Seminar Report REDEFINING the ROLE of FIREPOWER AND
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Seminar Report REDEFINING THE ROLE OF FIREPOWER AND MANOEUVRE IN FUTURE CONFLICT SCENARIO IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT April 30, 2019 Seminar Coordinator: Colonel Anurag Bhardwaj Seminar Report by: Kanchana Ramanujam Centre for Land Warfare Studies RPSO Complex, Parade Road, Delhi Cantt, New Delhi-110010 Phone: 011-25691308; Fax: 011-25692347 email: [email protected]; website: www.claws.in The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, is an independent think tank dealing with contemporary issues of national security and conceptual aspects of land warfare, including conventional and sub-conventional conflicts and terrorism. CLAWS conducts research that is futuristic in outlook and policy-oriented in approach. CLAWS Vision: To establish as a leading Centre of Excellence, Research and Studies on Military Strategy & Doctrine, Land Warfare, Regional & National Security, Military Technology and Human Resource. © 2019, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi All rights reserved The views expressed in this report are sole responsibility of the speaker(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India, or Integrated Headquarters of MoD (Army) or Centre for Land Warfare Studies. The content may be reproduced by giving due credit to the speaker(s) and the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. Printed in India by Bloomsbury Publishing India Pvt. Ltd. DDA Complex LSC, Building No. 4, 2nd Floor Pocket 6 & 7, Sector – C Vasant Kunj, New Delhi 110070 www.bloomsbury.com CONTENTS DETAILED REPORT 1 INAUGURAL SESSION 2 Welcome Remarks 2 Talk on “Indian Army’s Operations in East Pakistan in 1971: An Epitome of Manoeuvre and Firepower in Military Warfare” by Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd) 6 Presentation of Awards to the Winners of CLAWS’ National Essay Writing Competition by the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) 9 Session I: Future Conflict Scenario: Complementarity of Manoeuvre and Firepower 11 Theme 1: Complementarity and Orchestration of Firepower and Manoeuvre in Future Conflicts 14 Theme 2: Technology-Enabled Manoeuvre Warfare—Future Perspective 16 Session II: Army Aviation, Special Forces and Non-Military Manoeuvres—War Winning Assets in Future Conflicts 19 Theme 3: Options for Economic and Diplomatic Manoeuvres— Intrinsic Part of Effect-based Operations 20 Theme 4: Victory Through the Third Dimension in Future Conflicts—Army Aviation 22 CLOSING REMARKS 25 CONCEPT NOTE 26 PROGRAMME 30 DETAILED REPORT The aspects enumerated as part of this Report are based on the deliberations by panelists. These do not necessarily conform to the views of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) or that of the Indian Army or the Ministry of Defence, Government of India. A national seminar on “Redefining the Role of Firepower and Manoeuvre in Future Conflict Scenario in the Indian Context” was conducted on April 30, 2019 at CLAWS, Delhi Cantonment. Aim The objective of the Seminar was to analyse and deliberate on the redefined role of Firepower and Manoeuvre, including the role of Army Aviation, Special Forces (SF), and non-military manoeuvres in all future conflicts in the Indian subcontinent. Modalities of Conduct The one-day Seminar was conducted at CLAWS, Delhi Cantonment on April 30, 2019. The participants were from the Armed Forces, strategic community, veterans, and academia. Nominated Army Officers from field formations also participated in the Seminar. Chairperson Session I Lieutenant General AK Singh, PVSM, Distinguished AVSM, SM, VSM (Retd) Fellow, CLAWS Session II Lieutenant General Vinod Bhatia, PVSM, Director, AVSM, SM (Retd) CENJOWS Speakers • Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd) • Lieutenant General PS Rajeshwar AVSM, SM, CISC • Lieutenant General AK Singh, PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM (Retd) • Lieutenant General Vinod Vashisht, AVSM, VSM** (Retd) 2 REDEFINING THE ROLE OF FIREPOWER AND MANOEUVRE • Lieutenant General AB Shivane, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd) • Lieutenant General Vinod Bhatia, PVSM, AVSM, SM (Retd) • Dr. G Balachandran, Consultant IDSA • Lieutenant General BS Pawar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) INAUGURAL SESSION Welcome Remarks by Director, CLAWS, Lieutenant General (Dr.) VK Ahluwalia, PVSM, AVSM**, YSM, VSM (Retd) While delivering the welcome address, the Director focused on the centrality of attrition warfare in the context of the Indian Army; hence, the utmost need to integrate manoeuvre and firepower with India’s strategic thought process. Elaborating on the Battle of Lieutenant General (Dr.) VK Ahluwalia (Retd) delivering the Welcome Remarks DETAILED REPOrt 3 Transoxiana by Genghis Khan in 1219, the Director highlighted the use of Manoeuvre Warfare and manoeuvre in particular. Drawing an analogy between Newton’s Second Law of Motion and Genghis Khan’s manoeuvre, he elucidated how “mass” and “acceleration” could be redefined in the context of Genghis Khan’s campaigns. The technique employed by Genghis Khan was pre-emption based on speed which surprised and shocked the enemy, followed by disruption and dislocation. In Manoeuvre Warfare, if one can achieve these five, one can go with much lesser force and yet be assured of success. Giving the examples of the 1815 Battle of Waterloo, the Franco- Prussian War of 1870, the North African Campaign of 1940, the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, he established how manoeuvre, Manoeuvre Warfare, and firepower are essential components of a war-winning combination. In particular, a mention was made of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel who was feared by the commanders—be it Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, Field- Marshal Archibald Wavell or Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and the troops alike because of his ability to move at a great speed and achieve surprise by appearing out of nowhere. Citing the example of the 1999 Kargil War, he mentioned how firepower played a decisive role in India’s victory. The Director concluded by quoting the example of the then General Officer Commanding, 57 Mountain Division, Major General Gill’s timely decision to move troops by air from Manipur to Mizoram to deal with the rebels. Reiterating that manoeuvre was not limited to cavalrymen, the Director underscored how this was an example of manoeuvre achieved by the infantry in coordination with the third dimension and indeed, Operation Golden Bird, launched in March-April 2005, achieved excellent results. Keynote Address by Lieutenant General PS Rajeshwar AVSM, SM, CISC Lieutenant General PS Rajeshwar elaborated on how the Iraqis faced problems of manoeuvre and mobility that led to them losing 4 REDEFINING THE ROLE OF FIREPOWER AND MANOEUVRE thousands of lives to artillery (when they were close) and air-power (when they tried to retreat) during the Gulf War in 2003. Talking about the restructuring reforms being undertaken, the speaker mentioned that the Indian Army will soon have certain divisions with the ability to fight a structured defensive battle as well. Moreover, the number of newly acquired weapon systems will give India both firepower and the ability to manoeuvre in different terrains. These include the Ultra Light Howitzer (ULH), the K9 Vajra, Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS), etc. In addition to manoeuvre and firepower, the two things that need attention are the battle-concepts and the technologies that enable it. We need to closely watch how the adversary fights; hybrid warfare is something the adversary will resort to. Lessons from Russia The speaker also reflected on some of the lessons which the Russians learnt from their experience in Ukraine and Syria. Some of these are discussed as follows: Lieutenant General PS Rajeshwar delivering the Keynote Address DETAILED REPOrt 5 • Reliance on Armour. Earlier, the Russians relied on aerospace forces but they realised that armour enables one to get closer to the enemy and neutralise him. • Precision Weapons. They realised the need for further improving targeting measures to facilitate the role of artillery and conventional forces. The key to precision is the Globalnaya Navigazionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS) and the persistent Unmanned Aerial Weapons (UAVs). • High-Technology Assets. These are not just the prerequisites for modern warfare but also force-enablers and force-multipliers. • Combined Arms Operations. Elucidating on how the Russians have adapted differently from the Americans, the speaker mentioned that Russians defined the battlespace in terms of concentric rings, where they have a set of bombers at, say, 4,000 km, fighter aircrafts at 500 km. At less than 500 km, there are tactical and operational forces and gun systems. For precision and “fire-for-effect”, the Russians use the GLONASS system. They are focusing on UAVs, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Information Warfare (IW) including psychological operations (Psy Ops), command and control through the National Defence Management Centre. Their SFs have a dedicated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) structure. Challenges for India • Should India’s focus be on manoeuvre or should it concentrate on attrition? • Will we rely more on lighter ammunition or precision ammunition? What should their percentage be? • Battlefield transparency, ISR, the space element, Psy Ops, elements of hybrid war, etc., are the areas to be worked on. • Command and control will be the biggest challenge. It should be clearly defined for the proper execution of operational order/ operational directive. 6 REDEFINING THE ROLE OF FIREPOWER AND MANOEUVRE Indian Army’s Operations in East Pakistan in 1971: