Nepal's Constitutional Process
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NEPAL’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS Asia Report N°128 – 26 February 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE END OF THE 1990 CONSTITUTION ............................................................... 2 A. IN WITH A BANG ...................................................................................................................2 B. SECOND THOUGHTS ..............................................................................................................3 C. OUT WITH A WHIMPER..........................................................................................................3 III. THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION............................................................................... 5 A. THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION DRAFTING COMMITTEE ...........................................................5 1. Process .......................................................................................................................5 2. Public participation....................................................................................................6 3. Substance ...................................................................................................................6 4. Lessons ......................................................................................................................7 B. THE FINAL DOCUMENT .........................................................................................................7 1. How it was decided....................................................................................................7 2. Major features............................................................................................................8 3. Centralisation of power..............................................................................................9 IV. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY........................................................................... 10 A. GOALS ................................................................................................................................10 B. ELECTIONS..........................................................................................................................11 C. PROCEDURES ......................................................................................................................12 D. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AS LEGISLATURE ................................................................13 E. DURATION ..........................................................................................................................14 V. THE POLITICAL PLAYERS..................................................................................... 15 A. THE MAINSTREAM PARTIES ................................................................................................15 1. Views on constitutional substance and procedures..................................................15 2. Democratic reform...................................................................................................16 B. THE MAOISTS .....................................................................................................................17 1. Views on constitutional substance and procedures..................................................18 2. Democratic reform...................................................................................................19 C. THE RELUCTANT, THE RESISTANT AND THE REBELLIOUS....................................................19 VI. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION........................................................................................ 23 A. EDUCATION, DISSEMINATION AND DISCUSSION ..................................................................23 B. INCLUSIVENESS...................................................................................................................24 C. FROM CONSULTATION TO PARTICIPATION...........................................................................25 D. INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE .............................................................................................26 VII. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE............................................................................ 27 A. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICALITIES .......................................................................................27 B. POLITICAL CONTEXT...........................................................................................................28 C. THE UN MISSION................................................................................................................28 D. AREAS OF ENGAGEMENT.....................................................................................................29 VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 31 APPENDICES A. MAP OF NEPAL ...................................................................................................................33 B. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1740 (2007).......................................34 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................36 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA...............................................................37 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...................................................................................39 Asia Report N°128 26 February 2007 NEPAL’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS With the formation of an interim legislature and international constituencies, primarily the major incorporating mainstream parties and Maoists, Nepal’s party leaderships and India. If their judgement is out peace process hinges on writing a constitution that of step with the national mood – as it often has been permanently ends the conflict, addresses the widespread in the past – it will produce new problems. grievances that fuelled it and guards against the eruption of new violence. Most political actors have The constitutional process has to build a complex accepted the Maoist demand for a constituent equilibrium among elites. It must provide political assembly (CA) tasked with framing a new dispensation, space for the Maoists while limiting their options to although royalists are worried over the future of the use violence or coercion against political opponents. monarchy, which has in effect been suspended. The The consolidation of a competitive multiparty system major challenge is to maintain leadership-level consensus naturally bolsters the mainstream political parties but in while building a broad-based and inclusive process the short term will heighten their differences with each that limits room for spoilers and ensures long-term other and may encourage a return to the less than popular legitimacy. Recent unrest in the Tarai plains edifying tactics of earlier parliamentary politics. illustrates the dangers of ignoring popular discontent. Managing the transition in the palace’s role may also Key political actors need to prepare more seriously present difficulties: political leaders have skillfully for the CA. Led by the newly established United stripped royal powers comprehensively but gradually, Nations mission in Nepal (UNMIN), the international with no single step sufficient to prompt a backlash. But community should pressure all sides to abide by their a decisive alteration of traditional power structures will stated commitments and global norms and provide still encounter resistance from conservative institutions technical assistance to the electoral process. – not just the palace but also elements of the army, judiciary and bureaucracy. The interim constitution promulgated on 15 January 2007 established a framework for constitutional change So far the process has concentrated on building elite and enshrined the guiding principles agreed in earlier consensus at the expense of intense political debate or negotiations. The new constitution’s drafting process has extensive public consultation. A handful of SPA and to address the twin objectives of peacebuilding and Maoist leaders have controlled closed-door negotiations; longer-term political reform. It offers an opportunity to limited parliamentary scrutiny has not even extended to cement the Maoists’ integration into mainstream recognising the concept of an opposition. The interim democratic politics, to determine the monarchy’s fate constitution has granted the prime minister and cabinet and to tackle long-standing ethnic, regional and caste sweeping authority, subject to minimal checks and fissures. But successful constitutional processes require balances; the compromised independence of institutions a delicate balance of elite accommodations and broad such as the judiciary has weakened the principle of public participation. If the joint mainstream party/Maoist separation of powers. The inclusion of provisions such leadership fails to balance these sometimes competing as the unrestricted authority to grant pardons suggests demands, or the process stalls, violent conflict may that interim arrangements may enable the political elite emerge once more. to sweep past misdeeds under the carpet. There is also a tension over timescales – a speedy Warnings of a “new dictatorship” are exaggerated but