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Even If It Ain’t Broke Yet, Do Fix It Enhancing Effectiveness Through Military Change Even If It Ain’t Broke Yet, Do Fix It Enhancing Effectiveness Through Military Change Vivek Chadha INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES & ANALYSES NEW DELHI PENTAGON PRESS Even If It Ain't Broke Yet, Do Fix It: Enhancing Effectiveness Through Military Change Vivek Chadha First Published in 2016 Copyright © Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi ISBN 978-81-8274-919-1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without first obtaining written permission of the copyright owner. Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in the book are the individual assertion of the Author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, or the Government of India Published by PENTAGON PRESS 206, Peacock Lane, Shahpur Jat, New Delhi-110049 Phones: 011-64706243, 26491568 Telefax: 011-26490600 email: [email protected] website: www.pentagonpress.in In association with Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses No. 1, Development Enclave, New Delhi-110010 Phone: +91-11-26717983 Website: www.idsa.in Printed at Avantika Printers Private Limited. CONTENTS Acknowledgements ix List of Tables and Charts xi Introduction 1 1. Existing Theoretical Frameworks 11 What is Military Change? 12 Why Do Militaries Change? 16 PART I CONVENTIONAL THREATS Military Change in the Indian Army: Case of External Threats 31 2. An Assessment of Organisational Change 33 Changes Post 1962 Sino-Indian War 34 Reforms Post K.V. Krishna Rao Report 38 3. Strategic Military Change 42 Changes after the 1962 Sino-Indian War 43 Changes Post 1975 Krishna Rao Recommendations 48 Cold Start or Limited Pre-emptive Offensive 54 4. Assessment of Military Change in a Conventional Environment 62 Drivers of Military Change 62 Pathways of Military Change 68 Desirables for Successful Change 70 Long-term Strategic Assessment 70 vi Even If It Ain't Broke Yet, Do Fix It: Enhancing Effectiveness Through Military Change Support from Political Establishment 73 Visionary and Committed Military Leadership 75 Strong Institutional Structures 77 Follow-up Action 79 PART II MILITARY CHANGE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY Adaptation to Change 85 5. Change in Military Strategy 88 Frontier Warfare 88 CI Operations in the Mid-fifties and Early Sixties 90 CI Operations from Mid-sixties till the Seventies 93 Iron Fist and Velvet Glove Strategy 95 Major Increase in Force Levels 98 Change in Legal Provisions 99 LoC Obstacle System 100 Use of Local Militia 101 Use of Offensive Air Support 102 Change in Goals 102 6. Organisational Change 106 Creation of Ad Hoc Rifle Company 106 Rashtriya Rifle Battalions 108 Army Commander Special Financial Powers 109 Commando Platoon 109 7. Change in Conduct of Operations 111 Changes in Conduct of Operations 111 Training 113 Readjustment of Battalions 115 Strengthening and Buffering Vehicles 115 Use of Captured Equipment 115 Modification of SLR 116 Technology-driven Changes 116 Night-vision and Surveillance Devices 117 Creation and Deployment of Ashi Pillai 118 8. Army’s Ability to Cope with Change 119 Type of Change 120 Approach to Change and Its Manifestation 123 Drivers of Change 124 Contents vii Impact of Military Change 127 Source of Influence 127 Quality of Change 128 Speed of Implementation 130 Constraints of Military Change 131 Applicability of Military Change to Specific Regions 133 Conclusion 134 PART III ANALYSING MILITARY CHANGE 9. Contextualising Military Change 139 Relating Lessons from the Corporate World 139 Does Existing Theory Explain Military Change? 143 Drivers of Military Change 149 Who Drives Military Change? 151 Pathways to Military Change 152 Direction of Military Change 153 Scale of Change 154 Level of Change 154 Type of Change 155 10. Concluding Observations 157 Annexures 179 1. Illustration of Military Change in Counterinsurgency (CI) Operations 183 2.Region-wise Assessment of Military Change 185 Index 188 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful to Dr. Arvind Gupta, former Director General, IDSA and currently Deputy NSA, for guiding the project during its initiation and Shri Jayant Prasad, Director General, IDSA, for supporting it through its culmination. I am also thankful to Brig. Rumel Dahiya, Deputy Director General, IDSA, for his sage advice and facilitation of roundtables and fellow paper presentations, which provided valuable inputs for the project. The project benefitted immensely through the inputs by discussants, both external and internal, including Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar, Lt. Gen. Mukesh Sabharwal, Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda, Maj. Gen. Umong Sethi, Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal, Brig. Rahul Bhonsle, Gp. Capt. Naval Jagota, Gp. Capt. Ajey Lele and Col. Vijai Singh Rana. I would also like to acknowledge the support of the Military and Internal Security Centres at IDSA, for their valuable inputs, as well as the external reviewers who constructively critiqued the Fellow Paper and the final manuscript of the book diligently. I would like to acknowledge the Paper titled The Indian Army Adapting to Change: The Case of Counter-Insurgency, as part of a larger project undertaken by the Centre for Asian Security Studies at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo, that led to the publication of the book, Security, Strategy and Military Change in the 21st Century: Cross-Regional Perspectives. This Paper initiated the thought process on the subject and was developed into a section on counterinsurgency warfare in this book, duly enlarged both in context and scope. The inputs from the exceptional participants at the conference at Oslo and the support from Jo Inge Bekkevold, who guided the project, helped initiate the process. x Even If It Ain't Broke Yet, Do Fix It: Enhancing Effectiveness Through Military Change The relatively nascent subject led to hours of deliberations and arguments with my colleagues at IDSA and in particular Col. Rajeev Agarwal and Cdr. Abhijit Singh. Their inputs were very useful in helping shape the study. The tireless support of Vivek Kaushik during the publication of the book, Neha Kohli for publication of a paper related to the same subject in the Journal of Defence Studies, the library staff, forever eager and helpful, Rajan Arya, the publisher at Pentagon Press, whose positive support remains steadfast, the efficient Virender Negi who formatted the manuscript, and Nidhi Pant, a thorough editor, deserve special mention. I would like to thank the IDSA administrative staff for their continuing support through the conduct of events and publication of papers that led to this book. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their encouragement of not only this project, but also my endeavours in the field of research. Vivek Chadha List of Tables and Charts Table 1: India’s Defence Spending: 1962-1967 36 Table 2: India’s Defence Spending: 1982-1990 40 Table 3: Comparative Military Strength 52 Chart 1: Pace of Evolution of Army’s Strategy 163 Chart 2: Innovation in Army Strategy 163 Chart 3: Nature of Army’s Strategy 164 Chart 4: Characteristics of Army’s Strategy 166 Chart 5: Adequacy of PME 166 Chart 6: Encouragement of Innovation by PME 168 Chart 7: Does PME Generate New Ideas 168 Chart 8: Employment of Rote Learning in PME 169 Chart 9: Factors Affecting PME 169 Chart 10: Impact of Case Studies on PME 170 Chart 11: Access to Declassified Material in PME 170 Chart 12: Successful Adaptation at Tactical Level 172 Chart 13: Challenges to Innovation at Strategic Level 172 Chart 14: Percentage of Time Spent on Professional Development 173 Chart 15: Factors Affecting Time Availability 174 Chart 16: Challenges to Change Management 176 Chart 17: Source of Military Change 176 Chart 18: What is the Effectiveness of Organisations Affected By 178 INTRODUCTION Military change as a subject for both academics and practitioners remains a perplexing challenge. A number of attempts have been made to explain its definition, connotations, drivers, pathways, impact and conditions that facilitate its manifestation and implementation. This has not only been an obsessive concept for military analysts, but also management gurus who have made an endeavour to explain it in terms of corporate entities. Tomes have been written – arguments and counter-arguments continue to rage across published papers. However, the challenge of explaining the phenomenon remains open to interpretation and individual understanding. Thus, this Volume not only attempts to outline the definitive understanding of the subject, but also reinforces that the process is complex and tends to be influenced by a number of different factors and conditions which may be peculiar to a country or region. It is therefore unlikely to be explained through a singular framework. A large number of theoretical constructs are needed to explain it accurately in parts and under certain circumstances. Particularly, there seems to be no single, easy explanation for understanding military change with army as a basis, given its peculiar conditions of employment across the spectrum of conflict. The complexity of military change has primarily been commented upon from the perspective of conventional, or state-on-state conflicts, in the past. However, exceptions to this are highlighted through case studies presented in this Volume, which further complicate its understanding. For example, the emphasis on major shifts and innovations in the conventional domain related to external wars tends to get diluted in counterinsurgency (CI) operations, and operational factors at the tactical level tend to gain 2 Even If It Ain't Broke Yet, Do Fix It: Enhancing Effectiveness Through Military Change significance instead. In effect, change management in CI operations becomes more challenging than conventional threats for a number of reasons, which in turn impact the quality and pace of change: One, a conventional threat to a country receives undiluted and comprehensive focus from every state element including the armed forces, consequently increasing the state’s chances of overcoming the threat.