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Nepal's Constitutional Process
NEPAL’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS Asia Report N°128 – 26 February 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE END OF THE 1990 CONSTITUTION ............................................................... 2 A. IN WITH A BANG ...................................................................................................................2 B. SECOND THOUGHTS ..............................................................................................................3 C. OUT WITH A WHIMPER..........................................................................................................3 III. THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION............................................................................... 5 A. THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION DRAFTING COMMITTEE ...........................................................5 1. Process .......................................................................................................................5 2. Public participation....................................................................................................6 3. Substance ...................................................................................................................6 4. Lessons ......................................................................................................................7 B. THE FINAL DOCUMENT .........................................................................................................7 -
Annual Report Submitted to USAID So the Details of Those Activities Are Not Reported Here
From Combatants to Peacemakers Program Project Final Report October, 2015 to March 31, 2017 Award No: AID-367-F-15-00002 Under USAID/DCHA/CMM APS-OAA-14-000003 Submitted to: United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Democracy and Governance Office Maharajgunj, Kathmandu, Nepal Tel: +977-01-42340000 Submitted by: Forum for Protection of Public Interest (Pro Public) Gautambuddha Marg, Anamnagar P.O.Box: 14307 Telephone: +977-01-4268681, 4265023 Fax: +977-01-4268022 1 Disclaimer: All these activities were made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of Pro Public and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government. 2 Abbreviations BC Brahmin Chhetri CBO Community Based Organization CDO Chief District Officer CPN Communist Party of Nepal CSO Civil Society Organization DDC District Development Committee DF Dialogue facilitation ECs Ex-Combatants FGD Focus Group Discussion GESI Gender and Social Inclusion GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH KII Key Informant Interview LPC Local Peace Committee NC Nepali Congress NPTF Nepal Peace Trust Fund OCA Organizational Capacity Assessment OPI Organizational Performance Index PLA People Liberation Army Pro Public Forum for the Protection of Public Interest SDG Social Dialogue Group STPP Strengthening the Peace Process UCPN United Communist Party of Nepal UML United Marxist Leninist UNDP United Nations Development Program USAID United States Agency for International Development VDC Village Development Committee WCF Ward Citizen Forum 3 Acknowledgement This project completion report covers the overall implementation of the USAID-funded Combatants to Peacemakers (C2P) project (October 2015 to March 2017). -
Nationalism and Regional Relations in Democratic Transitions: Comparing Nepal and Bhutan
Wright State University CORE Scholar Browse all Theses and Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 2018 Nationalism and Regional Relations in Democratic Transitions: Comparing Nepal and Bhutan Deki Peldon Wright State University Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all Part of the International Relations Commons Repository Citation Peldon, Deki, "Nationalism and Regional Relations in Democratic Transitions: Comparing Nepal and Bhutan" (2018). Browse all Theses and Dissertations. 1981. https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all/1981 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Browse all Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of CORE Scholar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NATIONALISM AND REGIONAL RELATIONS IN DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS: COMPARING NEPAL AND BHUTAN A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts By DEKI PELDON Bachelor of Arts, Asian University for Women, 2014 2018 Wright State University WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL [May 4, 2018] I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY DEKI PELDON ENTITLED NATIONALISM AND REGIONAL RELATIONS IN DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS: COMPARING NEPAL AND BHUTAN BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS. Laura M. Luehrmann, Ph.D. Thesis Director Laura M. Luehrmann, Ph.D. Director, Master of Arts Program in International and Comparative Politics Committee on Final Examination: Laura M. Luehrmann, Ph.D. School of Public and International Affairs Pramod Kantha, Ph.D. School of Public and International Affairs Judson Murray, Ph.D. -
The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: a Monograph
THE MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL: A MONOGRAPH CAUSES, IMPACT AND AVENUES OF RESOLUTION Edited by Shambhu Ram Simkhada and Fabio Oliva Foreword by Daniel Warner Geneva, March 2006 Cover Pictures – clockwise from the top: 1) King Gyanendra of Nepal; 2) Madhav Kumar Nepal, leader of the CPN-UML Party; 3) A popular peace rally; 4) Girija Prasad Koirala, President of the Nepali Congress party; 5) The Maoist leadership; 6) The Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA); 7) A political rally of the Seven-party Alliance in Kathmandu; 8) Soldiers from Royal Nepal Army (RNA). This publication has been possible thanks to the financial support of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Bern, and is part of a larger project on the “Causes of Internal Conflicts and Means to Resolve Them: Nepal a Case Study” mandated and sponsored by the SDC in May 2003. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the PSIO. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form by any means - electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise - without the prior permission of the Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales (HEI) Copyright 2006, IUHEI, CH-Geneva 2 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS __________________________________________________________________________________ LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.................................................................................. 5 FOREWORD...................................................................................................... -
The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and the Political Economy of Violence∗
The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and the Political Economy of Violence∗ Avidit Acharyay October 2009 Abstract This paper studies the incidence of political violence associated with the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. I take a cross-sectional approach where the unit of analy- sis is the district, and dependent variable is total killings by state and Maoists normalized by district population. I find no evidence that political and economic grievances are linked to the incidence of political violence. There is also very lit- tle evidence that district prosperity or political ideology are associated with the incidence of violence. On the other hand, I find that the intensity of violence was greatest in the Midwestern districts and in districts with low road density. His- torical evidence suggests that the dummy variable for Midwestern districts that appears significant and robust reflects the political entrepreneurship of leftist lead- ers more than half a century ago. The results support a theory of conflict that treats an insurgency as analogous to a profit maximizing firm. JEL Classification Codes: D74 Key words: conflict, insurgency, political violence, greed, grievance ∗I would like to thank Jayaraj Acharya, Jose Azar, Nicholas Sambanis, Swarnim Wagle, an anony- mous referee, and the editors of this volume for valuable comments and discussions. All errors and shortcomings are my own. yWoodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Robertson Hall, Princeton University, Princeton NJ 08544-1013 (e-mail: [email protected]). 1 1 Introduction What were the causes of insurgency in Nepal? There have been two approaches to an- swering this question. In one line of research, studies such as Murshed and Gates (2005) and Bohara, Mitchell and Nepal (2006) have used cross-sectional regression techniques to predict the effect of poverty, inequality, rough terrain, and ethno-linguistic divisions on the intensity of political violence. -
Insurgency in Nepal
INSURGENCY IN NEPAL Thomas A. Marks December 2003 ***** The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** Research for this monograph was made possible through a grant from the Marine Corps University Foundation. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications Offi ce by calling (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or by e-mail at [email protected] ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http:// www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/ ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at [email protected] or by calling (717) 245-3133. ISBN 1-58487-148-2 ii FOREWORD Insurgency―the use of protracted low intensity violence and political warfare against a government―has been one of the most pervasive and strategically signifi cant forms of asymmetric confl ict for the past century. -
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) – CPN (M)
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) – CPN (M) P.G. Rajamohan Institute for Conflict Management Formation repercussions.3 Some splinter groups of the communist party and prominent leftist Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) is a leaders like Keshar Jung Rayamajhi have splinter group from the revolutionary been pro-palace and were supportive of the party-less Panchayat system while Communist parties alliance- Communist other groups were active in the struggle Party of Nepal (Unity Centre) (established in May 1991) - during mid-1994, formed for the re-establishment of multi-party under the leadership Pushpa Kamal Dahal democracy, under the umbrella organization United National People’s alias Prachanda.1 At the same time, the Movement (UNPM). After the restoration political front of the Unity Centre– United People’s Front of Nepal (UPFN), which of democracy and 1991 Parliamentary had 9 Members of Parliament in Nepal, election, Communist Party of Nepal also divided into two groups. The UPFN (Unity Centre) emerged as the third largest party in the Parliament, next to faction, led by Baburam Bhattarai Nepali Congress and Communist Party of expressed their willingness and support to 4 work with Communist Party of Nepal Nepal (UML). Ideological confrontation (Maoists) under the leadership of Pushpa and dissatisfaction over the multi-party democratic system under constitutional Kamal Dahal.2 The alliance of two monarchy among the CPN (Unity Centre) revolutionary factions -CPN (M) - was not recognized by the Election Commission to leaders led to the disintegration of the contest in the 1994 parliamentary mid- revolutionary and political front split into term election. They stayed outside and two factions. -
Monitoring Report
` Comprehensive Peace Agreement MONITORING REPORT (July- December, 2007) Published by : Population Watch INHURED International INHURED International/Popuilation Watch 1 Editor Dr. Gopal Krishna Siwakoti Writer B. P. Adhikari Project Coordinator Shree Krishna Subedi Published Date Jan 2008 First Publication 1000 copies Copy Right INHURED International/Population Watch Published by, INHURED International/Population Watch GPO Box : 12684, Kathmandu Ceasefire House, Jhamsikhel, Lalitpur-2, Nepal Tel : 977-1-5531896 Fax : 977-1-5547616 [email protected] www.inhurednepal.org UN Office : 41-42 Elbertson Street, Suite-301, Elmhurst, New York 11377, Tel/Fax : 1-718-4722018 INHURED International/Popuilation Watch 2 PEACE AUDIT ENDEAVOR In the context of internal armed conflict that was waged in Nepal from February13, 1996 resulting in suffering of thousands of Neplai people, the end of armed conflict was declared after the twelve-point agreement between the then rebel CPN (Maoists) and the then Seven Political Alliance (SPA). The culmination of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was also founded on the aspiration of the 19 day-long 'peoples movement'. It is obvious that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) raised expectation among people towards peaceful political transition with forward-looking strategies and restructuring of the state while duly honoring the sacrifice of thousands Nepalese people and embracing the voices of the victims. Since the blueprint itself was not guarantee of the attainment of lasting peace, the effective and honest implementation of the peace accord in both letter and spirit is highly desirable for meaningful change. Unfortunately, soon after the CPA was signed, series of incidences of non-compliance occurred. -
Insurgency in Nepal
INSURGENCY IN NEPAL Thomas A. Marks December 2003 ***** The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** Research for this monograph was made possible through a grant from the Marine Corps University Foundation. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications Offi ce by calling (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or by e-mail at [email protected] ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http:// www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/ ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at [email protected] or by calling (717) 245-3133. ISBN 1-58487-148-2 ii FOREWORD Insurgency―the use of protracted low intensity violence and political warfare against a government―has been one of the most pervasive and strategically signifi cant forms of asymmetric confl ict for the past century. -
8Th Progress Report, Sept 2009
FOUR MONTHLY PROGRESS REPORT Report No. 8 (mid September 2009 – mid January 2010) Peace Fund Secretariat Nepal Peace Trust Fund Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction www.nptf.gov.np April 21, 2010 (Baisakh 8, 2067) i Table of Contents Acronyms....................................................................................................................... ii 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1 2. Background ............................................................................................................ 1 3. Management of Fund ............................................................................................. 3 4. Implementing Agencies of the NPTF supported projects................................... 4 5. About this Report................................................................................................... 4 Part I: Progress at the Fund Level ............................................................................... 7 1.1 Project Proposals............................................................................................... 7 1.2 Meetings at Different Levels .............................................................................. 9 1.3 Finance and Budget......................................................................................... 14 1.4 Amendment to the Joint Financing Arrangement............................................. 15 1.5 Directives for the NGOs to Implement NPTF financed -
COMMITTENTE United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and The
United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women Final Evaluation of the Project “Strengthening Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Nepal (SIWPSAN)” Final Evaluation Report COMMITTENTE Authors: 8th December 2016 Gana Pati Ojha (Team Leader), Marta Balestrini and Sita Gautam SIWPSAN Final Evaluation Report TABLE of CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i 1 INTRODUCTION 5 1.1 Background and Context ....................................................................................................................... 6 1.2 Purpose, Objectives and Scope of the Evaluation ................................................................................ 7 1.3 SIWPSAN project overview ................................................................................................................... 9 1.3.1 SIWPSAN Theory of Change 12 1.3.2 SIWPSAN Approach and Strategy 13 2 APPROACH AND METHODS 14 2.1 Evaluation approach, Methods and Process ....................................................................................... 14 2.2 Ethics ................................................................................................................................................... 18 2.3 Evaluation Constraints and Limitations ............................................................................................... 19 3 FINDINGS BY EVALUATION CRITERIA 20 3.1 Relevance ........................................................................................................................................... -
Back to the Future: the Insurgency of the Communist Part of Nepal (Maoist)
Chapter 7 Back to the Future: The Insurgency of the Communist Part of Nepal (Maoist) Important as the case of Sendero Luminoso was on its merits, it was more so because, in a post-Cold War world that often saw strategic victory over communism confused with operational realities, die-hard elements of discredited Marxist-Lenin- ism looked to the Peruvian Maoists as their standard-bearers. This was as true in Nepal as elsewhere.1 What makes the Nepali case all the more compelling is that it has played itself out in the manner intended by the Maoists in the cases considered in previous chapters of this work. Indeed, in many ways all the elements are present, especially when compared to the Thai case, but they have played themselves out in dissimilar fashion and thrust the Nepali Maoists to the threshold of victory—what no other Maoist group in Asia has been able to accomplish since the end of the Vietnam War. Insurgency in Nepal has existed for perhaps five decades but burst into the open as a serious force only with the declaration of people’s war on 13 February 1996 by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or CPN(M), the most radical offshoot of the leftwing spectrum in Nepali politics.2 Desultory action ended when the “Mao- ists,” as they are universally known, unilaterally abrogated on-going talks with the government and launched a nationwide general offensive in November 2001. There followed a steadily increasing level of violence that by April had left some 13,000 Nepalis dead, a majority of them in not quite four years.3 In that month, the old-order was toppled, much as had happened in Thailand in October 1973, and a similar drama began to play itself out as occurred 1973–76—with important distinctions.