down and/or delay of previously planned activities, and has greatly slowed the speed of project implementation. The situation has been made worse in some areas by random bomb attacks, and while none of the representatives reported that the Maoists had engaged community members in direct conflict, they have abducted some individuals who they suspected were working for the government. The fact that the Nepalese Army, charged with providing security to civilians, has been leaving some areas at night to return to their barracks or headquarters, leaves these areas even more vulnerable to Maoist activity. This situation has made it very dangerous for anyone, community members or I/NGO staff, to move around after dark. The danger to staff has also hampered monitoring activities,

177 although one I/NGO noted that community members in their area have generally managed to work out problems on their own. An additional challenge mentioned by the representative of INGO B was the need for her organization's NGO partners at the local level to negotiate access and programming space in some of their projects. This situation has been complicated further by the fact that the Maoist leadership does not seem to be following the same policies throughout Nepal, and thus no strategy or agreement made in one region can be generalized to another. In some areas, INGOs have been asked to register their programs with the local cadre, as they have been doing with the government. The representative from INGO B noted that while the communities in these areas have been trying to negotiate on behalf of the organization, the Maoists have insisted that they deal with donors directly. One of the INGOs has had contact with Maoist representatives, but not to any large extent, in order to secure cooperation or non-intervention with project activities. Two representatives also stated that they have needed to correspond with the security forces, due to the government's regulations that they be informed about INGOs' large meetings, while one has also contacted the security forces regarding security policy and human rights issues. Issues of funding have also been made somewhat more challenging by the conflict. The representative from INGO B noted that there has been concern among donors as to the viability of continued work in Nepal, while another representative mentioned that there has been a general reluctance among bilateral donors to consider supporting new INGO initiatives in Nepal, although Norway was a notable exception. The representative of INGO B stated that "donors' reluctance to fund programs" or even to "look at anything in Nepal" was having a direct impact upon funding for their projects (Personal Interview, 2005, September 19). She said that their organization was having difficulty obtaining funding for a project in the conflict-affected Humla district, for example, because Embassy officials would not travel to the region because of the fighting yet refused to provide funding without visiting the project site.

178 8.2 Policy Responses ofl/NGOs to the Insurgency 8.2.1 Document Analysis According to Pradhan and Tuladhar (2004), NGOs have made a strong contribution to ameliorating some of the impacts of the conflict. Two areas in which NGOs have been playing a particularly notable part involve initiatives to uphold the rights of children, and to provide aid to internally displaced people (IDPs). A few of these initiatives will be discussed below. Pradhan and Tuladhar (2004) argue that although allegations of the violation of children's rights have generally been treated "indifferently amidst the up surging political distress in the country" (p.74), some encouraging efforts have been emerging from civil society with the intent to help mitigate the harm being inflicted upon children. One of the most active child-focused NGOs is Child Workers in Nepal (CVVIN), a Nepalese NGO that works for the protection and promotion of children's rights, with an emphasis on working directly with children. CVVIN was established in 1987, and is one of the most prolific and active organizations in Nepal working to advocate for and develop issues of children's rights. CWIN has also conducted numerous programs with the aim of improving children's rights, well being, protection, social reintegration, and rehabilitation for children at risk, and works to provide marginalized children, including survivors of the conflict, with a platform for participation and expression of their rights. CWIN has designed some services specifically to help mitigate the effects of the conflict on children, but many of its existing programs have also been of significant value to children at risk during the insurgency (Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004; CWIN, 2003). Some of CWIN's programs include: the CWIN Helpline service, the CWIN Centre for at-risk migrant children, the CWIN Clinic and Counseling Center, the CWIN Education Support Program, the CWIN Self-reliance Center, an ambulance service, as well as a telephone hotline. CWIN has also established a new Peace Home to provide services to children affected by the conflict, engages in action research and survey activities to determine the needs of various populations of marginalized children, and conducts studies to determine the impact of the conflict upon children (Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004).

179 In its belief that children should themselves play an active role in increasing social awareness, CWIN held its first of several "Child Rights Forums" in 1996, in cooperation with various local and international organizations. As of 2004 these forums had involved over 45,000 children. Their aim has been to educate children in regard to their rights, to organize social activities, instill leadership skills and responsible citizenship. In June 2004, CWIN held a National Consultation Program on children affected by conflict. Discussions were held regarding children's rights, the effect of the conflict on families, communities, and education, as well as ways to promote peace and support conflict-affected children (Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004). Another organization active in Nepal is Caritas Internationalis, a global confederation of 162 Catholic relief, development, and social service organizations. This group published an appeal for funds in early 2006 (following the collapse of the Maoists' unilateral ceasefire) to help alleviate the conflict-induced suffering of civilians. It hoped to raise US $1 million to contribute towards the provision of food aid to 100,000 people displaced by the conflict, noting that neither the urban areas nor the makeshift camps are equipped with the necessary infrastructure to manage the influx of IDPs. The funds raised are to be utilized to establish health centres for displaced people and to cover school-fees for children ("Caritas seeks $1 million", 2006). Throughout the conflict, several national and international organizations have combined forces with some government ministries to advocate for the declaration of "Children as Zones of Peace" (CZOP), or "Schools as Zones of Peace", and have conducted several projects, including social reintegration, psychosocial counseling, and educational support activities, under the auspices of this initiative. One milestone in the campaign was when five major political parties publicly committed to respect the CZOP mandate. The government has also upheld the notion of schools as zones of peace, and has instituted child protection guidelines for the security forces (SCN, 2005). Participating organizations in these campaigns include CWIN, Save the Children-Norway, Plan-Nepal, UNICEF, the Nepal Red Cross, and numerous other child rights groups. A Children in Conflict Coordination Committee has also been formed through cooperation between the government and NGOs, as well as the UN, with the objectives of coordinating programs related to

180 children and conflict at the national level, and preparing of a code of conduct for organizations working with conflict-affected children (SCN, 2005; Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004). 8.2.2 Interviews 8.2.2 (a) Adaptations to the Insurgency All of the INGO representatives interviewed stated that they have made at least some degree of modifications to their activities to ensure that their work can continue to take place amidst the conflict. While their priorities have largely remained the same, with additional ones added in some cases, the methods they use have required adjustment to the "new reality of community work in Nepal" (Personal Interview, 2005, September 19). As the representative from INGO C noted: The insurgency has fundamentally changed Nepal's politics, society and economy. Such changes are bound to affect our priorities and programs as well. A significant part of our 2006 budget, for instance, is being allocated for conflict management and mitigation, improving civil-military relationships, promoting human rights, supporting peace building initiatives and so on. If it were not for the conflict, we would have invested these resources on other priorities (Personal Interview, 2005, November 2). The representative from INGO B stated that for several years her organization has operated under new procedures intended to help reduce risks to staff. These include stipulations to: • Finish all meetings well before dusk, never move between villages at night time (although evening meetings and walking into the night hours used to be commonplace); • Remove all signage, or be prepared to remove all identification from vehicles, motorbikes, office rooms etc. (Their organization has never had a very high profile in any case, but now with the insurgency it is kept even lower); • Hold residential training either in smaller groups right in villages, or with larger groups in established, safe locations (although this has reduced the number of women able to attend);

181 • Move supplies carefully and with full authorization to avoid antagonizing the authorities. The representative noted that "this delays much work, but that is better than having plastic piping for water-systems confiscated because it was shipped without a permit" (Personal Interview, 2005, September 19). None of the representatives reported that the conflict had triggered any significant changes to their organizations' relationships with the government or with other INGOs or NGOs. Links have been made with other organizations when necessary or beneficial, but apparently not with greater frequency than prior to the insurgency. Similarly, relations with the media were not said to be particularly important to these organizations. The representative from INGO B noted that while their organization "has never sought out a media or advocacy" role, the current context made them "even more unlikely to seek the 'limelight' on an issue" (Personal Interview, 2005, September 19). 8.2.2 (b) Factors Facilitating Work during the Insurgency In the interviews, INGO representatives were asked what factors they believed facilitated the work of development organizations in Nepal. Some of the most commonly articulated points comprised the following: 1. Small size: The representative from INGO A stated for example that, "the programs of small size organizations like [ours] is more effective and transparent. As compared to larger organizations" (sic) (Personal Interview, 2005, October 20). She believed that their organization was having an easier time during the conflict as a result. 2. Good community relations: The representatives repeatedly asserted that NGOs' ability to continue amidst the conflict was made possible only through the dedicated effort of local staff along with the active participation of the community in every project activity. Representatives stressed the importance of the trust and respect that has been generated at the community level. 3. Increased community involvement: INGO B, for example, has increased the role of communities in project planning, implementation, and monitoring, because of the risk to project staff, and the fact that the activities of staff members draw the attention of the Maoists. This approach enables projects to continue in the event that staff are unable to reach communities, or are forced to leave the area. INGO B has also begun selecting

182 projects that do not require constant intervention, supervision, or continual technical assistance. The representative noted that the utilization of local resources, ideas and traditional knowledge in projects is also more sustainable and effective than resources and knowledge derived externally. She stressed with great emphasis that her organization's programs are based on the principle that communities have their own knowledge base and are simply in need of opportunities and resources to put indigenous skills to use, and thus communities are integrally involved in all aspects of the projects. 4. Local partnerships: It was noted by three organizations that projects that have been successful during the conflict have tended to focus on working in partnership with community organizations and local NGOs on small endeavors that the communities can manage themselves. However it was also noted that projects run by communities require more monitoring than those that are implemented directly. 5. Nepalese as opposed to expatriate staff: This is considered significant in terms of an organization's ability to continue its work with minimal harassment. INGO D, for example, has a policy of local hiring for all positions in Nepal, and also pays wages that are in line with respectable Nepalese, as oppose to Western, standards. This helps the organization avoid becoming a target of the Maoists, who object to the high salaries of some INGO staff. 6. Low profile: The representatives considered the maintenance of a low profile important at all levels: local, national, and international, because of the high risk incurred to those who either took sides or appeared to take sides in the conflict. A document obtained from INGO D states further that "simplicity gains the respect of the local people" (Personal Correspondence, October 3, 2005). 7. Country affiliation: National identity was accorded different significance for different organizations. INGO B, for example, strove to maintain its Canadian identity because Canada is seen as a peaceful, non-interventionist donor. Although the representative for this organization stated that while it would be preferable to be able to access additional aid from non-Canadian sources, the INGO's directors felt that implementing projects funded by USAID or DFID, for example, may pose risks. (The Maoists issued negative statements about these donors because USAID and DFID declared support for the Nepalese government at the start of the insurgency). Representatives of American organizations,

183 however, did not report problems stemming from their country affiliation, although the representative of INGO D noted that their funds are sought largely from private individuals and foundations and not from the US government. 8. Refusing to pay donations: INGO A has enacted a policy stipulating that the organization will pay no forced donations to the insurgents. If violence is threatened, the directors of INGO A have decided that all operations will be suspended, or shut down if necessary, rather than giving in to Maoist threats. This representative from INGO A stated that to pay donations would be counter-productive because it would merely encourage further extortion, waste project resources, undermine the organization's credibility, and would actually contribute to the violent conflict. All of the representatives were aware of stories of I/NGOs being forced to close down because they could not afford Maoist demands, and one representative mentioned that she had heard of cases in which officials were killed when they refused to make a second payment. 9. Refraining from direct negotiations with rebels: One INGO encouraged community members to negotiate with Maoists on their own terms and on their own behalf, and only when absolutely necessary. This way, if the INGO was forced to suspend activities, an agreement was already established between the communities and the Maoists or the government. 10. Increased monitoring of security situation: All of the INGOs mentioned the importance of keeping up to date regarding the political situation in the country as a whole, and in their respective areas of work. Monitoring was to be undertaken prior to field visits, and to involve community members more comprehensively, so that they would be able to implement monitoring activities in the absence of field staff. 11. Long-term vision: It was noted by one representative that if the problems of Nepal's most deprived communities are to be addressed, increased effort and more intensive activities will be needed. She stated that it will clearly take a long time before I/NGO projects bring about observable, tangible changes in people's lives, particularly in the very poor communities. Despite the fact that much has been accomplished in very trying circumstances, and that this itself is demonstrative of the dedication and abilities of community and staff members, she and the other representatives emphasized that an

184 improved security situation and political stability were integral if projects were to be sustainable and beneficial. 8.2.2 (c) Continuity of Work during the Insurgency Despite the increased challenges and the need for the types of modifications described above, all of the INGOs studied in this thesis, through document analysis or interviews, stated that the majority of their activities have been continuing despite the conflict, and that their priorities and goals remain largely the same. While most organizations have experienced some additional constraints in regard to logistical difficulties, other direct impacts such as threats of violence or government restrictions have not been significant enough to impair their activity. Only one of the INGOs interviewed mentioned that her organization had experienced significant difficulty in terms of the continuance of projects due to the strikes and fighting. None of the INGOs interviewed reported the need to scale down significantly or completely withdraw from any of their project areas, due in large part to partnership arrangements with local NGOs. New programs have also been initiated in response to the conflict, although some organizations expressed a hesitation to begin new programs in certain districts. INGO C, for example, has established new initiatives involving conflict management and mitigation, and INGO B has begun small-grants programs in support of local peace building activities. 8.2.3 Summary of Policy Responses ofl/NGOs to the Insurgency As the above discussion illustrates, it would be extremely difficult and overly simplistic to attempt to concisely summarize the role of NGOs and INGOs during the conflict in Nepal, for several reasons. First, Nepal's NGOs and INGOs are an extremely diverse group of organizations, some of whose mandates dictate a direct involvement in the conflict (such as those involved in human rights issues, or who offer assistance to displaced people), while many others provide more indirect support services that address the issues underlying the conflict, such as poverty and exclusion. Second, the variability of reports in regard to the functioning ofl/NGOs during the conflict, as well as the confusing and contradictory nature of the Maoists' own statements concerning the acceptability of these organizations, belie the possibility that any broad synopsis could do justice to the ground-

185 level complexity. Further, the issues pointed out by Murphy et al. (2005) in relation to the hesitation of I/NGO representatives to openly discuss sensitive matters in relation to the conflict, as well as the apparent fact that local level personnel and those at headquarters were not always forthcoming even with each other about events and circumstances, exacerbates the difficulties of determining the effects of the conflict upon the work of I/NGOs. Nonetheless, 1/NGOs in Nepal did reiterate pertinent issues mentioned in the literature (Chapter 2) concerning aid to fragile states and the work of agencies in conflict zones. These include issues of safety, conflict monitoring, long-term commitments, and neutrality. The I/NGOs also expressed the need for enhanced inter-agency cooperation, although this was a less prominent theme than it was among bilateral and multilateral organizations. While there was evidence of inter-I/NGO cooperation at a macro-level, i.e., through the existence and public statements of A1N, 1 found few examples of 1/NGOs sharing information or working together on joint endeavors, other than the children's rights advocacy campaigns. While other cooperative activities may very well have taken place among I/NGOs, it was not mentioned by the interviewees, nor in their organizations' project documentation. What did comprise a strong theme, however, was the importance of partnerships with local organizations and communities. This is in alignment with the suggestions made by Nepalese commentators mentioned in 8.1 above (Srestha 2001; Siwakoti, 2001), as well as the literature discussed in Chapter 2, which stress the importance of local NGOs as invaluable sources of input regarding the root causes of conflict, institution-building priorities, and suggestions for constructive international involvement (ICHRP, 2002). A further theme mentioned in Chapter 2 as an important consideration for INGOs during conflict is that of institutional interest. This has also been reflected in Nepal, for example in the emphasis placed by INGOs upon accountability and transparency, as well as the expressed desire to increase the self-sufficiency of local organizations and, for INGO B in particular, the value placed upon indigenous knowledge and local decision-making. What came across most clearly, however, during the interviews I conducted with INGO representatives, was the representatives' appreciation of the sincerity and dedication of local

186 staff members, and their determination to continue to engage with their constituencies in whatever manner their mandate entailed, despite frustrations, delays, and very real risks to their own safety. One final point, made by the representative from INGO B, is that the work of development agencies is highly constrained without the presence of a conducive political context. This is reflective of the literature concerning aid to fragile states, and also the documents of some of the organizations discussed in Chapter 7. Without concurrent improvements in the political situation and a resolution of the dynamics between rival politicians, these scholars and agencies argue that foreign assistance is limited in terms of bringing about sustainable development. Dialogue and other political measures should thus be a co-requisite of development aid during conflict. The policy and general programmatic responses made by 1/NGOs are summarized in Table 6 below. Table 6:1/NGO Policy & Programmatic Responses to the Insurgency I/NGO Policy & Programmatic Responses CWIN Many programs assisted children affected by conflict, including: a Helpline service, a centre for at-risk migrant children, a clinic and counseling centre, an education support program, an ambulance service and a telephone hotline, a Peace Home, and children's rights forums. Caritas Internationalis Engaged in fund raising efforts to help alleviate the conflict-induced suffering of civilians by providing food aid and health centres to 100,000 people displaced by the conflict, and to cover school-fees for children. Coalition of CWIN, Save the "Zones of Peace" campaigns, social reintegration Children-Norway, Plan Nepal, activities, psychosocial counseling, and educational UNICEF, Nepal Red Cross, support. Children in Conflict Coordination Committee children's rights groups and formed to coordinate programs at the national level, and the UN. prepare of a code of conduct for agencies working with conflict-affected children. INGO A Continuation of conflict-sensitive policies, such as local staffing, transparency and a low profile, and maintenance of existing priorities and programs. Work is conducted with extra caution, particularly during strikes called by the Maoists. INGOB New procedures instituted due to the conflict, including stipulations to conduct meetings and travel during the day, to remove INGO identification from vehicles and offices,

187 to conduct training initiatives directly in villages or in established, safe locations, and to move supplies carefully and with full authorization to avoid antagonizing the authorities. INGOC Shift in priorities and budget to accommodate need for conflict management and mitigation, improving civil- military relationships, promoting human rights, supporting peace building initiatives, and other conflict-related initiatives. INGOD Continuation of existing conflict-sensitive policies and procedures including local staffing, community involvement, locally appropriate wages, private funding, and streamlined operations.

8.3 Education Programming ofl/NGOs during the Insurgency 8.3. J Document Analysis As is the case in many Southern countries, I/NGOs' involvement in education in Nepal is most prevalent in the non-formal, as opposed to formal sector (Doftori, 2004). This trend has continued during the conflict as well, yet I/NGOs have also engaged indirectly with the formal sector through such initiatives as infrastructure rehabilitation and advocacy campaigns. One example of the latter, mentioned above, is the I/NGO-led coalition to declare "Children as Zones of Peace", or "Schools as Zones of Peace". As noted by the OHCHR, however, children's rights to education have been severely violated during the conflict, and INGOs' "Children as Zones of Peace" campaigns have unfortunately not had a substantial mitigating effect on the use of schools for military or political purposes by the Maoists or the government (OHCHR, 2006). Numerous I/NGOs have attempted to ameliorate this situation, however, by offering several types of non-formal education programs as alternatives for those children deprived of education either because of the conflict directly, or due to the poverty and exclusion that preceded it. Non-formal programs include skills training, ECE programs, and urban learning centres, and I/NGOs have also provided scholarships and assisted in school construction. Their projects have taken place across the country in areas with varying degrees of Maoist presence, including some in the heavily conflict-affected mid- and far-west regions (CWIN, 2003).

188 CWIN's Education Support Program, for example, has helped provide education to thousands of children, and several of its other services contain an educational component. Local CWIN centres in several districts provide re-integration programs for street children, abused children, or those affected by conflict; these include skills training, vocational training, adolescent education, and programs assisting marginalized children to enroll in the formal education system. CWIN has also assisted in the construction or reconstruction of schools in Maoist stronghold areas such as Rolpa, Rukum and Salyan. Another new educational support initiative for child labourers has also been established called CWIN- C1RCLE: From Exploitation to Education (Pradhan & Tuladhar, 2004; CWIN, 2003). The International Save the Children Alliance has also been particularly active in advocating for children's rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), including the right to education (Smith & Vaux, 2003). One initiative, begun in March 2006, is the Global Challenge for Education, which aims to ensure access to quality education by 2010 for over 900,000 children, including IDPs and those otherwise affected by the conflict in Nepal. The program was launched in Lalitpur, Nepal. Its goals are to promote non-violent and participatory teaching and learning methods, child-friendly approaches, participation of children and parents in school management, and the monitoring of curriculum implementation, learning materials, and the use of government funds ("Global challenge", 2006). Another NGO very active in education is BASE (Backward Societies Education Project), a Nepalese NGO that works with the Tharu indigenous groups in the mid-west of Nepal. BASE focused originally on education and awareness among Tharu communities, and began to provide non-formal education for adults, particularly women. By the late 1990s, BASE had become the largest local NGO in Nepal, and it now also initiates other types of programs such as health education and income-generating activities. Although it has ceased to identify explicitly with a particular ethnic group, and is not aligned with any particular political party, its activities are important in terms of local politics, given its support for Tharu tenant farmers and landless families. BASE also organizes annual Tharu cultural conventions in the attempt to revitalize Tharu culture. McDonaugh (1997) states that in her opinion the rapid expansion of BASE'S education programs suggests that they are

189 well liked and appreciated amongst the Tharu, and that these communities now seem to exhibit themselves as more positive and confident than in the past. However, BASE seems to be aware that education alone will not be enough to significantly improve the Tharu's well-being, and has now initiated other programs including land distribution, legal support, and agricultural development (McDonaugh, 1997). Unfortunately, BASE'S operations have been significantly impaired during the conflict. Armon et al. (2004) note that because of BASE'S focus upon political and social mobilization initiatives, and because they are funded by the US, they have been condemned by the Maoists, who have burned down their offices and looted equipment. BASE has also received threats from the security forces, who accuse them of cooperating with the Maoists. BASE has remained active despite these difficulties, however, and has even introduced various educational initiatives in response to the conflict. One initiative, in cooperation with Save the Children USA, involves a project in the Maoist stronghold area of Rukum to reintegrate conflict-affected children back into school by covering tuition fees, and also offers psychological counseling. Extra teachers have also been hired for government schools to compensate for the increased enrolment generated by conflict-induced student migration. Armon et al. (2004) state that both the Maoists and the security forces have accepted this project thus far, likely because it targets children impartially, and because both sides view schools as acceptable venues for reintegrating children into society. Armon et al. state that this project is one of only a few examples they have encountered in which an organization is working with the conflict as opposed to around it. 8.3.2 Interviews INGOA The representative from INGO A stated that, although she believed it would be difficult for her organization to complete all projects according to plan given the conflict situation, existing initiatives were continuing at the time of the interview. INGO A's education-related projects include: the establishment of kindergartens within existing primary schools, and the promotion of early childhood education in partner communities; improving school infrastructure and resource provision; teacher training initiatives; and the establishment of various women's groups dedicated to literacy, basic math and bookkeeping

190 skills, as well as community strengthening; and the publishing of literacy primers based on the writings of local women. INGO A also provides numerous types of scholarships, including scholarships for community schools, for Dalit groups, for vocational schools and colleges, and arranges private sponsorships with donors. INGOB The representative from INGO B stated that their programs have been able to continue in spite of the conflict, and have in fact expanded both geographically and substantively. INGO B's focus is upon sustainable farming and livelihood support in its partner communities, and its role in education is thus largely focused upon non-formal initiatives such as literacy and skills training, particularly for women, and also the training of literacy teachers. INGO B also provides scholarships for children to attend primary school, and has provided scholarships to vocational institutions in the past. The organization also assists with school infrastructure construction and resource provision, and has also organized extra-curricular sports activities with partner communities. INGOC INGO C has instituted numerous programs in response to the conflict, several of which have an educational aspect. These include: educational and economic support for victims of the conflict and disadvantaged children; human rights and conflict management training; training for journalists on conflict-sensitive reporting; a radio series on the effects of the conflict on women; training of student leaders on non-violent means of political expression; conflict-mediation training for community leaders; training in mediation, emergency and health support for families affected by the conflict; training in psychosocial counseling for traditional faith healers and youth; and the establishment of Peace Centres, which are safe-houses for youth and provide resources and information for conflict resolution and peace building. In the formal education sector, INGO C has provided resources and technical assistance to the Kathmandu College of Law, and has also distributed books to numerous institutions across Nepal. 1NGOD INGO D is focused upon the establishment of village libraries in partnership with interested communities. These libraries are designed to accommodate local needs, and their

191 construction and maintenance are undertaken with full community involvement and responsibility. The representative from INGO D noted that the libraries are apolitical and serve a variety of functions in the community: they are accessible to all and provide a venue for educational, social, and community-building activities. The libraries host literacy and other classes, and, according to documentation provided by INGO D, they therefore serve to reduce educational disparities between urban and rural areas (Personal Correspondence, October 3, 2005). The representative from INGO D stated that their work has been continuing despite the conflict, and that the Maoists had not interfered with their activities. She suggested that this was at least partly due to the fact that the projects are community-directed and the Maoists view them as beneficial, and also because INGO D is modest in terms of wages and other spending. 8.3.3 Summary of Education-Specific Responses ofl/NGOs to the Insurgency 8.3.3 (a) Formal Education The I/NGOs discussed above are not involved to a large extent in the formal education sector, i.e., there is little evidence ofl/NGOs attempting to challenge or influence the policies and practices of formal education in Nepal. Several organizations have, however, contributed towards improving the quality of formal education and/or its accessibility to marginalized populations. INGO A, for example, helps to establish and promote kindergartens within pre-existing schools, and provides scholarships and teacher training. INGO C has provided resources for tertiary institutions, and INGO B has assisted in school infrastructure construction and has provided scholarships. Other organizations such as Save the Children, in cooperation with various INGO coalitions, engage in advocacy initiatives regarding the importance of children's rights, educational access and safety within schools. 8.3.3 (b) Non-Formal Education The education-related initiatives ofl/NGOs in Nepal are concentrated in the non- formal sector, and each of the organizations studied has developed programming to help alleviate the discrepancies in educational provision in Nepal by providing educational resources for various marginalized populations. Organizations such as BASE, CWIN, Save

192 the Children, and the four INGOs whose representatives were interviewed currently operate myriad educational initiatives for a diverse array of target groups: poor children and adults, women, street children, health care workers, civil servants, journalists, and communities and individuals affected by the conflict. Such initiatives include: health education; non-formal literacy classes for children and adults; the construction of village libraries; training of facilitators for children's and post-literacy classes; awareness raising regarding human rights and other critical issues; alternative educational initiatives for students outside the confines of the formal system, such as street children or those displaced by the conflict; and numerous training initiatives for adults in issues pertaining to conflict mitigation. The roles of INGOs in education in Nepal, and their education-related responses to the conflict, are summarized in the following tables. Table 7 presents the activities of each organization, while Table 8 is organized according to theme. Table 7: Educational Programming of I/NGOs in Nepal during the Insurgency I/NGO Examples of Education-related Programs

CWIN Education Support Program included non-formal training initiatives and school construction for marginalized children; also an educational advocacy program for child-labourers Save the Children Global Challenge for Education, aimed to improve education quality

BASE Reintegration program for conflict-affected children

I/NGO Coalition Schools as Zones of Peace campaign

INGOA Establishment of kindergarten classes within existing schools, several types of scholarships, improvement of school facilities and provision of resources, teacher training, education and community groups for women. INGOB Scholarship provision for youth, literacy classes and training of literacy teachers, and support for construction of school infrastructure. INGOC Resource and technical support for Kathmandu School of Law; numerous training initiatives including conflict mitigation, community mediation, governance, human rights, civil liberties, health support, journalism, counseling, and the environment. Establishment of Peace Centres for youth. Educational support for victims of conflict and disadvantaged children. INGOD Construction of village libraries

193 Table 8: Educational Programming of I/NGOs by Theme Theme Organizations Involved Formal Education (i.e. scholarships & school INGO A, INGO B, INGO C, Caritas infrastructure support) Intemationalis Health Education / Facilities INGO C, BASE, CWIN Literacy Groups INGO A, INGO B, INGO D, BASE Construction of Libraries INGOD Training of Teachers / Literacy INGO A, INGO B Non-Formal Facilitators Education Awareness Raising (e.g. human INGO A, Save the Children, Plan Nepal, rights, importance of education) UNICEF, CWIN, Nepal Red Cross, BASE, other Human Rights groups Provision of Alternative Education INGO C, CWIN, BASE for Marginalized Populations (e.g. street children) Training in Conflict-Related Issues INGOC (e.g. mediation)

8.4 Conclusion: I/NGOs & Conflict-Sensitive Education in Nepal: Possibilities & Limitations The above discussion illustrates that I/NGOs in Nepal have been similar to bilateral and multilateral agencies in regard to considerations of conflict-sensitivity in education, i.e., there is little evidence to suggest that they are engaged in explicit questioning of Nepal's formal education system and its potential role in conflict. The advocacy work of I/NGOs is largely based upon ensuring access to education for Nepal's conflict-affected and marginalized populations, which is of course a much needed endeavor, but does not address issues pertaining to the politicization of education in Nepal or the limitations of foreign- modeled education reform. The small role of I/NGOs in the formal education sector, as pointed out by Doftori (2004), can be explained by the fact that the majority of reform work and donor support for the formal sector is directed to sector-wide approaches such as EFA, in which there seems to be limited space for the contributions of the alternative approaches of these organizations. It was noted in Chapter 7 that the standardized nature of EFA in Nepal belies true local ownership, and this rigidity perhaps curtails the involvement of I/NGOs as well. Also, to engage in explicit advocacy initiatives or critiques of formal education, particularly during the conflict, would not be in line with policies regarding the maintenance of a low profile,

194 which were mentioned by several of the representatives interviewed. The Code of Conduct for 1/NGOs has been further motivation for I/NGOs to remain under the radar. While the representatives did not suggest that the Code has thus far comprised a significant constraint to their work, they did stress the importance of refraining from antagonizing the government. Despite these limitations, however, the projects of I/NGOs have been directly addressing the issues underlying the conflict, such as poverty and exclusion. It was mentioned in Chapter 2 that I/NGOs may, by building the capacity of local populations, be quietly laying the foundation for these groups to engage in their own advocacy work, and this process could be underway in Nepal as well. The contributions of I/NGOs may also have had an indirect conflict-sensitization effect on education, by offering alternatives to some of the many people for whom the formal system is either inaccessible or unattractive, and who may have opted to join the Maoists had they not had the option of I/NGO programs. I/NGOs' provision of alternative educational resources to marginalized populations also serves to tacitly highlight some of the inadequacies of formal education in Nepal. As noted in Chapter 2, there is a consensus among scholars that centralized, state-funded formal education systems may not be viable in poor countries, or are at least insufficient to meet the needs of rural and marginalized groups. This has been recognized in Nepal through the advent of the Community School Support Program, notwithstanding the Maoists' insistence that the government bear the entire cost of education. Given the CSSP's inauspicious beginning, it remains to be seen whether this initiative will succeed in alleviating some of the strain upon the education system. Considering I/NGOs' emphasis upon strong community relations, these organizations would seem to be well placed to assist in facilitating the CSSP's implementation. Although the MOES has been criticized for ignoring the potential benefit of I/NGO involvement in the education sector, perhaps the impacts of the conflict, and/or the increased emphasis on I/NGO partnership among bilateral and multilateral organizations, will stimulate the government to begin to allow more space for alternative approaches to educational provision.

195 Chapter 9: Conclusion: Effects & Implications of Aid to Education in Conflict: The Lessons of Nepal 9.1 Answers to Research Questions The four research questions for this study are the following: 1. What is the historical relation between educational development and socio-political conflict in Nepal? 2. How has foreign aid affected the course of educational development in Nepal? 3. What have been the different policy and program responses of aid agencies to the political change and escalating Maoist conflict in Nepal? 4. What have been the corresponding aid agency changes to assistance for education in the context of the Maoist insurgency? Research Question 1: Hegemonic Education & Socio-Political Tension The first question of this study is concerned with the relationship between educational development and socio-political conflict in Nepal, both historically and presently. An exploration of this interface reveals two centuries of increasing linkages between education and social discord, driven by the ambitions of Nepal's rulers to utilize education to serve their particular goals in regard to national development and the consolidation of power. As discussed in Chapter 2, a standardized education system can be a convenient tool of hegemony, through which a government can expound its particular world-view and solidify a prejudiced and inequitable status quo (Maclure, 2000). This exploitation of education has been attempted in Nepal for generations by Nepal's succession of governments, and has also been opposed throughout the years by ethnic activists and rival politicians. The latest and most violent expression of resistance to state hegemony has been the Maoist insurgency, during which education has served as a platform for counter- hegemonic rebellion and anti-state propaganda. Through the actions of the Maoists, education has become an integral facet of the struggle between the autocratic forces of the state and those who oppose it.

Discrimination has always been endemic to Nepalese society. The process of "Nepali-ization", the construction of a distinct national identity according to the mores of the ruling elite, began immediately upon the founding of the state of Nepal. The conquering

196 of the region by a Parbatiya-caste, Nepali-speaking Hindu king established the initial outline of the new state's ethnic and social power balance. This was further consolidated through a civil code that delineated a social framework based upon the Hindu hierarchy. Nepali-ization as a purposeful national project, however, in which the worship of the monarchy, the speaking of Nepali, and the practice of Hinduism were enforced upon the citizens of Nepal, did not occur en masse until some hundred years later. What enabled the state at this point to comprehensively propagate its chosen vision for Nepal, many argue, was the establishment of a national education system. Mass education, while feared and eschewed by Nepal's earliest rulers due to its potential to foment dissention and unrest, came to be viewed by later regimes as a convenient vehicle through which to expound a nationalist dogma well suited to the interests of the elite classes. The hegemonic potential of education was brought to fruition by the Panchayat government, through a standardized school system that enforced the Nepali language, and utilized curricula and textbooks that expounded the pro-monarchy, homogenous national vision of Nepal's leaders. The cultural suppression this standardized system entailed for Nepal's many ethnic minority groups was a source of anger and dissent among ethnic activists. The repressive environment of the Panchayat years, during which political parties were banned, also stimulated the emergence of a vibrant student political scene, and Nepal's campuses became venues where partisan debate and campaigning could flourish without government interference. The Panchayat years thus marked the beginning of education's emergence as a site for counter-hegemonic resistance, a potential that would later be seized upon by the Maoists. The failings of the education system also induced much criticism during the Panchayat period, as the poor quality of the system was accused, by national commentators as well as donors, of failing to produce the skilled workers Nepal needed. At the same time, the repressive, ineffective, and elitist bureaucracy of the Panchayat government came increasingly under fire by Nepalese society for its inability to provide the people with tangible social or economic benefits, or with employment opportunities. This was particularly the case for the majority of students who did not pass the School Leaving Certificate examination, and were thus not eligible for white-collar jobs. The hopes placed

197 by Nepal's population in the People's Movement of 1990 were not realized, as subsequent governments largely failed to improve upon the performance of their predecessors. Nepal's democratic government initiated a series of large-scale education reform efforts in the 1990s, but far from spurring an overhaul of the troubled system, these programs did little to improve education quality. On the contrary, the poor state of public education yielded the emergence of a thriving private system, the elitism of which compounded public grievances regarding education. Education also became increasingly politicized after 1990, as previously surreptitious political machinations were brought once again into the open. Political parties were free to directly exploit the education system for their own welfare, hiring teachers for their political allegiances and employing them as partisan representatives in Nepal's remote regions. Given the role education has played throughout the history of Nepal as a political instrument and a means of serving the interests of the ruling elite, it seems natural that the Maoist leaders would themselves appropriate this tradition and attempt to exploit Nepal's schools - both ideologically and pragmatically - to achieve their own goals. The Maoists cultivated grievances surrounding the politicization and poor quality of education, condemned the system of elitist private schools in Nepal, and attempted, at least rhetorically, to replace the "autocratic" public education system with their own "people's education", complete with a curriculum designed to expound their own political agenda. Through the actions of the Maoists, education has thus reached a new level of politicization and contention. Education has come to symbolize a socio-political ideology and become an axis of counter-hegemonic struggle, a role quite distinct from its mainstream status as a purveyance of literacy, numeracy and social progress. The education sector does not develop in isolation, of course, and both its successes and challenges are informed by and reflective of the development course of Nepalese society as a whole, which itself is greatly impacted by shifting global trends in aid discourse. While Nepal's elite may have viewed education as a tool with which to craft the country they desired, this pretension has been severely constrained (and perhaps made irrelevant) by the broader societal context in which schools operate. Khan's statement cited in Chapter 2, that "education reflects the society around it", is clearly borne out in the case of Nepal (Bush &

198 Saltarelli, 2000: v). The poverty, poor governance, strong foreign influences, discrimination, and geographic, gender, and socio-economic discrepancies within Nepalese society have always been manifest within classrooms. The failure of successive political regimes to deliver expected development results in the education or other sectors, or to ameliorate long­ standing concerns such as poverty, social exclusion, ethnic and regional inequalities, and poor governance, have been repeatedly cited as the root causes of the insurgency. While the negative aspects of Nepal's education system, including its role in the consolidation of discrimination and inequality, its history as a vehicle for government propaganda, and its poor quality, were not direct instigators of Maoist violence, education has contributed to the perpetuation of socio-political discord and the kindling of the modern frustrations that are endemic to Nepalese society. Education was thus related to the Maoist conflict both in terms of the damage the conflict inflicted upon it, as well as by the role schooling has played in the perpetuation of the social grievances that underlay it. It has become positioned at the centre of Nepal's protracted socio-political struggle. Research Question 2: The Role of Foreign Aid in Educational Development in Nepal As was discussed in Chapter 2, and mentioned often throughout this thesis, the view of education that has most often been espoused, explicitly or tacitly, by mainstream development agencies over the past several decades has been one in which education is considered first and foremost a requisite for individual and social progress. The rationale for this view has stemmed in part from the neo-classical theory of education as a force for social and economic growth, a belief adopted by governments and citizens alike who subsequently began to demand access to education. The perspective of education as a benign force for progress, however, has been widely critiqued by scholars who point out that conventional formal education systems have, in the majority of the Southern countries in which they have been implanted, failed to deliver upon the promise of socio-economic betterment. On the contrary, education in the South is often of poor quality with a tenuous association with employment. As noted in Chapter 2, the presence of foreign aid and the desire for educational development has often lead to systems misaligned with the social, economic and cultural contexts of a country (Godoy et al., 2007; Grigorenko, 2007; Serpell, 2005). As noted above, in Nepal, as in

199 numerous countries, rather than being a force for socio-economic well-being, education has been a contributory factor underlying disillusionment and social grievances, and the perpetuation of discriminatory or prejudicial social structures. Education systems have also served as vehicles of elite hegemony, or even conduits for explicit repression and the instigation of violence. This dichotomy, between the view of education as a benign force for social engineering versus its position in many societies as a ground of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic struggle, is clearly in evidence in Nepal. As has been the case with numerous countries around the world, when Nepal first opened its doors to foreign assistance, educational development was targeted as a crucial prerequisite for modernization, and the education sector figured prominently within government and donor plans (Khadka, 1991). According to commentators such as Doftori (2004), Subedi (1997), Carney (2003), Caddell (2005), and Dixit (2002), the influence of donors and foreign models is thus integral to the history of educational development in Nepal, and to the present condition of the education sector. While the involvement of a large number of donors has allowed for a proliferation of schools and a large increase in student enrollment, and may also be contributing constructively to issues such as inclusiveness and human rights (Vaux et al., 2006), the influence of donors has not been entirely positive. The urgency with which Nepal's leaders and foreign donors expanded the education system was unfortunately not accompanied by sufficient attention to quality and contextual relevance, and modern-day education in Nepal remains beset with shortcomings, myriad large-scale reform efforts notwithstanding. Dixit (2002) argues the misuse of foreign funds in the education sector is such that Nepal's donors have been "fellow-travelers and participants in the farce of Nepali education", by failing to demand quality and accountability (p. 196). He correlates Nepal's faltering education system, which is plagued by numerous criticisms including allegations of poor quality, inequity, insufficient institutional support and financing, with the exacerbation of public disillusionment, social grievances, and the escalation of the Maoist insurgency. According to Doftori (2004), the fundamental fault in Nepal's education system, and the reason it has appeared stubbornly immune to various reform initiatives, lies in the fact that, regardless of changes to superficial policies and procedures, the Nepalese system was

200 never rooted in an indigenous model. Despite the insistence by some education planners in Nepal (notably the NEPC in the 1950s) that education be developed according to the particular needs of its citizens and society, the formal education system in Nepal has, from its inception, been based upon Northern systems and ideologies (NEPC, 1956). Its style of content, examination procedures, infrastructure, and other features have always strongly resembled those of the industrialized nations from which they originated. This process began with the Ranas' adoption of British-style schooling via colonial India, continued in the 1950s with USAID-funded teacher-training and curriculum-development initiatives, followed by the American-influenced and UNESCO-funded NESP during the 1970s, and has continued into modern times with the BPEP, BPEP II, SESP and EFA initiatives, all of which have been strongly influenced by donors and global education trends. Unfortunately, while these programs have offered expansive visions of educational improvement, they have largely ignored the realities of the politicization of education in Nepal, or the impacts of the country's entrenched socio-cultural power balance. The Western-model initiatives have been readily adopted by Nepal's governments, however, who appropriated the rhetoric of educational reform, such as stakeholder participation, democratic processes, and inclusiveness, thus assuaging public and donor criticism, without substantively altering the decision-making processes within education. Rather than fomenting real change in the education system, therefore, these programs have merely obscured the continuance of traditional structures of elite dominance, constrained dissent among stakeholders, and done little to improve education quality. Research Question 3: The Response of Nepal's Donors to the Conflict Although donors' adherence to development trends has not always translated into successful initiatives in Nepal, the response of the majority of donors during the conflict is perhaps one instance in which global trends have worked in Nepal's favour. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a global consensus among development agencies regarding the need for increased consideration of the particular needs exhibited by fragile and conflict-affected states (Picciotto, 2004). UNICEF (2005), McGillivray (2006), Berry et al. (2004), and Armon et al. (2004) argue that maintaining development assistance to these countries is

201 necessary both to mitigate the immediate impacts of state fragility or conflict, and also to prevent the descent into, or recurrence of, economic collapse or violence in the future. It is generally accepted that foreign assistance to fragile and conflict-affected states is prudent. If aid is to be effective in these countries, however, there are specific challenges that need to be considered. Some of the challenges inherent to aid provision in fragile states include the increased importance of donor coherence and coordination, of long-term engagement, ongoing contextual analysis, capacity-building for state and civil society institutions, the use of varied aid instruments, and ensuring that support is inclusive (McGillivray, 2006; Picciotto, 2004). Conflict-affected states present additional challenges such as the increased vigilance required in regard to staff safety, issues of neutrality and impartiality, the need for cooperation with local and international NGOs, and potentially difficult relationships with the military and host government (Rogers, 2001; ICHRP, 2002; Hollants Van Loocke & Philipson, 2002; Kirkby et al., 2001). During the Maoist conflict, the majority of Nepal's donors have demonstrated an alignment with these global trends. Despite the difficulties the conflict has entailed for development agencies, such as threats to staff safety, monitoring and logistical challenges, and interference by the Maoists and security forces, it was found that the majority of the bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental organizations studied did endeavor to continue their programs to the largest extent possible by adapting their programming to better suit the fragile environment and to make their activities more conflict-sensitive. Some of the most common responses to the conflict, among all types of organizations, involved an increased emphasis upon accountability, transparency, community ownership and inclusion, reviews to assess the conflict-sensitivity of programs, as well as additional procedures to reduce the risks to staff and local partners, such as restricting travel, and employing local staff. There was also a gradual increase in emphasis upon civil society involvement, as the importance of partnerships with NGOs was stressed. INGOs also mentioned the importance of maintaining a low profile and professing an apolitical identity, while bilateral and multilateral organizations stressed interagency cooperation, which was put into practice through the BOGs. Several bilateral and multilateral agencies, such as DFID, the EC, and SDC, also conducted conflict assessments or developed mechanisms to analyze the shifting conflict

202 dynamics, to facilitate program planning. Most agencies also suggested a tacit adherence to the principles of engagement in fragile states articulated by the OECD, although the Swiss Development Agency was the only donor to mention this explicitly in agency documentation. Attempting to work "on" the conflict, by engaging with the processes of mitigation and tackling the conflict's causes, has been a prominent theme within the documentation of bilateral and multilateral agencies. While agencies have varied substantially in terms of their programmatic responses to the conflict, projects related to good governance, human rights, community mediation, poverty reduction, the needs of marginalized populations, and strengthening local institutions and organizations have been common. I/NGOs such as CWIN, BASE, Caritas Internationales, and Save the Children have also initiated new projects to mitigate the effects of the conflict, such as assisting internally displaced populations, counseling and reintegration initiatives for conflict-affected children, and engaging in advocacy campaigns regarding the rights of children. Among the INGO representatives interviewed, INGO C was the only organization to have established new projects aimed towards conflict-mitigation, while the others have continued with their original programming. However, because the work of these INGOs is directed largely towards livelihood improvement, poverty reduction, and the needs of excluded groups such as women and street children, these organizations are also assisting to alleviate the root causes of the conflict. While most agencies continued to implement the greater part of their intended plans for Nepal, and some initiated new programs to respond to the unique demands of the conflict, the reduced space for development work, objections to the actions of the king and the government, and threats to project staff, has led a number of agencies, such as those from Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Norway, to scale back their programming to a degree, or temporarily suspend new funding. CIDA and DF1D suspended certain projects that worked directly with government agencies, the EU suspended a planned investment in the education sector following the king's coup in 2005, while the World Bank reduced funding to enforce their policy regarding good governance as a condition for assistance. Of the bilateral and multilateral agencies studied, only SNV of the Netherlands has withdrawn

203 significantly during the conflict, however this may have been influenced by other factors, such as the small size of their program in Nepal to begin with. None of the I/NGOs studied gave any indication that their programming was being scaled back due to the conflict. Research Question 4: Conflict-Sensitivity in Education Programming The final research question of this thesis is concerned with the education-specific responses of Nepal's donors, and whether these agencies have taken issues of conflict- sensitivity in education into consideration. Given the rather comprehensive manner in which donors and INGOs have responded to the conflict in terms of policy and program adaptations, and the accordance of these adaptations with the literature discussed in Chapter 2, it may be expected that a degree of consideration would be given to education and its relationship with conflict, which are also prevalent themes in the literature. It was found, however, that issues pertaining to education's multifaceted relationship with conflict, whether in general or in Nepal specifically, were not comprehensively addressed in donor documents. For bilateral and multilateral donors, the consensus seems to be that educational issues are best dealt with through continued support of the EFA agenda, which has been the main vehicle of educational support in recent years, and that if this program can be successfully implemented, this will in and of itself address any issues of conflict-sensitivity in education. As discussed in Chapter 6, EFA focuses upon numerous critical issues including access, retention, infrastructure, raising educational awareness, adult literacy, improving teacher training, assessing and improving curricula, and scholarships for marginalized groups. Some have contested the conflict-sensitivity of the EFA agenda, however. The EFA is charged with a degree of donor influence that has led to inappropriate methodologies (particularly quantitative targets and monitoring techniques), a lack of authentic local engagement and ownership, and an inability to address local needs (despite rhetoric to the contrary), as well as the constraints posed by school-level realities in Nepal, such as resource shortages and bureaucratic inefficiencies. The CSSP has also been hampered by people's mistrust of the government, the tensions and lack of communication between the various stakeholders, and Maoist interference. The potential limitations of the EFA program and the concerns raised by its critics are not considered in the documents available.

204 Aid to education in Nepal thus continues to struggle under the tension of two competing forces. Nepal's donors, encouraged by its government, have been working under the view of education as a necessary prerequisite for development, and have instituted numerous large-scale school construction and reform initiatives designed to increase access and enrollment. As I have suggested above, however, their efforts have not yielded a system that is satisfactory to meet the country's needs. The Maoist leaders, on the other hand, and those who have joined their ranks, have seized upon the political nature of education. They have denounced the current school system as demonstrative of the government's authoritarianism and ineptitude, and have included educational ideology in their counter- hegemonic resistance movement. Nepal's donors, in their project documents, articulate in detail the challenges inherent to implementing development work in Nepal, they have analyzed the socio-political context of Nepalese society, and express a belief in the importance of quality education for the welfare of the country. However, the divide between the goals of the EFA program on the one hand, and the reality of Nepal's socio-political context on the other, does not thus far seem to be reconcilable. In addition to support for EFA, however, donors' conflict-mitigation projects in other sectors have often involved non-formal education components, such as mediation, health, and skills training. Also, efforts such as those to improve the capacity of government departments, reduce corruption, support rural livelihoods, and promote participation and inclusion, are indirectly related to either the administration of, or access to, education. Thus while the specific issues of conflict-sensitivity in education in Nepal, i.e., those delineated in Chapters 4 and 5, have not, to any large extent, been directly engaged with by donors, it could also be suggested that tackling issues of governance, social exclusion, gender relations, and other important concerns within society more broadly will eventually be reflected within the functioning of the education sector. On the other hand, the deeply rooted and severe challenges within Nepal's education system, its relationship with the conflict, and the potential shortfalls and insufficiencies of modern approaches to educational aid, perhaps call for a more direct acknowledgement of, and engagement with, education's role in the engenderment and perpetuation of social grievances than appears to be the case among Nepal's donors.

205 The role of I/NGOs in enhancing the conflict-sensitivity of education has also thus far been indirect. Non-governmental organizations appear to be largely absent from Nepal's formal education system, and thus while I/NGOs have been involved in various types of non-formal educational activities, some of which are in direct response to the needs generated by the conflict, they have not engaged with issues of conflict-sensitivity within the education sector per se. As noted in Chapter 2, Mundy and Murphy (2001) point out that while the role of I/NGOs, in terms of challenging global trends and conventions in education, has thus far been limited, emerging I/NGO coalitions may be moving in a direction in which this type of advocacy is more feasible, and perhaps this will be the case in Nepal. For the moment, however, I/NGOs have been exhibiting a potential conflict- mitigation role in the education sector, through their provision of educational alternatives to marginalized and under-served populations. The I/NGOs studied offer education programs to individual communities as well as groups for whom the formal sector is inaccessible, such as street children, children displaced by the conflict, and those from impoverished families who cannot afford school fees. As noted in Chapter 2, however, the literature suggests that rather than creating a separate, parallel non-formal education system, the best approach may be to focus on adapting fonnal systems to make them more accommodating to alternative approaches. Nepal's formal system, with its rigid timetable, standardization, and history of centralized control, has not been particularly amenable to local-level adaptations or the direct involvement of civil society organizations. There is a possibility that this may change in the future with the continued implementation of the CSSP, but community involvement and contextual relevance may also be facilitated if allowances were made for increased involvement of 1/NGOs, provided the organizations in question have a good relationship with their communities and understand local needs. Rather than, or in addition to, operating educational projects independent from the formal system and the EFA program, as has generally been the case thus far, the involvement of 1/NGOs within a more flexible school system may assist bilateral and multilateral donors bridge the divide between large-scale reform efforts and local contexts.

206 9.2 Enhancing Conflict Sensitivity in Education: Lessons from Nepal Conflict sensitivity is fundamentally about recognizing the different discourses and ensuring that what we do reflects differing perceptions. We should not assume that we are trusted; in a conflict situation trust becomes very rare (Vaux et al., 2006). Education is generally considered to have great potential in helping to lay the foundations for a peaceful society. It can raise awareness of pertinent issues, and also impart the confidence necessary to engage in advocacy, public discussions and debate, as well as leadership and decision-making skills. Educated and healthy people are also more able to take advantage of income opportunities, to improve their own livelihood as well as the long- term economic prospects of their society. While the potential peace-building role of education has been well articulated by many, what is less straightforward is how governments and donors involved in education can make the most of this potential (Buckland et al., 2005; Weinstein et al., 2007). The importance of education in the maintenance of peace is acknowledged by several of Nepal's donors, who make reference in their plans to the importance of accessible, quality schooling for present and future conflict mitigation. Few, however, have taken the issue much further than this "more and better" approach to education embodied by the EFA program (Bush & Saltarelli, 2001). None of the donor documents examined for this study state explicitly the need to include elements within reform programs that will make education more intrinsically conflict-sensitive, or question the potential of education to perpetuate conflict. This issue has been raised, however, by Nepalese academics and researchers, and by independent assessments conducted during the conflict. Criticisms of Nepal's education system are ubiquitous within national media and scholarship. Many commentators have argued for years that fundamental and holistic changes need to be brought to the system, and the relationship of education with the Maoist conflict, such as its utilization by the Maoists as a symbol of governmental malfeasance, has added further dimensions of complexity and urgency to the situation. Some of the suggestions most frequently put forth by commentators are discussed below. One common theme among commentators is the need for improved democratic processes within Nepal's education system. Increased community involvement,

207 transparency, and genuine stakeholder participation and consultation, many argue, are necessary measures to enhance the efficiency and relevance of education, and to begin to dispel some of the mistrust between various groups, as well as the perceptions of corruption and centralized control (Vaux et al., 2006; Sharma & Khadka, 2003). Vaux et al. (2006) also note that Nepal's potential for conflict will not be reduced unless issues are addressed deeply, as opposed to mere power-sharing discussions among the elite groups. The democratic processes needs to reach throughout Nepal's bureaucracy, to eventually include such issues as quotas for excluded groups in higher education and employment, a reconsideration of the qualifications needed for government and other employment, and a shift towards local taxation for school funding. Processes at the school level could be made more democratic and egalitarian, Vaux et al. suggest, by improving the teacher-student ratio, the determination of policies regarding English use in schools, affirmative action for the SLC exam, and increased support and motivation for Community-Managed Schools, among other measures. Further suggestions include the need for increased and more effective dialogue with representative groups, such as teachers, in order to take regional participation beyond the rhetorical phase and encourage inclusiveness. To resolve issues important to minority groups, such as overcrowding in schools and language rights, Vaux et al. (2006), argue that more ethnic-minority representation in government is needed. Vaux et al. also suggest that the issue of ethnic inclusiveness would be well served through curriculum and teacher sensitivity, rather than diverting resources to minority language education. Another crucial prerequisite for enhanced conflict-sensitivity in education is to improve the monitoring of local level realities. Vaux et al. (2006) argue that if government officials do not understand education at the school-level first-hand, and how it has been affected by the conflict, the government will become more and more divorced from their constituents on the ground, and unable to make suitable policy decisions. Vaux et al. also stress that such assessments need to be conducted by independent third parties. Sharma and Khadka (2003) add that the results of regional conflict assessments should also be utilized for strategic planning in the education sector, to highlight the specific needs of particular groups, and make the system more equitable and thus amenable to peace. Vaux et al. (2006) also suggest that the TRSE monitoring process begun by donors should be expanded to

208 include additional educational issues such as: the causes of repetition and drop-out, efficiency of textbook delivery, exam success and failure, fees charged in all types of schools, and reviews of grant utilization. The campaign to declare schools as "Zones of Peace", which has been run by I/NGOs, UNICEF and others, has also raised criticism (Vaux et al., 2006). As noted in Chapter 2, some scholars argue against the view of schools as "islands" divorced from their socio-political context, yet the view of schools as isolated zones of peace seems to promote just this (Weinstein et al., 2007). At no time during the conflict have schools in Nepal actually been "zones of peace", and Vaux et al. argue that even suggesting they should be is not, moreover, particularly realistic. They question the validity of attempting to isolate Nepal's youth from the reality of the political crisis and conflict that grips their society. The conflict has raised fundamental issues such as discrimination, minority rights, and faulty governance, which deserve and need to be openly discussed. Rather than attempting to enforce a "peace" within schools that is removed from reality, therefore, Vaux et al. suggest that the political parties and the Maoists be challenged to put forth their own policies and plans for education in Nepal, and to state whether or not they are supportive of the EFA agenda. Many commentators are also highly critical of the government's lack of response to the educational needs of children displaced by the conflict or who have had to leave school because of it. Wagley and Lamichhane (2005) argue that the "need of the hour" is to formulate some innovative mechanisms to include children within conflict-affected regions in education, and that the particular needs of these children, which may include psychological counseling and/or essential provisions such as food, need to be given due consideration. Wagley and Lamichhane also suggest that the government support the efforts of I/NGOs working in the education field, and that the latter should place a greater priority upon the immediate needs of conflict-affected children. These researchers, in agreement with many Nepalese commentators, also stress the importance of vocational and skills education for children, as this would help all children, particularly child laborers and ex- combatants, increase their livelihood potential and hope for the future.

209 Aditya (2001) similarly argues that because of the length and depth of the conflict, any significant resolution effort needs to include not only immediate relief and demilitarization efforts, but also long-term strategies designed to promote sustainability and prevent a relapse into violence. This comprehensive multi-sectoral need, in turn, has specific implications for education. He argues that "a pedagogy and advocacy of peace has to be developed in policy, planning, and programming operationalized in education curricula, and a socialization process..." (p. 164). Lai (2001) argues, in addition, that because education raises expectations and also heightens awareness of the limitations of the current system, what is particularly important is the creation of an enlightened civic sense among young people through improvements to Nepal's social studies curriculum.

Further suggestions in regard to making education more conflict-sensitive in Nepal are suggested by Whelpton (1997) and Shah (1993), even though these authors were writing prior to the escalation of Maoist violence, and Davies (2005), who is writing about education worldwide. Whelpton (1997) notes, for example, that although Nepal's geographic and demographic context has precluded the creation of a sense of national identity as strong and specific as that of some other countries, it would nonetheless be possible and beneficial to facilitate greater harmony among the various groups. He suggests that while one primary way to accomplish this is to improve prosperity, another means is through education. Whelpton (1997) and Shah (1993) argue that Nepalese people from different groups or regions need to feel that the particular histories of their group are important elements of the full canon of Nepalese history. Whelpton suggests that this could be achieved by broadening school curricula beyond what is currently promulgated as "Nepalese" culture. Translations of literature from different groups could be incorporated into the school system, as could the role of different groups in the creation of the state of Nepal. This suggestion is informed further by Davies (2005), who argues that dialogue and encounter among conflicting parties is needed to bring a degree of "positive conflict" or "turbulence" into education, in order to challenge long-standing beliefs and prejudices (p. 366; 365). Davies also encourages a type of citizenship education that promotes a recognition of "hybrid identities", i.e., the integration of multiple identities within each individual (p. 362).

210 Suggestions for ameliorating caste discrimination include the establishment of affirmative action programs for Dalit groups, a possibility hat has been advocated by many Dalit activists. Others suggest that what is needed is a long-term endeavor to raise awareness about the plight of Dalit populations, and thereby change popular conceptions and reduce the acceptability of caste discrimination. Gersony (2003), for example, found through interviews with members of Dalit groups that while none predicted a timely solution to the complex problem of untouchability, they believed that the practice was beginning to diminish slowly, particularly in urban areas. In conclusion, the testimonies of numerous national and international commentators, donors, journalists, academics, and others, have demonstrated that education in Nepal, as in all countries, is inextricable from its broader context: it is influenced by and reflective of a country beset by social and political struggle. The depth and tenacity of the challenges associated with education have scuttled years of reform efforts and clearly belie any simple application of measures to expand or reform the system. The continued crises facing Nepal's education system also highlight the limitations of conventional donor-funded reform initiatives, in terms of the ability of these programs to reconcile the disparity between educational theories on the one hand, and ground level socio-political realities on the other, and thus underscore the need for education systems to be more accommodating of alternative approaches. The case of Nepal serves to further elucidate the paradoxical and multifaceted relationship of education, foreign aid and socio-political conflict, and highlights the need for an increased emphasis on critical research in this area. It is widely asserted in the literature that all initiatives within education should begin to be approached from a conflict perspective and that conflict analysis must become a routine aspect of educational planning and research. As has been the case in Nepal, modern conflicts tend not to be discrete, isolated events, but are often long-term and prone to recurrence. Conflict-sensitivity in education is thus not a "special case" applicable only in specific circumstances, but an essential concern for all involved in the support of education worldwide. Education has been related in a particularly unique way to the instigation and perpetuation of age-old as well as modern-day tensions underlying the Maoist insurgency.

211 Conflict has helped to illuminate in Nepal what Bush and Saltarelli (2004) refer to as the "negative face of education", and the case of Nepal serves as further substantiation of the importance, repeatedly stressed in the literature, of considering the role of schools in the perpetuation of discriminatory social practices, and the value of avoiding hasty replication of a system with fundamental and dangerous flaws. Nepal has faced, and continues to face, many of the universal paradoxes and tensions inherent to educational development, including debates over language use and cultural assimilation, education as socialization, allegations of corruption and misuse of funds, politicization, the questionable adoption of foreign ideologies and models, the impacts of standardized tests and achievement studies, and the self-interested actions of donors. Each of the many facets of an education system may contribute to the deterioration of social relations and thus deserves to be questioned. A critical questioning of education, which is an admittedly challenging and multidisciplinary undertaking, is nonetheless necessary in order to revitalize outdated and potentially harmful beliefs surrounding what learning ought to be. The case of Nepal has also demonstrated, however, how conflict may in fact open more space for, and increase the urgency of, debate regarding the future of education. This is a necessity for all countries, whether they are directly affected by violence, undergoing more subtle forms of oppression or prejudice, or experiencing a period of peace. It is hoped that the emerging recognition of the relationship between education and conflict will act as a catalyst, for both development agencies and national education planners, to stimulate a reconsideration of the structure and goals of education in today's tumultuous and interconnected global environment. While research into the impacts of education on conflict is critical, it would be ideal to balance this with an exploration of the more positive aspects of education, such as the efforts currently underway by schools to promote peace, as well as an examination of schools that have proven resilient in the face of conflict. Challenges also need to be made to long-held notions of what is considered important in educational research and development. For example, it seems pertinent to broaden comparative education and school achievement studies beyond the standard academic indicators of math and literacy, and examine how schools promote democracy, human rights, ecology, peace, and other subjects critical for global survival. There are likely numerous educational success

212 stories in Nepal and elsewhere, and exploring them may offer indications of how to make education more meaningful, egalitarian and truly supportive of, and supported by, development efforts more broadly, and suggest how education systems may not only help facilitate their own students' and societies' aspirations, but contribute to a positive global future for all.

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235 Appendix 1: Map of Nepal

FAR-WESTERN MID-WESTERN REGION r REGION \ CHINA rcA»ej*«m*: ; WESTERN REGION

^ tMHaClftWIIimi J**©H«e«»K6HI

Ecological Regions EH3 Mountains r~~1 Hills INDIA I I j **PT**I ;/Bi*t*«ftl/.BKJHjtdia:

Source: MOHP (2007) Appendix 2: The Maoists' Demands (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003: 189-194). The 40-point charter of demands and covering letter presented to Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba by Dr Baburam Bhattarai on behalf of the United People's Front Nepal on 4 February, 1996: Concerning nationality 1. All discriminatory treaties, including the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty, should be abrogated. 2. The so-called Integrated Mahakali Treaty concluded on 29 January 1996 should be repealed immediately, as it is designed to conceal the disastrous Tanakpur Treaty and allows Indian imperialist monopoly over Nepal's water resources. 3. The open border between Nepal and India should be regulated, controlled and systematized. All vehicles with Indian license plates should be banned from Nepal. 4. The Gurkha/Gorkha Recruitment Centres should be closed. Nepali citizens should be provided dignified employment in the country. 5. Nepali workers should be given priority in different sectors. A 'work permit' system should be strictly implemented if foreign workers are required in the country. 6. The domination of foreign capital in Nepali industries, business and finance should be stopped. 7. An appropriate customs policy should be devised and implemented so that economic development helps the nation become self-reliant. 8. The invasion of imperialist and colonial culture should be banned. Vulgar Hindi films, videos and magazines should be immediately outlawed. 9. The invasion of colonial and imperial elements in the name of NGOs and INGOs should be stopped. Concerning people' democracy 10. A new Constitution should be drafter by representatives elected for the establishment of a people's democratic system. 11. All special privileges of the king and the royal family should be abolished.

237 12. The army, the police and the bureaucracy should be completely under people's control. 13. All repressive acts, including the Security Act, should be repealed. 14. Everyone arrested extra-judicially for political reasons or revenge in Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, Gorkha, Kavre, Sindhupalchowk, Sindhuli, Dhanusa, Ramechhap, and so on, should be immediately released. All false cases should be immediately withdrawn. 15. The operation of armed police, repression and State-sponsored terror should be immediately stopped. 16. The whereabouts of citizens who disappeared in police custody at different times, namely Dilip Chaudhary, Bhuwan Thapa magar, Prabhakar Subedi and others, should be investigated and those responsible brought to justice. The families of victims should be duly compensated. 17. All those killed during the People's Movement should be declared martyrs. The families of the martyrs and those injured and deformed should be duly compensated, and the murderers brought to justice. 18. Nepal should be declared a secular nation. 19. Patriarchal exploitation and discrimination against women should be stopped. Daughters should be allowed access to paternal property. 20. All racial exploitation and suppression should be stopped. Where ethnic communities are in the majority, they should be allowed to form their own autonomous governments. 21. Discrimination against downtrodden and backward people should be stopped. The system of untouchability should be eliminated. 22. All languages and dialects should be given equal opportunities to prosper. The right to education in the mother tongue up to higher levels should be guaranteed. 23. The right to expression and freedom of press and publication should be guaranteed. The government mass media should be completely autonomous. 24. Academic and professional freedom of scholars, writers, artists and cultural workers should be guaranteed.

238 25. Regional discrimination between the hills and the tarai should be eliminated. Backward areas should be given regional autonomy. Rural and urban areas should be treated at par. 26. Local bodies should be empowered and appropriately equipped. Concerning livelihood 27. Land should belong to 'tenants'. Land under the control of the feudal system should be confiscated and distributed to the landless and the homeless. 28. The property of middlemen and comprador capitalists should be confiscated and nationalized. Capital lying unproductive should be invested to promote industrialization. 29. Employment should be guaranteed for all. Until such time as employment can be arranged, an unemployment allowance should be provided. 30. A minimum wage for workers in industries, agriculture and so on should be fixed and strictly implemented. 31. The homeless should be rehabilitated. No one should be relocated until alternative infrastructure is guaranteed. 32. Poor farmers should be exempt from loan repayments. Loans taken by small fanners from the Agricultural Development Bank should be written off. Appropriate provisions should be made to provide loans for small farmers. 33. Fertilizer and seed should be easily available and at a cheap rate. Farmers should be provided with appropriate prices and markets for their produce. 34. People in flood- and drought-affected areas should be provided with appropriate relief materials. 35. Free and scientific health services and education should be available to all. The commercialization of education should be stopped. 36. Inflation should be checked. Wages should be increased proportionate to inflation. Essential goods should be cheaply and easily available to everyone. 37. Drinking water, roads and electricity should be provided to all villagers. 38. Domestic and cottage industries should be protected and promoted.

239 39. Corruption, smuggling, black marketeering, bribery, and the practices of middlemen and so on should be eliminated. 40. Orphans, the disabled, the elderly and children should be duly honoured and protected.

240 Appendix 3: Interview Outline Section 1: The Effect of the Insurgency upon your Organization • When and how did you first become aware of the Maoist insurgency? • When did it begin to affect your organization? • To what extent does it currently affect your organization? • How has it affected your organization? Directly, indirectly? • How significant are the following issues for your organization, given the current political climate: o Staff safety o Organizational structure o Methods / activities o Codes of conduct o Other? Section 2: Adjustments to the Conflict - Inter-organizational Relationships • Has the insurgency influenced your organization's relationships with the following, and if so, how: o Relationship with government o Relationship with other INGOs o Relationship with national NGOs o Relationship with the media or advocacy groups o Relationship with other type of organization? • Has your organization needed to correspond directly with Maoist representatives? • Has your organization had direct contact with Nepalese security forces? Section 3: Effect of the Insurgency Upon Education - General • In your experience, how has the Maoist insurgency affected the education system in Nepal? o General effects to the system as a whole o Specific effects in the areas in which you work (if any) • In your experience, has the insurgency's affect upon education (if any) affected the people with whom you work, psychologically, economically, or socially?

241 • In the course of your activities, have you witnessed either direct or indirect effects of the following occurrences (all of which have been often reported in the media): o Destruction of schools by Maoist or government troops o Closure of schools due to student or teacher migration, threats of violence etc. o Co-option of school resources by Maoist or government troops o School strikes o Forced recruitment of students o Extortion of teacher's wages o Student dropout due to fear of violence or other effect of conflict • In your opinion, what is the place of education (both formal and informal) within situations of conflict, as in Nepal? For example: o How important is the maintenance of education for a community as a whole? o How important is the maintenance of formal education for children? o Where is education in the list of priorities during conflict? o What benefits do you perceive to maintaining education during conflict? o What risks do you perceive to maintaining education during conflict? Section 4: Effect of the Insurgency Upon Development Programs • To what extent are the programs you began prior to the escalation of the conflict continuing? • Has your organization maintained the same goals and priorities despite the conflict, or have priorities shifted? • Has the geographical distribution of existing or potential projects been affected? • Have issues of funding been affected by the conflict? • Has your organization faced challenges due to any of the following: o Logistical difficulties (due to blockades, etc.) o Violence or threats thereof o Government restrictions on INGO activity o Need to negotiate with Maoists or government o Other challenge? • Has your organization altered any of your programs or instituted new programming in direct response to the conflict? Are there any additional comments you wish to make regarding the educational situation in Nepal, or anything else about your programs that was not covered by the above questions?

243 Appendix 4: Educational Growth in Nepal: Figures Figure 1: Literacy in Nepal (Percentages) According to Gender

I Females Males

1950 1981 1991 2001 2005

Sources: UNESCO (2007); Savada (1993)

Figure 2: Number of Primary & Secondary Schools in Nepal

I Primary I Secondary

1950 1956 1970 1987 2002 2004

Sources: NEPC (1956); Savada (1993); MOES (2002; 2004); World Bank & DFID (2006)

244 Figure 3: Net Primary School Enrollment in Nepal

B Total El Girls

1950 1984 1990 1996 1999 2005

Sources: MOES (2000); Khaniya & Williams (2004); UNESCO (2007)

245 Appendix 5: The Maoist School Curriculum for Classes 4 & 5 (Nepal, 2005)

Course Year 4 (9 years old) Year 5 (10 years old) Philosophy • Introduction to philosophy • Introduction to philosophy: (60 credit • The two classes: the exploited and identifying the classes of capitalists hours) the exploiters and workers, and feudal landlords • Concept of two classes (a) and peasants consciousness and dialectical • Concept of two classes. Physical materialism (b) physical and mental and mental labour. labour (c) the known and the Material/consciousness. unknown Known/unknown. • Materialistic and idealistic philosophies • Introduction to materialistic philosophy: historical and dialectical materialism Politics • Biography of Prachanda • The life of Mao Tse-Tung (40 hours) • Beginning of the People's War • Biography of 4 'people's war' • General introduction to human warriors social development: the primitive • The Spartacus revolt stage, slave society, feudal society, • The organization, rules and capitalist society regulation, rights and duties of • The constitution of village level district people's councils People's Government, its rights and duties History • The history of the Communist • History of Nepal Communist Party (30 hours) movement in Nepal (foundation of (Maoist) (From General Assembly Nepal Communist Party, its of Unity to beginning of People's founders and beginning of the War) People's War). • Biography of Mitramani Acharya

246 • Biography of Dil Bahadur Ramtel • The Achham action • The Dang attack Economics • Definition of labour and wages • Introduction to value, distribution, (30 hours) • Introduction to types and capital importance of • What are the means of labour? • What is production and • What are the weapons of labour? consumption? • Private and social ownership • Exchange and barter of goods • Introduction to cooperatives • Types of cooperatives and production Culture • The song "I will keep my country • The song "Dear Jaljala" (20 hours) in my 'eyes'" • Biography and poetry by national • Poetry about Maoist martyrs and local poets • Children's stories • Short stories, science stories and • General introduction to traditional children's stories festivals and people's festivals • Types of culture: feudalism, imperialism, capitalism, Communism and socialism Military • Exercise and marching • Important tips for sentries science • What is roll call? • Rules for route finding (20 hours) • Information, counting soldiers, • Exercises and marching reporting about their conditions • How to make and use guns • Introduction to being a sentry • General introduction to explosives, • Introduction to homemade guns grenades and booby-traps • Communication in the battlefield • Student's role in military • Introduction to explosives and information and communication exchange of information • How to guide soldiers. Roll call • Introduction to war • Types of war - justified and unjustified

247 Appendix 6: The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) According to the United Nations, the MDG's, which all have a target date of 2015, "form a blueprint agreed to by all the world's countries and all the world's leading development institutions. They have galvanized unprecedented efforts to meet the needs of the world's poorest". The eight goals comprise the following: 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. 2. Achieve universal primary education. 3. Promote gender equality and empower women. 4. Reduce child mortality. 5. Improve maternal health. 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. 7. Ensure environmental sustainability. 8. Develop a global partnership for development. Source: United Nations Website: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/index.html.

248 Appendix 7: OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States 1. Take context as the starting point. 2. Move from reaction to prevention. 3. Focus on state-building as the central objective. 4. Align with local priorities and/or systems. 5. Recognize the political-security-development nexus. 6. Promote coherence between donor government agencies. 7. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors. 8. Do no harm. 9. Mix and sequence aid instruments to fit the context. 10. Act fast... to take advantage of windows of opportunity and respond to changing conditions on the ground... 11. ...but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance. 12. Avoid pockets of exclusion. Source: OECD (2005)