Orthodox Christianity and Modern Human Rights: Theorising Their Nexus and Addressing Orthodox Specificities �� 13 Vasilios N

Giuseppe Giordan · Siniša Zrinščak Editors

Global Eastern Orthodoxy Politics, Religion, and Human Rights

[email protected] Global Eastern Orthodoxy

[email protected] Giuseppe Giordan • Siniša Zrinščak Editors

Global Eastern Orthodoxy Politics, Religion, and Human Rights

[email protected] Editors Giuseppe Giordan Siniša Zrinščak University of Padova University of Zagreb Padova, Italy Zagreb, Croatia

ISBN 978-3-030-28686-6 ISBN 978-3-030-28687-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28687-3

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

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[email protected] Contents

Introduction. Global Eastern Orthodoxy: Religion, Politics and Human Rights �� 1 Giuseppe Giordan and Siniša Zrinščak

Part I Human Rights Between Religion and Politics Orthodox Christianity and Modern Human Rights: Theorising Their Nexus and Addressing Orthodox Specificities �� 13 Vasilios N. Makrides The Russian Orthodox Church and the Global World �� 41 Kathy Rousselet The Russian Orthodox Church’s Approach to Human Rights �� 59 Kristina Stoeckl The Great and Holy Council and the Orthodox Churches in the Public Sphere �� 77 Emmanuel Clapsis Religion and Human Rights in Greece �� 101 Effie Fokas Religious Freedom in Context: A Comparison Between Belarus and Romania �� 125 Olga Breskaya and Silviu Rogobete Greek-Cypriot Religiocultural Heritage as an Indicator of Fundamental Rights and a Means to Cultural Diplomacy �� 149 Georgios E. Trantas

[email protected] vi Contents

Part II Orthodox Diaspora and Identity in the Global World Orthodoxy Going Global: The Quest for Identity �� 175 Maria Hämmerli Singing an Old Song in a New Land: Orthodox Christian Churches in the Twenty-First Century America �� 193 Alexei Krindatch Orthodox Christianity in a Western Catholic Country �� 219 Marco Guglielmi Greek Diaspora in Germany: Church as the Ecclesia’s Forerunner and Point of Reference �� 241 Eleni D. Tseligka

Index �� 259

[email protected] Contributors

Olga Breskaya University of Padova, Padova, Italy Emmanuel Clapsis Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology, Brookline, MA, USA Effie Fokas Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens, Greece Giuseppe Giordan University of Padova, Padova, Italy Marco Guglielmi Fondazione Bruno Kessler, Trento, Italy Maria Hämmerli University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland Alexei Krindatch Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of the USA, Berkeley, CT, USA Vasilios N. Makrides University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany Silviu Rogobete West University of Timisoara, Timișoara, Romania Kathy Rousselet Sciences Po, Centre de recherches internationales (CERI), CNRS, Paris, France Kristina Stoeckl University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria Georgios E. Trantas Aston University, Birmingham, UK Eleni D. Tseligka Aston University, Birmingham, UK Siniša Zrinščak University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia

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[email protected] Introduction. Global Eastern Orthodoxy: Religion, Politics and Human Rights

Giuseppe Giordan and Siniša Zrinščak

Abstract This introductory chapter explains the state of the art, the objective, and theoretical perspectives of the current volume. It dwells into the discourses of religious, political, and human rights issues, which are presented in this book and analyzed as a continuum from a shared Eastern Orthodox vision to different national Orthodox Churches’ positions. By reflecting on recent arguments from sociology, political science, international relations theory, and political theology, we suggest the need to overcome the challenges of understanding Global Eastern Orthodoxy solely through one disciplinary perspective. On the contrary, we invite the readers to explore the variety of research approaches and investigate Eastern Orthodoxy as a transnational and global religion within challenging conditions of modernization and globalization. In addition, the introductory chapter explains the structure of the volume and thematic focuses of individual chapters. It navigates the theoretical linkages and clarifies the specificity of socio-political, economic, and cultural changes that force Eastern Orthodox tradition to elaborate its institutional positions towards political, human rights issues, and international Orthodox political and identity-building processes.

Keywords Eastern Orthodoxy · Global religion · Politics · Human rights · Identity · Pluralism · Globalization

Over the past decades, the interest of social science in religion and globalization has grown due to the novelties caused by socio-political, economic, and cultural changes, which forced existing religious organizations and groups to revise and redesign their own institutional structures, practices, and agendas. In addition, over the last 30 years the role and place of Orthodox Christianity has been affected

G. Giordan (*) University of Padova, Padova, Italy e-mail: [email protected] S. Zrinščak University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: [email protected]

[email protected] 2 G. Giordan and S. Zrinščak worldwide by multifaceted societal changes: end of communism, international migration, growth of religious diversity, European Union enlargement, secularization processes, and human rights challenges. Lately, a significant body of literature has been flourishing in different disciplinary fields highlighting the changing public role of Eastern Orthodoxy in civil societies and international relations. It explored the topics of Orthodox encounters with modernity in the context of globalization and political transformations (Swatos 1994; Roudometof 2014, 2015; Roudometof et al. 2005; Bremer 2008; Brüning and Van der Zweerde 2012; Krawchuk and Bremer 2014; Stoeckl 2014; Simons and Westerlund 2015; Demacopoulos and Papanikolaou 2017; Koellner 2018). These studies stressed the novelty of civil, political, human rights, and socio-religious conditions that forced Eastern Orthodoxy to negotiate the processes of identity building within national societies and develop inter-Orthodox relations in a continuity of historical dynamics. Nevertheless, the role and place of Orthodox Christianity is still understudied, in particular compared to other major world religions. With the intention of filling the gap, this volume seeks to highlight three intertwined aspects – religion, politics, and human rights, − related to the global context of Orthodox Christianity. From this perspective, religion is an unavoidable variable in explaining how global politics works, as much as politics and overall social changes explain the role of religion both globally and in particular contexts. Orthodoxy is an important part of this ongoing dynamic specificity, bringing into the discussion its uniqueness. This specificity is also linked to a particular geopolitical space, which includes Eastern and South-Eastern European countries, Middle East, and North America. However, as the papers in this collection markedly demonstrate, these particularities – religious, political, spatial – are not entirely different from the processes in other parts of the world, which underlines the need for bringing “specific Orthodoxy issues” into the broader social science scholarship on religion, politics and human rights. As is evident already from its title, this volume intends to problematize what Peter Beyer (2006) would call ‘Orthodox global religious system’ and what Viktor Roudometof (2014, 2015) describes by using the concept of ‘transnational religion’. Globalization, in particular migration flows, has fostered the spread of religious traditions outside of their territorial boundaries, reconfiguring the religious landscape globally. Whether these can or cannot be labeled in terms of globalization, glocalization, or transnationalization, it is the global outlook which offers the opportunity to grasp these changes (Beyer 2013). Thus, in talking about Orthodoxy – or other religions – this volume aims to bring together theoretical arguments from sociology, political science, international relations theory, and political theology to reflect on the need for overcoming binary categories, such as tradition/modernization, us/them, public/private, identity/plurality, religious teaching/secular human rights perspective. Though understanding and interpreting the world in binary schemes is inherent to human beings and forms the basis for social relations, it is frequently (mis)used by various social actors, including the religious ones – social processes are far too complex for this approach. This volume suggests various theoretical revisions to the above described antithetical categories by critically reconsidering existing social science perspectives used for

[email protected] Introduction. Global Eastern Orthodoxy: Religion, Politics and Human Rights 3 analyzing Eastern Orthodoxy and introducing specific interdisciplinary matrixes and approaches. It also advances socio-religious agendas for analyzing international Orthodox politics and suggests and theorizes legal cases and empirical data, including comparative studies of Orthodox countries.

Global Eastern Orthodoxy and Forms of Belonging

It is easily discernible that the concept of Orthodox identity/ies is one of the most used concepts in this book. As Yuval-Davis puts it, this book emphasizes the view that the social scientific approach to belonging needs the intersectional analytical approach that is introduced by “deconstructing simplistic notions of national and ethnic collectives and their boundaries and interrogating some of the differential effects that different political projects of belonging have on different members of these collectivities who are differentially located socially, economically and politically” (Yuval-Davis 2011: 2). Encounters with host countries have produced several dynamics that may change traditional forms of Orthodoxy. One can observe that part of the Orthodox diaspora in the U.S. is going through a process of the local church renegotiating the link between ethnic and religious identity. Yet, as the chapter by Alexei Krindatch argues, rising ethnicization goes in parallel with diversification in the way in which Orthodox parishes respond to the need to be ethnically distinctive in a markedly pluralistic context. In Western Europe, while Orthodox migration flows have favored maintaining transnational ties with the motherland and reproducing their ethnic identities, there is no single pattern observed. The way in which Orthodox believers negotiate their identity in the new context and in which they develop links with the motherland depend very much on the particular situations existing in the various countries, particular Orthodox churches and even waves of migration. Although being a minority in the pluralistic and secularized European context intensifies the religious ethnic identity role, this is, however, intertwined with the need to be open to others (and to converts) in order to transmit the religious message in the secularized world, a process which Maria Hämmerli describes in her chapter as indigenization of Orthodoxy in the West. In Italy, which has become a country with the largest number of Orthodox people among the Western countries, various Orthodox churches opted for various engagement strategies with the host environment, and these strategies reflected both the theological traditions of the countries from which they originated, and the paths chosen to establish relations with the dominant Catholic Church and the Italian state (chapter by Marco Guglielmi). In yet another chapter, Eleni Tselikga offers the individualistic collectivism concept in describing how Greek guest workers were able, particularly due to their ‘temporary status’ in Germany, to maintain their ethnic and religious identity without isolating themselves from the host society. This proves that the dilemma of integration/segregation effects on minority ethnic, linguistic and religious communities varies with context and cannot be straightforwardly resolved in either/or answers. As noted elsewhere:

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“Although the role of local organizations is not unambiguous, and can indeed contain negative aspects (social control, exclusion of some members, emphasis on difference and segregation), their role in social orientation is indispensable, and the everyday life of many individuals relies on that role. … Welfare needs (like educational, health and long-term care needs) are not abstracts, but are rooted and expressed in particular social/cultural terms, shaped to the great extent through collective action and collective experience” (Zrinščak 2011: 208).

International Orthodox Politics and Church-State Relations

After the end of communism, and in parallel with the globalization process, Orthodox Christianity became a new geopolitical actor in international affairs, operating as a stakeholder in international relations and acquiring an ever-increasing role in the European construction process. In turn, changes to Church-State relations (symphonia) in Eastern Orthodox countries are circumscribing a new physiog- nomy, while the states of the host countries are establishing a relationship with Orthodox churches in the diaspora. The documents approved by the Pan-Orthodox Council in Crete in July 2016 seem to be consistent with this global dimension as Orthodox Churches presented there “accepted in principle the plural and inclusive nature of modern democratic states … (and) … [chose] to respect the inherent pluralism of modern societies and recognize their cultural and religious particularity” (chapter by Emmanuel Clapsis). Still, the absence of several Orthodox Churches at the Crete Council limits the impact of such an important move. Also, a recent conflict between the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Patriarchate of Moscow over the issues of autocephaly of the Ukraine Orthodox Church with divisive consequences among jurisdictions is highly connected with the geopolitical dynamics behind those events. From a theoretical point of view, the global outlook on religious aspects of social changes helps reveal the global dimension of a particular religion and particular politics, a particular State and a particular Church, thus underlying how geopolitical actions and interests differ among various states and churches. It also emphasizes how current international Orthodox politics challenges the configuration of that relationship within Eastern Orthodoxy and raises the issue of governmental authority within its institutional arrangements. As is convincingly argued by Kathy Rousselet in her chapter, resisting Westernized globalization, or (as is advanced in other chapters and numerous papers elsewhere) morally questioning the modernized West, and even adapting to local contexts in countries to which Orthodox people migrate, are in the case of the Russian Orthodox Church coupled with the globally spread religio-political message, as coordinated by the foreign policy of the Russian state. This message is neither purely religious nor purely political, as it is expressed in terms of traditional culture and traditional moral values which should be respected and advanced nowadays.

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There are three theoretically interesting aspects of such a specific global action of the Russian Orthodox Church, which are crucial for understanding the global religio-political dynamics. Firstly, appealing to cultural/moral values which the Russian Orthodox Church allegedly defends (as, indeed, do many other Churches) illustrates the vitality of the identity issue in the contemporary world as individuals and groups struggle over how to mark the boundaries against others in order to obtain a clear sense of identity. While belonging has never been fixed and unambiguous, the modern social conditions have contributed to the loosening of social anchors “that made it look ‘natural’, predetermined and non-negotiable, [with] ‘identification’ [becoming] even more important for the individuals desperately seeking a ‘we’ to which they may bid for access” (Bauman 2004: 24). Thus, Orthodox Churches offer, as do other religious and social actors, specific answers, regardless of whether or not these answers resolve or complicate the relations to others. Secondly, as the chapter by Vasilios Makrides shows, there are various and not mutually exclusive approaches to studying Orthodoxy and human rights, with some of them, like comparative civilization analysis, multiple modernities and post- secularity approaches, being relevant to understanding the above mentioned political and civilizational stand of the Russian Orthodox Church. Thirdly, the issue of actors in the public space, and how this public space is understood and defined by these actors, is highly relevant as well. The question to be resolved by the democratic states, as, in principle, only democracies allow free public space, arises from the fact that public space is constituted more by collective actors with various interests and outlooks than by individual citizens, and also how to harmonize various public spaces, both in terms of their spatial dimensions (from local to global) and, sometimes, in terms of their very exclusive nature.

Global Eastern Orthodoxy and the Debate on the Universality and Particularity of Human Rights

These transformations at the religious and political levels also face challenges related to human rights issues. On the issue of European and international human rights norms, debates within Orthodox Christianity unfold a multifarious relationship to these norms as theological argumentation remains ambiguous. These discussions have provided various patterns of relations between Orthodox Christianity and human rights in different countries, ranging from open hostility to more accommodating attitudes. Still, the first starting point is the acknowledgment of ambiguity in the human rights concept itself as, notwithstanding its powerful civilizational influence, it is both differently understood by various actors and differently implemented in various social contexts. The particularities of Orthodox countries usually observed in relation to human rights could be put into this broader context of ambiguities. However, several chapters of this book reveal that there is one ambiguity arising in particular from the

[email protected] 6 G. Giordan and S. Zrinščak

Orthodox context, and that is the one between individual and collective human rights. Although human rights are not exclusively individualistic and although the issue of the rights of communities is an unresolved one in the Western context as well, the perceived tension between so-called modernized, individualistic, Westernized human rights, on the one hand, and traditional, communal, Eastern European human rights, on the other hand, constitutes the core of the social and political disputes. Yet, the human rights lenses used by this volume have the ambi- tion to go beyond this tension and to connect the particularities of a specific context with some general trends and issues. A closer examination reveals how below the surface of the human rights being perceived as a threat by a particular Church, interesting changes are taking place. In her chapter, Kristina Stoeckl argues that the Russian Orthodox Church has changed its stance from the strong rejection of the human rights concept to its critical acceptance, i.e. acceptance of the language of human rights, while trying to define these rights in conservative, religious terms. Here again, this selective acceptance is inseparable from positioning oneself as a global actor and acting in that way in the global political arena. This case also reveals interesting similarities with and differences from other countries and respective churches. While the Russian Orthodox Church kept silent on the subject of human rights in the communist era, Catholic Churches in much of Eastern Europe extensively used human rights as a way to defend religious rights and to effectively position themselves against the communist rule. Today, it would be worth exploring how and on the basis of which strategies both Churches selectively use human rights in order to promote their social visions. The Greek case would be also worth exploring from a comparative perspective. Effie Fokas’s chapter details how and why Greece fails to respect religious rights as defined by the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. The chapter demonstrates that it is not sufficient to simply affirm the religious-nation identity nexus as the main explanatory variable – as this nexus operates in other contexts too, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, and does not produced the same outcome – but that instead it is necessary to delve much deeper in order to see which dimensions of this nexus result in which consequences. Another explanatory factor is the position of various actors in interpreting and (non)implementing the Court’s decisions. In sum, the human rights perspective, or, in general, the sociology of religious freedom, could be employed more consistently as an additional theoretical perspective in understanding the social role of religions nowadays (Breskaya and Rogobete in this volume; Breskaya et al. 2018; Giordan and Zrinščak 2018).

Structure of the Volume

As mentioned above, this volume explores relationship patterns between the religious, political and human rights spheres by establishing connotations for the concept of Eastern Christian Orthodoxy and characterizing the global challenges it faces today. The analytical frameworks introduced in this volume provide various

[email protected] Introduction. Global Eastern Orthodoxy: Religion, Politics and Human Rights 7 perspectives, from the sociological and political science perspectives to theological observations. Some chapters are more empirically oriented, while others are more theoretically driven. They outline cases from Russia, Greece, Cyprus, Belarus, Romania, U.S., Italy, and Germany and make available in English materials originally available in languages other than English. Also, each chapter suggests a research methodology, which can be further applied to the qualitative and quantitative research of Global Eastern Orthodoxy from the interdisciplinary perspective. By reason of their diversity, the chapters, we believe, help capture the complexity of relations between religion, politics and human rights in the global and increasingly complex world. The volume is divided into two sections. The first section “Human Rights Between Religion and Politics” includes seven chapters. The first chapter Orthodox Christianity and Modern Human Rights: Theorising their Nexus and Addressing Orthodox specificities by Vasilios N. Makrides sets the analytical framework for the critical understanding of Orthodox responses to modern human rights discourses. Kathy Rousselet’s contribution The Russian Orthodox Church and the Global World gives the example of the Russian Orthodox Church in France, overlapping geopolitical and religious strategies, and the application of the ideas of Orthodox civilization and tradition to geopolitical discourses. The chapter The Russian Orthodox Church’s Approach to Human Rights by Kristina Stoeckl provides an overview of the Russian Orthodox Church’s approach to human rights in general and to religious freedom in particular, underlying the dynamics from rejection to critical acceptance within the broader context of the relationship between religious and political spheres. The chapter The Great and Holy Council and the Orthodox Churches in the Public Sphere by Emmanuel Clapsis explores the presence of Eastern Orthodoxy in the public sphere by applying the perspectives of John Rawls, Jurgen Habermas, and Charles Taylor to the analysis of recent documents and the positions of various Orthodox Churches expressed during the 2016 Crete Council. In her chapter Religion and Human Rights in Greece, Effie Fokas provides a detailed analysis of religious freedom policies in Greece, debates on religious freedom in the public sphere, and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. The author examines how political, legal, and religious boundaries produce national religious freedom dynamics within the broader international human rights regime. The chapter Religious Freedom in Context: A Comparison between Belarus and Romania by Olga Breskaya and Silviu Rogobete proposes a comparative study of the religious freedom perception in two countries with a majority Orthodox population, belonging to different political constellations. The authors discuss socio-legal and socio- political structural conditions that enhance the perceptions of religious freedom, including religious pluralism and the role of Orthodoxy at both the individual and the societal level. The final chapter in this sectionGreek-Cypriot Religiocultural Heritage as an Indicator of Fundamental Rights and a Means to Cultural Diplomacy by Georgios E. Trantas suggests, taking the example of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, the analysis of the process of Europeanization and the practices of religiocultural diplomacy in considering how the concept of religioscapes brings together religious, political and human rights dimensions.

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The second section entitled “Orthodox Diaspora and Identity In the Global World” contains four chapters emphasizing the religious aspects of Global Eastern Orthodoxy, in particular by discussing the sociological definitions of the concept of Orthodox diaspora and analyzing the strategies of Orthodoxy’s adaptation to local contexts. In her chapter Orthodoxy Going Global: The Quest for Identity, Maria Hämmerli advances possible responses of the Eastern Orthodox tradition to the challenges of modernity in the global secular society by analyzing in detail factors that impact Orthodox identity reconstruction in a global word. The chapter Singing an Old Song in a New Land: Orthodox Christian Churches in the twenty-first Century America by Alexei Krindatch introduces an empirical analysis of the processes of adherence to tradition and innovation by the adherents of the Orthodox Church in North America. The author discusses ways in which the universal tradition accommodates itself to the local context by applying the ‘congregationalist’ approach to the analysis of Eastern Orthodoxy. With his contribution Orthodox Christian Diasporas in Italy: Patterns of Negotiations in a Catholic Country, Marco Guglielmi analyzes the Romanian diaspora in Italy and the differences in the patterns of settlement and religious orientation between the Romanian Orthodox Church, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and the Russian Orthodox Church in Italy. Eleni Tseligka’s paper Greek Diaspora in Germany: Church as the Ecclesia’s Forerunner and Point of Reference which analyzes migrant communities and simul- taneous cultural retention strategies as well as the possibilities for the modernization of tradition. This volume is the result of the international conference held in Padua in May 2017 that was organized by the International Joint PhD Programme “Human Rights, Society, and Multi-level Governance” (Universities of Athens-Panteion, Padua, Western Sydney, Zagreb).

References

Bauman, Z. (2004). Identity: Conversations with Benedetto Vecchi. Cambridge/Malden: Polity Press. Beyer, P. (2006). Religions in global society. London/New York: Routledge. Beyer, P. (2013). Religion in the context of globalization: Essays on concept, form, and political implications. London/New York: Routledge. Bremer, T. (2008). Religion and the conceptual boundary in central and Eastern Europe: Encounters of faiths. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Breskaya, O., Giordan, G., & Richardson, J. (2018). Human rights and religion: A sociological perspective. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 57(3), 419–431. Brüning, A., & Van der Zweerde, E. (2012). Orthodox Christianity and Human Rights. Leuven: Peeters. Demacopoulos, G. E., & Papanikolaou, A. (2017). Christianity, democracy, and the shadow of Constantine. New York: Fordham University Press. Giordan, G., & Zrinščak, S. (2018). Introduction: Religions and human rights. Social Compass, 65(1), 3–10.

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Koellner, T. (2018). Orthodox religion and politics in contemporary Eastern Europe: On multiple secularisms and entanglements. London/New York: Routledge. Krawchuk, A., & Bremer, T. (2014). Eastern orthodox encounters of identity and otherness: Values, self-reflection, dialogue. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Roudometof, V. (2014). Globalization and orthodox christianity: The transformations of a religious tradition. London/New York: Routledge. Roudometof, V. (2015). Orthodox christianity as a transnational religion: Theoretical, historical and comparative considerations. Religion, State and Society, 43(3), 211–227. Roudometof, V., Agadjanian, A., & Pankhurst, J. (2005). Eastern orthodoxy in a global age: Tradition faces the twenty-first century. Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press. Simons, G., & Westerlund, D. (2015). Religion, politics and nation-building in post-communist countries. Farnham: Ashgate. Stoeckl, K. (2014). The Russian orthodox church and human rights. London: Routledge. Swatos, W. H., Jr. (1994). Politics and religion in central and Eastern Europe: Traditions and transitions. Westport: Praeger. Yuval-Davis, N. (2011). The politics of belonging. Intersectional contestations. Los Angeles/ London/New Delhi/Singapore/Washington, DC: Sage. Zrinščak, S. (2011). Local immigrant communities, welfare and culture: an integration/segregation dilemma. In E. Carmel, A. Cerami, & T. Papadopolous (Eds.), Migration and welfare in the New Europe: Social protection and the challenges of integration (pp. 197–212). Bristol: University of Bristol: The Policy Press.

Giuseppe Giordan is Professor of Sociology at the University of Padova where he teaches Sociology of Religion and Religions and Human Rights. He is Coordinator of the International Joint PhD Programme on Human Rights, Society and Multi-level Governance at the University of Padova and Co-editor of the Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion (Brill). His main research interest focuses on religious and cultural pluralism, spirituality, religion and human rights, and Orthodoxy in Italy. In 2018, he edited with Siniša Zrinščak the special issue of Social Compass on religions and human rights (65/1).

Siniša Zrinščak PhD in Sociology, is Professor and Head of the Chair of Sociology at the Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb. He is also Vice Coordinator of the ESA RN34, member of the Scientific Committee of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), and Associate Editor in the European Journal of Social Work. His main scientific interests include religious changes in post-communism, Church-state relations, European and comparative social policy, and gender. He has been involved in several mainly international scientific projects and has numerous publications in peer-reviewed journals and books. For more information, see https:// www.sinisazrinscak.com/

[email protected] Part I Human Rights Between Religion and Politics

[email protected] Orthodox Christianity and Modern Human Rights: Theorising Their Nexus and Addressing Orthodox Specificities

Vasilios N. Makrides

Abstract This chapter addresses the challenges posed by the modern human rights discourse to Orthodox Christianity, given that Orthodox Churches and individual Orthodox thinkers have expressed quite varied and diverging positions on this key issue; for example, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew and the Russian Orthodox Church. The first part of the chapter deals with selective theoretical perspectives that have been applied so far to an analysis of the relations between Orthodox Christianity and modern human rights; for example, the comparative civilizational analysis, the multiple modernities paradigm, the post- secularity, de-secularization and multiple secularities approach, postcolonial and postmodern perspectives, ethnicity and nationalism studies, globalization studies, as well as political science and international relations perspectives. The second part of the chapter attempts to chart, contextualize and explain the various Orthodox Christian specificities with regard to modern human rights. These pertain, among other things, to the Orthodox introversive attitudes in modern times, the anti- Westernism, the still pending fruitful encounter between Orthodoxy and modernity, the weak world-relatedness, and the overall marginality of the Orthodox discourse. Nevertheless, the growing Orthodox interest in the topic is a positive sign and attests to the promising developments that are currently taking place within this traditional religious system.

Keywords Orthodox Christianity · Modern human rights · Modernity · Secularity · Anti-Westernism

V. N. Makrides (*) University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

[email protected] 14 V. N. Makrides

The Challenge of Modern Human Rights to the Orthodox Christian World

Between 29 May and 2 June 2017, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew I, paid an official visit to Germany, invited by the Evangelical Church of Germany on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the Reformation. Among his numerous activities, talks and meetings, he gave on 1 June a lecture in Berlin at the headquarters of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation on the relations between Orthodox Christianity (commonly called Orthodoxy) and human rights. Among other things, he pointed to the key significance of human rights as an achievement of modernity and discussed the various problems the Christian Churches in the West had historically had with human rights. In his opinion, the contemporary situation is, however, a different one, as both Christian and secular actors from various domains essentially endorse human rights and cooperate with one another in order to protect human dignity. Bartholomew considered the human rights as deeply rooted in the Christian culture, hence their support by the Christian Churches and actors should be rather seen as the logical consequence thereof. Reservations and reactions against human rights originate nowadays mostly among non-Christian religions, which thereby fear an overthrow of traditional values. This notwithstanding, for Bartholomew, the future agenda lies more on the continuing mutual dialogue and understanding among all involved parties, not on any confrontation and polarisation (Bartholomaios 2017: 3–5). With regard to the Orthodox Churches, Bartholomew underlined that they do not share a common position on human rights whereas several of them see in the “Western” human rights a serious threat to Orthodox anthropology and identity. But such objections, in his view, are not grounded in the Orthodox theology itself, as they rather reflect the numerous negative experiences of the Orthodox Churches with the West across history. Given that Orthodoxy places emphasis on the social and communitarian dimension of human freedom and that the human person remains at the very core of Orthodox anthropology, such a person-centric perspective can certainly contribute to the safeguarding of human rights, so that they are not simply transformed into egoistic and self-centred individual demands and claims. In the end, for Bartholomew, Orthodoxy’s vision about the human being transcends the horizon of human rights. The ideal of Orthodox anthropology is namely the free and non-coercive self-transcendence when humans relinquish their own individual rights in order to serve their neighbours out of love (Bartholomaios 2017: 5–7). Such a basically positive attitude towards modern human rights on the part of an eminent Orthodox leader nowadays invites a closer analysis of its content. It is characteristic that Bartholomew also expressed his open disagreement with the various Orthodox critics of modern human rights. He thus mentioned and distanced himself explicitly from the views of the well-known Orthodox theologian and philosopher Christos Yannaras (1998, 2004), who proclaims a fundamental incompatibility between the genuine Orthodox orientation and the very concept of modern human rights of Western origin. In doing so, Bartholomew also dissociated his own stance

[email protected] Orthodox Christianity and Modern Human Rights 15 implicitly from the contemporary widespread Orthodox anti-modernist critique, especially represented by the Russian Orthodox Church. His own agenda clearly favours the closer dialogue of Orthodoxy with (Western) modernity and its various facets, without however accepting it fully, unconditionally and unreservedly. It is in this context that Bartholomew also formulated his own critique of human rights (e.g., against their individualistic nature) and suggested alternatives from the Orthodox tradition (e.g., a communitarian personalism), which may offer solutions to various impasses. He also proceeded to a theological reflection on the potential overcoming of the need for human rights through loving self-transcendence. However, his critique was not polarising and divisive, but productive and concilia- tory. Bartholomew seems to respect the modern societal differentiation along various separate lines of institutions and actors (including the Orthodox ones), who, despite divergences and disagreements, should ideally find a way to communicate with one another, collaborate and contribute to the defence of the inviolable human dignity. In this respect, his criticism of human rights and modernity as a whole is a moderate one (Bartholomaios 2017: 7–8) It is for the above reasons that I have considered such a position as basically indicating an acceptance of modern human rights in the first place by displaying a willingness to compromise and to mediate between them and the Orthodox standpoint (Makrides 2012a: 302–306). Despite some similarities and common points, this position differs, however, from another Orthodox trend characterised by a clear ambivalence and critical reserve towards human rights (Makrides 2012a: 306–310). The latter is reflected, for instance, in the position of the Russian Orthodox Church, which issued a well-known official document on human freedom, dignity and rights (Russian Orthodox Church 2008), which subsequently triggered many discussions and debates internationally (Stoeckl 2014). In this document, but also in the overall policy of the post-Soviet Russian Church, there exist a strong critique of and dis- tancing from the project of modernity in all its basic facets (e.g., secularity). The Russian Orthodox side is further at pains in creating an international front and alliance against the various emerging threats, including those that stem from modern human rights, which are perceived as directed against the so-called “traditional values” (Curanović 2015; Horvath 2016). In the end, the Russian position creates a new vision of Orthodox human rights, which is less compatible or even incompatible with the established and widely disseminated human rights concept (Agadjanian 2010, 2017). Such elements and characteristics are, however, absent from Bartholomew’s stance, who seems to come to terms more smoothly with the prerequisites of modernity without endorsing them uncritically. These few examples suffice to reveal the crucial differences between these two Orthodox Christian positions on human rights. Be this as it may, Bartholomew’s view, which has been expressed on various other occasions (Bartholomew 2008: 120–144), is hardly unambiguous, does not solve all related problems, and should not be overestimated. This is because it is not representative of the wide array of differing Orthodox positions on human rights. In general, Bartholomew thinks that a more systematic and productive encounter between Orthodoxy and modernity has yet to happen, thus it remains an absolute

[email protected] 16 V. N. Makrides must in the future. However, he acknowledges the existing deep rift between Christian and modern secular ideas (e.g., concerning the secular concept of freedom promoting human autonomy, extreme liberalism, self-centredness, and self- realisation). In addition, the specific Orthodox remedy that Bartholomew proposes for overcoming the eventual deficits of modern human rights, namely personalism, is not altogether persuasive. This is because Orthodox personalism has been used both in favour of and against human rights – the latter being the case with the aforementioned Yannaras. Evidently, there exist quite varying and even contradictory interpretations of Orthodox personalism, which constitutes a dominant current in modern Orthodox theological thought (Papanikolaou 2008). All this points to the imminent danger of ideologisation, a constant problem in contemporary Orthodox theorising (Makrides 2018). The above introductory discussion clearly shows that the relationship between Orthodox Christianity and human rights in contemporary Europe (and beyond that) still remains topical and quite tense, a fact that has led to a considerable corpus of relevant literature in the last years (Brüning and van der Zweerde 2012; Makrides et al. 2016; Diamantopoulou and Christians 2018). A turning point in the recent history of this relationship was the aforementioned Russian Orthodox document of 2008, which was not, however, endorsed by the other Orthodox Churches (for the Romanian Orthodox Church, see Grigore 2016). Characteristically enough, the Holy and Great (Panorthodox) Council of the Orthodox Church (2016) has dealt only tangentially with this huge and complex issue, thus there is still no common Orthodox position on it. Yet, even a cursory look at contemporary developments in state legislation related to human rights (e.g., laws on cohabitation and same-sex marriage) in the European Union and more broadly in the Western world makes clear the numerous new challenges that some Orthodox Churches already face. This is because such developments are still considered by the majority of the Orthodox world as an unmistakable sign of the ongoing spiritual decay of the West. However, such problems are also observed in other religious and cultural contexts, whereas interesting parallels may be drawn between the Orthodox Christian and the Islamic positions on human rights (Boldişor 2015). Historically speaking, both religions have had serious problems in their encounter with Western modernity. Bearing all this in mind, the purpose of this chapter is basically twofold: First, it will present and discuss various theoretical perspectives on the relations between Orthodox Christianity and modern human rights. Second, it will contextualise the whole issue and try to explain the obvious Orthodox specificities in this realm. This will hopefully enable a better understanding of the cultural idiosyncrasy of Orthodox Christianity, which can be observed in other instances and which clearly distin- guishes it from Western Latin Christianity.

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Theorizing Orthodox Christianity and Modern Human Rights

Given the ever-growing interest in the relations between Orthodox Christianity and modern human rights nowadays, it comes as no surprise that this issue has been examined and analysed so far from various, at times interdisciplinary, theoretical perspectives, which often exhibit overlapping and interrelated features. This has happened especially after the fall of the Eastern Bloc, as Orthodox Christianity became afterwards increasingly the focus of a systematic scholarly examination and was strongly incorporated into the wider interdisciplinary research on religious phenomena. The following list of such theoretical perspectives is selective and non- exhaustive. Further, these should not be considered as opposite, but rather as complementary, thus reflecting the methodological variety and plurality in contemporary research.

Comparative Civilisational Analysis

To begin with, comparative civilisational analysis, which constitutes an old frame of reference and research, has provided some interesting perspectives that have been applied to the study of the Orthodox East in various ways. This may also explain why scholars in this broad field have expressed quite divergent views on our topic. In the past, there were mostly critical and negative evaluations of Orthodox Eastern and South Eastern Europe as lagging behind, being underdeveloped or at least being different compared to the Latin West (Makrides 2005). More recently, such a comparison was attempted in the well-known geopolitical theory of Samuel Huntington (1996: 70-72), who pointed to the key features distinguishing the Western civilisational group (decisively influenced, among other things, by Roman Catholicism and Protestantism) from the rest of civilisations including the Orthodox Christian one. In this context, Huntington argued that one central point of difference and conflict between these civilisational complexes was the acceptance of individual human rights and the rule of law. Aside from these critical voices, there have also been recently more moderate and neutral positions on this matter, criticising the Western intellectual imperialism and provincialising the related Western discourse (McGuckin 2010). More emphasis was subsequently put on the specificities of the Orthodox case and its various facets concerning individuality, liberality, democratisation and secularity, which differ from those of Western modernity (Hann 2011). In Orthodox contexts, among other things, one simply lacks historically the presuppositions that gave rise to the Western human rights in the first place. In other words, the overall evolvement of the Orthodox world since Byzantine times was quite different from the Western Latin one, thus it is necessary to overcome previous widespread prejudices about

[email protected] 18 V. N. Makrides the Orthodox East owed to its misrepresentation through Western lens (Arnason 2010). Furthermore, the process of individualisation took on another course in the Orthodox East than in the West and remained incomplete (Buss 2003). Finally, the formation of the Eastern European legal tradition was heavily dependent on the catalytic influence of the Western one, from which it also received the notion of rights (Giaro 2011; Artemyeva 2012). All this accounts for the Orthodox specificities with regard to human rights and the difficulties with their endorsement, which are not solely of religious nature. The above perspectives are particularly useful insofar as they enable a distanced look at Orthodox cultures without blaming them uncritically for any observed developmental deficits in comparison to the West.

The Multiple Modernities Approach

Another related theoretical frame that puts the entire issue on a broader canvas concerns the multiple modernities approach, which has become quite fashionable in the wake of the seminal work by Eisenstadt (2000). It was basically the result of a pluralisation of perspectives beyond the older and dominant Western, Christian and Eurocentric ones. This change has taken place in recent decades by looking for alternative models of social and cultural development and by considering more seriously local parameters and other specificities. The multiple modernities approach constitutes the opposite of the previously widespread Westernisation paradigm, namely that non-Western societies and cultures would unavoidably be forced to Westernise themselves in the long run. The new approach states, however, that modernisation should be basically disentangled from Westernisation, but without becoming too broad and inclusive as far as potential local modernities are concerned. There is a core of modernity that still remains “Western” and to which local modernities relate to a varying degree. The main agenda here is not to fully emulate Western modernity. Yet, the so-called multiple modernities are not completely unrelated to it; for example, in terms of the formation of nation-states, institutions, legal systems and administration structures. It goes without saying that this approach has been also applied to the Orthodox case (Makrides 2012b), given that the latter was for centuries under the formative Western influence and also attempted to Westernise itself. Stoeckl (2011) has specifically applied this model to the Russian Orthodox case and tried thereby to explain its obvious anti-modern attitude. Introducing a distinction between a comparative-civilisational and a post-secular perspective within the multiple modernities discourse, she argued that the former helps to understand modernisation processes within large cultural-civilisational units, whereas the latter focuses more on actors and cultural domains within civilisational units and on inter-civilisational crossovers. The two perspectives should not be seen as contradictory, but rather as complementary. The example of Russian Orthodoxy is a case in point for clarifying this difference. Whereas from a comparative-civilisational viewpoint Russian Orthodoxy and its critique of Western modernity may appear as the Europe’s

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“other”, from a post-secular perspective Orthodoxy is part of Europe’s religious pluralist landscape and partakes in the ongoing process of defining the meaning of European political and cultural integration. This includes the issue of human rights as well, on which the Russian Church has expressed views that seem to deviate from established Western patterns. In this respect, the multiple modernities approach can contribute to a better grasp of Orthodox specificities through its flexible agenda and conceptual tools.

Post-secularity, De-secularisation, and Multiple Secularities

The already mentioned notion of post-secularity is another perspective used to better understand current debates and conflicts in the relations between East and West. Originally, it had to do with a re-evaluation of the preeminent religious-secular divide in Western modernity in order to enable a more viable societal integration for diverse actors. Habermas (2006) has asked, for example, from secular actors to be more sensitive, tolerant and flexible towards religious actors and their claims, regardless if secular actors still keep a clear primacy in the overall decision-making. Taylor (2007: 303-304, 531-532), further, has suggested the process of a “mutual fragilisation” of both the religious and secular camps as a way to start anew their mediation; namely, when both basically accept the undermining sense that others may think differently. In fact, there are many different notions of post-secularity in use today (Beckford 2012), showing that secularity becomes more self-reflective and self-critical and that Western modernity has perhaps become secular more by institutional design and not necessarily by ideology. Such theoretical perspectives have been applied to the human rights issue by Stoeckl (2016a), who leads a broader research project on “Postsecular Conflicts” in various settings across the globe including the Russian Orthodox one. The positions of the Russian Church, including those on human rights, are considered to fall under the category of traditionalism, which lies between liberalism and fundamentalism. This is not something unique or special, given that it is part of a larger global resurgence against secular modernity. All this takes places in a clear post-secular setting, which aspires to renegotiate the boundaries between the religious and the secular. The Russian Orthodox case, however, stands out in this broader traditionalist resurgence, as it is strongly backed by the respective strong state and enjoys international presence and appeal. There are two further perspectives on secularity that are relevant in this context: The first one concerns the concept of de-secularisation, which has been applied to the post-Soviet Russian situation (Karpov 2010). Here it is about a de-secularising regime that initiates purposely a counter-secularisation process through which religion reasserts its societal influence in many domains and through different means, including in the issue of human rights by openly supporting the so-called “traditional values”. In a parallel context, there is a strong tendency to consider the various existing forms of secularity from a plural perspective, whereas Euro-secularity

[email protected] 20 V. N. Makrides is regarded rather as an exception vis-à-vis broader global trends (Davie 2002); for example, in the particular connection between modernisation and secularisation, which is, however, not validated on a global scale. All this points to the existence not only of multiple modernities, but also of multiple secularities (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012). Furthermore, Fokas (2012), who leads a broader research project on the directions of religious pluralism in Europe, examined the issue of religious minorities in Greece and other predominantly Orthodox countries, as well as their respective specificities, which do not support a linear and normative concept of secularisation. Basically, this concerns the discursive nature of “Eastern” and “Western” secularisation, a fact that precludes any generalisations on this topic. Fokas also took a closer look at the various engagements of religious minorities and churches with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and found out that the decisions of the latter similarly do not support a normative secularisation concept and process. On the contrary, they exhibit variation and plurality in the treatment of the “rights” of specific religious communities in local contexts (Fokas and Richardson 2017; Fokas 2018). This attests to an ongoing, more flexible conceptu- alisation of human rights and the enhanced consideration of local cases and parameters in applying them and in decision-making. In turn, this is quite crucial for the Orthodox case, which also has its own features and specificities.

Postcolonial and Postmodern Perspectives

Another theoretical frame concerns the postcolonial perspectives aimed at deconstructing and disclosing Western or Eurocentric grand narratives, hegemonic ideologies and power structures. Such approaches do not only concern the Orient and its usual historical construction by the West, but also the predominantly Orthodox countries of Eastern and South Eastern Europe, in which similar phenomena under Western influence did take place. Postcolonial perspectives have been thus increasingly used in the study of East-West relations. Among other things, this relates to the various Orthodox constructions of the West (Demacopoulos and Papanikolaou 2013). It is in this context that different, specific and always culturally-defined meanings of human rights were proposed. This holds true, for example, for post- communist Bulgaria where Ghodsee (2009) found a notion and practice of secularity, yet not in the Western sense and without the same degree of liberal orientation. This is why she spoke about a “symphonic secularism” here, namely about a model of church-state relations that combines both tradition (a form of an Orthodox sym- phony between church and state) and modern secular elements of a church-state separation. One can thus hardly understand Orthodox specificities without taking this particular situation into consideration. Ghodsee (2014) exemplified this issue further by commenting on the reaction of the American Embassy in Sofia against a new Bulgarian legislation on religions (Denominations Act of 2002) that supposedly impinged on human rights and minorities. However, this reaction arose without paying attention to the multiple differences between the USA and Bulgaria in

[email protected] Orthodox Christianity and Modern Human Rights 21 understanding religion and the concomitant legal ramifications between the two countries. From another related perspective, namely the postmodern one, it has also been attempted to explain the specificities of the overall Orthodox religious system and discourse. In fact, some of the key characteristics of postmodernity support the deconstruction of the grand narratives (mostly of Western provenance), the overcoming of past anti-religious biases, and the opening of horizons towards previously neglected or unconventional forms of attaining knowledge. This also pertains to the issue of human rights, which has historically been an integral part of a related Western dominant discourse. In general terms, Orthodoxy’s chances in the postmodern context have been described in a positive light, given that several Orthodox key features (e.g., apophaticism, overcoming of logocentrism, non-rational forms of knowledge) resonated quite well with postmodern quests (Mouzelis 2010; Makrides 2012b: 270–274). In this frame, there have been also attempts to bring together allegedly incompatible elements, namely the modern human rights discourse and its liberal background with a fresh re-reading of the Orthodox tradition. Such an attempt was made by Papanikolaou (2012), who tried to found a new Orthodox political theology unequivocally endorsing a democratic political community and structuring itself around the modern liberal principles of freedom of religion, the protection of human rights, and church-state separation. It remains to be seen whether such an ambitious and promising intellectual plan will also have practical consequences in predominantly Orthodox countries in the long run.

Ethnicity and Nationalism Studies

Another interesting perspective in examining the present issue comes from ethnicity and nationalism studies. This is basically because the emergence of the modern, ideally homogeneous nation-state unavoidably brought with it the violation of human rights of the various minorities existing within its territory. Given the usually strong connection between church, state and ethnic/national identities in predominantly Orthodox contexts, where the Orthodox Church usually enjoyed special privileges and influence, problems with minorities of all sorts were not out of the ordinary (Makrides 2013a). This became evident since the nineteenth century when the Orthodox world has been radically fragmented and nationalised, a process that continues until today. Jakelić (2010) has referred to the “collectivistic religions”, including those stemming from Christianity and putting emphasis on collective narratives (e.g., the nation) and memory, historical continuity, ascribed and prescribed roles, fixed categories, and clear demarcation lines from the “others” – as opposed to “interiorized, privatized religions”. Once more, Orthodoxy comes closer to such a collectivist pattern, especially due to its prioritisation of everything communal to the detriment of the individual (Makrides 2010). This holds true historically if we are to compare Eastern Orthodox and Western Latin Christianity, given that the individualisation process was much weaker in the former and remained incomplete.

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Not least, this is not unrelated to the fact that modern human rights, despite problems and difficulties, were much more accepted in the West than in the East including the church and the theological realm. Furthermore, various processes of migration, diasporic movements and communities, acculturation, hybridisation and transnationalism (Roudometof 2015) had in recent years an immediate impact upon the rigidness and homogeneity of nation- states. This basically explains why there is so much talk today about multicultural and multireligious societies and cultures, pointing to their increased pluralisation, openness and receptivity. More specifically, Orthodox countries have been, on the one hand, places of immigration, a process that led to considerable changes and concomitant adaptations. On the other hand, Orthodox Christianity has also become an immigrant religion, both in history and at present (Hämmerli and Mayer 2014). Especially in the latter case, Orthodox Christians have mostly lived in Western settings and were thus forced by their environment to articulate other forms of Orthodox identity, usually more pluralistic and cosmopolitan. It is worth mentioning that many innovative ideas and plans pertaining to the future of Orthodoxy today originated from such communities, which tend to move beyond conventional Orthodox thinking and break new ground. This has also an immediate effect on the human rights issue, which many Orthodox in the West seem to endorse and support without the reservations that are usually observed in the traditional Orthodox heartlands (Papanikolaou 2012: 87–130). The same can be also observed among native Orthodox as minorities within a predominantly different religious culture (e.g., among Orthodox Finns). This notwithstanding, one may also observe at times a re- traditionalisation and even a radicalisation of Orthodox Christians living in Western diasporas for various reasons (Kostarelos 2017, forthcoming). In other words, the long presence of Orthodox (and other religions, of course) in Western settings does not render them automatically proponents of modernity including modern human rights.

Globalisation Studies

A further fruitful perspective comes from globalisation studies, which focus on a radical and multifaceted process that has led to significant changes worldwide including the religious sphere, as well as to the fluidity of boundaries separating diverse cultures and religions. This process in its various phases has also deeply affected Orthodox Christianity and reshaped it at times quite radically creating various “Orthodox glocalisations” (Roudometof 2014). However, many Orthodox Churches feel uneasy with the globalisation process and often contrast their traditions of universality, catholicity and holism with secular globality (Agadjanian and Rousselet 2005). Given that globalisation does not necessarily mean absolute homogenisation and uniformity of cultures and religions (Roudometof 2016, 2018), it may thus lead to the formation of more “glocal” Orthodox identities. These, however, exhibit, their own character, autonomy and reformulation of tradition, thus

[email protected] Orthodox Christianity and Modern Human Rights 23 they often avoid to fully identify themselves with the positions of a mother church, including on the issue of human rights. For example, Orthodoxy in France has adapted itself interestingly to the existing laïcité-system in many ways and has in fact profited from it with regard to its relations with public authorities and the state (Kazarian 2015). The same concerns the mass migration of Orthodox Romanians to Italy in recent decades, a process that effected various cultural changes in their identity, religious life and practices (Ihlamur-Öner 2014). It goes without saying that all this has an immediate impact on the endorsement of modern human rights by diverse Orthodox actors.

Political Science and International Relations

Finally, useful insights for our issue derive from political science and international relations theory, which pay significant attention to the role of religion in democratisation processes, the establishment of human rights regimes, and the prerequisites for such a development and transition. Here the evaluations of Orthodoxy’s democratic potential and endorsement of human rights diverge significantly. Pollis (1993) has thus examined the contours of the Orthodox Christian belief system and came to the conclusion that it does not foster the acceptance of human rights out of different reasons (e.g., the lack of emphasis on individuality). Such problems were also exemplified by reference to the post-communist Orthodox Eastern and South Eastern Europe, in which human rights standards were seen as being far from satis- factory (Ramet 2008). However, other scholars have underlined that Orthodox Christianity, despite some ambivalences, does not present any real problem for democracy or democratisation processes and can fully guarantee human rights, since its structure and doctrine contain elements compatible with modern democratic principles (Prodromou 2004). The question that arises again here is whether such pro- or contra-arguments can be corroborated by empirical evidence or other data. On another bent, Stoeckl (2016b) has examined the broader activities of the Russian Orthodox Church (including those regarding human rights) from the perspective of a “conservative moral entrepreneur and protagonist”, taken from international relations theory. It is about a normative agency of actors operating in transnational governance regimes, deploying their own organisational platform, and enjoying the privilege of a supportive state. Thereby the Russian Church undertook a campaign to publicly draw attention to hitherto neglected facets of the human rights issue, which were not yet named as norms by international actors (e.g., the European Court of Human Rights, the United Nations Organisation, the Council of Europe). Its final aim was to contribute to a norm domestic internationalisation and to the creation of a new cognitive frame, in which its own normative view of religion would acquire a key role. The interpretation of this case makes clear the various ways in which Orthodox institutions and actors deal with modern human rights, usually out of their own specific perspectives and objectives.

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Contextualising and Explaining the Orthodox Specificities vis-à-vis Modern Human Rights

Bearing the above selective overview on the relations between Orthodox Christianity and modern human rights and leaving other theoretical perspectives aside (e.g., from psychoanalysis: Uzlaner 2017), it becomes obvious that the whole issue has attracted considerable attention, especially in the post-communist era. Yet, one cannot escape from noticing the numerous specificities of the Orthodox Christian religious system, which are in many respects different from Western Christian standards. One of them relates directly to the differing acceptance of modern human rights in Eastern and Western Christianity. But we should also not forget that even the secular discourse about human rights exhibits many ambiguous sides, unclear positions and divergent evaluations. As a result, we are talking about a highly contentious and complex issue nowadays that defies a unique categorical answer or an one- dimensional perspective. Seen in this light, the existing variety of Orthodox attitudes towards modern human rights should not occasion any surprise, but needs a pertinent contextualisation and explanation.

The Orthodox Introversion and Its Repercussions

A first important issue relates to the introversion that has traditionally characterised the Orthodox world for long periods of time with far-reaching repercussions. This phenomenon is connected with several important events in the history of Orthodox Christianity, such as the definitive establishment of Orthodoxy in ninth century- Byzantium, the Great Schism between East and West in 1054, and the fall of the Byzantine Empire to the Ottoman Turks in 1453. Certainly, not all Orthodox actors have showed this kind of introversion, as several luminary examples proving the opposite abound. However, we are referring to a general and pervasive orientation that was further strengthened by other residual characteristics of the Orthodox world, such as the dominant conviction of possessing the sole religious truth, coupled with a strong traditionalism and a normative veneration of the past (Makrides 2012c). In this way, many Orthodox came to care more about their own tradition and its intact preservation instead of opening up themselves to the world and enter- ing into a constructive dialogue with it. This situation was intensified from the early modern period onwards and concerns a variety of developments connected with the Western-led modernity, which were only fragmentarily and partially received by the Orthodox, mainly because of their introversive attitudes. This also holds true for the issue of modern human rights, which were initially the product of Western modernity, despite their worldwide influence later on. A fruitful and productive discussion with them will be only possible if the Orthodox

[email protected] Orthodox Christianity and Modern Human Rights 25 understand fully the broad and multi-layered socio-political, cultural and intellectual background that led to their genesis in the first place. For example, a religiously homogeneous society does not exist anymore, and it is futile for the Orthodox to dream about it nowadays. Such a kind of introversion is evident in the Russian Orthodox document on human rights of 2008. Although it shows an openness to enter into a dialogue about the topic with modern actors and endorses the human rights vocabulary to a large degree, it still evaluates the whole issue from a position that clearly reflects its own superior self-understanding and its unshaken conviction of possessing the sole religious truth. In other words, behind an apparent extrover- sion there is a strong inward orientation, which renders it difficult to move beyond the Orthodox normative perspective and moral standards. In Stoeckl’s opinion (2016c), the Russian Church has gradually changed its position on human rights during a long period of time (1999–2008), even though conservative ecclesiastical elites perceived this change as controversial and contradictory. This process also comprised a controlled opening to the cultural heritage of the West, including ongoing debates on values and their justification. At the same time, however, the church sought to articulate and publicise its own independent position, which it defined as “defending traditional values”. Thus, Stoeckl believes that this document was less designed for clarification and teaching within the church, but was rather understood as an instrument of foreign ecclesiastical policy and international presence. An opposite opinion is held by Agadjanian (2008) and Wasmuth (2016), who consider this document rather as an official guideline for Orthodox clergy and laity in pursuing moral-theological concerns. Be this as it may, it is also characteristic that this document was criticised from different perspectives (e.g., Protestant: Tobler 2016; Roman Catholic: Uertz 2016; cultural-philosophical: Zwahlen 2016) as failing to capture the central aspects of the background of modern human rights. This points again to the inherent limitations of the Orthodox world, which have a lot to do with its resilient introversion, as it tries to address modern problems by using pre-modern techniques, drawn from its own sources and tradition. Such an inward-looking perspective lacks, however, pragmatism and contextual thinking. This also happens, for example, when the Orthodox look for human right-related concepts and language in the Church Fathers, which, however, do not bear any real significance for modern human rights and concomitant debates. The same happens also when the Orthodox ignore or refuse to learn critically from the Western Christian experience and various engagements with human rights across history or even from the related Western intellectual and other evolution in modern times. As already mentioned, there have been attempts to combine Orthodox personalism with modern human rights, yet the long-standing connection between personalism and human rights in the Western thought has been mostly overlooked by the Orthodox (Makrides 2018).

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Orthodox Anti-Westernism and Its Numerous Consequences

Another related point concerns the tenacious Orthodox anti-Westernism, which tends to critically consider modern Western developments through strict Orthodox lens and to mostly reject them as inappropriate and even as potentially dangerous for the Orthodox world. Aside from this, the Orthodox attempt to save the fallen West from its many alleged problems and deadlocks through the salvific potential of their own genuine and superior Orthodox tradition. The whole story of the so-called Western Christian deviation from the Eastern Orthodox authenticity lies in the background of such attitudes and discourses. Characteristically enough, this deviation does not only pertain to the religious sphere, but also comprises all the “problems” that the West has produced throughout history including the project of modernity. It goes without saying that the modern human rights that belong to this Western heritage are also seen sceptically or negatively from the Orthodox majority (Brüning 2012). It is thus not accidental that some of them try to save modern human rights by “orthodoxizing” them; for example, by introducing moral norms for their assessment, by limiting their range or by denying their secular character. Such a harmoni- sation is what the Russian Orthodox document of 2008 has also attempted to do (Agadjanian 2008). However, such attempts are also due to the above mentioned introversion of the Orthodox perspective and self-understanding, as well as to its strong self-complacency and self-sufficiency. This is because the introduction of such confessional moral criteria and conditions for modern human rights cannot be accepted beyond the limits of Orthodox Christianity. The question is then whether this is the most pertinent way for Orthodoxy to enter into a constructive dialogue and relationship with modern human rights. All this perpetuates the historical wall of separation between the Orthodox East and the Latin West and the lack of any meaningful mediation between them. Given that the Western Churches have basically accepted, albeit in different ways, the legitimacy of modern human rights, one can better understand the gap that divides them from the Orthodox East. In fact, the relationship of institutional Christianity in Western Europe to modern human rights had been a negative one for a long time, accompanied by numerous tensions and conflicts. This particularly affected the Roman Catholic Church, considering the condemnations of human rights by Pope Pius VI in 1791 and Pope Pius IX in 1864. For this reason, the most important defenders of secular human rights kept their distance from the institutional churches, even though not all of them were anti-religious or anti-Christian. No doubt, there was no lack of Catholic thinkers committed to modern human rights, but the break- through did not materialise until after the Second Vatican Council. Today, the Catholic Church expressly stands for the inviolability and protection of human rights (cf. the related speech by Pope Benedict XVI in 2008 before the UN General Assembly), although specific Catholic milieus, such the Polish one, still have problems with modern human rights (Fajfer 2016). In the Protestant context, on the other hand, one can generally speak of a more positive reception of modern human rights, although some Protestants of fundamentalist provenance still have problems with them.

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Many Orthodox, nonetheless, tend to ignore this long and rich Western Christian engagement with modern human rights and try to unearth their own alleged potential (Patristic or otherwise) to overcome modern problems or to solve alleged Western impasses. To be true, if the Church Fathers have fought or written against social injustice and supported the needy and weak people, this is undoubtedly praiseworthy. But this is hardly the best strategy to deal with modern human rights. At times, these Orthodox also start from the ongoing debates within the Western world about the ultimate foundation or the specific character of human rights and their occasional reconfigurations in order to promote their own views, which in fact lie in a misunderstanding of modern human rights. To this purpose, they also profit sometimes from today’s deliberative, liberal, tolerant and pluralist democratic structures to present and uphold their usually absolute views, which may, in actual fact, turn against the very democratic order itself. They also tend to selectively use decisions of the European Institutions (e.g., the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights) for the support of their interests and goals (see Rimestad 2015 and Richters 2016 regarding the Russian Orthodox Church). In other cases, they intend to remind the Western world of significant aspects in the human rights history that went unnoticed or are virtually forgotten. To this purpose, Patriarch of Moscow Kirill referred to the article 29 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and interpreted it for his own Orthodox goals in an attempt to move beyond an exclusively secular understanding of human rights by emphasising the role of morality, duties and community (Stoeckl 2014: 60–65, 2016b: 135). In other cases, some Orthodox draw on Western thinkers who were critical of the secular and liberal project of modernity including human rights (e.g., the theologian John Milbank and the “Radical Orthodoxy” movement, the philosopher Alastair MacIntyre), while using them for Orthodox anti-Western and other purposes. Yet, this is certainly not a productive way of encounter with modern human rights, as it basically castigates the fallen West and its products and misinterprets the intellectual fermentations within the Western world itself. As already mentioned, discussions and debates about human rights abound in the West and also on a global scale today. But such Western self-reflection, self-criticism and self-correction do not aim at introducing religious and moral (and of course much less Orthodox) criteria in the human rights discourse or at deconstructing the achievements of the modern secular or religiously neutral state.

The Still Pending Fruitful Encounter Between Orthodoxy and Modernity

Another issue that places the above discussion on a broader canvas relates to the Orthodox stance towards modernity as a whole, which is insufficient for a number of reasons and still lags behind (Makrides 2012b). Once more, the differences of Orthodoxy to the Western Churches are here more than conspicuous, given that the latter have managed to articulate in the long run a much more fruitful and construc-

[email protected] 28 V. N. Makrides tive relationship with modernity. In other words, the human rights issue is only one facet of the multifaceted project of modernity, whose engagement with Orthodoxy was never substantial, extensive and thorough (Giordan and Guglielmi 2017). Considering this situation, the aforementioned potential closeness between some traditional Orthodox and postmodern perspectives should not be overestimated. At first glance, it may appear promising, yet it is more an apparent and rather superfi- cial one, since the differences between the two in other domains are unbridgeable. More importantly: The Orthodox first need to engage themselves more systematically with the rich heritage of modernity before skipping it and dealing with the era of postmodernity. This means that a well-founded and critical assessment of the modern era and its achievements is absolutely a sine qua non before proceeding to any other discussion about more recent developments. All this is directly connected with the Orthodox knowledge and evaluation of modern human rights. Characteristically enough, even some apparently positive Orthodox positions on human rights, such as the above mentioned of Patriarch Bartholomew, still do not go deep enough into analysing their entire multifaceted background, which is closely connected with the emergence of modernity. The same holds true for other eminent Orthodox prelates of today (Yannoulatos 2003). No doubt, such positions are welcome, as they distance themselves clearly from other reserved or negative Orthodox views and attitudes towards human rights. However, this is far from enough, simply because these Orthodox positions pass over many crucial issues in silence and basically address selective aspects of human rights that are mostly harmless to the main Orthodox orientations. When it comes to more sensitive issues (e.g., personal or public morality), things are different. This is why cases of “blasphemy” are not basically tolerated in Orthodox countries – the most prominent one being that of the “Pussy Riot” punk band and their condemnation following an unauthorised performance inside the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow in 2012 (Uzlaner 2014). It is exactly this Orthodox arbitrariness and selectivity vis-à-vis modern human rights and by extension towards modernity that needs serious reassessment. It is thus characteristic that some Orthodox intellectuals (Džalto et al. 2016) criticised such an attitude, which they discovered in the references of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church (Crete, June 2016) to human rights, expressed in the official document “The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World”: Related to this is the piecemeal application of human rights language. The text relies on human rights to guarantee a public voice for the Church and freedom of religion for individuals, yet it limits the scope of human rights, insofar as they diverge from the Church’s moral teachings (5.3). Rather, the Church should endorse the idea of inalienable human rights, without qualification or discrimination, as a baseline corollary to its Gospel teaching of the dignity and sacred character of human life, which is divinely conferred and endures even when human beings transgress moral boundaries taught by the Church. This selective fragmentation of the modern human rights discourse and its arbitrary manufacturing by the Orthodox comes to the fore several times. For example, many Orthodox consider the Greek Orthodox Archbishop of North and South America Iakovos (1911–2005, Archbishop from 1959 to 1996) as a paradigmatic

[email protected] Orthodox Christianity and Modern Human Rights 29 example of Orthodoxy’s endorsement and support of the rights of minorities. This is because Iakovos engaged himself actively in the well-known struggle of Martin Luther King in the civil rights movement. Nevertheless, in this case, it is more about the practical side of the commitment of an Orthodox cleric to the rights of discrimi- nated people and minorities, which can be observed mutatis mutandis in other Orthodox contexts. We thus have Orthodox clerics in the Soviet Union, who have fought for religious freedom and became known as human rights activists, such as Father Pavel Adel’geim from Pskov and Father Veniamin Novik from St. Petersburg (Brüning 2016a). Yet, when it comes to the support of sexual or other unconventional minorities, things become much more complicated, and the Orthodox are not usually keen to support their causes respectively. It becomes then clear that the Orthodox often profit from the modern human rights discourse as they please. This is again not the appropriate way to enter into a sincere broader dialogue on this issue and by extension to find a productive modus vivendi with modernity as a whole.

The Weak World-Relatedness of Orthodoxy

A further topic that is quite central for understanding the Orthodox specificities regarding human rights is again a wider one and relates to the Orthodox attitudes towards the world as such. The issue of world-relatedness – not to be understood negatively as worldliness in the sense of secularisation – is perhaps the most crucial throughout the history of Christianity and constitutes an area where the differences between East and West become once more quite conspicuous. This is because, historically speaking, world-affirming attitudes became gradually stronger in the West than in the East, where world-escapism and world-negation – to apply Max Weber’s fine terminology and categories – did acquire many times a normative character. Hence, both outer- and otherworldly stances were at times dominant in the Orthodox East (cf. the case of Eastern monasticism) with far-reaching implications. The whole issue became even more prominent in the West from the early modern period onwards, particularly due to the Reformation, the growing secularisation, the Enlightenment, and the open critique against an otherworldly-oriented Christianity. This long process was full of strong tensions, debates and conflicts concerning the overall relations between a transcendent and an immanent order. Once more, the human rights issue relates to these fermentations in the West and is subsequently characterised by such a profound world-affirming attitude. The same holds true for its acceptance by the Western Churches, especially by Protestantism, where in fact world-affirming attitudes have reached a peak and even led to secular outlooks, as well. It is thus not accidental that the Western Churches have also accepted in this context the legitimacy of the secular sphere with which they should necessarily live and cooperate, without of course agreeing with it on every single point. By contrast, the Orthodox still struggle to find a moderate and pragmatic solution to this fundamental dilemma. The long-standing lack of an Orthodox systematic social teaching attests to this (Makrides 2013b). Certainly, there are numerous

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Orthodox world-related attitudes and practices in a positive sense, both historically and at present. For example, the philanthropic and welfare activities of the church (e.g., during the recent Greek economic crisis: Makris and Bekridakis 2013) or the environmental activities of Patriarch Bartholomew, the “Green Patriarch”, (Bartholomew 2011) are a case in point. Yet, they are tangential and peripheral to the main issue at stake here, namely the very value of the earthly world as such, and not sub specie aeternitatis. This issue is either not touched at all by the Orthodox or has only a secondary importance for the church, as it becomes clear from many instances. For example, the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church discussed the relations of the church to the modern world very briefly and stated that a more comprehensive treatment of this topic will be the task of such future councils. The adduced reasons for this decision were understandable and persuasive, given that this Council gave absolute priority to the solving of internal church problems. Yet, such a ranking of church interests and actions clearly reveals that dealing with the world was never an urgent and main concern for the Orthodox Church (Makrides 2017). It is also worthwhile to mention that the Orthodox have paid so far minimal attention to the ground-breaking documents of the Second Vatican Council concerning the relations of the church to the modern world including human rights (e.g., the document Gaudium et spes, namely the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World). By contrast, they focused almost exclusively on the ecclesiological and other documents of the Council related to the internal affairs of the church (Vletsis 2012). This attests once more to their own weak world-affirming attitudes and interests. It goes without saying that a comprehensive and detailed dealing of the Orthodox with modern human rights, as well as their critical assessment will not be possible until they develop a fundamentally different attitude towards the world and accept its own independent value. This entails, among other things, the acceptance of the legitimacy of a secular sphere as such, which would not have to be transformed into a religious one, as many Orthodox still long for.

The Marginality of the Orthodox Christian Discourse

On another bent, this particular Orthodox attitude vis-à-vis the world also explains the striking marginality or even the complete absence of Orthodox elements and influences in the overall human rights discourse of today (and beyond that). In other words, secular and other Christian/religious institutions, organisations and actors hardly take notice of the Orthodox positions on human rights or acknowledge any debt to them, despite the fact that Orthodox actors have become louder in recent years and intend to enter into a broader dialogue concerning human rights. In addition, important theorists on modern human rights hardly refer to any Orthodox resources. Joas (2013) has attempted to create, for example, a new genealogy of the modern human rights in what he termed the “sacralisation of the human person”, namely the view on every single person seen as sacred, which was later on institutionalised by law. To be true, Joas developed here a particular understanding of

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“sacrality” from a socio-philosophical perspective that did not draw on relevant theological concepts while he left the Orthodox side completely out of the picture. No doubt, this has mostly to do with the fact that modern human rights are still associated in numerous ways pre-eminently with Western Christianity and related debates; for example, the struggle of the Roman Catholic Church with the idea of natural law or Georg Jellinek’s views about the intrinsic connection of the Reformation with the emergence of modern human rights. Hence, the Western origins of modern human rights, regardless if contested, disputed or blurred, still set the pace for future discussions in this domain. Given this situation, what the Orthodox have to do is to find ways to be part of this globally conducted dialogue on human rights and to be taken more seriously into account in a positive sense by non-Orthodox actors. Up to now, reactions to the Orthodox positions on human rights are mostly critical and negative, considering those formulated in the wake of the Russian Orthodox document of 2008, given that the latter supported a conservative moralism, which was later translated into a political rhetoric of solidarity and patriotism in Putin’s Russia. The aforementioned views of Patriarch Bartholomew are different in many respects from the Russian ones, yet they are still not representative of the entire Orthodox body and are not backed by a powerful state like Russia. Hence, although they are heard internationally, their appeal is still limited. After all, there are many other Orthodox actors worldwide, even in highly pluralist environments, who openly criticise and reject modern human rights out of rigid Orthodox concerns (Guroian 1998, 2014) and render the whole situation far more complicated. Undoubtedly, such ambiguities and problems do not bother the Orthodox side alone, but also the entire philosophical and overall intellectual foundation of human rights (Van der Zweerde 2016). Debates about the theistic or non-theistic/secular groundings of human rights and the range of their application abound, not only in the West, but also beyond that (Agamben 1996; Redmond 2017). The same concerns the issue of human dignity and the lack of a consensus about its definite articulation (juridical, political, theological or otherwise) – a topic of higher interest within the overall human rights discourse, on which the Orthodox have often proclaimed their own specific views openly (Brüning 2013). This multidimensional topic is thus subject to constant reflection and potentially to revision, while religious institutions and actors take part on a global scale in the related discussions and negotiations. The same holds true for Christianity, and exactly here the Orthodox are called to play, if possible, a more vital role. This depends, however, on the pre- dilections and the goals of the Orthodox discussion partners. If they deal critically with the whole issue, understand the logic of modernity and attempt to offer fresh and innovative perspectives, it is possible that their views may be taken more seriously into account. If, however, the Orthodox resort to their usual strategies towards the West and modernity (e.g., by looking for solutions in an idealised pre-modern past, by denying and reversing the key contours of the modern project, and by intending to save the West and the rest of the world), then they should not expect to play an important role in the future. No doubt, we are living today in a highly pluralist global environment, and everybody has the right to express opinions and sugges-

[email protected] 32 V. N. Makrides tions on all possible topics. The point is, however, who is taken earnestly into account and who plays an important, serious or even leading role in shaping future trends or in taking decisions on an international scale. It should not be forgotten that we are talking here about the hitherto Orthodox absence from the dominant discourse on modern human rights and how this could be remedied to a considerable degree.

Recent Promising Developments

What is very promising, nonetheless, are certain international developments during the last decades pertaining to the Orthodox world, especially after the collapse of the communist Eastern Bloc. This led, first of all, to a massive wave of emigration of Orthodox people mostly to Western countries, but also beyond that, to which we have already referred above. This is not the first time that such a development took place – consider, for example, the Russian (Orthodox) emigration after the October Revolution of 1917. Yet, we are talking today of a much more massive movement that brought catalytic changes with it and was also closely connected with the globalisation process. The formation of such migrant Orthodox communities is still in the making and may develop in various directions, either in close connection with a mother church or more independently. Most importantly, we are witnessing today the de-composition and re-composition of Orthodoxy under diaspora conditions and the various signs of a future more “global Orthodoxy”, which was not possible in the past in such a form. In this novel context, many traditional Orthodox view- points may be considerably adjusted to new pluralist situations and exigencies and may thus be reassessed. This may also lead to the creation of new “Orthodox identities” beyond the historical Orthodox heartlands and new indigenous “Orthodoxies” within Western settings. This should not be necessarily a smooth process, as ecclesiological, jurisdictional and other problems do arise in such contexts. The emergence of Orthodox rigorist attitudes should also not be excluded, as this potential for radicalisation has some particular roots within the overall Orthodox past and may be activated under certain circumstances (Makrides 2016). In addition, the Orthodox may profit from the pluralist structures of their host societies and the international free speech norms in order to present their own anti-pluralist agendas and deny the overall relativist Western frame of reference. The fact also that numerous converts to Orthodoxy join such diasporic communities make things even more complicated, since in many cases converts exhibit more conservative outlooks and orientations (Slagle 2011). At the same time, such Orthodox communities may develop unique dynamics within the Orthodox world and may unleash new impulses leading to reforms in the future. It is thus characteristic that many key points in Orthodox thinking today, such as the issue of women’s ordination to priesthood, have originally emerged in such novel diasporic contexts. Last, but not least, this may also affect the issue of human rights and its Orthodox evaluation and appropriation. It is also worthwhile to mention that some of the fresh Orthodox discourses

[email protected] Orthodox Christianity and Modern Human Rights 33 in favour of human rights have originated in such contexts, as well (cf. the aforementioned views of A. Papanikolaou in the USA). Although these attempts should not be overestimated, they still attest to the emergence of a “global Orthodoxy”, which may influence the mother churches and their perspectives in the long run. A second parallel development concerns the formation of a new internationally- oriented generation of Orthodox clerics, theologians and intellectuals (including some converts) that operates to a large degree again outside the historical Orthodox heartlands. It includes mostly persons that are eager to proceed to the creation of a new and fresh image of Orthodoxy that views its tradition both creatively and critically and strives to address the many challenges of today. A clear evidence of this ongoing process is the foundation of the “International Orthodox Theological Association” (IOTA) in 2017, which attempts to bring under its auspices all these novel trends from all over the world and contribute to a fundamental renewal of Orthodox Christianity. Its inaugural meeting took place in Iasi (Romania) in January 2019 and was an event that marked a new era in the interdisciplinary reflection and research on Orthodoxy. Another initiative is the Orthodox Christian Studies Center at Fordham University (New York City), which has initiated a lot of interesting activities over the past years including a blog on “Public Orthodoxy. Bridging the Ecclesial, the Academic, and the Political” and a specific “Journal of Orthodox Christian Studies”. We are thus witnessing another facet of an emerging “global Orthodoxy”, which aspires to play an important role in the future within the wider Orthodox world by transcending local and national boundaries. In this process, this young generation of international Orthodox scholars has entered into dialogue, exchange and collaboration with various broad-minded circles in the historically Orthodox countries and cultures, which are also exhibiting a more or less similar progressive, open and reformist attitude (e.g., the Volos Academy for Theological Studies, founded in 2000) (Willert 2014). These are also working towards an Orthodox Christianity that can combine tradition, development, reform and change in a fruitful and constructive way. It is thus characteristic that in all these new Orthodox milieus the issue of human rights has often acquired a prominent place as a topic of systematic reflection, self-critique and creative design for future changes. In addition, many other cardinal facets of modernity, such as secularisation, are also evaluated in such contexts in another, more positive and productive light (Džalto et al. 2016; Ladouceur 2017; Kalaitzidis 2018).

Concluding Remarks

The preceding analysis has shown that modern human rights constitute a key topic that interests the Orthodox world as a whole and has generated so far quite many discussions, tensions and debates. The entire issue has been approached from various theoretical angles trying to place the related discussions on a broader canvas and showing the numerous Orthodox specificities. This should not occasion any surprise, given that human rights issues have increasingly become the focus of the

[email protected] 34 V. N. Makrides interdisciplinary study of religion (Hackett 2004). Certainly, there are some undeniable difficulties in the encounter between Orthodox Christianity and modern human rights. However, it remains to be seen whether the aforementioned recent developments may influence the respective Orthodox Church hierarchies and whether the official Orthodox Churches may be ready to endorse new and at times quite progressive positions. At first sight, despite the dominant re-traditionalisation and the more conservative outlook among some Orthodox Churches (especially the Russian one), it seems that such opinions are heard and are increasingly taken into consideration. For example, before the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church, there was in January 2016 a meeting of such international Orthodox scholars at the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, which resulted in the issuing of interesting concise statements (Scholars’ Meeting 2016). Yet, one should also not underestimate other Orthodox reactions and their significance, since we are talking about an overall religious and cultural milieu that still and predominantly remains deeply embedded in a traditionalist climate. The reactions and the critique against the above mentioned Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Council itself are a case in point. After all, the positive Orthodox evaluations of modern human rights (e.g., Delikostantis 2007) do not represent the majority in the Orthodox world, and the various problems associated with this situation still continue to exist (Brüning 2016b). It is obvious thus that the Orthodox world of today is more or less on a turning point, not only with regard to the human rights issue, but also much more broadly. But if we ponder on the very long time the Catholics needed to come to terms in their own way with modernity including human rights, then all the Orthodox problems and eventual difficulties with this topic should be regarded as quite normal, understandable and expectable.

References

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Ghodsee, K. (2014). Secularism without liberalism: Orthodox Churches, human rights, and American foreign policy in southeastern Europe. In L. N. Leustean (Ed.), Eastern Christianity and politics in the twenty-first century (pp. 754–775). London/New York: Routledge. Giaro, T. (2011). Legal tradition of Eastern Europe: Its rise and its demise. Comparative Law Review, 2, 1–22. Giordan, G., & Guglielmi, M. (2017). Ortodossia cristiana, modernità e la questione dei diritti umani. Prospettive teoriche. Religioni e Società, 87, 41–49. Grigore, M.-D. (2016). Positionen zu den Menschenrechten in der rumänischen Orthodoxie. In V. N. Makrides, J. Wasmuth, & S. Kube (Eds.), Christentum und Menschenrechte in Europa. Perspektiven und Debatten in Ost und West (pp. 137–148). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Guroian, V. (1998). Human rights and modern Western faith: An Orthodox Christian assessment. The Journal of Religious Ethics, 26, 241–247. Guroian, V. (2014, April). Godless Theosis: A review of “The Mystical as Political”. First Things. https://www.firstthings.com/article/2014/04/godless-theosis. Accessed 20 Nov 2018. Habermas, J. (2006). Religion in the public sphere. European Journal of Philosophy, 14, 1–25. Hackett, R. I. J. (2004). Human rights: An important and challenging new field for the study of religion. In P. Antes, A. W. Geertz, & R. R. Warne (Eds.), New approaches to the study of religion: Volume 2: Textual, comparative, sociological, and cognitive approaches (pp. 165–191). Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter. Hämmerli, M., & Mayer, J.-F. (Eds.). (2014). Orthodox identities in Western Europe: Migration, settlement and innovation. Farnham: Ashgate. Hann, C. (2011). Eastern Christianity and Western social theory (Erfurter Vorträge zur Kulturgeschichte des Orthodoxen Christentums, 10). Erfurt: University of Erfurt. Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church. (2016). The mission of the Orthodox Church in today’s world. https://www.holycouncil.org/-/mission-orthodox-church-todays-world. Accessed 20 Nov 2018. Horvath, R. (2016). The reinvention of “traditional values”: Nataliya Narochnitskaya and Russia’s assault on universal human rights. Europe-Asia Studies, 68, 868–892. Huntington, S. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Ihlamur-Öner, S. G. (2014). Romanian Orthodox Churches in Italy: The construction of the Romanian-Italian transnational Orthodox space. In M. Hämmerli & J.-F. Mayer (Eds.), Orthodox identities in Western Europe: Migration, settlement and innovation (pp. 29–50). Farnham: Ashgate. Jakelić, S. (2010). Collectivistic religions: Religion, choice, and identity in Late Modernity. Farnham: Ashgate. Joas, H. (2013). The sacredness of the person: A new genealogy of human rights. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Kalaitzidis, P. (2018). Individual versus collective rights: The theological foundation of human rights: An Eastern Orthodox view. In E.-A. Diamantopoulou & L.-L. Christians (Eds.), Orthodox Christianity and human rights in Europe: A dialogue between theological paradigms and socio-legal pragmatics (pp. 273–296). Bruxelles: Peter Lang. Karpov, V. (2010). Desecularization: A conceptual framework. Journal of Church & State, 52, 232–270. Kazarian, N. (2015). The Orthodox Church in France facing French secularism (“laïcité”). Religion, State & Society, 43, 244–261. Kostarelos, F. (2017). Religious pluralism, fundamentalism and contested identities in North American Orthodox religious life: The case of the Greek Orthodox Church in North America. In Orthodox Christian Laity 30th Annual Conference, Holy Resurrection Serbian Orthodox Cathedral, Chicago, Illinois, October 28, 2017. https://ocl.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ Frances-Kostarelos_Paper_corrected.pdf. Accessed 20 Nov 2018.

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Kostarelos, F. (forthcoming). Pluralism and contested identities in the Greek Orthodox Church in North America. In S. Rimestad & V. N. Makrides (Eds.), Current developments within Orthodox Christianity – Dynamics between tradition, innovation, and Realpolitik. Berlin: Peter Lang. Ladouceur, P. (2017, November 1). Can Orthodox support human rights? The Divine Image, the person, and human rights. Public Orthodoxy. https://publicorthodoxy.org/2017/11/01/can- orthodox-support-human-rights/. Accessed 14 Nov 2018. McGuckin, J. A. (2010). The issue of human rights in Byzantium and the Orthodox Christian tradition. In J. Witte Jr. & F. S. Alexander (Eds.), Christianity and human rights: An introduction (pp. 173–190). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Makrides, V. N. (2005). Orthodox Christianity, rationalization, modernization: A reassessment. In V. Roudometof, A. Agadjanian, & J. Pankhurst (Eds.), Eastern Orthodoxy in a global age: Tradition faces the twenty-first century (pp. 179–209). Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press. Makrides, V. N. (2010). Gemeinschaftlichkeitsvorstellungen in Ost- und Südosteuropa und die Rolle der orthodox-christlichen Tradition. In J. von Puttkamer & G. Schubert (Eds.), Kulturelle Orientierungen und gesellschaftliche Ordnungsstrukturen in Südosteuropa (pp. 111–136). Berlin: Harrassowitz. Makrides, V. N. (2012a). Die Menschenrechte aus orthodox-christlicher Sicht: Evaluierung, Positionen und Reaktionen. In M. Delgado, V. Leppin, & D. Neuhold (Eds.), Schwierige Toleranz. Der Umgang mit Andersdenkenden und Andersgläubigen in der Christentumsgeschichte (pp. 293–320). Fribourg/Stuttgart: Academic Press/W. Kohlhammer Verlag. Makrides, V. N. (2012b). Orthodox Christianity, modernity and postmodernity: Overview, analysis and assessment. Religion, State & Society, 40, 248–285. Makrides, V. N. (2012c). Orthodox Christianity, change, innovation: Contradictions in terms? In T. S. Willert & L. Molokotos-Liederman (Eds.), Innovation in the Orthodox Christian tradition? The question of change in Greek Orthodox thought and practice (pp. 19–50). Farnham: Ashgate. Makrides, V. N. (2013a). Why are Orthodox Churches particularly prone to nationalization and even to nationalism? St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 54, 325–352. Makrides, V. N. (2013b). Why does the Orthodox Church lack systematic social teaching? Skepsis. A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research, 23, 281–312. Makrides, V. N. (2016). Orthodox Christian rigorism: Attempting to delineate a multifaceted phenomenon. Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society, 3, 216–252. Makrides, V. N. (2017). Zwischen Tradition und Erneuerung. Das Panorthodoxe Konzil 2016 ang- esichts der modernen Welt. Catholica, 71, 18–32. Makrides, V. N. (2018). Orthodox personalism: In favor of or against human rights? In E.-A. Diamantopoulou & L.-L. Christians (Eds.), Orthodox Christianity and human rights in Europe: A dialogue between theological paradigms and socio-legal pragmatics (pp. 239–272). Bruxelles: Peter Lang. Makrides, V. N., Wasmuth, J., & Kube, S. (Eds.). (2016). Christentum und Menschenrechte in Europa. Perspektiven und Debatten in Ost und West. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Makris, G., & Bekridakis, D. (2013). The Greek Orthodox Church and the economic crisis since 2009. International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 13, 111–132. Mouzelis, N. (2010). Self and self-other reflexivity: The apophatic dimension. European Journal of Social Theory, 13, 271–284. Papanikolaou, A. (2008). Personhood and its exponents in twentieth-century Orthodox theology. In M. B. Cunningham & E. Theokritoff (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to Orthodox Christian theology (pp. 232–245). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Papanikolaou, A. (2012). The mystical as political: Democracy and non-radical Orthodoxy. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Pollis, A. (1993). Eastern Orthodoxy and human rights. Human Rights Quarterly, 15, 339–356. Prodromou, E. (2004). Christianity and democracy. The ambivalent Orthodox. Journal of Democracy, 15, 62–75.

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Ramet, S. P. (2008). Redefining the boundaries of human rights: The case of Eastern Europe. Human Rights Review, 9, 1–13. Redmond, D. (2017). Against Wolterstorff’s theistic attempt to ground human rights. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 12, 127–134. Richters, K. (2016). Der Europarat als Adressat des Menschenrechtsdiskurses der Kirchen. In V. N. Makrides, J. Wasmuth, & S. Kube (Eds.), Christentum und Menschenrechte in Europa. Perspektiven und Debatten in Ost und West (pp. 121–136). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Rimestad, S. (2015). The interaction between the Moscow Patriarchate and the European Court of Human Rights. Review of Central and East European Law, 40, 31–55. Roudometof, V. (2014). Globalization and Orthodox Christianity: The transformations of a religious tradition. New York: Routledge. Roudometof, V. (2015). Orthodox Christianity as a transnational religion: Theoretical, historical and comparative considerations. Religion, State & Society, 43, 211–227. Roudometof, V. (2016). Glocalization: A critical introduction. London/New York: Routledge. Roudometof, V. (Ed.). (2018). Glocal religions. Basel: MDPI Books. https://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions/special_issues/glocal_religions. Accessed 14 Nov 2018. Russian Orthodox Church. (2008). Basic teaching on human dignity, freedom and rights. https:// mospat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom-rights/. Accessed 14 Nov 2018. Scholars’ Meeting. (2016, January 4–5). Scholars’ meeting at the Phanar. https://www.patriarchate.org/-/scholars-meeting-at-the-phanar. Accessed 14 Nov 2018. Slagle, A. (2011). The Eastern Church in the spiritual marketplace: American conversions to Orthodox Christianity. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Stoeckl, K. (2011). European integration and Russian Orthodoxy: Two multiple modernities perspectives. European Journal of Social Theory, 14, 217–233. Stoeckl, K. (2014). The Russian Orthodox Church and human rights. London/New York: Routledge. Stoeckl, K. (2016a). Postsecular conflicts and the global struggle for traditional values (lecture). State, Religion and Church, 2-3, 102–116. Stoeckl, K. (2016b). The Russian Orthodox Church as moral norm entrepreneur. Religion, State & Society, 44, 132–151. Stoeckl, K. (2016c). Die Menschenrechtsdoktrin der Russischen Orthodoxen Kirche aus dem Jahr 2008 – der institutionelle und ideologische Kontext. In V. N. Makrides, J. Wasmuth, & S. Kube (Eds.), Christentum und Menschenrechte in Europa. Perspektiven und Debatten in Ost und West (pp. 27–44). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Taylor, C. (2007). A secular age. Cambridge, MA/London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Tobler, S. (2016). Die Erklärung der Russischen Orthodoxen Kirche zu den Menschenrechten. In V. N. Makrides, J. Wasmuth, & S. Kube (Eds.), Christentum und Menschenrechte in Europa. Perspektiven und Debatten in Ost und West (pp. 59–75). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Uertz, R. (2016). Das Menschenrechtsverständnis der Russischen Orthodoxen Kirche und der Katholischen Kirche – ein Vergleich. In V. N. Makrides, J. Wasmuth, & S. Kube (Eds.), Christentum und Menschenrechte in Europa. Perspektiven und Debatten in Ost und West (pp. 77–86). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Uzlaner, D. (2014). The Pussy Riot Case and the peculiarities of Russian postsecularism. State, Religion, Church, 1, 23–58. Uzlaner, D. (2017). Perverse conservatism: A Lacanian interpretation of Russia’s turn to traditional values. Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, 22, 173–192. Van der Zweerde, E. (2016). Begründung der Menschenrechte jenseits von Religion und Säkularismus? In V. N. Makrides, J. Wasmuth, & S. Kube (Eds.), Christentum und Menschenrechte in Europa. Perspektiven und Debatten in Ost und West (pp. 191–211). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Vletsis, A. (2012). Das II. Vatikanum und die Orthodoxie: ein Beispiel zur Nachahmung? Catholica, 66, 161–179.

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Wasmuth, J. (2016). Die Grundlagen der Lehre über die Würde, die Freiheit und die Rechte der Menschen im Kontext der Soziallehre der Russischen Orthodoxen Kirche. In V. N. Makrides, J. Wasmuth, & S. Kube (Eds.), Christentum und Menschenrechte in Europa. Perspektiven und Debatten in Ost und West (pp. 49–57). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Willert, T. S. (2014). New voices in Greek Orthodox thought: Untying the bond between nation and religion. Farnham: Ashgate. Wohlrab-Sahr, M., & Burchardt, M. (2012). Multiple secularities: Toward a cultural sociology of secular modernities. Comparative Sociology, 11, 875–909. Yannaras, C. (1998). Ἡ ἀπανθρωπία τοῦ δικαιώματος [The Inhumanity of Right]. Athens: Domos. Yannaras, C. (2004). Human rights and the Orthodox church. In E. Clapsis (Ed.), The Orthodox Churches in a pluralistic world: An ecumenical conversation (pp. 83–89). Geneva/Brookline, MA: WCC Publications/Holy Cross Orthodox Press. Yannoulatos, A. (2003). Orthodoxy and human rights. In A. Yannoulatos (Ed.), Facing the world: Orthodox Christian essays on global concerns (pp. 49–78). Geneva: WCC Publications. Zwahlen, R. M. (2016). Kulturphilosophische Anfragen an die russisch-orthodoxe Konzeption der Menschenwürde. In V. N. Makrides, J. Wasmuth, & S. Kube (Eds.), Christentum und Menschenrechte in Europa. Perspektiven und Debatten in Ost und West (pp. 87–102). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

Vasilios N. Makrides since 1999 is Professor of Religious Studies (specializing in Orthodox Christianity) at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Erfurt. He has studied at the Universities of Athens, Harvard, and Tübingen, from where he obtained his doctorate in 1991. His research interests pertain to the Sociology and Cultural History of Orthodox Christianity, to East- West relations in Europe, to the relations between Orthodox Christianity and modernity, as well as to the Greek Orthodox diaspora in modern times. Among his publications is Christentum und Menschenrechte in Europe: Perspektiven und Debatten in Ost und West, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2016 (co-edited with J. Wasmuth and S. Kube).

[email protected] The Russian Orthodox Church and the Global World

Kathy Rousselet

Abstract The analysis of Russia’s imaginaire, which is based on spiritual and moral values anchored in a multiply defined civilization and an expanded historical tradition, makes it possible to identify the specific logics of the Russian Orthodox Church’s engagement in the global world. Russia’s plastic imaginaire has evolved in line with both Russia’s foreign policy and the Church’s own agenda. The Russian Orthodox Church, which has increasingly competed with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, has responded in a very specific way to the challenges of globalization. On the one hand, it conveys a religion that is largely culturalized and identity-oriented; the Russian Church positions itself in an Orthodox and Christian oriental space that is becoming more and more extensive. On the other hand, through the moralization of its message, it has increasingly global claims and contributes today to the diffusion of a global message that spreads beyond traditions. It becomes global not by adjusting its message to local cultures, but by engaging in dialogue and allying itself with other so- called “civilisations”. Finally, it is extending the perimeter of its traditional space through its attitude towards compatriots and through processes of autochthonization.

Keywords Russian Orthodox Church · Civilization · Tradition · Morality · Compatriots · Autochtonization

Introduction

This chapter examines how the Russian Orthodox Church has adapted to processes of globalization. Globalized religions transcend borders. David Lehmann (2009) calls them the “original globalizers” as they export a metaculture that can be absorbed by local contexts. But these characteristics hardly apply to the Russian Orthodox Church, which is still very much linked to ethnicity. In fact, broadly

K. Rousselet (*) Sciences Po, Centre de recherches internationales (CERI), CNRS, Paris, France e-mail: [email protected]

[email protected] 42 K. Rousselet speaking, Orthodox ecclesiology may not be easily adjusted to globalization because of its main principle of a local Church and its relationship to the principle of universality. As the theologian Pantelis Kalaitzidis points out, In our era, which is characterized by the emergence and consolidation of pluralism and democracy, as well as the increase of globalization and the consequent dissolution of boundaries and barriers, it is clear that the Orthodox are in an awkward position ecclesio- logically, but they also seem unable or unwilling to acknowledge the need for a new ecclesiological paradigm that is compatible with the current socio-political and cultural context. The Orthodox appear to readily accept adapting or imbuing our ecclesiology with imperial structures or ethno-theological concerns, but they are incapable of reflecting on the inevitable implications of globalization in the area of ecclesiology. (2013) Kalaitzidis underlines the “impasses caused by national jurisdictions in the diaspora, the principle of territoriality, the question of primacy” and dares to ask: After our national revolutions and after supposedly achieving national independence and, often, the resulting ecclesiastical independency, after playing with fire and inextricably binding religion and nation, Orthodoxy and nationalism, is it perhaps not time to reexamine our positions on all these issues, even those associated with national autocephalies, which appear to be sacrosanct to the national and state version of Orthodoxy? Inspite of these considerations, some analysts tend to consider that the problem is not the Orthodox ecclesiology as such. Some of them distinguish between the Russian Church and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Pantelis Kalaitzidis himself con- trasts the “more or less transnational perspective of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople” with the “deeper nationalist frenzy and a greater identification of the Church with the state and the nation” in the Russian case. For Nicolas Kazarian (2012, 140), the Church of Constantinople tries to analyze globalization in the light of its own history. He interprets its universality in relation to ecumenism. Victor Roudometof (2013), for his part, devotes an entire book to the globalization of Orthodoxy, relying essentially on the example of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and insisting on what he calls glocalization phenomena, but he conceives of globalization as a long-term process, which certainly contributes to the dilution of the concept. Moreover, as stated by Maria Hämmerli and Jean-François Mayer (2014), while Victor Roudometof considers transnationalisation as one of the forms of blending universal religion with local particularism, « it is not clear how transnationalisation can be a form of glocalization » (20). As a matter of fact, even though some Russian hierarchs insist on the need to separate state and religious borders, the question of borders and the relationship to national identity remain central to the Russian Orthodox Church’s message. The Bases of the Social Concept (2000) of the Russian Orthodox Church clearly states: The universal nature of the Church, however, does not mean that Christians should have no right to national identity and national self-expressions. On the contrary, the Church unites in herself the universal with the national. Thus, the Orthodox Church, though universal, consists of many Autocephalous National Churches. Orthodox Christians, aware of being citizens of the heavenly homeland, should not forget about their earthly homeland (II, 2) More and more migrants of Russian Orthodox tradition are settling in Western Europe and the rest of the world. The hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church continues to insist not so much on adapting religion to the local context, but on

[email protected] The Russian Orthodox Church and the Global World 43 preserving the national tradition and maintaining strong links with the Russian State. Meso- and microlevel approach, focusing both on the life of the parishes and on the diverse attitudes of the believers towards the Russian tradition, would probably help nuance the ethno-centered approach of the Russian Orthodox Church. But recent anthropological research shows that adjustments to local contexts are still relatively rare within the Russian Orthodox Church in the West (Hämmerli and Mayer 2014). Yet this chapter shows that this statement does not cover the whole issue. The analysis of the discourses and the practices of the Russian Orthodox Church shows that it is pursuing a strategy, which is related to a political and religious imaginaire that is shared with the Russian State.1 It is both civilisation- centered and tradition-centered. But paradoxically these two principles help the Church engage in the global world.

Thinking Religion and Politics in the Same Movement: The Russian imaginaire

Many researchers have analyzed the Russian Orthodox Church as one of the main actors of the soft power of the Russian state and have wondered whether it should be concluded that the state is instrumentalizing the religious institution, the Russian Orthodox Church is merely operating alongside it or it has even taken the lead in some domains (Stoeckl 2014, 118). Alicja Curanović insists that there is cooperation between the Church and the State but she concludes that “Russia’s religious diplomacy is only now taking form; it is hazardous to judge whether it can become a transformative element of Russian soft power. After all, religion is a particular factor and its use as a political instrument has its limits. The full potential of this area of Russia’s foreign policy is still to be seen” (Curanović 2012, 28). It is certainly possible to insist that there is a convergence of interests between Russian political and religious actors, not only within Russia but also internationally. In France, the Russian Orthodox Church competes with the Ecumenical Patriarchate while the Russian State seeks to exert its influence through its diaspora, as it does in other parts of Europe. In Paris, the Russian State recently funded the construction of a Russian Orthodox cathedral in a prominent location on the south bank of the Seine, which opened in 2016. As Nicolas Kazarian states, “the construction of a cultural and spiritual centre of the Russian Orthodox Church by the Russian Federation in Paris on Quai Branly, almost at the foot of the Eiffel Tower, highlights two issues: the relationship between Church and State in Russia and the transfer of

1 The assumption that there is a religious and political imaginaire shared by political and religious elites has methodological consequences. The attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church towards the global world, at least the position of the hierarchy, can be analysed on the basis of both political and religious discourses. This research should be completed by an analysis of the discourse of those who, within the Russian Orthodox Church or at its margins, are opposing both the hierarchy and the Russian state.

[email protected] 44 K. Rousselet this relationship to the French context” (Kazarian 2015, 247). The economic dimension should also not be neglected: properties outside Russia provide financial as well as symbolic resources. However, merely identifying the convergence of the interests of the State and the Church does not sufficiently account for the way in which these two institutions are intertwined. As Ariane Zambiras and Jean-François Bayart (2015) write, if we analyze the relationships between two distinct forces, we assume that they are separate. And there is indeed a separation between Church and State in contemporary France, and also in other countries. However, other configurations exist. In the Russian context, where the separation is not so evident and where religion now appears to be a structuring element of political culture, a better way of analyzing the relationship between politics and religion is through the concept of a socio-political imaginaire, a “founding discourse of society”2 where religion and politics are intertwined in a certain way. In Russia, this imaginaire is based on spiritual and moral values anchored in a civilization, and a historical tradition, and is thus both political and religious in nature. It is spread both by religious and political authorities, and elaborated in institutions such as the World Russian People’s Council, bringing together Russian political, economic and religious elites, and in international forums such as the Christmas Educational Readings. It is highlighted in major political documents such as Russian national strategy programmes, and conveyed by political elites as well as by Orthodox hierarchs and well-known priests intervening on television and in social networks. Institutional cooperation contributes to the consolidation of this shared imaginaire. In 2003, a Working Group was established between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Russian Orthodox Church, and relations between the two institutions have continued to develop.3 The Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), which trains diplomats, has also signed an agreement with the Church and in particular with the latter’s doctoral school. Finally, the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation, commonly known as Rossotrudnichestvo, and the Russkii Mir Foundation for the dissemination of Russian language and culture are multiplying their activities with the Russian Orthodox Church (Lunkin 2018). This imaginaire, which can be defined along two notions: civilization and tradition, has evolved over the past 20 years in response to both political and religious changes in the world. This imaginaire makes it possible for the Russian Church and State to renew the paradigms of the Cold War, marked by East-West opposition, and to affirm Russia’s place as a moral authority in the world. It also enables the recre- ation of an area that extends beyond Russia’s borders, through its application to a

2 The concept of imaginaire comes from Paul Ricœur: “Every society […] possesses, or is part of, a socio-political imaginaire, that is an ensemble of symbolic discourses. This imaginaire can function as a rupture or a reaffirmation. As reaffirmation, the imaginaire operates as an “ideology” which can positively repeat and represent the founding discourse of society, what I call its “foundational symbols,” thus preserving its sense of identity. (Kearney 1984, 29)”. See also Ricœur 1984. 3 In the embassies, chapels have multiplied.

[email protected] The Russian Orthodox Church and the Global World 45 larger “Russian world” encompassing the former Soviet states. This blurry and changing imaginaire has been mobilized for performative aims and to support the strategies of both the Church and the State. During the Post-Soviet period the perimeter of Russian civilization has constantly been redefined, and the tradition both reinforced and reimagined, according to the agenda of various political and religious elites.

Spiritual and Moral Values: From a Russian Civilizational imaginaire to Global Values

Spiritual and moral values, as a central element of the contemporary Russian imaginaire, are not associated only with a religious perspective, or with what is generally considered to be spiritual in the West (Rousselet 2020). They are mainly about culture and morals. Over the past two decades these values have been incorporated into a civilizational idea with multiple facets. Two types of discourse have developed. First, there is a discourse promoting a world characterized by a civilizational diversity and a dialogue of civilizations. Kirill had developed this idea in his writings in the early 2000s (Rousselet 2001; Agadjanian and Rousselet 2005) and it has become more and more present in political texts in the years 2007–2008 (Linde 2016). Secondly, there is the growing idea of a specific Russian civilisation that should be preserved: authors such as Verkhovskii and Pain (2012) point out that Russian elites are promoting a “civilizational nationalism” that emphasizes the specificity of the “Russian path”. The perimeter of the civilization to which Russia belongs is in constant evolution: the Russian Federation, Holy Russia, Orthodox or Eastern Christian civilization, Europe … The sense of sharing a common civilization is made possible by a culturalization of the Orthodox religion, the discourse on the dialogue of civilizations is enabled by a moralization of the latter.

Russian and Eastern Slavic Civilization, « Russian World », Orthodox Civilization

At the heart of the Russian civilization, Russia’s spiritual and moral values, of which both Patriarch Kirill and Vladimir Putin speak, are said to have been established with the Great Prince Vladimir’s baptism in 988, which Putin identifies as the starting point of Russian statehood.4 They are seen to characterize the Russian nation and to distinguish it from other national groups. They also bind generations together,5

4 1030th anniversary of Baptism of Rus celebrations, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ news/58123 5 Russia Day reception, 12 June 2018, available at:http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ news/57732

[email protected] 46 K. Rousselet strengthen the country and shape Russian civilization beyond the Russian Federation itself. In their message on the occasion of the 1030th anniversary of the baptism of the Rus’ on July 14, 2018, the Patriarch and the Holy Synod wrote: Why do we call the Baptism of Russia the watershed in the history of our peoples? We do so because it changed forever the entire Slavic civilization and predestined the further course of its development. […] The Orthodox faith implanted in the life of our ancestors by the Grand Prince transfigured our people, developing in them the spirit of selflessness and meekness, self-sacrifice and patience. […] Prince Vladimir’s choice of religion was also the choice of mindset and of the Christian mode of social life and style of the culture. It was the choice of the path that the civilization would embark on. So now we cannot imagine our literature, fine art, architecture or music without the Gospel motives and subjects. Imbued with the Christian moral ideals and values, these works of art lead us to the rich spiritual world of the Orthodox faith, encouraging us to ponder on the eternal questions of human life and its purpose. (Message of Patriarch Kirill…, 2018) This way of thinking emerged in Russia in the nineteenth century and intensified in the post-Soviet period, and even more in recent years. This is evident in the fact that spiritual and moral values are at the heart of the Russian Federation’s programmatic political texts, and in particular the 2015 National Security Strategy, where they are mentioned eleven times: the destruction of these spiritual and moral values is considered a threat to State security (Laine and Saarelainen 2017). While the term Russian civilization has been used extensively to refer to the Russian Orthodox Church’s space of influence, Patriarch Kirill has gradually preferred the term Eastern Slavic civilization, which is “less ethnically connoted,” and which highlights the process of integration within the post-Soviet space (Kirill 2012). Patriarch Kirill and the political authorities also use the term “Russian world” even though several religious actors have affirmed that religious and political borders must be distinguished (Kirill 2015). As Marlène Laruelle points out, The concept of the Russian World offers a particularly powerful repertoire: it is a geopolitical imagination, a fuzzy mental atlas on which different regions of the world and their different links to Russia can be articulated in a fluid way. This blurriness is structural to the concept, and allows it to be reinterpreted within multiple contexts. First, it serves as a justification for what Russia considers to be its right to oversee the evolution of its neighbors, and sometimes for an interventionist policy. Secondly, its reasoning is for Russia to reconnect with its pre-Soviet and Soviet past through reconciliation with Russian diasporas abroad. Lastly, it is a critical instrument for Russia to brand itself on the international scene and to advance its own voice in the world. (Laruelle 2015) During the conservative turn of Winter 2012, anti-Western civilizational rhetoric took centre stage in Russia’s political discourse and the Russian world became a synonym for civilization. For his part, Patriarch Kirill has often stressed the idea that the Russian world is a “civilizational and not a political concept” (Kirill 2014). But there is yet a broader geographical contour that seems to be taking over in Russian religious rhetoric today: that of a panorthodox civilizational idea, led by the Russian Orthodox Church. The failure of the June 2016 Panorthodox Council, the competition between the Patriarchate of Constantinople and that of Moscow, the granted autocephaly to a new Orthodox Church of Ukraine by Patriarch Bartholomew on 6 January 2019, the break between Moscow and Constantinople in October

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2018, the official recognition of the autocephaly of the new Ukrainian Church by the Church of Greece in October 2019 and by the Patriarchate of Alexandria in November 2019 show that this Orthodox civilization is less a reality than an objective. But the Moscow Patriarchate is increasingly staging the unity of the patriarchates, whether at the time of the commemoration of the restoration of the Moscow Patriarchate in November 2017 or in July 2018 on the 1030th anniversary of the Baptism of the Rus. At this event, delegations from ten Orthodox churches gathered in Moscow and Patriarch Kirill highlighted the spiritual unity of Orthodox believers, well beyond Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: Today we live in a new era – an era of the globalizing world and globalizing society, and some may have an illusion that there are other reasons for community apart from faith, such as political unions, military unions, dependence of some mighty centers of financial power in the world. But all this is an illusion. On this level, there can never be a genuine unity. A genuine unity is there where we partake of the same Cup. For me, today’s liturgy in the Kremlin together with all of you has been a powerful spiritual experience. I very strongly felt this community before the face of God and our responsibility before God for our nations, for our people. (Kirill 2018)6

From Pan-Europeanism to the Global World

The values of the Orthodox civilization are often presented as partly alien to the political values that prevail in Western Europe. Filipp Riabykh, the Russian Orthodox Church’s representative at the Council of Europe, spoke on this topic on March 6, 2018 at a seminar organized in the European Parliament by both the European People’s Party and the Committee of Representatives of Orthodox Churches to the European Union in the context of the European Year of Cultural Heritage. Orthodox cultural heritage includes not only architecture, religious singing, icon painting and other works of art, but also theology, social thought and spiritual life. The Orthodox world includes ideals about man and society, which were not formed under the influence of the current political situation, but over the centuries. That is why when it comes to building relationships with the liberal and democratic value system, it cannot unconditionally accept interpretations of values that were not generated in an Orthodox context. Orthodoxy may find some proximity to elements of the liberal and democratic tradition and even similarity to its heritage and experience. It can be categorically opposed to other elements.7 But there is still a competing discourse which states that Russia is part of the European civilization. Speaking at the opening of the new spiritual centre in Paris, Ambassador Orlov explained the difficulties of France, and especially its loss of moral orientations. He added that a lot of French people “yearn for the roots we had

6 https://mospat.ru/en/2018/07/28/news162591/ 7 V Evropeiskom parlamente proshel seminar, posviashchennyj sokhraneniiu khristianskogo kul’turnogo naslediia v Evrope [A seminar on the preservation of Christian cultural heritage in Europe was held in the European Parliament], 7 March 2018, http://www.strasbourg-reor. org/?topicid=1287&printed=1. Accessed 21 Dec 2018.

[email protected] 48 K. Rousselet in common, spiritual and Christian ones.”8 This illustrates, as Marlène Laruelle suggests, a “dual discourse criticizing contemporary Western politics but emphasizing Russia’s role in preserving ‘authentic’ European values […]. A fundamental ambiguity of the ‘Russian idea’ is that it claims both a specific path for Russia and universal significance. The narrative is both national and messianic” (Laruelle 2014). Russia’s messianism goes beyond Europe.9 In addition to being extended to a wider Eastern Slavic world and a wider Orthodox world, or to Europe, spiritual and moral values are also presented as global values. The nineteenth point of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation states: A genuine consolidation of efforts of the international community requires a set of common values as a foundation for joint action, based on the common moral force (dukhovno- nravstvennyi potentsial) of the major world religions, as well as principles and concepts such as aspiration to peace and justice, dignity, freedom and responsibility, honesty, compassion and hard work. (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2016) Russian elites tend to create a spiritual and moral front against secularization and more generally against liberal values. This front concerns the global problems of the world such as the environment, ethics, bioethics, and Islamism. The major themes of radical conservatism circulate from the American Christian Right to traditional Catholicism and to Russia, as shown by the evolution of the World Congress of Families (Stoeckl 2018). At the Global Christian Forum Committee meeting in Turkey in January 2011, Filipp Ryabykh stated: “What comes to the fore I think is not the achievement of church unity but the building of a global system of Christian solidarity in such fundamental issues as the protection of Christianity and provision of favourable conditions for its mission in the world” (Ryabykh 2011). This idea of a spiritual and moral crisis that all Christians, and even all believers, should face and cope with together, is reflected in many discourses of the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church.10 The Russian Church pursues its mission to promote Russian spiritual and moral values through fostering dialogue between civilizations. A dialogue programme was set up in 2002 in Moscow, at the initiative of Russian, Greek and Indian leaders, and a think tank, the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute, was created the same year, chaired by Vladimir Yakunin, a former president of the Russian Railways Company. Every year, this institute brings together international and non- governmental organizations and representatives of the world’s major religions to call for the development of spiritual and moral values. In order to promote this dialogue of civilizations, the Russian Orthodox Church has also established links

8 Ivanova, V. (2016, October 19). Podarok emigrantam: v Parizhe otkryli rossiiskii pravoslvnyi tsentr [A gift to emigrants: in Paris a Russian Orthodox centre has been opened]. Ria Novosti. https://ria.ru/religion/20161019/1479563822.html. Accessed 21 Dec 2018. 9 Fabian Linde mentions even a “tripartite model of a European ‘organic unity,’ encompassing Russia North Ameraica and the European Union. “(2016, 616) 10 See, for example, Patriarch Kirill congratulates the Rev. Dr. Olav Fykse Tveit, General Secretary of World Council of Churches, and members of the WCC Central Committee on the 70th anniversary of WCC, https://mospat.ru/en/2018/06/21/news161191/; Representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church take part in International Conference “Religious Freedom in the World. The Way to Dialogue”, https://mospat.ru/en/2018/05/31/news160582/

[email protected] The Russian Orthodox Church and the Global World 49 with institutions such as the Catholic organization Sant’Egidio and the Evangelical Christian non-governmental organization Samaritan’s Purse for charitable purposes. These competing discourses produce a blurry picture. All of them help conclude that religious elites develop a particularistic discourse against globalization, but their civilizational approach enables them to engage in the global world.11

Territory and Tradition

Tradition is another structuring element of the Russian imaginaire. Analysts rightly explain that insisting on the Russian tradition and placing Russian social and political life in a particular tradition is a way for the Russian State and Church to oppose globalization as it unifies the world. However, the affirmation of tradition does not prevent the Russian State and Church from legitimizing their presence beyond the borders of the Russian space, and even post-Soviet. On the contrary, by expanding the perimeter of its traditional territory, the Russian Church is responding to globalization without contradicting its ecclesiological foundations. Tradition legitimizes both political power and the religious institution. The Russian Orthodox Church doesn’t justify its presence outside Russia by aiming to evangelize Christians who are not of Orthodox tradition, or even non-believers. The Church is present in the world in order to maintain the link of Orthodox Christians with the Russian tradition. In this respect, its strategy differs greatly from globalized religious movements such as the Evangelical Churches. The Russian Orthodox Church conducts its policy mainly according to two ecclesiological principles that are opposed to any globalization of religion.12 First, the principle of “canonical territory” makes it impossible for other Christian religions to co-exist with the Orthodox religion on the same territory. It involves a form of domination on a given territory. Speaking of Catholic-Orthodox relations, Metropolitan Kirill said in 2006 in an interview with the Nezavisimaia Gazeta: A single case of proselytism resulting from a missionary strategy would seriously damage our relations. This shouldn’t exist between Orthodox and Catholics. We are sometimes asked why we don’t have any missionary strategy in Italy, why we don’t give any talks in Italian schools and universities? We answer: there is already a Church that is responsible for its people before God and history. And we want the Catholic Church to have the same position towards Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church. […] We need mutual trust. (Kirill 2006)

11 From his analysis of political discourses, F. Linde (2016) argues that “The introduction of the idea of multiple civilizations in 2008 was a momentous event which brought with it not only the basic notion of civilizational diversity itself, but other corollaries as well, such as the notion of competing value systems. He states in his paper that “the conceptual trajectory from roughly 2008 onward moved consistently in the direction of an increased emphasis on Russian cultural and civilizational distinctiveness.” (624) In light of the texts we have analysed, this trajectory is not so clear, and the idea of multiple civilizations emerged earlier in the Church’s discourse. 12 See On the external mission of the Russian Orthodox Church today, 27 March 2007, https:// mospat.ru/en/documents/osovremennojj-vneshnejj-missii-russkojj-pravoslavnojj-cerkvi/

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The second principle is the principle of co-territoriality and co-jurisdiction based on ethnophyletism which is applied by the Church in the West. This principle allows the Russian Orthodox Church to develop in the global world. Filipp Riabykh specified in 2011: Its canonical jurisdiction includes the following countries: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. The unity of the Russian Church is based not on the boundaries of a single state or ethnos but on a common spiritual tradition. It is called Russian because it was born in the place called Rus’. […] Outside her canonical jurisdiction the Russian Church supports the activity of some 700 parishes in various countries. These parishes are found not to carry out any special missions but to support those who came from the countries under the canonical jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate to live or reside abroad. Among the notable developments in recent years has been the construction of churches in Rome, Pyongyang, Havana, Sharjah, and in Antarctica for scientists who make researches in the South Pole. Widely known is the fact that a land has been bought in Paris for the construction of a cathedral. (Riabykh 2011) In affinity with this ecclesiastical policy, the Federal Law On the State Policy of the Russian Federation in respect of compatriots abroad, as amended in 2010, defines “compatriots by a virtually infinite combination of ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural and even professional characteristics.” The definition “can accomodate an interpretation that all former Soviet citizens are Russia’s compatriots.” But the new law also emphasizes cultural and spiritual ties with Russia. As a matter of fact compatriots also include “people living outside the border of the Russian Federation who made a free choice in favor of spiritual and cultural connections with Russia and who usually (kak pravilo) belong to peoples (narody) which have historically lived in the territory of the Russian Federation” (Shevel 2011, 89; see also Suslov 2017). The reception of Archbishop John, hierarch of the Archdiocese of Russian Orthodox Churches in Western Europe, into the Russian Church in September 2019, as well as the decision of some parishes and monasteries to join the Moscow Patriarchate, undoubtedly strengthen the presence of the Russian Orthodox Church in the West.

The Church and the Compatriots: The Example of the Russian Orthodox Church in France

At a symposium in 2001 on “Religion and Diplomacy,” the current Patriarch Kirill, then Head of the Department of Foreign Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, stated that the Church was working closely with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to “restore historical equity” and “restitute to the mother country its architectural and artistic treasures, created by Russian artists and with the money of the Russian people” (Kirill 2001). The Moscow Patriarchate wanted to bring together Christians of Russian tradition living in the West, and extend in the Western context its principle of national territorialization. On April 1, 2003, Alexis II sent a letter

[email protected] The Russian Orthodox Church and the Global World 51 which proposed the creation of an autonomous metropolis of Russian tradition in Western Europe, in order to “reunify the Russian juridictions, which formed only one in 1922”. A year later, on March 31, 2004, the Movement for a Local Orthodoxy of Russian Tradition was created in France, to contribute to the rapprochement of the Diocese of Chersonese of the Moscow Patriarchate, with the Archdiocese of Russian Orthodox Churches in Western Europe within the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia. Several conflicts broke out about places of worship, which had been previously administered by parishes of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Their property rights were claimed by the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Federation. In 2004, the rector of the parish of Biarritz decided to place his church, built at the end of the nineteenth century, under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. The parish community brought the case in the court; the Bayonne Regional Court and then the Pau Court of Appeal confirmed its membership in the Archdiocese of Russian Orthodox Churches in Western Europe (Patriarchate of Constantinople). In contrast, the Nice Cathedral, run since 1923 by an Orthodox religious association within the Archdiocese of the Patriarchate of Constantinople (ACOR), was transferred to the Russian Federation by the Nice Regional Court after a long judicial procedure from 2006 to 2011. Currently, the Russian cemetery in Caucade-Sainte-Marguerite, in Nice, is still the subject of a conflict between the cathedral of Nice, now part of the Diocese of Chersonese of the Patriarchate of Moscow, and the ACOR of Nice (parish of Saint- Nicolas-et-Sainte-Alexandra). New churches belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate have been built and a new Russian seminar has been established. For both the Russian State and the Russian Church, taking hold of Orthodox parishes in Europe, and in particular in France, is a way of reconciling the white Russian émigrés with Russia. Several gestures seem to have been intended for this reconciliation: the canonization by the Russian Orthodox Church of Tzar Nicholas II and his family as passion bearers in 2000; the transfer, on October 3, 2005, of the corpse of General Anton Denikin to the Donskoy monastery cemetery in Moscow, where Patriarch Tikhon is buried; and the signing in 2007, with the support of Vladimir Putin, of an Act of Canonical Communion of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia with the Moscow Patriarchate. The Russian Spiritual and Cultural Centre on Quai Branly, located on diplomatic land, financed and built by the Russian State, favours liturgy in Russian, for Russians. It appears largely as a showcase for Russia, even though the iconographic programme and frescos are intended to demonstrate a “space for dialogue between Russian and French cultures”13 and even though a promise was made to the City of Paris that this cathedral would not only be intended for Russians. Antoni Sevriuk, appointed in May 2019 primate of the Patriarchal Exarchate in Western Europe (created on 28 December 2018), is the head of the department in charge of the institutions (eparchies, parishes, exarchies, and missions, for example) of the Moscow

13 The iconostasis will include icons of saints of Russia and Gaul (including Saint Denis and Saint Genevieve) (Cathédrale orthodoxe de la Sainte-Trinité à Paris, a leaflet which has been sold in the Spiritual and Cultural Centre).

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Patriarchate abroad. During his chirotony as bishop on October 6, 2015, Kirill insisted on the importance of maintaining the links of compatriots with the Mother Church, cultural and spiritual traditions, and relations between compatriots themselves.14 Will the transfer of parishes of the Archdiocese of Russian Orthodox Churches in Western Europe to the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate lead the Russian Church to change its strategy? David Struve, an Orthodox Christian, a member of the Archdiocese who decided to follow Archbishop John, wrote in 2011: Our orthodoxy, like that of America, is not and will not be national. It marks a return to the early days of Christianity, when the Church gathered Christians of all origins […] Beyond the particular histories of national or political communities, beyond the different waves of immigration with their own unique characteristics, an already century-old history of the Orthodox presence in Western Europe has been constituted: it is our common history. (Struve 2011) At the reception on the occasion of the “reunification” of the Archdiocese of Orthodox Parishes of Russian Tradition in Western Europe with the Russian Orthodox Church, Archbishop John quoted the Church’s document On the external mission of the Russian Orthodox Church: The Russian Orthodox Church’s parishes outside her canonical boundaries were originally established to take care of the compatriots who found themselves far from their homeland, but many of these parishes have become a spiritual home also for native people who have embraced Orthodoxy.15 He added that “the mission was achieved as the Archdiocese, which has its origins in the Russian tradition, has become a multi-ethnic and multilingual entity.”16

The Expansion of Tradition as a Response to Globalization

Beyond this link to the Russian tradition, the Russian Orthodox Church aims to rediscover the very old Christian tradition in Europe, and in particular the saints of the undivided Church, who have become a subject frequently discussed by the

14 « V prazdnik Iverskoi ikony Bozhiei Materi Predstoiatel’ Russkoi Tserkvi sovershil Liturgiiu v Novodevich’em monastyre g. Moskvy i vozglavil khirotoniiu arkhimandrita Antoniia (Sevriuka) vo episkopa Bogorodskogo [On the day of the Iverskaya Icon of the Mother of God, the Primate of the Russian Church celebrated the Liturgy at the Novodevichy Monastery in Moscow and headed the consecration of Archimandrite Anthony (Sevryuk) as Bishop Bogorodsky]», available at: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4255265.html 15 On the external mission of the Russian Orthodox Church today, 27 March 2007, https://mospat. ru/en/documents/o-sovremennojj-vneshnejj-missii-russkojj-pravoslavnojj-cerkvi/ 16 Christophe Levalois, Remise de la gramata et discours de Mgr Jean de Doubna aujourd’hui dans la cathédrale du Christ-Sauveur à Moscou, 3 November 2019, https://orthodoxie.com/remise-de- la-gramata-et-discours-de-mgr-jean-de-doubna-aujourdhui-dans-la-cathedrale-du-christ-sauveur- a-moscou/. To understand the history of the Archdiocese of Russian Orthodox Churches in Western Europe, see Nivière 2012.

[email protected] The Russian Orthodox Church and the Global World 53 clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church. The presence in the West of saints who should be venerated within Russian Orthodox tradition contributes to the development of pilgrimages, organized, among others, by the very official Radonezh agency17; it dramatically modifies the map of religious mobility of Russian Christians. The Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church has recently officially included many Western saints, such as Saint Genevieve or Saint Patrick, in the liturgical calendar. Relics of Saint Helen are venerated at the St. Leu church in Paris. Those of Saint Sophia and her daughters Faith, Hope and Charity are worshipped at St. Trophimus’ church in Eschau, near Strasbourg. As the imperial family is being worshipped more and more in the Russian Church, pilgrimage services lead believers to Romanov’s memorial places and relics in Germany: Wiesbaden, to the St. Elizabeth’s church, where the Grand Duchess Elizabeth Mikhailovna Romanova is buried, Darmstadt, birthplace of Saint Elizabeth Fedorovna, where a St. Mary Magdalene Chapel was built on soil which would be brought from Russia at the end of the nineteenth century, Wolfsgarten, where Sts Alexandra Feodorovna and Elizabeth Feodorovna grew up. The Orthodox people are said to rediscover the Christian tradition while Catholics pay less attention to the saints venerated on their own territory. And this action finds its legitimacy in the authority of the startsy who recommended it. Worshipping these saints does not mean proclaiming that Orthodoxy has become globalized, but it assumes that Orthodoxy has been present in a large part of the world from the very beginning of Christianity. What is at stake is the history of the Church before the Schism and the designation of the Church in the West, which the patriots refer to as “Orthodox”.18 Moreover, through the veneration of these saints, the Russian Orthodox aim to reaffirm the Christian civilization. For Andrei Tkachev (n.d.), an Orthodox priest who is very active in the media and social networks, and is well known for his patriotic stances, going and worshipping the saints in Western Europe is a “civilizational task.” He refers to Saint John of Shanghai and San Francisco who urged Russians, scattered all over the world, not to forget the Orthodox saints who lived where they settled. This saint, a hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia,19 having himself travelled all around the world, was canonized by his Church in 1994; he appears nowadays as an authority in patriotic circles of the Russian Orthodox Church. As a matter of fact, the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia has a significant influence on some parts of the Russian Orthodox Church: as an example, it canonized some 20 years before the Russian Orthodox

17 See its official website: http://www.radonez.ru/about/ 18 http://saints.artos.org/fr/text/about-58ed0b7ea2a5517f0f2093d4/. An alternative project on the Saints of the Undivided Church is being carried out by Serguei Chapnin, an Orthodox journalist and former editor-in-chief of the Moscow Patriarchate Journal, now in Vienna. For his part, he aims to develop relations between the churches of the East and the West. Marked by an ecumenical concern for the recognition of the Catholic Church, this project does not follow the logic of the above-mentioned actors, in that the latter highlight an undivided Orthodox Church. 19 The Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia is a Church which was established in Serbia in 1922.

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Church the Imperial family and Christians who were persecuted during the Soviet Period as new martyrs. The fact that the saints are martyrs is a decisive point. These Orthodox Christians emphasize the link between the presence of martyrs on Western soil and the rebirth of Christianity in a secularized world. It must be remembered that in Russia, the new martyrs appear as model figures of resistance to secularization. The martyrs of the early period were, for their part, models of resistance to paganism and heresies. Many are not known, as was the case during the Soviet period. The presence of the saints in Western Europe contributes to reaffirming the existence of a deeply rooted Christian civilization which should be protected by both Russia and Western Europe. This observation echoes the discourses and practices of autochthony highlighted by James Kapalo in his research on Orthodoxy in Ireland (2014). The researcher explains that in that country the Orthodox “discursive space” is “characterized by a blend of ‘revisiting’and ‘re-visioning’ of the Celtic Christian past and is linked to ‘memory and meaning’ making in the Irish Landscape. The arrival of Orthodoxy and Orthodox migrants in the West has given rise to a process of reinterpretation of the West’s religious past as prototypically Orthodox (242).” Some Orthodox com- mentators tend to find sources which “expand the existing conceptual boundaries of territorio orthodoxiae into a lost Western realm. The historical spiritual traditions of the Irish, Welsh, Scottish and also early Anglo-Saxon churches become assimilated into a contemporary Orthodox habitus and landscape, a case of ‘your past is our perpetual present’ (243).” As Peter Geschiere and Jean-François Bayart point out, “autochthonism is part of globalization as it exacerbates identity particularities (2001, 127).”

Conclusion

The place that the Russian Orthodox Church confers to tradition in the quest for salvation, the strong link it maintains with the State, even if differences in approach appear, its link with identity-formation, do not make it (for the moment) a globalized institution. For the Russian Orthodox Church, the Christian believer who belongs to the Russian Orthodox Church is rooted in a tradition, the Tradition of the Rus, which is both political and religious in nature. To what extent is the position of the Russian Orthodox Church still tenable? As suggested by Olga Bronnikova and Andy Byford, studies on Russian diasporas in the world show that “the concepts of nationhood and ethnicity no longer seem to conform to the same semantic or conceptual rules as before?” (2018, 18). The two researchers add: “What exactly is implied in contemporary constructions of ‘Russian-speakers’ in Finland as a ‘minority’? What is the polity to which Russians currently living in the UK should identify with? What might be the relationship between the former USSR, the Russian Federation, a fluid set of ‘Russophone’ communities worldwide, and a constructed network of Russia’s ‘compatriots’?” In this context, the Russian Church may well appear as the last bulwark of an identity that is disappearing. The recent evolutions

[email protected] The Russian Orthodox Church and the Global World 55 of the Church in the West could deeply transform some of its ecclesiological principles. The analysis of Russia’s imaginaire, which is based on spiritual and moral values anchored in a multiply defined civilization and an expanded historical tradition, makes it possible to identify the specific logics of the Russian Orthodox Church’s engagement in the global world: globalization processes depend largely on the religious traditions which nourish them, on ecclesiological principles and on the political contexts in which religious institutions have developed. Russia’s plastic imaginaire has evolved in line with both Russia’s foreign policy and the Church’s own agenda. The Russian Orthodox Church, which has increasingly competed with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, has responded in a very specific way to the challenges of globalization. On the one hand, it conveys a religion that is largely culturalized and identity-oriented; the Russian Church positions itself in an Orthodox and Christian oriental space that is becoming more and more extensive. On the other hand, through the moralization of its message, it has increasingly global claims and contributes today to the diffusion of a global message that spreads beyond traditions. It becomes global not by adjusting its message to local cultures, but by engaging in dialogue and allying itself with other so-called “civilisations”. Finally, it is extending the perimeter of its traditional space through its attitude towards compatriots and through processes of autochthonization.

References

Agadjanian, A., & Rousselet, K. (2005). Globalization and identity discourse in Russian Orthodoxy. In V. Roudometof, A. Agadjanian, & J. Pankhurst (Eds.), Eastern Orthodoxy in a global age: Tradition faces the 21st century (pp. 29–57). Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press. Bayart, J.-F., & Geschiere, P. (2001). « J’étais là avant ». Problématiques politiques de l’autochtonie. Critique internationale, 1(10), 126–128. https://doi.org/10.3917/crii.010.0126. Bronnikova, O., & Byford, A. (2018). Transnational exopolities: Politics in post-soviet migration. Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest, 49(4), 9–25. Curanović, A. (2012, June). The religious diplomacy of the Russian Federation. https://www. ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifrirnr12curanovicreligiousdiplomacyjune2012.pdf. Accessed 21 Dec 2018. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016). http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_docu- ments/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248. Accessed 21 Dec 2018. Hämmerli, M., & Mayer, J. F. (Eds.). (2014). Orthodox identities in Western Europe. Migration, settlement and innovation. London/New York: Routledge. Kalaitzidis, P. (2013). Ecclesiology and globalization: In search of an ecclesiological paradigm in the era of globalization (after the previous paradigms of the local, imperial and national). St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 57(3–4), 479–525. Kapalo, J. (2014). Mediating Orthodoxy: Convert agency and discursive autochthonism in Ireland. In M. Hämmerli & J. F. Mayer (Eds.), Orthodox identities in Western Europe. Migration, settlement and innovation (pp. 229–249). London/New York: Routledge. Kazarian, N. (2012). Orthodoxie et mondialisation: une résistance en mouvement: étude des paradigmes grecs et russes. In C. Grannec & B. Massignon (Eds.), Les religions dans la mondialisation. Entre acculturation et contestation (pp. 125–146). Paris: Karthala.

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Kazarian, N. (2015). The Orthodox Church in France facing French secularism (‘laïcité’) Religion. State & Society, 43(3), 244–261. Kearney, R. (1984). Dialogues with Paul Ricoeur. The creativity of language. Dialogues with contemporary continental thinkers (pp. 17–35). Manchester: Manchester University Press. Kirill (Mitropolit, Gundiaev). (2001). Religiia i diplomatiia. Tserkov’ i vremia, 3, 72–75. Kirill (Mitropolit, Gundiaev). (2006). Svoboda ot grekha. Mitropolit Kirill- ob itogakh Vsemirnogo russkogo narodnogo Sobora [To free oneself from sin. Metropolitan Kirill on the conclusions of the World Russian People’s Council]. Rossiiskaia gazeta – Federal’nyi vypusk, 4050 (0). https://rg.ru/2006/04/21/mitropolit-kirill.html. Accessed 21 Dec 2018. Kirill (Patriarch). (2012, June 15). Tserkov’ podderzhivaet integratsionnye protsessy na post- sovetskom prostranstve [The Church supports the processes of integration in the post-Soviet space]. Russkii Vek: Portal rossiiskikh sootechestvennikov. http://ruvek.info/?module=news& action=view&id=9935. Accessed 21 Dec 2018. Kirill (Patriarch). (2014, September 8). Sviateischii Patriarkh Kirill: Russkii mir – osobaia tsivi- lizatsiia, kotoruiu neobkhodimo sberech’ [Patriarch Kirill: The Russian World is a particular civilization that must be preserved]. http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3730705.html. Accessed 21 Dec 2018. Kirill (Patriarch). (2015, July 20). Net nichego bolee dalekogo ot istiny, chem otozhdestvliat’ Russkii mir iskliuchitel’no s Rossiiskoi Federatsiei [There is nothing further far from the truth than to identify the Russian World only with the Russian Federation]. http://www.patriarchia. ru/db/text/4164499.html. Accessed 21 Dec 2018. Kirill (Patriarch). (2018, July 28). Reception devoted to 1030th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus’ at Church of Christ the Saviour in Moscow. https://mospat.ru/en/2018/07/28/news162591/. Accessed 21 Dec 2018. Laine, V., & Saarelainen, I. (2017). Spirituality as a political instrument. The Church, the Kremlin, and the creation of the “Russian World”, Working paper, The Finnish Institute in international Affairs, n°98, September. https://storage.googleapis.com/upi-live/2017/11/wp98_russia.pdf. Accessed 21 Dec 2018. Laruelle, M. (2014). Beyond Anti-Westernism. The Kremlin’s Narrative about Russia’s European Identity and Mission. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, 326, June. Laruelle, M. (2015). The “Russian World”. Russia’s Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination. Center on Global Interests, May. http://globalinterests.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/ FINAL-CGI_Russian-World_Marlene-Laruelle.pdf. Accessed 21 Dec 2018. Lehmann, D. (2009). Religion and globalisation: A comparative and historical perspective. In L. Woodhead, C. Partridge, & H. Kawanami (Eds.), Religions in the modern world: Traditions and transformations (pp. 345–363). Oxon/New York: Routledge. Linde, F. (2016). The civilizational turn in Russian political discourse: From Pan-Europeanism to civilizational distinctiveness. The Russian Review, 75, 604–625. Lunkin, R. (2018). Tserkov’ i vneshniaia politika: ot “Russkogo mira” k globalizatsii [The church and the foreign policy: From “Russian World” to globalization]. Nauchnye vedomosti. Seria Istoria, politologia, 45(1), 165–175. Message of Patriarch Kirill and the Russian Holy Synod on the 1030th anniversary of the Baptism of Russia. (2018, July 18). Interfax Religion. http://www.interfax-religion. com/?act=documents&div=268. Accessed 21 Dec 2018. Nivière, A. (2012). Genèse historique et enjeux éthiques contemporains de l’identité des Églises orthodoxes russes. Revue d’éthique et de théologie morale, 270(3), 53–95. Ricoeur, P. (1984). L’idéologie et l’utopie: deux expressions de l’imaginaire social. Autres Temps. Les cahiers du christianisme social, 2(1), 53–64. Roudometof, V. (2013). Globalization and Orthodox Christianity: The transformations of a religious tradition. New York/London: Routledge. Rousselet, K. (2001). Globalisation et territoire religieux en Russie. In J.-P. Bastian, F. Champion, & K. Rousselet (Eds.), La globalisation du religieux (pp. 183–196). Paris: L’Harmattan. Rousselet, K. (2020). Dukhovnost’ in Russia’s politics. Religion, State and Society, 48(1), 38–55.

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Ryabykh, F. (2011). Trends and changes in the Orthodox Churches from the Russian Orthodox Church’s perspective. http://www.globalchristianforum.org/_literature_132885/Istanbul_-_ Hegumen_Philip_Ryabykh_-_Trends_and_changes_in_the_Russian_Orthodox_Church. . Shevel, O. (2011). Migration, refugee policy, and state building in Postcommunist Europe. Cambridge/New York: The Cambridge University Press. Stoeckl, K. (2014). The Russian Orthodox Church and human rights. Oxon/New York: Routledge. Stoeckl, K. (2018). Aktivisty vne konfessional’nykh granits: “konservativnyi ekumenizm” Vsemirnogo kongressa semei. Gosudarstvo, religiia, Tserkov’ v Rossii i za rubezhom, 36(4), 58–86. Struve, D. (2011). Etre orthodoxe en Occident: être l’Eglise en Occident. Service orthodoxe de presse, n°355, février. Suslov, M. (2017). “Russian World”: Russia’s Policy towards its Diaspora. Notes de l’Ifri. Russie. Nei.Visions, 103, July. https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/russieneivisions/russian-world-russias-policy-towards-its-diaspora. Accessed 21 Dec 2018. Tkachev, A. (n.d.). Zabytye sviatye Zapada: Sviatitel’ Ioann o podvizhnikakh nerazdelennoi Tserkvi [The forgotten Western saints: saint Ioann and the saints of the undivided Church]. https://vk.com/andreytkachevcom. Accessed 21 Dec 2018. Verkhovskii, A., & Pain, E. (2012). Civilizational nationalism: The Russian version of the ‘special path’. Russian Politics and Law, 50(September–October), 52–86. Zambiras, A., & Bayart, J. F. (Eds.). (2015). La cité cultuelle. Rendre à Dieu ce qui revient à César. Paris: Karthala.

Kathy Rousselet is Research Professor at Sciences Po, Centre de recherches internationales (CERI), CNRS, Paris, France. She is Associate Fellow at the Centre d’études des mondes russe, caucasien et centre-européen of the Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales (Paris) and member of the editorial boards of the Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest, of Archives de sciences sociales des religions and of the International Observatory of Religions (CERI and Groupe Sociétés, Religions, Laïcités, Paris). Her work focuses primarily on social and religious transformations in post-Soviet Russia. Among other publications she published is ‘The Church in the Service of the Fatherland,’ Europe-Asia Studies, Volume 67/1 (January 2015, pp. 49–67).

[email protected] The Russian Orthodox Church’s Approach to Human Rights

Kristina Stoeckl

Abstract This chapter looks at the ways in which the Russian Orthodox Church has approached human rights, in particular the right to religious freedom, from 1948, the year when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations was signed, up until the publication of the Human Rights Doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2008. In the course of this half-century, the attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church on human rights has changed from an outright rejection to a position of critical acceptance. Today the Moscow Patriarchate uses the language of human rights in order to further its own goals and it pursues a conservative human rights agenda which goes against the liberal individualist consensus that informs the international human rights system.

Keywords Human rights · Russian Orthodox Church · Russia · Soviet history · Church and state

In 2008, the Russian Orthodox Church published the document Teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church on Human Liberty, Dignity and Rights, and at the time of writing this chapter in 2019, the Moscow Patriarchate frequently uses the language of human rights in the defence of its position on religious freedom in disputes over the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov 2019).1 Yet, the Russian Orthodox Church has not always endorsed the notion of human rights approvingly. Between 1948, the year when the Universal Declaration of Human

1 This chapter contains in a nutshell the argument I made in my book: Stoeckl 2014. The original version of this chapter was published in Russian: (2014) “Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov’ i prava cheloveka”, Gosudarstvo, Religiya i Tserkov v Rossii i za rubezhom, 3/32, 146–165. It has been translated into French (2015) “Les droits de l’homme: l’approche de l’Eglise orthodosse russe” Istina LX, 59–75. This English version contains a new section (section 4) and an updated bibliography. I acknowledge that this chapter was revised with the support from the European Research Council (ERC STG 2015 676804).

K. Stoeckl (*) University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria e-mail: [email protected]

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Rights of the United Nations was signed, up until the publication of the Human Rights Doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2008, the attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church on human rights has changed from an outright rejection to a position of critical acceptance. It is this change in attitude which explains todays positive endorsement of human rights language by the Russian Orthodox Church. This endorsement, however, happens in a specific key, namely, it pursues a conservative human rights agenda which goes against the liberal individualist consensus that informs the international human rights system. 1948, the year of the Universal Declaration, is an appropriate starting point for a discussion of the encounters and frictions between the Russian Orthodox Church and human rights, because this is when human rights as international legal standard were born. In terms of the Russian Orthodox Church’s ideological engagement with the idea of human rights, as it emerged in the wake of the French Revolution, one could of course go back further in history, to the time of the Napoleonic Wars and the influence of French Enlightenment ideas in Tsarist Russia. I will not take this path, but it is necessary to bear in mind this intellectual history and to remember that some of the Church’s ideological arguments against human rights (human rights as the fruit of the anthropocentric and anti-religious Enlightenment) are derived from the nineteenth century intellectual struggle which the Slavophiles conducted against Westernizers (Bowring 2013). The chapter is structured in four parts. In the first part, I look at the Russian Orthodox Church and human rights during the Cold War. In the second part, I analyse the way in which the Church has approached human rights in post-Soviet times, paying particular attention to the way in which the right to freedom of conscience and religion are dealt with in the Social Doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church published in 2000. The third section is dedicated to the drafting and the content of the document The Teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church on Human Dignity, Liberty and Rights, which from today’s perspective represents the most conclusive statement on human rights that has come out of the Moscow Patriarchate. The fourth part briefly looks at how the Russian Orthodox Church has used its teaching on rights and freedoms after 2008.

The Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights During the Cold War

The Soviet Union and its satellite states were among those countries in the General Assembly of the United Nations that abstained from signing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948. The Soviet delegates to the United Nations were critical of the document, in particular of column III of the Universal Declaration (articles 18 to 21), which they would have wanted to qualify to the effect that they “must be exercised in conformity with the interests of working people and used to strengthen the socialist system” (Glendon 2001: 184). But

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20 years later, in 1968, the Soviet Union did sign two other important international human rights instruments that translated the principles pronounced in the Declaration into positive law, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ratified in 1973). In 1975, it also signed the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Helsinki Accords did not have a legal binding effect on the signatory states, but politically they nonetheless constituted a clear commitment to the values of human rights. The “principles guiding relations between participating states,” enumerated in the Helsinki Final Act, included “the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief” and confirmed that member states should act “in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1975).2 When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed, the Russian Orthodox Church was hardly in a state to react to the event or to reflect on the potential impact which this document could have on the life of the Church. In the late 1940s, it had just emerged from three decades of severe repression, which had brought its institutional structure almost to complete collapse, and was going through a gradual recovery under strict state tutelage. Throughout the Cold War the Church remained almost completely silent on the question of human rights, despite the fact that the Soviet Union signed three international human rights treaties, and notwithstanding the incessant violation of believers’ rights in the Soviet Union. The deal between Soviet government and the Church consisted of an agreement that the Church would be spared repression in exchange for unconditional loyalty to the Soviet state. This pledge of loyalty included the Church’s silence on human rights violations by the government, in particular on religious persecution. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes the freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others, and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” From the perspective of the church in the late 1940s, this should have seemed an unrealizable dream. But there was also an internal, ecclesiological aspect to the denial that religious freedom was being violated in the Soviet Union: Before and during the Second World War, different parts of the Russian Orthodox Church had declared themselves independent from the Moscow Patriarchate, in particular the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (Miner 2003: 101) and the Russian Church in Western Europe. After 1945, Patriarch Alexii made every effort, supported by the Soviet government, to bring these groups back under the jurisdiction of Moscow.

2 Needless to say, these international treaties did not prevent the Soviet government from restricting individual human rights and freedoms. The most glaring example of the discrepancy between human rights obligations according to international law and actual human rights violations in the country was the suppression of the Moscow Helsinki Group, formed in 1976.

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In short, at the time of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the situation of the Russian Orthodox Church was deeply paradoxical: at the very moment when an important international body enshrined religious freedom as a fundamental value of the post-war order, certainly also moved by the undeniable religious persecution in the areas of Communist domination, the Russian Orthodox Church, which was itself suffering severe limitations at the hands of the Soviet government, made every effort possible to deny that there was religious persecution in the Soviet Union. The motives for this denial were twofold: on the one hand side, the Church kept silent out of fear of repression, but on the other hand there was a genuine convergence of interests between the Church and the State in denying religious freedom to those parts of the Russian Orthodox Church that sought to detach themselves from the Moscow Patriarchate. The individual right to religious freedom was not something that the Russian Orthodox Church could wholeheartedly support in 1948, for political-pragmatic as well as internal-ecclesiastical reasons. This paradoxical situation continued throughout the Cold War, and became the first ground for an open clash between the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church and those Russian Orthodox believers who demanded religious freedom on the grounds of human rights. The most famous example is the case of the priest Gleb Yakunin. In 1975, Yakunin and Lev Regelson wrote a letter to the General Assembly of the World Council of Churches gathered in Nairobi that year. In their letter, they denounced the persecution of religious believers in the Soviet Union and accused the Church of inactivity in the defence of believers and collaboration with the state. Not surprisingly, the official delegation of the Russian Orthodox Church tried to silence the protest and condemned the statement, but the Assembly of the World Council of Churches nonetheless discussed the issue and tabled a resolution in which it requested “that the question of religious liberty be the subject of intense consultations with the member Churches of the signatory States of the Helsinki Agreement” (Kelly 1976: 5). The incident is important because it was the first time the Moscow Patriarchate found itself confronted explicitly with the human right of religious freedom as an international legal standard. During the Cold War, the Church remained largely silent with regard to the human rights regime that was being consolidated as an independent international legal standard. With the exception of one statement by Metropolitan Nikodim in 1963 and one article in the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate entitled “Theological Aspects of Human Rights” by Alexej Osipov in 1984, there is little evidence of programmatic or official statements by members of the Moscow Patriarchate that dealt explicitly with human rights prior to 1991. However, both the statement by Nikodim and the article by Osipov are quite instructive, as I show below. In his first speech at a regional meeting of the Prague-based Christian Peace Conference in 1963, Metropolitan Nikodim said: “‘Every civil right … is of genuine value only if it is used for the good of society, of one’s country, of all mankind’ instead of ‘to protect the interests of a selfish individual or of a privileged class’” (cited in Webster 1993: 51). Webster, who cites this speech in his book, defines Nikodim’s statement as a “socialist version of human rights”. In fact, Nikodim’s Marxist premise surfaced clearly in his assessment of the human right to own

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property: “Is it possible, from a Christian standpoint, to consider true liberty the legal protection of a right for individuals to hold undisputed ownership over means of production which should belong to society as a whole?” (cf. Webster 1993: 52). The fact that the representative of the Church singled out in his speech article 17 of the Universal Declaration (the right to own property) is clearly indicative of Nikodim’s acceptance of Communist ideological exigencies with regard to the Russian Orthodox Church’s voice in the world. However, in the light of the massive requisition of Church property by the Bolsheviks, legitimized with the argument that the Church represented a selfish and privileged class, the last rhetorical question of the Metropolitan appears bitter and cynical. At a time when property rights were emerging as an international legal human rights standard, and against the background of massive expropriation of church property, i.e. at a time when the Russian Orthodox Church’s own situation was a clear case of violation of article 17, the representative of the Church stood up in support of collective ownership. Needless to say, this denial was just one more sign of the deeply paradoxical situation of the Russian Orthodox Church under Soviet rule. However, the motives for Nikodim’s attack on human rights were most probably, again, twofold: on the one hand, he could hardly have argued otherwise as an official representative of his Church at the mercy of the Soviet government, but on the other hand there was also a genuine convergence of positions between the Church and the socialist state in denouncing the risk that individual rights would further human selfishness. The theological reasoning becomes clearer in an article by Aleksandr Osipov, published in the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1984 (Osipov 1984). In this article, Osipov pointed out that freedom constituted only a conditional, not an absolute right and could be considered “good” only as long as it enhanced the development of what is good in man and human society. On these grounds he also criticized the philosopher Nikolay Berdyaev. “Berdyaev was absolutely not right,” he writes, “when he affirmed the primacy of freedom. Freedom, understood as unlimited right to act, is not a positive reality, but a temptation, to which the first man has fallen and his descendants have as well.” (Osipov 1984) Putting aside, in the context of this chapter, the question whether Osipov was correct in his criticism of Berdyaev or not, what is noteworthy here is that Osipov links freedom to human sin, in that human beings may use their freedom in order to seek merely sinful self-interests. For this reason, freedom in society should always be understood as “limited”. Freedom of speech, for example, remained a human right, Osipov argued, “only as long as it does not overstep its positive bounds” by allowing the advocacy of lies, slander, violence, and other evils. When this freedom exceeds these bounds, it “can no longer be called a human right and be allowed to exist in society” (Osipov 1984). Half-way through his article, Osipov turns to a discussion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords. He calls these two treaties “authoritative international documents”, but he points out that both of them run into a problem of definition “of the border of those rights, which man really needs” (Osipov 1984: 58). Osipov writes that there existed a tendency to such a borderless expansion of rights that rights which, taken for themselves were fully positive, turned into their opposite. This emphasis on “limits” foreshadows the contemporary

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Orthodox debate on human rights, as does another argument brought forward in Osipov’s article: the idea that human rights are not universal and should be defined in relation to the degree of “maturity” of a society (Osipov 1984: 59). Osipov’s article not only foreshadows the distinction between positive and negative freedom and the insistence on the limits of individual human rights which are characteristic of the human rights discourse of the Russian Orthodox Church throughout the 1990s and 2000s. It also makes clear that the problems which the Orthodox Church manifested with regard to human rights were from the start not only of a political but also of a theological nature. Prior to 1991 it would have been unthinkable politically that the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church might challenge the Soviet government on grounds of human rights, but after 1991 it became clear that it was also unthinkable theologically that the Russian Orthodox Church would subscribe wholeheartedly to the idea of human rights. Nikodim’s speech from 1963 and Osipov’s article from 1984 clearly show that the Church had misgivings about individual human rights as such.

The Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights after 1991 and the Social Doctrine in 2000

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and the Church finally emerged free from political and ideological strictures, it soon became clear that it was not going to give full-hearted support to the cause of liberal democracy and human rights. Two factors contributed to the hardening up of the negative standpoint of the Russian Orthodox Church vis-à-vis human rights: first the fact that international human rights standards in matters of religious freedom clashed with the self-understanding of the Russian Orthodox Church as Russia’s privileged majority religion; and second misgivings of the Church regarding the liberalization and pluralisation of Russian society. After 1991, the Patriarchate did not change the position it had held during the Cold War period according to which religious freedom constituted a threat to its canonical and territorial integrity rather than a blessing for the fruition of church life. In the first half of the 1990s, the Moscow Patriarchate was concerned about the proselytizing activities of Catholic and Protestant Churches. It did not frame the question of Russian citizens adhering to one or another religion as an issue of individual religious freedom, but instead focused on the threat of “totalitarian sects” and the risk of watering down the “Russian Orthodox identity” (Papkova 2011, 74–93; Shterin and Richardson 1998). The 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience, which set certain limits to the activities of newcomer religions in the Russian Federation, responded to the desire of the Moscow Patriarchate for a “managed” religious pluralism (Gvosdev 2002). But in 1997 the legal situation in Russia had changed with respect to the Soviet period, and the Moscow Patriarchate continued to be challenged by disputes over

[email protected] The Russian Orthodox Church’s Approach to Human Rights 65 religious freedom. In 1996, the Russian Federation had become a member of the Council of Europe. It had ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and was now a party in front of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. It soon became clear that international human rights legislation could have a direct impact on church life. Just in order to give an example, it is worth considering the case Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafia v. Ukraine, brought before the court in 2001 and decided in 2007. This case concerned a parish in Kiev, which had been founded in 1989 as a parish of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and, 10 years later, sought to change denomination to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. This change in denomination led to a split in the parish and an active contestation of the church building between supporters of the Moscow and of the Kyiv Patriarchate. The local administration supported the Moscow Patriarchate’s position and refused legal recognition to the new entity. The parishioners loyal to the Kievan Patriarchate appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, which found that article 9 (“freedom of religion”) of the European Convention had been violated by the refusal of the Ukrainian local authorities to grant recognition (European Court of Human Rights 2007). Notwithstanding the restrictive legislation inside Russia, therefore, international human rights standards demonstrated their potential to infringe on the Moscow Patriarchate’s ecclesiastical integrity and canonical territory. The second factor which determined the Church’s negative attitude on human rights was the liberalization of post-Soviet Russian society. The 1990s were perceived by many Russians as chaotic and lawless years of transition, but they also produced a hitherto unseen cultural and social pluralism. From the perspective of the Church, this pluralism was not necessarily a positive development. Two issues caused particular suspicion on its part, namely the newly gained freedom for homosexuals and the proliferating art scene. The Church condemned homosexuality as immoral and sinful, and it criticized the freedom of artistic expression as potentially hurtful to religious sensibilities. The controversies surrounding the organization of gay-parades in Russian cities and the scandal caused by the art exhibition Ostorozhno Religiya in the Sakharov Centre in Moscow are only two examples of how entrenched the human rights debate between secular liberal human rights activists and religious groups had become by the mid-2000s. For the artists and human rights activists, the accusation and the criticism of the Church was a sign that individual freedoms were being suppressed in Russia and that the political scene was becoming increasingly clericalized. Representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, on the other hand, warned against the decline of public morality and a return of Soviet “militant athe- ism” and saw themselves in the role of the victim. In the light of these public controversies over human rights involving the Russian Orthodox Church, it is not really a surprise that the first dogmatic treatment of human rights which came out of the Moscow Patriarchate – as part of The Bases of the Social Teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church published by the Bishops’ Council in 2000 – was negative. Human rights were treated in section IV of the Social Doctrine (Christian ethics and secular law) as the product of the rise of secularism and “self-sufficient” humanism:

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As secularism developed, the lofty principles of inalienable human rights turned into a notion of the rights of the individual outside his relations with God. In this process, the freedom of the personality transformed into the protection of self-will (as long as it is not detrimental to individuals) and into the demand that the state should guarantee a certain material living standard for the individual and family. In the contemporary systematic understanding of civil human rights, man is treated not as the image of God, but as a self- sufficient and self-sufficing subject (section IV.7 of the Social Doctrine, Russian Orthodox Church. Department for External Church Relations 2000). The Social Doctrine presented human rights as a topic that was fundamentally alien to theological discourse and the life of the Church. The drafters of Social Doctrine made clear that the Church entered into this alien legal discourse only with a sote- riological scope: How should an Orthodox Christian deal with legal claims that were motivated on the ground of human rights but contradicted his or her Christian convictions? (Agadjanian 2010) In the Social Doctrine the answer to this question was radical: should a state make laws that contradict Christian convictions, the Church could call for civil disobedience (section IV.8 of the Social Doctrine, Russian Orthodox Church. Department for External Church Relations 2000). The Social Doctrine clearly remained on a confrontational and ideologically closed plane vis-à-vis the concept of human rights. But there was also another, less official document which came out of the Moscow Patriarchate in 2000, which suggested that section IV of the Social Doctrine was not the last word on the Church’s attitude on human rights. On 16 February 2000 Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, today Patriarch, Kirill published an article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta with the following opening: A fundamental contradiction of our time and also a major challenge to the human community in the 21st century is the confrontation of liberal civilization standards, on the one hand, and the values of national cultural and religious identity. The study of the genesis of the contradiction between these two crucial factors of modern development and the search for ways to overcome it should take, as it seems, an important place in Orthodox theological studies. Since this is a problem whose solution will largely determine the future shape of the human civilization, it is clear that the very formulation of the problem and attempts to settle its primary definition [here Kirill refers to his previous article] is not only the fruit of a sincere interest, but no less of sincere anger. Anger about those who out of ideological convictions reject the very idea of raising these issues for fear of a possible correction or revision of the liberal ideas which today underpin the attempts to shape the human community into a “melting pot” of cultures and civilizations. Anger also about those zealots and religious and cultural fundamentalism who have made up their mind on these problems long ago and are deeply convinced that the only way to move further is to tightly close the door of their house. (Metropolitan Kirill 2000a, b) Kirill concluded that the critical and creative engagement with liberal values was among the most important tasks of Orthodox theology (Metropolitan Kirill 2000a). It is quite symbolic that Nezavisimaya Gazeta printed this article alongside a reproduction of two nineteenth century woodcuts by the romantic artist Julius Schnorr von Carolsfeld entitled “The healing of the two blind men” and “Jesus and the apostles in the storm”. The two images and their symbolism underlined the argument of the article, namely that there was a conflict between two sides that were “blind” in their ideological fervour and that the Church was in a crisis. What Kirill

[email protected] The Russian Orthodox Church’s Approach to Human Rights 67 did in this article was to distance himself from both forms of “blindness”: he did not think that Russia should unconditionally adhere to the Western modern and secular trajectory, as liberal secularists would argue, nor did he want to find himself on the side of the religious zealots, who would not even consider the question of human rights because they condemn the intellectual universe that has created them in the first place. In contrast, Kirill argued for the need to find a third way of confrontation. This “third way” went beyond the short dogmatic treatment which human rights had found in the Social Doctrine and, as I will show below, eventually led to the publication of another document in matters of individual freedom and human rights 8 years later: The Teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church on Human Dignity, Liberty and Rights.

The Shaping of a Middle Ground and the Human Rights Doctrine of 2008

From the mid-2000s we find clear evidence that the Church’s standpoint on human rights shifted from rejection to a strategy of “acceptance-through-rejection” (Agadjanian 2010). This strategy consisted in the acceptance of the human rights language in principle and the rejection of concrete human rights regulations in practice. A new feature of this discourse was a more intimate knowledge of the Western human rights regime, of its history and of existing tensions in human rights legislation. This strategy was inaugurated around 2005 by Metropolitan Kirill when he cited for the first time – and would subsequently do so again and again – Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 29 states: 1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible. 2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. The “discovery” of Article 29 had an important effect on the human rights debate in the Russian Orthodox Church, in that it allowed the Church to no longer place itself in opposition to a Western individualistic understanding of human rights, but instead to actively present itself as the vanguard of a more original understanding of human rights according to article 29, an understanding which emphasized the importance of morality and duties to the community. This new strategy was visible in several of Kirill’s speeches in the years leading up to the publication of the Doctrine. At a seminar entitled “The evolution of moral principles and human rights in multicultural society” in Strasbourg, on 30–31 October 2006 he said: “I am convinced that the concern for spiritual needs, based moreover on traditional morality,

[email protected] 68 K. Stoeckl ought to return to the public realm. The upholding of moral standards must become a social cause. It is the mechanism of human rights that can actively enable this return. I am speaking of a return, for the norm of according human rights with traditional morality can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948” (Metropolitan Kirill 2006). The same view was expressed in his speech to UNECSO on 13 March 2007: “The Orthodox Church invites the world to return to the understanding of the role of human rights in social life that was established in 1948. Moral rules can put limits to the realization of human rights in public life” (Interfax Religion 2007). The point was repeated again by Patriarch Alexii II in a speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 2 October 2007. In this speech, not only the Universal Declaration was mentioned, but also the European Convention of Human Rights: … there occurs a break between human rights and morality, and this break threatens the European civilization. We can see it in a new generation of rights that contradict morality, and in how human rights are used to justify immoral behavior. In this connection, I may note that morality, with which any human right advocacy has to count, is mentioned in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. I am convinced that the makers of the European Convention on Human Rights included therein morality not as something ambiguous but rather as an integral element of the whole human rights system. (Patriarch Alexei II 2007) The point is corroborated once more 2 years after the publication of the Human Rights Doctrine by Metropolitan Ilarion: It should be noted that the postwar human rights instruments did reflect the connection between freedom and moral responsibility. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 and the European Declaration of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms from 1950 speak about the connection between human rights and morality. It is in later international acts such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union from 2000 that the connection between human rights and morality is not mentioned. Freedom is therefore completely divorced from morality. (Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov (2010)) What this series of quotations shows is that during the period in which the Human Rights Doctrine was being drafted, the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church acquired an increasingly clear understanding of contemporary human rights politics and legislation. In particular, the Moscow Patriarchate identified those features of the modern human rights regime which relate to the idea of protection of public morality and it spoke out in defence of these “limitation clauses”. The Church’s position in this field was no longer determined by the sense of rejection that informed the treatment of human rights in the Social Doctrine of 2000. In 2006, a second document in matters of human rights came out of the Moscow Patriarchate. To be precise, the “Declaration on the dignity and rights of man” of the World Russian People’s Council (VNRS, Vsemirnij Nardognij Russkij Sobor’) was not a church-document strictly speaking. But the fact that it was issued by the World Russian People’s Council, a non-governmental organization chaired by the Patriarch with its seat on the premises of the Patriarchate, makes clear that the document was a product from inside the Church. In retrospect we can interpret the Declaration as

[email protected] The Russian Orthodox Church’s Approach to Human Rights 69 an intermediary step on the path of the Russian Orthodox Church to the formulation of the Human Rights Doctrine. In 2006, however, when the Declaration was published, its decidedly anti-Western and anti-liberal attitude produced an escalating effect with respect to the ideas expressed in the Social Doctrine 6 years earlier. The Human Rights Declaration established a link between human rights and morality. In the Russian original this connection was expressed with the rather con- voluted phrase “the content of human rights cannot not be connected with morality” (in Russian: ne mozhet ne byt’ svyazano), straightened out in the English translation as “human rights essentially involve morality”, thus emphasizing the essentially ontological nature of the link between human rights and morality. The authors of the Declaration drew a distinction between human “worth” (tsennost’) and human “dignity” (dostoinstvo), claiming that the attainment of the latter depended on a morally dignified life-conduct: “Each person as image of God has singular unalienable worth, which must be respected by every one of us, the society and the state. It is by doing good that the human being gains dignity. Thus we distinguish between human worth and dignity. Worth is given, while dignity is acquired.” (Human Rights Declaration of the VNRS 2006). The distinction between “human worth” and “human dignity” was theologically untenable and it is no surprise that the Human Rights Doctrine 2 years later corrected this distinction and no longer used the term “human worth” at all. But the very fact that this distinction had been made in the document of the World Russian People’s Council demonstrates that the new affirmative human rights strategy of the Moscow Patriarchate built on the link between dignity and morality. The Human Rights Doctrine published in 2008 dedicated the entire first chapter to the question of human dignity as a religious and moral category. In this chapter, we read that, from the Orthodox Christian perspective, human dignity is related to the creation of the human being “in God’s image and likeness”. God’s image in man is described by the document as the source of human dignity. It remains “indelible … even after the fall,” i.e. even man’s susceptibility to sinfulness cannot erase the God-given dignity. With this sentence, the Human Rights Doctrine corrected the distinction between “worth” as given and “dignity” as acquired that the authors of the Human Rights Declaration of the World Russian People’s Council had made. However, also for the authors of the Human Rights Doctrine human dignity was not a 100% unqualified: divine-human likeness becomes for the Church the source for a precise understanding of how human beings should strive to overcome sin and “restore human life in the fullness of its original perfection” (I.1): “dignified life is … achieved through God’s grace by efforts to overcome sin and to seek moral purity and virtue. … what is dignified and what is not are bound up with the moral or amoral actions of a person and with the inner state of his soul. Considering the state of human nature darkened by sin, it is important that things dignified and undigni- fied should be clearly distinguished in the life of a person” (I.2). This is how the authors of the document explained what effectively constituted a “good life” according to “God’s design for human beings and their calling” (I.3): “… moral norms inherent in humanity just as moral norms set forth in the divine revelation reveal God’s design for human beings and their calling. These norms are

[email protected] 70 K. Stoeckl guidelines for a good life worthy of God-created humanity” (I.3). Knowledge about these moral norms derives from revelation (the scriptures and the model of Jesus Christ) and from conscience. Human nature is a problematic source for morality because of its potential for sin (“life according to the law of the flesh” (I.4)). For this reason the document put a special emphasis on repentance and stated: “The patristic and ascetic thought and the whole liturgical tradition of the Church refer more to human indignity caused by sin than to human dignity” (I.5). Chapter I concludes: “According to the Orthodox tradition, a human being preserves his God-given dignity and grows in it only if he lives in accordance with moral norms because these norms express the primordial and therefore authentic human nature not darkened by sin.” The Russian Orthodox Church thus established a direct link between human dignity and morality. At the risk of slightly exaggerating the point, one could say that with the Human Rights Doctrine the Russian Orthodox Church sought to offer a theological justification for article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “everyone shall be subject […] to […] limitations […] for the purpose of […] meeting the just requirements of morality.” The wording of the document and the statements surrounding its drafting and publication demonstrate that by 2008 the Moscow Patriarchate had come to accept the language of human rights and it used this language and the very provisions of international human rights treaties for the justification of its own conservative human rights agenda. This shift from rejection to acceptance had become possible by anchoring two concepts which the Church considered indispensable for its vision of freedom and social life inside the modern human rights regime: “limitations” and “morality”. Whereas previous theological treatments, from the article by Osipov in 1984 up until the Social Doctrine in 2000, had rejected human rights as the fruit of a boundary-less understanding of human freedom and god-less “selfishness”, the Human Rights Doctrine from 2008 actually uses the very notion of human rights in order to underpin the Church’s vision of an orderly society. There is ample evidence that the drafters of the document themselves were aware of this shift and that they really looked back on the writing of the Human Rights Doctrine as a learning process. Igumen Filaret (Bulekov), at that time representative of the Moscow Patriarchate in Strasbourg, said that the document aimed at destroy- ing at least two commonly held stereotypes against Russian Orthodoxy: that the Orthodox Church had no relationship to the topic of human rights, and that the Church was against human rights (Igumen Filaret 2008). It is important to recognize that the stereotypes which Filaret (Bulekov) is alluding to in his article not only existed outside the Russian Orthodox Church, but also inside. The Human Rights Doctrine was as much as document for internal as for external clarification. An indicator for the tensions and ambiguities which persisted in the internal Church-discourse is the pastoral letter of the Bishops‘Council of June 2008, which contains a net condemnation of the human rights concept, even though the very same Council had just adopted the Human Rights Doctrine: “The idea of human rights has become one of the key concepts in politics and jurisprudence of states. This idea is often used to justify sin and to reduce the role of religion in society and

[email protected] The Russian Orthodox Church’s Approach to Human Rights 71 to deprive people of the possibility of living their faith” (Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov. Otdel Vneshnih Tserkovnuch Svyasey 2008). The discrepancy between the net condemnation of human rights in this letter and the inclusive language of the Human Rights Doctrine conveys a strong sense of tension and ambiguity in the Patriarchate’s engagement with the issue of human rights. The strategy of the Patriarchate with the publication of the Human Rights Doctrine stood in clear contradiction to the position of conservative hardliners in the Church, who during the Bishops’ Council “picketed the entrance of the Church of Christ the Saviour, dem- onstrating against ‘the heretics of the Synod’, mobile phones, identification card numbers and other ‘devilries’” (Moshkin 2008). The publication of the Human Rights Doctrine can therefore be interpreted to mark the shaping of a “middle-ground”, the construction of a “third way” of confrontation with liberal values which Kirill had outlined already in his article in 2000. A middle-way between “those who out of ideological convictions reject the very idea of raising these issues for fear of a possible correction or revision of the liberal ideas” and “those zealots and religious and cultural fundamentalism who have made up their mind on these problems long ago and are deeply convinced that the only way to move further is to tightly close the door of their house” (Metropolitan Kirill 2000a).

The Russian Orthodox Church as Moral Norm Entrepreneur

Since 2008, the Russian Orthodox Church has come to act as transnational moral norm entrepreneur on issues of human rights (Stoeckl 2016). “Norm entrepreneur- ship” or “norm protagonism” are terms used in the study of international relations to describe the normative agency of actors in transnational governance regimes. Norm entrepreneurs “create” norms by calling attention to issues that hitherto have not been “named, interpreted, and dramatized” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 910) as norms. They construct cognitive frames, often in opposition to rival frames, effectively causing a shift in public perceptions of appropriateness. The Russian Orthodox Church’s engagement with human rights can be interpreted as a norm protagonism of a conservative kind, whose declared source of the promoted norms are not human rights instruments, but in the words of the Patriarch of Moscow Kirill, “traditional values rooted in all world religions” (Interfax Religion 2007). The Russian Orthodox Church has acted as a moral conservative norm promoter through the European Court of Human Rights in several documented cases (Rimestad 2015), for example in the case Lautsi versus Italy (European Court of Human Rights 2011). The Lautsi-case dealt with the legitimacy of religious symbols in the public sphere. In November 2009, the ECHR ruled that the compulsory display of the crucifix in Italian state schools represented a violation of the European Convention of Human Rights (article 9 on freedom of conscience and religion, and article 2 of the optional protocol on education). The disputed case originated from the complaint filed by a Finnish citizen living in Italy that the display of the crucifix

[email protected] 72 K. Stoeckl in the classroom attended by the family’s children violated their right to freedom of conscience. The claimant argued that according to the principles of state secularity, explicated through the Italian Constitutional Court in 1989, no religious symbols should be displayed in the public space of a school. In its first verdict in November 2009, the European Court of Human Rights adopted the point of the view of the claimant, effectively demanding the removal of crucifixes from Italian classrooms. The judgment caused a heated debate both in Italy and internationally about the place of religion in the public space and about the power of the Strasbourg Court to interfere with church-state relations in individual countries. Many critics of the verdict felt that the court had, as summarised by the Italian law scholar Marco Ventura, “imposed a vision of laïcité that is modelled on the pluralistic neutrality of the great Western liberal democracies” (Ventura 2011), but was not necessarily congruent with the cultural tradition and religious history of the Italian state. The first Lautsi decision evoked a strong reaction by the Russian Orthodox Church. Archbishop Ilarion (Alfeev) sent a letter to the Vatican Secretary of State in which he said that the Moscow Patriarchate considered the verdict “an attempt to impose radical secularism everywhere despite the national experience of church- state relations” (Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov. Otdel Vneshnih Tserkovnuch Svyasey 2009a, November 27). He added that religious communities in Europe should work together to discuss the fact that “the Court has turned into an instrument of promoting an ultra-liberal ideology”. Patriarch Kirill sent a letter to the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in which he stated his “full and unconditional support for the intention of the Italian Government to appeal this decision … in cooperation with the Roman Catholic Church” (Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov. Otdel Vneshnih Tserkovnuch Svyasey 2009b, November 26). The ECHR’s judgment convinced the Russian Church’s leadership that “on the European continent an encroachment on the religious symbols of Christianity is taking place” (Russkaya Narodnaya Liniya 2011). Church officials repeatedly mentioned theLautsi case in public interventions between 2009 and 2011 as evidence that “aggressive secularism” and “Christianophobia” were on the rise in Europe. The Italian government appealed against the first ruling, supported by the Vatican and a coalition of several countries, namely the Russian Federation, Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Monaco, Romania and San Marino. In March 2011, the ECHR overturned the first ruling and found that it was up to Italy to decide whether there should be crucifixes in Italian public schools (in juridical terms, the court accorded Italy a “margin of appreciation”). In its verdict, the ECHR conceded that it was not possible to derive one specific model of “admissible” church-state relations from the European Convention of Human Rights, but instead that “every country is free to decide ‘which place to give to religion’ and to favor Christianity, or rather the dominant churches” (Ventura 2011). The Russian Orthodox Church played an active role in forming a coalition of supporters of the Italian government in the appeal. The coalition of supporters has been analysed by Pasquale Annicchino, who has pointed out that the collaboration of conservative groups from different religions was decisive in turning around the first verdict of the court during the appeal (Annicchino 2011). The particularly

[email protected] The Russian Orthodox Church’s Approach to Human Rights 73 important role of Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church in the Lautsi appeal case was later recognised by the Italian government during a meeting between the Italian Ambassador to Russia and Patriarch Kirill (Interfax Religion 2011). The Lautsi-case convinced the Russian Orthodox Church that in Europe a secularist encroachment on the rights of religious believers was taking place. The Moscow Patriarchate has since developed a pro-active strategy on the rights of religious believers, for example through the setting up of a homepage (orthodoxrights. org) – run by the Representation of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg – which describes its scope as “monitoring the rights of Orthodox Christians in Europe.” The mission-statement on the website reads: “There is now an evident need to monitor the rights and freedoms of Orthodox Christians in Europe within 47 countries of the Council of Europe. Such monitoring the religious rights of Orthodox Christians will help to protect their religious freedom more effectively”. The threats that Christians in Europe face are, according to the website, “intolerance, discrimination, and even violence on the part of material- istic supporters of the ‘new morality’, of aggressive antireligious groups and from those who, in arguing for the secular character of the state, demand exclusion of religion from public life – media, education, culture, and health.” The mission statement continues: “New legislation too often becomes an instrument to violate the rights of believers and their freedom of religion, thus provoking tensions and conflicts within society.” (Orthodoxrights.org 2018). The website offers a contemporary case of the Russian Orthodox Church’s use of human rights in an anti-liberal key. As an example, it confirms the analysis put forward in this chapter, namely that the Russian Orthodox Church has actively started to use human rights language, but with the aim to oppose a liberal, progressive expansion of human rights norms.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have given an overview over half a century of confrontation of the Russian Orthodox Church with human rights, in particular with the right to freedom of conscience and religion, as an international legal standard. This confrontation has been shaped, on the one hand, by the political context, and, on the other hand, by religious exigencies. During the Soviet period, the Moscow Patriarchate did not embrace the modern human rights regime and in particular the right to religious freedom for political as well as ecclesiastical and theological reasons. In the post- Soviet period, the official stance of the Russian Orthodox Church remained largely negative, but from the mid-2000s onwards it gradually shifted from an outright rejection of human rights to the acceptance of the human rights language and to a conservative human rights agenda. The Russian Orthodox Church also continues to be critical of the right to freedom of conscience and religion and follows critically debates and court cases, like the case Lautsi v. Italy, where freedom of conscience was interpreted as a right to freedom from religion. After half a century of development of an Orthodox discourse on human rights, which has been presented in this

[email protected] 74 K. Stoeckl chapter, the Russian Orthodox Church has become a vocal promoter of a positive right to religious freedom and an able communicator in a language of human rights of its own making.

References

Agadjanian, A. (2010). Liberal individual and Christian culture: Russian Orthodox Teaching on human rights in social theory perspective. Religion, State, and Society, 38(2), 97–113. Annicchino, P. (2011). Winning the battle by losing the war: The Lautsi case and the Holy Alliance between American Conservative Evangelicals, the Russian Orthodox Church and the Vatican to reshape European identity. Religion and Human rights, 6, 213–219. Bowring, B. (2013). Law, rights and ideology in Russia. London: Routledge. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. (1975). Helsinki Final Act. http://www.osce. org/mc/39501?download=true. Accessed 5 Mar 2013. European Court of Human Rights. (2007, December 14). Case of Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine. Application no. 77703/01. European Court of Human Rights. (2011). Case of Lautsi and others vs. Italy. Application no. 30814/06. Strasbourg 18 March 2011. Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. International Organization, 52(4), 887–917. Glendon, M. A. (2001). A world made new. Eleanor Roosevelt and the universal declaration of human rights. New York: Random House. Gvosdev, N. K. (2002). In C. Marsh & N. K. Gvosdev (Eds.),. Civil society and the search for justice in Russia “Managed pluralism” and civil religion in Post-Soviet Russia (pp. 57–87). Lanham: Lexington Books. Igumen Filaret (2008, June 30). Russkaya Pravoslanaya Tserkov sformulirovala osnovy ucheniya o dostoinstve, svobode i pravakh cheloveka. Representation of the Russian Orthodox Church in Strasbourg. http://www.strasbourg-reor.org/?topicid=86. Accessed 27 Oct 2010. Interfax Religion (2007, March 13). Vystuplenie mitropolita Smolenskogo i Kaliningradskogo Kirilla na mezhdunarodnom seminare YUNESCO na temu “Dialog civilizacij: prava cheloveka, nravstvennye cennosti i kul’turnoe mnogoobrazie”. http://www.interfax-religion. ru/?act=documents&div=604. Accessed 01 Oct 2018. Interfax Religion. (2011, June 22). Italy thanks Russia for support in Lautsi vs. Italy case. http:// www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=8538. Accessed 01 Oct 2018. Kelly, D. (1976). Nairobi: A door opened. Religion in Communist Lands, 4(1), 4–17. Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad. (2000a, February 16). Norma very kak norma zhizni I. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2000-02-16/8_norma.html. Accessed 01 Oct 2018. Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad. (2000b, February 17). Norma very kak norma zhizni II. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2000-02-17/8_norma2.html. Accessed 01 Oct 2018. Metropolitan Kirill, of Smolensk and Kaliningrad. (2006). The experience of viewing the problems of human rights and their moral foundations in European religious communities. Presentation at the Conference ‘Evolution of Moral Values and Human Rights in Multicultural Society’, Strasbourg, 30 October 2006. Europaica Bulletin 6 November 2006, no. 108: http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/108.aspx#1. Miner, S. M. (2003). Stalin’s holy war: Religion, nationalism, and alliance politics 1941–1945. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

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Moshkin, M. (2008, June 27). Prava – ne dogma. Arkhierejskij soboro RPC utverdil svoe uchenie o svobodakh i dostoinstve cheloveka. Vremya Novostej. http://www.vremya.ru/print/207064. html. Accessed 27 June 2008. Orthodoxrights.org (2018). Monitoring the rights and freedom of Orthodox Christians in Europe. http://www.orthodoxrights.org. Accessed 01 Oct 2018. Osipov, A. (1984). Theological aspects of human rights [in Russian]. Journal of Moscow Patriarchate, 5, 51–56. Papkova, I. (2011). The Orthodox Church and Russian politics. New York/Washington, DC: Oxford University/Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Patriarch Alexey II, of Moscow and All Russia. (2007). Address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Europaica Bulletin 7 October 2007 no. 128: http://orthodoxeurope.org/ page/14/128.aspx (last accessed 12.03.2013). Rimestad, S. (2015). The interaction between the Moscow Patriarchate and the European Court of Human Rights. Review of Central and East European Law, 40, 31–55. Russian Orthodox Church. Department for External Church Relations (2000). The bases of the social concept. http://www.mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/. Accessed 6 Dec 2009. Russkaya Narodnaya Liniya. (2011, December 3). Svyatejshij Patriarkh Kirill: Voinstvuyushchij sekulyarizm proyaflyaet neterpimost’ ko vsemu imeyushchemu otnoshenie k khristianskoj kul’ture. http://ruskline.ru/news_rl/2011/12/03/svyatejshij_patriarh_kirill_voinstvuyuwij_ sekulyarizm_proyavlyaet_neterpimost_ko_vsemu_imeyuwemu_otnoshenie_k_hristianskoj_ kultu/. Accessed 01 Oct 2018. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov. Otdel Vneshnih Tserkovnuch Svyasey (2008, June 27). Osvyashchennyi Arkhiereiskii Sobor. Poslanie Osvyashchennogo Arkhiereiskogo Sobora kliru, chestnomu inochestvu i vsem vernym chadam Russkoi Pravoslavoi Tserkvi. http://www. mospat.ru/archive/41648.htm. Accessed and archived 26 June 2013. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov. Otdel Vneshnih Tserkovnuch Svyasey (2009a, November 27). Arkhiepiskop Ilarion napravil Gosudarstvennomu sekretaryu Vatikana kardinalz Tarchizio Bertone poslanie, posvyashchennoe verdiktu Evropejskogo suda o zaprete khristianskoj simvoliki v shkolakh Italii. https://mospat.ru/ru/2009/11/27/news9297/. Accessed 19 Apr 2013. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov. Otdel Vneshnih Tserkovnuch Svyasey (2009b, November 26). Poslaniye Svyateyshego Patriarkha Kirilla v podderzhku pozitsii Pravitel’stva Italii po resh- eniyu Yevropeyskogo suda o zaprete khristianskoy simvoliki v shkolakh. https://mospat.ru/ ru/2009/11/26/news9194/. Accessed 19 Apr 2013. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov. (2010, June 24). Vystuplenie mitropolita Volokolamskogo Ilariona na prezentatsii pol’skogo izdaniya knigi Svyatejshego Patriarkha Moskovskogo i Vseya Rusi Kirilla ‘Svoboda i otvestvennost’: v poiskakh garmonii. Prava cheloveka i dostoinstvo lichnosti’. http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1186072.html. Accessed 1 Oct 2018. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov. (2019, March 27). V Ukrainskoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi rasskazali o sakhvatakh khramov i narusheniyakh prav veruyushchikh. https://mospat.ru/ ru/2019/03/27/news172044. Accessed 10 May 2019. Shterin, M. S., & Richardson, J. T. (1998). Local laws restricting religion in Russia: Precursors of Russia’s new national law. Journal of Church and State, 40(2), 319–341. Stoeckl, K. (2014). The Russian Orthodox Church and human rights. London: Routledge. Stoeckl, K. (2016). The Russian Orthodox Church as moral norm entrepreneur. Religion, State & Society, 44(2), 131–151. Ventura, M. (2011, March 19). La tradizione come diritto. Corriere della Sera, 23. VNRS. (2006). World Russian People’s council: Declaration on human rights and dignity. Europaica Bulletin, 93(14). http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/93.aspx#1 (last accessed 14.04.2008). Webster, A. F. C. (1993). The price of prophecy. Orthodox Churches on peace, freedom, and security. Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center.

[email protected] 76 K. Stoeckl

Kristina Stoeckl is Professor of Sociology at the University of Innsbruck, where she teaches Political Sociology and Sociology of Religion. Her main fields of research are politics and religion, public religions, and Russia and Russian Orthodox Christianity. From 2016 until 2021, she conducts an ERC Starting Grant-funded research project on the role of Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church in transnational moral conservative alliances (‘Postsecular Conflicts Project’). She has published (2014) The Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights and co-edited, with Ingeborg Gabriel and Aristotle Papanikolaou, (2017) Political Theologies in Orthodox Christianity.

[email protected] The Great and Holy Council and the Orthodox Churches in the Public Sphere

Emmanuel Clapsis

Abstract This paper explores how the Orthodox churches may be actively present in the public sphere of a plural society. It argues – based on the explicit desire of the Orthodox Church in the Great and Holy Council of Crete (2016) – that the presence of the Orthodox Church in the public sphere must be theologically informed and at the same time sensitive to the social realities of liberal democratic societies. The Orthodox churches must take into account the fact that in the public sphere, all communities in their differences are claiming the right to be recognized in their particularity, to be respected, and to have the right to be active participants in public deliberations on matters that regulate their shared life. The Orthodox churches direly need to acquire attitudes and conversational skills that allow them to respect, converse, and collaborate with those who do not share their worldview. Insights from the writings of the political philosophies of John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Charles Taylor may provide helpful guidance on these matters. At the same time, the paper argues that the Orthodox churches must go beyond their expressed desires to be actively present in the public sphere of liberal democratic states and begin to identify those aspects of their tradition that impair their robust presence and performance in modern societies.

Keywords Orthodoxy · Political theology · The Great and Holy Council · Public sphere · Interfaith dialogue · Pluralism

Introduction

The Orthodox churches in the Great and Holy Council (2017) accepted in principle the plural and inclusive nature of modern democratic states. They outrightly affirmed that “every human being regardless of skin color, religion, race, sex, ethnicity, and

E. Clapsis (*) Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology, Brookline, MA, USA e-mail: [email protected]

[email protected] 78 E. Clapsis language, is created in the image and likeness of God and enjoys equal rights in society.”1 Thus, they rejected discrimination for any of these reasons as contrary to the inherent dignity that God has bestowed to all people. They have chosen to respect the inherent pluralism of modern societies and recognize their cultural and religious particularity. According to the Council, it is possible for multiple cultural and religious communities through dialogue to converge in their human aspirations to peaceful coexistence in an inclusive and just world. This paper argues that John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Charles Taylor, three of the most important political philosophers, provide the moral values and principles that religious communities need to embrace for a meaningful and constructive presence in the public sphere of liberal democratic states. It then proceeds, based on the statement “The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World,” to identify how the participation of the Orthodox churches in public deliberations may be envisioned. In practical terms, it explores the ways Orthodox churches have to reform their understanding of their mission in the world, so they may not be a source of conflict but a positive contributor in building a culture of peace and justice. In predominantly Orthodox countries, religious and cultural minorities have been suppressed. For instance, based on a 2012 study of violations of religious freedom found by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 79% of these were against 11 majority Orthodox states, while 9% were against majority Catholic countries, 5% against majority Muslim countries, and none against Protestant countries. Though the Court’s judgments are not a reliable measure of the relationship of Orthodoxy to religious freedom, they do indicate a trend. Currently, the Orthodox churches are struggling to embrace pluralism without ceasing to be faithful to the basic tenets of their traditional beliefs and practices.2 The modernization of the Orthodox churches and reconfiguration in light of new social realities generate internal dissents and conflicts. There is an increasing polarization within the life of every Orthodox Church between the traditionalists and the reformists, between those who celebrate the critical integration of the modern culture into the Orthodox ethos and those who believe such a critical integration is an abomination, a betrayal of the Orthodox tradition. The modernization of religious communities either of the Orthodox tradition or any other is a highly contested process that generates different and perhaps irreconcilable conflicting understanding of its effects on the self-identity of these communities. This polarization will characterize the life of the Orthodox churches as they find their place in the life of the modern world. It is an epiphenomenon of the effects of modernity upon them. Nevertheless, the Orthodox churches at the highest authoritative level have jointly expressed in the Council their desire to accept the pluralistic nature of modern societies and to participate in public dialogues for the formation of the common good. Such an option is not for them a matter of political expediency or capitulation to modernism and secularity, but it reflects their theology and ethical beliefs that the

1 See: “The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World,” Article 5.2. 2 Fokas 2012.

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Great and Holy Council has identified in its statements. As the Orthodox churches reflect on how to deepen their transformative presence in the public sphere, this paper identifies some aspects of their theological and spiritual tradition that tend to weaken or to discourage their public presence in plural and inclusive society.

The Great and Holy Council and the Demands of Cultural Plurality

The Primates of Orthodox Churches after many years of preparation, studying, and contemplation decided in March 2014 to convene in 2016 the much anticipated and many years in planning Holy and Great Council of the universally recognized Orthodox Patriarchates and autocephalous Churches.3 Its purpose would be to address some pastoral and canonical challenges that churches are facing and to reach a common understanding of the churches’ presences and missions in today’s plural world. After reviewing and revising the previously prepared texts that the Council would address, they decided to hold the Council in Kolymbari in the Island of Crete, Greece. The Council received and deliberated these prepared statements and approved them with minor amendments. Also, it adopted a message addressed to the Orthodox people and all people of good will and issued an Encyclical along with the approval of texts on: • The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World; • The Orthodox Diaspora; • Autonomy and the Means by which it is Proclaimed; • The Sacrament of Marriage and Its Impediments; • The Importance of Fasting and Its Observance Today; • Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World. The Patriarchates of Antioch, Russia, as well as the Churches of Bulgaria and Georgia decided not to attend the Council. The Antiochian Church pulled out due to the dispute over the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of Qatar that is also claimed by the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. The Russian Orthodox Church pulled out because of her belief that the council was not truly “pan-orthodox” without the Antiochian, Bulgarian, and Georgian Churches. The Bulgarian and Georgian Orthodox Churches withdrew because of their disagreements with specific texts that they had already approved in their preparatory form. They claimed that they had insufficient time to

3 For the Official Documents of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church see its official site: https://www.holycouncil.org.Accessed6 December 2018. For the ongoing reception/discussion its decisions see: https://panorthodoxcemes.blogspot.com.Forthe long preparation of the Council and some initial assessment of its significance see: Papandreou (1972), Harakas (1978), Viscuso (2006), Meimaris (2013), Archimandrite Vasileios (2016), Chryssavgis (2016), Symeonides (2016a, b), Bishop Maxim of Western America (2016), Archbishop Job (Getcha) of Telmessos (2017), Gallaher (2017) and Ladouceur (2016).

[email protected] 80 E. Clapsis express their objections in the preparatory committees, and they refused to attend the Council where they could share their views with the other churches. In any case, their refusal in the last minute to participate in the Council may have other reasons from the ones that they stated. The Orthodox churches currently are in the process of assessing and receiving the statements of the Holy and Great Council. Some have enthusiastically embraced the outcomes of the Council as binding for all Orthodox churches and faithful,4 while others believe that the statements because of their brevity did not go far enough in articulating how the Orthodox churches understand their mission in the world and her relation to the modern world. Still, others perceive the work of the Council as a capitulation to modernity and ecumenism, a betrayal of the Orthodox faith. In this context, it is important to note how the Patriarchates of Antioch, Russia, and the Churches of Bulgaria and Russia have reacted to the work of the Council. The Patriarchate of Antioch viewed the Council as “a preliminary gathering on the way to a Pan-Orthodox Council,” and the documents that it issued were judged to be provisional and subject to further discussion.5 The Moscow Patriarchate also expressed the same views that the Holy and Great Council is indeed an important event in the history of the synodal process in the Orthodox Church, but it can’t be considered pan-orthodox, and consequently its decisions do not reflect a panorthodox consensus.6 Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew responded to adversarial reactions against the Council and its decisions of a few clergymen and theologians in Greece asking the Archbishop of Athens to admonish them. He was particularly annoyed not by their opposition to the Council but from the manner by which they were expressing their opposition and accusing those who participated in its proceedings as heretics.7 Despite the refusal of some Orthodox churches and clergymen to accept the panorthodox nature of the Great and Holy Council and its decisions perhaps for other reasons than the ones they publicly stated, it must be noted that the Orthodox churches for the first time after the passing of many centuries had the opportunity to meet in a Council and reflect on their presence in and their mission to the world. Since all the Orthodox churches had participated in the draft of the preparatory texts that the Council eventually adopted with some modifications, it is fair to assume that the decisions of the Holy and Great Council reflect the beliefs and the consciousness of all Orthodox churches on the matters that it addressed.

4 See: “Pan-Orthodox Council goes ahead without Russians; decisions ‘will be binding,’” Ecumenical News (June 17, 2016); “Church officials say Orthodox Council decisions will be binding,” National Catholic Reporter (June 23, 2016). 5 Statement of the Secretariat of the Holy Synod of Antioch, June 27, 2016, https://www.antioch- patriarchate.org/en/page/1448. Accessed 4 December 2018. 6 Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church express its position on the Council held in Crete in https://mospat.ru/en/2016/07/16/news133743. Accessed 4 December 2018. 7 “Admonishment is not the same as excommunication,” in http://myocn.net/admonishment-is-not- the-same-as-excommunication. Accessed 6 December 2018.

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This assumption, however, does not preclude or ignore the fact that in the process of reception of these decisions, local Orthodox churches embedded in diverse socio-cultural and political contexts will interpret them in diverse ways. What is uniquely important with this Council is the fact that the Orthodox churches jointly expressed most authoritatively their understanding of the churches’ mission to and presence in the world along with addressing some other pastoral and canonical issues. The Orthodox churches in the Great and Holy Council of Crete (June 2016) claimed the right to proclaim their faith in the “public sphere” through dialogue.8 They stated that the “identity and culture of different peoples”9 should be respected, and an “honest interfaith dialogue”10 could contribute to the development of mutual trust, reconciliation, and peace among various nations and religions. They also noted that it is their responsibility to encourage in a plural society: “all that which genuinely serves the cause of peace and paves the way to justice, fraternity, true freedom, and mutual love among all children of one heavenly Father as well as between all peoples who make up the one human family.”11 Accepting religious, philosophical, and cultural differences in a plural society presupposes the recognition of the freedom of all human beings to choose their pattern of life and cultural practices that shape their identity under the presupposition that their liberty does not impede the freedom of religious and cultural others. Such an inclusive and tolerant pluralism is heralded by some as the dawn of a new civilization. They assumed that all cultures and religions that have provided a horizon of meaning for large numbers of human beings of diverse characters and tempera- ments over an extended period have something that deserves admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied by much that they may abhor and reject. This assumption enables them to hear one another, to be receptive of each other’s cultural beliefs and practices, and to be cognizant of how their contexts and interests have shaped their views of other religious traditions, cultures, and ethnic traditions. For others, however, such cultural and religious accommodation and acceptance of the others is perceived as a threat to their socioeconomic interests, values, and moral beliefs. In particular, they fear the relativization of their worldview, social fragmentation, and

8 The explicit reference to the modernist notion of “public sphere” and the possibly purposeful avoidance of the Council to discuss Church and State relationships signify in my judgment the intention of the Church to distance Herself from the state and be placed in the civil society. This is a distinct ‘modern’ way of expressing and communicating the Christian gospel to the world compared of how the Church had communicated her beliefs and practices to believers in their traditional cultures. This difference is shaped by the nature of the “public sphere,” its assumptions, and the conditions or rules of dialogue that every interlocutor must adopt for civil and meaningful communication in the public sphere. See: Article 5.3. https://www.holycouncil.org/-/mission- orthodox-church-todays-world. Accessed 6 December 2018. 9 Ibid. Preamble. 10 See: Article 6.17. https://www.holycouncil.org/-/encyclical-holy-council. Accessed 6 December 2018. 11 See: Article 3.5. https://www.holycouncil.org/-/mission-orthodox-church-todays-world. Accessed 6 December 2018.

[email protected] 82 E. Clapsis weakening or even loss of their religious and cultural identity. The Holy and Great Council repudiated such fears and suspicions that generate violence against religious, cultural, and ethnic others. It considered the aggression of religious fanat- icism to be alien to Orthodoxy. The involvement of the Orthodox churches in the political, cultural, and economic life of the world, according to the Holy and Great Council, should primarily rely on their theological and spiritual resources and not be simply a matter of political expediency or an uncritical surrender to the forces of modernity. Such an involvement, however, challenges the Orthodox churches to reflect on how receptive and tolerant they can be of insights and claims that other interlocutors bring to the public space and possibly develop ways of collaborating with them without compromising their essential beliefs and practices.12 The churches, despite their expressed desire in the Great and Holy Council, may have difficulty fully accepting the plural nature of modern societies if they fail to recognize their internal plurality and encourage the cultivation of dialogue at all levels of their lives. In some predominantly Orthodox countries, democratically-elected governments have begun to introduce legislation – despite the vocal opposition of the churches – that recognizes and grants due equal rights and privileges of citizenship to all religious and cultural minorities of their state. The legal recognition of the equal rights of minorities in predominantly Orthodox countries compels the Churches to undergo a process of adjustment, learning to recognize and respect the equal rights of these minorities as well as their constitutional entitlement to contribute their insights and experiences in the public life of their society. In such a state of affairs, dialogue has the potential to be an indispensable medium of communication that facilitates convergence on issues of shared life.

The Public Sphere and Religious Communities

Since the Orthodox Churches in the Great and Holy Council expressed the desire to be actively present in the public sphere, it is imperative to explore the nature of the public sphere. It is important for the scope of this paper to reflect on the presup- posed conditions that ensure that the presence of particular religious traditions in the public sphere has the potential to be not a source of conflict but a peaceful and just contributor to the formation of the common good. The notion of the “public sphere”13 refers to a social space – distinct from the state, the economy, and the family – in which people as citizens reasonably engage

12 For a theological discussion of the proper balance between commitment to one’s own faith while maintaining openness to the other. See: Moyaert (2012). 13 The origins, nature, and dynamics of the public sphere have been elucidated by Jürgen Habermas in his seminal book The Structural transformation of the public sphere (1980). For a critical appreciation of his philosophical reflection on the Public Sphere see: Crossley and Robers (2004) and Braidotti et al. (2014).

[email protected] The Great and Holy Council and the Orthodox Churches in the Public Sphere 83 each other in public deliberations about the common good. It consists of a complex network of groups rather than one huge, undifferentiated deliberative body.14 It aspires to be an open space in which all reasonable arguments can be expressed and heard, a realm in which reasons that can form the common good are forwarded and debated, accepted or rejected. Citizens in it exchange opinions regarding public affairs, discuss, deliberate, and eventually form public opinion. It is a vital sign of a truly inclusive democratic society, and its requisites are free flows of information, free expression, and open debate. Such social space, despite its vital importance for democracy, has never been entirely actualized in any democratic society. But without such a free and inclusive public sphere, citizens would not be able to assert any influence over political decisions and government officials could not be held accountable for their actions. Religion was initially unwelcomed in the public sphere because of fears that the absoluteness of its metaphysical claims could generate discord and violence. Citizens were free to believe and practice their faith in their private lives, but in the public sphere, where matters of shared importance for all citizens were discussed and decided, only reasonable arguments could be accepted. Today, however, because of changing social realities, the importance of religion in forming people’s personal and communal identities has led many political theorists and philosophers to reflect on how religious communities can actively participate in the public deliberations of liberal democratic states. They argue that finding ways to integrate religion in the public sphere is a vital challenge for participatory democracy, since religion does not generate only conflicts and fragmentation, but it also may contribute to a culture of care, human solidarity, justice, and peace. How can multiple religious communities with incommensurable worldviews participate in public deliberations on fundamental political, moral, and economic matters? John Rawls has argued that in plural liberal democratic societies, citizens may continue to live and affirm in their private lives the metaphysical grounds of their personal and communal identities, but in their contribution to the public deliberations must only rely on public reason and practice of civility. The use of natural reason in the public sphere, for him, is perhaps the only possible way to maintain human solidarity and social cohesion in a plural society that no longer depends on religious legitimacy. Thus, he argues that comprehensive doctrines of truth or right in the public sphere should be replaced with reasonable arguments “addressed to citizens as citizens”.15 Civility, on the other hand, obliges citizens to explain to one another how principles and policies that they advocate can be reasonably supported. In the public sphere of free democratic societies, citizens have the civic responsibil-

14 Democracy, in the words of Seyla Benhabib, privileges “a plurality of modes of association in which all affected can have the right to articulate their point of view. These can range from political parties to citizens’ initiatives, to social movements, to voluntary associations, to consciousness- raising groups, and the like. It is through the interlocking net of these multiple forms of associations, networks, and organizations that an anonymous ‘public conversation results (Benhabib 1966). 15 Rawls 1997: 766.

[email protected] 84 E. Clapsis ity to look for a way to reach a rationally motivated agreement. It is inevitable, however, that some disagreements may stubbornly persist, but their impact may not be as severe if the parties involved have tried to understand the perspectives of each other. They need to be willing to listen to others and be fair-minded in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made.16 The virtue of civility and the use of public reason, while they guarantee equal freedom for everybody, need to be coupled with freedom of religion. Freedom of religion is a basic right that free citizens accorded to each other. They have the right to practice their faith freely and at the same time refrain from unduly attacking one another. The state, in Rawls view, should operate with strict impartiality vis-à-vis religious communities. Here, Rawls offers a moral imperative, necessary for his understanding of how a liberal democratic state should relate to multiple, and in some instances, competing religious worldviews. In actuality, no state has strictly enforced moral principles in their policies. While the state guarantees all its citizens’ freedom of religion, religious communities, each from the perspective of their tradition, should accept not only the separation of religion and state but also the restrictive definition of the public use of reason along with the virtue of civility. Rawls, however, believed that this proviso should not be strictly enforced. In a later essay entitled “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” he seems to have revised his view that in the public sphere only arguments based on natural reason should be allowed. He argued that the idea of public reason should not apply to all political discussions but only on those issues discussed in the public political forum. In his view, the political forum is understood to be the space of the discourse of judges in the process of making their decisions, of government officials, and of candidates for public office, especially in their public oratory, party platforms, and political statements.17 The exclusive use of public reason in the public domain implies that religious communities should adopt a secularist public attitude, detaching their public contributions from the specificity of their religious claims and beliefs.18 Such an attitude raises difficulties for believers who cannot dissociate their religious worldview from their political choices without jeopardizing the integrity of their faith as it informs and guides the totality of their lives. But he rightly insisted that government and its agents should be neutral towards competing worldviews. The virtue of civility that all citizens must acquire in liberal democratic states implies that religious communities must communicate their ethical beliefs and moral practices in ways that others, who do not necessarily share their worldview and ethical discourse, recognize as important for their common life. Jürgen Habermas, while he affirms the basic views of John Rawls on public reason and civility, has recently argued that religious people in liberal democracies

16 Rawls 1993: 217. 17 Rawls 1999: 575. 18 Yet, reasonable religious or non-religious arguments may at any time be introduced in the public political deliberations under the provision that in due course proper political reasons are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are said to support.

[email protected] The Great and Holy Council and the Orthodox Churches in the Public Sphere 85 should have the freedom to communicate in the public sphere their political views based on religious principles and values that inspire their lives.19 He believed that the persistence and the vitality of religions, along with other philosophical, secular, or agnostic systems of belief, have the potential to enhance public life of a plural society not only from their perspectives but also from possible new insights that the dialogue with them brings to life. Thus, he argues that religious persons and communities must not be discouraged from expressing themselves politically based on their religious belief system, for it cannot be known, as he states, whether secular society would not otherwise cut itself off from key resources for the creation of meaning and identity. He believes that giving a hearing to public religious arguments can be done without abandoning the premise of the precedence of secular reason in public life. Citizens are free to communicate their political views and moral beliefs in the informal space of the public sphere based on their worldviews, ethical beliefs, and moral practices; however, in the formal public deliberations of political bodies that yield to collectively binding decisions only reasonable arguments with secular orientation should be accepted.20 Religious public arguments expressed in the informal public space, at some point, need to be subject to translation in a reasonable language so they can be understood and taken into consideration by those who do not share the same religious worldview and ethical practices. Without a successful translation, there is no prospect of the substantive content of religious voices being taken up in the agendas and negotiations within political bodies and the broader political process. The responsibility or moral obligation for the act of translation, for Habermas, is a shared responsibility for the religious and secular people alike. He argues that religious people are challenged to adapt to an increasingly secular environment, and the secular people are called to acknowledge the persisting vitality of religion and its possible political contributions in promoting human solidarity, compassion, peace, and justice.21 The appreciation of each other’s gifts in a post-secular society requires religious and secular people to subscribe to a learning process that allows them to revisit and revise their respective systems of belief and frames of reasoning in order to recognize otherness as an indispensable constitutive element of their identity in a plural democratic society. His proposal, while it remains faithful to the liberal goal that all legally enforceable and publicly sanctioned decisions should be formulated and justified in a universally accessible reasonable language, does not restrict the polyphonic diversity of public voices at its very source.22 Charles Taylor, the distinguished Canadian philosopher, critiques as presumptu- ous the privileged operation of public reason in a democratic state because it ignores the fact that there is not such a set of timeless principles that can be determined by

19 See: Jürgen Habermas (2004, 2006, 2011). 20 Habermas 2011: 25. 21 Habermas 2011: 26. 22 Habermas 2011: 26.

[email protected] 86 E. Clapsis pure reason alone. He believes that the political principle of public reason and the strict separation of the state from religion is primarily of Western origins and cannot be easily exported and applied to other continents and cultures. He suggests that in a highly complex, ever-changing, and increasingly pluralistic society, there is a need to build political unity by using different kinds of “agreed general principles” but not independently of the existing specific historical realities.23 He differentiates the aims of liberal democracy from their institutional expressions and suggests adherence to the aims rather than its institutional expressions. The basis of political unity in today’s pluralistic society, in his view, must have four important pillars. These are: first, freedom of religion, including freedom not to believe; second, equality of all people regardless of their religious or ideological belief or nonbelief; third, giving to all citizens a hearing in the ongoing process of determining what the society is about (its political identity) and how it is going to realize its goals (the exact regime of rights and privileges); and finally, trying as much as possible to maintain relations of harmony and comity between the supporters of different religions and other systems of belief.24 Once these aims are widely accepted and constitutionally embodied in a liberal democratic state, there is no reason to single out religion as a special concern or to see it as a threat to liberal democracy.25 He discerns a confusion of the aims of a secular state with its operational modes, which has led some to grant the operational modes an equivalent or greater status than that of the aims.26 Based on the primacy of the aims over the institutional expressions, he argues that it is possible to develop new institutional expressions (modes of operation) of liberal democracy in new historical contexts provided that one develops these by starting from the goals (aims) and then proceeding to develop the detailed arrangements for their implementation. This approach provides freedom to think creatively and imaginatively about possible new modes and arrangements by which liberal democracies realize their basic aims in different cultural settings and contexts. Once the institutional arrangements by which a secular regime achieves its goals are understood to be instrumental and historically conditioned, then they can be viewed as resilient, cognizant of contextual factors, and adaptive to new realities that may not be necessarily adversarial to religious beliefs and practices.27 Thus, Taylor suggests that citizens in a democratic state should search for ways

23 Taylor 2011: 35. 24 Taylor 2011: 35. 25 Taylor 2011: 34–35. 26 Taylor noted: “we think that secularism (or laicité) has to do with the relation of the state and religion; whereas in fact it has to do with the (correct) response of the democratic state to diversity…Indeed, the point of state neutrality is precisely to avoid favoring or disfavoring not just religious positions but any basic position, religious or nonreligious” (Taylor 2011: 37). 27 Recently in an open discussion about the separation of Church and State, sponsored by the Political party Potami, Professor of Constitutional law at the University of Athens Nikos Alivizatos and the former minister of Justice Michalis Stathopoulos argued that the debate about the separation of Church and State should be abandoned because it is ideologically loaded and divisive, instead reforms should be instituted that further distance the Church and the State. http://topotami. gr/prepi-na-milame-gia-chorismo-ekklisias-kratous-i-apantisi-tou-n-alivizatou/. Accessed 10 January 2019.

[email protected] The Great and Holy Council and the Orthodox Churches in the Public Sphere 87 to maximize the norms of liberal democracy without ignoring contextual realities, instead of being fixated with “mantra-type formulae like ‘separation of church and state’ or the necessity of removing religion from public space.” He suggests that the aims of liberal democracy that include the political principles of human rights, equality, the rule of law, and democracy capture the imagination of “people of very different basic outlook[s]” who concur on the principles but differ on the deeper reasons for upholding these political principles.28 The vitality and the inclusiveness of democracy, Taylor has argued, depends more on the opportunities and the willingness of citizens to construct a democratic life together than on any institutional arrangements or even an a priori agreement on all the reasons to engage in joint pursuits. Their joint deliberations become the basis of their communal life that allows citizens to listen, respect, and try to understand the views of all citizens in developing inclusive norms of their common life in free and inclusive democratic society. Thus, the public sphere, for Charles Taylor, is understood to be not just a space of argumentation about the truth-value of proposi- tions but a realm of creativity and social imaginaries in which citizens give shared form to their lives together, a realm of exploration, experiment, and partial agreements. Citizens need to find ways to treat each other’s basic commitments with respect; fortunately, they are also likely to find considerable overlap in what they value. Jürgen Habermas, as well as Charles Taylor, have eloquently expressed the current need in liberal democratic societies to seek sources of meaning and value which can broaden and enhance the quality and the inclusiveness of public deliberations. What are the visions of humanity, the sources of life, which can inspire social discourse to become a genuine forum of civil respect that leads to a community of justice and generosity – even of willingness to sacrifice interests for the sake of the need of others? To raise this question is to consider a fundamental aspect of the relationship between religion and society: the relationship between visions of meaning, value, and purpose, and the procedures of argument and debate that give concrete expression to the rights of members of modern societies.

The Participation of the Orthodox Church in Public Deliberations

Should the Orthodox churches participate in public debates on fundamental questions of ethical living by drawing arguments from their historical, theological, and ethical tradition? Or should they rely on reasonable public arguments that reflect the currently prevailing discourse in their respective public sphere? An appeal to shared public arguments has the strength of communicability, but it risks reducing Orthodox witness to statements of generalities. In appealing to what is common and socially

28 Taylor 2011: 37.

[email protected] 88 E. Clapsis acceptable, the Orthodox churches may be sacrificing what is distinctive to their own identity. By speaking directly from their tradition, they may succeed only in alienating other members of society, who hear no more than a religious group recounting special claims to divine authority and privileged ethical guidance, rather than a community which genuinely seeks to contribute to a common human task.29 It is crucial for the Orthodox churches to ground their social and cultural witness on the particularity of the Christian story or else they are at risk of abandoning their faith claims and becoming an apologist of a particular culture or an agent of social change with some religious underpinnings.30 The challenge that the Orthodox churches are facing is not whether they should be actively present in the public sphere but how they should interact and collaborate with others and at the same time remain faithful to their tradition in light of the increasing and irreversible plurality of modern societies. Based on Jürgen Habermas’ and Charles Taylor’s standpoints, the Orthodox churches in modern societies should not only recognize their inherent pluralism but they should also accept their differentiation into multiple subsystems (state, science, economy) that have their respective functional rationalities independent of any ecclesiastical sanction or metaphysical grounding as was the case in traditional societies. The Church, faithful to her worldview and moral outlook, may critique the performance of each of these subsystems on issues of equitable distribution of power and resources, adherence to human rights, as well as their contributions to an inclusive culture of justice and peace. The Orthodox churches in modern societies have the potential, according to Jürgen Habermas´ outlook, to become a source of inspiration and empowerment to movements of social-political transformation by offering a unique narrative that grants ultimate meaning to people’s lives, an altruistic concern and love for the others, a compensation for unavailable rewards, and transformative power that empow- ers their lives. Once they have accepted the intrinsic pluralism of modern societies and their internal differentiation in multiple subsystems, they may critique the modern assumption that the subsystems (the state, the academy, and the market economy) can operate in the modern world without any regard for values, moral norms, or human considerations. The impact of such ecclesial intervention into public life should not be measured by its success in imposing the Church’s universal claims or agenda upon the other. Instead it should be assessed based on whether their intervention provides an opportunity to question the normativity of modern facticity and thus contribute to the sustenance of civil life, the protection of rights, and the moral responsibility that people have for one another. However, people and communities of different worldviews should have the freedom in the public sphere to critique the performance of the churches in history assessing how they have embodied through

29 Gascoigne 2001: 2. 30 See: Stoeckl, Gabriel, & Papanikolaou (2017); Athanasopoulou-Kypriou (2015); Clapsis (2017).

[email protected] The Great and Holy Council and the Orthodox Churches in the Public Sphere 89 actions their religious claims about humanity and the world.31 In the Habermas/ Taylor view, religious and secular communities in dialogical engagement in the public sphere have opportunities to persuade others about the rightness of their beliefs; enhance their moral outlook as a result of their dialogue; or acknowledge in some instances insurmountable differences among them while committing themselves to peaceful coexistence.

Theology for Social Involvement

The Holy and Great Council (2016) identified, in the broadest possible terms, those elements of the Orthodox tradition and of liturgical practices that might be the basis for the Church’s social involvement and public witness.32 It has provided signs that differentiate, at least at the level of origins and intention, the participation of the Orthodox Church in the public sphere from other cultural and secular agencies. The theological grounds for the involvement of the churches in the life of the world are derived from the vision of how the world should be and it is destined to be. This vision is derived from the understanding of God’s kindom as it is actualized in the celebration of the Eucharist, the sign and image of God’s kingdom in history. In the Eucharist, the Orthodox churches believe that humanity’s future is revealed and experienced as life in unity with Christ, a foretaste of a new way of being and relating without any regard to race, sex, age, social, or any other condition.33 This unity, beyond its sacramental realization in the Eucharist, can be partially experienced in history in multiple patterns and degrees since its plenitude is primarily an act of God to be fully realized in the eschaton. The eschatological orientation of the Christian faith does not permit the identification of the Church with any human ideology, culture, or economic system. Its vocation is to invite all in a never-ending process of personal and social transformation, moving the world as much as possible from a human perspective closer to God and contributing to a pattern of life that reflects the new life that Christ and the Holy Spirit has granted to the world. What the Church becomes in the Eucharist is what it offers to the world as the good news (Ευαγγέλιον) of a new life. What the Church offers to the world is primarily an offering of love that generates hope that evil does not and should not determine the future, since God is the future of the world.34 While the Eucharist may inspire and guide the involvement of the Orthodox churches in the world, it is important to reflect on how it is possible to communicate

31 Clapsis 2000a, b. 32 The public theology of the Orthodox Church, as it has been enunciated in the document The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World and The Encyclical of the Holy and Great Council depends on the doctrinal tradition of the Church, her anthropology, the experiences of the saints and her liturgical life, namely the Eucharist. 33 Gal 3:28; cf. Col 3:11. 34 The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World, Preamble.

[email protected] 90 E. Clapsis their eucharistic ethos in the public sphere. In the public sphere along with the presence of the churches other religious, secular and agnostic communities and individuals desire to be recognized and to contribute to the public conversation their insights towards the formation of the common good. In a pluralistic society, the common good is built on affirmations of shared political values, rather than of the sacred texts and teachings of any particular religious or secular tradition. In such a context, the churches may use their language of faith with an emphasis on its hermeneutical potential to illuminate and interpret shared meanings, rather than to bear witness to their sovereign truth. An insistence on particular religious doctrine may be heard simply as an appeal to a particular group identity, rather than as an invita- tion to reflect on our common situation. The Church should instead evoke the share- able human experience that allows the citizens of democratic societies to reflect on their common human situation. Τhe promotion of human rights plays a key role in the Church’s relationship to the contemporary world (Stoeckl 2014) and thereby in the process of shaping a renewed sociocultural identity. This form of identity does not have demarcation from antagonistic ideological forces or other Christian communities as a constitutive feature, and for this reason, it is capable of initiating a wide range of alliances in promoting justice and peace for all. Refraining from religious language in circumstances where it may alienate other citizens of goodwill is a form of respect, recognizing that Christian witness must often take the form of anonymity precisely for the sake of respecting the presence of Christ in our neighbor. This kind of dialogical participation of the Orthodox churches in the public sphere that the Holy and Great Council seems to encourage is highly contentious within the internal life of different local Orthodox churches. While some enthusiastically endorse the openness of the Church to modernity and its dialogue with different religious and secular communities and individuals, others consider this openness as a surrender to secularism that eventually dilutes the ethos of the church. Thus, there is emerging tension within the life of the Churches between those who embrace this dialogical approach to modernity and those who reject it as they strive to be faithful to the Orthodox faith.35 Both sides are using derogatory names (“liberal,” “ecumenical,” “secular,” “betrayers of the faith,” or “zealots,” “fundamentalist,” “close-minded”) for each other at the expense of the Church’s unity. The cultivation of an intra-ecclesia culture of dialogue perhaps could contribute to maintaining the internal unity of the churches in the midst of disagreements. The Holy and Great Council through its text on The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World attempted to draw its ethical implications linking them with human dignity, rights, equality, peace, justice, and coexistence, while it

35 See: Hovorum (2016), Mitrofanova (2014), Ventis (2018), Thermos (2018) and Hieromonk Gabriel (2018). Orthodox theologians recently have met at an International Conference sponsored by the Volos Academy for Theological Studies to discuss Orthodoxy and Fundamentalism. The conference was held on May 10–12, 2018 in Belgrade, Serbia.

[email protected] The Great and Holy Council and the Orthodox Churches in the Public Sphere 91 acknowledged the normative role that the liturgy plays in constituting the Church.36 Thus, it invited her members to be actively involved in efforts to ameliorate human poverty, discrimination, injustice, violence, and oppression. It endorsed human rights and opposed all forms of discrimination that assault human dignity.37 The Orthodox churches affirmed in the Great and Holy Council that every human being, regardless of skin color, religion, race, sex, ethnicity, and language is created in the image and likeness of God and enjoys equal rights in society. It also stated that the dignity of humanity is inconceivable apart from freedom, “one of God’s greatest gifts to the human being.”38 Freedom differentiates humanity from the rest of God’s creation and is constitutive of personal, relational existence. The exercise of freedom requires prudence and a sense of responsibility for the well-being of all human beings as well as of the natural world. Relating freedom with human rights and dignity leads to the denunciation of all forms of violence against nature and humanity. The Orthodox churches in all situations and times should proclaim through words and deeds the love of God for all human beings. Thus, they “cannot remain indifferent to the problems of humanity.” They are concerned about the suffering of “all people who in various parts of the world are deprived of the benefits of peace and Justice.”39 Their participation in joint efforts “to confront destitution and social injustice” is an expression of faith and service to Christ who has identified Himself with every person and especially with those in need.40 To be a disciple of Christ, according to St. Basil the Great, one needs to love all people and live in peace with them as much as possible.41 In his words, “nothing is so characteristic of a Christian as to be a peacemaker.”42 To be a peacemaker is an attitude of life that orients the kind of relationships that you develop in the world, especially in situations of potential or actual conflict. It is the vocation of the Church not only to pray for justice and peace but also to support “all initiatives and efforts to prevent or avert it (war and violence) through dialogue and every other viable means.”43

36 The Orthodox Church in her ecumenical engagement has been criticized that her liturgical orientation is susceptible to the danger of leading to ecclesiolatry, limiting God’s presence and operation only within the canonical boundaries of the Church and to social indifferentism. In response to such criticism, Orthodox theologians have developed the notion of “liturgy after Liturgy” wishing to link the liturgy with ethical actions in history. See: Bria (1996). 37 Human rights are the appropriate framework for the interaction between diverse cultures and religions in modern plural society. See: Johannes A. van de Ven (2006: 429). 38 The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World, Article 2.1. 39 The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World, Article 3.5. 40 Ibid., Article 5.1. 41 Epistle 203, 2. PG 32, 737B. 42 Epistle 114, PG 32, 528B. 43 The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World, Article 4.2.

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Impediments to a Robust Orthodox Witness in the Public Sphere

The Holy and Great Council has provided ample expressions of those elements of the Orthodox tradition that may contribute to human transformation and may lead Orthodox people and others to a common quest for advancing a culture of justice, peace, and equality. While most of the Orthodox people and local churches formally accept the nobility of their spiritual and theological culture, they, for a variety of reasons, do not always observe it or selectively choose to emphasize some elements of this culture depending on their socioeconomic conditions, their self-interests, and sensibilities. Thus, while they accept in principle the Orthodox spiritual culture, their material practices do not reflect their spiritual worldview and moral outlook most of the time. Thus, the witness of the Orthodox churches in the modern world, as it is envisioned by the Council, is at risk to be reduced just to a mere wish for an ideal future, an abstract vision of a new world to be realized only by God without any human input and collaboration. The participation of the Orthodox churches in God’s transformative mission depends on whether the Christian gospel is directly related to the complexities and challenges of the increasingly pluralistic global modern world. Thus, their understanding of their presence in and witness to the modern world requires the contextualization of ethical principles and moral beliefs. This critical appropriation of the Christian faith in concrete situations of life could contribute to a better understanding of how the Orthodox faith has been embodied, challenged, and possibly modified by the impact of the social, cultural, and economic realities in which local Orthodox churches find themselves. The churches would be able to discern those social, cultural, and epistemic impediments that compromise their transformative contributions in the public sphere. Based on this awareness, they could devise effective pastoral strategies that take seriously not only the “existential” challenges of the modern world but also the emerging socioeconomic and cultural realities and challenges. The Orthodox churches, in today’s plural and democratic societies, are not insular social agents that can influence their social and cultural space and not be influenced by it. The churches and their members play a role in society: they produce, consume, raise, and educate children, and engage in a wide range of leisure, cultural, and other pursuits. Most importantly, they relate in one way or another to the political and economic norms and policies that shape the structure and distribution of authority, power, status, and wealth locally, nationally, and internationally. Are Orthodox people, whether as persons or communities, able to influence such norms, policies, and structures in ways that privilege the dignity of the human person, the satisfaction of basic human needs, and the peaceful coexistence with people of different worldviews? It is fair to say that, whereas theologians, seers, and practitioners have contributed useful theological and spiritual insights to both the diagnosis and the treatment of the postmodern condition, most of the local Orthodox churches have found it exceedingly difficult to devise authentic yet creative responses. Multiple impediments, some located outside and others within the Church’s domain,

[email protected] The Great and Holy Council and the Orthodox Churches in the Public Sphere 93 explain the limited success of their inspired endeavors. Perhaps the single most powerful constraint bearing upon the religious ethic is the state itself. As a general proposition, Orthodox churches are unwilling or unable to address the shortcomings of the modern state, to construct credible responses to the abuse or misuse of power, and to integrate ethical principles into decision-making processes and institutions. In an attempt to address this matter, we must take notice how in the history of the Orthodoxy, the relation of the Church to the state was and is understood. In the past, the Church for a variety of reasons – not always in agreement with the Christian gospel – favored the “fusion of religion and state,” but in recent times states have opted to be separated from the churches.44 The concept of the separation of Church and state is often interpreted to mean that God and politics do not mix, that religion is fundamentally a private matter, and hence that personal spirituality cannot or should not inform one’s role in the public sphere. This principle limits religion’s capacity to inform and influence collective decisions. On the other hand, the other approach of the fusion of Church and state is equally prejudicial. Whenever the Church and the state become inseparable, the Church loses the capacity to evaluate the ethical propriety of state actions and institutional practices. Paradoxically, both ideological premises have the same practical effect: both clip the wings of the Church’s imagination and substitute isolationism in one case and a constricting pragmatism in the other. The Church is more likely to uphold ethical standards if it intimately engages in the public sphere, contributing to the deliberations and decisions that vitally affect the human future, yet remaining faithful to theological and spiritual tradition. While she always retains – in fidelity to God’s kingdom – a critical distance from political ideologies and actions, she must never remain aloof from those whose experiences of injustice and oppression inspire them to struggle for justice and peace by advancing the dignity of all human beings, rights, and freedom. The Church, in the words of Michael Walzer, should act in the public life of modern society as a “connected critic”.45 As a connected critic, the Church deeply cares about the values inherent in any political project, and her critique serves to call a community back to its better nature.46 At the same time, she participates in public deliberations and efforts to lessen the injustice, oppression, violence, and poverty in the local, regional, and global living space. Are the Orthodox churches capable of developing a discourse and practice that meets the highly complex, interpenetrating, ever-changing challenges of the modern global world? The Orthodox churches, as well as other religious communities in general, lack the deeper analytical frame of reference needed to make sense of these global developments and offer useful guidance as to the appropriate responses. As a general proposition, they remain strangely insular despite their universalist ethic.

44 Fokas 2014. 45 Walzer 1987: 39. 46 “Because people of faith share the fundamental values of democratic societies, they remain connected to public life even as they engage in criticism; because their commitment to democracy remains penultimate, however, they can appeal to transcendent ideas to critique current practice and to elevate their understanding of democratic values themselves” (Thiemann 2000: 85).

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They are unable or incapable of developing a coherent response to the new challenges implicit in notions of global governance and global citizenship. They interact with each other within the parameters of a highly complex, interdependent, and plural world that raises challenges that only regional and global governance can address. The World Council of Churches – as a global ecclesial agency of more than 350 Anglican, Eastern and Oriental Orthodox, Old Catholic, Protestant, independent, and united churches and communities from 140 countries – provides opportunities for the Orthodox churches, other Christian churches, and communities of living faiths to engage in dialogue with each other and jointly study all the facets of the emerging highly complex global world.47 The aim of such dialogue and delib- eration is not simply to understand but also to initiate joint actions for social transformation. The Orthodox churches in joint deliberations with other Christian churches and religious communities could reach an understanding of the critical role of the market in modern societies, the logic, and far-reaching social consequences of the unfettered globalization of market relations. Such a consensual understanding could provide principles that might form the basis of an alternative to the prevailing cultural and political ethos. The credibility of the Church’s advocacy for human rights and dignity, for justice and peace, and democratic governance, however, is seriously threatened by the tendency of the Church’s hierarchy to intervene in the political sphere, solely or predominantly in defense of self-interested objectives or nationalistic aims. Here we have in mind the various causes that the Church’s hierarchs often espoused with predictable vociferousness and, at times, intransigence. These cases generally fall into two categories: political pressure designed to protect and expand the physical infrastructure of religious establishments asking mostly for preferential treatment on matters of taxation and those that safeguard their authority and prestige in a given society; and advocacy of certain rules and regulations that form part of personal morality, with particular reference to sexual relations. In predominantly Orthodox countries, the hierarchy seeks to acquire or maintain privileged positions vis-à-vis minority faiths, with respect either to moral code or protection of physical assets, in particular access to public funds whether through outright grants, funding of religious, educational, and other institutions, or tax exemptions. The net effect of such narrowly based advocacy is to blunt religion’s capacity to be an effective voice on behalf of the “other” and in defense of religious and cultural pluralism. More importantly, it tarnishes the churches image and so feeds a widespread perception that religious activism is no less self-interested or more far-sighted than other self- seeking pressure groups. Another factor that contributes to the Orthodox Church’s difficulties expressing the political implications of its spiritual and cultural tradition is the primacy that her liturgical life and practice have over particular interpretations of texts. A community

47 See: VanElderen (2001). The Roman Catholic Church for its ecclesiological reasons has opted not to become formally a member of the WCC but it actively involved in many of its projects. For joint reflections of the Christian churches on global issues see: Rogate (2013) and a background document, Alternative Globalization: Addressing Peoples and Earth (2005).

[email protected] The Great and Holy Council and the Orthodox Churches in the Public Sphere 95 may be rigorously attentive in its observance of religious obligations (fasting, prayers, pilgrimage, celebrations of religious events), but such observance may not in practice be well attuned to the imperatives of justice, peace, and advocacy for human rights, freedom, and dignity for humanity. John Zizioulas suggests that Eastern Christianity in her tradition is primarily shaped by sacramental experience of living in the reality of God’s Kingdom as it is actualized in the celebration of the Eucharist. This emphasis in some instances undermines mission and involvement in history by generating a sense of liturgical wholeness without bothering to draw the social and ethical implications of the Liturgy. The Orthodox churches, Zizioulas points out, should “draw the ethical implications of the Eucharist and see it as a source of life in all respects and not simply as a cultic experience”.48 The prevailing hesychastic spiritual tradition in the Orthodox churches also contributes to their reluctance to be actively involved in movements of social, political, and economic transformation, despite their rhetoric. Hesychastic spirituality generally rejects the belief that Christian life in the modern world can be reduced to love and service to one’s fellow beings. It ascertains that loving God and developing an intimate living presence with Him through prayer and ascetical practices have primacy over the love of the neighbor. Love and service to humanity can be effective, both as a means of salvation and as a truly constructive expression of charity and compassion, only if they spring from a prior love of God. This in practical terms means that one may serve fellow humans by bringing to them first the love and knowledge of God. Hesychastic spirituality tilts to contemplation. “For it is only through the contemplative life in all its aspects – ascetic watchfulness, prayer, meditation, the whole uninterrupted practice of the presence of God to which the Philokalia is the guide – that humans can actualize in themselves the personal love and knowledge of God on which depend not only their own authentic existence as human beings but also their capacity to cooperate with God in fulfilling the inner- most purposes of creation”.49 A disjuncture between liturgical and spiritual practice and societal concerns, whether or not it is the result of a conscious retreat into personal piety, cannot but militate against constructive responses to the challenges posed by widening economic inequalities, political corruption, refugee flows, human rights violations, threats of war, or various forms of environmental degradation. The Orthodox churches may enhance their understanding of spiritual life by retrieving from their history how contemplation was intimately linked with serving the poor and the needy.50 The faithful in today’s world do not all subscribe to the same aspects of the Orthodox tradition. There is an internal differentiation within every Orthodox church. More often than not, the faithful are subdivided into distinct schools of thought, spiritual practices, or tendencies. They adhere to conflicting interpretations

48 Zizioulas 1986: 71. 49 Sherrard 1991: 428. 50 Holman 2001, 2010; Constantelos 1968.

[email protected] 96 E. Clapsis of the Orthodox faith, and they dispute who offers the most authoritative and binding interpretation of the Orthodox tradition and mitigates against common or coherent responses to major national or international crises.51 There is a need for the Orthodox churches to review critically how they transmit their faith and spiritual practices. They should also examine to what extent schools of theology, seminaries, monasteries, and religious education programs sensitize their faithful to issues of justice and peace. The churches should also review how these institutions, through their ethos, curriculum, and pedagogy, equip the faithful to have a living relationship with God and to love their neighbor, including all humans and most especially those in need, the poor, the oppressed, and the suffering ones.

References

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51 For instance, attitudes to peace and war in the Orthodox churches oscillate between an uncom- promising commitment to nonviolence at one end of the spectrum and a highly permissive reading of the Just War doctrine at the other end. See Alexander F. C. Webster “Justifiable was as “Lesser Good” in Eastern Orthodox Moral Tradition” (2003) and the consequent responses of Joseph Woodhill, Jim Forest, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Philip LeMasters, David Pratt, John Breck (2003: 59–109).

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Chryssavgis, J. (2016). Toward the Holy and Great Council: Retrieving a culture of conciliarity and communion. Faith Matters Series, no. 1. New York: Dept. of Inter-Orthodox, Ecumenical and Interfaith Relations, Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America. Clapsis, E. (2000a). Orthodoxy in conversation: Orthodox Ecumenical engagements. Geneva: World Council of Churches. Clapsis, E. (2000b). The Orthodox Church in a pluralistic world. In E. Clapsis (Ed.), Orthodoxy in conversation (pp. 125–150). Geneva: World Council of Churches. Clapsis, E. (2004). The Orthodox Churches in a pluralistic world. Geneva: World Council of Churches. Clapsis, E. (2007). Violence and Christian spirituality: An Ecumenical conversation. Geneva: World Council of Churches. Clapsis, E. (2017). An Orthodox encounter with liberal democracy. In G. E. Demakopoulos & A. Papanikolaou (Eds.), Christianity, democracy and the shadow of Constantine (pp. 111– 126). New York: Fordham University Press. Constantelos, D. J. (1968). Byzantine philanthropy and social welfare. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Crossley, N., & Robers, J. M. (2004). After Habermas: New perspectives on the public sphere. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. Fokas, E. (2012). Eastern Orthodoxy and ‘Western’ secularization in contemporary Europe (with special reference to the case of Greece). Religion, State and Society, 40(3/4), 395–414. Fokas, E. (2014). Pluralism and religious freedom in majority Orthodox contexts. Working Paper No 49. Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy/ELIAMEP. Forest, J. (2003). Justifiable war: Response #2. St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 47, 65–67. Gallaher, B. (2017). The Orthodox moment: The Holy and Great Council in Crete and Orthodoxy’s encounter with the West: On learning to love the Church. Sobornost, 39(2), 26–71. Gascoigne, R. (2001). The Public forum and Christian ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Habermas, J. (2004). Religious tolerance – The pacemaker for cultural rights. Philosophy, 79, 5–18. Habermas, J. (2006). Religion in the public space. European Journal of Philosophy, 14, 1), 1–1),25. Habermas, J. (2011). “The Political”: The rational meaning of a questionable inheritance of political theology. In E. Mendieta & J. Van Antewerpen (Eds.), The power of religion in the public sphere: Butler, J., Habermas, J., Taylor, Ch., & C. West (pp. 15–33). New York: Columbia University Press. Harakas, S. S. (1978). Something is stirring in World Orthodoxy: An introduction to the forthcoming Great and Holy Council of the Orthodox Church. Minneapolis: Light and Life Pub. Co. Hieromonk Gabriel. (2018). On allegations of Orthodox fundamentalism. Remembering Sion: https://www.rememberingsion.com/2018/07/16/allegations-orthodox-fundamentalism-holy- fathers-holy-tradition. Accessed 12 Dec 2018. Holman, S. R. (2001). The hungry are dying: Beggars and bishops in Roman Cappadocia. New York: Oxford University Press. Holman, S. R. (2010). God knows there’s need: Christian responses to poverty. New York: Oxford University Press. Hovorum, C. (2016). Orthodox fundamentalism: From religion to politics. The Wheel, 4(Winter), 54–60. Hovorum, C. (2018). Political Orthodoxies: The unorthodoxies of the Church coerced. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Kalaitzidis, P. (2012). Orthodoxy and political theology. Geneva: World Council of Churches. Ladouceur, P. (2016). The Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church (June 2016). Oecuménism/Ecumenism (Montreal), 51(198/199), 18–39. Meimaris, T. A. (2013). The Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church & the Ecumenical movement. Thessaloniki: Ant. Stamoulis Publications.

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Miller, C., & O’Mahoney, A. (2010). Orthodox churches in contemporary contexts. International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 2/3(10), 192–210. Mishana, R. R., & Peralta, A. (2013). Economy of life: Linking poverty, wealth and ecology. Geneva: World Council of Churches Publications. Mitrofanova, A. V. (2014). Orthodox fundamentalism: Intersection of modernity, postomodernity, and tradition. In K. Tolstaya (Ed.), Orthodox paradoxes, heterogeneities and complexities in contemporary Orthodoxy (pp. 91–105). Boston: Brill. Moyaert, M. (2012). Recent developments in the theology of interreligious dialogue: From soterio- logical openness to hermeneutical openness. Modern Theology, 28(1), 25–52. Papandreou, D. (Ed.). (1972). Towards the Great Council. Introductory reports of the Interorthodox Commission in preparation for the next Great and Holy Council of the Orthodox Church. London: SPCK. Papanikolaou, A. (2012). The mystical as political. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Popkova, I. (2009). Contentious conversations: Framing the ‘fundamentals of the Orthodox culture’ in Russia. Religion, State and Society, 17(3), 291–309. Pratt, D. (2003). Dual trajectories and divided rationales: A reply to Alexander Webster on Justifiable War. St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 47, 83–95. Rawls, J. (1993). Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Rawls, J. (1997). The idea of public reason revisited. Chicago Law Review, 64(3), 765–807. Rawls, J. (1999). The idea of public reason revisited. In Collected papers (p. 575). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rogate, R. M., & Peralta, A. (2013). Economy of life: Linking poverty, wealth and ecology. Geneva: World Council of Churches Publications. Schöpflin, G. (2001). Liberal pluralism and post-communism. In W. Kymlicka & M. Opalski (Eds.), Can liberal pluralism be exported? Western political theory and ethnic relations in Eastern Europe (pp. 109–125). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sherrard, P. (1991). The revival of hesychastic spirituality. In L. Dupré, D. E. Saliers, & J. Meyendorff (Eds.), Christian spirituality, post-reformation and modern (pp. 417–431). New York: Crossroad. Stoeckl, K. (2014). The Russia Orthodox Church and human rights. London: Routledge. Stoeckl, K., Gabriel, I., & Papanikolaou, A. (Eds.). (2017). Political theologies in Orthodox Christianity. New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark. Symeonides, N. (Ed.). (2016a). Toward the Holy and Great Council: Decisions and texts. (Faith Matters Series, no. 2). New York: Dept. of Inter-Orthodox, Ecumenical and Interfaith Relations, Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America. Symeonides, N. (Ed.). (2016b). Toward the Holy and Great Council: Theological commentaries (Faith Matters Series, no. 3). New York: Dept. of Inter-Orthodox, Ecumenical and Interfaith Relations, Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America. Taylor, C. (2011). Why we need a radical redefinition of secularism. In E. Mendieta & J. Van Antewerpen (Eds.), The power of religion in the public sphere: Butler, J., Habermas J., Taylor, Ch., & C. west (pp. 34–59). New York: Columbia University Press. Thermos, V. (2018). Fundamentalism: Theology in the service of psychosis. Public Orthodoxy, 30 May. https://publicorthodoxy.org/2018/05/30/fundamentalism-and-psychosis. Accessed 12 Dec 2018. Thiemann, R. F. (2000). Public religion: Bane or blessing for democracy? In N. L. Rosenblum (Ed.), Obligations of citizenship and demand of faith (pp. 73–89). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Van de Ven, J. A. (2006). A chapter in public theology from the perspective of human rights: Interreligious interaction and dialogue in an intercivilizational context. The Journal of Religion, 86(3), 412–441. VanElderen, M. (2001). Introducing the World Council of Churches. Geneva: WCC Publications. Ventis, H. (2018). Fundamentalism as “Orthodoxism.” Public Orthodoxy, 3 July. https://publicorthodoxy.org/2018/07/03/fundamentalism-as-orthodoxism. Accessed 12 Dec 2018.

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Emmanuel Clapsis is the Archbishop Iakovos Professor of Orthodox Theology at Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology specializing in Systematic Theology. He has served as the Dean of Hellenic College and of Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology in Boston, MA. His main academic interests include ecclesiology, ecumenism, political and public theology, globalization and religion, interfaith dialogue, spiritual life, and prophetic witness. He has served as the Vice Moderator of the Faith and Order Commission of the World Council of Churches (1991–1998) and commissioner of Faith and Order Commission of the US National Council of Churches (1985–1991). He served as a member of the reference group that informed and accompanied the work of the World Council of Churches during the Decade to Overcome Violence (DOV: 2001–2010).

[email protected] Religion and Human Rights in Greece

Effie Fokas

Abstract The intersection between religion and human rights is particularly busy in the Greek context: Greece is host to a very broad range of challenges and related debates regarding religious freedom, from blasphemy laws, proselytism bans, and protracted resistance to the building of mosques, to religious education in public schools, limitations on legal status of religious minorities, and – less directly related to religion but rather conspicuously influenced by majority Orthodoxy – limitations on rights to do with social ethics issues (e.g., same-sex marriage). This chapter presents an overview of such challenges and debates, and in so doing draws on research conducted at the grassroots level regarding religion, human rights, and the impact of the ECtHR. The latter carries particular significance in Greece because of that court’s finding of a disproportionate percentage of religious freedoms violations by the Greek state as compared with those by other states.

Keywords Religious freedom · Religion and national identity · Religious education · Blasphemy · Church-state relations · European Court of Human Rights

Introduction

From a number of perspectives Greece may be considered to hold a special place at the nexus of religion and human rights: Greece was the recipient of the first European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or, the Court) judgment finding a violation of religious freedom (in Kokkinakis v. Greece, 1993); it is also the single country with the largest number of ECtHR religious freedom convictions to date; and it is host to a very broad range of debates regarding religion-related rights, from blasphemy laws,

The author would also like to acknowledge the support of the Orthodox Christian Studies Center’s Henry Luce/Leadership 100 project on Orthodoxy and Human Rights.

E. Fokas (*) Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens, Greece e-mail: [email protected]

[email protected] 102 E. Fokas proselytism bans, and protracted resistance to the building of mosques, to religious education in public schools, limitations on legal status of religious minorities, and – less directly related to religion but rather conspicuously influenced by majority Orthodoxy – limitations on rights related to social ethics issues (e.g., same-sex marriage), and free speech (e.g., blasphemy). This chapter offers an overview of contemporary challenges and debates in the Greek public sphere regarding religion and human rights.1 How do we define the nexus of religion and human rights in the Greek context? As we shall see below, there are many entry points to this space. First, there is the issue of limitations on freedom of conscience (both in its belief and manifestation dimensions): such complaints of limitations are voiced by religious minority groups, by other conscience-based minority groups (e.g., atheists, secularists and human- ists), and at times by the majority faith. Second, there is the role of majority religion in limiting the rights of others: these may be rights of religious minorities, or of citizens with claims that either impinge upon the privileges enjoyed by the majority church or are somehow otherwise contrary to the interests and preferences of the majority church. The latter, in particular, calls for a broad conception of religion- related rights. For the purposes of this chapter, these are rights either related to freedom of conscience, or rights claims which mobilise religious or other conscience-based groups: for example, same-sex civil union is not, per say, a religious matter, yet the role of factions within the Greek Orthodox Church in seeking to limit that right is key. Third, there is the very powerful mark left by the European Court of Human Rights in introducing national level changes in the management of rights related to religion. Fourth there is also the perspective of how religion-related issues arising in the Greek context have positively contributed to the development of that Court’s jurisprudence in the domain of religion and human rights at the ECtHR. On the flip side, there are the many ways the Greek state fails to confirm to legal standards set by the Court’s general jurisprudence in this domain (within and beyond Greece). The narrative presented here is one informed by political science and socio-legal scholarship. In the main it describes a strained relationship between religion and human rights. There is of course also a positive story to be told from a theological perspective, focusing on the implications of Orthodox conceptions of the Trinity and of the dignity of the person, and for this there is an excellent body of theological scholarship to be consulted (see for example Yannoulatos 2003; Papanikolaou 2012; Kalaitzidis 2012; McGuckin 2012). The purpose of the present text is to provide insight into problems around the nexus of religion and human rights in Greece, problems faced by religious and other conscience-based groups, many of which stem from the relationship between the majority Orthodox Church and the Greek state.

1 This chapter draws on research conducted in the context of the ERC-funded Grassrootsmobilise Research Programme (Grant Agreement No. 338463), and while Research Associate of the LSE Hellenic Observatory. For a more in-depth analysis based on fieldwork on limitations to religious freedom conducted in Greece and in other majority Orthodox contexts, see Fokas 2015a.

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To this end the chapter begins with a historical overview of the relationship between religion and national identity which in large part sustains the close church- state links in the Greek context. In a second section, the legal framework for the management of issues arising at the intersection between religion and human rights is presented. Third, the path-breaking role of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is explored through a brief consideration of relevant case law against the state of Greece. Though indeed path-breaking, there remain of course several open politically and socially sensitive issues at the intersection between religion and human rights; a selection of these forms the focus of the penultimate section. Finally, the chapter closes with a consideration of expectations for the future that we may have in this domain, based on research conducted on grassroots level awareness of and engagement with existing case law in the field of religion and human rights. Specifically, in the context of a broader study on the grassroots level impact of ECtHR religion-related case law,2 in-depth interviews were conducted in Greece with representatives of religious majority and religious minority groups, lawyers and representatives of NGOs dealing with religion-related issues, representatives of state institutions engaged in the management of religion-related issues, and representatives of secularist, humanist and atheist NGOs and networks. The perspectives of such grassroots actors yield insight into the potential and limitations at the nexus of religion and human rights in Greece.

Religion, National Identity, Church and State

The historical links between religion and national identity in Greece are broad and deep and well-researched. For our purposes, it suffices to highlight certain climactic points in the evolution of this relationship. The first of these is the experience of the Orthodox Church under the Ottoman Empire (1453–1821) and in the Greek national revolution which entailed the beginning of the end of Ottoman rule over Greece.3 Under the Ottoman millet system, non-Muslim communities were divided into religious groups and given ‘protected’ status: in exchange for the payment of a special tax, they were allowed to live within the Muslim state without converting but as second-class subjects. The millets enjoyed a measure of autonomy and were represented by their religious leaders in their dealings with the high porte (Zürcher 2001: 12). By Sultan’s decree, the Patriarch of Constantinople was recognized as the highest religious and political leader of all Orthodox peoples – regardless of ethnicity – living within the empire. The entailed privileges and responsibilities were immense: the Patriarch and higher clergy were exempted from taxes, but they

2 See www.grassrootsmobilise.eu; see also Fokas 2015b and 2016. 3 A full historical analysis of the relationship between religion and national identity in Greece would take us as far back in history as the Byzantine Empire and the Great Schism, but space limitations do not allow for such historical depth.

[email protected] 104 E. Fokas were responsible for collecting them from the Orthodox populations and for guar- anteeing the latters’ full obedience to the Sultan. The millet system also granted the Patriarchate full juridical authority over the Orthodox (on matters of marriage, dowry, property, inheritance, education, and social welfare) (Kokosalakis 1995: 239–40). Thus, with this vast expanse of functions, the Church was legitimised by the Ottoman State as a religio-political institution (see Makrides 1991: 284; see also Dimitropoulos 2001: 52). Although the Orthodox millet was ecumenical and multinational in nature, in reality it was largely Greek-dominated: the succession of Patriarchs was (and continues to be) Greek, and the social administration was almost exclusively in the hands of Greeks. This latter fact was due to the simple reality that the Greek population living in Constantinople, the Phanariots, were already the leaders of business there and had become directly involved in the administration of the Ottoman Empire itself (Kokosalakis 1995: 240). With a Greek Patriarch carrying out secular and ecclesiastical functions, and a largely Greek hierarchy in control of the Orthodox millet, ‘Greek interests came to dominate a Church that became increasingly involved in the preservation and perpetuation of Hellenism and it became more and more difficult to separate Hellenism from Orthodoxy’ (Rexine1972 : 201). Accordingly, beyond the institutional role of the Church – in its economic, legal, and political dimensions – it also has an important psychological function for the Greeks under Ottoman rule: the Church was seen as provider and protector of the people and preserver of their national identity. Besides the aforementioned power and privileges, the Church also became especially wealthy: many Christians transmitted their land to the Church and the Monasteries since, under the millet system, ecclesiastical property was protected from confiscation by the Turks (Kokosalakis 1995: 240). Therefore, the high clergy were not entirely supportive of revolutionary ideas which might threaten their privileged positions (see Roudometof 2001: 56). However, as education and Greek-language secular literary production expanded in the post-1750 period, the reemergence of classical antiquity in the discourse of the western Enlightenment reached the Rum millet and strongly influenced its secularization. The ecclesiastical establishment and many Phanariots opposed these new ideas since they correctly perceived that secularization would lead to the dele- gitimisation of the Church (Roudometof 2001: 56–61). Yet many clerics did fight for Greek independence. According to Nicos Mouzelis (1978: 61), though originally hostile to the revolution against the Ottoman Empire, they joined the cause when they realised its irreversibility. The symbolic importance of those clergy members who did fight for Greek independence remains embedded in the memories, and historical chronicles, of many. One of the most renowned aspects of the revolution is the act of a Greek bishop, Germanos of Patra, who on the 25th of March 1821, raised as the banner (lavaron) of revolution the curtain of the sanctuary of the Cathedral of Patras (Rexine 1972: 203). And it is thus that the 25th of March is now celebrated as Greek national independence day (not coincidentally, also a religious holiday: the Annunciation of the Virgin Mary). So in spite of conflicting perspectives on the attitudes and actions of the clergy throughout the national

[email protected] Religion and Human Rights in Greece 105 revolution, the prevailing interpretation in school books and in popular opinion is that the Church saved the Greek nation throughout the four centuries of Ottoman rule. A second climactic period in the relationship between religion and national identity is the establishment of the Autocephalous Church of Greece and its eventual recognition by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Newly independent Greece was ruled by the Regency of the Bavarian King Otto, who was installed by the Great Powers (Britain, France and Russia). Georg von Mauer, a member of the regency responsible for issues of Church, Education and Justice, believed that complete political independence for Greece required a disentanglement of the Church from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. He formed a relevant Commission which saw to the latter: against the Patriarch’s staunch protests, the Autocephalous Church of Greece was proclaimed by royal decree in July of 1833 (See Dimitropoulos 2001: 55–8; Kokosalakis 1987: 235; Papastathis 1996: 75–6; Rexine 1972: 204). The declaration of autonomy from the Ecumenical Patriarchate entailed the Church’s subordination to the state: the administrative leader of the highest ecclesiastical power, a five-member Synod, was to be the King (though Roman Catholic). The latter was in accordance with the Bavarian prototype of the King as ‘supreme bishop’ (Kokosalakis 1987: 235). The members of the Synod were hired by the government, and a royal commissioner would represent civil power at each of its meetings. Synodal decisions were also subject to government approval (Dimitropoulos 2001: 59). Thus, the declaration of autonomy rendered the state the exclusive legislative ruler and the Church subject to the Monarch.4 The situation was, as one scholar describes it, a cultural and political anomaly: not only was the head of the Greek (Orthodox) nation a Catholic and foreigner, but the three-man regency council was Bavarian and Protestant (Kokosalakis 1995: 241). Scholars’ interpretations conflict over whether the establishment of the Autocephalous Church was primarily an act of Europeanisation and secularisation, in conformity with the patterns of state-building in Europe, or if it was a subjugation of the Church by the state for the purpose of manipulating it (Makrides 1991: 287). Undoubtedly though the literal creation of the Autocephalous Church by the state signals the radical beginning of Church subordination to state interests. The consequent relationship between church and state is complex: while the right of the state to interfere in ecclesiastical matters was legalised, ecclesiastical issues were recognised as public issues (Manitakis 2000: 328–331). Under a widespread impression of an attack on Orthodox traditions, many began to interpret the separation of the Greek Church from the Patriarchate as a conspiracy aiming to convert the people to Protestantism and Catholicism5 (Roudometof 2001: 104). Unease over the state’s extensive control over the Church led many clergy and lay people to call for renewed relations with the Patriarchate (Dimitropoulos 2001: 62). This initially resulted in the Constitutional recognition of the Orthodox Church

4 This was later institutionalised in the Constitution of 1844, Article 105, stipulating that Church administration matters would be regulated by the state (Papastathis 1996: 76). 5 The latter interpretation derives from further developments beyond the scope of the present text; for a more nuanced account, please see Fokas 2004.

[email protected] 106 E. Fokas as the ‘prevailing’ church, which ‘existed’ in dogmatic union with the Church of Constantinople. In the context of compromise, the King ceased to be the head of the Church and its administration was left to a Synod of hierarchs. The Church remained under the control of the state and its holy canons were applied to the extent that they were not contrary to the canons of the state. And finally, all acts of proselytism committed ‘against’ Orthodoxy were strictly prohibited. Conservative factions of society remained unsatisfied, however, and pressed for normalisation of relations with the Patriarchate. Thus, as a further concession, the Greek government formally requested of the Patriarchate its recognition of the Church of Greece as Autocephalous (Kokosalakis 1987: 239). In 1850, the Patriarchate obliged, officially recognizing the Autocephalous Church of Greece (Dimitropoulos 2001: 204–5).6 This development clearly added legitimacy to the Church in its national role. A further climactic point in the developing relationship between religion and national identity is the consolidation of religious and nationalist aspirations in Greek irredentism – in particular, in the Megali Idea (‘Grand Idea’). Here the aims of the state for its expansion coincided with the visions of religious nationalists for ‘redemption’ of Orthodox peoples. In 1844 John Kolettis, a politician favoured by the King, first articulated the doctrine ofΤ he Megali Idea, a romantic vision of re-establishing modern Greece with its pre-Ottoman occupation boundaries (Kokosalakis 1987: 238–9) and which ‘blended millenarian hopes of a restored Christian Empire with secular Greek state-sponsored nationalism’ (Roudometof 2001: 105). The King became an ardent supporter of the vision as did most of the Greek people. The manifestation of this idea in government policy, and its tragic termination in 1922 (the Asia Minor Catastrophe), are well-documented in historical texts. Here it is important to note that the Megali Idea acted as an ultimate synthesis of church, state and national identity. In Dimitropoulos’ interpretation, the place of the Church in the state structure did not differ significantly from that of other churches in Europe before the period of the Megali Idea: as the ‘prevailing’ Church, it had a number of privileges and responsibilities. However, in beginning to operate as a public authority in a state with ‘unredeemed dreams’, though submitted to the state, the Church began to be ‘politicised’ with the intention to serve the interests of state policy; ‘the process of its ethnicisation would lead to the “religionisation” of the nation, and to the elevation of the ideology of identification of orthodoxy with Greekness’ (Dimitropoulos 2001: 65). The three historical facts of the establishment of the Autocephalous Church, its recognition by the Patriarchate, and the development of the Megali Idea – particularly in relation to one another – carry a great deal of importance in terms of understanding certain trends which we see repeated later: first, the tendency of the state to compromise in the face of church demands; second, the tendency of the state to see the Church and Orthodoxy as expedient factors of national unity and to use

6 In ecclesiastical terms this means that the Greek Orthodox Church was in communion with the other Orthodox churches, and that matters relating to dogma or faith must be referred to the Patriarchate. See also Rexine (1972: 204–5).

[email protected] Religion and Human Rights in Greece 107 the Church and faith for its purposes; and third, the tendency of the Church to identify itself with such national causes.7 The purpose of this schematic historical overview is to indicate the rather extraordinary historical factors which underpin the particular relationship between church and state that developed in Greece. Of course all histories are unique, but the intrica- cies of how religion and national identity came to be intertwined in the Greek national context are remarkable, from the elements of finance and foreign influence to that of timing (e.g., of the French Revolution and the rise of nationalism), several factors came together to yield a deeply interdependent relationship between religion and national identity in the Greek case, and in turn, with the Greek state. The latter critically underpin a number of privileges enjoyed by the church vis-à-vis the state and, most importantly, vis-à-vis other faiths represented in Greece – many of which are embedded in the relevant Greek legal framework. It is these privileges which lead – directly or indirectly – to limitations on religious freedoms and on other human rights for Greek citizens.

Relevant Legal Framework

The privileged position of the Greek Orthodox Church vis-à-vis the state is rather conspicuous in the Greek Constitution (the current version in force since 1975): the entirety of Part One Section II of the constitution is comprised of Article 3 on ‘Relations of Church and State’, wherein it is indicated that ‘The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ’. Lawmakers and scholars have extensively debated whether ‘prevailing’ is a descriptive or prescriptive term (see for example Kyriazopoulos 2001; Alivizatos 1999; Hatzis 2009); certainly a great deal of governance of religion-related issues has served to maintain that prevalence. Part Two of the constitution sets out a host of individual and social rights, including equality of all citizens before the law; rights of petition, assembly, association; freedoms of religion, expression and the press; and rights to property, privacy, and family life, amongst others. The crux of the legal framework relevant to persisting limitations on human rights, including religious freedoms, is comprised of Articles 13 on religious freedom, Article 16 on education, and Articles 198 and 199 of the Greek Criminal Code on blasphemy. Article 13 sets out ‘freedom of religious conscience’ as inviolable, indicates that all ‘known’ religions are free and their worship protected by law as long as the latter does not ‘offend public order or the moral principles’, and prohibits proselytism. Unpacked, this article reveals significant limitations on religious freedom. First, the

7 One further historical period which has had a powerful, ambiguous effect on the relationship between religion and national identity is the military dictatorship of 1967–74. This period represents perhaps the most intense identification of church and state which, because of the particularly violent character of that military regime, left negative marks on the latter.

[email protected] 108 E. Fokas requirement that a faith be recognized by the state, following an application process, in order for it to be ‘known’, is problematic. According to the former UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, equality and freedom inextricably belong together, as part of the ‘architectural principles’ of human rights (2013: 50–51): ‘Without equality,’ he posits, ‘rights of freedom would amount to mere privileges of the happy few.’ He gives as an example various countries with constitutions or laws on religion that give a privileged status to one or a few ‘recognised’, or, in the case of Greece, ‘known’ religions. The various lists of recognised religions, he argues, whether short or long, are problematic in that their mere existence suggests that ‘pluralism can only unfold within a predefined set of permissible options’, which runs counter to the foundational concept of normative universalism (Bielefeldt 2013: 37). Such inequality amongst religious groups is conspicuous in the Greek context, and with significant legal repercussions. Three religious groups – the Greek Orthodox Church, adherents of the Jewish faith and the Muslim minority of Western Thrace – exist in the Greek legal framework as faith communities with public law status, and without any necessity of registration. Until a recent legislative change, introduced in 2014 (Law 4301/2014 on religious legal personality), all other religious groups could be registered only as legal entities of private law either as associations, foundations, or charitable fundraising charities, rather than as religious groups per se. This fact limited groups’ rights to enter into contract, own property, act as an employer, and enjoy tax exemptions. The 2014 law confirms the present legal status of the Greek Orthodox, Jewish and Muslim of Thrace communities, and offers a new form of formal legal status automatically (i.e., without an application or court process necessary) to the Roman Catholic, Anglican, Ethiopian Orthodox, Evangelical, Coptic Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox communities. For other religious minority groups it offers the possibility of the legal status but only through an application process and court confirmation that they fulfill a list of rather stringent conditions. For example, the group in question must reach a threshold of 300 members (a tall order for some smaller religious groups) and submit to the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs the names of the members of the group’s administration and the full CV of the ‘pastor’ of the group (even though some groups are not hierarchically organized and to not have a pastor, per se). Further, the religious community with legal status may be dissolved if its membership level drops below 100; if it remains without a pastor for 6 months; if its aims are in practice different from those approved; and if its practice has become illegal, unethical, or against public order. Thus the 2014 law on religious legal personality falls short of resolving the inequalities amongst religious groups and, for many minority faith groups, it fails to offer a viable solution to their lack of legal status (Fokas 2015a; Markoviti 2017). Second, the conditionality set out in Article 13 that protected worship is that which does not offend ‘public order and moral principles’ is of course also rather problematic. ‘Public order’ has masked many human rights offenses historically and internationally: depending on one’s perspective, the closure of a series of Islam- related political parties in Turkey, the refusal to register faith groups considered ‘too

[email protected] Religion and Human Rights in Greece 109 similar’ to the majority church, or the banning of the burqa from public spaces may be considered amongst these. And, of course, the notion of ‘moral principles’ is highly subjective, malleable and manipulatable. Third amongst rights limitations in this constitutional article is the outright ban on proselytism. The latter is problematic not least for the loose definition of proselytism (in a still-in-force 1938 law) as the ‘direct or indirect’ attempt of someone to intrude on the religious beliefs of a person of a different religious persuasion, with the aim of undermining those beliefs, either by any kind of inducement or promise of an inducement or moral support or material assistance, or by fraudulent means, or by taking advantage of his inexperience, trust, need, low intellect, or naïveté.8 This looseness in definition has contributed to the rather liberal applications of the ban in the past, as that which led the Greek state to the ECtHR in the case of Kokkinakis (see below). A second constitutional article which is central to the religion-human rights nexus is Article 16, which identifies the ‘development of religious conscience of youth’ as an aim of national education. Religious education in the Orthodox faith is compulsory in the public education system, with exemption available only on declaration of a faith other than Orthodox Christianity. The latter is legally awkward because of the requirement to reveal one’s (minority) faith to a state institution, because exemption is limited to the non-Orthodox, and because the content of the course may – in spite of recent changes in the curriculum – be considered catechetical in nature. Each of these issues has been addressed by ECtHR case law against other states (notably, in Folgero v. Norway (2007), Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey (2007), and Mansur Yalcin v. Turkey (2014)), the judgments of which render the Greek current practices contrary to standards set by the Court’s jurisprudence. Each of these issues has also been the subject of intense political and social debate in Greece (debate which, notably, does not much factor in these highly relevant cases; see Fokas and Markoviti (2017)). Regarding blasphemy and the freedom of speech, Article 14 of the Greek Constitution, after setting out freedom of speech, freedom of the press and prohibition of censorship, indicates in paragraph 4 that ‘Seizure by order of the public prosecutor shall be allowed exceptionally after circulation and in case of’, amongst two others, ‘An offence against the Christian or any other known religion’, and ‘An obscene publication which is obviously offensive to public decency, in the cases stipulated by law’. But it is two particular articles of the Greek Criminal Code that form the main legal basis upon which individuals may be prosecuted for the crime of blasphemy: Articles 198 and 199 of the Greek Criminal Code, both of which fall under Section 7 of the Criminal Code on ‘Offenses against Religious Peace’. Article 198, on ‘malicious blasphemy’, indicates that:

8 Notably, in the 1864, 1922 and 1927 Greek constitutions, the proselytism ban was embedded in Article 1 of the constitution and applied only to proselytism practiced ‘against the prevailing religious faith’; only in 1975 was the ban extended to protect all ‘known’ religions (for more on this, see Fokas 2017b).

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1. Anyone who insults God in public and with malicious intent, in any way whatsoever, shall incur a prison sentence of up to 2 years. 2. Anyone who blasphemes in public in circumstances other than those specified in paragraph 1, thereby showing a lack of respect towards God, shall incur a prison sentence of up to 6 months or with a fine of up to 3000 euro. And Article 199, on ‘insulting a religion’, sets out that: Anyone who insults the Eastern Orthodox Church or any other religion recognised in Greece, in public and with injurious intent, in any way whatsoever, shall incur a prison sentence of up to two years. It is these two articles which exclusively which carry the potential punitive measure of imprisonment and which have attracted extensive national and international critique. All of the above aspects of the relevant Greek legislative framework, it must be borne in mind, are deeply embedded in the historical relationship between Orthodoxy and Greek national identity presented above; and efforts to bring about legislative change are intensely challenged by the close relations between church and state resulting from the latter. In turn, efforts to bring about change to the status quo in church-state relations have tended to be undermined by the powerful mobilizing potential of the religion-national identity link. And thus a vicious cycle of sorts is in place, difficult to break in the context of party politics; hence the hope placed by many in international institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights. As we shall see in the following sections, parts of the legal framework presented here have given rise to cases against the Greek state at the European Court of Human Rights (e.g., legal status inequalities, proselytism), some of which cases have, in turn, led to legislative change. Other parts of this legal framework contribute to persistent problems at the intersection between religion and human rights (e.g., religious education and blasphemy). The former are addressed in the next section, and the latter in that to follow.

The Role of the ECtHR9

As indicated at the outset, Greece has a special place in the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence on religion. Τhe 1993 ECtHR Kokkinakis v. Greece case was a watershed case for the Court: it was the first Article 9,10 that is, religious

9 Note bene: This is a necessarily selective presentation of relevant cases, mainly to set out the contours of the relevant case law. More comprehensive information about Article 9 violations and about case law against the state of Greece can be found through the website of the ECtHR: www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. 10 Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, on ‘Freedom of thought, conscience and religion’, provides that: 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching,

[email protected] Religion and Human Rights in Greece 111 freedom, conviction issued by the Court, after its first 34 years of operation.11 In the 25 years since then, the Court has issued over 70 judgements finding Article 9 violations (and far more on religious freedom, but in conjunction with another right – such as non-discrimination or freedom of expression). These numbers suggest a rapid judicialisation of religion, post-Kokkinakis. Kokkinakis is, notably, the case which delivered the oft-cited ‘mantra’ regarding the importance of religious freedom; here we find the first and still one of the strongest declarations of the ultimate value of religious freedom communicated by the Court and of its equal relevance for those seeking freedom from religion: As enshrined in Article 9 (art. 9), freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it. (Kokkinakis v. Greece, 1993, para 31) Greece continued to pioneer in religion-related case law, having achieved by 2014 over 20% of all Article 9 violations found amongst the 47 states party to the Convention defended by the ECtHR.12 Thus, Greece has been a fruitful ground for the elaboration of religion-related rights protected by the ECtHR; meanwhile, the ECtHR has proven a fruitful venue for the elaboration of religion-related freedoms in Greece. Jehovah’s Witnesses have a leading role in Greek Article 9 case law (but also more generally; see Richardson 2017)13: Kokkinakis was followed in 1996 by practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 11 More precisely, in the Court’s first 33 years (1959–92), cases related to the right to religious freedom were dealt with exclusively by the European Commission of Human Rights and not by the Court (until the introduction of Protocol 11 in 1998, a two-tiered system was in place, with the European Commission of Human Rights filtering which cases would reach the Court). Protocol 11 abolished that Commission, and allowed for direct access of individual applicants to the Court. As Ringelheim (2012) indicates, until 1989 almost all cases brought under Article 9 were deemed inadmissible. 12 Such statistics should be taken with a grain of salt: statistics regarding Article 9 convictions alone are of limited explanatory value regarding religious freedoms jurisprudence in general, given that many religious freedoms cases are decided under or in conjunction with other Convention articles (e.g., Freedom of Expression, Art.10, Freedom of Assembly and Association, Art.11, and Prohibition of Discrimination, Art.14). Another factor to consider is the timing of Kokkinakis, so soon after the inclusion into the ECHR framework of a number of newly democratizing post- Communist countries, many of them majority Orthodox. From different perspectives Ferrari (2012) and Richardson and Shoemaker (2008) argue that an example was made of Greece to communicate a message to the new member states. At the time of writing, that percentage stands at 16 (i.e., in 2018 Greece has received 12 of the 73 ECtHR judgements finding an Art.9 violation). 13 This is so much the case that Margarita Markoviti has found, in her study of grassroots mobilisa- tions around ECtHR religion-related case law on Greece, that the JWs have a ‘filtering effect’ over Greeks’ awareness of ECtHR case law. See Markoviti 2017.

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Manoussakis (on the right to build places of worship), Valsamis and Efstratiou (both in 1996, and both on exemption from school parades14), and Thlimmenos (2000, to do with conscientious objection), all important cases lodged by JWs in Greece. Most of these cases have led to long-term effects on the Greek state’s handling of each of these issues, though not necessarily to legislative change. For example, whilst proselytism is no longer prosecuted (Hatzis 2009), representatives of different religious minority groups complain of a sense of insecurity fed by the fact that the 1938 laws banning proselytism have still not been removed from the law books (Fokas 2015a). The Manousakis legacy reminds us, on the other hand, that legal change is not always sufficient because, though legal barriers to the building of places of worship have been removed, religious minority groups have continued to face barriers to in this domain because of a host of reasons concocted by certain civil servants personally determined to limit the presence and growth of religious minorities, especially in smaller towns and localities. Similarly, though alternative service for conscientious objectors to military service was eventually introduced in the aftermath of Thlimmenos, the issue still gave rise to further case law in 2016 in Papavasilakis v. Greece, wherein the Greek government argued that Mr. Papavasilakis had failed to demonstrate that he had a stable and sincere objection to military service.15 Here too the Court found the Greek state in violation of Article 9 of the Convention. There is also a body of cases which challenge the public place of religion and religion-state relations. Specifically, in Alexandridis v. Greece (2008), Alexandridis challenged the requirement that a practicing lawyer is obliged to reveal his religious convictions if he is to seek the option to affirm rather than take a religious oath. And in a series of three cases (Dimitras and others v. Greece Nos 1, 2, and 3, in 2010, 2011, and 2013, respectively), the applicants take issue with the fact that Greek courts simply assume as a matter of principle that the people appearing before them are Orthodox Christians, requiring a corrective process to change the record which, in turn, requires revelation of one’s religious convictions. In Dimitras and others v. Greece No.3., the presence of religious symbols in court rooms (Orthodox Christian icons) was also challenged, but deemed by the Court a manifestly ill-founded claim.16

14 In both cases the students in question were Jehovah’s Witnesses, who claimed that their faith forbids any practice associated with war or violence; the school parade in question commemorates the outbreak of war between Greece and Fascist Italy on 28 October 1940. Notably, the Court issued critical judgments in Valsamis and Efstratiou for the state’s handing of the matter (a violation of Art.13, for lack of effective remedy, ‘taken together’ with Art.9 on religious freedom), but did not go so far as to find a stand-alone violation of Article 9 in either case. For more on these cases, see Stavros 1997. 15 It should be noted that ECtHR Greek proselytism case law was not limited to that of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Kokkinakis; Larisis and others v. Greece involved a claim by a member of the Pentecostal Church. 16 Unsurprisingly, given that the decision was taken in the aftermath of the Lautsi v. Italy ECtHR judgment in 2011, wherein the Court’s Grand Chamber dramatically reversed the 2009 decision of a chamber of the Court where the display of the crucifix on Italian public school walls was found

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A third main category of Article 9 case law has arisen in the context of the Muslim minority living in Western Thrace; here we have an anomaly in Europe for the prevalence of sharia courts over secular courts on matters related to family law for this geographically and historically defined Muslim minority.17Three violations found in Agga v. Greece (2002, 2006 and 2006) and one in Serif v. Greece (1999) concerned the election procedure of the Muftis of the region. Arising from this same geographic and thematic area is the very recent case of Molla Sali v. Greece: on 6 December 2017 the ECtHR heard the case of a woman seeking to defend her right to inherit the entire estate of her deceased husband, as per his civil law will. This will was contested by the deceased’s sisters on the grounds that for members of the Thrace Muslim community, Islamic law prevails over Greek civil law in matters of inheritance. On the basis of sharia law in this case, Sali would inherit only one quarter of the estate. The Sali case is not one of an Article 9 claim; Sali’s arguments are based on the right to a fair trial (Article 6) and to non-discrimination (Article 14), but the Court’s engagement with this issues bears the potential to have a significant impact on religion-related rights to do with the practice of sharia law in general in this region of Greece and of Europe (see below). The Court’s decision is pending at the time of writing. Also in the domain of Articles 6 and 14, in Canea Catholic Church v Greece (1997), a Catholic Church appealed to the ECtHR because it was unable to take legal proceedings as a result of civil courts’ refusal to acknowledge that it had legal personality (it was thus unable to legally defend its property from a neighbor’s affronts). In so doing it complained of inequality amongst religious groups in Greece, because the ‘Applicant church, which owned its land and buildings, had been prevented from taking legal proceedings to protect them, whereas Orthodox Church or the Jewish community could do so in order to protect their own property without any formality or required procedure.’ (Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, para. 4 of the chamber judgment summary). According to the Secretary General of Religions at the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, it is directly, though significantly belatedly, in response to the Canea judgment that the 2014 law on legal personality discussed above was introduced and passed by the Greek parliament (Markoviti 2017). As noted above, this 2014 law is touted as a significant step forward, but for many minority religious groups is neither viable nor appealing because of the conditions attached to the new legal status. Finally, in the broader domain of issues related to religion because of the role of religion (whether direct or indirect, transparent or not) in limiting the right in question, Vallianatos and others v. Greece (2013) addresses the discriminatory nature of a new law on ‘civil union’ (Law 3719/2008), which defines civil union as a union between two different-sex adults. Here the applicants argued that the law violated in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Protocol 1, Article 2). See Mancini (2010), Ronchi (2011) and, from an alternative perspective, Puppinck (2012). 17 This Muslim minority is a remnant of the forced population exchange between Greece and Turkey foreseen by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 which, in turn, was the final treaty concluding World War I and set out the boundaries of the modern Turkish state.

[email protected] 114 E. Fokas both their right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 of the Convention) and their right to non-discrimination on the basis of sex (Article 14); the Court found in their favour on both counts. And in 2015, against the strong opposition from factions within the majority Orthodox Church, same-sex civil union was legalised. This overview of religion-related (in the broadest definition of the term) ECtHR case law in the Greek context, schematic and selective though it is, yields a clear sense of the magnitude of the role of the ECtHR in the domain of religion. Yet, as suggested above, many problem areas endure, often regardless of judicial precedence on a given issue.

Flashpoints in Human Rights: Enduring Arenas of Conflict and Controversy

There are in fact many enduring areas of conflict and controversy at the nexus of religion and human rights in Greece. Below three particular areas are presented as a ‘watch this space’ for scholars of religion and human rights.

Blasphemy

The above-presented anti-blasphemy articles 198 and 199 of the Greek civil code are very much alive in the Greek context (Fokas 2017a). In reality, the issuing of prison sentences for the crime of blasphemy is rare. Instances of the issuance of interim measures, however, such as the temporary banning of films, plays, books, or displays of works of art, are numerous and the center of mobilization efforts towards the revocation of the blasphemy laws, not least because of concerns regarding self- censorship, particularly in the world of art. Two highly significant cases of the operationalization of the blasphemy laws took place in 2012, both of which, as we shall see below, became key to mobilisa- tions calling for the abolition of those laws. First, in late September 2012, 27 year old Phillipos Loizos was arrested in Evia, Greece, on charges of posting ‘malicious blasphemy and religious insult on the known social networking site, Facebook’.18 The accused had created a Facebook page for ‘Elder Pastitsios the Pastafarian’, playing on a combination of Elder Paisios, the late Greek Orthodox monk revered as a prophet by some (and who, eventually, was canonized a saint), the Greek baked pasta dish pastitsio, and Pastafarianism. On that Facebook page, Loizos displayed an image of Paisios with his face covered in pastitsio. Loizos’ self-proclaimed intent was to satirize the trend of ‘Paiso-worship’ which, he indicated, was connected to

18 On this case, see Christopoulos (2013a, b) and Tsimitakis (2012).

[email protected] Religion and Human Rights in Greece 115 anti-Westernism, complaints about ‘atheist’ politicians, derogatory statements about the role of women, calls for a return to the monarchy, and extreme intolerance of all things not Greek and modern (Loizos 2015).19 In the following month, October of 2012, on-going protests blocked the staging of Terrence McNally’s Corpus Christi at the Hyterion Theatre in Athens. The play depicts Jesus and the Apostles as gay men living in modern-day Texas. As such it attracted the negative attention of the Orthodox Church early on in its staging, with the Holy Synod issuing, on 7 June 2012, a press release informing believers of the allegedly blasphemous play and urging ‘our People to censure this’.20 Amongst the protesters were clerics of the Orthodox Church of Greece and also Golden Dawn supporters and notably MPs who, beyond the peaceful protest, on the 11th of October also exercised violence and verbal abuse, issuing threats to the actors and their families.21 This particular incident attracted increased media attention also because of the involvement of the ultra-nationalist far-right, racist and neo-Nazi political party Golden Dawn, and the noted inaction of the police in the face of protests (the Greek police force having long been accused of openly supporting Golden Dawn in general). The actual lawsuit in this case began with a claim filed by Greek Orthodox Bishop Seraphim of Piraeus; he was accompanied by four Golden Dawn MPs though, according to the bishop, they joined him only for support. In November, the production of the play was cancelled, and the Athens public prosecutor charged the organizers, producers and cast of the play with blasphemy.22 As suggested above, these developments contributed to various mobilisation efforts against the blasphemy laws. Here timing was key. In early 2015 an international ‘End Blasphemy Laws Now’ campaign was established by the European Humanist Federation (of which the Humanist Union of Greece [HUG] is a member organisation), together with the International Humanist and Ethical Union. Around the same time, a new Minister of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights was instated – Nikos Paraskeuopoulos – who was expected to be sympathetic to the campaign. HUG sent a letter to the Secretary General for Transparency and Human Rights at the Ministry of Justice, Mr. Kostis Papaioannou, bringing the campaign to his attention and calling for the repeal of Articles 198 and 199 of the Criminal Code.23

19 It should be noted that the following paragraphs describing the events that took place are drawn solely from Loizos’ own published account. 20 Press release available on the Orthodox Church of Greece website; cited by Sakellariou (2013), at p. 43. 21 The play also met with significant protests and was cancelled and reinstated at its original staging in NY in 1998, but continued with special security measures. The Corpus Christi affair in the Greek context is covered broadly in the relevant literature. See especially Christopoulos (2013a, b), and Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou (2013). 22 For more information, see Tsakirakis (2005), Christopoulos (2013a, b), Tsolakidou (2012), Tagaris (2012), and Diamantopoulou (2016). 23 See http://end-blasphemy-laws.org/2016/06/greece-must-uphold-pledge-to-abolish-blasphemy/. See also https://roides.wordpress.com/2016/06/22/22june16/; and www.lifo.gr/now/greece/108436

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The Loizos case helped bring the ‘End Blasphemy Laws Now’ campaign to life in the Greek context. It also strengthened the Greek Helsinki Monitor’s case before United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), seeking a recommendation to Greece for the abolition of the blasphemy laws on the basis of the discriminatory way in which they are applied (namely, solely in protection of Christianity generally and the Orthodox Church and faith, specifically).24 CERD issued a statement saying that The Committee is concerned about the continuing existence of blasphemy legal provisions and the risk that they may be used in a discriminatory manner that is prohibited under the provisions of the Convention (art. 5 (d) (vii)) (CERD 2016, para. 18–19). The Committee recommends the State party to abolish articles 198 and 199 on blasphemy from its Criminal Code. Finally, the timing of the UN Recommendation, which elicited the public statement by the then Minister of Justice indicating that the blasphemy laws must indeed be rescinded and that his government would work toward that effect, contributes to the expectation that a change in this domain may indeed be on the way. But in the meantime, calls to apply the anti-blasphemy laws continue: as recently as February 2018, two metropolitan bishops of the Orthodox Church of Greece filed lawsuits against the actors of an Athens-based theater production of Jesus Christ Superstar, provoking a counter-demonstration under the banner ‘Fear will not win’ (Chrysopoulos 2018).

Sharia

The anomaly of an entire region of northern Greece being governed by sharia law exclusively when it comes to matters of family and inheritance has attracted a great deal of negative attention from those international observers aware of it. It has also motivated a long process of legal mobilization on the part of committed human rights lawyers, challenged though this has been by family pressures on potential claimants to abandon the cause. Somewhere in the space between the latter two, the Greek government has increasingly engaged with the question of whether sharia law in Western Thrace should be abolished or somehow limited. In November of 2017, Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras announced a bill to limit the jurisdiction of sharia law in Thrace. The timing of the bill’s announcement (November 2017) made rather conspicuous the connection to the then pending European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) hearing against the state of Greece on the matter (the hearing took place the following month). The announcement revealed, according to a human rights lawyer actively engaged in this topic, the government’s state of panic: ‘they are panicking because

24 As Greek Helsinki Monitor director Panayote Dimitras explains: ‘We convinced them that not only do we have the bloody law, but it is used exclusively against those perceived to blaspheme against Orthodoxy’. Personal interview, 9 December 2016.

[email protected] Religion and Human Rights in Greece 117 they know they’ll lose.’25 The bill, approved by Parliament on 9 January 2018, renders recourse to Islamic courts optional: both parties in a dispute must choose such recourse. The change has been hailed as a historic step ensuring equal treatment for all Greek citizens, whilst still respecting Muslim identity by making sharia law a right and not an obligation. For many proponents of secularism and human rights, however, it is a matter of too little too late. The new law is contrary to principles established by the ECtHR, in the sense that the choice of recourse to sharia courts would entail a voluntary relinquishment of one’s fundamental rights for one of the parties in a dispute. There is legitimate concern that parties to a case may be subjected to intense social pressure to choose recourse to Islamic courts, in the name of preserving religious tradition. Meanwhile, the new law still leaves the sharia courts, and the discrimination these entail for women, in place. According to human rights NGO Greek Helsinki Monitor, in its written intervention in the ECtHR Sali case, Sharia can hardly be considered as offering Muslim women living in Western Thrace even a remotely comparable level of legal protection in family or property issues to that afforded under the Civil Code. This is because Sharia, and its implementation by Greek courts, dis- criminates against Muslim women on three grounds: first, on the grounds of religion, second on the grounds of sex and third, on the grounds of location/residence (Greek Helsinki Monitor 2017, Third Party Intervention, Sali v. Greece). From a different perspective, and arguing on the basis of the operation of sharia councils in the United Kingdom (where, however, domestic law strictly prevails wherever there are inconsistencies between it and the decisions or recommenda- tions of sharia councils26), the UK-based Christian NGO Christian Concern also intervened in the Sali case, arguing that As a result of different factors including demographic shifts, cultural relativism and unfettered accommodation, the United Kingdom provides the Council of Europe with an example of a system which has fundamentally failed in the area of social integration. The consequence has been the creation of a parallel society with competing human rights norms predicated upon views of equality which often times are diametrically opposed to democratic values (Christian Concern, Third Party Intervention, Sali v. Greece). On receiving Molla Sali’s application, the ECtHR assigned it directly to the Grand Chamber, a move which tends to signify the perception that a case engages an issue of grave importance in the realm of human rights. In the current context of intense pressures on the legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights, exac- erbated by a broader climate of national isolationism and backlash to perceived threats on national sovereignty, many factors have converged to lead the Court to a commitment to offer states a generous ‘margin of appreciation’ on nationally sensitive matters (see Fokas 2016). Thus, this is an important case to follow as it tests the boundaries of that commitment. Specific to the Greek context, though, the unfold-

25 Personal interview, 28 November 2017. 26 See ‘The independent review into the application of sharia law in England and Wales. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty’, February 2018.

[email protected] 118 E. Fokas ing of this issue is critical because, under the new law, efforts to abolish sharia courts will be significantly hampered: if two parties in a dispute consent to the recourse to a sharia court, there is no role left to be played in the dispute by civil law in general, or by the ECtHR specifically.

Religious Education

If the issues of blasphemy and sharia law represent open legal challenges in the Greek setting, religious education represents an open legal and political minefield. This has especially been the case since the rise to political power of the Syriza party in 2015 – a party that campaigned on a secularist platform promising change in church-state relations. Church and state have, several times in recent years, come head to head on the place of religion in the Greek public school system. One such critical point arose in September of 2015 when the brief comment during a radio talk show of then deputy minister of education Sia Anagnostopoulou, and the brief response it elicited from the leader of Orthodox Church of Greece, Archbishop Ieronymos, unleashed a can of worms in Greece in the area of religious education. Religious education is, in the Greek context and within the parameters set by the relationship between religion and national identity, a definitive space for ‘emotional inheritance’ (Asad 2006; Berger 2014). And as explained above regarding the relevant legal framework, the Greek constitution is rather non-apologetic about the role of religion in the education system as a carrier and sustainer of emotional inheritance: the ‘development of religious conscience of youth’ is a stated aim of that system. In its active fulfillment of that aim, the Greek state finds itself in contraven- tion of several aspects of ECtHR precedence – though one would not know this judging from the national debate on the topic, which is conspicuously devoid of references to that case law. This however will change drastically in the near future, as an ECtHR case against the Greek state for the mandatory religious education in the Greek public school system is on the horizon.27 In this case any one of a number of rights breaches may be addressed, or indeed a combination of these. First, currently in Greek public schools there is a mandatory course of religious education taught which is catechetical in character, teaching the Orthodox faith (catechetical to varying degrees, depending on the level of education in question, whether primary, secondary, or tertiary). Thus, the course fails the standard set in Folgero v. Norway, that ‘the curriculum be conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner’. Further, exemption from the course is currently available only to the non-Orthodox – a highly discriminatory practice – and only upon formal declaration of a different faith (and which thus, in turn, creates a new problem of a breach in private data). History suggests that intense conflict and controversy can be expected in the context of this pending ECtHR case. In 2006 the introduction of a new history text

27 The case of Papageorgiou and Others v. Greece has been accepted to be heard by the Court.

[email protected] Religion and Human Rights in Greece 119 book for primary school which limited references to Orthodoxy as a carrier of Greek national identity led to a highly charged backlash from within the Orthodox Church of Greece (Halikiopoulou 2011); the textbook was withdrawn in 2007. As recently as March of 2018, efforts towards establishment of a more pluralistic presentation of religious difference in the religious education textbooks also met powerful resistance: on 4 March a protest rally was held in Athens, calling for a rescinding of the revised religion course text books and for their replacement with texts which are (more) catechetical in nature. Here participants chanted ‘Greece means Orthodoxy’ whilst carrying banners proclaiming ‘No to the new religion courses’, ‘Orthodox education for all the schools’, and ‘We the Greek Orthodox demand Orthodox books’. Religious education is, then, a particularly important space to watch for scholars of religion and human rights.

Where to from Here? Religion and Human Rights at the Grassroots Level

One might expect that, given the central role played by the ECtHR jurisprudence in the development of rights and freedoms somehow related to religion in the Greek context, representatives of religious minorities and of other conscience-based groups might be rather well versed on ECtHR cases of relevance to their interests and keep apprised of new developments in this field. Yet our research has shown that levels of awareness of ECtHR case law are generally rather low, except amongst legal scholars and activists (Fokas 2017c; Markoviti 2017). Levels of awareness of the Court’s case law are influenced by four factors in particular: the national political and legal opportunity structure in a given context; where the Court stands within the national legal order, both de jure and de facto (with the latter much influenced by how national judges view the Court); where the majority faith stands in the ‘national religious order’ (i.e. in the hierarchy which exists most everywhere between and within various majority and minority religious groups); and the national track record of the state in question in relation to the ECtHR may impact levels of grassroots awareness of the Court (e.g., how much case law against the state in question is there before the Court, and with what percentage of violations found?) (Fokas 2017c). Our research on the Greek context has shown that the Greek constitutional provisions setting out the Orthodox Church of Greece as the ‘prevailing faith’ serve to discourage actors seeking to challenge that privilege (whether minority religious groups or secularist groups), and by extension limiting their expectations of the ECtHR in this aim. Historically we find that the Court, in line with the trend in the Europeanisation process in general (Koenig, 2007), has tended to allow significant space to dominant religion (or non-religion, as the case may be), as an expression of cultural and national identity and thus meriting a wide margin of appreciation (Fokas 2015b). Such preferential treatment of a majority faith is highly relevant in

[email protected] 120 E. Fokas the Greek context, and evinced also in ECtHR case law against these states. Even in the watershed case of Kokkinakis v. Greece (1993) which vindicated a minority rights claim, ‘the Court recognizes that the Christian Eastern Orthodox Church, which during nearly four centuries of foreign occupation symbolised the maintenance of Greek culture and the Greek language, took an active part in the Greek people’s struggle for emancipation, to such an extent that Hellenism is to some extent identified with the Orthodox faith’ (para. 14). Thus, the Court stopped short of declaring the Greek ban on proselytism in violation of the Convention, showing an understanding of the state’s protection of the Orthodox Church because of its historical role in relation to national identity (it found an Article 9 violation not for the ban itself but rather for its disproportionate to a legitimate aim implementation).28 The Grand Chamber decision in the case of Lautsi v. Italy (2011) solidified the perception that the ties that bind church and state in contexts such as Greece and Italy are stronger than the Convention system’s defence of minority (whether secularist or religious) rights. It also influenced greater attention amongst interviewees to the concept of the margin of appreciation (Fokas 2015a). Emphasis on the margin of appreciation is disproportionately high in the interviews with Greek social actors (viewed positively by majority religious respondents and negatively by conscience- based minority groups) – disproportionate both in relation to the other country cases and in relation to knowledge of other aspects of the Court and its case law. As a result, ECtHR judgements are referred to as ‘a suggestion’, and as acquiring ‘an autonomy at the national level’. One Greek majority faith representative asked: I wonder what the main criterion of judgment is in the Court’s decisions. Shouldn’t this criterion be societal cohesion? […] There is a certain contradiction in the Court: on the one hand it seeks to protect minorities, on the other however it considers what each state would want (Fokas 2017c29). To a large extent, when looking at the matter from the grassroots level, it is easy to see the Court not for the dynamic player that it is in the area of human rights but, rather, as one amongst several ‘European institutions’ which are felt to be distant from and rather non-transparent to the European citizen, and/or weak in the face of state demands. This, increasingly, is the best-case scenario, as in the context of rising xenophobia and right-wing politics across Europe, a narrative is on the rise of the Court as a ‘European institution’ representation threats to national sovereignty, and pressing on sensitivities when it comes to moral/ethical issues (e.g., ‘who is this collection of international judges to tell us whether we can limit access to abortions,

28 These points are fleshed out in Fokas 2018. Specifically, the Court found application of the ban against proselytism, set out in section 4 of Law 1363/1938 (a law dating back to the Metaxas military dictatorship), as prescribed by law (para. 41), within pursuit of a legitimate aim (para. 44), but not ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in that Kokkinakis’ conviction was not shown to be justified by a pressing social need and could thus not be deemed proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (para. 49). See also Alivizatos (1999). 29 This text draws information about the case of Greece from the research conducted for Grassrootsmobilise by Dr. Margarita Markoviti.

[email protected] Religion and Human Rights in Greece 121 or marriage between homosexuals?’) or nationalist concerns (‘we will deport whatever threat to our nation we want to…’). The anti-European defiance represented in the Brexit campaign has traces also in rhetoric around the Court in certain contexts (and let us not forget that in 2016, Theresa May was proclaiming that it was not the EU that the UK should leave, but the European Convention on Human Rights).30 Greece is not a country where, in the present moment at least, such anti-European rhetoric generally has a strong foothold. But it is a country where the links between religion and national identity and church and state are strong enough to cloud expectations of changes at the nexus of religion and human rights, unless those changes are embraced by the majority church. The latter is the case because the church carries quite a bit of sway with nearly any government, due to its proven potential to sway large percentages of the voting public when it comes to issues linked to national identity (see for example the aftermath of the church-state struggle over removal of the religion field from the national identity cards; Fokas 2004; Molokotos- Leiderman 2007; see also current discussions between the current government and the church regarding church-state separation).31 The case of religious education, and perhaps also those of blasphemy and sharia law in Western Thrace, bear real potential to change this state of affairs. That is, if and as international institutions such as the ECtHR and the United Nations introduce changes on nationally sensitive issues, within this broader climate of populism and so-called ‘new’ nationalism in Europe and beyond, one might expect to see new levels of attention to such institutions and, realistically, a great deal of negative attention. What this will mean in the long run for the nexus of religion and human rights in the Greek context is a question worthy of careful attention.

References

Alivizatos, N. (1999). A new role for the Greek Church? Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 17(1), 23–40. Asad, T. (2006). French secularism and the ‘Islamic veil affair. The Hedgehog Review, 93, 93–106. Berger, B. (2014). Religious diversity, education and the “crisis” in State neutrality. Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 29(1), 103–122. Bielefeldt, H. (2013). Misperceptions of freedom of religion or belief. Human Rights Quarterly, 35, 33–68.

30 See http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/25/uk-must-leave-european-convention-on- human-rights-theresa-may-eu-referendum. Accessed 12 Jan 2019. 31 See ‘Tsipras reiterates plans plan to change Church-state relations’ (http://www.ekathimerini. com/234153/article/ekathimerini/news/tsipras-reiterates-plan-to-change-church-state-relations), and ‘Holy Synod says no change needed in Church-state relations’ (http://www.ekathimerini.com/234230/ article/ekathimerini/news/holy-synod-says-no-change-needed-in-church-state-relations). At the time of writing the latest development in these discussions is presented as ‘Ieronymos accepts “religious neutrality” in exchange for clergymen’s wages.’ (http://www.ekathimerini.com/234417/article/ ekathimerini/news/ieronymos-accepts-religious-neutrality-in-exchange-for-clergymens-wages)

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Stavros, S. (1997). Freedom of religion and claims for exemption from generally applicable, neutral laws: Lessons from across the pond. European Human Rights Law Review, 6, 607–627. Tagaris, K. (2012). Blasphemy charges filed over gay Jesus play in Greece. Reuters, 16 November 2012. www.reuters.com/article/entertainment-us-greece-blasphemy-idUSBRE- 8AF0MU20121116. Accessed 12 Jan 2019. The independent review into the application of sharia law in England and Wales. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty. (2018). February. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/678478/6.4152_HO_CPFG_Report_into_Sharia_Law_in_the_UK_WEB.pdf. Accessed 12 Jan 2019. Tsimitakis, M. (2012). A delicate blasphemy case in Greece. Al Jazeera, 16 October 2012. https:// www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/20121013154342907568.html. Accessed 12 Jan 2019. Tsakirakis, S. (2005). Religion against art (2016th ed.). Athens: Polis. Tsolakidou, S. (2012). Greece prosecutes Corpus Christi for blasphemy. Greek Reporter, 16 November 2012, available at http://greece.greekreporter.com/2012/11/16/greece-prosecutes- corpus-christi-for-blasphemy/. Accessed 12 Jan 2019. Yannoulatos, A. A. (2003). Facing the world: Orthodox Christian essays on global concerns. Crestwood: WCC/St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press. Zürcher, E. (2001). Turkey: A modern history. London: I.B. Tauris.

Effie Fokas is Principal Investigator of the European Research Council-funded project on grassroots impact of European Court of Human Rights religious freedoms case law (Grassrootsmobilise), based at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), where Dr. Fokas is a Senior Research Fellow. She is also Research Associate of the LSE Hellenic Observatory. Her publications include Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence, co-edited with Aziz Al-Azmeh; Religious America, Secular Europe?, co-authored with Peter Berger and Grace Davie; and over 40 articles and book chapters exploring religion at the intersection with politics, law, human rights, nationalism, national identity, and European identity.

[email protected] Religious Freedom in Context: A Comparison Between Belarus and Romania

Olga Breskaya and Silviu Rogobete

Abstract This chapter is an attempt to contribute the comparative study of religious freedom and Eastern Orthodoxy in sociological perspective. By examining the socio-legal similarities and differences in religious freedom governance in Orthodox Belarus and Romania and patterns of religious freedom views among adolescents (16–19 years old) in Belarus (N = 651) and Romania (N = 589), the authors argue that the official religious freedom policies had resemblance with religious freedom views of a young generation. The current empirical study showed a greater level of skepticism towards religious freedom entitlements expressed by young people in Belarus, compared to Romania. For both countries, this study indicated differences between non-religious, religious majority, and religious minorities groups in regard to ‘religious freedom entitlements,’ but not in regard to ‘religious freedom governance.’ Considering the similarities in religious freedom views regarding the predictive power of individual religiosity together with the traditional role of religion linking national and spiritual elements and the absence of predictive effect by religious pluralism, we problematize the concept of religious freedom for the further analysis of Orthodoxy worldwide. Based on empirical evidence, we discuss how sociology of religious freedom advances the study of Orthodox tradition and modernization nexus and better understanding of relationship between individual beliefs and institutional conditions that affect religious freedom advancement in Eastern European Orthodox countries.

Keywords Eastern Orthodoxy · Religious freedom · Quantitative research · Role of religion · Pluralism/exclusivism · Belarus · Romania

O. Breskaya (*) University of Padova, Padova, Italy e-mail: [email protected] S. Rogobete West University of Timisoara, Timisoara, Romania

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Introduction

The study of religious freedom and Christian Orthodoxy in Eastern Europe has a relatively recent history. One can designate two overlapping research perspectives that characterize its current state and development. The first evolves within the broader objective – to construct the models of negotiations of Eastern Orthodox tradition with human rights. It emphasizes the processes of harmonization of Christian Orthodox ethos with modernity and liberal democratic principles (Agadjanian 2010; Makrides 2012a, b) defining spheres of encounters and frictions of Orthodoxy with human rights (Stoeckl 2014, 2016), as well as the specifics of Orthodox theological interpretations of religious freedom (Diamantopoulou and Christians 2018). Complexity, ambiguity, and absence of coordinated and integrated Orthodox position on human rights make this perspective more oriented towards the history and tradition (Giordan and Guglielmi 2017) along with the questioning of its potentiality for universal religious freedom claims. The second perspective focuses on current practices of religious freedom implementation in Orthodox countries applying the analysis of legislation and cases of religious freedom violations (Richardson and Lee 2014; Fokas 2018). Both perspectives flourished from 2000s, considering the new role of Orthodoxy in public sphere in Eastern Europe after the 90s and regional specifics of religious freedom implementation as a sign of post-1989 changes (Borowik 1999; Marinović et al. 2004; Tomka and Yurash 2007). Evolving research perspectives indicated the centrality of religious freedom analysis for the understanding of the renewed societal role of religion. Meanwhile, two described perspectives do not exhaust the analysis of religious freedom as an international human rights principle in social sciences. During the last 10 years, sociologists observe the birth of the sociology of religious freedom (Richardson 2006; Finke 2013) that allows integrating mentioned above perspectives. By defining religious freedom “as a social construct that is relatively new in human history, and one with meanings that have varied over time and place” (Breskaya et al. 2018: 425), James Richardson suggested to combine the contextualization perspective for religious freedom analysis with the institutionalization approach, clarifying the role and status of the courts for religious freedom advancement in the society (Richardson 2015). His analyses of religious freedom cases in the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union brought comparative perspective to sociology of religious freedom and opened the research prospects for the empirical study of the meaning of religious freedom cross-nationally. As Sinisa Zrinščak (2011) noted, social expectations are usually understudied in the analyses of relationship between religions and states. As well, Jonathan Fox (2015) highlighted, the societal attitudes and actions are not “unworthy of study” in the religious freedom comparative projects, however current research in social sciences does not produce this kind of analysis. This chapter is an attempt to contribute the study of religious freedom and Eastern Orthodoxy within the emerging sociology of religious freedom by examining the views on religious freedom in the context of religious governance regimes in Orthodox Belarus and Romania. By the comparison of two countries with majority

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Orthodox population, however belonging to different Orthodox Churches and political constellations, we aim to explore the patterns of religious freedom views among adolescents (16–19 years old) in Belarus (N = 651) and Romania (N = 589). First, we highlight the socio-legal content of religious freedom legal framework in assessed countries focusing on the exclusive status of Orthodoxy and roles of religion as defined by law. Second, we explore the patterns of religious freedom views by the majority Orthodox, religious minority, and non-religious youth in Belarus and Romania and the kind of intergroup dynamics they produced. Third, we compare the data on attitudes towards the traditional-modernizing role of religion in Belarusian and Romanian societies and their implications for religious freedom views. Fourth, we illustrate how religious exclusivism-pluralism nexus, individual religiosity, roles of religion in society, and political secularism affected the understanding of religious freedom principles. Finally, we discuss how religious freedom laws resembled with religious freedom views of young people brought up at the time when those legal norms came into force.

Theorizing International Religious Freedom in Sociology

Religious freedom as an international human rights principle is treading an uncharted territory of research while socio-religious contexts are explored with religious governance patterns. As Roger Finke (2013) noted, “government restrictions on religion do contribute to increased social isolation of the religious groups” (Finke 2013: 308) that consequently increases violence and conflicts in society (Finke and Harris 2012). Interdependence of social cohesion and regulatory policies highlight how the presence/absence of dominant religion, social isolation, and exclusion, configuration of religious minority-majority nexus (Finke 2013) affect the religious freedom policies towards particular religious groups. It also shows how the practices of religious freedom are shaped by the type of human rights and religious freedom culture in society, how they resemble and resonate with each other. The articulated gap between declared legal norms and practices of state religion policies by Jonathan Fox (2015), together with the socio-cultural context (Giordan and Breskaya 2018) set up the structural conditions for the free exercise of religion. Before the analysis of religious freedom legal framework and religious freedom views in Belarus and Romania, we are interested in examining how the analyses of described above gap contribute the study of religious freedom and Orthodoxy. Classifying state religion policies and the statuses of religion, Jonathan Fox (2015) highlighted that Romania is an example of a multi-tier system of religion governance. By recognizing 18 religions as religious denominations, the Law on the Freedom of Religion (2006) established the equal right for each religious denomination to teach religion in public schools. The practices of religion governance showed that “the Romanian Orthodox Church is favored by the state” (Fox 2015: 51) or that in some cases during the public events in Romanian public schools, attendance of Orthodox religious services is a must regardless of religious affiliation of the pupils (Fox 2015: 96). Orthodoxy

[email protected] 128 O. Breskaya and S. Rogobete in Romania, being a marker of individual and collective identity, keeping ethnoreligious linage (Rogobete 2006a), has to react in some way to “high and unjustified state intrusion in and control of the internal affairs of the individual, particularly at the level of his or her religious life” (Rogobete 2006a, b: 39). At the same time, Orthodoxy as a majority religion is “in a continuous attempt to monopolise the support offered by the state and to limit the presence of other potential rivals to the notion of defining Romanian identity” (Rogobete 2006a: 39). Belarusian law established the same principle of equality of religious denominations with no preferences in educational sphere in the Code on Education (Kodeks 2011, Article 2, para 4). Moreover, only the registered religious organizations with specific status, which signed an agreement of cooperation with the Ministry of Education, have legal grounds to organize extra-curriculum religious upbringing (Polozheniye 2011). In practice, Belarus remains the country from the post-soviet bloc where neither majority nor minority religions benefit from the state neutrality in public schools. Even, the legal regulation of teaching religion in school creates more preferable situation for majority religion, the specifics of designating religious education from religious upbringing prescribes for the curricula of teaching of religion the civic, moral and patriotic competences (Breskaya 2017) and suggests for the Orthodox church the ideological function for building up national identity (Vasilevich and Kutuzova 2014). The gaps between religious freedom norms and governance practices in Belarus and Romania indicate that political secularism relies on religious freedom laws, restrictions, limitations, and “good practices,” however competing religious and secular actors follow not only the legal rules but are defined in their activities by the structural elements. They are the socio-cultural roles/functions exercised by religion or prescribed for religion in public spaces; modes of religious majority/minority nexus; outcomes of institutionalization of religious freedom (for example, history of failures and success of religious education in public schools).

Religious Freedom Regulations in Orthodox Countries

International religious freedom standard became a reference point for the national religion governance policies in Belarus and Romania.1 Comparatively late adoption of religious freedom legislation in Romania, according to Liviu Andreescu (2008), became “a testimony to the sometimes bitter struggles among some of the country’s most important religious groups” (Andreescu 2008:140) and a matter of public discussions (Rogobete 2004, 2006b; Andreescu 2008; Vlas 2012). That did not become a case for wider public discussion in Belarus. However, Belarusian Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” (1992) and Romanian

1 Belarus and Romania signed International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights at the same in 1968 and ratified in 1973 and 1974 accordingly.

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Law “On the Freedom of Religion and the General Status of Denominations” (2006) adopted after political transformations have some sociological similarities important for our study. They imply: (a) socio-legal exclusivism for the majority religion; (b) specific societal roles for religions regarding education, spiritual, cultural spheres of life; (c) different types of legitimate religious collectivities. (a) socio-legal exclusivism for the majority religion To the majority religion – Eastern Orthodoxy – the laws prescribe particular roles in Belarusian and Romanian societies. In Belarus, religion governance framework defines that “The Orthodox Church was recognized as having the determining role in the historical formation and development of spiritual, cultural and state traditions of Belarusian people” (Zakon 1992). In Romanian case, the societal role of Orthodoxy is defined in a similar, even if somehow softer terms: “The Romanian State recognizes the important role of the Romanian Orthodox Church and that of other churches and denominations as recognized by the national history of Romania and in the life of the Romanian society” (Law 2006, Art.7(2)). Nevertheless, the legal provisions do not affirm the prescribed exclusive statuses of Orthodoxy, both laws in fact emphasize the equality of all religions before laws and public authorities. However, the models of religion-state relations established by these laws made the equality relative. Legal regulations create particular socio-legal structures of religions and modes of their participation in public life. Classifications of religions in Romania follows a two-tier system and presupposes the existence of three types of religious collectivities. Moreover, along with the prescribing of exclusive/determining/important roles to Orthodoxy, Belarus and Romania differ in defining other religions with similar societal implications. While in Belarus, the Law on Freedom of Conscience (2002) depicted four other religious traditions with inherent spiritual, cultural, and historical roles (Catholic Church, Evangelical Lutheran Church, Judaism, and Islam), the Romanian Law (2006) did not mention any other religion than Orthodoxy. As Andreescu explained, that happened due to the long-going negotiations around the Religious Freedom Law in Romania which finally “did not award the Romanian Orthodox Church the status of a national church but ‘merely’ acknowledged its historical role” (Andreescu 2008:146). (b) specific societal roles for religions regarding education, spiritual, and cultural spheres of life Romanian Law in its Art. 7(1) claims that: “The Romanian State recognizes the denominations’ spiritual, educational, social-charitable, cultural and social partnership role, as well as their status as factors of social peace.” As Andreescu (2008) noted, teaching of religion in schools was initiated and controlled by the Romanian Orthodox Church educational sphere and became “most important battles” which Orthodoxy won in Romania after the 1990s (Andreescu 2008: 143). However, Belarusian Law has a more paternalistic approach regarding the roles of religion in public life. For instance, Art. 8 “State and Religion” of the Belarusian Law “On freedom of conscience and religious organizations” claims that: “The state neither charges religious organizations with any state functions nor interferes in

[email protected] 130 O. Breskaya and S. Rogobete activities of religious organizations unless such activities contradict the legislation of the Republic of Belarus.” (Zakon 1992). This kind of imposition of “any state functions” on religion has relevance to the teaching of religion in secondary public schools that still has an experimental character in Belarus. The practice of facultative teaching of religion in Belarusian schools shows the replacement of educational role of religion by the ideological one and the “lasting history of the relationship between religion and political power, which creates different constraints for the presence of religious education in secondary schools” (Breskaya 2017: 44). (c) different types of legitimate religious collectivities According to the Romanian Law, religious denominations and religious associations can obtain distinct legal statuses, while religious groups can perform religious activities without any previously obtained legal status. In opposite, Belarusian legal framework with differentiation of similar three types of religious collectivities has obligatory registration for all types of religious collectivities: religious organizations, religious communities, and religious associations. Obligatory registration procedures in Belarus and Romania put direct linkage between the autonomy of religious groups and institutions, their presence in public space, and the state. Various requirements for religious registration creates constraints for religious minorities to obtain the legal status and to be competitive actors with the majority religion.

A Model of Quantitative Study of Religious Freedom in Orthodox Belarus and Romania

After explaining the legal framework and practices of religious freedom governance, we are interested to analyze the socio-religious and socio-political contexts which produce particular views on religious freedom in two Orthodox countries. Following this task, we introduce the quantitative methodology we applied and discuss empirical results. In our study, four items constructed the meaning of religious freedom (see Fig. 1). Two items covered the dimension of the state’s negative obligations interpreted as “refrain from interfering in rights” by the European Court of Human Rights’ Guide to Article 9 (Guide to Article 9: 19). Two items covered the dimension of religious manifestation and the perspective of positive obligation of

(RF1) State should not interfere with missionary activities in both the majority and minority religions. (RF2) State should stay out of the public manifestations by the majority and minority religions. (RF3) Students should be offered time, space and a room in schools to do their prayers. (RF4) Government should provide for enough space that religion could be taught in schools.

Fig. 1 Dimensions of religious freedom. (We applied the instrument elaborated within the international research project “Religion and Human Rights” (Van der Ven and Ziebertz 2012, 2013))

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(1) How often do you think about religious issues? (2) To what extent do you believe that God or something divine exists? (3) How often do you take part in religious services? (4) How often do you pray? (5) How often do you experience situations in which you have the feeling that God or something divine intervenes in your life?

Fig. 2 Dimensions of religiosity the state concerning religious freedom – to enable individuals to practice their belief. Selected four items did not exhaust the meaning of religious freedom but are used to study attitudes towards equality of religious presence in public space for the majority and minority religions, their autonomy in missionary activities, realization of the right to pray in public and to have religious education. A 5-point Likert-type response scale was suggested for the measurement of religious freedom concept. In our research model, religious freedom is a dependent variable predetermined by four domains of factors: individual and institutional religious contexts, exclusivism/pluralism nexus, and the socio-political characteristics. For the purposes of our study, four concepts were used to measure individual and institutional dimensions of religious contexts: religious affiliation, faith/spirituality experiences, religiosity, and the role of religion in society. For the concept ‘religious affiliation’ the list of seventeen different religious affiliations were suggested including ‘non-religious’ identity. Later, the suggested list was recoded into the three groups: religious majority, religious minority, and non-religious groups in order to respond to the research questions. The concept ‘religiosity’ was measured with 5-items Centrality of Religiosity Scale (Huber and Huber 2012) that covers intellectual, ideological, experiential, private and public practices dimensions of religiosity (Fig. 2). All independent variables were measured with a 5-point Likert-type response scale. Considering the ongoing debate on religiosity-spirituality nexus (Roof 1993, 2003; Wuthnow 1998; Heelas and Woodhead 2005) we introduced to our conceptual model elements of faith/spirituality experiences. Taking into account that the concept of spirituality “emerges into the sociological ambit of religion from this context of contemporary pluralism” (Giordan 2007:162) and “the spiritual perspective” consists of “on the one hand, the gradual establishment of the freedom of choice of the subject, and on the other hand, the experience of diversity and religious pluralism” (Giordan 2016: 201), we expect that this concept affects religious freedom views. For the measurement of faith/spiritual experiences, the instrument developed by Kass et al. (1991) and Hood (1975) was introduced. For the faith/spirituality experiences, the following question was suggested to the respondents: “Have you had an experience like these people describe?” and the following two scales, each consisting of two items were used in the questionnaire (see Fig. 3). As Miklós Tomka (2006) argued, that contextual and socio-cultural elements of Orthodoxy in Eastern Europe present distinct kind of religious culture. It can be characterized by “the rough preservation of the traditional socio-cultural pattern, which is functional both in societal and individual respects (…) notwithstanding the fact that differentiation, modernity, and secularization have encroached into this

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(Faith experience) People say that their faith gives them a certainty in life that they otherwise would not have. People say that their faith has often helped them not to lose courage in particular situations. (Spirituality experience) People say that they have had an experience of oneness with all things. People say that they have had an experience of profound inner peace. Answer scheme: 1= I never had; 2= I rarely had; 3= now and then; 4=I often had; 5=I very often had

Fig. 3 Dimensions of faith/spirituality experiences

(Exclusivism) My religion gives the best access to a flourishing life. Other religions, different from mine, have only parts of a flourishing life. (Pluralism) Religions are all equal; they are just different paths to a flourishing life. There is no difference between religions, they all long for a flourishing life.

Fig. 4 Dimensions of exclusivism/pluralism part of the world as well” (Tomka 2006: 256). In our study, we analyze the views about the role Orthodox churches perform in Belarusian and Romanian societies. Hence, starting from Tomka’s argument, we assess how religion’s role in these two societies follows the tradition/modernization nexus. The measuring instrument consists of eight items that represent different roles (see the list in Table 6) that religion can perform in a society, i.e., role of religion as a public institution, influencing societal and cultural spheres, as well as being an institution for personal spiritual growth. As James T. Richardson pointed out (2006), “religious freedom is of interest only in religiously pluralistic societies” (Richardson 2006: 274) because religious or social homogeneity does not create conditions for the support of a plurality of views, norms, and values. As we have noted above, exclusivism is a socio-legal principle, somehow encroached into the legal framework on religious freedom in Belarus and Romania. Hence, we are interested to analyze the values of exclusivism- pluralism in these societies and to explore their effect on religious freedom views. In other words, we are interested in exploring if legal exclusivism-pluralism has any resemblance with religious exclusivism-pluralism (Giordan 2014). In our study, exclusivism-pluralism nexus was measured with the scales consisted of two items for each concept (see Fig. 4). Both scales were elaborated for the questionnaire used in the international research project “Religion and Human Rights” mentioned above in this study. Political secularism (Fig. 5) is conceptualized with the two items covering opposite patterns of the religion-state competition (Fox 2015). Alfred Stepan (2010, 2012) noted, the models of secularisms follow the logic that “Democratic institutions do need sufficient political space from religion to function, just as citizens do need to be given sufficient space by democratic institutions to exercise their religious freedom” (Stepan 2010: 2).

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(1)Politicians may consult religious leaders about any ethical problem in the country, but should decide independently by themselves. (2) Parliament should decide on school laws, regardless religious leaders’ opinion.

Fig. 5 Dimensions of secularism

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Against the background of what is said in the previous parts of this chapter, this present explorative research aims to compare views on religious freedom expressed by young people in Belarus and Romania and to answer the following specific questions: 1. Does the religious context contribute the intergroup dynamics among Orthodox believers, members of minority religions, and non-religious youth vis-à-vis religious freedom views? 2. Do the individual and institutional religious contexts have any effect on religious freedom views? 3. Are exclusivism/pluralism nexus and secularism principles good predictors of attitudes towards religious freedom? To answer these research questions we used frequency analysis, t-test, ANOVA, ANCOVA, and linear regression analysis. We assume that three contexts have similar predictive power for religious freedom views in two Orthodox countries. Based on theoretical arguments and previous studies (Ziebertz and Sterkens 2018; Botvar 2018; Breskaya and Ališauskienė 2017; Breskaya and Döhnert 2018; Sjöborg 2012), the following hypotheses were verified in this study: H1: Religious and non-religious affiliation produce no difference in views on religious freedom in Belarus and Romania. H2: Religiosity has a positive influence on religious freedom views in both countries, while faith/spirituality experiences have not. H3: Role of religion in society contributes to religious freedom views. H4: Exclusivism has a stronger influence on religious freedom views than pluralism in the two countries. H5: Political secularism has stronger implications for religious freedom views in Belarus than in Romania.

Method and Sample

The data presented in this chapter was collected within the period 2014–2015 as a part of Religion and Human rights Project 2.0 in the largest cities in the two compared countries. In Belarus, 651 respondents (16–19 years old) participated in the survey, most of whom were undergraduate University students from Minsk,

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Table 1 Religious affiliation of Belarusian and Romanian youth (frequencies (%)) Belarus Romania Orthodox Christians 56.1 72.2 Religious minorities (including Catholics, Protestant, Muslim, 19.5 19.1 Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu, others) Religious ‘none’ 24.4 8.7

Vitebsk, Brest, Hrodna, Gomel, Mogilev. The questionnaire was filled in online, and participation in the survey was secured with individual passwords. In Romania, the study was conducted in high schools in eight major cities covering the whole country: Bucuresti, Cluj-Napoca, Constanta, Craiova, Iasi, Ploiesti, Sibiu and Timisoara. These cities cover all regions of the country and reflect population sizes. The study investigated 589 high-school students studying at well-run high schools of these cities. The participants were 16–18 years old. We used a stratified random sample of high-school classes – strata being computed for regions of Romania. We questioned all students in the class. The questionnaire was filled in online, under the direct supervision of the tutors responsible for the ITC courses. Descriptive statistics allowed us to emphasize similarities in our samples regarding the presence of Orthodox majority (see Table 1). Orthodox youth built up 56% of the Belarusian sample and 72% of Romanian and religious minorities that constituted one-fifth of the samples in both countries. However, the category of religious ‘nones’ revealed the difference: this group was more than twice as large presented in the Belarusian sample than in the Romanian one. According to the official statistics, around 58.9% of Belarusians are believers and 82% of them identified themselves as Orthodox (49% of population), 12% as Catholics (7% of population), and 6% represented other denominations (3.5% of population).2 In Romania, the national study “The believing Romania. Perceptions and religious behaviour” showed that 83% of the population belong to Eastern Orthodoxy, 4% – to Roman- Catholicism, 4% – to Protestantism, 3% – to Neoprotestantism, 4% – to other religious groups, 1% are Greek-Catholics (Uniates), and atheists constitute 1% of the population.3 Our survey samples reflect these tendencies in general, meanwhile we can also observe slight differences with national surveys. That fact can be explained by the differences in religiosity of young generation, the specific age cohort we selected for our study.

2 Commissioner on Religions and Nationalities of the Republic of Belarus by the Department of Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus. November 2011. http:// www.mfa.gov.by/upload/pdf/religion_eng.pdf. Accessed 10 Nov 2018. 3 ROMÂNIA CREDINCIOASĂ. Percepții și comportament religios (The believing Romania. Perceptions and religious behaviour). August 2015, Institutul Român pentru Evaluare şi Strategie (IRES). http://www.ires.com.ro/articol/302/romania-credincioasa%2D%2Dpercepții-și- comportament-religios. Accessed 14 Sep 2018.

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Empirical Findings

In this section, the descriptive statistics of the respondents’ views on the four dimensions of religious freedom and the t-test are reported. Second, the variance among the religious majority, religious minority and non-religious groups within and across the countries by applying ANOVA was examined. Third, a One-way ANCOVA was executed to measure how the religious freedom views were adjusted by the religious, socio-cultural, and political secularism contexts for the three groups. Finally, the analysis of the regression models were discussed revealing the challenges of multiple-country research on religious freedom.

Religious Freedom: One Concept, Two Dimensions

As already mentioned, the overall aim of this research is to explore the attitudes towards religious freedom expressed by young people in Belarus and Romania with the further comparison. After finding similar socio-legal characteristics of religious freedom governance in Belarus and Romania, we hypothesized that Belarus and Romania have similar patterns in religious freedom culture among young people. Accordingly, the differences were examined at the level of general samples and groups – Orthodox Christians (majority religion), religious minorities, and non- religious youth. Descriptive statistics (Table 2) show that the level of ambiguity of young people towards religious freedom was quite high in both countries. It composed more than one-third of answers for each dimension of religious freedom. The most noticeable contrast in respondent’s uncertainty regarded the views on the possibility to pray in school in special places and on teaching religion. Belarusian youth was more skepti- cal about those aspects of religious freedom than the Romanian was. In Romania, where religious education has been a well-established practice, the support for this

Table 2 Religious freedom views for Belarusian and Romanian youth (frequencies (%)) State State non- Offered time non- interference in and space in interference public schools for State should provide in missionary activities of prayers for space for teaching activities religion students religion in school RF1 RF2 RF3 RF4 BY RO BY RO BY RO BY RO I totally disagree 4.3 6.6 3.4 6.5 11.4 9.3 9.2 9.3 I disagree 10.8 18.8 14.0 17.5 22.9 15.8 17.4 11.9 I am not sure 49.2 49.2 37.6 41.8 44.2 38.9 38.9 30.9 I agree 26.3 17.3 31.6 22.1 15.5 25.8 24.4 31.7 I fully agree 9.5 8.0 13.4 12.2 6.0 10.2 10.1 16.1

[email protected] 136 O. Breskaya and S. Rogobete dimension of religious freedom was stronger, even if equal access with the majority religion is somewhat still problematic for the other minority religious groups. On the contrary, the negative obligations of the state related to the manifestation of institutional religion (RF1, RF2) received stronger support from the Belarusian youth. For the concept of ‘religious freedom,’ a principal component factor analysis with Varimax (orthogonal) rotation was performed to identify the empirical dimensions of the survey instrument. The findings show that 4-items of Religious Freedom Index (RFI) were similarly loaded in two factors in both data-sets. The analysis yielded two factors, explaining a total of 75% of the variance for the entire set of variables in Belarusian dataset, and 71% in the Romanian dataset. ‘Factor 1’ was labeled ‘religious freedom entitlements’ due to the high loadings of the following items: a right to pray in school, and right to religious instruction in school. This first factor explained 46% of the variance in Belarusian data-set and 43% of the variance in Romanian one. The second factor was labeled ‘religious freedom regulations’ due to the high loadings of the following factors: state non-interference in missionary activities of religions and state non-interference into public activities of the majority and minority religions. The variance explained by this factor was 29% in Belarusian sample and 28% in Romanian one. KMO (.566 in Belarus and .528 in Romania) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity both indicated that the set of variables are adequately related for the factor analysis. Two empirical dimensions of religious freedom suggested that the theoretical concept used in the survey and assessed by the respondents did not construct the holistic meaning. It had fragmented patterns that kept the religious freedom entitlements separately at the individual level and religion governance. To proceed with the hypothesis verification, we created a 4-items Index of Religious Freedom. The Cronbach’s Alpha in Romanian (Alpha = 0.54) and in Belarusian (Alpha = 0.61) samples indicated the moderate reliability of the created index. This result is discussed in the final section of our article, providing insights for the further theoretical work needed. An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare Religious Freedom attitudes for young people in Belarus and Romania. There was no significant difference in the scores for RFI in Belarusian sample (M = 3.14, SD = 0.686) and in Romanian sample (M = 3.16, SD = 0.694); t (1238) = −0.52, p = 0.61. These results suggested that country variance has no statistical effect on RFI attitudes.

Patterns of Attitudes Towards Religious Freedom Among Orthodox, Religious Minorities, and Non-religious Youth

In this section, we presented the analysis of variances in views on religious freedom among three groups of respondent: affiliated with the religious majority (Orthodoxy), religious minorities, and non-religious youth. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to

[email protected] Religious Freedom in Context: A Comparison Between Belarus and Romania 137 compare the effect of religious affiliation on RFI and its two dimensions – ‘religious freedom entitlements’ and ‘religious freedom regulations.’ For the Belarusian youth, we found that there is a significant effect of religious affiliation on RFI at the p < .05 level for the three groups [F(2, 648) = 21.33, p = .000]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that there is a significant statistical difference between all three groups regarding their attitudes towards RFI. However, respondents affiliated with minority religions (M = 3.36, SD = .716) have stronger difference with non-religious (M = 2.86, SD = .776) than with those affiliated with Orthodoxy (M = 3.18, SD = .591). A one-way ANOVA was measured separately for two dimensions of religious freedom. Concerning the concept of ‘religious freedom entitlements,’ we obtained similar and discerning results in two data-sets. There was a statistically significant difference among the three groups in their attitudes towards ‘religious freedom entitlements’ in two countries. However, the strongest division in scores of means was between religious minority and non-religious respondents in Belarus while running ANOVA. Meanwhile, in Romania, the strongest variance in views on religious freedom was seen between religious majority and non-religious respondents while running ANOVA for ‘religious freedom entitlements’ concept. Also, Belarusian results indicated that there is no statistical difference among the three groups regarding the ‘religious freedom regulations’ dimension of religious freedom. For the Romanian data set, the same analysis was conducted. As in Belarus, we found the significant effect of religious affiliation on RFI at the p < .05 level for the three groups [F(2, 586) = 11.13, p = .000]. The effect of religious affiliation also appeared if we analyzed the views about the ‘religious freedom entitlements.’ Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that there was a statistically significant difference in variance of attitudes towards RFI produced by religious minority (M = 3.20, SD = .896) and non-religious (M = 3.13, SD = .865) and between religious majority (M = 3.05, SD = . 811) and non-religious. We have discovered similar patterns of outcomes in Romania as in Belarus concerning ‘religious freedom regulations’: there was no statistically significant difference among the three groups regarding this dimension of religious freedom. Taken together, these results suggested that RFI with its two dimensions structured the relationship among the adolescents with different religious affiliation in Belarus and Romania producing two patterns: 1. There was no statistically significant difference between non-religious, religious majority, and religious minorities groups in their attitudes towards the dimension of ‘religious freedom regulations,’ while statistically significant difference appeared in views on ‘religious freedom entitlements.’ 2. Regarding the concept of ‘religious freedom entitlements,’ there was a statistically significant difference between non-religious young people and religious minorities in Belarus and between non-religious and Orthodox youth in Romania. We also observed a small difference between the Orthodox majority and religious minorities in Romanian data when conducting this analysis.

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Individual Religiosity, Faith/Spirituality Experiences, and Religious Freedom

Previous studies reported that for the analyses of religiosity and the role of religion in post-communist countries (Zrinščak and Črpić 2017), it is more relevant to apply the theoretical concept of diversity than to search for similarities. Before presenting the effect of religiosity on religious freedom views, we explored the variance in religiosity patterns between Belarusian and Romanian youths. In our study, individual religiosity is measured by the concepts of belonging, belief, and practice and they are supplemented with the analysis of faith/spirituality experiences. Also, at the individual level, “the lack of correlation between religiosity and other fields of human behaviour in several countries of Eastern and East-Central Europe” was seen as the “proof of the emptiness of the debated religious revival” in Eastern Europe (Tomka 2006: 252). Our study allowed measuring that argument on the example of the effect of religiosity, faith/spirituality experiences on religious freedom views. Individual religiosity characteristics (belief and practice) have a particular variance between the countries and among the three groups (the religious majority, minority, and religious ‘nones’) within the one country (see Table 3). Group of young people who confirmed their belief (‘quite a bit’ and ‘very much so’) comprised 65% of Romanian youth and almost half of the Belarusian young people (47%) if measuring the three groups together (Orthodox, religious minorities, and religious ‘nones’). However, when we excluded religious ‘nones,’ a similar pattern

Table 3 Answers to the question “To what extent do you believe that God or something divine exists?” (frequencies (%)) ‘Quite a bit’ Not very Quite a Very and ‘very Not at all much Moderately bit much so much so’ Belarus 9.5 15.5 28.0 15.1 32.0 47.1 Romania 8.2 9.9 17.4 22.8 41.7 64.5 Belarus 1.9 8.2 28.8 20.0 41.1 61.1 (Orthodox) Romania 4.4 6.9 18.7 26.2 43.8 70 (Orthodox) Belarus 3.1 11.0 29.1 14.2 42.5 56.7 (religious minorities) Romania 4.0 12.1 14.1 18.2 51.5 69.7 (religious minorities) Belarus 32.1 35.8 25.2 4.4 2.5 6.9 (religious ‘nones’) Romania 50.0 30.4 13.0 4.3 2.2 6.5 (religious ‘nones’)

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Table 4 Religious practices (weekly pray) and church/mosque/other places attendance (frequencies (%)) Monthly attendance of Weekly prayer religious services Belarus 21.8 11.9 Romania 60.2 26.1 Belarus (Orthodox) 26.4 12.4 Romania (Orthodox) 65.3 22.8 Belarus (religious minorities) 35.8 17.6 Romania (religious minorities) 68.0 44.3 Belarus (religious ‘nones’) 0.7 0.0 Romania (religious ‘nones’) 4.0 8.0 of responses was observed. In Romania, 70% of Orthodox youth and members of religious minorities confirmed their belief in God. Belarusian Orthodox youth expressed their belief with a higher percentage than the religious minority (61% vs. 57%). The pattern of ‘moderate belief’ that can also be seen as a non-rejecting category had higher values among all groups in Belarus than in Romania. Religious ‘nones’ in Belarus were more keen on having a religious belief (answering “not at all” (32%)) than in Romania (with 50% of similar responses). At the same time, a similar number of religious ‘nones’ (7%) had a strong belief in the two countries. Weekly prayer (see Table 4) was exercised three times more often in Romania (60% against 22% in Belarus), and monthly church attendance was two times more often in Romania (26%) than in Belarus (12%). In Romania, minority religions were nearly two times more active than the religious majority in attendance of religious services. The similar tendencies in Belarusian sample were revealed: youth from religious minorities was more active in weekly prayer and monthly attendance of religious services than the Orthodox youth. It is interesting to see that some Romanian religious ‘nones’ exercise weekly prayer and attend religious services; meanwhile Belarusian religious ‘nones’ are not practicing religion in the same way as Romanians. This finding shows how religious practices can be part of various processes of cultural, educational, and family socialization and overlapping functions of religion in the two societies. We will come back to the functions of religion in these two Orthodox societies and its impact on religious freedom views in the following sections. We were further interested in making comparison between Belarus and Romania regarding religious freedom when taking into consideration the impact of faith/ spirituality and religiosity. Hence, we computed the variables of ‘faith’ and ‘spirituality’ from suggested four items into two scales, as the criterion for an acceptable reliability has been satisfied for ‘faith experience’ (Cronbach’s alpha in Belarus = .86 and Romania = .76) and ‘spirituality experience’ (Cronbach’s alpha in Belarus = .84 and Romania = .75). Analysis of both scales demonstrates (see Table 5) that young people in Romania experienced faith and spirituality to a greater degree compared to Belarusian adoles-

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Table 5 Percentage of respondents who had faith/spirituality experiences (frequencies (%)) Religious Religious majority minority Religious ‘nones’ Faith experience Belarus 56.2 70.9 52.2 Romania 78.4 72.6 68.6 Spirituality Belarus 43.0 56.7 25.2 experience Romania 66.4 60.2 47.1 cence. The following answers are summarized in this table: “3 = now and then; 4 = I often had; 5 = I very often had”. The faith/spirituality experiences show an interesting differences between Belarusian and Romanian youth. Young people belonging to a religious minority groups in Belarus are more likely to admit the presence of faith/spirituality experiences if compared to Orthodox, while in Romanian case it is the opposite. The Orthodox majority in Romania had faith/spirituality experiences in a greater degree compared to religious minorities. Three groups, including religious ‘nones,’ expressed stronger faith experiences than the spiritual one. The diversity elements which could characterize our samples are seen at the level of more active religious practices in Romania and stronger experiences of belief and spirituality, while more moderated belief in Belarus (compared to Romania) including ‘religious ‘nones’ is observed there. This context of diversity is counterbalanced by similarities in some structural composition of religious landscape (presence of minorities) and similar expression of their belief.

Role of Religion and Religious Freedom

The role of religion in society represents the students’ opinion regarding the function that religion should have in society. Among eight suggested roles of religion, in both samples the highest support was given to the statement that “Religions should take responsibility for their members’ spiritual growth” (M = 3.48 in Belarus, M = 3.47 in Romania), followed by: “Religions should go along with changing ideas in society” M = 3.38 and M = 3.46. The third most important function is different for two groups of young people in Belarus and Romania. This is: “Religions should take joint responsibility with the state for our national culture” in Belarus (M = 3.23), and “Religions should always keep up with current social trends” (M = 3.14) in Romania. The least important function for young Belarusians (M = 2.19) and Romanians (M = 2.52) is “Religions should use their authority to intervene in societal affairs”. For the concept ‘role of religion’, a principal component factor analysis with Varimax (orthogonal) rotation was conducted in two samples (See Table 6). The 8-items of ‘role of religion’ scale loaded in two factors, explaining in Belarusian and Romanian samples 57% of the variances. The similarity in the results of factor analyses made it possible to conclude that six items loaded in the “factor 1”. This is

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Table 6 Principal component analysis with Varimax rotation for ‘role of religion in society’ Belarus Romania Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Religions should take responsibility for their .592 .634 members’ spiritual growth. Religions should create places for deep .579 .572 spiritual experiences. Religions should take joint responsibility with .752 .738 the state for our national culture. Religions should go along with changing ideas .894 .882 in society. Religions should take public responsibility for .802 .693 the societal development. Religions should always keep up with current .882 .835 social trends. Religions should use their authority to .613 .698 intervene in societal affairs. Religions should consolidate nation against .751 .702 alien influences and deprivation of its originality. Belarus: Explained variance: 57.374 KMO = .769 Romania: Explained variance: 56.525 KMO = .763 a set of intertwined roles of religion at the institutional and individual levels that all together can be seen as a “basis for consolidated national, cultural, spiritual identity.” Among these items are societal and spiritual roles of religion, religion as the foundation for the national identity, and cooperation of religion with the state for the sustaining of national culture. Along with that, the two items: “Religions should go along with changing ideas in society” and “Religions should always keep up with current social trends” loaded in the “factor 2” that links religion with the social changes and modernization. The results of the ANCOVA did not show the statistically significant differences between the countries neither controlling the role of religion as a “consolidated national, cultural, spiritual identity” nor “religion as a social change and modernization force” (factor1/factor2). This finding confirms the similarity in patterns of religious freedom culture among young people while considering the role of religion in this regard.

Exclusivism-Pluralism Nexus and Religious Freedom

For the general samples (see Table 7), the data revealed that the level of uncertainty about exclusivism was stronger in comparison with the uncertainty related to pluralism statements.

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Table 7 Religious exclusivism/pluralism in Belarus and Romanian (frequencies (%)) There is no My religion or Other religions, Religions are all difference between worldview gives the different from mine, equal; they are just religions, they all best access to a have only parts of a different paths to a long for a flourishing life flourishing life flourishing life flourishing life Belarus Romania Belarus Romania Belarus Romania Belarus Romania I totally 15.4 10.0 30.7 25.0 9.7 13.8 11.7 18.3 disagree I 17.7 15.4 29.5 24.8 13.1 17.3 17.2 19.0 disagree I am not 43.0 34.5 32.3 34.6 23.0 20.4 27.2 24.8 sure I agree 16.9 26.1 4.8 11.2 34.4 26.8 28.3 22.4 I fully 7.1 13.9 2.8 4.4 19.8 21.7 15.7 15.4 agree

Table 8 The analysis of attitudes towards religious exclusivism/pluralism religious with consideration of religious identity (means) Religious Orthodox minority Non-religious General sample Exclusivism Belarus 2.58 2.82 2.09 2.51 Romania 2.84 2.93 2.42 2.82 Pluralism Belarus 3.47 3.28 3.30 3.30 Romania 3.25 2.85 2.63 3.12

The values of the means showed that exclusivism was more appreciated by Romanian youth (M = 2.82) than Belarusian (M = 2.51), while pluralism, in opposite, was more valued by Belarusian young people (Table 8). If to take into account religious affiliation, youth belonging to religious minorities are slightly more exclusivist in their views in both countries, while young Orthodox people are more pluralistic than other groups. A one-way ANOVA and Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that for exclusivism views a statistically significant difference was observed among three groups in Belarus, even though p-value was stronger for the difference between the non-religious and religious youth than between Orthodox and members of minority religions. The same tests for the views on pluralism in Belarusian sample showed that there was a statistically significant effect of religious affiliation on pluralism at the p < .05 level for the three groups in Belarus [F(2, 648) = 13.49, p = .000]. Between Orthodox believers and religious youth from religious minority groups, there was no statistically significant difference observed (see Table 9). Results from ANOVA analyses produced the assumption that Orthodox believers and members of minority religions in Romania shared similar exclusivist attitudes, while similarity in pluralistic views was depicted for majority/minority nexus in Belarus and minority/non-religious nexus in Romania. Also, a one-way ANCOVA

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Table 9 ANOVA results for the effect of religious affiliation on exclusivism/pluralism attitudes Exclusivism Exclusivism Pluralism Pluralism Belarus Romania Belarus Romania Between Orthodox/ + – – + minority religions (p = .020) (p = .005) Between Orthodox/ + + + + non-religious (p = .000) (p = .005) (p = .000) (p = .001) Between minority + + + – religions/non-religious (p = .000) (p = .002) (p = .022) Presence of statistically significant difference is marked by “+” and its absence by “–” revealed statistically significant results while controlling exclusivism/pluralism effects for religious freedom attitudes. The views on RFI were statistically significantly different among the three groups of young people (majority, minority, and non-religious) when adjusting for the effect of exclusivism in Belarus, F(2, 647) = 15.24, p = .000 and Romania, F(2, 579) = 10.00, p = .000. The same results regarding the views on RFI were observed when we controlled for the effect of pluralism for three groups in Belarusian and Romanian samples. Our research questions are related to three contexts (religious, exclusivism-pluralism nexus, and political secularism) and their implications for religious freedom views. The linear regression analyses (Table 10) showed that for religious context, the majority-minority nexus had predictive power for religious freedom view (beta = .119) in Belarus only. The first hypothesis is therefore not relevant for Belarusian sample, and it is true for the Romanian sample. The concept of religiosity contributed to religious freedom views. What Tomka described as a “lack of correlation between religiosity and other fields of human behaviour,” was not observed for the understanding of religious freedom views. Religiosity was near to have the strongest effect on the dependent variable. The second hypothesis is true for Belarusian and Romanian youth – religiosity had a positive influence on religious freedom views, while faith/spirituality experiences had not. More detailed analyses of religiosity components vis-à-vis religious freedom views indicated that in the Romanian case the intellectual, ideological (belief), experiential, and attendance of religious services had predictive power for religious freedom views, while in Belarusian case it was only the religious belief. As for institutional religious context, the societal role of religion as a source for national, cultural, and spiritual identities had predictive power for religious freedom views in both countries. The third hypothesis was proved, however not for the role of religion as a modernization force. This finding confirmed the argument of Tomka that the role of religion as a keeper of national tradition was functional for religious freedom views, while modernization discourse is not functional in that regard. The attitudes towards exclusivism revealed their predictive power for the Romanian sample only, and pluralism did not affect religious freedom attitudes either in Belarus or Romania. Thus, the fourth hypothesis is true for Romania only. The influence of political secularism on religious freedom views was only relevant for Belarusian youth, so the fifth hypothesis is true. For ‘political secularism’ con-

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Table 10 Regression analysis for RFI views Belarus Romania Beta Sig. Bet. Sig. Religious minority affiliation (ref. .076 0.47 NS religious majority) Non-religious (ref. religious NS NS majority) Faith experience NS NS Spirituality experience NS NS Religiosity .179 .000 .276 .000 Role of religion (religion and NS NS modernization) Role of religion (national, cultural, .188 .000 .213 .000 and spiritual identity) Exclusivism NS .128 .002 Pluralism NS NS Political secularism .118 .002 NS Gender NS NS Age NS NS Adj. R2 (explained variance) 17% 25% Reference: Religious affiliation = majority religion (Orthodox Church in Belarus and Romania); gender = male ∗p ≤ .05; ∗∗p ≤ .01; ∗∗∗p ≤ .001 cept, we can see the existing state religion policies can explain the presence of its effect in Belarus. Religious freedom law and state religion policy in Belarus keep strong paternalistic character and necessity to have the dialogue between competing religious and political powers is still current especially in regulations regarding religious education. At the same time, established norms of religious education in Romanian law and policies of its implementation satisfy Orthodox youth, even though it produces new discussions and challenges for members of religious minorities or non-religious youth.

Conclusions and Discussion

The comparison of Belarus and Romania, two majority Orthodox countries, indicated that the official religious freedom policies and practices of religious freedom implementation had resemblance with religious freedom views of a young generation. The current empirical study showed a greater level of skepticism towards religious freedom entitlements expressed by young people in Belarus, compared to Romania. At the same time, greater support for the right to pray and religious instructions in schools is being seen in Romanian sample. Moreover, for both countries this study indicated differences between non-religious, religious majority, and religious minorities groups in regard to ‘religious freedom entitlements,’ but not in

[email protected] Religious Freedom in Context: A Comparison Between Belarus and Romania 145 regard to ‘religious freedom governance.’ The state religion policies had particular socializing effects for young generations, while religious and non-religious affiliations contributed to intergroup dynamics. This study brought empirical evidence to Finke’s argument, who stated that religious governance can contribute to social cohesion and increased isolation of religious groups (2013), by showing how religious freedom views structured the differences between non-religious, religious minorities, and religious majority. The absence of country effect on RFI between Orthodox Belarus and Romania induces to consider various sociological factors that produced that similarity for young people. The empirical evidence about the predictive power of individual religiosity, together with the traditional role of religion linking national and spiritual elements, can contribute the theoretical discussions about the negotiations of Orthodoxy with modernity and to the understanding of sociological levels and arguments for such encounters (Breskaya et al. 2018). Considering the empirical evidence that religion at the individual and societal levels had positive predictive power for religious freedom views while religious pluralism had not, we have to rethink Richardson’s argument. Religious freedom is valued in religiously pluralistic societies (Richardson 2006); however, it is also an important factor within cultures hold- ing to religiously exclusivist values. Religious freedom for majority religion, which for a long period of history had no political-legal conditions to exercise its institutional autonomy and publicly to manifest its practices, appeared to be intertwined with the religious exclusivism values. The limitations of this study are related to the multidimensionality of pluralism and exclusivism concepts. The concept of religious pluralism, which we applied in the empirical analysis, differs from legal pluralism (Giordan 2014). The conceptualization of legal pluralism together with the religious pluralism and exclusivism is an important sociological task for further religious freedom research. Finally, the findings about individual religiosity, which appeared to confirm a robust pattern in religious freedom and human rights research, raises new sociological inquiries about the classical concept of the sociology of religion – religiosity, its constituents, and relationship to spirituality analyzed in view of religious freedom. Hence, it requires further investigation why the four items from the five-item scale of religiosity had the predictive power for religious freedom in one Orthodox country, according to our findings, and it was only one in the other. This current two-country comparison suggested that religious freedom was not seen as a monolith concept. It actually had at least two dimensions for our respondents. The first one was related to the religious freedom entitlements for the individual and it was seen separately from the second one, namely religious freedom governance. It is hoped that such statistical gap for our respondents can contribute better understanding of an embedded socio-political structural conditions that impede religious freedom advancement in the two Eastern European Orthodox countries assessed in this work. This finding has, nevertheless, to be confirmed in other religious and political contexts of religious freedom governance. Hence, the necessity of further research to be conducted in the area of the conceptualization of religious freedom for empirical sociological studies.

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Author Note The article was jointly conceived in dialogue between the two authors. Olga Breskaya took the lead in writing the sections: “Introduction,” “Theorizing international religious freedom in sociology,” “Model of quantitative analysis on religious freedom,” and “Empirical findings,” while Silviu Rogobete took the lead in writing “Two cases of religious freedom regulation in Orthodox countries,” “Research questions and hypotheses,” “Method and sample,” and “Conclusions and discussion.”

References

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Olga Breskaya is a Sociologist of Religion exploring the relationship between religion and human rights. She is currently working on her PhD project in the International Joint PhD Programme on Human Rights, Society and Multi-level Governance at the University of Padova, integrating perspectives from the sociology of human rights and quantitative study on religious freedom. She compares instruments on religious freedom analysis using statistical methods and interdisciplinary approaches. Among her publications is ‘Human rights and religion: A sociological perspective’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 57(3), 419–431, 2018 (co-authored with Giuseppe Giordan and James T. Richardson).

Silviu Rogobete is a Professor of Applied Moral Philosophy, West University Timisoara, formally Consul General of Romania in South Africa (2006–2013). His academic interests are human rights, religion and politics, diplomacy, and foreign affairs. In 2016, he was appointed Associate Professor Extraordinary of Stellenbosch University, South Africa. He obtained a BA (1994) and a PhD (1998) from Brunel University (UK), and in the summers of 2001 and 2002, he received postdoctoral instruction in Human Rights, under Professor David Robertson at St Hugh’s College, Oxford University. Among his publications is Religion, Political and Judicial Rights in Post- communist, Post-Atheist Spaces together with Robert Reisz, in a collective volume (Springer, 2018).

[email protected] Greek-Cypriot Religiocultural Heritage as an Indicator of Fundamental Rights and a Means to Cultural Diplomacy

Georgios E. Trantas

Abstract The process of Europeanisation and the Westphalian reversal that it entails does not only mean the erosion of borders, the shift of national powers upwards and the review of the notion of sovereignty as it emerged from the fermentations that gave birth to a secular(ist) state-system. The contemporary international environment, being in essence postsecular, means the indirect political enabling of religion, by rendering recognised religious organisations as civil society addenda and therefore, essentially as actors. The Treaty of Lisbon (2007, into force 2009) for instance, allows room for more participation and intervention by churches, among other religious and philosophical actors, in the European Union (EU) Institutions. Thereby, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus (hereafter OCC) has been able to set in motion an operation towards securing the fundamental and religious rights of the Greek-Orthodox community – particularly where heterodox religioscapes inter- sect – not least, through the utilisation of the office of Representation of the Church of Cyprus to the EU (RCCEU). In doing so, the application and implementation of the European acquis and the Charter of Fundamental Rights without exceptions was deemed essential in order to safeguard the aforementioned rights, which constitutes religiocultural diplomacy in practice, exercised by a par excellence religious actor.

Keywords Orthodox Church of Cyprus · Religioscapes · Religiocultural heritage · Cultural diplomacy · Human rights · Europeanisation · EU acquis

Introduction

The object of the present research is to shed light on the approaches and strategy of the OCC vis-à-vis the EU, considering particularly the options and political instruments made available to them via the EU membership of the Republic of Cyprus;

G. E. Trantas (*) Aston University, Birmingham, UK e-mail: [email protected]

[email protected] 150 G. E. Trantas namely, the utilisation of the accesses thereof, the priorities of their agenda, their main purposes, conduct and rhetoric, and the problématique that has been ushered into the EU discourses. It would not be amiss to maintain that the OCC has utilised its representation in Brussels in order to pursue its priorities that pertain to the Greek-Orthodox religioscapes located in the Turkish-occupied territory of Northern Cyprus. The OCC has linked the condition and accessibility of the Greek-Orthodox religiocultural heritage that comprises religious monuments, churches, monasteries, relics, icons, frescoes, pilgrimage sites, etc. to the EU principles and values on human rights, religious freedom and equality regardless of creed and faith; and thereby to the terms and conditions of a potential reunification of the island’s communities and the accession of the rest of Cyprus to the EU. In short, the state of those religioscape markers and cultural signifiers is deemed the measure of a potentially peaceful and harmonious coexistence and of successful Europeanisation, i.e. of appropriation, endorsement and observation of the EU set of values and principles on fundamental rights. Within this conceptual framework, the purpose of the present study is (a) to shed light on the activities and initiatives of the OCC for the promotion of religious freedom and human rights via the implementation of the EU acquis, (b) identify and assess the cultural-diplomatic practices and the collaboration with the EU Institutions; (c) examine the uses of religiocultural means towards acknowledging the Greek-Orthodox religioscapes in Northern Cyprus and safeguarding their fundamental rights; (d) contemplate Europeanisation as a means towards promoting democratisation, consolidation of human rights and interreligious dialogue – ultimately, the guiding EU principles and values, which are also EU membership prerequisites. In order to do so, the Post-Westphalian international political context has been taken into account as it upgraded the place and role of religious and philosophical actors in the EU, which is also attested by the church representations in Brussels, as they are in a position to exercise religious and cultural diplomacy. The methodological approach of choice was a qualitative content analysis that was intended to bring to light and coherently structure in thematic categories the emergent patterns that were identified in the data. The key sources of primary and secondary data were the official monthly bulletin of the OCC Apostolos Varnavas (Gr.: Απόστολος Βαρνάβας), the official websites of the OCC1 and the RCCEU,2 and two high circulation Greek-Cypriot daily newspapers, i.e. Phileleftheros (Gr.: Φιλελεύθερος) and Simerini (Gr.: Σημερινή). The period of interest is from 2006 to 2016, that is, from the enthronement of Archbishop of Nova Justiniana and all Cyprus Chrysostomos II (2006–), who publicly and explicitly set the repatriation, restoration and preservation of the Greek-Orthodox religiocultural heritage in Northern Cyprus as a high priority within an EU context and ushered in the era of religiocultural diplomacy, to the most recent repatriation of stolen religious arte-

1 See: http://churchofcyprus.org.cy. Accessed 12 Jan 2019. 2 See: https://www.churchofcypruseu.com/index.php/en. Accessed 12 Jan 2019.

[email protected] Greek-Cypriot Religiocultural Heritage as an Indicator of Fundamental Rights… 151 facts – at least when the research for the present paper was initiated – via the mediation of the OCC and the RCCEU. The International Relations (IR) approach that was utilised as a theoretical framework was the English School of International Relations (ESIR). The reason is that the ESIR emphasises on the importance and role of the international society, which is pertinent when examining the EU, and it allows room for qualitative, her- meneutic and interpretive analyses (Buzan 2001: 475). Not to mention that it acknowledges that within the contemporary international system a range of non- state actors are now able to exert influence, while at the same time the EU Member States emerge as post-sovereign (Suganami 2010: 22). Moreover, ESIR’s view of the world as a society of states entails a code of conduct that, among other things, and in the absence of a higher regulatory authority, includes a mode of communication between states that is based on a minimum consensus on values and principles that help preserve order (Ibid.: 23). In fact, there have been examples in relevant literature where e.g. the human rights culture is examined as a “new standard of civilisation”, and in that sense it is suggested that the international society remains Eurocentric and Western-centric in its theorisation (Linklater 2013: 26).

Religiocultural Heritage and Diplomacy

Berridge defines diplomacy as “the conduct of international relations by negotiation rather than by force, propaganda, or recourse to law, and by other peaceful means” (Berridge 1995: 1) and makes the distinction that diplomacy is not foreign policy, as the latter is “the attitude struck by one state towards another”, whereas “diplomacy is one of a number of instruments employed in order to make that attitude persuasive” (Berridge 1997: 184). In addition, cultural diplomacy is defined as the “exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding” (Cummings 2003: 1), and as “the deployment of a state’s culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy” (Mark 2009: 1). However much elusive the term ‘culture’ may appear to be – although it traditionally meant “high culture” when used in conjunction with diplomacy – as it encompasses a wide range of cultural expressions (Ibid.: 5), ultimately “it transcends ideology, and is about the substance of identity for individuals in a society” with religion playing a profoundly formative role in shaping culture and identity (Murden 2008: 420). Indeed, soft power, i.e. the indirect and co-optive means to achieve outcomes in international politics rests heavily, among others, on culture (Nye 2004). Cultural heritage, not unlike the concept of culture, instead of being confined within its initial narrow perception of history and art, nowadays encompasses values, identity and memory (Vecco 2010: 324). Either tangible – artefacts, objects, architecture, landscapes – or intangible – performance, ritual, memory, language –, cultural heritage is constitutive of the collective identity and intertwined with territory (Silverman and Ruggles 2007: 3). And when the territory is contested emerge

[email protected] 152 G. E. Trantas disputes over the stewardship of the cultural heritage therein, which by and large applies to national heritage (Ibid.). Cultural heritage may also be under threat, directly or indirectly, either because of neglect, hence natural wear and tear damages it, or because of intentional damages, meant to erase it (Ibid.: 11). It ought to be clarified though that heritage is much more likely to convey meaning when remembered and utilised as patrimony (Ibid.: 12). The significance of cultural heritage to the EU is attested by several activities and initiatives; suffice it only to highlight one or two examples of noteworthy importance. For instance, the Faro Convention of the Council of Europe focused precisely on the value of cultural heritage. In the document produced thereafter, the right of every person was recognised to engage freely with one’s cultural heritage and participate in corresponding activities, stressing that such provisions are “enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and guaranteed by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)” (Council of Europe 2005: 1); likewise, such provisions are to be found in the “European Cultural Convention (1954), the Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe (1985), the European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (1992, revised) and the European Landscape Convention (2000)” (Ibid.). In fact, the Faro Convention produced a definition according to which, cultural heritage is a group of resources inherited from the past which people identify, independently of ownership, as a reflection and expression of their constantly evolving values, beliefs, knowledge and traditions. It includes all aspects of the environment resulting from the interaction between people and places through time (Ibid.: 2). It follows that thereby the Council of Europe wished to promote the notion of a common European cultural heritage, as well as its preservation and transmission to future generations, considering Article 3 and Article 4 of the Faro Convention (Ibid.). In the same spirit the Namur Declaration of the Ministers who partook in the cultural convention meeting of 23–24 April 2015, reiterated and consolidated the aforementioned definition of cultural heritage, while stressing that it is “a key component of the European identity” (The Namur Declaration 2015: 1). It is crucial here to stress that cultural heritage is seen as collectively European, and what is more, as a constituent element of the collective European identity – a powerful statement in itself. Most importantly, the Council of Europe acknowledges the linkage between human rights and cultural heritage, which is quite pertinent in the present case of interest: namely, “Culture is an essential component and a key factor for the effective delivery of the core mission of the Council of Europe to promote human rights, the practice of democracy and the rule of law” (Council of Europe 2018). The term religiocultural heritage is used here to denote and emphasise the religious aspect of the latter. Religion’s intangible and tangible, material manifestation via an array of artefacts, buildings, sites etc., is a constituent element of culture and identity. In that sense it is instrumental in the exercise of cultural diplomacy, i.e. as the main axis and content of cultural diplomatic engagement. More to the point, this does not need to be conducted by the diplomatic corps exclusively; non-state actors

[email protected] Greek-Cypriot Religiocultural Heritage as an Indicator of Fundamental Rights… 153 such as churches and religious institutions are by definition pertinent, particularly within a post-Westphalian, postsecular context.

The Relevance of Religion in a Post-Westphalian Context

It is generally acknowledged that ever since the 1990s, a notable religious resurgence has transpired, which has a social and political bearing, challenging thus the secularist certainties of modernity (Habermas 2006). The emergence of postsecularism is indicative of the relevance of religion and its function in terms of ideas, values, morality and meaning that exceed the domain of the private sphere and impinge on society (Gräb 2010). Moreover, ever since the Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent steps towards the further enlargement and deepening of the EU, the corresponding debate and problématique concerning Europeanness – religion included – has sought to determine the fundamentals of an overarching European personality as such; whereby “Greek culture, Roman jurisprudence, Christianity, and the political legacy of the Germanic peoples” (Martín Ramirez 1969, in Vergara 2007: 16), have been defined as the foundational constituent elements of European personality. Incidentally, this is view is shared by the OCC. This statement directly impinges on a perceived, broader moral community within an international society of states, beyond the constraints of national sovereignty; a post-Westphalian take of the international system, ushered in by E. H. Carr, where the notions of sovereignty, nationality and citizenship would be subject to review and retheorisation, to be replaced by a “new European transnational citi- zenry” (Linklater 1998: 179). In fact Carr entertained the thought of a transnational personification of a society of states, equivalent to the traditional state personification, where the state projects morality, values and overarching, predominant identity traits (Carr 2001). Just like in the case of the nation-state to which the abstractions that are attributed (McGraw and Dolan 2007: 299) render a perceived unitary identity that withstands the test of time possible (Wendt 2004: 295), equivalent ones have been attributed to the EU – particularly by churches of Member States – so that to put forward the notion of a religiocultural common denominator. In fact, churches have campaigned so that to have a declaration that acknowledges Christian values as integral to the European personhood in the preamble of the EU Constitutional Treaty (Anastassiadis 2010; Trantas 2018). It is quite telling, for instance, that not only the Roman Catholic Church in collaboration with the Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG) pursued to contribute to the formulation of the European Constitution (HSCG 2002a, b), but even the former Presidents of the EU Commission Jacques Delors (1985–1995) and Romano Prodi (1999–2004) were in favour of a written reference to Europe’s Christian heritage (Cholevas 2003). As for the OCC, it has sought to contribute to this discussion at a pan-Orthodox level, via the World Council of Churches (WCC), the Middle Eastern Council of Churches (MECC) and the Conference of European Churches (CEC) (Roudometof and Dietzel 2014: 168).

[email protected] 154 G. E. Trantas

Early church attempts towards involvement in the European Communities’ state of affairs, date back to the first meeting of CEC in 1959, amidst the Cold War tensions, and for years to come they had a clear national orientation instead of a European one (Leustean 2014). What allowed room for closer involvement, and indeed, official representation and direct contact with the EU Institutions was that postsecularism, it appears, was co-facilitated by the post-Westphalian international, and particularly European, paradigm shift. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648), followed by the seventeenth-century European state system and the nineteenth-century emergence of the concept of International Relations, set the foundations for what came to be the global paradigm of international order (Valaskakis 2000; Osterhammel 2011). Therein, sovereignty, i.e. “the rightful entitlement to exclusive, unqualified, and supreme rule within a delimited territory” (McGrew 2009: 24), was a conditio sine qua non. However, this applies no longer in full as the emergence of the EU and the process of European integration within a globalist context where state sovereignty is eroded, challenges and reverses the Westphalian arrangement (Anderson 2007), which was unequivocally secularist. In addition, the EU challenges the previous certainty of nation-states being the sole and absolute actors in the international system. Non-state actors, civil society, and what is more, churches, are recognised as actors, de jure through the Lisbon Treaty, Article 17 (Official Journal of the European Union 2012: 55), and in practice through their offices of representation in Brussels. The latter are in a position to directly engage with the structure, bureau- cracy and institutions of the bloc-actor, and notably this activity has intensified exponentially during the last decade, which has a bearing on the decision-making processes as well (Leustean 2013). Indeed, to attempt to completely separate religion and politics, to isolate and insulate them from one another would be futile. In the case of the EU and Europe, religion alone, Christianity in particular, could not provide the symbolic means, which, as a common denominator would function as a unifier for European societies and peoples; but it does constitute a means of demarcation as far as European personhood – and identity, though the term, considering its complexity, is used as a convenience here – is concerned. This can be attributed, in part, to the “culturalisation” of religion, often traceable in the EU official documentation (Foret 2015). The Westphalian marginalisation of religion should not be mistaken for an indication that the latter is ‘weak’ and irrelevant. On the contrary it should be considered a purveyor of legitimacy and soft power. Namely, “normative factors are having an increasing influence on international relations. […] Identity is clearly an influence on international politics and religion is an influence on identity” (Fox and Sandler 2004: 45). In turn, this bestows upon churches the capacity to exert soft power, with the latter seeking to co-opt rather than impose, using their sway in order to “shape the preferences of others” (Nye 2004: 5) by appealing to value systems, beliefs, morality, culture. Considering the briefly outlined framework above, it appears that postsecularism and the Westphalian Reversal in conjunction, enable the churches and their representations to take part in the fermentations within the EU mechanisms, and it would not be amiss to maintain that they may mutatis mutandis function as non-state actors.

[email protected] Greek-Cypriot Religiocultural Heritage as an Indicator of Fundamental Rights… 155

The Republic of Cyprus, the OCC and the EU

The European orientation of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and by extension of the OCC dates back to the 1970s, with the RoC signing a customs union agreement with the European Economic Community. But this relationship was significantly upgraded as the RoC applied for EU membership on July 4, 1990 (Kyris 2012: 88). Being partly motivated by Greece’s reorientation to the European Economic Community and given the lack of influence of the Non Aligned Movement in the international environment, the change of direction was pursued during the 1990s more consistently (Roudometof and Dietzel 2014: 167). All in all, this was a strategic move on behalf of the RoC, one that was expected to deliver tangible guarantees in terms of national security, as well as strengthen Cyprus’ position towards a solution: the RoC joined the EU as a united state entity, in line with the respective UN Security Council resolutions, and thus the EU legally and officially reaffirmed the rejection of the 1983 unilateral declaration of independence by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, which gave rise to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (Ker-Lindsay 2010: 70–71). Namely, the UN Security Council Resolution 541 declared the TRNC invalid, and with the exception of Turkey, this unilaterally declared entity remains internationally unrecognised. What is more, the Security Council’s Resolution 1251 establishes “restrictive conditions for the permanent status of a territory”, while the provision regarding the future of the Cypriot state is clear that there should be a “single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded” (Constantinou 2010: 24). Not to mention that it is unlikely that a third country to the EU would recognise the TRNC and risk the imposition of sanctions or face the obstructionism of the RoC from within the EU, expressed via an array of political countermeasures (Ker-Lindsay 2010: 71). Within this context, i.e. the UN Security Council resolutions and Cyprus’ EU accession as a single, united entity, and with the EU legally and officially aligned favourably to the Republic of Cyprus – regardless if certain Member States have been in favour of the Turkish side – Nicosia considered the EU membership of high strategic value. In turn, the international community was hopeful that the EU accession would help in the sense that, should an opportunity arise, a solution to the Cyprus problem would be rendered possible, trusting that the EU was an actor that could make a meaningful contribution to that end (Kyris 2012: 88). Likewise, in the early 2000s, when Archbishop Chrysostomos II was still the Metropolitan of Paphos, maintained that it would be more fruitful for Cyprus to pursue its national interests from within the EU, particularly regarding its ‘National Issue’, that is, the Cyprus problem (Metropolitan Chrysostomos 2006: 337). However the approach of the OCC really took shape after Cyprus’s 2004 EU accession and further, after Chrysostomos’s II ascension to the rank of archbishop; for that is when he officially outlined his programme, which included the intensification of the OCC’s European presence, established the Office of Inter-ecclesiastical Relations and European Affairs headed by bishop of Mesaoria Gregorios, and the office of representation to the EU in Brussels,

[email protected] 156 G. E. Trantas the RCCEU, with bishop of Neapolis Porfyrios as its director (Roudometof and Dietzel 2014: 168). Chrysostomos II made his intentions known already on the day of his enthronement; to engage the foreign diplomatic corps and institutions so that to raise awareness regarding aspects of the ‘National Issue’. He specifically announced that the EU accession would be strategically utilised and therefore the RCCEU would be upgraded (Mitsides 2006: 509). But he was not alone in this as the synod was like- minded, and what is more, the same applies to the other candidates of the archbishopric elections, i.e. the metropolitans of Lemessos, Kykkos, and Paphos, thus leaving no room for doubt concerning the strategic orientation consensus and priorities (Trantas 2018). Upon the appointment of Bishop of Neapolis Porfyrios as the RCCEU director, Chrysostomos II set the ‘National Issue’ as the first priority of the office, which would necessitate that bishop Porfyrios would have to engage “the heart of European and international diplomacy” and promote the agenda of the OCC within the framework of the European acquis (Apostolos Varnavas 2007: 777).

Greek-Orthodox Religiocultural Heritage and Religious Freedom

The highest priority of the OCC’s agenda was to preserve, protect and recover the remainder of Greek-Orthodox cultural heritage in the occupied territory of Northern Cyprus. The 1974 invasion and occupation of the aforementioned area resulted in the loss of some 520 churches, chapels, monasteries, and an estimated 23.000 icons, of which, many dating back to the twelfth century, among numerous other items. Notwithstanding the buildings that have fallen in disrepair, it is estimated that at least 130 church buildings have been plundered and destroyed, while objects of value such as frescoes, icons, relics and other artefacts have been looted and chan- nelled to the corresponding international market. Also, 77 churches have been converted to mosques, 18 have been appropriated for military and medical use, 13 for agricultural purposes, while others have been turned to hotels and restaurants (Roudometof and Dietzel 2014: 172). Further, the eradication of Christianity in the, since 1974, occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus is also demographically quantifiable: of the 20.000 Christians who resided there before the invasion and occupation, now remain 330 Greek-Orthodox and 109 Maronites. Freedom of worship is suppressed, given that apart from the complex process of issuing a permit to cross the UN Green Line so that to visit religious sites and perform rituals or simply preserve their cemeteries, the applications for permits are frequently rejected (Prodromou 2013). The 2012 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) annual report, denotes the general attitude of the Turkish government’s “systematic and egregious limitations on the freedom of religion or belief that affect all religious communities in Turkey” (USCIRF 2012: 199), threatening minorities

[email protected] Greek-Cypriot Religiocultural Heritage as an Indicator of Fundamental Rights… 157 as such, whereby Turkey was designated a “country of particular concern” (Ibid.) status. More to the point, it is clearly stated that Turkey’s military control over Northern Cyprus supports numerous arbitrary regulations implemented by local Turkish-Cypriot authorities. These regulations limit the religious activities of all non-Muslims living in Northern Cyprus, deny these religious communities the right to worship freely and restore, maintain, and utilize their religious properties, and threaten the long-term survival of non-Muslim religious communities in the area (Ibid.). Analogous cases, which, when examined carefully demonstrate a pattern, have been reported by the United States, Department of State (USDS) annual International Religious Freedom Reports, issued by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour. The 2011 report’s assessment was that restrictions of religious freedom were observed, due to the politically divisive climate; those were particularly directed to the Greek-Orthodox, Armenian-Orthodox and Maronite Christians. They ranged from increased police monitoring and harassment, to prohibition from visiting religious sites. Apart from the right to worship being restricted to designated churches by designated priests, permits for liturgies have been often rejected without justification or because those sites have been made unavailable due to change of usage (e.g. converted to youth centres). Others, close to collapse and in need of maintenance remained inaccessible, while cases of vandalism have been reported as well (USDS 2011). The obstructionist pattern persisted in the 2012 report as well with minor fluctuations (USDS 2012), as was the case in 2013 accordingly. Apart from permissions being rejected for various reasons (such as conversion of churches to youth centres or libraries), there have been cases where no explanation was offered; for instance, the usage of Panagia Chrysopolitissa was denied, as well as the request to restore tombstones and crosses at the cemeteries of Pano and Kato Dikomo. Further, the non-allocation of funds for restoration purposes was noted (USDS 2013). Limitations of access to Greek Orthodox, Maronite Catholic, and Armenian Orthodox religious sites, as well as other restrictions continued in 2014, yet religious services were allowed to take place in 14 churches for the first time in approximately 40 years, while an easing of restrictions compared to previous years was noted. However, Archbishop Chrysostomos II complained via a press statement that the Turkish- Cypriot authorities rejected his request to visit the monastery of Apostolos Varnavas. Further, it is worth noting that a bicommunal initiative, the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage (TCCH), under the aegis of the UN Development Program (UNDP) ‘Partnership for the Future’, announced that there were concrete steps taken towards the restoration of the Apostolos Andreas Monastery, the agreements for which had been signed already in 2013 between the UNDP, the OCC and the Vakf (Turkish-Cypriot religious authority). In fact, the OCC and the Vakf agreed to fund this initiative. In addition, the TCCH announced that a number of EU funded emergency measures and conservation works at the Church of Agios Nikolas in Syrianochori had been completed (USDS 2014). A mixture of the easing of access on the one hand, with persistent restrictions on both the visitation and of the right of worship on the other, continued in 2015, giving

[email protected] 158 G. E. Trantas off an ambivalent message concerning the progress made. It was encouraging, however, that the restoration works at the Apostolos Andreas Monastery in the peninsula of Karpas continued, while the UNDP and the EU announced that they would contribute with $3.5 million in order to restore the 400-year-old Greek Orthodox monastery of Agios Panteleimon in Myrtou. Further, the TCCH announced that since 2008 when it was founded, it had restored 18 religious sites, with another 40 listed in need of immediate restoration, whereby it would commence conservation works in 14 sites as such (USDS 2015). In 2016 instead of building upon the progress made thus far, a regress was recorded. Namely, apart from the diachronically existing restrictions and obstructionism, the Turkish-Cypriot authority announced a further curb of religious rights, maintaining that the latter were being abused – due to the increased number of access permit requests – and politicised by the Greek- Cypriots. Namely, it was announced that the churches of Apostolos Andreas, St Barnabas, and St Mamas would remain open throughout the year, St George Exorinos would be open on a monthly basis, whereas the rest would be allowed to conduct religious services once a year, with the dates available being either on the name-day of each, on Easter Day or Christmas Day. The UN, via a Special Rapporteur on Freedom and Cultural Rights, condemned this policy while expressing concern that this could give rise to cultural and religious rights violations. The restoration works at the monastery of Apostolos Andreas continued, and with the completion of the first phase the main church building and the annex buildings were restored and opened. In addition, interreligious dialogue and organised pilgrimages mutually across the ‘green line’ continued (USDS 2016), indicating the presence of a will to maintain the dialogue.

The OCC’s EU Engagement and Initiatives

At this point it would be helpful to indicatively mention a few of the OCC’s activities in promoting its religious freedom, human rights, and cultural heritage agenda. The RCCEU was already established in 2007 and its inauguration took place on March 18, 2009. Its strategic priorities, in line with the OCC’s agenda, have been from the outset to raise awareness of the illegal occupation of Christian places of worship, their destruction, desecration, pillage, the stealing and illegal export of more than 50,000 Byzantine icons, frescoes and other artefacts; and to monitor all EU affairs of interest to the OCC and produce pertinent suggestions to the EU institutions, while partaking in the discourses and fermentations therein (Ekklesia 2009). Already whilst at the airport of Larnaca, prior to the inauguration of the RCCEU, Chrysostomos II briefly outlined the plans towards informing and raising awareness by way of exhibitions, conferences and lectures hosted and organised by the RCCEU in Brussels (Georgios 2009: 315). But he also revealed that many stolen and smug- gled artefacts had been traced and repatriated, following a coordinated effort between church and government (Ibid.: 319). The Monastery of Kykkos in particular, had already mounted a considerable effort and managed to recover several

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artefacts currently on display at its museum, which is in line with the long-term strategy of the OCC (Roudometof and Dietzel 2014: 172). The RCCEU functions within a framework that essentially qualifies as religiocultural diplomacy. It is not far from what successive governments of the Republic of Cyprus have done, but it does specialise on the matter, it is systematic in its approach and issue-focused. It disseminates the corresponding informative material through memos, meetings, exhibitions, and conferences, even excursions of foreign MEPs to Cyprus, together with an extensive correspondence with key political EU figures, not always intended for the public eye (Trantas 2018). Several events are hosted at the premises of the office of representation in Brussels and in the EU Parliament, often with the support of the Conference of European Churches (CEC) and the Church and Society Commission (CSC). However, the RCCEU also seeks to invest in a more autonomous and dynamic manner as Orthodox, and in closer cooperation with homodox – i.e., of the same convictions, opinion, dogma, creed, etc. – representations within the framework of the Committee of the Representatives of Orthodox Churches to the European Union (CROCEU) (Ibid). The director of the office, bishop Porfyrios, has conducted a systematic international campaign towards reclaiming stolen artefacts and raising awareness of Cyprus’s cultural heritage destruction, while taking advantage of the opportunities that the EU representation has to offer. For instance, in collaboration with the Greek-Cypriot MEP Eleni Theocharous he has organised events such as exhibitions and conferences, while, with the expenses of the church he has made it possible for foreign MEPs to assess the situation in Cyprus first hand, by accommodating their visits there (Ibid.). His efforts have been fruitful so far, resulting in reclaiming and repatriating several frescoes and icons from across Europe but also from the USA, while the issue of religious freedoms in Northern Cyprus is being systematically disseminated. One could sample the output of this effort by visiting the official website of the RCCEU where an entire section is dedicated to cultural heritage, under the official aims of the office, which comprises foci on churches and monuments, icons, frescoes, cemeteries, EU projects and a detailed account on the initiatives in occupied Cyprus. Apart from the initiatives of the office which are within the scope of its aims and purposes, archbishop Chrysostomos II has been involved in this cultural diplomacy campaign personally, and some examples would help highlight this. He met with the President of the European Commission Barroso (2004–2014) in Brussels on 14 May 2007, and during the conference on the following day he described the extent of the destruction to the cultural heritage that has become merchandise in Europe and America (Mitsides 2007: 355). In fact, German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed her disappointment in the press conference later on, in light of the destruction of churches and other religious monuments in Northern Cyprus (Ibid.: 337). An example of analogous weight would be the official visit of Chrysostomos II to the Vatican. On Friday 15 June 2007, he was received by the Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi. The archbishop asked him to exert his political influence in favour of the preservation and maintenance of monuments in the occupied Northern Cyprus, while pointing out the strategic importance of Cyprus to the EU. To which the Italian prime minister replied with the promise that he would raise the issue in

[email protected] 160 G. E. Trantas the next meeting of either the heads of state, or of governments of the EU (Georgios 2007: 609). Another example of the OCC’s activities would be the organisation of a photo exhibition at the EU Parliament May 28, 2008, the theme of which was the condition of the Christian monuments in occupied Cyprus. Some of the leading figures who attended were the President of the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pöttering (2007–2009) and the Leader of the European Peoples Party in the EU Parliament Joseph Daul (2007–2014) (Ekklesia 2008: 468). Lobbying included the European People’s Party (EPP) as well. On 13 April 2010, Archbishop Chrysostomos II visited Brussels in order to attend the seminar at the EU Parliament, dedicated to religious freedom and places of worship in the Republic of Cyprus that was to take place the next day. It was co-organised by the RCCEU, CSC and CEC, hosted by MEP Eleni Theocharous, and took place under the aegis of the President of the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pöttering. The archbishop seized the opportunity to raise the issue of religiocultural heritage to the President of the EPP at the time, Joseph Daul, expanding to the problem of the ‘Enclaved’.3 On behalf of the EPP, Joseph Daul expressed his solidarity and support, while indicating that he had a first-hand appreciation of the situation, having himself visited the island (Vasileiadis 2010). These are merely but a few examples, indicative of the efforts of the OCC to internationalise and upgrade a domestic issue to an EU level by way of cultural diplomacy. The respective instrumentalisation of European institutions is evident of a strategy linked to the EU accession of the Republic of Cyprus. The development of a network of communications, lobbying and mobilisation is not of course intended to resolve a complex issue such as the Cyprus Problem; it does however address an important aspect of it, which is ultimately the utilisation of the Greek-Orthodox religioscapes on the island of Cyprus.

Sacred Space – The Greek-Orthodox Religioscapes

The aforementioned Greek-Orthodox tangible cultural heritage denotes physi- cally – by corresponding markers in the public sphere – demarcated religioscapes. McAlister defines religioscapes as “subjective religious maps – and attendant theologies – of immigrant, or diasporic, or transnational communities who are also in global flow and flux” (2005: 251). To this I might add the refugee displacement and influx of settlers as contributing factors of this state of flux, which are in fact observable and pertinent to the theme presently in focus. Movements and demographic fluctuations as such within a given space, give rise to intersecting religioscapes, as described by Hayden and Walker (2013). Intersecting religioscapes of different faiths and creeds – in the present case Sunni Muslim and Christian Orthodox – are

3 The Enclaved (Gr.: Εγκλωβισμένοι) are communities of Greek and Maronite Cypriots, approximately 20.000, who resided in villages behind the line of fire after the invasion of 1974 and remained there, in the occupied territory. Today there are less than 500 left.

[email protected] Greek-Cypriot Religiocultural Heritage as an Indicator of Fundamental Rights… 161 spatially differentiated and distinguished by the presence of symbolic constellations in the public sphere. Hence, frontiers emerge and shift, as they are primarily determined by the clearly distinguishable traces of religious communities – of more or less homogeneous self-perception and identity. Notably, being demarcated by physical structures, territorial spaces become porous as they need not be coterminous with existing physical or political borders, since complexes of religious demarcations infuse places or territories with corresponding meaning anew (Hayden and Walker 2013). Likewise, when the above concept is interpreted from an international relations perspective, one recognises that religioscapes fall into the category of cultural geography, which in turn does not necessarily abide or coincide with borders, as it rather demarcates frontiers – domains of a coherent cultural physiog- nomy and geopolitical zones. The disparity between borders and frontiers gives rise to tensions, even conflicts (Davutoğlu 2001). Indeed, the case examined here demonstrates those characteristics that distinguish intersecting religioscapes, in that a complex of Muslim, Turkish-Cypriot, and Orthodox, Greek-Cypriot symbolic religious constellations is empirically detectable in the public sphere, and their aesthetic and architectural particularities and symbolisms are rich in meanings of self-perception within their sacred spaces. The interruption of homogeneous space by a ‘sacred’ space entails a form of sacred manifestation, a hierophany. This hierophany is the cornerstone of creation as it ontologically establishes the sacred amidst the plain or, amorphous space. Therefore, the ontological establishment is transferrable to the mundane notion of territory, the actual place itself, where for instance a church-building may be located. And henceforth it is the point of reference for the religious person or a community (Eliade 1957: 20–22). In fact, Eliade equates, conditionally of course, settlement to consecration when it is a permanent establishment, as the latter constitutes an existential choice for a whole community and a paradigmatic imitation of an archetypal universe (Ibid.). Hierophany, i.e. the manifestation of the sacred in an ordinary framework, “of something of a wholly different order, a reality that does not belong to our world, in objects that are an integral part of our natural ‘profane’ world” (Ibid.: 11), takes spatial non-homogeneity for granted. Sites or relics as such, however, are not the only ones that impose spatial differentiation. Man-made artefacts, buildings, sites and spatial demarcations have the same effect as they impose a sacred space, with the most typical example being a church, which, albeit stands amidst the profane space, differentiates the space that it occupies. Ultimately, “every sacred space implies a hierophany, an irruption of the sacred that results in detaching a territory from the surrounding cosmic milieu and making it qualitatively different” (Ibid.: 26). And when no sign of hierophany manifests itself it may be provoked, in the sense that it is either evoked – typically via ritual – or constructed symbolically in order to signify the sacred (Ibid.: 27). In the same spirit Foucault introduces the concept of Heterotopia, i.e. a place of different order amidst a spatial-cultural continuum, a cultural break amidst its surrounding environment; this differentiation is both spatially and temporally observable. Pervaded by distinct otherness in relation to its surroundings, a heterotopia is present in many forms, including religious sites. There, not only the concept of

[email protected] 162 G. E. Trantas space but also of time is differentiated from the norm as a heterochronism, a temporal differentiation within the heterotopia which disregards the this-worldly perception of time; a cemetery for instance epitomises the phenomenon thereof (Foucault 1997: 332–35). Both Eliade and Foucault vividly make a distinction between sacred and mundane space and demonstrate that this spatial discontinuity constitutes a powerful demarcation as well as a spatial-cultural parenthesis, which certainly applies to the religioscapes under examination. Sacred space, in particular Christian, is in itself a container of divine, social, and personal power. As dynamic and powerful, Christian space articulates via material cultural codes both theological as well as sociopolitical manifestations of power. The buildings themselves – interior and exterior –, adapt to the sociocultural particularities of their environment, for, they do not exist in a vacuum. Religious spaces reflect, reify and perpetuate relationships and practices (Kilde 2008: 199–201). It follows that sacred space often constitutes an organic part of a cultural heritage, and as such, it gives rise to issues of ownership, custody, access and usage, therefore, in turn, of the corresponding rights as defined by the EU Institutions. To the Greek-Cypriot collective psyche the nine occupied districts of Akanthous, Ammochostos, Karabas, Keryneia, Kythrea, Lapythos, Leykonoiko, Lysis and Morphou, are of high symbolic significance, and the contribution of the OCC’s raising awareness strategy to the collective emotional charge is considerable (Roudometof and Dietzel 2014: 173). In that sense it indirectly co-determines the threshold of social tolerance regarding the entrenched positions and red lines of the Republic of Cyprus in the negotiations with the Turkish-Cypriot side, as it exercises its soft power domestically. Power, an essential political means – an end in itself often – is of the ‘soft’ kind in this case (Nye 2004), with the OCC being the flag bearer of a moral cause which is compatible with the values and desires of its target group.

Europeanisation

Culture, one of religion’s integral elements, is not the only factor that bestows the OCC the capacity to exert soft power and voice territorial claims through the religioscapes’ argument. The prospect of EU citizenship as part and parcel of the island’s reunification is also variably appealing to the Turkish-Cypriot community – particularly as Turkey’s accession seems ever more remote – and allows room for cultural-diplomatic manoeuvres at an EU level. EU membership and the post- national citizenship that comes along with it, bestow obligations and rights which are quite pertinent to the case that the OCC puts forward. Article 167 of the Treaty on European Union contains provisions concerning the “flowering of the cultures of Member States” (Official Journal of the European Union 2012: 121) and their promotion, while it encourages cooperation between Member States towards support, conservation, improvement and non-commercial exchanges, including cooperation with third countries and international organisations, and fully supports cultural

[email protected] Greek-Cypriot Religiocultural Heritage as an Indicator of Fundamental Rights… 163 diversity (Ibid.: 122). Moreover, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union acknowledges in the preamble the spiritual and moral heritage of the Union (Ibid.: 395). And further on, in the specifics, several articles provide the OCC with an arsenal of arguments: Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, states that “everyone has the right […] to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance” (Ibid.: 397); Article 12 states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association at all levels” (Ibid.: 398); Article 21 clearly prohibits any discrimination, among others, on the basis of “religion or belief”, or “on the grounds of nationality” (Ibid.: 400); Article 22 stipu- lates the Union’s “Cultural, religious and linguistic diversity” (Ibid.); finally Article 45 states that “every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (Ibid.: 404). In short, the acquis is permissive of the OCC’s strategy and approaches. Clearly, there are immense complications that render the full and unobstructed implementation of the EU acquis and the Charter of Fundamental Rights next to impossible. Complexity partly rests on Realpolitik as well as on the particularities of Cyprus’ sovereignty. First and foremost the RoC, on an island of many masters over the centuries, emerged as a state despite the fact that it was not meant to be such: the Greek-Cypriots wanted an Enosis (union: Gr.: Ένωσις) with Greece, whereas the Turkish-Cypriots wished for partition (Tur.: Taksim), while the rest of minorities preferred the continuation of the British colonial status quo. An array of terms intended to describe this divergence between communities with regard to this republic emerged, such as, “‘realpolitik compromise’, a ‘reluctant republic’, a ‘self- determination substitute’, an ‘unwanted child’, a ‘sham’” (Constantinou 2010: 17), indicative of the nominal sovereignty of the state. Constitutional and treaty constraints and limitations, the presence of Guarantor Powers (Greece, Turkey and Great Britain) with a right of intervention, the appointment of foreign troops and the presence of sovereign British military bases attest to the post-colonial arrangement of the nominal sovereignty of an otherwise “internationalised” state (Constantinou 2010: 17, 20). This internationalisation is reflected on the multilateralism that permeates the Cyprus Problem. For instance, the UN initiative, the Annan Plan, euphemistically named so after its Secretary General Kofi Annan (1997–2006), together with the EU, the United States, and the Guarantor Powers of the Republic of Cyprus, was intended to help towards the reunification of Cyprus prior to the accession of the latter to the EU in 2004. The fifth and final version of a “Comprehensive Solution to the Cyprus Problem” failed to materialise though: the Turkish-Cypriot community approved it by 64.9 percent, but the Greek-Cypriots rejected it by 75.8 percent (Varnava and Faustmann 2012: 1; Kyrris 2014: 8–9). The UN, however, is not impervious to Realpolitik; power and alignment of interests affect the organisation as much as its constituent members – particularly the most influential ones. In that sense the UN can only function within the constraints and limitations of its members and not against their interests, which applies to the Cyprus Problem as well. In fact the latter is, to some state actors, a useful obstruction to Turkey’s potential EU accession, while others may perceive it as an actual, strategic, regrettable impediment

[email protected] 164 G. E. Trantas to Turkey’s western orientation that may risk its EU alignment in the long run (Mibagheri 2010: 154). Following the accession of the RoC in 2004, the EU was resolved to assist the Turkish-Cypriots and prepare them for a future reunification opportunity, particularly considering the positive attitude of the Turkish-Cypriot community towards the Annan Plan. Apart from rewarding them for the latter, a number of programmes were developed in order to prepare the ground for the implementation of the EU law and facilitate their European Integration as well as the integration between the two largest communities of the island. The two main pillars of this action are: the Financial Aid Regulation, intended to lay the groundwork for the EU law implementation and for the political and economic development of the Turkish-Cypriot community; and, the Green Line Regulation, intended to help establish direct trad- ing channels between the Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot community, to help the economic development of the former, and facilitate a degree of cooperation. This framework would eventually allow the implementation of the EU acquis throughout the island, which remains suspended in Northern Cyprus, in accordance with Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaties (Kyris 2012: 93). Such initiatives and structures are part of a broader Europeanisation action. Indeed, the process of Europeanisation affects domestic political structures, structures of representation and cleavages, public policies and their actors, thematic areas, instruments and resources, as well as cognitive and normative structures, which includes, norms and values, identities, political cultures, paradigms, narratives and identities, where the transformative element is ever present (Radaelli 2003: 35–36). Societal Europeanisation in particular is far reaching and exceeds the political domain, in that it seeks to instigate a broader societal change, retheorise established perceptions of identities – thus introducing the re-articulation of the latter and the notion of a multi-layered, European post-national version of it – and accordingly affects the structures and bureaucracies thereof (Diez and Tocci 2010: 177). The Greek-Cypriots wished for an indirect Europeanisation of Turkish policies, assuming that they would be motivated by Turkey’s aspiration to eventually join the EU. As regards the Turkish-Cypriots, it was hoped that their civil society would be strengthened, while, societal Europeanisation would transform their identity perception, with the prospective EU membership being the catalyst (Diez and Tocci 2010: 178). It is also clear that the Greek-Cypriot persistence for a “European solution” involved the full implementation of the acquis and its four freedoms (movement of goods, services, capital and labour) aimed at reunifying the island via EU integration, which self-evidently affects the religioscapes in focus. But this does not coincide with the Turkish-Cypriot attitude to Europeanisation processes and goals, as their take on a solution would be a federation based on the Annan Plan, within an EU context; in other words, it would include transitional periods and derogations from the acquis. In fact, ever since the accession of the RoC to the EU, disillusion- ment ensued with the latter, which is considered a factor of complication by the Turkish-Cypriot side, hence a “European solution” as such is seen with scepticism, while the legitimacy of the EU as actor is in decline (Diez and Tocci 2010: 182–83).

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Even so, the EU remains very important to the Turkish-Cypriots, considering that it is a major international bloc-actor that engages with them bilaterally, not to mention that it provides them with economic and technical assistance so that they can embed the capacity to harmonise with the EU acquis. Essentially it is a training project that comprises of an array of programmes, and progress has been noted in the areas of environment, agriculture, statistics, finances, and competition legislation. Still, they are far from being an EU integrated community and as such they do not enjoy the benefits of full membership, to which a solution is a prerequisite, and thereby they remain internationally isolated. Hence, even though pro-European attitudes are in decline, EU integration remains appealing (Kyrris 2012: 94). The unilateral declaration of the TRNC has had the adverse effect, for it constitutes yet another reason for their international isolation, which results in economic stagna- tion as well. The prospect of recognition remains unlikely, particularly since the UN Security Council Resolution 541 of 1983 calls on all states not to recognise the TRNC. Annexation by Turkey is not a realistic option either; should steps to that end ensue, Turkey’s hopes for EU accession will evaporate, not only because the EU itself would refuse to continue any further negotiations, but also because the RoC would veto any initiative as such, and in sum Euro-Turkish relations would suffer a major blow (Ker-Lindsay 2012: 191). On the other hand, the EU accession has emboldened the Republic of Cyprus, and it has rendered it more assertive in its pursuits regarding the solution to its ‘National Issue’. Greek Cypriotism came to the forefront within the context of a power game on behalf of Greek-Cypriot politicians, who take full advantage of the veto leverage that allows them to block Turkish accession to the EU. Critics have even considered it as an expression of hegemonic intent (Loizides 2007: 184). In part because of the EU’s minor contribution to a solution, and in part due to the self- confidence that the EU accession has bestowed upon the Greek-Cypriots, which functions as a motivation for assertiveness in negotiations, coupled with the Turkish- Cypriot entrenched positions and EU disenchantment, a solution does not seem likely in the foreseeable future (Kyris 2012: 92). Be that as it may, the Cyprus Problem is a European problem now. A candidate state, Turkey, occupies part of an EU Member State territory; what is more, it does not recognise the sovereignty of the RoC. Therefore, the EU has a vested interest in a solution as long as the status quo is detrimental to its credibility in upholding its founding principles. Following the Annan Plan rejection, very little progress has been noted, which leaves the EU in the difficult position of managing the problematic aspects of this complex issue. But should a window of opportunity come to be, the EU will be called upon to adopt a constructive and bold stance so that to contribute to the composition of a feasible plan to a solution, by addressing issues such as the despoilments of property rights for instance, and certainly the implementation of the acquis (Drevet and Theophanous 2012: 2–3) without derogations, which directly impinges on the religioscapes in focus.

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Concluding Remarks

The return of religion to the public sphere, or rather the return to viewing religion beyond the constraints of its privatisation, coupled with the correlation of religiocultural phenomena with sociopolitical ones, goes hand in hand with the acknowledge- ment that postsecular contours are clearly identifiable within the current international political scene. Indeed, the post-Westphalian international system, with the EU epitomising this phenomenon, upgrades religious and philosophical institutions to a level of actors and thus facilitates their involvement – within reason – in issues of immediate concern to them. With the accession of the RoC to the EU in 2004, the OCC seized the opportunity to make the most of the strategic advantage that was made available; it was, after all, already grasped since the 1970s and better appreciated since the 1990s, in the post- cold-war climate, that being a Member State had significant political benefits in store. The consensus among the ranks of the Holy Synod was, in fact, that an office of representation in Brussels would be instrumental in making the most of the newly acquired accesses and opportunities to exercise cultural diplomacy. The OCC’s clearly – and in its own view self-evidently – defined agenda had the Greek- Orthodox religiocultural heritage as its utmost priority: the recovery of artefacts, scattered throughout Europe and the US and sold by auction houses; the access to- and preservation and restoration of religious buildings and sites in Northern Cyprus; and, the dissemination of information on the activities thereof, in order to raise primarily political but also social awareness internationally. Most importantly, the utilisation of the EU acquis to that end was deemed crucial, as it constitutes an integral element of the island’s Europeanisation process, which is part and parcel of the ‘European solution’ that the Greek-Cypriots consistently and unwaveringly seek. One cannot but observe that heterotopic configurations, in being spatially differentiated, relativise the sovereign rights on the corresponding religioscapes as they give rise to claims, which are legitimised by the sacredness of space and the high cultural significance that this may have. Moreover, religioscapes, along with the entire religiocultural heritage that they contain, are rendered coterminous with human rights, democracy and the rule of law in accordance with the acquis, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the definition of cultural heritage by the Council of Europe; the preservation, restoration and accessibility of the collective European heritage therein, is intertwined with the broader problématique that permeates the Cyprus Problem. More to the point, it is part and parcel of the Europeanisation process and the prerequisites that it entails, which boil down to compliance with democratisation. And ultimately, the treatment of those religioscapes has been rendered an indicator of respect to fundamental rights and to the collective European heritage that co-shapes the common European identity, according to the Council of Europe. In addition, culturalised Christianity is embedded in the EU. Although this is not explicit, it is insinuated by the fact that the Council of Europe considers the

[email protected] Greek-Cypriot Religiocultural Heritage as an Indicator of Fundamental Rights… 167 collective European cultural heritage – where Christianity’s imprint is predominantly widespread – as formative of the perceived European personhood and identity. Considering the interest of the EU Institutions and given that pockets of Greek-Orthodox religioscapes in Northern Cyprus contain by definition collective European cultural heritage, the latter became part of a corresponding diplomatic campaign that triggered the engagement of leading political figures. The intersecting religioscapes’ question though constitutes a complex challenge, given the divergence between borders and frontiers, within the Realpolitik context of problematic sovereignty issues and the rule of – international – law. The Turkish- Cypriot side has been urged and pressured by UN resolutions, the EU institutions and consecutive US State Department annual reports to conform to the suggested provisions and requirements and meet its obligations with regard to human and religious rights. Indeed, the programmes designed to promote Europeanisation and prepare the ground for the implementation of the acquis have improved the situation, at least to a level of engaging in interreligious dialogue and proceeding in actions that at least can be interpreted as gestures of good will. Yet as long as the Annan Plan continues to be tantamount to a basis and a blueprint to a solution, with derogations and exceptions in the application of the EU membership prerequisites, Europeanisation will inevitably continue to be impeded. Therefore, the religious rights of the Greek-Orthodox religioscapes which are demarcated by tangible manifestations in the public sphere, to the extent that they are dependent on the process of Europeanisation, will most likely share the progress of the latter. Be that as it may, with the EU providing the post-Westphalian, postsecular venue, the issue of religiocultural heritage is now on the agenda; it has been disseminated, internationalised, and has brought about the mobilisation and involvement of institutions. Without these opportunities that have rendered the OCC an actor and upgraded its reach up to an EU level via the RCCEU, it is doubtful whether there could have been any notable progress, on an issue that would have probably remained obscured from international attention. The OCC has had an active involvement in raising awareness and internationalising the issue. It has exercised religiocultural diplomacy, it has successfully accomplished the repatriation of several artefacts and has contributed to the restoration of several sites. Moreover, it has given rise to a narrative, which renders the Greek-Orthodox cultural heritage in Northern Cyprus a benchmark of democratisation and Europeanisation. In turn, however much the latter may be partial, fragmented, and heavily dependent on Realpolitik, however much affected by constraints on the full implementation of the acquis and the fundamental rights charter, the risk of its relativisation via derogations is considerable; for, the EU is bound by its own acquis, principles and values, and by the moral obligations thereof.

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References

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Georgios E. Trantas is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the University of Aston, Department of Politics and International Relations. His research interests include the Politics of Religion; cultural diplomacy; the exercise of soft power by churches functioning as international organisations, including the process of Europeanisation in conjunction with the notion of Europeanness; and by extension self-perception, nationhood, citizenship, and cultural-political identity. Moreover, he researches intra-European migration and the formation of religioscapes thereof, with a focus on religious art and culture as spatial markers of migrant communities in the public sphere and as symbolic constellations of being and belonging.

[email protected] Part II Orthodox Diaspora and Identity in the Global World

[email protected] Orthodoxy Going Global: The Quest for Identity

Maria Hämmerli

Abstract Though Orthodoxy may not qualify as an ideal-typical example of global religion, it is however being deeply affected by globalization. Its recent worldwide geographical spread and the intense transnational connectivity this generated have brought about unprecedented religious identity questions. This chapter discusses Orthodox identity recompositions in the context of the global spread of this religious tradition: what does it mean to be Serbian, Russian or Greek Orthodox and live in contemporary France, Great Britain or Germany? And what does it mean to be French, British or German and be Orthodox? The chapter focuses on three aspects of this large topic: after a brief overview of the various waves of migration to Western Europe, I consider the main factors that impact the reconstruction of Orthodox identity in a global context, such as minority status, secularization and the recent transformations of religion in the West, and religious pluralism. Last, this chapter discusses two local instantiations of the global spread of Orthodoxy (glocalizations), as described by V. Roudometof (Religions 5:1017– 1036, 2014a, Globalization and orthodox Christianity: the transformations of a religious tradition. Routledge, London/New York, 2014b), namely verncularization (the blend of Orthodoxy’s universalism with local languages, such as French and English) and indigenization (the blend of Orthodox universalism with a specific ethnicity). The chapter concludes with the idea that globalization has challenged Orthodoxy to reconsider its relationship to ethnicity, “the world” (i.e. the secular) and other religions.

Keywords Orthodoxy · Globalization · Secularization · Glocalization · Ethnicity · Religious pluralism

The title of the present volume and of the conference that preceded it – “Global Eastern Orthodoxy: Politics, Religion, Human Rights” – is thought-provoking, particularly because of the “global” dimension it attributes to a religious tradition long

M. Hämmerli (*) University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland e-mail: [email protected]

[email protected] 176 M. Hämmerli associated with a particular geographical location (Eastern Europe, as the designation “Eastern Orthodoxy” tends to indicate) and with its corresponding ethnic and national populations. My contribution to this volume tackles religious identity issues elicited by the global spread of Orthodox populations through various waves of migration. Before I proceed to the actual discussion of the topic, I would like to clarify my understanding of the syntagm “global Orthodoxy”, in order to situate my approach to the relation between Orthodoxy and globality. To begin with, one can speak of Eastern Orthodoxy as global, to the extent that it has claims of universalism, as all major world religions do (Robertson and Chirico 1985). Previously confined to specific geographical, cultural and national territories, Orthodoxy has rediscovered and reasserted its universality over the last century when it spilt over its national and historical borders and reached new places, i.e. when it experienced another aspect of globality, namely worldwide spread, transnational connectivity and the circulation of people and of specific religious goods. However, this “sheer experience of globality” in its geographical and transnational dimensions differs from “its normative endorsement” and cultural acceptance (Agadjanian and Roudemotof 2005: 3), which presupposes religion embraces globality, though to various degrees. Global religion is one mode of expressing a positive response to globality, whose distinct features and trends scholars have tried to summarize as follows: Agadjanian and Routometof (2005) mention, among others, the autonomization of religious communities, which cross old political and denominational loyalties and are endowed with a not-rigid authority structure; an individualistic style of religiosity, rid of ascriptive affiliation with a particular religious and ethno-cultural tradition; the reduction of the goal of religion as such to individual self-realization; the simplification of the belief system in favor of a minimal dogmatic content; the ability to fuse archaism with hyper-modernity, etc. Agadjanian and Roudometof conclude that “Eastern Orthodox traditions have created no substantive infrastructure” that would bring them close to the ideal type of global religion as it is illustrated by Pentecostalism, Charismatic Catholicism, New Age or yoga. However, the authors do not imply Orthodoxy is unaffected by globalization nor that it has not developed its own responses to it. I will come back to this aspect later. Csordas (2009) similarly argues that the pre-modern globalization of world religions differs significantly from the post-modern context, in that today’s global religion has two key characteristics: a portable practice, i.e. “rites that can be easily learned, require relatively little esoteric knowledge or paraphernalia, are not necessarily linked to a specific cultural context, and can be performed without commitment to an elaborate ideological and institutional apparatus” (Csordas 2009: 4). Global religion has also a transposable message, i.e. “the basis of appeal contained in religious tenets, premises or promises can find footing across diverse linguistic and cultural settings and…is susceptible to being transformed or reordered without being denatured” (Csordas 2009: 5). Csordas also identifies the means by which religions travel today, namely missionization (in a global age mission originates in non-Western contexts and occurs in revival movements), migration of populations, but even more mobility of individuals, and mediatization (TV, radio, the internet, etc.). The application of this model of global religion to the Orthodox case brings

[email protected] Orthodoxy Going Global: The Quest for Identity 177 about similar conclusions as Agadjanian and Roudometof: the Orthodox Churches – with their intricate hierarchical organization and authority distribution, strong attachment to ethnicity and national identities, complex dogmatic content, and ritual apparatus, to name a few aspects – fit difficultly the above mentioned descriptions of global religion. Moreover, worldwide spread of Orthodox Churches is not the result of innovative missionary activity, nor of the globalization of their religious message, but rather of migration. The Orthodox presence in Western Europe, the Americas and Australia is due primarily to the circulation of cradle Eastern European Orthodox, who established religious communities in their host countries, along ethnic lines. Even if Orthodoxy is not an ideal-typical example of global religion, the growing transnational circulation of Orthodox people, values, imaginaries, and religious objects generates the creation of a “transnational Orthodox space” (Ihlamur 2014), whose geographical development, temporal endurance and cultural adaptation may result into the foundation of global Orthodoxy over time. This explains the title of this chapter, “Orthodoxy going global”, which underlines the idea of “work in progress” and of becoming global. In the following, I would like to discuss Orthodox identity recompositions in the context of the global spread of this religious tradition: what does it mean to be Serbian, Russian or Greek Orthodox and live in contemporary France, Great Britain or Germany? And what does it mean to be French, British or German and be Orthodox? I will focus on three aspects of this large topic: after a brief overview of the various waves of migration to Western Europe, I will consider the main factors that impact the reconstruction of Orthodox identity in a global context: minority status, secularization and the recent transformations of religion in the West, and religious pluralism. Last, I will discuss two local instantiations of the global spread of Orthodoxy (glocalizations), as described by Roudometof (2014a, b), namely verncularization (the blend of Orthodoxy’s universalism with local languages, such as French and English) and indigenization (the blend of Orthodox universalism with a specific ethnicity). The paper is based on existing literature (very scanty though) on Orthodox communities in Italy, Germany, Ireland, Finland, Denmark and Norway, and on findings of my own qualitative research I did primarily in Switzerland between 2007 and 2011, when I surveyed the life of 14 parishes belonging to the four major jurisdictions present in Switzerland (the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church).

Orthodox Migrations and the Issue of Religious Identity

Having been for centuries confronted with harsh political situations, such as Ottoman occupation, authoritative tsars and communist regimes, Orthodox Churches did not have the means to deploy well-supplied missionary activities that would spread them worldwide. The various missionary attempts that marked their history

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(e.g. Russian mission in Japan, China and Alaska) are much less known and undeni- ably more modest in scope than those undertaken by Western Christian denominations. This caused them to be routinely perceived as stagnant Churches (Ramet 2006) stuck in their traditional territories in Eastern Europe and the Near East, separate from and alien to modern and Western developments (Hungtington 1996). The turning point of Orthodoxy spilling over its historical heartland is commonly associated with the twentieth century: massive and successive migration waves arrived in what is called “the West” from the Russian empire after the Bolshevik coup and the subsequent political chaos in the 1917–1920s. The advent of communism in other countries of Eastern Europe after the WWII caused other Romanian, Bulgarian and Serbian Orthodox populations to flee to Western Europe and the Americas. Political turmoil in Asia Minor (the crisis between Turkey and Greece in early 1920s and between Turkey and Cyprus in the 1970s) was another push factor that set on the road other numerous Orthodox people. Economic hardships caused many Greeks and Serbians to search for a better living in a West that increasingly needed labor force in various post WWII fast- developing industrial sectors. Other events that occasioned Orthodox migrations were the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe after the 1990, the war in ex- Yugoslavia in early 1990s and the economic difficulties that devastated the respective countries afterwards, culminating with a new generalized economic crisis in 2008–2009, which affected especially Greece (Hämmerli and Mayer 2014). In recent years, refugees from the Near East and North Africa (Syria, Egypt, Ethiopia and Eritrea) diversified the Orthodox landscape in the West with a considerable Oriental Orthodox1 presence. This latter category is beyond the scope of my research and of the present paper. Economically and politically driven migrations contributed to bringing an esti- mate2 of at least 4 million Eastern Orthodox people in today’s Western Europe. In the process of settling down in these new contexts, the Orthodox were soon brought to asking themselves the question: who are we? The stakes of redefining religious identity differed from one wave of migration to another, according to the reasons that triggered migration (whether forced or freely chosen) and to the reception context (e.g. whether the host country was ready to accept migrants and offered acceptable working conditions or not). The Orthodox political exodus comprised the military and intellectual elites of the former Russian empire, but also of royal Romania and Serbia, who understood their countries were no longer accessible to them and strove to reconstruct their religious identity in a new context. The attempts of the Russian intelligentsia remain

1 This commonly designates a family of six autocephalous church bodies, comprising the Ethiopian, Coptic, Armenian, Syrian, Indian and Eritrean Churches, which are in close dialogue, yet not in communion with the Eastern Orthodox Churches, with whom they share great similarities in doctrine and religious practice. 2 This this figure is based on estimates of Orthodox believers in Great Britain (approximately 460.000, according to https://faithsurvey.co.uk/uk-christianity.html), Germany (1.5 million, according to Bremer et al. 2016), Italy (1.5 million, according to Giordan 2015) and France (500.000, according to the Annuaire de l’Assemblée des Eglises orthodoxes de France 2017).

[email protected] Orthodoxy Going Global: The Quest for Identity 179 the most remarkable, especially with figures such as Vladimir Lossky, Nikolai Berdiaev, Sergei Bulgakov, George Florovsky, Alexander Schmemann and John Meyendorff, who have greatly contributed to shape a new refreshed Orthodox theology, meaningful for modern Man and understandable also to Western Christians, with whom they engaged in a stimulating dialogue (e.g. through the creation of the Fellowship of Saint Alban and Saint Sergius in Great Britain or the Brotherhood of Saint Photius in France). Their legacy seems to remain relevant even today, not only in the West, where it continues to nourish contemporary Orthodox thought in search for self-understanding and self-definition, but also back in the Orthodox heartland, where academic theology could not develop during communism, with some rare exceptions (e.g. Romanian theologian Dumitru Staniloae). But not all political migrants reacted to their situation of quasi-exile with efforts to enculturate Orthodoxy in the West. Many ROCOR and some Romanian and Serbian parishes (at some point in their history) remained so focused on preserving Orthodoxy together with their ethnic identity, that they ended up stuck in an ideal- ized image of the country of origin, irrelevant for their offspring and even for other Orthodox people. One of my elderly Russian informants in French-speaking Switzerland reported that, even after 70 years spent in Switzerland, she still felt it was impossible for her to pray to God in French. Moreover, she considered the practice of celebrating Orthodox liturgies in French as a betrayal. As far as labor migrations are concerned, at least during the period before 1990, they were also characterized by a strong connection between ethnic and religious identity. As seasonal guest workers in Switzerland (and more largely in Western Europe), Greeks and ex-Yugoslavs appear to have had short-term vision for their parishes, which they often conceived of as ethnic community centers attending to the pastoral needs of temporary migrants. Migrations after the 1990s are highly interesting to look at (and not only in the case of Orthodox communities), because of several reasons. First, because the migrants’ socio-cultural profile diversified: students, artists, low-skilled workers, home and health care workers (nannies, housekeepers, caregivers for elderly people), highly skilled professionals (especially in the field of IT, engineering and med- icine), and increasingly more women. This is a generation who has experienced both the heritage of communism in terms of religious persecution, and also the resurgence of religion in the public life in the aftermath of the fall of communism. Field data indicate that, though these Orthodox migrants generally have little theological knowledge, have a sense of Orthodoxy being part of their identity as Romanians, Serbians, Russians, etc. Second, post −1990 migrations differ from the previous waves because of the way new technologies have changed distant communication and travelling, making the country of origin and its culture (including religion) more easily accessible. The possibility of more frequent and intimate connections between those who move and those who remain behind, the immediacy and intensity of migrants’ contact with their sending communities, allow them to be actively involved in everyday life in fundamentally different ways than in the past (Levitt 2001a). This easier way of staying in touch with the homeland contributes to the continuation of the strong bond

[email protected] 180 M. Hämmerli between ethnicity, culture and Orthodoxy, but also to the creation of ‘a transnational Orthodox space’, in which circulate religious objects, spiritual charismatic figures, religious literature, etc. On the one hand, this circulation of Orthodox goods and imaginaries can be interpreted as an obstacle to faster integration in the host country’s cultural and religious landscape. On the other hand, the actors involved in it see it as an asset for maintaining an “authentic” Orthodox identity, close to the roots. The third characteristic of new migrations that differentiates them from previous experiences is the fact that the present receiving contexts are usually more tolerant to ethnic and religious pluralism (Levitt 2001b). This provides a social and political environment that encourages the maintenance of migrants’ religious, cultural and ethnic traditions. Contemporary migrant populations have more resources available to them to sustain their diversity in the new local context (Martikainen 2013). In the case of Orthodox Churches this translates into simpler procedures for establishing religious organizations, help from local Christian denominations in finding worship places or in some cases politically facilitated recognition (e.g. Italy and Switzerland). But the Orthodox landscape in the West is by far not made uniquely of first- generation migrants. Parishes are populated also with descendants of earlier migrants, who are Western-born-and-raised Orthodox, speak the local language and are culturally attuned to local values and realities. The presence of converts is also highly important, though not numerically, but qualitatively, because they tend to be greatly involved in the life of their parishes. These two categories of Orthodox population differ from first-generation migrants with respect to the ethnic “color” of the faith and advocate for the universal dimension of Orthodoxy and the possibility of its enculturation in new territories. While in the Orthodox heartland religious identity is something self-evident, intertwined as it is with ethnicity, the social and the political spheres, the global dispersion of Orthodox Churches and people brings them to redefine Orthodox identity, especially with regard to the interplay between ethnicity and religion (Hämmerli and Mucha 2014). First generation migrants have experienced the Church back home not so much as an institution that safeguards Tradition and provides means of salvation, but rather as an important social actor throughout the history of their nation, one that claims to have contributed to the preservation of language and promoted national culture in hard times of external oppression. The Church is expected to provide identity in situations of crisis or of threat. And migration, in its first stages, can be a challenge for one’s identity. Religious practice in a familiar setting and atmosphere helps reconnect migrants to their roots and provides a sense of community. It is an understanding of religion as something deeply connected to the history and identity of the community that practices it. Seen from this perspective, an Orthodox Church with the ethnic qualifier “Russian” or “Greek” in its name who does not care for her people’s Russianness or Greekness appears as a betrayal (Hämmerli and Mucha 2014). For converts, the “Russian” in Russian Orthodox Church or “Greek” in Greek Orthodox Church, stands only for a certain liturgical and spiritual tradition. Religion is distinct from categories such as ethnicity, nationality or race. They imagine Orthodoxy in terms of a system of belief and practice, which draws its ethos from

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Early Christianity, the Church Fathers and the Ecumenical Councils. It is a source of Truth, which provides a path of salvation, to which all humanity is called. For converts, ethnicity, nationality and culture are spiritually neutral, contingent and this-worldly categories and therefore should have no incidence on Orthodox identity and no place in the Church, where one is supposed to look for salvation, eternity and the sacred. Therefore converts often claim that the privatization of ethnicity would allow for a more universal expression of Orthodox Christianity and that the Church should follow its liturgical and theological vocation, doubled by an intense philanthropic activity to the larger society. In her study of American converts to Orthodoxy, Amy Slagle (2011) argues that the converts’ effort to translate and enculturate Orthodoxy in America does not result into an ethnicless Orthodoxy. Ethnicity here is rather invisible and not upset- ting, but it is not inexistent, as it is claimed. The process of enculturating Orthodoxy in other contexts than the historical ones, in other words associating it with other ethnicities than those we are used to, is subject to resistance and negotiation. The success of this endeavor could participate in making Orthodoxy global religion, as defined in the previous section of this chapter.

Factors That Impact Orthodox Identity Reconstruction in a Global Context: Minority Status, Secularization, and Religious Pluralism

One of the crucial factors that impact the reshaping of Orthodox identity in a migration context is the fact that the Orthodox people and Churches move from societies in which they used to represent the religious majority, to places where they are a tiny and often insignificant religious minority. But there is something deeper and more important than statistics about this: migration brings Orthodox people and Churches out of societies where the religious is highly intertwined with culture and the political sphere, to societies which have been developing the separation of the religious from all other spheres of human activity since the eighteenth century. While back home Orthodox identity was self-evident, taken-for-granted and culturally transmitted, in a migration and minority context it becomes an object of reflection, a purpose in itself, which demands from practitioners personal involvement and action. The question of what is religious and what is merely cultural arises in many individuals, laymen or clergy alike. While the latter have the means to discriminate between the two, based on their theological education, the former are more often than not disori- ented, especially in early stages of migration. Interviews with Orthodox priests in Switzerland indicate that clergy’s main preoc- cupation is mission to their own ethnic community. Priests report that their most urgent task is to explain people the basics of Orthodox doctrine, the meaning of the liturgy, of sacraments, of fasting, iconography, etc. They do this kind of general catechism partly during sermons, linking the explanation of the day’s reading from the

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Gospel with an aspect of Orthodox theology. Consequently, migrants’ faith and practice become informed with theological notions and meanings, empowering them with knowledge that can potentially serve as a basis for shaping an Orthodox identity outside an ethnic framework. Religious practice is another area affected by the minority condition of the Orthodox Churches in a global context. In the Orthodox homeland people can express and manifest piety spontaneously, outside an organized religious service, in a variety of ways, facilitated by the existence of numerous worship places (churches and monasteries alike) that are open all day long and that people can enter for a short time to pray, venerate icons, light a candle, etc. As migrants, the Orthodox seldom own their worship places (most parishes rent Catholic or Protestant buildings for Sunday service) and even when parishes do so well off to purchase or build their own churches, these are very few and geographically situated outside their reach during a normal working day. Most Orthodox people travel some distance to get to the nearest Orthodox parish. The inaccessibility of Orthodox worship places outside Sunday liturgy leads to a Protestant-like type of religious practice: on the one hand, the collective practice is reduced to Sunday liturgical attendance and on the other hand this situation encourages informal and individual style of practicing, outside an organized framework. My field experience indicates also the fact that the lack of genuine Orthodox buildings impacts the practitioners’ relationship to the sacred space, especially in the case of recent migrants: some of my Romanian informants reported that the fact of doing and undoing the sacred space (with a trunkful of liturgical objects, books, vestments and icons the priest had to bring with him), which moreover was used by non-Orthodox people for their own religious celebrations, diminished the feeling of the sacred and the mystical atmosphere they expected to experience in an Orthodox worship place. By the same token, a convert informant reported having chosen to attend liturgy in the Russian parish in Geneva because it has a 150- year old church, where he could feel an “Orthodox atmosphere”, in spite of the language barrier. In a global context Orthodoxy too is required to develop a “portable practice”, as Csordas (2009) puts it, but this adaptation does not seem to satisfy Orthodox practitioners. Another consequence of the minority status is that clergy become shepherds of a small specific flock, losing their larger social significance. This shrinks their area of exercising authority, which is moreover reduced at the level of the parish to “spiritual matters”, a body of laymen being in charge of the “secular matters”, including financial ones. The priest becomes the employee of the parish and has to comply with contractual obligations and responsibilities. This puts him in a somewhat precarious position, as Thorbjørnsrud’s research on Orthodox priests in Norway seems to indicate (Thorbjørnsrud 2014). My own field experience indicates a change of the relationship between clergy and laity, in that laity become more involved in running and managing the parish and thus gains more power than in a context in which it is a passive consumer of Church services. In some cases, priests and bishops were overthrown by the will of the congregation or of a group in the parish (e.g.

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Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev made a very short career in the British Orthodox diocese of Sourozh; Metropolitan Michael of ROCOR was removed from his position in Geneva as a result of a few laymen’s intervention with the head of the ROCOR in New York). Another consequence of disembedding the administrative and “worldly” matters of the parish life from the theological principles that are supposed to govern them (Schmemann 1965), is a shift from a traditional way of parish governing to governance, a modern concept that emerged in business management, extended to politics and is now affecting religious institutions globally (Gauthier 2019). An example of this can be found in a recent announcement of the Orthodox Church in Finland about a reform of its parish organization.3 This consists in regrouping parishes in a certain geographical area under a single administrative unit, a so-called “mother-parish”, which will supervise the smaller worship units. The latter will no longer have a parish board and all issues related to property, real estate and employment (of clergy, choir director, etc.) will be dealt with by the “mother-parish”, i.e. by an external authority. The Church of Finland argues this reform is necessary in order to allow parishes to focus more on spiritual matters and waste less energy in paperwork. What most Orthodox practicing people I interviewed report missing in a minority context is the omnipresence of Orthodox symbols and references in the public space, in the way time is shaped in society and in the social life more largely. These aspects facilitate religious identification, feeling of belonging and transmission. Religion, i.e. Orthodoxy, is no longer something “just there”, but something one has to actively search, question and seek for. In other words, implicit religion needs to be made explicit in order to be perpetuated: religious identity needs to be recon- structed through a process of rationalization (in the sense of clarification through explanation) of the faith, of the practice and of transmission. Orthodox identity is no longer something passively received, infused in individuals by mere socialization in a culture deeply marked by Orthodoxy, but the result of purposeful action. This affects also the perception of time, which is no longer organized in line with religious feasts revolving around the celebration of events in Christ’s life, of the Theotokos and the saints (Louth 2012), especially in Protestant countries, who withhold a much less number of religious feasts than the Catholic ones. Yet, the reported absence of a culture porous to Christian symbols, references and values is not only the result of living in a minority context, but also of the fact that the Orthodox in the West are in social and cultural spaces marked by secularization. The global spread of Orthodox communities brings them (back) in contact with this phenomenon. Why back? Because during communism Eastern Europe experienced a process of secularization, forcefully imposed by the political regime by excluding religion from education, art and intellectual discourse, by banning religious symbols from public space, reducing drastically religious institutions and their possibility to perpetuate and renew themselves. The secularization process under way in Europe has a very different face, consisting in a historical process of “disenchantment of the world” through rationalization and bureaucratization (Weber

3 See: https://www.ort.fi/ru. Accessed 12 November 2018.

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1930) and the gradual dissociation of religion, culture, politics, economics and other social spheres because of structural and social differentiation (Durkheim 1915). This led to a radical transformation of Christianity: decline in Church membership, practice and belief, decline of institutionalized religion and religious authority, irrelevance of Christian values and beliefs in the making of law and the construction of the public sphere, etc. The advent of new forms of religiosity, belief and practice, based on the affirmation of individual autonomy and subjectivity (what Heelas and Woodhead 2005 described as the shift from “religion” to “spirituality”) contributed to further change the way religion evolves in the West. Orthodox migrants are called to live their religious ethos in the “generalized immanent frame”, an expression Taylor (2007) uses to describe the “conditions of belief” in the West. This represents a major challenge to the Orthodox Churches and people, given the imbrication of the transcendent and the immanent, of religion and politics specific to this religious tradition, as a consequence of the enduring belief that divine-human union is the aim of human existence (Papanikolaou 2007). How do the Orthodox react to these new “conditions of belief”? Despite common general agreement that secularization is pernicious and destructive, there is no homogeneous Orthodox stand in this regard. I will try to outline two observable trends. The first one consists in the rejection of secularization and resistance to it through bolstering the theological knowledge of parish members (both highly practicing and occasional visitors), criticism of modernity, emphasis on a proud difference, securing spaces and reservoirs of Tradition (monasteries), etc. Aware that secularization is an irreversible process, this category of Orthodox try to preserve Tradition and traditions as faithfully as possible, so as not to let the contingent cultural trends cor- rupt it. The extreme manifestation of this attitude could be epitomized by “the Benedict option” proposed by American Orthodox convert Rod Dreher (2017), who suggests that the only way forward for Christians (who have lost any chance to be politically relevant in their societies), is actually the way back – all the way to Saint Benedict of Nursia (sixth century), who embraced exile from mainstream culture, inciting the construction of alternative communities and of a counterculture based on Scripture and the wisdom of the ancient Church. The second trend is represented by some theologians, institutional actors and lay- people who believe a dialogue and exchange with the “world” (to be more precise, modernity) is possible, desirable and beneficial. These Orthodox do notunderstand secularization as a threat against which they need to develop defense strategies, but rather as an opportunity to spread the Orthodox message, by engaging dialogue with secular philosophy and the findings of modern science. This was the central message conveyed at the Western European Orthodox Congress in 2015 by keynote speaker Assaad Kattan, who challenged the 500 people in the audience to become actors in a “renewed relationship of the Church” and to seek a dynamic interpretation of Tradition, enlightened by the discoveries of humanities, psychiatry and philosophy. Reactions from the audience joined his position, suggesting that Orthodox intellectuals should identify those texts (liturgical, patristic, etc.) that are relevant and appealing to twenty-first century modern men and women in order to use them to empower people in their quest for a meaningful relationship to God and the world.

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More recently (October 2016), a French-Russian youth organization (ACER- MJO4) titled its annual conference “Has Orthodoxy missed the train of modernity?” and invited its members and conference participants to reflect on the responses Orthodoxy can provide to modern challenges, on the Church’s resources, tradition and theology, which qualify it as a valid interlocutor to modernity “at the dawn of the third millennium, at a time of accelerating pace of history and radical transformations of the world (in terms of technology, economy, bioethics, computer science, etc.)”.5 The same youth organization has been running a journal, Mouvement, since 2014. Its columnists made a survey among 185 Orthodox people in the Paris, the majority of whom defined their Christian identity as an obligation to take action in society, but not necessarily in a political type of engagement, nor by a loud, protest- ing and claimant attitude. The Christian way should be discrete, loving service to one’s neighbor and community. The second issue of this journal (2015) discussed the possibility of Christian manifestations of faith in a secular society in a similar tone: the authentic Christian “lives and acts as a servant, making no noise, speaking no word of proselytizing… The greatest testimony of a saint is not that of his word, but of the divine light that radiates from his face. Let us be radiant, this is not against the principles of secularism!” (Laham 2015: 19). These excerpts show that actually the Orthodox, though critical of secularization, are also willing to confront its presuppositions against Orthodox theology and anthropology. The advocates of this approach represent a minority in the Orthodox Church worldwide and are concentrated mainly in lay academic circles in the West, but also present among some clerics (most notable examples are Metropolitan Kallistos Ware and Metropolitan John Zizioulas). They believe in Orthodoxy’s potential to provide an alternative to modern secular presuppositions, while using modernity’s language, concepts and ideological inclinations. The two Orthodox trends I have sketched above are highly divergent and critical of each other, claiming the other is wrong. There is a great deal of “in-between”, which is neither on the one side, nor on the other, but receives influence from both. This is inline with the whole history of the Church, which has been made by the cohabitation of such opposing enterprises: at all times, some representatives of the Church were critical of society and the various forms of its sinful inclinations, while others continued to preach the Orthodox message to this very sinful world. And Tradition has been enriched and nourished by both attitudes, who represent the two facets of the coin “be in the world but not of the world”. The third factor that shapes the reconstruction of an Orthodox identity in a global context is religious pluralism, which characterizes today’s Western societies. Religious pluralism defies Orthodox Churches to reinterpret their creed of being the one and true Church of Christ in a world in which other religious movements make claims for truth and authenticity. The Orthodox Churches in the West are all the more uncomfortable to maintain their claim of dogmatic superiority because they

4 The acronym stands for: Action chrétienne des étudiants russes (en France). 5 http://www.acer-mjo.org/fr/congres-de-l-acer-mjo-8-9-octobre-2016. Accessed 12 November 2018.

[email protected] 186 M. Hämmerli are in a situation in which they solicit Catholic and Protestant institutions’ assistance in establishing parishes and monasteries or in educating their own clergy. They sign agreements with local Christian communities by which they commit themselves to refrain from proselytizing and mission, thereby limiting their activity to pastoring their own (ethnic) flock. Decades of ecumenical relations and theological dialogue have led to a certain attenuation of the Orthodox consciousness of being the unique true Church, as proves the change of vocabulary introduced by the Council of Crete in 2016. One of the conciliar documents (Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World) refers to the other Christian denominations no longer as “heretical” or “schismatic”, according to the tradition of the first Ecumenical Councils, but grants them the title of “Church”, a designation previously confined to the Orthodox Church alone. This comes maybe as a logical sequence of the 1965 meeting between Pope Paul VI and Patriarch Athenagoras who pronounced the mutual lifting of the anathemas of 1054. This has paved the way also for the affirmation of the complementarity of Eastern and Western Christianity in asserting the full Christian revelation, in official declarations of twentieth century popes and patriarchs. An increasing number of joint statements of Orthodox bishops and other religious leaders in the face of human or natural catastrophes indicate that the Orthodox, at least at the level of Church diplomacy, prefer to emphasize communalities and unity, rather than dogmatic differences and disagreements. At the level of individuals, the high rates of intermarriage also brings new questions about how the spouses define religion for their families and what religious heritage they will transmit to their offspring. The deflation of the strong belief that the Orthodox Church is the one and true Church of Christ is about to penetrate some ecclesiastical and academic bodies in the Orthodox heartland as well, via the global spread of Orthodox students of theology that complete MA, doctoral and postdoctoral degrees in Catholic and Protestant universities. Upon return in the homeland, these students bring new ideas in their academic, professional and personal networks, which it can be presumed that over time may introduce profound changes in academic Orthodox theology. In a global context, the influence of religious developments extends in a “reverse” direction, from the margins (the Orthodox “diaspora”) to the metropole (the Orthodox heartland).

Emerging Glocalizations of Orthodoxy

Victor Roudometof has explored extensively the topic of Orthodoxy and globalization (Roudometof 2014a, b), especially from a historical point of view, showing how Orthodox claims of universality blended with local particularisms, resulting in four forms of glocalization: vernacularization (the fusion of Orthodoxy and a specific local language), indigenization (the fusion of Orthodoxy and a specific ethnic identity), nationalization (the modern fusion of religion and the nation-State in Eastern Europe) and transnationalization (the hybridization of globality and nation).

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Though vernacularization and indigenization pertain to the pre-modern globalization of Christianity, I argue these can be relevant categories to describe contemporary glocalizations of Orthodox Christianity, crystallized in attempts to build a French-speaking or an English-speaking Orthodoxy, for example. In the following I will refer to two practices of Orthodox communities in a migration context: first, translations of liturgical and spiritual texts as well as the creation of an Orthodox vocabulary in various Western languages (vernacularization); second, the appropriation of the early Christian past of the respective Western European countries as prototypically Orthodox, followed by the emergence of new rites and practices (indigenization of “Swiss Orthodox Saints”, “British Orthodox Saints”, “German Orthodox Saints”, etc.). The global spread of Orthodoxy brought about the need to translate religious services6 and major spiritual texts in new languages, so as to make them available for converts and descendants of first-generation migrants. Translations are not only cult (i.e. worship) productions intended for ecclesiastical use, but also cultural productions that serve at the creation of a new French-speaking or English-speaking Orthodox culture (Dumas 2013), with its own vocabulary and theological terminology. The actors involved in this process do not aim at literal or equivalent translations, but rather at grasping Orthodox concepts in a meaningful way, in languages whose theological vocabulary was wrought by Roman Catholicism and/or Protestantism. For example, “toute immaculée” (all immaculate) is a term that has theological connotations that bring to mind the Roman Catholic dogma about the Immaculate Conception, which the Orthodox reject. In order to avoid dogmatic and theological confusion, translators have preferred the use of a more neutral term – “toute irréprochable” (all irreproachable). The same attempt to affirm the specificity of Orthodox theological identity by making sure to clearly distinguish key concepts from existing Western Christian ones is to be found also in the case of the translation of the word referring to the death of the Virgin Mary: Dormition (English and French) and Mariä Entschlafung (German) are preferred to Assumption (Eng.), Assomption (Fr.) and Mariä Himmelfahrt (Ger.). Whenever the target-language lacks the necessary lexical tools to designate Orthodox theological notions, cult objects or forms of worship, translators draw on Greek and Slavonic vocabulary, which they “naturalize” in the target-language.7 The construction of a French-speaking, English-speaking, German-speaking, etc. Orthodox identity is also enhanced with translations of spiritual texts produced by great spiritual figures in the Orthodox heartland. The choice of editors tends to favour recent saints or spiritual figures: in the French-speaking world, the publish-

6 The liturgy is the central text and act of worship in Eastern Christianity, because it contains the main Orthodox theological assumptions that command and orient collective and private devotional practices. It is mainly about Saint John Chrysostom’s liturgy, which dates back to the fourth century. Two other liturgies are celebrated in the Orthodox Church on specific occasions: the Liturgy of Saint Basil (used only ten times a year) and the Liturgy of the Pre-Sanctified Gifts (performed only on the weekdays of the Great Lent). 7 For example in French: acathiste, acédie, kondakion, épitrachilion, épitaphios.

[email protected] 188 M. Hämmerli ing house L’Âge d’Homme8 is well-known for its collection Grands spirituels orthodoxes du 20ème siècle, led by convert theologian Jean-Claude Larchet and rich of 25 volumes. But there are other publishing houses that engage in issuing Orthodox literature, such as Les Editions du Cerf, with the collections Orthodoxie and Catéchèse orthodoxe and Les Editions des Syrtes. In Germany, there are also several Orthodox publishing houses, such as Hagia Sophia, Theophano Verlag, Orthoodxe Quellen und Zeugnisse, which complete and enrich the translations and publications of the various Orthodox dioceses in this country. Closely connected to vernacularization, Orthodoxy in a global context is also undergoing a process of indigenization. Two practices illustrate this form of glocalization: first, the project of creating a “Western rite” Orthodoxy, i.e. a liturgical form that is conceived in continuity with the rites practiced in the West before the Great Schism; second, the reappropriation of the Western Christian past as prototypically Orthodox. Jean-François Mayer, who documented the issue of the Western rite Orthodoxy, notes that “there is a surprising variety of liturgical forms compared to the small number of canonical Western rite communities” (Mayer 2014: 283), and quotes research that inventoried three types of Western rites: “‘historical’ (Mensbrugghe), ‘modern-pragmatic’ (pre-Vatican II Roman rite with some adaptations) and ‘personal-eclectic’. Mayer further argues that this diversity reveals the different backgrounds of people involved in Western rite efforts, who aspire to recover the fullness of Christianity or the “true” Christian identity of the West by reviving liturgical forms that have fallen out of use or were simply lost.9 This kind of work resulted into the revival or construction of the Roman rite, the Sarum rite, the Gallican rite, etc. that are celebrated sporadically in Western Europe (e.g. France, Switzerland, Germany, Great Britain) and mostly in the USA. Bishops who have jurisdiction over Western European countries are rather reluctant to the practice of liturgical pluralism. In a Lausanne based meeting between advocates of the practice of the Gallican rite and a Serbian bishop, the former conveyed the importance for converts to practice Orthodoxy in continuity with their former Christian background, cast within musical and linguistic forms as well as bodily gestures fitting their spiritual sensitivity. The argument was also about the authenticity of the Western rite for Western converts, compared to the imported Byzantine rite, which they assumed had never been celebrated in the West. Another facet of indigenization in the case of Orthodoxy in the West is the veneration of the pre-Schism Christian saints10 and the reappropriation of this historical

8 L’Age d’Homme was founded in Lausanne in 1966 by a Serbian Orthodox immigrant, Vladimir Dimitrijevic, and extended in France. 9 At times, this amounts to archaeological work that consists in compiling fragments of liturgical texts that were preserved here and there in other contexts. 10 The practice of venerating local Western saints reached the Orthodox heartland, as testifies the addition of saint Patrick of Ireland to the Russian Orthodox Calendar, a decision announced by the Moscow Patriarchate in March 2017. This is another indication of the fact that in a global context the flow of religious influence can be reverted from the periphery to the centre, as argued in section “Factors that impact Orthodox identity reconstruction in a global context: Minority status, secularization, and religious pluralism” of this paper.

[email protected] Orthodoxy Going Global: The Quest for Identity 189 period as part of the universal Orthodox past of Europe. In his analysis of the Orthodox settlement in Ireland, James Kapalò (2014) noted: The arrival of Orthodoxy and Orthodox migrants in the West has given rise to a process of reinterpretation of the West’s religious past as prototypically Orthodox. This discourse, and the practices that flow from it, can serve to strengthen a sense of belonging amongst migrant Orthodox, who have a means of conceptualising themselves as representatives of the ancient past of their new homeland, tapping into a local ‘Orthodox memory’ and ‘imagi- nary’, and at the same time can also operate to legitimise the religious choices and identities of local Western converts to Orthodoxy. (Kapalò 2014: 242–243) This process of indigenization of Orthodoxy takes on material, visual and ritual forms in contemporary Western Europe. First, naming parishes after local saints (Saints Columba, Patrick and Brigit in Ireland; Saints Alban, Bede and Chad in Great Britain; Saints Genevieve, Germain and Cloud in France; Saint Maurice and Saint Maire in Switzerland; Saints Killian, Kolonat and Totnan in Germany, etc.). Second, producing aesthetic worship objects such as icons depicting the respective saints (several websites present rich collections of such productions, which are often initiated by convert iconographers.11 Apart from representations of individual saints, there are also icons presenting the “Synaxis of all Orthodox saints” in the Americas, Britain, Belgium, Switzerland, etc., imitating an iconographic practice in Orthodox countries, where national Churches have instituted feasts, rituals and visual representations of their “national” saints. Third, the proper Orthodox veneration of local saints calls also for composing hymns and prayers addressed to these saints. The synaxis of the local saints are usually celebrated the second or third Sunday after Pentecost.12 The composer of the “Hymn to All Saints that Flourished in the Land of the Swiss”, late Bishop Ambroise of the ROCOR, established this feast on a date that has a symbolic meaning in Switzerland, namely the Federal Day of Thanksgiving, Repentance and Prayer (Jour du Jêune federal in the French-speaking part of Switzerland or Bettag in the German- speaking part), observed on the third Sunday of September. He also ordered the embroidery of a Swiss Orthodox flag, which imitates the traditional Orthodox cross with Monogramma Christi (IS XR NIKA) placed between the arms of the cross. The fourth practice that contributes to indigenize Orthodoxy in the West is the visiting of ancient religious sights, especially of places where relics of local saints are preserved (e.g. Saint Maurice in Switzerland, Saints Geneviève, Radegonde and Martin in France, Saint Alban in Britain, Saint Columba, Patrick and Brigit in Ireland, Saint Boniface in Germany, etc.). The indigenization of Orthodoxy in a global context relates with the observations I made in the first section of this paper, about converts’ (and other Western-born-and-

11 See: https://aidanharticons.com/category/western-saints; http://www.oodegr.com/english/istor- ika/europe/orthodox_evangelists_west_europe.htm. Accessed 12 January 2019. 12 The Pentecost is considered the feast that marks the beginning of the Church, with the synaxis (gathering) of all the apostles. The Sunday following the Pentecost is dedicated to “all the saints of Orthodoxy”. National Churches introduced a feast dedicated to the synaxis of their local saints, celebrated the second Sunday after Pentecost. Similarly, the Orthodox in the West celebrate the Western local saints the second or the third Sunday after Pentecost.

[email protected] 190 M. Hämmerli raised Orthodox) affirmation of the need to de-ethnicize Orthodoxy in order to allow for its universal dimension to be expressed. However, the enculturation of Orthodoxy in other national, cultural or ethnic contexts does not equate with creating an ethnicless Orthodoxy, but it consists in indigenizing it, i.e. impregnating it with other ethnic “colors”, invisible as this may be to the actors involved in this process.

Conclusion

The main conclusion we can draw from the previous remarks is that the global spread of Orthodoxy generated unprecedented identity questions in this religious tradition. These questions could be ultimately formulated as tackling the relationship between: 1. Orthodoxy and ethnicity: competing claims of authenticity as a result of keeping Orthodoxy in connection to the history and culture of the people who practice it, versus authenticity as a result of de-ethnicizing Orthodoxy in order to affirm its universal dimension and allow its indigenization in new ethnic contexts. 2. Orthodoxy and “the world”: representations and solutions about how Orthodoxy should relate to Modernity and secularity vary from defensive attitudes, expressed however through modern tools and channels, to confident attitudes that affirm the capacity of Orthodoxy to “absorb” ideas and practices produced by Modernity without “corrupting” its belief system, to rather indifferent or irresolute attitudes at the level of individual believers, who approach religion (and therefore Orthodoxy) as a private matter. 3. Orthodoxy and other religions: the global context brings religious institutions that have lived separately for centuries into close proximity, compelling them to redefine their boundaries and reinterpret some of their dogma. The cohabitation and, at times, dependency of Orthodox Churches on their Catholic and Protestant hosts in Western Europe, as well as the Orthodox participation in ecumenical relations over the last century have led to the attenuation, at least at the level of public discourse, of the affirmation that the Orthodox Church is the one true Church of Christ. The answers and solutions to the Orthodox quest for identity in a global context are neither homogeneous nor coherent. They are shaped by the interplay between the context of migration (the reasons that triggered migration) and the context of reception (a situation of religious minority; “conditions of belief” characterized by “the immanent frame”; increasing religious pluralism). The identity questions generated by the global spread of Orthodoxy and some of the solutions and practices resulting from them have been affecting not only the so- called “diaspora”, but resonate back in the Orthodox homeland, through the circulation of people and ideas characteristic to a global context.

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References

Agadjanian, A., & Roudometof, V. (2005). Introduction: Eastern Orthodoxy in a global age – Preliminary considerations. In V. Roudometof, A. Agadjanian, & J. Pankhurst (Eds.), Eastern Orthodoxy in a global age. Tradition faces the twenty-first century (pp. 1–29). Walnut Creek: Altamira Press. Assemblée des Évêques Orthodoxes de France, Annuaire de l’Église orthodoxe en France, Villebazy, Éd. (2017). Monastère de Cantauque. Bremer, T., Kattan, A., & Thöle, R. (2016). Orthodoxie in Deutschland. Münster: Aschendorff Verlag. Csordas, T. (2009). Introduction: Modalities of transnational transcendence. In T. Csordas (Ed.), Transnational transcendence: Essays on religion and globalization (pp. 1–29). Berkeley: University of California Press. Dreher, R. (2017). The Benedict option: A strategy for Christians in a non-Christian nation. New York: Sentinel. Dumas, F. (2013). La liturgie eucharistique de l’Église orthodoxe et l’histoire de sa traduction. Iasi: Doxologia. Durkheim, E. (1915). The elementary forms of the religious life. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. Gauthier, F. (2019). Nation-state to market: Religion in a neo-liberal age. London: Routledge. Giordan, G. (2015). Orthodox Christianity in Italy: Historical continuity and social discontinuity. Religion, State & Society, 43(3), 262–275. Hämmerli, M., & Mayer, J.-F. (Eds.). (2014). Orthodox identities in Western Europe: Migration, settlement and innovation. Farnham: Ashgate. Hämmerli, M., & Mucha, E. (2014). Innovation in the Russian Orthodox Church: The crisis in the diocese of Sourozh in Britain. In M. Hämmerli & J.-F. Mayer (Eds.), Orthodox identities in Western Europe: Migration, settlement and innovation (pp. 290–312). Farnham: Ashgate. Heelas, P., & Woodhead, L. (2005). The spiritual revolution. Why religion is giving way to spirituality in the modern world. Oxford: Blackwell. Huntington, S. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of the world order. New York: Simon and Schuster. Ihlamur-Öner, S. G. (2014). Romanian Orthodox Churches in Italy: The construction of the Romanian–Italian transnational Orthodox space. In M. Hämmerli & J.-F. Mayer (Eds.), Orthodox identities in Western Europe: Migration, settlement and innovation (pp. 29–50). Farnham: Ashgate. Kapalò, J. (2014). Mediating Orthodoxy: Convert agency and discursive autochtonism in Ireland. In M. Hämmerli & J.-F. Mayer (Eds.), Orthodox identities in Western Europe: Migration, settlement and innovation (pp. 229–250). Farnham: Ashgate. Laham, O. (2015). Laïcité: et nous, les chrétiens, dans tout ça? Mouvement, 2, 19. Levitt, P. (2001a). The transnational villagers. Berkeley: University of California Press. Levitt, P. (2001b). Between God, ethnicity, and country: An approach to the study of transnational religion. Paper presented at the workshop transnational migration: Comparative perspectives, 30 June–1 July 2001, Princeton University. Louth, A. (2012). Orthodoxy and the problem of identity. International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 12(2), 96–104. Martikainen, T. (2013). Religion, migration, settlement: Reflections on post-1990 immigration to Finland. Leiden/Boston: Brill. Mayer, J.-F. (2014). We are westerners and must remain westerners: Orthodoxy and Western rites in Western Europe. In M. Hämmerli & J.-F. Mayer (Eds.), Orthodox identities in Western Europe: Migration, settlement and innovation (pp. 267–289). Farnham: Ashgate.

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Papanikolau, A. (2007). Orthodoxy, post-modernity, and ecumenism. The difference that divine- human communion makes. Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 42(4), 527–546. Ramet, S. (2006). The way we were- and should be again? In T. Byrnes & J. Katzenstein (Eds.), Religion in an expanding Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Relations of the Orthodox Church to the Rest of the Christian World. https://www.holycouncil. org/-/rest-of-christian-world Accessed 12 Jan 2018. Robertson, R., & Chirico. (1985). Humanity, globalization and the worldwide religious resurgence: A theoretical exploration. Sociological Analysis, 46(3), 219–242. Roudometof, V. (2014a). Forms of religious glocalization: Orthodox Christianity in the longue durée. Religion, 5, 1017–1036. Roudometof, V. (2014b). Globalization and Orthodox Christianity: The transformations of a religious tradition. London/New York: Routledge. Schmemann, A. (1965). Problems of Orthodoxy in America. The spiritual problem. Saint Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 9(4), 171–193. Slagle, A. (2011). The Eastern Church in the spiritual marketplace: American conversions to Orthodox Christianity. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Taylor, C. (2007). A secular age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Thorbjørnsrud, B. (2014). Orthodox priests in Norway: Serving or ruling? In M. Hämmerli & J.-F. Mayer (Eds.), Orthodox identities in Western Europe: Migration, settlement and innovation (pp. 191–210). Farnham: Ashgate. Weber, M. (1930). The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. New York: Dover Publications.

Maria Hämmerli is a Researcher in the field of Social Scientific Study of Religion at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. While her general research interests include religion, migration, globalization, and ethnicity, her main research expertise is with Orthodox communities in Western Europe, a long-neglected research topic. She contributed to filling this literature gap with numerous publications on Orthodox ‘diaspora’, Orthodox monasticism, and Orthodoxy in a global context and a co-edited volume on Orthodox Identities in Contemporary Contexts. Migration, Settlement and Innovation (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014).

[email protected] Singing an Old Song in a New Land: Orthodox Christian Churches in the Twenty-First Century America

Alexei Krindatch

Abstract Orthodox Christianity in America exists in cultural, religious, and social environments which are different from the “Old Lands” of Orthodoxy, where more homogeneous religious demography gave rise to presumptive religious identity. In contrast, the historically established American tradition of religious pluralism, in combination with an ever-expanding smorgasbord of religious options, force most churches to compete to retain or gain adherents. This has numerous implications for how Orthodox Church life in the U.S. is organized. Based on a number of original studies conducted by the author from 2010 to 2018, this chapter, first, focuses on the administrative structure, geography, parish, monastery and membership data on various U.S. Orthodox Churches. Secondly, the author explains the ongoing changes in Orthodox Church membership (influx of new immigrants, growing number of American converts to Orthodoxy, increasing number of religiously mixed families). Third, the strength of ethnic culture and identity in U.S. Orthodox Churches is explored. Fourth, the author discusses the major (non-theological) differences between American Orthodox parishes and Protestant congregations. Finally, the chapter discusses the possible future developments and adaptations by U.S. Orthodox Churches to the mainstream American cultural and religious environment.

Keywords Orthodox Churches in America · Orthodox parish life · Church membership · Ethnic culture · Cultural pluralism · Religious identity

A. Krindatch (*) Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of the USA, Berkeley, CA, USA e-mail: [email protected]; http://www.orthodoxreality.org; http://www.assemblyofbishops.org/news/research

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Introduction: American Religious Context

Organized religion has flourished in America from its very onset as a country. Very different religious communities have found it possible not simply to “exist,” but to express themselves freely and creatively in a wide variety of forms. The American religious context also has a number of distinct features that make the “American experience” of Orthodox Christianity very distinct from Orthodoxy in the “Old World.” First, the Orthodox Churches in America exist in a situation of cultural and religious pluralism, which is historically rather unusual for them. Back in the “Old World,” many national Orthodox Churches had a history of relying on the state to enforce an “Orthodox agenda.” America is very different: it is the country where the principles of religious freedom and pluralism have been historically the foundational cornerstones upon which American society was built. That is, Orthodox Christianity in the USA is not a tradition which symbolizes national unity and solid- ifies a particular national identity. Rather, it exists among many other equally “valid” Christian communities and non-Christian faith groups. Second, despite ongoing discourse about growing secularization and increasing percentage of religious “Nones” (Nones on the Rise 2012), the share of population participating in organized religious life remains high. The 2010 “Religious Congregations Membership Study” (also known as “U.S. Religion Census”)1 indicated that 48.8% of Americans are the adherents2 of various local faith communities: e.g. Christian congregations, Muslim mosques, Jewish synagogues, Baha’i temples, etc. (Grammich et al. 2012). That is, nearly half of Americans do not simply say that they are “religious persons” or “believers,” but are actually involved in some local religious organizations. Further, according to earlier Religious Congregations Membership Studies, during the past decades, the percentage of religious adherents in US total population has remained fairly stable: 49% in 1952, 48.7% in 1971, 49.7% in 1980, 55.1% in 1990 and 50.2% in 2000. Third, the American religious “landscape” and demography are uniquely diverse and mosaic. The principle of religious pluralism and freedom has always been one of the cornerstones upon which American society was built. This has created a fertile soil for the flourishing of myriads Christian groups and other faith communities. Many subsequent waves of immigration contributed to the continuing increase in American religious diversity. One of the recent developments that further supports this trend is the proliferation of various non-denominational churches (including the so-called “Megachurches”). According to the study by Hartford Institute for Religion Research: “If the nation’s all independent and nondenominational churches were combined into a single ‘denomination’ they would represent today the third largest cluster of congregations in the country, following the Roman Catholic Church and

1 See at: http://www.rcms2010.org. Accessed 20 September 2018. 2 The term “adherents” is meant to describe all people affiliated with and participating in the local religious communities regardless of frequency of their participation or their formal “membership status.” In effect, “adherents” allow for the most comparable count of religiously involved people across different Christian denominations and other faith groups.

[email protected] Singing an Old Song in a New Land: Orthodox Christian Churches in the Twenty-First… 195 the Southern Baptist Convention” (Nondenominational & Independent Congregations 2011). The increasing religious diversity of American society means also that USA is a country where people have an ever-growing abundance of “religious choices.” Fourth, it is fully socially acceptable and increasingly common in America to choose and change one’s religion or affiliation with a particular religious organization. The 2015 US Religious Landscape Study by the Pew research center revealed a remarkable degree of “religious switching.” Even if Protestantism is treated as a single religious group (i.e., not counting switching between various Protestant denominations), then 34% of American adults currently have a religious identity different from the one in which they were raised. By comparison, in 2007, this figure was only 28%. If the three major Protestant traditions (evangelical Protestantism, mainline Protestantism and historically black Protestantism) are analyzed separately, then the share of Americans who have switched religions in the course of their lives rises to 42% (America’s Changing Religious Landscape 2015). The implications for Orthodox Churches of this growing religious switching are simple: in America, it would be seen by many as perfectly socially acceptable for an Orthodox person to abandon the Church which is unwilling to meet changing expectations and aspirations of the new generations of her faithful. In summary, if one would use “marketing” terminology, America could be described as a country with a fairly stable “religious market capacity” (as measured by the percentage of people who participate in the local religious communities), but with a growing number of “religious vendors” who share and divide this religious market. The Orthodox Christian Churches are part of this unique American religious reality. As the prominent sociologist Peter Berger pointed out, the conditions of an ever- expanding market of religious options force American churches to compete in retain- ing or gaining the adherence of the free-to-choose population. And this task has proved to be especially difficult for churches with a claim to exclusive authority and a history of relying on the state to enforce a religious monopoly, which to a large degree was the case of Orthodoxy. On the level of individual religious consciousness, religious pluralism means the shift from religion as a taken-for-granted (or inherited) reality to religion as a matter of personal voluntary and deliberate choice” (Berger 2003). The following essay is not an academic paper which would involve the use of a particular theoretical framework, research methodology, and discussion of hypotheses that need to be proven. Our goal is different: to present a snapshot of Orthodox Christianity in twenty-first century America. And this task is not as easy as one might think. While some prominent American theologians and church leader sometimes refer to the “Orthodox Church” in the singular and even talk about the “mission of Orthodoxy” in America,3 the reality is that Orthodoxy in the United States has been and remains an internally very diverse and extended family of national Churches and their local parish communities. In this “Orthodox Church family,” some relatives are closer to each other, while some are fairly “distant cousins.” The individual histories of these Churches on American soil are distinct, their current

3 See for instance the sermon “The Mission of Orthodoxy” written by Fr. Alexander Schmemann: http://www.peterandpaul.net/schmemann-missionoforthodoxy. Accessed 20 September 2018.

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“niches” in the context of the wider society are different, and their mutual relations are at times sensitive. And, yet, despite this internal diversity, the American Orthodox Churches share in common (besides theology) some trends in their developments and certain features that distinguish their parishes from other Christian congregations. On the next pages, we will discuss some of these distinct features. In short, our hope is that this article will help readers (both in the USA and abroad) to better recognize the very distinct Orthodox “colors” within the bright and increasingly mosaic American religious landscape. One additional preliminary note should be made. Most of the statistical and survey data used in this article is drawn from original studies conducted by the author in his professional capacity during the past 10 years. The article is intentionally based on descriptive statistics so that all discussed subjects, observations and findings will be easily accessible and understandable for a broad audience of readers.

Orthodox Christian Churches in the USA in the Twenty-First Century: An Overview4

In 1794, a group of eight Orthodox monks, from the Valaam and Konevits Monasteries in the Russian north, arrived on the island of Kodiak in Alaska. Sent to what was then Russian America, the monks built a church dedicated to Christ’s Holy Resurrection and a wooden monastery near the Kodiak harbor. The arrival of this religious mission marked the beginnings of organized Orthodox Church life in America.5 In the course of following decades and centuries, many national Orthodox Christian Churches that have faithful in the United States have organized their own jurisdictions6 in North America.7 The first dispersed and autonomous “ethnically based” parishes founded by Orthodox immigrants from various countries were later eventually united into centrally administrated dioceses subordinated to the “Mother

4 This article is limited to Eastern Orthodox Christian Churches (also known as “Byzantine” Churches) and does not include information on the Oriental Orthodox Churches (such as Armenian, Coptic, Ethiopian, Syrian and Malankara-Indian Churches). 5 Unlike institutional Church, individual Orthodox Christians appear to have been present in America since the early seventeenth century. The records of the Virginia Company, for instance, note that a certain “Martin the Armenian” came out to the Jamestown colony in 1618. Better documented at this point is the story of Virginia aristocrat Philip Ludwell III, who converted to Orthodoxy at the Russian church in London in 1738 himself, his daughters and son-in-law. Well known is also the story of New Smyrna, a colony of several hundred Greeks that British entrepreneur Andrew Turnbull established near St. Augustine, Florida, in 1768. Disease and brutal working conditions at New Smyrna led to its abandonment within a decade. 6 The word “jurisdiction” is commonly used within the American Orthodox community – instead of the Protestant term “denomination” – to describe a national Orthodox Church body. 7 For a short yet sufficient overview of historical development of the Orthodox Christianity in the USA, we recommend the chapter on “Orthodox Christianity in America: One Faith Many Stories” in (Krindatch 2011).

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Churches” in an Old World. The original goal of American Orthodox Churches was clear: to minister to the religious needs of these diverse immigrant ethnic communities: the Greeks, Russians, Serbians, Romanians, Bulgarians, etc. There is no doubt that the ethnically based Orthodox jurisdictions have brought a big measure of order and unity for the newly arrived immigrants who otherwise would have remained fragmented and enfeebled in an “American melting pot.” Today, most of the Orthodox Churches – or “jurisdictions”- in the United States are still linked to their “Mother Churches” in the Old World: some being directly subordinated and some being more autonomous.8 Table 1 shows how complex is the composition and administrative structure of Eastern Orthodox Christianity9 in America and how strong is the presence of each national Orthodox Church body. In summary, Table 1 shows that today at least 800,000 adherents of various Orthodox jurisdictions in America participate in the lives of 1900 local Orthodox parishes and 80 monastic communities. These figures suggest that Eastern Christianity has become firmly rooted in American diverse religious landscape. And yet Orthodox Christians in the United States still sometimes refer to their faith and Church as the “best-kept secret in America”10 implying that in many ways, Orthodox Christianity – its history, beliefs, and practices – remains generally unknown to mainstream America. In part this may be due to the uneven geography of American Orthodoxy. Orthodox churches – with their distinct domes and other architectural features – are common enough in many Northeastern and Midwestern industrial cities, in rural areas and small towns of Pennsylvania, and in the villages of Alaska, but they are less often seen in the Southern and Western (California being an exception) states. Statistically, 45% (almost half!) of all US Orthodox Christians are concentrated in five states: New York (14% of all Orthodox adherents), California (10%), Illinois (8%), Pennsylvania (7%) and Massachusetts (6%) (Krindatch 2011). Occasional publications and appearances in local mass-media may call attention to the pageantry of Orthodox Holy Week (which often falls some weeks after western Christians have celebrated it) or to customs associated with Christmas (which for many Orthodox Christians falls 13 days after the western observance). But these token acknowledgements mostly tend to reinforce the impression that Orthodoxy is

8 Except the Orthodox Church in America which is autocephalous (fully independent) US based Church. 9 The data in Table 1 and further in this article refer only to the Orthodox Churches that are part of the Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of the USA (www.assemblyofbishops.org). In addition to them, there is a number of Orthodox Churches of irregular status. They adhere to Orthodox theology and liturgical practice, but because of various reasons the other Orthodox Churches do not recognize their validity and qualify them as “non-canonical” Churches (e.g. Macedonian Orthodox Church, Holy Orthodox Church in North America, etc.). 10 This expression originates from the sermon delivered in 1987 by the late Metropolitan Philip (Saliba) of Antiochian Archdiocese on the occasion of the reception of the Evangelical Orthodox Church into Antiochian Archdiocese. Metropolitan Philip declared: “We thank God that those faithful people have found their true faith which once and for all was delivered to the saints. This faith which remains the best kept secret in America because of our laziness. Because we have been busy taking care of our little ethnic ghettoes.”

[email protected] 198 A. Krindatch d 920 700 2,600 12,400 84,900 74,600 10,400 483,700 Estimated number of adherents c Number of monasteries for men and women 1 for men 7 for men 13 for women 1 for men 1 for women 8 for men 11 for women 1 for men 1 for men 2 for women 1 “dual” monastery 0 0 b 2 33 15 28 75 534 535 251 Number of parishes and mission parishes a New York, NY York, New Syosset, NY Featerville-Trevose, Featerville-Trevose, PA New York, NY York, New New York, NY York, New Englewood, NJ Englewood, Johnstown, PA Johnstown, Administrative Administrative center on US territory Jamaica Plain, MA A group of individual parishes (not a A group of individual diocese) subordinated to the Russian Moscow) Orthodox Church (Patriarchate Until 1970, part (“Metropolia”) of the Russian Orthodox Church. Since 1970, an autocephalous (fully independent) US based Church. Diocese of the Patriarchate of Georgia. Diocese of the Patriarchate Eparchy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of of the Ecumenical Patriarchate Eparchy Constantinople Part of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church of the Bulgarian Part Autonomous (self-ruled) church body within Antioch of the Patriarchate Autonomous Church within the Ecumenical of Constantinople Patriarchate Status and relation to “Mother” Churches abroad Autonomous church body within the of Constantinople Ecumenical Patriarchate Eastern Orthodox Churches in the United States Patriarchal Parishes of the Parishes Patriarchal Russian Orthodox Church www.mospatusa.com Orthodox Church in America. www.oca.org Georgian Apostolic Georgian Church in North America Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America www.goarch.org Bulgarian Eastern Orthodox Bulgarian Diocese www.bulgariandiocese.org Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese www.antiochian.org American Carpatho- Russian Orthodox Diocese www.acrod.org Orthodox Church jurisdictions and their websites Albanian Orthodox Diocese of America Table 1 Table

[email protected] Singing an Old Song in a New Land: Orthodox Christian Churches in the Twenty-First… 199 22,400 68,800 27,700 11,200 0 6 for men 7 for women 12 for men 6 for women 1 for men 1 for women 84 30 121 199 Bound Brook, NJ Warren, NJ Warren, IL Grayslake, Alhambra, CA New York, NY York, New Chicago, IL Autonomous Church within the Ecumenical of Constantinople Patriarchate Three dioceses on the US territory are part of and are directly subordinated to the Serbian Orthodox Dioceses Autonomous Church within the Russian Moscow) Orthodox Church (Patriarchate Part of the Romanian Orthodox Church Part ). Published in (Krindatch 2011 ) and (Grammich et al. 2012 Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA www.uocofusa.org Serbian Orthodox Dioceses in North America www.easterndiocese.org www.newgracanica.org www.westserbdio.org Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia www.synod.com/synod/ indexeng.htm Romanian Orthodox Archdiocese of the United States of America www.mitropolia.us Number of parishes as indicated in the online directories of the respective Orthodox Church jurisdictions Number of parishes as indicated in the online directories respective Membership Study ( www.rcms2010. The most recent accurate data on number of Orthodox Church adherents were obtained in 2010 Religious Congregation Some of US Orthodox Churches have centralized national church administrations and headquarters, whereas some consist of several dioceses each of which centralized national church administrations and headquarters, whereas some consist of several Some of US Orthodox Churches have online These data are also available The data on US Orthodox monasteries were obtained and updated in 2015–2017 studies. Published (Krindatch 2016 ). is subordinated directly to the “Mother” churches abroad at: http://assemblyofbishops.org/assets/files/news/scoba/AtlasOfMonasteriesSecondEditionBookmarkedOptimumSize.pdf org a b c d

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“exotic” and closely linked to certain ethnic cultures: Greek, Russian, Serbian, Romanian, etc. In other words, the main source of confusion concerning Orthodox Christianity in America is that it is often perceived not as a single faith community, but as collection of ethnic groups, each with its own cultures and traditions, united together by little more than a shared name “Orthodox.” True, some US Orthodox parishes or even entire national jurisdictions remain “ethnically-based” (more about this in the next chapter), but the “full reality” is much more complex. On the one hand, the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s resulted in the new wave of the Orthodox immigrants to America from such countries as Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, etc. (Alperin and Batalova 2018). This new Orthodox immigration contributed to reawakening of ethnic sentiments in many old Orthodox parishes and to creation of the new parish communities with strong ethnic culture and identity. On the other hand, however, during past decades the “newcomers” to Orthodox parishes in America were not only newly arrived immigrants. Throughout its entire history in America, the Orthodox Church has attracted many men and women from other religious backgrounds to convert to Orthodoxy. The American converts came to Orthodoxy in a variety of ways. Most joined the Orthodox Church as individuals (either after a period of individual religious search- ing or through the marriage with the “cradle Orthodox”), but some have entered as part of a religious group. An “iconic” example of the latter case is a conversion of more than two thousand members of Protestant “Evangelical Orthodox Church” who joined Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese in 1987 (Michalopulos and Ham 2003). Regardless of background, most converts are well read, articulate, and enthusiastic about their new faith. Their growing presence has made Orthodoxy in America more diverse than ever, but also less cohesive. Many converts have a strong sense of mission and religious outreach (especially, former Evangelical Protestants), which at times makes them “disappointed” with cradle Orthodox who may view Orthodoxy simply as an aspect of their ethnic culture and limit their religious involvement to occasional attendance of worship services. Some converts, being upset by modernization developments in their former denominations (especially Episcopalians and Roman Catholics) and impressed by the strong adherence of Orthodoxy to established traditions and practices, try to be as “Orthodox” as possible. Their religious zeal and rigid observance of all Church requirements is seen by many cradle Orthodox in America as rather odd. One way or the other, today, the converts to Orthodoxy form a sizeable part of the membership in American Orthodox Churches. According to 2008 “Orthodox Church Today” national study, 29% of lay members of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America – the largest of all American Orthodox jurisdictions – were raised in the other (non-Orthodox) religious traditions. In the Orthodox Church in America (the second largest Orthodox jurisdiction), a dominant majority (51%) of church members are adult converts to Orthodoxy (Krindatch 2008). These figures are consistent with the findings from 2010 national “Faith Communities Today”

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(FACT) study.11 FACT data for Orthodox Churches indicated that 27% of the members of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese are converts to Orthodoxy. In the case of the Orthodox Church in America and Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese (the third largest Orthodox jurisdiction) the percentage of converts among church members was estimated as 49% and 51% respectively. Another trend which further complicates the demography and culture of American Orthodox Churches is growing proportion of inter-married families – i.e. couples where one of the spouses is Orthodox and another is not. In the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, for instance, the official registry records show that in 1963 only 22% of marriages were mixed inter-Christian marriages, but in 2016, as many as 61% of marriages were between Orthodox and non-Orthodox12 (Registry Statistics 2016). To be sure, intermarried couples have increasing presence and impact on all Christian denominations in the United States (U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: Religious Affiliation 2008). Yet, in the case of Orthodoxy this trend is more complex and challenging for the local Orthodox parishes, because of the strict rules surrounding intermarriage in the Orthodox Church13 and because of many requirements in Church life. Indeed, in many cases, the non-Orthodox spouses are actively involved and vol- unteer their time and resources for the Orthodox parish. However, the presence of the intermarried couples in an Orthodox parish poses an inevitable question of how much effort this parish should put to “convey” the Orthodox Tradition and Doctrine to the non-Orthodox spouse in order to assure that he/she has a better understanding of what the Orthodox faith is about, thus, feeling reasonably comfortable with his/ her involvement into the parish. Non-Orthodox cannot receive Holy Communion and other sacraments in the Orthodox Church. While this rule is generally understood and accepted, it also discourages parishioners to bring to the church their non-Orthodox spouses or their non-Orthodox family members. The issue of who can serve as a sponsor in baptisms also poses a challenge, because today only members of the Orthodox Church can be “god-fathers” or “god-mothers” for Orthodox baptisms, while the non-Orthodox part of the family is not “eligible” for these roles. The intermarried couples face wide range of issues dealing with religious upbringing and religious choices of their children. The differences in “Western” (Gregorian) and “Eastern” (Julian) Church calendars combined with the strict requirements of the Orthodox Church for fasting during certain periods and during Great Lent can

11 For detailed information on 2010 Faith Communities Today study see: http://faithcommunitiestoday.org/fact-2010 12 It should also be noted that the real percentage of intermarriages should even be higher than 61%, because of unknown number of the GOA members who marry in non-Orthodox Christian Churches, thus, being not counted by the GOA registry. 13 In essence, an Orthodox Christian may marry a non-Orthodox and remain a Church member in a good stance only if two conditions are observed: (a). The non-Orthodox partner has been baptized in a Christian Church which baptizes in the name of Holy Trinity. That is, if an Orthodox Christian would marry a Muslim, Jew, Hindu, Mormon, Unitarian or simply not baptized person, he/she would excommunicate him/herself from the Church; (b) The marriage must be performed by the Orthodox priest and with the Orthodox Sacrament of Matrimony.

[email protected] 202 A. Krindatch also be frustrating and disturbing for the “normal” family and social life in the mixed households. The list of the issues and challenges that the Orthodox – non- Orthodox couples and their parishes are facing is long. As national Orthodox jurisdictions and individual parishes struggle with the challenges of ministering to new immigrants and US-born cradle Orthodox, integrating converts into church life and dealing with religiously mixed families, they continue to face the old question: how, indeed, “ethnic” are American Orthodox Churches at the beginning of the third millennium?

How “Ethnic” Are American Orthodox Christian Churches at the Beginning of the Third Millennium?

The question to what extent the American Orthodox Churches can still be seen as “ethnically based” religious communities remains open. Further, this subject continues to be hotly debated by Orthodox Church leadership and by the “rank and file” clergy and laity. That is for good reason. Indeed, the inquiry in this question leads to many sensitive issues which have significant implications for church life such as the usage of English versus “ethnic” languages in church, the presence and role of converts, the openness of Orthodox parishes to the ethnically and culturally “others,” the preference of younger generation of faithful for either cherishing their ethnic heritage and identity or for “blending” with mainstream America – the list of these “big” questions is endless. The membership of the Orthodox Christian Churches in the United States consists of four distinct demographic groups: • US-born descendants (second, third, fourth, fifth generations) of the original Greek, Slavic or Arab immigrants; • Newly arrived immigrants who emigrated to United States from Eastern Europe or Middle East in recent decades; • American converts to Orthodox Christianity – the former Protestants or Roman Catholics or persons without any religious upbringing; • The children of American converts: the persons who were born and raised in the Orthodox Church, but have no Orthodox “ethnic” heritage themselves. The presence of these four groups varies significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from parish to parish. As a result, there exists great diversity among local Orthodox communities in terms of how strong various ethnic elements in their religious and social lives are expressed. The US Orthodox parish survey conducted in 2011 under the auspices of Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of North and Central America (Krindatch 2012) provides several insights into the subject of ethnic identity and culture in US Orthodox Christian Churches. In this survey, each Orthodox parish which belongs to the Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops was asked to respond four questions:

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• Please, estimate the percentage of the English language used in your parish on a typical Sunday as the language of the Divine Liturgy (from 0% – “no English used” to 100% – “exclusively English used”); • Please, estimate the percentage of the English language used in your parish on a typical Sunday as the language of sermon(s) (from 0% – “no English used” to 100% – “exclusively English used”); • Please, estimate the percentage of the English language used in your parish on a typical Sunday as the language in which church choir or chanters sing (from 0% – “no English used” to 100% – “exclusively English used”); • Do you agree or disagree with the statement “Our parish has a strong ethnic culture and identity that we are trying to preserve?” Please, select one answer: “Strongly agree,” “Rather agree,” “Neutral/Unsure,” “Rather disagree,” “Strongly disagree.” 98.6% of all US Orthodox parishes which are part of the Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops responded to the survey, thus, making survey findings sound and reliable. Figure 1 on the next page furnishes information on the usage of the English language in worship services in the parishes of the various Orthodox jurisdictions. One should keep in mind that the data in Fig. 1 reflect US national “average” picture for each jurisdiction. Clearly, within each jurisdiction, there are significant varia- tions in the usage of various languages among individual parishes. Nevertheless, several important observations can be made. First, overall in the entire American Orthodox community – for all Orthodox jurisdictions combined – English is much more widely used in the church than the other languages. US nationwide, average proportion of English used as language of liturgy is 73%. In the case of language of sermon, the national average of the usage of English is even higher: 81%. Second, in terms of the usage of English versus non-English languages, all Orthodox jurisdictions in America can be divided in three categories. The first group includes three Churches which use almost exclusively English as the language of liturgy and sermon. These churches are: American Carpatho-Russian Orthodox Diocese, Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese and Orthodox Church in America (OCA). The second group includes jurisdictions where English dominates in worship services, but other languages also have a strong presence. This is the case of the Patriarchal Parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church, Bulgarian Diocese and Greek Orthodox Archdiocese. Finally, the third group consists of five jurisdictions where various non-English languages remain at least as important as English or even dominate as languages of liturgy and sermon. These are Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, Serbian Orthodox Dioceses, Albanian Diocese and Romanian Archdiocese. Third, Fig. 1 indicates a fairly consistent pattern: in all jurisdictions (Romanian Archdiocese being the only exception) English is more widely used as the language of the sermon than as the language of liturgy. This makes sense, because in the formal liturgy parish can still use a language which is not understood or spoken by the some of church members, but delivering homilies on various subjects would make no sense without clear communication between clergy and people present in the church.

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Average % of English used as language of liturgy Average % of English used as language of sermon

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

73% All jurisdictions together 81%

96% Carpatho-Russian Diocese 100%

94% Antiochian Archdiocese 97%

85% Orthodox Church in America 87%

Patriarchal Parishes of Rus. 77% Orth. Church 85%

68% Bulgarian Diocese 68%

66% Greek Orthodox Archdiocese 86%

52% Ukrainian Orthodox Church 58%

49% Rus. Orth. Ch. Outside of Russia 57%

Serbian Orthodox Dioceses 47% 57%

45% Albanian Diocese 85%

25% Romanian Archdiocese 23%

Fig. 1 Average percentage (%) of usage of English language in the parishes of various Orthodox jurisdictions

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Fourth, as noted, in almost all US Orthodox Churches, English is more frequently used as the language of sermon than as the language of liturgy, but in two jurisdictions this gap is especially wide: in Greek Orthodox Archdiocese (66% average usage of English in liturgy versus as much as 87% average usage of English in sermon) and in Albanian Diocese (45% and 85%). What this wide gap suggests is that compared to the other jurisdictions, the Albanian Diocese and Greek Orthodox Archdiocese are more attached to the idea of keeping “traditional ethnic” languages in liturgy as long as possible even if actual language of communication with church members – i.e. the language of the sermon – is English. In summary, survey data indicate that in terms of the languages used in worship services, the majority of parishes in most American Orthodox jurisdictions can be described today as predominantly “English speaking.” The exception from this rule are five jurisdictions where various non-English languages remain either as important as English or even dominate in the local church life: Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, Serbian Orthodox Dioceses, Albanian Diocese and Romanian Archdiocese. The fact that English language dominates in American Orthodox church life – as the language of liturgy and sermon – may prompt a premature conclusion that today solid majority of US Orthodox parishes can be described as “all American” congregations. However, the responses of the parishes to the last question in the survey show that this is not the case. In essence, the question “Do you agree or disagree with the statement ‘Our parish has a strong ethnic heritage and identity that we are trying to preserve?’” asked parishes about how they view themselves in terms of being or being not “ethnically based” and about how important to them their “ethnic roots” are. Figure 2 shows that relative majority (45%) of all US Orthodox parishes agreed with the statement “Our parish has strong ethnic heritage that we are trying to preserve.” Only 39% of parishes rejected this statement and 16% responded “neutral or unsure.” Further, in seven out of eleven jurisdictions, a strong absolute majority of parishes agreed with the statement about “having strong ethnic heritage and identity.” These jurisdictions are: Albanian Diocese (100% agreement with the statement), Romanian Archdiocese (87%), Serbian Orthodox Dioceses (82%), Greek Orthodox Archdiocese (63%), Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (63%), Ukrainian Orthodox Church (61%) and Bulgarian Diocese (58%). By contrast, in only three jurisdictions (Orthodox Church in America, Antiochian Archdiocese and Carpatho- Russian Diocese), absolute majority of parishes rejected statement about “having strong ethnic heritage and identity.” Finally, one jurisdiction – Patriarchal Parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church – presents an interesting case, when dominant majority of parishes responded that they are “neutral or unsure.” To conclude, survey data tell us that dominance of English language in most of US Orthodox jurisdictions does not mean that local Orthodox parishes are in a hurry to abandon their ethnic roots and heritage. A rather strong sense of ethnic identity is still present in American Orthodox Christian Churches.

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% of parishes responding: Agree (rather or strongly) Neutral / Unsure Disagree (rather or strongly) 0% 20%40% 60%80% 100%

All jurisdictions combined 45% 16% 39%

Albanian Diocese 100%

Romanian Archdiocese 87% 3% 10%

Serbian Orthodox Dioceses 82% 12% 6%

Greek Orthodox Archdiocese 66% 18% 16%

Rus. Orth. Ch. Outside of Russia 63% 13% 24%

Ukrainian Orthodox Church 61% 16% 23%

Bulgarian Diocese 58% 16% 26%

Patriarchal Parishes of Rus. 35% 10% Orth. Church 55%

Orthodox Church in America 35% 14% 51%

Carpatho-Russian Diocese 31% 16% 53%

Antiochian Archdiocese 17% 15% 68%

Fig. 2 Strength of ethnic identity in the parishes of various Orthodox jurisdictions: “Do you agree or disagree with the statement ‘Our parish has a strong ethnic culture and identity that we are trying to preserve’?”

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Ten Facts About US Orthodox Parishes That Make Them “Different” from American Protestant Congregations

A prominent US sociologist of religion, Nancy Ammerman, wrote: “By creating religious congregations – in cities and on the frontier – Americans embodied the cultural and religious values they cherished in ongoing institutions, structures that gave those values and traditions a place to thrive” (Ammerman 1997). That is, in many ways, the American religious congregations are much more than simply places of worship. Rather, congregations are voluntarily associations of people who share not only their religious beliefs, but also certain cultural and social values and attitudes. And they are also associations of people who not only pray together, but engage in many other activities: both within and beyond their congregations. How the life of a congregation – its programs, ministries, governance, finances – is organized and what congregation does beyond worship services vary greatly from one faith community to another. On the following pages, we will provide just a glimpse into some notable differences (besides liturgical life and theology) between American Orthodox Christian parishes, on the one hand, and the Mainline and Evangelical Protestant congregations, on the other hand. Granted, as American religious diversity continues to grow, the USA cannot be defined anymore as the “Protestant” or even “Christian” nation. Nevertheless, according to 2015 US Religious Landscape Study, nearly half (46.5%) of all Americans define themselves as the Protestants of various kinds. If we exclude from the count the persons who do not have any particular religion, then “Protestants” comprise an absolute majority (60%) of American believers (America’s Changing Religious Landscape 2015). In a sense, comparing American Orthodox parishes with Protestant congregations is like comparing US Orthodox Churches with the “core” of American religion. The data presented on the following pages were obtained in 2015 national survey and study of American religious congregations “Faith Communities Today” (Roozen 2015). 580 Orthodox parishes (30% of all US Orthodox parishes) participated in 2015 FACT study. It should be noted that the following ten facts about the “differences” between American Orthodox parishes and Protestant congregations highlight only those characteristics where there is an obvious gap between Orthodox parishes and both Mainline and Evangelical Protestant churches.

Fact 1: About Location Compared to American Protestant congregations, US Orthodox parishes can be described as much more “urban” and “suburban.” Figure 3 shows that 59% of American Orthodox parishes are situated either in or near cities with population of 50,000+ in comparison with only 44% of Mainline and 32% of Evangelical Protestant congregations. On the contrary, only 14% of US Orthodox churches are in rural areas and towns with population of less than 10,000 in comparison with 45% Mainline and 48% Evangelical Protestant congregations.

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Rural area, village or town with population of less than 10,000

Large town, small city with population 10,000-50,000 Downtown or older residential part of the city with population 50,000+ Suburb around a city with a population of 50,000+

Orthodox 14% 27% 33% 26% parishes

Mainline Protestant 45% 11% 28% 16% congregations

Evangelical Protestant 48% 20% 17% 15% congregations

Fig. 3 “How would you describe the location of your Church?”

Fact 2: About Conflicts and Disagreements Among the Church Members US Orthodox parishes are more prone to internal conflicts and disagreements than Mainline and Evangelical Protestant congregations. Answering question “During the past 5 years has your parish/congregation experienced any disagreements or conflicts?”, nearly three-quarters (73%) of Orthodox parishes reported “yes” in comparison with only 63% of Mainline and 57% of Evangelical Protestant congregations.

Fact 3: About the Style of Worship The liturgical worship in US Orthodox parishes is best described with the word “reverent,” while worship services in Mainline and Evangelical Protestant congregations tend to be more “joyful,” “innovative” and “thought-provoking.” Figure 4 shows, when asked to describe their Sunday worship services many more Orthodox parishes (88%) than Mainline (77%) and Evangelical (65%) congregations have chosen the word “reverent” as describing their Sunday worship “Quite well” or “Very well.” Differently, more Mainline and Evangelical congregations than Orthodox parishes reported that their worship services are “innovative,” “joyful” or “thought provoking.”

Fact 4: About Involvement of the Church Members in the Life of a Parish/ Congregation Compared to Mainline and Evangelical Protestants, the members of American Orthodox Churches are less involved in the lives of their parishes beyond

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% of parishes/congregations reporting "Quite well" or "Very well"

Orthodox parishes Mainline Protestant congregations

Evangelical Protestant congregations 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

88% Worship services 77% are "reverent" 65%

76% Worship services 85% are "joyful" 84%

70% Worship services are "thought- 91% provoking" 91%

22% Worship services 35% are "innovative" 31%

Fig. 4 “How well do the following words describe your parish’s/congregation’s regular Sunday worship service?” worship services. When asked “Overall, to what extent are your members involved in parish’s/congregation’s various programs, committees and projects outside of worship?”, only 45% of the Orthodox parishes reported “Quite a bit/A lot” in comparison with 56% of the Mainline and 53% of the Evangelical Protestant congregations.

Fact 5: About What Parishes/Congregations Do Beyond Worship Services When it comes to the life of a congregation outside of worship services, Orthodox parishes engage less than Protestant congregations in various activities and programs. Compared to Protestant congregations, Orthodox parishes are especially “passive” in developing “prayer groups and spiritual retreats” and “community service activities.” See Fig. 5.

Fact 6: About Ecumenical and Interfaith Involvement Compared to Protestant congregations, Orthodox parishes are much less involved in communication and cooperation with “religiously other” (non-Orthodox) groups. This is true not only for joint worship services, but also for the joint “educational or fellowship activities” and “community service activities.” See Fig. 6.

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% of parishes/congregations reporting that the following activities and programs receive "A lot of emphasis" or are "A specialty of ours."

Orthodox parishes Mainline Protestant congregations Evangelical Protestant congregations

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

19% Prayer, meditation groups, spiritual retreats 35% 31%

48% Community service activities, 65% helping those in needs, 61%

43% Bible, Scripture, theological studies 47% 60%

62%

Fellowships, social activities 66%

68%

37% Youth activities and programs 39% 60%

Fig. 5 “Does your parish/congregation have any of the following programs or activities? If ‘yes,’ how much emphasis is given to each activity?”

Fact 7: About Continuing Faith Formation of Church Members American Orthodox parishes and Protestant congregations have different priorities in their religious education programs. Compared to Protestant congregations, Orthodox parishes pay more attention to “relating Orthodox Faith’s beliefs and practices to each

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% of parishes/congregations reporting "YES"

Orthodox parishes Mainline Protestant congregations Evangelical Protestant congregations 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

28%

Worship services 66%

45%

36% Educational or fellowship 64% activities 50%

60% Community 73% service activities 69%

Fig. 6 “During the past 12 months, has your parish been involved in any of the following ecumenical or interfaith activities?” age level.” Differently, compared to Orthodox parishes, Mainline and Evangelical Protestant congregations place greater emphasis on “teaching their members about love and justice toward others” and on “engaging church members in nurture and fellowship.” See Fig. 7.

Fact 8: About Differences in “What Matters” in the Life of a Parish/ Congregation Orthodox parishes have a much stronger sense of their distinct religious identity than Protestant congregations. More than three-quarters (77%) of American Orthodox parishes agreed with the statement “Our congregation is quite different from other congregations in our community” compared to only 44% of Mainline and 58% of Evangelical Protestant congregations. At the same time, compared to Protestant congregations, Orthodox parishes appear to be less caring about their own members and less concerned with social justice advocacy. Figure 8 shows

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% of parishes/congregations reporting that the following has "High" or "Highest" priority

To relate one's 81% Faith's beliefs 65% and practices to each age level 76%

To engage 65% members in 73% nurture and fellowship 77%

58% To teach about love and justice 64% toward others 68%

Orthodox parishes Mainline Protestant congregations Evangelical Protestant congregations

Fig. 7 “How high or low a priority is each of the following in your religious education programs?” that fewer Orthodox parishes than Protestant congregations agreed with the statements “Our congregations is caring of members who have health, financial and personal needs” and with the statement “Our congregation is working for social justice.”

Fact 9: About Attitudes of the Clergy Towards the Use of Internet Technologies in Religious Life The American Orthodox priests are greater supporters of the use of the modern Internet technologies in church life than their fellow Protestant clergy. When asked “Which of the following best expresses your opinion about the use of Internet technologies (email, social media, texting, etc.) in parish life?”, 67% of Orthodox clergy have chosen the answer “In today’s world, parishes must

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% of parishes/congregations that "agree" or "strongly agree" with each statement

Orthodox parishes Mainline Protestant congregations Evangelical Protestant congregations

77% Our congregation is quite diﬀerent from from other congregations on 44% our local community 58%

82% Our congregation is caring and supportive of members who have 96% health, ﬁnancial or personal needs 92%

25% Our congregation is working for 58% social justice 37%

Fig. 8 “Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about your parish/ congregation?” use modern communication technologies as widely and as well as possible.” Only 58% of the Mainline Protestant pastors and 57% of the Evangelical Protestant ministers have chosen the same answer. Similarly, many more Orthodox priests than the Mainline Protestant pastors or Evangelical Protestant ministers think that “Our congregations uses Internet and social media effectively.” See Fig. 9.

Fact 10: About Spiritual Vitality and the Sense of Mission and Purpose A smaller percentage of Orthodox parishes than Protestant congregations evaluate themselves as being “spiritually vital and alive.” Similarly, fewer Orthodox parishes than Protestant congregations have a clear sense of the parish’s purpose and mission. See Fig. 10.

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% of clergy that "agree" or "strongly agree"

In today's world, 67% parishes/congregaions must use modern communication 58% technologies as widely and as well as 57% possible

66% Our parish/congregation uses Internet and 48% social media tools eﬀectively 54%

Orthodox parishes Mainline Protestant congregations Evangelical Protestant congregations

Fig. 9 Opinions of clergy about use of internet technologies in their parishes and congregations

Some Final Thoughts and Questions for the Future

A close reading of Orthodox history demonstrates a remarkable flexibility and adaptability in the life of the Church (Taft 2006). Yet, Orthodox Christianity praises adherence to tradition and emphasizes continuity and stability in Church life. Generally, changes and innovations in the Orthodox Church are accepted rather grudgingly: only if proven absolutely necessary and properly approved by Church hierarchy. This distinct feature of Orthodox Christianity is seen by many as its major strength, but, under certain circumstances, it can pose a major challenge or even threat for the Church’s future. Today and more than ever, there are two difficult questions that the Church needs to answer: • How to keep a proper balance between a supposedly once-and-forever established tradition and dynamically changing social realities? • How to adapt the Orthodox universal traditions and rules to the various local circumstances in which the Orthodox Church and her parish communities function? Further, in the American religious and cultural context, these questions are especially urgent. That is for three reasons.

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% of parishes/congregations that "agree" or "strongly agree" with the statements Orthodox parishes Mainline Protestant congregations Evangelical Protestant congregations

76% Our parish/congregation 83% is spiritually vital and alive 83%

72% Our congregation/parish 81% has a clear mission and purpose 89%

Fig. 10 Spiritual vitality of the congregations and their sense of mission and purpose

First, Orthodox Christians in America are a religious minority. Being a minority and in order to avoid social marginalization, the Orthodox community has in many ways to adapt to the mainstream American culture. Accordingly, the Church leadership cannot simply pretend that, for instance, such issues as sharing laity with clergy in ministry or the ordination of women or same-sex marriage among Orthodox Christians are not present. In the past, the strong ethnic identity and the sense of close-knit community – both culturally and religiously distinct from the wider American society – allowed Orthodox Churches to maintain established patterns of church life and to expect taken-for-granted obedience of their faithful. Today, with the strength of ethno-cultural values and sentiments having declined, the Orthodox Churches cannot count anymore on the “unconditional” loyalty of their members. Second, an unquestionable hierarchical authority and a highly centralized church administration are fundamental for the Orthodox Church. For a number of historical reasons, however, the factor of “congregationalism” (i.e. significant local autonomy) has been always present in American Orthodox parishes to a much greater extent than in the “Old Lands of Orthodoxy.” According to Fr. Tomas Hopko, “Orthodox parishes and dioceses in North America today are voluntary associations of like- minded Orthodox Christians organized for purposes determined by their members.” The reality is that “a parish belongs to the diocese of its choice, most often on its own

[email protected] 216 A. Krindatch terms. In some cases in North America, parishes considering themselves Orthodox have not belonged to any diocese at all, or have belonged only nominally to insure a minimal measure of legitimacy for their ecclesiastical status” (Hopko 2003). The “congregationalism” – as a distinct feature of American Orthodox parishes – has its roots in the ways many parishes were founded. Generally, most parishes in the US were not and are not created by the hierarchy of the Church. Rather, it is typically a founding group of lay people who organize a community, then approach a bishop and petition for reception into a particular jurisdiction. In many parts of the US, the significant local autonomy of the parishes is further augmented by significant geographic distances and by the scant communications between them and their diocesan centers. Overall, in the US, the individual parishes have relative flexibility and freedom in making decisions locally about patterns of their lives and about either embracing certain innovations or avoiding any changes in the Church. Third, theologically, all Orthodox Churches in US see themselves as one faith community and part of one universal Orthodox Church. The reality, however, is that – so far – Orthodox community was unable to speak with one voice vis-à-vis American society at large. Indeed, Orthodoxy in America has always had multiple faces due to the existence of many Orthodox jurisdictions divided along ethnic lines. The growing presence of converts from other religious traditions among both Orthodox laity and clergy made the local expressions of Orthodox Christianity in America even more “mosaic.” Moreover, as Aristotle Papanikolau pointed out, the inability to adapt to the situation of American cultural pluralism has led to further fragmentation of American Orthodoxy. That is, “indeterminacies, internal strains and conflicts are evident in Orthodoxy in America in the sheer diverse number of interpretations of what it means to be an Orthodox Christian through the eclectic appropriations of traditional Orthodox Christian beliefs, rituals and symbols by those who choose to maintain some affiliation with Orthodox identity. Indeed, within the Orthodox churches in America you have diverse interpretations and appropriations of the traditions that lead to diverse theologies that span the spectrum of the extremes of the so-called ‘Culture Wars,.” (Papanikolau 2003). To conclude, today as in the past, the American Orthodox Churches face the challenge of adapting to the American context and reaching out in witness and mission, without sacrificing their core beliefs and practices and their cultural and spiritual heritage. How they will respond to this challenge remains to be seen. In American pluralistic society, Orthodox Christianity also has to compete with many other religious and secular choices easily available in the US’ vast cultural marketplace. Under these circumstances, the future of American Orthodox churches depends on the sensitivity to their public image and their “conversational skills” with mainstream America, and, at the same time, on the firm adherence to their particularity, their fundamental beliefs and their unique message.

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References

Alperin, E., & Batalova, J. (2018). European immigrants in the United States (Report). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/european-immigrants- united-states#RegionsCountries. Accessed 26 Aug 2018. America’s Changing Religious Landscape. (2015). Report. Pew Research Center. http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/. Accessed 09 Oct 2017. Ammerman, N. (1997). Congregation and community. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Berger, P. (2003). Orthodoxy and pluralistic challenge. In A. Vrame (Ed.), The Orthodox parish in America (pp. 33–43). Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press. Grammich, C., Hadaway, K., Houseal, R., Jones, D., Krindatch, A., Stanley, R., & Taylor, R. (2012). 2010 U.S. religious census: Religious congregations & membership study. Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies. Hopko, T. (2003). The Orthodox parish in America. In A. Vrame (Ed.), The Orthodox parish in America (pp. 1–11). Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press. Krindatch, A. (2008). The Orthodox Church today (Report). Patriarch Berkeley: Athenagoras Orthodox Institute. http://www.hartfordinstitute.org/research/OrthChurchFullReport.pdf. Accessed 09 Oct 2017. Krindatch, A. (2012). Usage of English language, ethnic identity, and ethnic culture in American Orthodox Christian Churches (Report). Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of the USA. http://www.assemblyofbishops.org/assets/files/docs/research/3.%20Usage%20Of%20 English%20Language%20Ethnic%20Identity.pdf. Accessed 20 Sept 2018. Krindatch, A. (Ed.). (2011). Atlas of American Orthodox Christian Churches. Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press. Krindatch, A. (Ed.). (2016). Atlas of American Orthodox Christian monasteries (2nd ed.). Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press. Michalopulos, G., & Ham, H. (2003). The American Orthodox Church. A history of its beginnings. Salisbury: Regina Orthodox Press. Nondenominational & Independent Congregations. (2011). Report. Hartford Institute for Religion Research. http://hirr.hartsem.edu/cong/nondenom.html. Accessed 09 Oct 2017. Nones on the Rise. (2012). Report. Pew Research Center. http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/ nones-on-the-rise/. Accessed 26 Aug 2018. Papanikolau, A. (2003, November 15). The one becomes the many: Orthodox Christianity and American pluralism. Paper presented at the seminar “Orthodox Christianity and American public life: The challenges and opportunities of religious pluralism in the 21st century” sponsored by the Institute of Religion and World Affairs at Boston University, Boston. Registry Statistics. (2016). Resource document. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America. https:// www.goarch.org/documents/32058/4582646/registry-2016-stats.pdf/b0f71f2e-7ff1-4d4a- 906a-5001264fd5b2. Accessed 09 Oct 2017. Roozen, D. (2015). American congregations: Thriving and surviving (Report). Hartford: Hartford Institute for Religion Research. http://www.faithcommunitiestoday.org/sites/default/files/ American-Congregations-2015.pdf. Accessed 09 Oct 2017. Taft, R. (2006). Through their own eyes. Liturgy as the Byzantines saw it. Berkeley: InterOrthodox Press. U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: Religious Affiliation. (2008). Report. Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2008/02/25/us- religious-landscape-survey-religious-affiliation. Accessed 09 Oct 2017.

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Alexei Krindatch is a Sociologist of Religion and a leading expert on Orthodox Christian Churches in America. He is the Research Coordinator for the Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of the USA (www.assemblyofbishops.org). Along with numerous articles, he has authored three books: Atlas of American Orthodox Christian Monasteries (2017), Atlas of American Orthodox Christian Churches (2011), and Geography of Religion in Russia (1997). A native of Moscow, Russia, he presently lives and works in Berkeley, California. Many of his studies on Orthodox Christianity in America can be viewed and downloaded at http://www.assemblyofbishops.org/news/research www.orthodoxreality.org

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The Glocalization of Orthodox Diasporas in Italy

Marco Guglielmi

Abstract Orthodox Christianity in Italy can be considered as a ‘Western Orthodox laboratory’. In this scenario, in fact, some patterns relating to the establishment of Eastern Orthodoxy in Western Europe may be identified. Taking into consideration that in Italy there is the largest number of Orthodox faithful in Western Europe and the largest Romanian Orthodox diaspora in the world, I adopt the framework of religious glocalization and focus on the hybridization of Orthodox diasporas within the Italian environment. The first objective is to offer an overview of the universe of Orthodox churches in Italy. I examine the Orthodox community in the Italian peninsula, and then I study the constellation of its jurisdictions (canonical and non- canonical). In summary, I attempt to portray a recent Orthodox Christian panorama in Italy. The second aim is to offer an overview of the patterns of establishment of the three main Orthodox jurisdictions. I try to define the engagement with the host context of diasporas of the Romanian Orthodox Church, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and the Russian Orthodox Church. I hypothesize that these three diaspora religions maintained different relationships with society, the dominant religion, and the State in the Italian context. They have thus developed different paths of settlement and religious orientations within their mission.

Keywords Orthodox Christianity · Orthodox diaspora · Italy · Glocal religions · Transnational religions · Catholic-Orthodox relations

Introduction

Orthodox Christianity in Italy has ancient and deep historical roots. Over the last two decades, however, its socio-cultural facets have been modified thanks to the phenomenon of the high levels of migration from the Eastern European countries to

M. Guglielmi (*) Fondazione Bruno Kessler, Trento, Italy e-mail: [email protected]

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Italy (Giordan 2015). Social discontinuity in the Italian territory becomes relevant in quantitative terms also in the international scenario. In fact, in recent research Giordan and I had shown that in Italy there is the largest number of adherents of the Orthodox faith in Western Europe, and the largest Romanian Orthodox diaspora in the world (Giordan and Guglielmi 2018). Morever, with respect to the settlement of this latter diaspora religion, its study has highlighted some changes in customary Orthodox practices that are related to the socio-cultural context of the host country. This Italian scenario seems to follow the trends of recent sociological studies on the subject. If the main theological narrative argues that there are good reasons to hypothesize “why Orthodoxy in the West did not grow into being local churches” (Noble 2016: 11),1 some recent social scientific studies emphasize tendencies underestimated in dominant positions. They suggest that the scenario of an Orthodox diaspora in Western Europe which is solely engaged in the assistance of immigrant communities has been surpassed. According to these research, in the last decade the Orthodox diasporas in this European region are marked by trasformations that mainly concern their identity, their practices, and their transnational ties (Giordan and Guglielmi 2018; Ihlamur-Öner 2009; Hämmerli 2011; Hämmerli and Mayer 2014a; Roudometof 2015a). In this chapter, I focus on Orthodox Christianity in Italy seen as a ‘Western Orthodox laboratory’, as some patterns relating to its establishment in Western Europe may be identified. The ‘potential’ of the Italian case is favoured by four main specificities: the presence of the largest Orthodox diaspora of Western Europe and the largest Romanian Orthodox diaspora in the world; the virtual monopoly of the Catholic Church in the socio-cultural context (Garelli 2011, 2016), and the ‘particular’ religious diversity more centered on Christianity in the Italian peninsula (Garelli et al. 2003; Pace 2011, 2013); the settlement of several Orthodox jurisdictions and bishops in the territory, as well as the violation of Canon 28 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council, which grants the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople a primacy of honour after the bishop of Rome and over ‘barbarian’ dioceses.2 Here, it seems possible to frame a fragmented and heterogeneous Orthodox landscape, in which the number of canonical jurisdictions is equal to that of non-canonical jurisdictions.

1 Excluding from this perspective, as Noble also suggests, the Orthodox Church in America (OCA) as the only case of an indigenous Orthodox diaspora in a Western country. 2 The question of primacy over the traditionally non-Orthodox territories is a source of conflict founded in historical, theological, and ecclesiological reasons. Currently, it is polarized by two main positions. The Ecumenical Patriarchate claims jurisdiction over all the territories in the world that are not already part of the canonically delimited territories of another Orthodox church. On the other hand, the national autocephalous churches contest this right of world jurisdiction, warning of the danger of generating a primacy of authority similar to that of the Pope, and in some cases asking for a reading of the canons adapted to the present demographic reality of the Orthodox Communion. For a theological problematization of this issue, see Hämmerli (2010).

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The first objective of this chapter is to offer an overview of the universe of Orthodox churches in Italy. Initially, I examine the Orthodox community in the Italian peninsula. The new quantitative data available allow for an analysis of the Orthodox faithful on a national basis, and suggest the distribution of national communities within the main churches in diaspora of this religious tradition. Subsequently, I focus on the institutions of this religious scenario, studying the constellation of jurisdictions canonically internal and external with respect to the Eastern Orthodox Communion. In this section, I attempt to portray the main facets of a recent Orthodox Christian panorama in Italy. The second aim of this chapter is to offer an overview of the establishment of the three main Orthodox jurisdictions in Italy. I attempt to define the patterns of establishment of diasporas of the Romanian Orthodox Church (Romanian Orthodox Diocese of Italy – Episcopia Ortodoxă Română a Italiei), the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (the Holy Orthodox Archdiocese of Italy and Malta – Ὀρθόδοξος Ἱερά Μητρόπολις Ἰταλίας καί Μελίτης), and the Russian Orthodox Church (the Moscow Patriarchate parishes in Italy – Приходов Московского Патриархата в Италии). I hypothesize that these three diaspora religions maintained different relationships with society, the dominant religion, and the State in the Italian context. They have thus developed different processes of settlement and religious orientations within their mission, upon which the cultural and religious heritage in the motherland and the transnational ties have an influence. In this research, I adopt the framework of religious glocalization and focus on the hybridization of these diaspora religions within the Italian environment. With different trajectories and intensity, these diasporas are cultural hybrids that blend religious universalism with forms of local particularism (Roudometof 2016). I will not consider them as fixed entities or as exclusive bodies, and will rather focus on the processes referred to as hybridization and glocalization. The concept of glocal religion, in fact, focuses on the meeting point of cultures and a valorization of the interaction occurring between the local and global levels (Beyer 2007). In this study, the patterns of establishment of the three Orthodox jurisdictions represent overall three distinct paths of religious glocalization. The data come from a research project started in November 2015 (until October 2018) concerning the settlement of Orthodox Christianity in the Italian peninsula. Some data have been collected in the field through qualitative approaches (semi- structures in-depth interviews, and participant observation), while others come from the processing of quantitative data provided by the Orthodox churches themselves. I have collected in-depth interviews from clerics and faithful who belong to the Romanian Orthodox Church in Italy, and to the other main Orthodox jurisdictions in Italy, especially to the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church. Moreover, I have been able to visit the seat of the dioceses of these three churches, some of their places of worship, and to carry out an ethnographic observation of a Romanian Orthodox parish in Italy. In these 3 years of research I have collected 35 in-depth interviews in Italy, and I was also able to be a visiting scholar at the Romanian Patriarchate in Bucharest for 3 months.

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The Plurality of Orthodox Christianity in Italy

In the first section below, I focus on the body of the faithful of the Orthodox diasporas and present the quantitative data of the latest research. In the second section, I focus on the scenario of Orthodox jurisdictions and examine the redistribution of national groups within the Orthodox Christian panorama in Italy.

Orthodox Christians Faithful in Italy

As previously mentioned, the main change in the presence of Orthodox Christianity in Italy began to develop in the nineteen-nineties. Table 1, which contains data from the Immigration Statistical Dossier compiled by the IDOS Study Centre, indicates that the Orthodox presence in Italy has been constantly increasing since the year 2000. The growth accelerated especially in 2003, probably as a consequence of the immigration rules that were introduced by the Italian Government in the previous year. Since 2006 there have been more Orthodox then Catholic immigrants, and in the following years the numbers almost corresponded to that of Muslim immigrants. In 2010 the recorded difference between Orthodox and Muslim immigrants amounted to approximately 100,000 subjects, and some scholars suggested that “if this trend remains constant, in three years’ time the number of Orthodox immigrants is bound to exceed that of the Muslims, and, subsequently, the expected decline of

Table 1 Religious adherence of the immigrants in Italy Catholics Orthodox Muslims 2001 362,066 198,824 488,300 2002 363,809 204,373 553,007 2003 496,051 446,099 723,188 2004 629,712 565,627 919,492 2005 668,048 659,162 1,009,023 2006 685,127 918,375 1,202,396 2007 775,626 1,129,630 1,253,704 2008 739,000 1,105,000 1,292,000 2009 700,777 1,221,915 1,354,901 2010 876,087 1,404,780 1,504,841 2011 960,359 1,482,648 1,650,902 2012 994,000 1,534,000 1,708,000 2013 911,200 1,459,300 1,628,000 2014 917,900 1,528,500 1,613,500 2015 908,000 1,541,000 1,609,000 2016 910,000 1,506,557 1,641,800 Source: IDOS (2017)

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Table 2 Religious adherence Catholics Orthodox Muslims of immigrants in Italy (2015) 1,038,600 1,606,900 1,423,900 Source: ISMU (2016) flows from Eastern Europe will cause a reversal of the positions” (Perego and Gnesotto 2010: 207). In the years 2011, 2012 and 2013 the difference between the two religious traditions in quantitative terms increased considerably, probably also due to the effect that the international economic crisis and recent conflicts in the African continent has had on migratory flows. However, it would appear that this difference decreased in a significant manner in 2014, to the point of presenting the lowest divergence since 2001. In 2015 Orthodoxy was the only religious tradition that saw an increase in the number of its followers. The other two religions saw a slight decline, and since 2000 the numerical difference between Orthodoxy and Islam has never been so small (68,000 subjects). On the other hand, the ISMU Foundation (2016) offers another authoritative source of data concerning the relationship between immigration and religion in Italy. Table 2 presents an estimate of the numbers of faithful of the various religions among foreign residents in Italy. The latest data provided indicate a greater number of adherents of the Orthodox faith, who exceed the number of Muslims by over 180,000 subjects. The Orthodox religion seems to be more widespread in the northern regions (Lombardy 265,200, Veneto 175,500, Piedmont 162,900, Emilia Romagna 156,700) and in some central regions (Tuscany 116,400, Marche 40,700), with a peak noted in the Lazio region (259,900).3 The latter religion would appear to be less present in the southern regions (with a maximum presence in the Campania region of 84,800 faithful), and, from the geographical point of view, this also reflects the situation of the Italian labour market, and that of the immigrant population in the country. To conclude, more than half of the followers of the Orthodox faith seem to live in the northern regions of Italy (53.8%), and a third in the two regions of Lombardy and Lazio (32.7%). Finally, the data in Table 3, from the Immigration Statistical Dossier compiled by the IDOS Study Centre, shows the nationalities represented in the group of faithful of Orthodoxy in Italy and those of the other two Christian traditions. These additional data offer a more in-depth view of the processes of Christian differentiation in the Italian territory. The Romanian Orthodox community is the largest group, followed by that of the Ukrainian and the Moldavian immigrants. The faithful of these three national

3 In this estimate of followers of the Orthodox faith in Italy the adherents of the Coptic Orthodox Church are not included, and are accounted for individually. This is the jurisdiction of the Non- Chalcedonian Orthodox churches most deeply-rooted in Italy, whose faithful amount to about 18,700 and reside mainly in the northern regions (over 40% live in Lombardy).

[email protected] 224 M. Guglielmi 97,000 226,000 152,000 135,000 115,000 828,000 Christians 1,151,000 2,704,000 Citizenship Romania Ukraine Philippines Moldova Albania Peru Other countries Total 68,000 20,000 19,000 17,000 16,000 15,000 Protestants 100,000 255,000 Citizenship Romania Nigeria Ghana Philippines Germany United Kingdom Other countries Total 94,000 84,000 84,000 80,000 74,000 Catholics 135,000 357,000 908,000 Citizenship Philippines Poland Peru Romania Ecuador Albania Other countries Total 42,000 41,000 40,000 93,000 Orthodox 999,400 193,000 133,000 1,541,000 Nationalities of immigrants the three Christian traditions in Italy (2015) Citizenship Romania Ukraine Moldova Bulgaria Albania Republic of Macedonia Other countries Total Table 3 Table Source: IDOS Study Centre (These data were provided me by the IDOS Study Centre, and have not been published) me by the IDOS Study Centre, and have Source: IDOS Study Centre (These data were provided

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communities together represent the ‘basin’ of the three main Orthodox jurisdictions. The Moldavian and Ukrainian faithful constitute the majority of adherents of the Russian Orthodox Church in Italy, thus respecting the jurisdiction to which the two respective churches in the motherland belong (the Moldovan Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church). In the definition of this grouping a key role is played by common ethnic and vernacular aspects among these faithful, and, in particular, those ones relating to the culture of the Slavic world and usage of the Slavonic language. On the other hand, some of the Ukrainian faithful are members of the parishes of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, considering the presence in their homeland of a church (the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Patriarchate of Kiev) more close to Constantinople. This Ukrainian church was founded in 1992, and in October 2018 the Ecumenical Patriarchate conceded the status of autocephaly to it, opening thus a large conflict with the Moscow Patriarchate. In 2016 this Ukrainian jurisdiction founded in Italy a Deanery which is developing and can facilitate a further redistribution of the Ukrainian faithful in the Orthodox parishes in Italy. In this regard, also the Moldovan faithful in Italy are influenced by divisions in the motherland, where the two settled Orthodox jurisdictions reflect ethnic and cultural tensions occurring across the country. These are an Orthodox church under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Moscow, and a church under the jurisdiction of the Romanian Patriarchate (Metropolis of Bessarabia) (Grigore 2016). According to this situation, the Moldovans in Italy are to a large extent present in the Russian parishes, and are then also found in the Romanian parishes and in those of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Finally, the data concerning the other two Christian traditions suggest other two relevant insights. The first is the quantitative impact of the Romanian population, which also has the third largest Catholic community and the first community of the Protestant branch of the immigrant population in Italy. This latter community even surpasses the overall total of the two main African Protestant communities in Italy (those of the Nigerian and Ghanaian immigrants), which is rapidly rising in our peninsula thanks to the unprecedented phenomenon of the African Pentecostal churches (Butticci 2016). The second situation concerns the trends of the entire Christian dimension of immigrants in Italy: the Romanians reveal their considerable influence, however one should not underestimate the presence of faithful from other countries with an Orthodox majority, such as the Ukraine and Moldova, or from those with a large Orthodox community as occurs in Albania.

The Orthodox Jurisdictions in Italy

In a previous research (Giordan and Guglielmi 2018), Giordan and I note that at the beginning of 2016 there were 18 Orthodox Christian jurisdictions present in the Italian territory, with a total of 486 parishes distributed across the entire country. Table 4 offers the possibility to compare these values with those recorded 5 years ago. In 2011 there were 16 jurisdictions and 355 parishes and as far as the latter are

[email protected] 226 M. Guglielmi concerned an increase of 37% was recorded in only 5 years. Moreover, with respect to details relating to the individual jurisdictions the data show that the most significant increase concerned the Moscow Patriarchate (43%), the Patriarchate of Romania (37%) and the Coptic Church (52%). The Metropolis of Milan and Aquileia, which presents a surprisingly increased percentage, is a particular case as it comprises clergy and faithful of various ethnic groups. In Table 4 I have also included the Orthodox Church in Italy, which, however, presents a rather controversial situation that will be discussed later. The increase of the parishes of the Romanian Patriarchate has been quite surprising in terms of both quantity and speed. For instance, there was an increase in the number of Romanian parishes in Italy, from 34 to 228 over a period of 12 years,

Table 4 Orthodox Churches in Italy (2011 and 2016) Parishes and Parishes and monasteries in monasteries in Jurisdiction January 2011 January 2016 Romanian Orthodox Church (Patriarchate of 166 228 Romania), Diocese of Italy Sacred Orthodox Archdiocese of Italy and Malta 84 87 (Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople) Russian Orthodox Church (Patriarchate of 44 63 Moscow), Administration of the Churches in Italy Coptic Orthodox Church 21 32 Greek Orthodox Church of the Calendar of the 9 12 Fathers – Synod of the Resistant Archbishopric for the Russian Orthodox Churches 7 7 in Western Europe (Exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate), Deanery of Italy Ethiopian Orthodox Church Tewahedo 5 6 Serbian Orthodox Church (Patriarchate of Serbia) 4 5 Romanian Orthodox Church of the Old Calendar 3 4 Autonomous Orthodox Church of Western Europe 3 14 and the Americas – Metropolis of Milan and Aquileia Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Patriarchate of 2 2 Bulgaria) Eritrean Orthodox Church 2 3 Macedonian Orthodox Church 2 3 Armenian Apostolic Church 1 2 Russian Orthodox Church of the Ancient Rite 1 1 (Metropolis of Belokrinitsa) Orthodox Church in Italy 1 2 Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Patriarchate of Kiev) – 5 Georgian Orthodox Church – 10 Total 355 486 Source: Giordan and Guglielmi (2018)

[email protected] Orthodox Christianity in a Western Catholic Country 227 with this diffusion also resulting from the change in European legislation on migration. It is moreover evident that from the quantitative point of view, the Orthodox Romanians in particular have made a difference within the panorama of the Orthodox Christian churches in Italy. In the aforementioned study (Giordan and Guglielmi 2018), Giordan and I also consider the number of Orthodox parishes present in each region of the Italian peninsula at the beginning of 2016. These data seem to overlap with previous estimates relating to the distribution of adherents of the Orthodox faith in the Italian peninsula. Indeed, the regions with the largest number of parishes are Lombardy and Lazio, the principal destinations of the religions in diaspora in Italy, and also Piedmont, Emilia-Romagna and the Veneto, which are the areas with the most important economic and productive activities in the country. Places of worship are present in all major cities in all of the Italian regions. While their presence is consistent across Northern Italy it is evident that the number of Orthodox parishes in the central areas (excluding Lazio) and in the Southern regions (except Sicily) is more limited. This Orthodox Christian panorama appears to be a fragmented and heterogeneous scenario characterized by internal tensions among various churches. It includes the jurisdictions of 7 canonical Orthodox churches, 4 Non- Chalcedonian Orthodox churches, and 7 non-canonical Orthodox churches. As stated in the previous section, these 18 jurisdictions welcome faithful not only from their own national group, and also ‘import’ into the Italian territory hostile situations relating to ecclesiastic conflicts and the issue of the multiple jurisdictions in the homeland. For instance, this scenario also comprises the parishes of the Greek and Romanian factions that refer to the Orthodox tradition of the Old Calendarists, the Orthodox churches that did not accept modification of the traditional Julian- Constantinian ecclesiastical calendar in 1924. I also refer to settlement in the city of Turin of the largest Lipovenian community from Romania in Western Europe (probably on a par with another large community in Spain). This diaspora religion forms part of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Ancient Rite, a church faithful to the liturgy of the origins that began to spread across the world in the mid 1600s following the repression of the Patriarch Nikon as it did not accept some of his reforms in the Russian church. Finally, in 2016 a sensation was caused in the Orthodox world and the attention of the Italian media was attracted by the attempt on the part of some Italian clerics, sometimes former Catholics and acting externally or at the margins of the Orthodox world, to constitute the first Italian Orthodox Church, which attempts to unite with a shared autocephalic status various Italian religious realities.4 This Orthodox Christian panorama appears to suggest that some forms of (religious) nationalism are no longer suitable in a (host) context that forces the various jurisdictions to interact with each other at an unprecedented level with respect to the

4 A historical profile of this church is available at the website of the Center for Studies on New Religions (CESNUR): http://www.cesnur.com/la-chiesa-ortodossa-italiana. Accessed 28 June 2018.

[email protected] 228 M. Guglielmi situations of the motherland. In this regard, the example of the Orthodox Episcopal Conference of Italy and Malta is a first attempt at establishing Pan-Orthodox coordination among the bishops and canonical Orthodox churches that have jurisdiction over the Italian territory. The assembly appears as a local institution marked by a Pan-Orthodox nuance, and an attempt to coordinate different experiences, issues, and needs of Orthodox (canonical) diasporas in a Western country. To conclude, I may argue that within this Orthodox Christian panorama the redistribution of national groups within the jurisdictions of Orthodox diasporas assumes glocal traits as it combines canonical tensions of the motherland and international Orthodox affairs with socio-cultural facets of the host country and typical aspects of the diasporic condition. In the next section I will focus on the relation of the host environment with the settlement and with the mission of these diaspora religions, instead in this section my intention is to emphasize how the host country may re-define the boundaries that normally affect the overlapping of national and religious identity. Moreover, the configuration of the jurisdictions of the Orthodox diasporas in a specific country seems to constitute a ‘glocal puzzle’, which, also on account of the hybridization processes favoured by their ethnic and vernacular aspects, and also by transnational religious ties, may not be easily identified in other contexts. As stated by Roudometof (2015b: 223–224), it appears that through the recent migratory flows Orthodoxy may in certain situations distance itself from its historical experiences.

A Western Orthodox Laboratory?

In this section, I focus on the patterns of establishment of the three main Orthodox diasporas in Italy. In the first sub-section, I study the engagement of Orthodox diasporas with the host environment, i.e., spheres of interaction and negotiation of the Orthodox churches with the Italian context. In the second sub-section, instead, I attempt to outline paths of settlement in the new country and the religious orientations within them. From a theoretical point of view, the ‘indications’ listed in the following tables are the result of the elaboration of the main empirical sociological studies on the phenomenon of the Orthodox diaspora (Hämmerli 2011; Hämmerli and Mayer 2014b; Roudometof 2014a; Krindach 2011, 2016). When they are not nominal or numerical, the values corresponding to the ‘indications’ present a general quantitative grading (none, low, medium, high).

Spheres of Engagement

The perspective adopted to analyse the engagement of Orthodox churches with the new socio-cultural environment is based on the concept of reflexivity developed by Lichterman (2005). Basically, it may say that a reflective process is initiated when a

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Table 5 Engagement with the socio-cultural context of the Orthodox Churches in Italy The Orthodox Pastoral Relations with the diaspora Language activity Catholic Church Romanian Orthodox Romanian, Moldavian, Italian High Good Church Ecumenical Greek, Moldavian, Romanian, Low Good Patriarchate Italian, Slavonic Russian Orthodox Slavonic, Moldavian Low Good Church religious institution engages in a dialogue with other religious, political, social, and cultural communities of the host country. Following this broad vision, as indicated in Table 5, I outline the general attitude of an Orthodox church by analyzing its main spheres of relationship with the host environment. These latter areas are related to some dynamics and practices within the life of parishes and that one of diocese that influence its interaction with the new context. Use of the language of the host society is one of the main factors of integration of a diaspora. It supports modification of the linguistic and cognitive points of references of the immigrant, and favours the absorption of new practices as well as identities. In the diaspora religions, the use of this language in religious services as liturgical language is an indication of the depth of religious glocalization, i.e., of the path of hybridization of a religion in diaspora that can lead towards its novel condition of a local church. I have mapped the most widely used languages in the three diaspora religions with data collected through in-depth interviews with the religious leaders of these jurisdictions. The languages mainly used in the parishes of the Romanian Orthodox diaspora are Romanian and Italian, and Moldovan in the parishes formed by the faithful who come from the Metropolis of Bessarabia. This church in diaspora is mainly composed of faithful who have arrived from the motherland, and a small group of Italians who have converted as a result of the occurrence of mixed marriages. The documentation and material of the diocese is substantially bilingual, even if in the liturgy and in the life of the parish the language used is Romanian. Space for the Italian language is always reserved in celebrations, and this will vary in terms of intensity and expression from parish to parish. On the other hand, in the parishes of the Ecumenical Patriarchate the language used in the liturgies is ancient Greek and, in order of use, Moldovan, Romanian, Italian and Slavonic (and, sporadically, other languages of the Eastern countries). This linguistic plurality seems to be due to the heterogeneous set of national communities that form the body of the faithful of this diaspora religion. According to the data that I collected from the Archdiocese in Venice in 2016, the religious communities of this jurisdiction comprise the following nationalities: Greek, Cypriot, Italian, Moldovan, Romanian, Ukrainian, Georgian, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Albanian. As highlighted in the previous section, this diaspora religion has the capacity to welcome immigration from various Orthodox countries, especially from Moldova. Moreover, it seems to have developed a small community of Italians con-

[email protected] 230 M. Guglielmi verted to Orthodoxy, which constitutes a subject that would be interesting to study in a further research. Finally, in the Russian Orthodox Church the liturgical language is the Slavonic language, the traditional language of the liturgy. As suggested by father Ambrogio Cassinasco, rector of the Russian Orthodox parish of San Massimo in Turin, it is conceivable that this language may be accompanied by a minor use of the Moldovan language and in some cases by Italian. This diaspora religion unites the faithful from countries where the local churches are under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Moscow, especially from Moldova and the Ukraine (and to a lesser extent from other countries of the former Soviet bloc, such as Belarus and Estonia). This composition of the body of the faithful as a whole favours the central position of the Slavonic language in religious services and of Russian in the life of the parishes, and the use of Moldovan in some communities. I will analyse the following sphere concerning religious practices elaborated by Orthodox churches in diaspora. Over the last decade, the Italian diocese of the Romanian Orthodox Church seems to have developed a social activity which we might define as ‘original’ in the Orthodox world. As has emerged also in other researches (Ihlamur-Öner 2009, 2014; Giordan and Guglielmi 2018; Ricucci 2017: 109–127; and also Harja and Melis 2010: 25–31), the Romanian Orthodox parishes have organized social assistance for the migrant community, developing true paths of helping linked to needs of the local communities, such as those involving the important phenomenon of Romanian carers (Caselgrandi et al. 2013). Furthermore, the parishes have developed a pastoral activity aimed at young people mainly through student school camps, and sports and musical activities within religious events, along with other new habits, such as spiritual retreats for the clergy of the diocese. I hypothesize that Romanian Orthodoxy in Italy has initiated a reflective process with respect to the Catholic Church (which I will discuss later), from which it has assimilated some of its religious practices. As I outlined in the introduction, this hypothesis stems from a lengthy form of research in which I interviewed on two occasions the bishop and the vice-bishop of the Romanian Orthodox diaspora, who provided me quantitative data about diocese’s activities used in sociological analysis, as well as Romanian clerics and faithful at the Patriarchate in the motherland and the parishes in Italy. This attitude towards reflexivity and the quantitative dimension of the Romanian diaspora has led to its ‘resonance’ within the Italian public sphere. The considerable participation of the faithful in religious celebrations (also organized in the public space5) has favoured the frequent presence of Romanian parishes in the local media. Moreover, in recent years bishop Siluan (Şpan) of the Romanian diocese seems to have acquired a particular position in the Italian Catholic media as the religious leader of the second largest Christian community in Italy.

5 An example is the traditional Easter celebration of the Romanian Orthodox community of Turin in a central square of the city (Cingolani 2011).

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The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople boasts the most ancient Orthodox presence in the Italian peninsula. The presence of Greek-Orthodox communities is linked to the influence of the Byzantine Empire occurring in the Italian territory in the fifteenth century (Ravegani 2004). However, despite this long-term settlement in the Italian territory these parishes do not seem to have developed a particular form of negotiation with the host environment. As emerges from data collected from the Archdiocese in 2016 regarding the activities of its communities spread in the country, the parishes focus on the typical practices of the Orthodox world, such as charitable works (diakonia), catechism activity, and courses on Byzantine music and the Greek language. This diocese also organizes liturgies in the public space, in particular where its main communities are present, such as in the cities of Venice and Perugia. Lastly, the Russian Orthodox Church does not seem to have elaborated relevant reflective processes with the Italian context (as apparently suggested by initial research on this religious community in Italy (Carnevale 2018)). The Russian parishes seem to concentrate their attention on the liturgical field, and the main practices ‘beyond the altar’ appear to focus on the Orthodox habits concerning charitable works and catechism activities. This religious community has a positive relationship with the Italian social fabric, cultivated thanks to its long-term presence in the peninsula (Talalay 1998). However, it does not seem to have developed practices related to the host environment and its diaspora condition, nor any particular changes favoured by the plurality of nationalities of its adherents. It seems to propose also in Italy the typical distance of the Orthodox tradition from social issues: it combines the exercise of diakonia with responses oriented towards a spiritual perspective to contend with social issues. The three diaspora religions have good relations with the Catholic Church. Generally, their parishes adhere to local ecumenical institutions, and many of their places of worship are located in churches of the Catholic dioceses that are offered a few hours a week or conceded to them for a few years on a loan-for-use basis. On the other hand, these churches in diaspora have established a variety of positions towards the dominant religion in Italy. These are due to both local dynamics in the host environment and to the ecumenical perspective of the church of origin. In fact, it seems appropriate to underline the extent of the effect of the transnational processes from the Patriarchates to the diasporas as the transnational religious ties have an influence on the glocalization of the Orthodox diasporas in Italy. It seems difficult to define the position of each religion in diaspora with respect to Catholic- Orthodox relations, however it is possible to grasp some ‘signs’ that suggest their main narrative towards the dominant religion of the host country. In this regard, the main narrative of the Romanian diocese in Italy seems linked to the need for a rediscovery of the ‘Christian roots’ of Europe. In this perspective the main challenge of European Christian churches concerns common objectives, such as the defence of the Christian identity of the Old Continent, a containment of the processes of secularization and the growth of certain religious minorities (Payne

[email protected] 232 M. Guglielmi and Kent 2011).6 On the other hand, the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Italy seems to find a privileged role in the exercise of its honorary primacy and in the official representation of the entire Orthodox world in the Italian peninsula. Through its main narrative of primus inter pares, it maintains a dominant narrative within the institutional relations between these two branches of Christianity and in the ecumenical dialogue. Finally, the Russian Orthodox Church in Italy – as in the case of its diaspora in Germany (Rimestad and Kadotschikow 2014) – seems to preserve, in a certainly positive framework, an ‘ambivalence’ that alternates a more open and a more closed attitude that changes at the local level.7

Settlement and Religious Orientation

In this section I analyse the settlement of the main Orthodox jurisdictions in Italy, especially focusing on their religious orientations within these processes. The concept of religious orientation refers to the general stance assumed by a diaspora religion in the engagement with the host context, and in the definition of the settlement and of its principal mission. With the term mission, instead, I refer to the most important objectives of a church in diaspora. In this case I focus solely on the main aim, which considers the diaspora religions engaged in the task of providing centres for immigrants. As shown by Ebaugh and Chafetz (1999: 599), migrant religious organizations act both as religious and community centres, where immigrants can meet to reappropriate the sense of their national identity and cultural and religious heritage (also simply through the use of their native language). The mission of religious communities in diaspora is thus flanked by a more or less informal goal which concerns the reproduction of the national (and in some cases also the ethnic) identity of the faithful.8 This latter mission in diaspora becomes an even more central issue in the cases of national churches (which from a sociological point of view

6 For instance, this main narrative seems to be identifiable in three interviews of bishop Siluan on Italian television channels; available at the URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=89O9cw1I-hA; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FcAZ fqpeUHM; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NNV8X9nB734. Accessed 20 September 2018. Moreover, at the seat of the Romanian Patriarchate in Bucharest the main hall was renamed ‘Europa Christiana’ (Christian Europe). This symbolic choice highlights the adhesion of Romanian Orthodoxy to the European project and the space reserved for Europe in its ecumenical vision. 7 As Carnevale confirmed in a long interview in June 2018 about his research project on the Orthodox churches in the Emilia-Romagna region (Carnevale 2018), the position of Russian Orthodox parishes towards the Catholic Church changes particularly in relation to Russian parish’s bonds with the local Catholic diocese, the local State institutions, and Slavic national groups involved. 8 Within this task of providing centres for immigrants, the parishes, considering the precarious state created by the condition of the faithful as migrants, can provide economic aid to the point of organ- ising real services for their adherents. They often become places where it is possible to share information and find solutions with respect to the basic needs of immigrants.

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Table 6 Settlement of the Orthodox Churches in Italy The Orthodox Engagement with the Church-state Religious diaspora socio-cultural context relations Mission orientation Romanian High No agreement National Contamination Orthodox Church identity Ecumenical Medium Agreement Religious Flexibility Patriarchate identity Russian Orthodox Low No agreement National Spiritual Church identity Security should be understood as a form of church-type (Turcotte 2012)), as in the case of the Eastern Orthodox tradition. The first column in Table 6 presents an overall assessment of the level of engagement of the diaspora religions with the socio-cultural context of the host country previously analysed (Table 5). The Romanian Orthodox community seems to present a high degree of engagement with the Italian environment, thanks to a reflective process which results in a shift from a ‘contemplative style’ to a ‘community-builder style’. In the former style, more closely linked to that of the church in the mother country, the life of the parish is centred on the liturgy; while in the latter case attention is paid to the peoples’actual needs, and these will comprise issues of a social, cultural, and administrative nature. This change emerged in the analysis of the empirical data collected in the research about every day life and practices in the Romanian Orthodox parishes. It also was officially confirmed in a long interview with bishop Siluan, who stated: “In the diocese we try to adapt to the new contexts in order to pass on our message, developing a pastoral practice as we proceed in a society that is also very different from that of Romania”. In the case of the diaspora of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, on the other hand, a medium degree of engagement seems conceivable. It remains anchored to a ‘contemplative style’, but manages to accept communities of various national groups, adapting to the main aspects of local parishes. For example, this adaptation also emerges from the nationality of its clerics, an aspect that ‘embody’ a powerful trajectory of hybridization. From the data collected, in fact, it emerges that 37% of the priests are Italian, followed by the Greek, Moldavian, Ukrainian, Romanian, and Georgian nationalities.9 Finally, the Russian Orthodox Church seems to be characterized by a low degree of engagement with the Italian context. This diaspora religion does not seem to develop reflective processes with the host society, remaining focused on the contemplative dimension and not developing particular social and cultural practices related to the new environment. All three churches in diaspora appear to have a positive relationship with the host State. However, the Ecumenical Patriarchate is the only Orthodox jurisdiction that

9 In this regard, in a long interview in 2016 the archimandrite Evangelos Yfantidis, vicar general of the Archdiocese, underlined the importance – especially in the case of the diaspora – of not super- imposing and confusing, as I will discuss shortly, the identity of the Ecumenical Patriarchate with that of the Greek Orthodox Church.

[email protected] 234 M. Guglielmi has reached an agreement (officially referred to as an ‘Intesa’) with the Italian State, while for the other two churches the negotiation of an agreement is still under way. This agreement, drawn up in 2007 and ratified in July 2012, grants the practice of spiritual support within the national health service and in military structures and also the recognition of some religious festivities. It moreover solves the question of the civil effect of religious marriage, and provides the Ecumenical Patriarchate with certain forms of economic aid, such as the deduction of donations in State tax declarations and its participation in the so-called ‘Eight-per-one-thousand’ convention, whereby a small portion of general taxes collected by the State may be donated to religious institutions that have signed the agreement (Parlato 2012). Proceeding with the sociological analysis, the main mission of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Italy seems to correspond to the reproduction of a national identity. As noted earlier, this church in diaspora focuses very much on social activity with respect to its corresponding immigrant community, and is characterized by a non-competitive position with the dominant religion; that is, it discourages proselytism and conversion among Italians. Moreover, this position is marked by a narrative in Catholic-Orthodox relations that focuses on the common historical and religious heritage of the two Christian traditions. It seems possible to summarize the religious orientation adopted by this diocese, referring to the concept of contamination, i.e., a position of openness towards some linguistic and cultural aspects of the host country and towards some practices of its dominant religion. In this case, the reproduction of the Romanian identity is articulated through a path marked by its hybridization with the socio-cultural context. These processes of glocalization seem to occur thanks to both the reflective stances defined by the Romanian Patriarchate and by the Romanian diocese in Italy, and also the ‘fertility’ of the Italian context. The latter in fact presents a cultural proximity with the Romanian context: the Romanian ethnic identity reveals a Latin character, as does its common everyday language which belongs to the Romance or neo-Latin linguistic family. This ‘shared Latinity’ between Romania and Italy seems to favour interaction between the Romanian faithful and Italian society, and a religious glocalization generated especially through the ethnic and vernacular aspects.10 Conversely, it appears that the main mission of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Italy may be generally associated with the reproduction of a religious identity with a global vision. In fact, as argued by Roudometof (2014a: 144–148) this church operates in the international arena both as a transnational institution, which maintains ties with the Greek communities in the diaspora, and as a global institution focusing on its traditional status of primus inter pares intervening in the processes

10 Regarding the Latin character and nature of the Romanian people a debate exists in which certain discordant positions are present. I maintain that: the Latin character forms part of the collective identity, of the public discourse, and of the theology of the Romanian Orthodox Church; the Latin character may be seen as corresponding to the ethnic identity of the Romanian population, although the different historical and cultural trajectories that characterize the Romanian regions must be considered. Regarding the first point, see Turcescu (2002), and with respect to the second point reference may be made to Antohi (2002).

[email protected] Orthodox Christianity in a Western Catholic Country 235 of deterritorialization/reterritorialization. This patriarchate seeks to operate as an impartial arbiter in the ‘affairs’ of the Orthodox world, and for this reason the identity developed by its diocese in the diaspora in Italy does not focus on the national aspect. This allows the church to include Greek immigrants and, above all, to receive within it a heterogeneous group of faithful and also clerics from various national and ethnic groups. This diaspora religion seems to remain focused on the contemplative dimension and appears not to develop particular social practices or hybridize in a significant manner with Italian society. On the other hand, it presents a certain flexibility at the linguistic and cultural level, adapting religious services to the needs of local parishes. These dynamics seem to be similar to those affecting the communities of the same church in the diaspora in French territory. In this regard, Kazarian argues that in France “the Ecumenical Patriarchate is thus reinvesting the field of its ‘ecumenic- ity’ by developing a global representation of Orthodoxy as a form of leverage, while at the same time highlighting the crucial issue of multiculturalism in the context of a diaspora” (2012: 132–133; in Kazarian 2015).11 Finally, in the Russian Orthodox diaspora, the principal mission seems to be the reproduction of its national identity through the Russkii Mir promoted by the leadership of the Patriarch of Moscow. The latter promotes the consolidation and diffusion, through a close collaboration with the State, of the ‘Orthodox world’ trying to curb the processes of secularization; a task that Patriarch Kirill has defined a ‘second Christianization’. This religious position aims to promote the Russian identity and culture, occasionally assuming ‘imperial’ tones in the field of international relations and geopolitics (in this regard see, for example, Sidorov 2006; Suslov 2014). Indeed, it is characterized by a transnational perspective, and occurs outside national borders and territories in which the Russian language is spoken, such as Belarus and the Ukraine. Its trajectories involve the Russian Orthodox diasporas in Western countries in the desire shared by the Russian State and church to promote multiple Russian political and cultural centres around the world (Petro 2018). These parables also seem to involve the Russian Orthodox Church in Italy, where the religious orientation within its settlement seems to follow the international agenda of the Patriarchate of Moscow. Some scholars have used the concept of spiritual security (Payne 2010; Marsh 2013; Leustean 2018) to emphasize that the Russian Orthodox Church has been collaborating with the Russian State to promote internal security in the country, and with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the purpose of expanding and consolidating the Russian world. Focusing on the interplay between Orthodoxy and security, especially during the Putin administration, the Russian Orthodox Church expanded its mission relating with that of the foreign ministry to secure the rights or spiritual security of the Russian diaspora. By col-

11 Furthermore, “in France, [as in the Italian case] the power strategy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate is expressed through the appropriation of the institutional representation of Orthodoxy, as is the case at the worldwide level” (Kazarian 2015: 252). Finally, also Roudometof states that “the overall strategy of the EC-PATR is to advance a vision of deterritorialized religiosity expressed through a flexible or opportunistic use of national autocephaly” (2014a: 147).

[email protected] 236 M. Guglielmi laborating with the foreign ministry, the church has indicated that it is promoting a greater Russia through the spread of Russian Orthodox Christianity, and it has been able to expand the influence of the Russian government throughout the world. As in the case of the Russian Orthodox Church in Italy, its main places of worship, such as the Church of St. Catherine Martyr at the Russian Embassy in Rome and the Church of St. Nicholas in Bari, seem to be integrated with the policy that promotes the “building of Orthodox centres in the West to advance Orthodox state relations, such as the inauguration of the Russian Cultural and Spiritual Center in Paris in 2016” (Leustean 2018: 205).

Conclusion

The framework adopted in this chapter has attempted to go beyond the dichotomy of a church in diaspora vs local church, a format that favours the canonical dimension of the Orthodox diaspora and its relationship with the church of origin. My aim has been to develop this view by focusing on the sociological perspective rather than on the canonical perspective associated with the Orthodox diaspora in the Western countries. If the former concerns the historical development and the current socio-cultural and religious facets of these religious communities abroad, the latter relates mostly to the issue of multiple Orthodox jurisdictions in the diaspora and its ecclesiastic conflicts (Hämmerli2010 : 97–98).12 I have rather attempted to analyse sociologically the cultural hybrids that make up these glocal religions, attempting to connect the different analytical categories (motherland vs diaspora, national vs transnational, but also local vs global), and seeking to elaborate the socio-cultural complexity deriving from their contaminations. In the first part, I showed how the Orthodox diasporas in a Western country seem to represent a sort of ‘puzzle’ that seems difficult to identify in another country. The hybridization processes favoured by their ethnic and vernacular aspects and also by transnational ties can redraw inside the jurisdictions the boundaries that usually overlap the national and religious identity. These processes of glocalization seem to favour the definition of a real Orthodox Christian panorama in a Western country, in which does not seem to necessarily subsist tensions and issues between Christian churches present in the motherland. In particular, I’m referring especially to some experiences of dialogue among Orthodox churches and Greek-Catholic churches in Italy. In the second part, I illustrated the patterns of establishment of the three main Orthodox churches in the Italian peninsula. The different engagement of the dias-

12 This double interpretation suggests a distinction already emphasized by some scholars (and followed in this chapter): while from the canonical point of view the phenomenon of the Orthodox diaspora should be declined in the singular (the Orthodox diaspora), in the sociological perspective the diasporic phenomenon of the Orthodox churches should be declined in the plural (Orthodox diasporas).

[email protected] Orthodox Christianity in a Western Catholic Country 237 pora religions with some spheres of host environment show how they seem to develop different socio-cultural aspects as elaborate different religious attitudes. These churches in diaspora, in fact, seem to develop processes of settlement and religious orientations that are not homogeneous (contamination, flexibility, and spiritual security). On the other hand, the patterns of establishment or paths of religious glocalization (or hybridization) also suggest some different diaspora’s orientations with respect to State of the country of origin. The religious glocalization of the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church seems to follow more the goals and orientations developed in their Church-state relations (the mission to assist millions of Romanians abroad assigned by the Romanian State to the Romanian Orthodox Church abroad, the role of actor in international relations and in the dissemination of Russian culture assigned by the Russian State to the Russian Orthodox Church), while the glocalization of the Ecumenical Patriarchate seems less tied to State dynamics concerning national interests. Finally, the subject of this chapter forms part of the debate on the ‘controversial’ issue of the relationship between Orthodox Christianity and the main Western model of modernity (Makrides 2012a, b, 2013). In fact, this religion maintains powerful bonds with the past and with tradition, and it retains a set of reservations with respect to some typical requirements of the main Western modern project. On the other hand, from a historical perspective in some occasions it has also been able to accommodate cultural changes and elaborate processes of modernization. Following this vision, if in this research I have especially referred to the theme of religious establishment, further stud of Orthodox parishes in the diaspora might emphasize the multiple hybridizations of Orthodox clerics and faithful with respect to lifestyles and attitudes more typical in Western countries. For example, as emerged during the collection of empirical data, the Romanian Orthodox diaspora in Italy seems to be developing a recent sensibility with respect to the creation of a social doctrine in the Orthodox thought. This attitude widespread among a minority of faithful seems to be favoured by the processes of religious glocalization and by an engagement with Catholicism in the Romanian parishes (Giordan et al. 2018). In actual fact, the glocalization of the Orthodox diasporas in Italy could also have effects on the future trajectories of Orthodoxy in its traditional territories. This scenario was hypothesized by the Metropolitan of Pergamon Joannis Zizioulas in his lectio magistralis (2008) on the occasion of the conferment of his honorary doctoral degree at the St. Sergius Orthodox Theology Institute in Paris in 2008. He states that the Orthodox Christian communities within the diaspora in Western Europe have developed new practices towards the contemporary world as a result of their relationship with host countries and their status as a religious minority. In the near future, these Orthodox diasporas will be asked to ‘export’ some of these practices to their homeland, where societies are already changing due to the progress of secularization and processes of religious differentiation. This view presented by Zizioulas seems to take into consideration recent changes of Orthodox Christianity in the global scenario, who appear to identify in Orthodoxy the facets of a transnational religion (Roudometof 2014a, b, 2015b). As explored in the case of the Orthodox Christian panorama in Italy, this recent condition seems to suggest the (Western and

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European) evolution of a religious tradition which may no longer be appropriately referred to as solely Eastern.

References

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Ravegnani, G. (2004). I Bizantini in Italia. Bologna: Il Mulino. Ricucci, R. (2017). Diversi dall’Islam: Figli dell’Immigrazione e Altre Fedi. Bologna: Il Mulino. Rimestad, S., & Kadotschikow, E. (2014). The ambivalent Ecumenical relations among Russian Orthodox faithful in Germany. In M. Hämmerli & J. F. Mayer (Eds.), Orthodox identities in Western Europe: Migration, settlement and innovation (pp. 74–82). Farnham: Ashgate. Roudometof, V. (2014a). Globalization and Orthodox Christianity: The transformations of a religious tradition. London/New York: Routledge. Roudometof, V. (2014b). The glocalizations of Christianity in Europe: A global-historical perspective. In R. Robertson (Ed.), European glocalization in global context (pp. 62–81). London/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Roudometof, V. (2015a). Special section: Orthodox Christianity in Western Europe. Religion, State, and Society, 43(3), 1–2. Roudometof, V. (2015b). Orthodox Christianity as a transnational religion: Theoretical, historical and comparative considerations. Religion, State and Society, 43(3), 211–227. Roudometof, V. (2016). Globalization. In D. Yamane (Ed.), Handbook of religion and society (pp. 505–524). New York: Springer. Sidorov, D. (2006). Post-imperial third Romes: Resurrections of a Russian Orthodox geopolitical metaphor. Geopolitics, 11(2), 317–347. Suslov, M. D. (2014). “Holy Rus”: The geopolitical imagination in the contemporary Russian Orthodox Church. Russian Politics & Law, 52(3), 67–86. Talalay, M. (1998). Ortodossia Russa in Italia. Religioni e società, 30, 90–98. Turcescu, L. (Ed.). (2002). Dumitru Stăniloae: Tradition and modernity in theology. Iași/Palm Beach: Center for Romanian Studies. Turcotte, P. A. (2012). The national Church as a historical form of Church-type. Elements of a configurative theorization. Social Compass, 59(4), 525–538. Zizioulas, J. (2008, February 10). Il Contributo della Teologia Ortodossa Occidentale. Paris: Institut de Théologie Orthodoxe Saint-Serge. Available at URL: http://www.esarcato.it/ archivio_testi/theologica/teologia_ortodossa_occidentale.pdf. Accessed 26 June 2018.

Marco Guglielmi obtained his PhD from the University of Padova in 2019 graduating from the International Joint PhD Programme on Human Rights, Society, and Multilevel Governance. His main research interests include the relationship between religions and human rights, Orthodox Christianity, religions in diaspora, and religious diversity in Italy. He has published articles in the academic journals Religioni e Società, Religions, and State, Religion and Church in Russia and Worldwide. Recently he published the book chapter ‘Be Fruitful and Multiply…Fast! The Spread of Orthodox Churches in Italy’ (with Giuseppe Giordan) in J. Stolz, C. Monnot (eds.), Congregations in Europe (Springer, 2018).

[email protected] Greek Diaspora in Germany: Church as the Ecclesia’s Forerunner and Point of Reference

Eleni D. Tseligka

Abstract Tradition can be the cultural lifeline between Diasporas and the national body, as a process of transmission of social institutions that regulate behaviour. The linguistic-religious sense of identity is documented in the Greek Diaspora, which, during the era of stateless Hellenism preserved its distinct self-perception. Continuing the tradition of choregia, in the form of euergetism, Greek diasporic communities organised their lives around their church, as through church attendance they could satisfy both their religious and linguistic sentiment. A similar pattern was observed in the Greek mainland with the semiautonomous villages within the millet system, rendering the concept of community and village as synonymous in the Greek language. The paradigm of Greeks in Germany, however, represents a departure from the common typology. The temporariness of settlement, linked to their Gastarbeiter status, resulted in a variation under which, instead of having the community building the church, the church build the community. That sets apart Greeks in Germany from prior diasporic paradigms. The Greek paradigm of individualistic collectivism however, permits the modernisation of tradition. Through the process of interrupting old customs, Greeks in Germany salvaged those elements of tradition, which allow them to maintain their cohesion without being isolated from their modern surroundings.

Keywords Greek · Diaspora · Gastarbeiter · Germany · Orthodox · Immigration

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to examine the cultural and social factors that made the church the epicentre of the Greek communal life in Germany and advanced its role to a facilitator of cultural retention. By looking at tradition as the medium through which behaviour-regulatory social institutions travel in space and time,

E. D. Tseligka (*) Aston University, Birmingham, UK e-mail: [email protected]

[email protected] 242 E. D. Tseligka thus assuming the role of the umbilical cord that connects a Diaspora with the national body, this chapter analyses the common Greek cultural paradigm as it developed during the era of stateless Hellenism, which manifests itself as a self- perception of a distinct linguistic and religious identity. The existing bibliography on Greek Diasporas offers numerous examples of established communities that build their church by continuing the tradition of choregia, in the form of euergetism. However the example of Greeks in Germany represents a departure from the previous archetype of Greek migrant settlement that sets them apart from prior diasporic paradigms. This chapter investigates how their Gastarbeiter status contributed to the formation of that variation, in which instead of having the community building the church, the church built the community. By interrupting old customs, Greeks in Germany retrieved those elements of tradition that allow them to maintain their cohesion without being isolated from their modern surroundings; thus offering a pattern of individualistic collectivism. The main research question this work tries to answer is why the example of community building in Greek migrants in Germany represents such a departure from all other cases of Greek diasporic communities. In addition this work tries to answer why religion is so closely associated with the notion of national identity for Greeks in Germany, as well as the role of religion in their integration to the German society. Moreover this study tries to answer if and to what extent migrant groups who create their own cultural spaces, in terms of customs and traditions, can at the same time be part of mainstream society. The narratives analysed in this chapter come from 31 semi-structured interviews, with outstanding individuals and leading figures of the Greek communities in Germany, conducted between December 2012 and May 2013; eight of those interviews are partly featured here. All interviews were conducted as part of a larger qualitative research project that examines the sociopolitical integration of Greeks in Germany before and after the Maastricht Treaty, based on participant observation and semi-structured interviews. The sample of interviewees was carefully selected from 14 locations in Germany, in particular Berlin, Bielefeld, Bonn, Cologne, Darmstadt, Dortmund, Düsseldorf, Erfurt, Jena, Munich, Rüsselsheim, Siegen, Stuttgart and Weimar. Those cities, either host large or historic communities or have pockets of Greek expatriate population. To ensure the anonymity of the interviewees their individual details are withheld, but it must be emphasised that they were all selected not because of a single attribute, but because of a combination of such, all of which contributed to unique insights of the research topic. A model of thematic analysis was implemented for the taxonomy of the data into coherent categories, following the thematic patterns that emerged from the interviews, containing research results in the form of indicators and qualifications, which allowed further interpretation of the recorded narratives.

[email protected] Greek Diaspora in Germany: Church as the Ecclesia’s Forerunner and Point of Reference 243

The Background of Greek Migration to Germany

By the 1960s the division of Germany into two separate states had an impact in West Germany’s economic development. Emigration to the West was made a very dangerous affair by the regime in East Germany. That resulted to a decrease in labour supply and slowed down the economic growth in West Germany, which was already among the richest countries in the world. As a solution to the problem of growing labour deficiency the West German government signed bilateral agreements that allowed foreigners to work in German industries. A new term was created in the German language to describe the newly arrived workers, Gastarbeiter, guest- workers (Braun 1990: 168–169). The legal status for guest-workers had linked residence permits with the individual’s ability to meet in full the terms of each work contract and be able to secure a new one when the running contract expired. Alternative employment was prohibited for Gastarbeiter, limiting their options to manual labour for German employers. Such restrictions, paired with harsh social conditions, sustained the temporary status of guest workers and inhibited their social integration. Following Italy and Spain, Greece was the third country to sign the agreement in March 1960. Shortly after that, the German Committee in Greece opened two recruitment offices, the first in Athens, at Viktoros Ougko Street, near Omonoia Square, and the second in Thessaloniki at Dodekanisou Street (Rimpa 2010: 4), creating a very efficient system to bring into contact German employers with Greek jobseekers. Foreign labour recruitment was banned in November 1973, but most of the immigrants did not go back to their country of origin, mostly out of fear that they would not be able to return to Germany if the situation at home was not what they expected (Meyers 2004: 130).

The Common Greek Paradigm

The nineteenth century was an era characterised by philhellenism and orientalism and it was exactly the spirit of the times that helped the establishment of the modern state of Greece in 1830. Greeks managed to convince their fellow European nations that their claim for independence from the Ottoman Empire was legitimate, while they also received help in their struggle. Given the context of those times, the problem of identity assumed existential importance for the newfound state, creating a pressing need to define ‘Greekness’, as proof of cultural continuity with classical antiquity; else Greece risked losing the European support. Therefore, instead of defining themselves through the results of their own historical actions, Greeks agreed to be identified by the narratives and the perceptions others had for them (Tsoukalas 2002: 27–28). The founder of modern Greek historiography, Konstantinos Paparigopoulos, dedicated his magnum opus ‘The History of the Hellenic Nation’, written between 1865 and 1876, in the effort to reconnect contemporary Greece

[email protected] 244 E. D. Tseligka with its distant past at an academic level. He treated the classical past as the foundational period of the Greek nation. This way the definitive medieval, Byzantine era is directly linked with ancient Greece (Diaz-Andreu 2007: 106). The antagonism between Roman Catholicism and Easter Orthodoxy, during the middle ages, such as orientalism and the legacy of the crusades, brought the focus of European narratives regarding Greek identity on its the classical past and its modern present. However, between the decline of the ancient world in the fourth century and the founding of the modern state of Greece in the nineteenth century (Venturas 2009: 125), there is an intermediate period of one and a half millennia that summarises the Byzantine and the Ottoman eras of Greece. That fragmented image of Greekness came with many side-effects, one of which was, as previously mentioned, the fact that modern Greeks were expected to measure up to their highly- regarded ancestors, while at the same time they were always expected to be able to prove their lineage or face exclusion from the European family. In Western Europe, the impact of the Christian legacy of Byzantium on the contemporary Greek culture was widely ignored; however that legacy is of significant importance to the Greek narratives of self-perception. In fact, the two most commonly used words by Greeks to describe their civilisation are Ελληνοχριστιανικός (in English Hellenic-Christian) and Ελληνορθόδοξος (in English Hellenic- Orthodox). The aforementioned concepts were coined in the nineteenth century, in order to describe the fusion of Greek national identity with Orthodox Christianity (Roudometof 2010: 27). The reference to Hellenism is primary linguistic and to Christianity it is religious. In other words, Greeks perceive themselves as helleno- phone Christians. Even though, the term Hellenic refers to more than the Greek language, suggesting Greece’s ancient past and all the cultural traditions that go with it, within a contemporary context it makes more sense to place the emphasis on the linguistic meaning of the word, as, after Theodosius I ordered the prohibition of any public non-Christian religious custom in 393 (Gallagher 2004: 68), the term was separated from its original meaning. Therefore, the Greek perception of the self is primarily linguistic and secondarily religious, which means that language and religion are the two core elements that sustain Greekness within the historic time and the geographical space, forming a linguistic-religious notion of the Greek sense of self.

Euergetism and Choregia

One of the oldest surviving customs of Hellenism is the tradition of patronage, choregia, As the richest individuals of the Polis, the choregiasts (patrons) would use part of their wealth to fund the erection of public buildings, pay for communal feasts, conduct works of philanthropy and sponsor the arts and sciences. Therefore, as their wealth contributed towards the common good, they would rightfully assume the social status of outstanding individuals (Naerebout and Singor 2013: 182). That culture of ‘doing good deeds’, or as the Greeks would call it euergeto (ευεργετώ),

[email protected] Greek Diaspora in Germany: Church as the Ecclesia’s Forerunner and Point of Reference 245 could but survive and thrive in Christian times, since it was directly compatible with almsgiving. In Byzantium, some of the notable Church Fathers, like Basil of Caesarea were euergetists, as they spent their personal wealth for the benefits of others (Finn 2006: 223–224). The practice of euergetism evolved further in the Greek Diasporic communities, to become almost synonymous to the kind of philanthropy that helps preserve the linguistic-religious cultural individuality of Greeks. Therefore, an euergetist of the Diaspora would be expected to provide towards the building of a church or a school, or to maintain an institution that preserves Greek culture for the generations to come. As a result, the term ‘national euergetist’ was coined in the Greek language, to describe the patrons of the Greek ethnos. A pattern was developed in the Greek Diaspora that when the circumstances allowed it, the wealthiest members of each community would fund the erection of a church, which would become the epicentre of the community and the gathering point of all Greeks in the vicinity, and often of other Orthodox Christians who lived in the area but did not have their own church building. The history of Greek Diaspora offers a plethora of such examples. The ‘Greek Street’ in the Soho district of London was originally called ‘Hog Lane’, but was renamed from the Greek-Orthodox church, built there in the late 1670s (Harris 2009: 33). Outside Europe and in most recent times, Greeks continue to follow the paradigm of euergetism. For example, the Greek-Orthodox church of St Nicholas in Manhattan, which until the September 11 terrorist attacks stood across the World Trade Center. The parish was originally founded in 1919 by five families, who between them raised 25,000 US dollars to buy an old tavern, which at the time stood on the spot, and converted it to a place of worship. The building of the old tavern was later replaced by a proper church, which was open to people of all denominations, but unfortunately was destroyed by the collapse of the south tower of the World Trade Center, becoming the only church destroyed by the terrorist attacks. The Greek-American community, following once more the paradigm of euergetism, raised funds to replace the loss with a new church, designed by the world-famous architect Santiago Calatrava, the building of which is expected to be finished by early 2017 (Dunlap 2004; Bagli 2008; Pulliam Bailey 2014; Gardner 2014). Etymologically the concept of culture is linked to the soil,1 the cultivation of territory, as every culture originates from its own distinct place in the world. Through communication and the exercise of symbolic representations, culture outlines the shared kinship in space and time and draws its distinct characteristics from the way its participants communicate their mundane interactions (Papastergiadis 2000: 103). However, as people are mobile so is culture, thus, facilitating the formation of a sense of coherence that is independent from spatial demarcation per se. That is obvious in Diasporas where the reference to space has been distorted by geographical distance, resulting in the deterritorialisation of culture (Papastergiadis 2000: 115–116) and creating the need for new spatial references and narratives, hence the

1 From the Latin cultūra, which means cultivation, agriculture. Cicero in his Tusculanae Disputationes, wrote of cultura animi (cultivation of the soul), creating the metaphor of the refine- ment of the spirit, still associated with the world culture today.

[email protected] 246 E. D. Tseligka need for cultural reterritorialisation. Under this prism, it is not amiss to say that, for Greeks, the church becomes the homeland, as it provides that shared space within which, important functions of shared culture – language and religion – are being exercised, hence the historically proven need of Greeks for their own houses of worship. The above is commonplace knowledge to Greeks and it has been expressed explicitly in most of the interviews I conducted. It is also a fact commonly accepted by the clergy, for example father P.T., a second-generation young priest of the Greek Orthodox Church told me: Our Metropolitan says, “every church is a small homeland”, by that I think it is described how Greeks see their church. All the things they do not have and miss from their homeland, they bring to the church, they live (experience) in the church. For instance, in the Easter, when we roast our lambs, if someone does not have a garden at home, we will roast his lamb here. (P.T. Cleric 2013) The importance of liturgy attendance for individuals of diasporic communities can be explained by the dual perception of the Greek identity as Hellenic-Christian, hence by default linguistic-religious. The core books of the Old Testament, the Hebrew Pentateuch, which is the first half of the Christian Bible, was translated into Greek as early as the third century BC, to be included in the library of Alexandria during the reign of Ptolemy II (Collins 2000: 6–7). In addition, the second half of the Christian Bible, the New Testament, was originally written in Koine Greek, the common Greek tongue (Aland and Aland 1987: 52). Therefore, church attendance satisfies both the religious and the linguistic sentiment of Diaspora Greeks, as the liturgy takes place in their mother tongue. That sense of belonging allows migrants to re-establish their connection to the ancestral land and it is especially important to second and subsequent generations, as it is they who lack the narratives which link culture to space. Their memories of Greece, if any, are limited and without the participation in communal activities they would have to rely on the memories of their parents and grandparents, resulting in an outdated and second-hand experience of Greekness. Father P.T. shared his experience with me: The Church is also a part of my roots, of my identity, and it is necessary in order for me to say that I am Greek. I am not just Greek by name, but I also live as a Greek inside the Church and my family and I also visit Greece to see where my parents come from and my roots. And that is necessary; if you do not have that I think you feel lost, you must have something to hold on to and say, “this is who I am.” (P.T. Cleric 2013) That synthesis between the national and the religious is deeply embedded in the collective memory of Greeks and often reflects on their national legends, such as that of the Krypho Scholio, the ‘secret school’. According to that story during the years of Ottoman rule, or as the Greeks sometimes call it Turkocracy – from a historic point of view a rather inaccurate term –, the Church compensated for the prohibition of education by secretly teaching Greek children at night (Roudometof 2010: 27). Even though it is commonly acknowledged that the story of the ‘secret school’ is but a myth, there is however some link to the reality of the times. The Ottoman Empire had no other public educational system for Christian youths than

[email protected] Greek Diaspora in Germany: Church as the Ecclesia’s Forerunner and Point of Reference 247 that which facilitated their conversion to Islam by instructing them with readings of the Qur’an and lessons in Turkish, Arabic, and Persian (Göçek 1987: 132). From that perspective, it can be assumed that the literacy of Greek children of poor, rural background, could often depend on their attendance to Sunday school and the goodwill of the local priest to teach them how to read and write. Vestiges of that tradition can still be found in parishes of the Diaspora. For example, the parish of St Demetrios in Chicago organises a broad range of public activities, including lessons of Greek culture, history and language (Kniss and Numrich 2007: 29, 234).

An Individualistic Paradigm of Collectivism

The archetype of community, with the church at its epicentre, is endemic to Greek culture and pre-existed the international Greek Diaspora. In fact, as oxymoron as it may sound, it pre-existed Christianity and therefore the church as we know it. Its roots can be traced back to the Polis and the Ecclesia of the Demos, the assembly of voters in the democratic Greek city-states. Later on, it evolved to the autonomous Byzantine communities, which existed until the founding of the Modern Greek state. Their unique sense of social cohesion is self-evident in their tax collection system, where the subject of taxation was not the individual but the community as a whole (Yannaras 2013), as yet another form of euergetism. At this point it should be mentioned that the Greek term for community, the koinotita, (Dragostinova 2011: 221) refers to something commonly shared and is used to refer to both the ‘village’ and the ‘community’. During the Ottoman period, the koinotita was a vital institution of local governance for the Greek Orthodox subjects (Yosmaoglu 2015: 203). In the Middle Ages and under Ottoman rule, the life of communities revolved round their church or monastery, which became central to their sense of identity by reproducing their social and cultural ethos, but also their institutions; therefore, for Greeks in Ottoman ruled territory and within the millet system, the contexts of community and of the Orthodox Church became indistinguishable (Payne 2011: 252–253). It should also be mentioned that the Greek term ecclesia bears a qua- druple meaning. As already mentioned, it refers to the assembly of voters in ancient democracies, but it is also the word used for the church, referring to the congregation of believers, as in the Ecclesia of Christ. Furthermore, the word refers to both the religious institution of the church, as for example the Church of Greece, but also to the building that houses worship, the temple. While at the same time the word koinonia (in Greek κοινωνία) means both ‘society’ and ‘holy communion’. The cultural complexity of Greeks makes it difficult to classify them as either collectiv- ists or individualists, since even though they lean towards individualism (Kniss and Numrich 2007: 10) they also maintain a great deal of those elements that can support the argument of collectivism. The point on the matter is that in the case of Greeks, the two classifications should not be mutually exclusive, as they can both apply at the same time and without having the one contradict the other. That is made possible when the public and

[email protected] 248 E. D. Tseligka the private spheres remain separate from each other, allowing thus the individual to pursue a private path of development, while at the same time, as relational person, to follow a prescribed course in his/her public life. Therefore, and after taking all the above into consideration, I hold that Greek collectivism is individualistic and constitutes a sui generis archetype, which compels society to help the person and the person to help society in return. Hence Greeks prefer euergetism to philanthropy, as euergetism serves the society of persons, while philanthropy serves the individual or a sum of individuals; while, at the same time, euergetism allows the person to assume a distinct social position, not by exercising authority but by offering service. At this point I should mention that in Greek culture the ‘person’ (prosopo) and the individual (atomo) are two distinct notions. The ‘person’ is a relational being and therefore the individual becomes a person through his/her interactions with others (Hirschon 2010: 305). That cultural particularity of Greeks comes in support of the argument regarding a sui generis pattern of individualistic collectivism, since the concept of the ‘person’ offers an alternative self-perception to the individual, according to which, s/he is more than a single, isolated, human being; while the community, in contrast to society, is more than the sum of its parts.

The Unique Paradigm of Greeks in Germany

The need for a space of their own was not initially acknowledged by the Greek Gastarbeiter in Germany. Despite their shared background with all other Greeks around the world, there were several external factors, which affected their establishment in the receiving state, resulting in the creation of a unique paradigm. First of all, it was the sense of temporariness deriving from their guest-worker status, which inhibited settlement and integration. As it was discussed earlier, Greeks in Germany did not believe that they would eventually be allowed to stay and therefore focused all their efforts towards their upcoming return to Greece. Senior cleric, father I.P., explained to me how during the early years Greeks were reluctant to invest in the building of parishes, despite the fact that they were church-going people: They were unable to realise that they would stay here (in Germany), that they would be able to stay, or that they should. That temporariness, so to speak, was the dominant element for at least the first twenty years. […] When we started this effort (to build their parish) the question of our people was: “father, since we are going to leave, are we going to leave all this behind for the Germans?” […]. (I.P. Cleric 2013) So far, the Greek diasporic paradigm, as it derives from history, is that the community helps build the church. However, when one observes the example of guest- workers in Germany, impressively enough, it can be said that in their case the church helped build the community, or at least the establishment of the two was parallel to each other. Founded on the 5th of February 1963, the Greek-Orthodox Metropolis of Germany was also named Exarchate of Central Europe in August 1969 and achieved the legal status of a public legal person in October 1974 (Trantas and

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Tseligka 2016: 256). Initially it had no property of its own and liturgies were performed in borrowed houses of worship of other Christian denominations, like Protestant and Catholic churches and chapels. Currently there are 56 parishes and more than 150 places of worship, all of which as sustained by donations; in Bonn, there is a Greek-Orthodox cathedral and classes of Greek-Orthodox religious education were introduced in the school curriculum of North-Rhine Westphalia and Bavaria. At the University of Bonn, a Master’s degree of ‘Ecumenical Studies’ is being offered along with seminars of Orthodox theology. Furthermore, the Metropolis publishes the periodicals ‘Orthodox Presence’ and ‘Orthodox Immigrant’, as well as organises an annual Clerical conference (Die Griechisch- Orthodoxe Metropolie von Deutschland 2013). The Greek-Orthodox Church is now the third largest recognised Church in Germany, with a plethora of owned houses of worship, parish meeting centres and other buildings (D.T. Cleric 2013). As the above dates of establishment and long list of achievements indicate, the institution of the church acted as if it were certain that the presence of Greeks in Germany was not going to be temporary. Guided by a sense of foresight that can only be attributed to its millennia-long lifespan, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Mother Church, is no stranger to population movements and it was prepared for the permanent settlement of Greeks in Germany. The Church was always saying, at least during my time, that we are not temporary (residing in Germany). (Metropolitan of Germany) Irenaios (Galanakis) used to say that we must think and act as if we know that we are going to stay (in Germany) forever. It may be so that we will leave tomorrow, yet (we must act) as if we know we will stay forever. […] Another thing he was saying, […] emphasising on the national consciousness of the people, both Orthodox and national consciousness: “we must work in such a way my children that the future generations will be able to say, ‘the Greeks passed through this place (were here)”. (I.P. Cleric 2013) Furthermore, it must be added that given the initial poverty of the guest-workers, there were no patrons who could emerge as natural community leaders through a choregia. Instead the church had to rely on modest donations; the proverbial ‘hum- ble candle every faithful lights at church’ is, according to an anonymous priest, the main source of income for parishes in Germany and as far as maintenance goes, parishes rely on volunteering. As in the case of storefront churches in the US, which function as community-based organisations with the ability to inspire public support (Kostarelos 1995: 124), the Greek-Orthodox parishes in Germany rely on their parishioners as much as their parishioners rely on the church. Most parishes organ- ise leisure activities, such as arts and crafts workshops and quite often the parishioners donate the fruits of their labour to be sold as a source of income for their church. Such items include hand-painted icons, handmade candles, crochet and embroidery textiles, handmade pottery and other items of similar creative merit. Also, it should be mentioned that mundane activities such as cleaning and catering are always done voluntarily by parishioners. However, none of these time-consuming services are seen as offers to the church, but instead they are perceived by volunteers as services to their community; as, though, and thanks to those services, the Diaspora maintains its cohesion. After all, everything they donate returns to them in one form

[email protected] 250 E. D. Tseligka or another, as the list of activities offered by Greek-Orthodox parishes in Germany is very long and includes babysitting services, caretaking of the elderly, music lessons, iconography or other crafts workshops, dance classes, public feasts and free meals. In order to facilitate and house all the above, parishes own or rent further buildings apart from the church; but also, every diasporic parish serves the people of an extended area, often including several towns, and not just those in surrounding neighbourhoods. A high-ranking cleric and academic from Dortmund explained to me: The parishes here in Germany have the particularity of being extended in space; namely ours, has the church in Dortmund but serves the (Greek) expatriates of the wider area of Bochum, of Witten, of Unna and Menden (and Holzwickede). (Dr P. M. Cleric 2013) Clerics are fully aware of the importance the church space has for the Diaspora and therefore, they happily configure their parish’s buildings to assist communal needs, and by doing so they preserve the central role the church has in the village. Father P.M. told me how his parish buildings were being renovated to serve the needs of the community: In our church (parish), which is currently being renovated, we have placed great weight to the configuration of this space and we consider that space as parlour of Hellenism, which is not just to facilitate the need of people to socialise, as a kind of a coffeehouse, but will also serve as an audience chamber that can receive individuals of the German political scene, or from different Christian denominations and be presentable and appropriate. (Dr P. M. Cleric 2013) This way the Church becomes a reconstruction of the archetypal Greek village, the koinotita, and all its functions, including the village square, a reminiscent of the Athenian Agora: the space where communities exercise their daily political rights and obligations, a vital form of sustenance for the social fibre and an integral way of Greek socialising. The above is demonstrated further by the fact that the various Greek clubs and immigrant associations that often borrow church’s buildings for their activities, are regulated by councils elected by their registered members; and the structure of those councils is identical to town councils. It should be emphasised that those immigrant associations are fully secular and completely independent from the church.

Political Divisions

Guest-worker migration to Germany, took place during a highly-politicised period in contemporary Greek history, ipso facto, given that in its entirety Modern Greece is a deeply politicised state and society. Therefore, as it can be expected, guest- workers carried their political beliefs along with their social traumas to the receiving state, and, the immigrant associations they created suffered the same post-civil-war divisions as the rest of the Greek society. Namely they were divided to ‘right’ and ‘left’, as in right-wing and left-wing, a division that deepened further

[email protected] Greek Diaspora in Germany: Church as the Ecclesia’s Forerunner and Point of Reference 251 in the diasporic communities in Germany after the 1977 national elections, in which the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) of Andreas Papandreou gained significant strength. During those elections, the Union for Democratic Centre had its deputies divided between PASOK and the conservative New Democracy (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2009: 186), thus creating the foundation for a new kind of political polarisation, which, quantitatively, lasted until the European debt crisis and the Greek national elections of June 2012. The relationship the former two ruling parties of Greece had with the immigrant associations in Germany is a taboo subject, which very few of the interviewees were willing to touch, at least on record. However, it is commonly acknowledged in Greece that a number of those associations hosted political events for the benefits of one or the other political party, supported their pre-election campaigns and organised trips to Greece so the expatriates could vote in the national elections. The result of that kind of polarisation was the division of the Diaspora, according to political preference. That also explains why in most places there were two separate Greek immigrant associations, each hosting their own separate events. Dr A. L. told me the following: In Dortmund, there were two communities (associations); one of them was mostly supporting New Democracy (conservative party) and the other was mostly supporting PASOK (socialist party), which was a common phenomenon back then for associations to be so politicised, an element that is now extinct. I became familiar with the element of political polarisation in the union of Greek students at Münster, who were divided in either left-wing or right-wing during the late 80s, and each group was really trying to tarnish the other and were competing about who will get the most seats at the union’s council […]. Those associations were originally founded in the 1970s, as a democratic reaction to the military junta in Greece, but from the early 1980s and even during the 90s they developed a rivalry towards each other, because of their affiliations to the political parties in Greece […]. (Dr A.L. 2013) It was not until recently that this rivalry subsided and most regional immigrant associations begun to merge, as it made no sense to remain divided. That happened for a variety of reasons; first of all, the second generation took over from the previous one, and, lacking the civil war narratives, they had little interest in Greek, divisive politics. Furthermore, the number of people frequently attending events organised by those associations has been dramatically reduced, therefore those clubs could not survive financially for much longer and as a result, merging with each other became the only reasonable thing to do. Finally, the 2009 Eurozone debt crisis brought such deep and sudden changes to the perception of Greeks about the two former ruling parties, that the previous level of political polarisation became redundant. As explained above, the lack of patrons in the guest-worker community, resulted in having to rely on small donations from a large number of people; therefore, the church was something they all built together and everyone was welcome there. Presently, a great number of immigrant associations borrow parish buildings for their activities, as they cannot afford to own or lease private space any longer.

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Between the Religious and the National

The constant and persistent apolitical position of the church gave it an advantage compared to all other immigrant associations, as it focuses its attention on all those things that could unite the Greek community rather than divide it. As a senior Greek diplomat in Germany, who expressed the wish to remain anonymous, told me: ‘Greece is the only place in the world where even the members of the communist party go to church […]’ (A.D. 2013). Attesting to the above opinion is the religious quest of some Greek intellectuals and artists, associated with the Left, who since at least the 1980s had demonstrated a degree of interest in the Orthodox tradition, which was unusual for the traditional Left intelligentsia that thought too little of Orthodoxy and all religions for that matter. Commonly known as Neo-Orthodoxy, the current can be described as an unofficial dialogue between Orthodoxy and Marxism, particularly on the education of the Greek nation, drawing from the Athonite spirituality and Orthodox tradition (Makrides 1998: 141–143). The above fact constitutes a Greek particularity; due to its strong connotations with language, territory and identity, the Greek-Orthodox religion has a strong national subtext, which often runs independently from the individual’s sense of religiosity, hence the paradox of the church-going atheists. To a certain extend that can be attributed to the role of the church in the Byzantine Empire, but most importantly to the system of millets established by the Ottoman Empire, which ensured that religious institutions were held as a primary collective identifier. Those religious institutions spread literacy in their effort to maintain the ecclesiastical and liturgical language, a process, which, in the nineteenth century, resulted in the evolution of millets to proto-nations, with modern Greece being the first of them (Nielsen 2011: 4). When asked if Greeks in Germany place more emphasis to sustaining their language or their religion, teacher and left-wing trade unionist told me ‘Is there any difference between the two?’ (M. F1. Unionist 2013). And she was not the only interviewee who replied in such a manner. As a matter of fact, almost everyone I talked to gave me an analogous reply, while some could not see any point to that question. Through that mentality, the church is openly acknowledged as a leading institution towards the maintenance of Greek identity. There are many organisations, clubs for example, often in association with the Greek authorities; the Church as well is highly contributing towards that direction, of the preservation of Greek identity. At least here in Munich and the whole of Bavaria, it has assumed a leading role, probably because everyone else has withdrawn from that field. There are of course the Greek communities, but they have fallen in a state of decay, the Greek political parties are no more as they have deteriorated and of course there is the institution of the Greek school. The school contributes to the preservation of Greekness. […] In the Church, one does not only have the opportunity to listen to Greek, but also social interactions and relations cultivated there take place in Greek and in German of course, depending on the congregation that can be found in every parish. (M. F1. Unionist 2013) As a result of such perceptions, the life of Greek migrant communities in Germany is in essence built around the church, either the institution or the building, or both, depending on every individual’s religious sentiment. This way the collectivism of

[email protected] Greek Diaspora in Germany: Church as the Ecclesia’s Forerunner and Point of Reference 253 the archetypal koinotita is being maintained among Greeks in Germany, while it has almost died out in contemporary Greece. As a matter of fact, that observation is so obvious and self-evident that it often came up in my conversations with members of the Diaspora, who would inform me that the villages from which they originate in Greece, have lost the ‘village spirit’ that they have so carefully maintained in their communities in Germany. When asked to define the concept of village spirit I did not get specific answers. However, everyone used their own words to describe a state of respect and care for their fellow villagers, expressed through acts of kind- ness and mutual help. Since the diasporic parish has evolved in the village, its role to preserve the socio-cultural cohesion of Diasporic communities became more important than the preservation of the religious faith. Prof. Dr K.N., a Greek academic in Munich told me the following: […] the Church is a cohesive link (in the community) if you observe every Sunday or during important (Christian) celebrations, the crowds of people who assemble (at the church), it is amazing […]. The church here has multiple faculties, not just the preservation of our religion and our faith, it is indeed a place of gathering. There (at church) people meet; people who toil through the week, anticipate Sunday because they meet other people who often come from remote locations. Further, all parishes have made sure to provide people with suitable facilities, so people would not have to leave right after the liturgy. (Prof. Dr K.N. Academic 2013) However, all the above raise the matter of tradition and modernity, and given this is a study on immigrant communities, questions regarding their social integration are important; namely, can people who create their own cultural – not spatial – villages, within the urban limits be at the same time part of mainstream society? But first of all, let us examine what is meant by tradition. The word tradition comes from the Latin traditio, which indicates something that is transferred hand-to-hand, passed from one generation to the next for safekeeping. Etymologically it is suggested that any alterations to the transferred object should be avoided, as that would be an act of tradition-breaking. Therefore, in that sense, tradition is something, which, by nature abhors change and resists innovation. Tradition is a process of doing things in a certain way and at the same time it is the knowledge resource of how to do things in that certain way, therefore tradition is both a process and a resource (Cashman et al. 2011: 3). It is the processes and means by which humans form and replicate their social bonds and cultural identities. Therefore, the concept of tradition can also be defined as an intergenerational process of transmission of social institutions, which regulate behaviour. Tradition is a message from the past generation to the present, instructions from the dead to the living; however, as the dead do not actually speak, the importance of their message is restricted by its interpretation by the living (Despland 2012: 19). The Greek word for tradition is paradosis (παράδοσις), which can be defined as traditio, but most commonly it refers to the act of surrendering, perhaps suggesting the limited control the previous generations have over the present.

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Tradition Within the Context of Modernity

During a visit in Rüsselsheim, I participated in the celebrations of the Greek community for the 1973 anniversary feast in memory of the Polytehneio events, the Athens Polytechnic uprising, which led to the fall of the junta and the reinstatement of democracy in Greece; there I was able to observe the modernisation of tradition. The tables for the party were arranged in the traditional linear manner, which is typical of rural Greek public feasts. As seating was free, participants were allowed to mix and socialise with everyone around them, whether they were previously familiar with each other or not. That is also typical of village feasts, including wed- ding and funeral receptions that rarely ever have formal seating arrangements. In such events children are usually not expected to seat with their parents, unless very young, but instead they are encouraged to play with other children; usually there is a space used as a playroom for children, under adult supervision. Even though the majority of the guests were Greek, they were by no means exclusively Greek. The feasts of all Greek immigrant associations in Germany are open to the general public and are being advertised well in advance. In most cases, they see a high attendance of non-Greeks, either Germans or people from different migrant backgrounds who appreciate Greek cuisine; especially so in small towns, like Rüsselsheim, with limited options for entertainment. The food was a mixture of popular Greek and German dishes resulting in a form of syncretistic cooking; for example, souvlaki (Greek, grilled skewered pork) with sauerkraut (German, sour cabbage). The wine and other spirits was commonly mixed with soft-drinks, as one would expect during a Greek party, where people enjoy drinking but not getting drunk. The music was the only thing that was exclusively Greek, performed live by a band that specialises in Greek parties (including social events like weddings), and covered most aspects of Greek music, from rural folk to contemporary pop. The general atmosphere did remind me of a common rural feast, a panigyris (πανήγυρις) as it is called in Greek, like those that still take places in Greek villages; especially so when the typical circular dance was performed and most people in the room joined in. The feast in Rüsselsheim on Polytechneio day (November 17), was a typical party organised by a Greek immigrant association; almost identical was the feast in Darmstadt on Ochi day which I had attended a few weeks earlier and every other Greek feast I witnessed during my research in Germany. The archetype of the Greek village panigyris became the blueprint for any Greek night in Germany. However, the customs and traditions brought from the homeland were reinterpreted in order to be adjusted to the ethos of the receiving state. That process of modernisation and adaptation of tradition, can also be observed in contemporary Greece, however it is more obvious in diasporic communities. During this entire research, I witnessed time and again the interruption of old deep-rooted customs, not for the sake of abandoning tradition, but in an attempt to maintain it. In Darmstadt, I witnessed a group of female dancers performing the Greek Pontic Pyrrhichios (Πυρρίχιος, Pyrrhic dance), a traditionally male dance associated with battle and warfare. In other

[email protected] Greek Diaspora in Germany: Church as the Ecclesia’s Forerunner and Point of Reference 255 words, a custom was interrupted, since in contemporary society, rigorism in gender roles has become irrelevant, and that minor change allowed for a very old tradition to be preserved. Being able to distinguish between those elements of tradition that should carry on, and the ones that should be left in the past, has allowed space for the modernisation of tradition. Instead of denying modernity, they incorporated tradition in the modern concept. Therefore, diasporic Greeks have the ability to maintain their cultural particularities without turning their backs to mainstream society. Tradition is something they do in their social gatherings, it is part of their Greekness and allows them to connect and belong in the group, but it is not something that segregates them from the host society. As practices of cultural cohesion, the particularities of Greek tradition adapted to the modern socio-political environment of Germany, in order to facilitate and sustain their peculiar kind of individualistic collectivism, described earlier. Because of that, Greekness does not act as an inherent hindrance that prevents them from integrating, but as an excuse for further social mingling. Within the above-stated context, Greek communities have the autonomy to follow modernity in their own way and at the same time express their cultural traits freely, and in their own individualistic way.

Conclusion

The majority of Greeks in Germany descend from the original Gastarbeiter of the 1960s, a group of people characterised by initial poverty and a conviction that their residence in the host-state would be short-lived. Their paradigm derives from the uncertainty of settlement during the earlier years of their migration, and it portrays a variation to the common typology of Greek migrant settlement, in which instead of having the community building the church, Greeks in Germany had the church build the community. Long before the Modern Greek state was founded in the 1830s, a sense of linguistic-religious identity had emerged in the Greek Diaspora, which had organised its communal life around the church, through the practice of euergetism, as a continuation of the custom of choregia. Satisfying both their linguistic and religious sentiment, church attendance was elevated to be the epicentre of communal life. During that same era in the Greek mainland, the semiautonomous Greek villages operating under the millet system, made the concept of community and that of village synonymous in the Greek language, under the common word koinotita. Regardless of the fact that the concept of a Hellenic-Orthodox civilization is a nineteenth-century construct, it still describes the Greek perception of self. Tradition, as a process of behavioural regulation, through the transmission of social institutions, is the umbilical cord that connects Diasporas to the national body. But can Greek migrants in Germany have their own cultural spaces, in terms of customs and traditions, and at the same time be integrated into mainstream society? As previously analysed, the process of interrupting old customs, the modernisation of tradition is possible within the Greek cultural paradigm of individualistic collectivism.

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That allowed Greeks in Germany to retain those elements of tradition that promote their sense of cohesion, without remaining isolated from their new surroundings in Germany. That bring us to the main research question, namely why the paradigm of community building in Greek migrants in Germany is distinct to all other cases of Greek diasporic communities. The main factor for that variation is the sense of temporariness originating from their guest-worker status, which inhibited their settlement and integration. The Gastarbeiter migratory regime linked residence permits with the individual’s ability to meet in full the terms of each work contract, excluding guest- workers from alternative employment and limiting their work prospects to manual labour for German employers. As a result, Greeks did not trust that they would be allowed to settle in Germany and therefore focused all their efforts towards their upcoming repatriation. It must also be added that, due to the initial poverty of the guest-workers, no patrons could emerge through a choregia as natural community leaders. But why is the line between the religious and the national so blurry for Greek diasporic communities? The perception of Greek identity as Hellenic-Christian, therefore linguistic-religious, explains the importance of the church for individuals of diasporic communities; liturgy attendance satisfies both the religious and the linguistic sentiment of Diaspora Greeks, as the liturgy takes place in their mother tongue, creating a sense of belonging which connects the diaspora to the ancestral land. This synthesis between the national and the religious is deeply engraved in the collective memory of Greeks and it is associated with an archetypal community that has the church at its epicentre and is endemic to Greek culture. This can be attributed to the role of the church in the Byzantine Empire, as well as the millet system established by the Ottoman Empire, which held religious institutions as the primary collective identifiers. Those religious institutions spread literacy in an effort to maintain the ecclesiastical and liturgical language, resulting in religion becoming an integral part of identity for Orthodox Christians and Greeks in particular.

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Interviews

A.D. (2013). Interview with anonymous diplomat on 21st February 2013. Stuttgart. [Notes in possession of author] D.T. Cleric. (2013). Interview with Father D.T. Cleric on 19th March 2013. Bielefeld. [Recording in possession of author] Dr A.L. Scientist. (2013). Interview with Dr A.L. Scientist on 8th March 2013. Erfurt. [Recording in possession of author] Dr P.M. Cleric. (2013). Interview with Archimandrite Dr P.M. Cleric on 22nd April 2013. Dortmund. [Recording in possession of author] I.P. Cleric. (2013). Interview with Father I.P. Cleric on 16th April 2013. Düsseldorf. [Recording in possession of author] M. F1. Unionist. (2013). Interview with M.F1. Unionist on 29th April 2013. Munich. [Recording in possession of author] P.T. Cleric. (2013). Interview with Father P.T. Cleric on 31st March 2013. Siegen. [Recording in possession of author] Prof. Dr K.N. Academic. (2013). Interview with Prof. Dr K.N. Academic on 18th April 2013. Munich. [Recording in possession of author]

Eleni D. Tseligka has a PhD in Humanities and Social Sciences and has been a Lecturer of Politics at Staffordshire University from 2013 to 2016, before she moved on to the University’s Academic Development Unit. Since 2018, she works at the Centre for Learning Innovation and Professional Practice at Aston University. She is a Senior Fellow of the Higher Education Academy of the UK and an International Associate of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, as well as a member of the editorial board for the Cogent Arts & Humanities and a peer reviewer for the Journal of International Migration.

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A Church of Constantinople, 42, 104 Accommodation, 79, 82, 115 Church-state relations, 4–5, 70, 108, 116, Adherents, 8, 106, 192, 195, 196, 218, 221, 231, 235 223, 225, 229 Citizens, 5, 42, 50, 54, 62, 69, 80–85, 88, Anti-Westernism, 26–27, 113 100, 105, 115, 130, 161 Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops Clergy, 25, 52, 101, 102, 179–181, 184, 200, of North and Central America, 201, 210, 212–214, 224, 228, 244 195, 200, 201 Collective human rights, 6 Autocephaly, 4, 223, 233 Community building, 240, 253, 254 Consensus, 31, 58, 78, 149, 154, 164 Conservatism, 48 B Converts, 3, 32, 33, 103, 178–180, 182, Bases of the Social Teaching of the Russian 185–187, 198, 200, 214 Orthodox Church, 63 Converts to Orthodoxy, 32, 179, 187, 198 Belarus, 7, 47, 50, 124–143, 228, 233 Council of Europe, 23, 27, 47, 63, 66, 71, Belonging, 3–5, 7, 51, 52, 125, 136, 138, 140, 115, 150, 164 175, 181, 187, 244, 254 Cultural context, 16, 42, 125, 174, 212, 231 Bishops, 51, 63, 68, 77, 102, 103, 113, 114, Cultural diplomacy, 7, 147–165 153, 157, 180, 184, 186, 187, 195, 200, Cultural pluralism, 92, 214 214, 218, 226, 228, 230, 231 Cyprus problem, 153, 158, 161, 163, 164 Blasphemy, 28, 99, 105, 107, 108, 112–114, 116, 119 D Demarcation, 21, 88, 152, 159, 160, 243 C Democracy, 5, 23, 42, 62, 70, 81, 82, 84, 91, Canonical territory, 49, 63 150, 155, 164, 245, 249, 252 Catholic-Orthodox relations, 49, 229, 232 Democratic institutions, 130 Charitable works, 229 Democratic society, 65, 81, 83, 85, 88, 90, 91, Christian civilization, 53 109, 118 Christian congregations, 192, 194 De-secularisation, 19, 20 Christian culture, 14 Diaspora, 3, 4, 8, 22, 32, 42, 43, 46, 54, 77, Christian values, 151, 182 184, 188, 218–220, 225–235 Church members, 198, 199, 201, 206, 208 Diasporic communities, 32, 240, 243, 244, Church membership, 182, 198, 200 249, 251, 252, 254

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Diocese, 50, 51, 181, 186, 194, 196, 197, 201, Freedom of religion, 21, 28, 63, 71, 82, 84, 203, 213, 218, 224, 227–229, 231–233 127, 154 Discrimination, 28, 71, 76, 89, 109, 115, 161 Fundamental freedoms, 59, 63, 66 Dominant religion, 117, 125, 219, 229, 232 Fundamentalism, 19, 64, 69, 88

E G Eastern Bloc, 17, 32 Gastarbeiter, 240, 241, 246, 253, 254 Eastern Europe, 6, 17, 20, 23, 124, 129, 136, General Assembly of the World Council 174, 176, 181, 184, 198, 200, 221 of Churches, 60 Eastern Orthodoxy, 1–8, 124, 127, 132, 173 Geopolitical actor, 4 Ecumenical institutions, 229 Germany, 3, 7, 14, 175, 176, 186, 187, Ecumenical Patriarchate, 8, 34, 42, 43, 50, 54, 222, 230, 239–254 103, 196, 197, 218, 219, 223, 224, 227, Global, 2, 19, 43, 90, 152, 173, 219 229–233, 235, 247 Global action of Church, 5 Emancipation, 118 Globality, 22, 174, 184 Engagement strategies, 3 Globalization, 1, 2, 4, 41, 42, 49, 52–54, 92, Enlightenment, 29, 58, 102 174, 175 Equality, 84, 85, 88, 90, 105, 106, 115, 126, Global religion, 174, 179 127, 129, 148 Global secular society, 8 Eschatological orientation, 87 Glocalization, 2, 175, 184–188, 219, 227, 229, Ethnic culture, 198, 201, 204 232, 234, 235 Ethnic heritage, 200, 203 Glocal religions, 219, 234 Ethnic identity, 3, 177, 184, 200, 203, 204, Governance, 8, 23, 69, 92, 105, 124–128, 133, 213, 230, 232 134, 143, 181, 205, 245 EU acquis, 148, 161–164 Grassroots level, 101, 117–119 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), The Great and Holy Council and the Orthodox 6, 7, 20, 23, 27, 63, 69, 76, 99–101, Churches, 7, 75–94 107–112, 114–119, 124, 128 Great Schism, 24, 101, 186 European identity, 150, 164 Greece, 20, 70, 77, 99, 151, 153, European institutions, 27, 118, 158 161, 176, 241 Europeanisation, 7, 103, 117, 148, 160–165 Greek-Cypriot community, 7, 147–165 European region, 218 Greek diaspora, 8, 239–254 Exclusion, 4, 71, 125, 242 Greek national identity, 108, 117, 242 Exclusivism, 125, 127, 129–131, 139–143 Greek Orthodox Archdiocese, 196, 198, 199, 201, 203 Greek-Orthodox religiocultural heritage, F 148, 154–156, 164 Faith, 69, 76, 100, 129, 148, 178, 192, Greek-Orthodox religioscapes, 218, 251 148, 158–160, 165 Faithful, 76, 78, 83, 86, 88, 91, 93, 94, 182, Greek state, 100, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 193–195, 200, 213, 219–225, 227, 228, 116, 245, 253 230, 232, 233, 235, 247 Faith/spirituality experiences, 129–131, 136–139, 141 H Finland, 54, 175, 181 Habermas, J., 7, 19, 76, 80, 82, 83, 85–87, 151 First-generation migrants, 178, 185 Hierophany, 159 Foreign policy, 4, 43, 48, 54, 149 Holy Orthodox Archdiocese of Italy France, 7, 23, 43, 44, 47, 50–52, 103, 176, and Malta, 219, 224, 226 177, 183, 186, 187, 233 The Holy Synod of the Russian Freedom from religion, 71, 109 Orthodox Church, 52 Freedom of conscience, 58, 62, 70, 71, Host country, 176, 178, 226, 227, 100, 126, 127 229, 231, 232

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Human dignity, 15, 31, 58, 65, 67, 68, 88 L Human rights, 2, 14, 57, 85, 99, 124, 148, 173 Lautsi vs. Italy, 71, 110, 118 Human Rights Doctrine of the Russian Legal framework, 101, 105, 106, 108, 116, Orthodox Church, 58 125, 128, 130 Human rights norms, 5, 71, 115 Liberal individualist consensus, 58 Huntington, S., 17 Liberalism, 16, 19 Hybridization, 22, 184, 219, 226, 227, 231, Liturgical worship, 206 232, 234, 235 Liturgy, 47, 51, 89, 93, 179, 180, 185, 201, 203, 225, 227, 228, 231, 244, 251, 254 Local church, 3, 42, 90, 203, 218, I 227, 228, 234 Icons, 47, 51, 110, 148, 154, 156, 157, Local faith communities, 192 180, 187, 247 Image and likeness of God, 76, 89 Imaginaire, 43–49, 54 M Immigrant associations, 248–250, 252 Mainline Protestant congregations, 206, 207, Immigrant communities, 218, 232, 251 210–213 Immigrant religion, 22 Mainstream culture, 182 Immigrants, 22, 158, 186, 195, 198, 200, 218, Majority church, 100, 107, 119 220–223, 227, 230, 232, 233, 241, Majority religious groups, 117, 129 247–252 Makrides, V.N., 5, 7, 15–18, 21, 24, 25, 27, 29, Immigration, 22, 52, 192, 198, 220, 221, 227 30, 32, 102, 103, 124, 235, 250 Inclusive society, 77 Migrant communities, 8, 228, 250 Indigenization, 3, 175, 184–188 Migrant religious organizations, 230 Individual human rights, 17, 59, 62 Migrant settlement, 240, 253 Individualistic collectivism, 3, 240, 246, 253 Migration, 2, 3, 22, 23, 174–179, 185, 188, Injustice, 27, 89, 91 217, 225, 241, 248, 253 Innovation, 8, 212, 214, 251 Ministry, 44, 50, 106, 111, 113, 126, 132, 205, Integration, 3, 19, 46, 76, 115, 152, 162, 163, 213, 233 178, 227, 240, 241, 246, 251, 254 Minorities, 3, 20, 54, 76, 100, 125, 154, 175, Interfaith dialogue, 79 213, 229 Intermarriage, 184, 199 Minority religious groups, 111, 117, 134 Internal affairs, 30, 126 Minority status, 175, 179–184 International Covenant on Civil Modern human rights, 7, 14–34, 66, 68, 71 and Political Rights, 59, 126 Modernity, 2, 5, 8, 14–20, 22, 24, 26–29, 31, International Orthodox politics, 3–5 33, 34, 76, 78, 80, 88, 124, 129, 143, International relations (IR), 2, 4, 23, 69, 151, 174, 182, 183, 188, 235, 251–253 149, 152, 159 Modernization, 2, 8, 76, 130, 139, 141, 142, International system, 149, 151, 152, 164 198, 235 Italy, 3, 7, 23, 49, 69, 110, 175, 217, 241 Moldova, 50, 222, 223, 227, 228 Moldovan Orthodox Church, 223 Motherland, 3, 219, 223, 226–228, 234 J Multiculturalism, 233 Jurisdictions, 4, 42, 50, 51, 59, 77, 114, Multicultural society, 65 175, 186, 194, 195, 198, 200–204, Multiple modernities, 5, 18, 20 214, 218–221, 223–228, Multireligious societies, 22 230, 231, 234 Muslim, 76, 101, 106, 111, 115, 132, 158, Justice, 48, 76, 79, 81, 83–86, 88–94, 103, 192, 199, 220, 221 113, 114, 124, 209

N K National culture, 138, 139, 178 koinotita, 245, 248, 251, 253 National identity, 42, 101–105, 117–119, 126, Kokkinakis vs. Greece, 99, 108, 109, 118 139, 192, 230–233, 240

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Nationalism, 21–22, 42, 45, 104, 105, P 119, 225 Pan-Orthodox coordination, 226 Nation-state, 18, 21, 22, 151, 184 Particularity, 2, 5–6, 76, 86, 159–161, 214, Negotiations, 8, 31, 83, 124, 127, 143, 149, 246, 248, 250, 253 160, 163, 179, 226, 229, 232 Patriarchate of Constantinople, 4, 34, 42, 46, Neo-Orthodoxy, 250 50–52, 175, 196, 218, 219, Networks, 44, 53, 54, 81, 101, 158, 184 224, 229, 247 North America, 2, 8, 194–196, 213 Patriarchate of Moscow, 4, 51, 223, 224, Northern Cyprus, 148, 153–155, 157, 162, 228, 233 164, 165 Personalism, 15, 16, 25 Pluralism, 4, 7, 20, 42, 62, 63, 76, 79, 86, 92, 106, 109, 129–131, 139–143, 175, O 178–184, 186, 188, 192, 193, 214 Office of Inter-ecclesiastical Relations Political borders, 46, 159 and European Affairs, 153 Political contexts, 54, 71, 79, 128, 143, 148 Oppression, 89, 91, 178 Political institutions, 102 Orthodox anthropology, 14 Political rights, 248 Orthodox Christianity, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 14–34, Political secularism, 125, 126, 130, 131, 133, 107, 179, 185, 192–195, 198, 141, 142 200, 212, 214, 217–236, 242 Political spheres, 7, 178, 179 Orthodox Church in America (OCA), Political theology, 2 201, 203, 218 Political values, 47, 88 Orthodox Church of Cyprus (OCC), Post-national citizenship, 160 7, 147–149, 151, 153–158, Post-secular, 5, 18–20, 83 160, 161, 164, 165 Poverty, 89, 91, 247, 253, 254 Orthodox civilization, 7, 45–47, 253 Pray, 89, 129, 133, 134, 137, 142, 177, 205 Orthodox countries, 3–5, 20–22, 28, 33, 76, Privatization of ethnicity, 179 80, 124, 126–128, 131, Proselytism, 49, 100, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 142, 143, 187, 227 118, 232 Orthodox diaspora, 3, 8, 77, 218, 220, Protestantism, 17, 29, 103, 132, 185, 193 226–229, 231, 233–235 Public authorities, 23, 104, 127 Orthodox ecclesiology, 42 Public life, 66, 71, 83, 86, 91, 127, 177, 246 Orthodox glocalisations, 22 Public morality, 28, 63, 66 Orthodox identities, 3, 8, 22, 32, 62, 175, Public order, 65, 105, 106, 109 178–185, 214 Public schools, 70, 100, 110, 116, Orthodox immigrant, 186, 194, 198, 220, 247 125, 126, 128 Orthodox jurisdictions, 195, 198, 200–204, Public space, 5, 70, 80, 83, 85, 107, 126, 128, 214, 218–220, 223–226, 129, 181, 229 230, 231 Public sphere, 7, 69, 75–94, 100, 124, 158, Orthodox migrants, 177, 182, 187 159, 164, 165, 182, 228 Orthodox parishes, 3, 51, 180, 195, 198–201, 203, 205–213, 219, 223, 225, 228, 230, 235, 247, 248 Q Orthodox person, 193 Quantitative research, 7 Orthodox political theology, 21 Orthodox settlement, 187 Orthodox spiritual culture, 90 R Orthodox symbols, 181 Rawls, J., 7, 76, 81, 82 Orthodox theology, 14, 64, 177, 180, 183, 184, Realpolitik, 161, 165 195, 235, 247 Regions, 46, 111, 114, 132, 221, 225, 230, 232 Ottoman Empire, 101, 102, 241, 244, Religiocultural heritage, 7, 147–165 250, 254 Religion-related freedoms, 109

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Religioscapes, 7, 148, 158–160, 162–165 Russian Orthodox Church in Italy, 8, 223, 230, Religiosity, 125, 129, 131, 132, 136–139, 233, 234 141–143, 174, 182, 233, 250 Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, Religious affiliation, 125, 129, 132, 135, 140, 175, 197, 201, 203 141, 143, 199 Russian State, 4, 43, 49, 51, 233, 235 Religious beliefs, 83, 84, 107, 137, 141, 205 Russkii Mir, 44, 233 Religious communities, 3, 20, 70, 76, 80–85, 91, 92, 106, 128, 154, 155, 159, 174, 175, 192, 193, 200, 229, 234 S Religious education, 94, 100, 107, 108, Sacralisation of the human person, 30 116–117, 119, 126, 128, 129, 133, 142, Second Vatican Council, 26, 30 208, 210 Secularity, 15, 17, 19, 20, 70, 76, 188 Religious freedom, 6, 29, 48, 57, 76, 99, Secularization, 2, 53, 102, 129, 175, 179–184, 124, 148, 192 192, 229, 233, 235 Religious freedom views, 125, 129–131, 133, Secular modernity, 19 136, 137, 141–143 Serbian Orthodox Dioceses, 197, 203 Religious groups, 63, 86, 101, 106, 111, 117, Sharia, 111, 114–116, 119 125, 126, 128, 132, 134, 143, 193, 198 Slavonic language, 223, 228 Religious identity, 3, 64, 140, 174–179, 181, Socio-cultural context, 125, 227, 231, 232 193, 209, 226, 231, 232, 234, 240 Soviet Union, 29, 58–60, 62 Religious liberty, 60 Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religious ‘none’, 132, 136–138 Religion, 106 Religious particularity, 4, 76 Spiritual practice, 93, 94 Religious sights, 187 State, 3, 16, 42, 58, 75, 100, 124, 148, 192, Religious symbols, 69, 70, 110, 181 219, 241 Religious truth, 24, 25 Strategies of adaptation, 8 Religious upbringing, 126, 199, 200 Switzerland, 175, 177–179, 186, 187 Re-traditionalisation, 22, 34 Synodal decisions, 103 Rights claims, 100, 118 Role of religion, 2, 6, 23, 68, 111, 116, 124, 125, 128–131, 136, 138, 139, T 141–143, 240 Taylor, C., 7, 19, 76, 83–87, 182 Roman Catholic Church, 26, 31, 70, 92, The Teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church 151, 192 on Human Dignity, Liberty and Rights, Roman Catholicism, 17, 132, 185, 242 58, 65 Romania, 7, 33, 70, 124–143, 176, 198, 222, Theological argumentation, 5 224, 225, 231 Tradition, 3, 15, 43, 68, 76, 103, 124, 150, Romanian Archdiocese, 201, 203 173, 192, 239 Romanian diaspora, 8, 228 Traditional cultures, 4, 79 Romanian Orthodox Church, 8, 16, 125, 127, Traditional morality, 65 175, 219, 224, 228, 232 Traditional values, 14, 15, 19, 25, 69 Romanian Orthodox Church in Italy, 219, 232 Transnationalism, 22 Romanian Orthodox diaspora, 218, 227, Transnational religion, 2, 235 228, 235 Transnational religious ties, 229 Rule of law, 17, 85, 150, 164 Turkey, 48, 106, 111, 153, 154, 160–163, 176 Russian Cultural and Spiritual Center Turkish-Cypriot authorities, 155, 156 in Paris, 234 Turkish-Cypriot community, 160–162 Russian Federation, 44, 46, 48, 50, 51, 54, 62, 63, 70 Russian Orthodox Church, 4–8, 15, 23, 27, U 41–54, 57–72, 77, 78, 178, 196, 197, Ukrainian Orthodox Church, 63, 197, 201, 201, 203, 219, 223–225, 227–231, 203, 223, 224 233–235 United Nations, 58, 59, 114, 119, 150

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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, W 27, 57–61, 65, 66, 68, 150 Western Christianity, 24, 31, 184 US Orthodox Christians, 195, 200 Western Europe, 3, 26, 47, 50–53, 59, USSR, 54 175–177, 186–188, 218, 224, 225, 235, 242 Westernized globalization, 4 V Western rite, 186 Violence, 61, 71, 80, 81, 89, 91, World Russian People’s Council, 44, 66, 67 110, 113, 125 Volos Academy for Theological Studies, 33, 88 Y Voluntarily associations, 205 Yannaras, C., 14, 16, 245

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Orthodox Christianity and Modern Human Rights: Theorising Their Nexus and Addressing Orthodox Specificities ���������������� 13 Vasilios N

Orthodox Christianity and Modern Human Rights: Theorising Their Nexus and Addressing Orthodox Specificities �� 13 Vasilios N