Seminar Report

REDEFINING THE ROLE OF FIREPOWER AND MANOEUVRE IN FUTURE CONFLICT SCENARIO IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT

April 30, 2019 Seminar Coordinator: Colonel Anurag Bhardwaj Seminar Report by: Kanchana Ramanujam

Centre for Land Warfare Studies RPSO Complex, Parade Road, Delhi Cantt, New Delhi-110010 Phone: 011-25691308; Fax: 011-25692347 email: [email protected]; website: www.claws.in

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, is an independent think tank dealing with contemporary issues of national security and conceptual aspects of land warfare, including conventional and sub-conventional conflicts and terrorism. CLAWS conducts research that is futuristic in outlook and policy-oriented in approach.

CLAWS Vision: To establish as a leading Centre of Excellence, Research and Studies on Military Strategy & Doctrine, Land Warfare, Regional & National Security, Military Technology and Human Resource.

© 2019, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi

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The views expressed in this report are sole responsibility of the speaker(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India, or Integrated Headquarters of MoD (Army) or Centre for Land Warfare Studies.

The content may be reproduced by giving due credit to the speaker(s) and the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

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DETAILED REPORT 1

INAUGURAL SESSION 2

Welcome Remarks 2

Talk on “’s Operations in East Pakistan in 1971: An Epitome of Manoeuvre and Firepower in Military Warfare” by Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd) 6

Presentation of Awards to the Winners of CLAWS’ National Essay Writing Competition by the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) 9

Session I: Future Conflict Scenario: Complementarity of Manoeuvre and Firepower 11

Theme 1: Complementarity and Orchestration of Firepower and Manoeuvre in Future Conflicts 14

Theme 2: Technology-Enabled Manoeuvre Warfare—Future Perspective 16

Session II: Army Aviation, Special Forces and Non-Military Manoeuvres—War Winning Assets in Future Conflicts 19

Theme 3: Options for Economic and Diplomatic Manoeuvres— Intrinsic Part of Effect-based Operations 20

Theme 4: Victory Through the Third Dimension in Future Conflicts—Army Aviation 22

CLOSING REMARKS 25

CONCEPT NOTE 26

PROGRAMME 30

DETAILED REPORT

The aspects enumerated as part of this Report are based on the deliberations by panelists. These do not necessarily conform to the views of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) or that of the Indian Army or the Ministry of Defence, Government of India. A national seminar on “Redefining the Role of Firepower and Manoeuvre in Future Conflict Scenario in the Indian Context” was conducted on April 30, 2019 at CLAWS, Delhi Cantonment.

Aim The objective of the Seminar was to analyse and deliberate on the redefined role of Firepower and Manoeuvre, including the role of Army Aviation, Special Forces (SF), and non-military manoeuvres in all future conflicts in the Indian subcontinent.

Modalities of Conduct The one-day Seminar was conducted at CLAWS, Delhi Cantonment on April 30, 2019. The participants were from the Armed Forces, strategic community, veterans, and academia. Nominated Army Officers from field formations also participated in the Seminar.

Chairperson

Session I Lieutenant General AK Singh, PVSM, Distinguished AVSM, SM, VSM (Retd) Fellow, CLAWS Session II Lieutenant General Vinod Bhatia, PVSM, Director, AVSM, SM (Retd) CENJOWS Speakers • Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd) • Lieutenant General PS Rajeshwar AVSM, SM, CISC • Lieutenant General AK Singh, PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM (Retd) • Lieutenant General Vinod Vashisht, AVSM, VSM** (Retd) 2 Redefining The Role of Firepower and Manoeuvre

• Lieutenant General AB Shivane, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd) • Lieutenant General Vinod Bhatia, PVSM, AVSM, SM (Retd) • Dr. G Balachandran, Consultant IDSA • Lieutenant General BS Pawar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

INAUGURAL SESSION

Welcome Remarks by Director, CLAWS, Lieutenant General (Dr.) VK Ahluwalia, PVSM, AVSM**, YSM, VSM (Retd) While delivering the welcome address, the Director focused on the centrality of attrition warfare in the context of the Indian Army; hence, the utmost need to integrate manoeuvre and firepower with India’s strategic thought process. Elaborating on the Battle of

Lieutenant General (Dr.) VK Ahluwalia (Retd) delivering the Welcome Remarks Detailed Report 3

Transoxiana by Genghis Khan in 1219, the Director highlighted the use of Manoeuvre Warfare and manoeuvre in particular. Drawing an analogy between Newton’s Second Law of Motion and Genghis Khan’s manoeuvre, he elucidated how “mass” and “acceleration” could be redefined in the context of Genghis Khan’s campaigns. The technique employed by Genghis Khan was pre-emption based on speed which surprised and shocked the enemy, followed by disruption and dislocation. In Manoeuvre Warfare, if one can achieve these five, one can go with much lesser force and yet be assured of success. Giving the examples of the 1815 Battle of Waterloo, the Franco- Prussian War of 1870, the North African Campaign of 1940, the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, he established how manoeuvre, Manoeuvre Warfare, and firepower are essential components of a war-winning combination. In particular, a mention was made of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel who was feared by the commanders—be it Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, Field- Marshal Archibald Wavell or Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and the troops alike because of his ability to move at a great speed and achieve surprise by appearing out of nowhere. Citing the example of the 1999 , he mentioned how firepower played a decisive role in India’s victory. The Director concluded by quoting the example of the then General Officer Commanding, 57 Mountain Division, Major General Gill’s timely decision to move troops by air from Manipur to Mizoram to deal with the rebels. Reiterating that manoeuvre was not limited to cavalrymen, the Director underscored how this was an example of manoeuvre achieved by the in coordination with the third dimension and indeed, Operation Golden Bird, launched in March-April 2005, achieved excellent results.

Keynote Address by Lieutenant General PS Rajeshwar AVSM, SM, CISC Lieutenant General PS Rajeshwar elaborated on how the Iraqis faced problems of manoeuvre and mobility that led to them losing 4 Redefining The Role of Firepower and Manoeuvre thousands of lives to artillery (when they were close) and air-power (when they tried to retreat) during the Gulf War in 2003. Talking about the restructuring reforms being undertaken, the speaker mentioned that the Indian Army will soon have certain divisions with the ability to fight a structured defensive battle as well. Moreover, the number of newly acquired weapon systems will give India both firepower and the ability to manoeuvre in different terrains. These include the Ultra Light Howitzer (ULH), the K9 Vajra, Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS), etc. In addition to manoeuvre and firepower, the two things that need attention are the battle-concepts and the technologies that enable it. We need to closely watch how the adversary fights; hybrid warfare is something the adversary will resort to.

Lessons from Russia The speaker also reflected on some of the lessons which the Russians learnt from their experience in Ukraine and Syria. Some of these are discussed as follows:

Lieutenant General PS Rajeshwar delivering the Keynote Address Detailed Report 5

• Reliance on Armour. Earlier, the Russians relied on aerospace forces but they realised that armour enables one to get closer to the enemy and neutralise him. • Precision Weapons. They realised the need for further improving targeting measures to facilitate the role of artillery and conventional forces. The key to precision is the Globalnaya Navigazionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS) and the persistent Unmanned Aerial Weapons (UAVs). • High-Technology Assets. These are not just the prerequisites for modern warfare but also force-enablers and force-multipliers. • Combined Arms Operations. Elucidating on how the Russians have adapted differently from the Americans, the speaker mentioned that Russians defined the battlespace in terms of concentric rings, where they have a set of bombers at, say, 4,000 km, fighter aircrafts at 500 km. At less than 500 km, there are tactical and operational forces and gun systems. For precision and “fire-for-effect”, the Russians use the GLONASS system. They are focusing on UAVs, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Information Warfare (IW) including psychological operations (Psy Ops), command and control through the National Defence Management Centre. Their SFs have a dedicated Intelligence, Surveillance, and (ISR) structure.

Challenges for India

• Should India’s focus be on manoeuvre or should it concentrate on attrition? • Will we rely more on lighter ammunition or precision ammunition? What should their percentage be? • Battlefield transparency, ISR, the space element, Psy Ops, elements of hybrid war, etc., are the areas to be worked on. • Command and control will be the biggest challenge. It should be clearly defined for the proper execution of operational order/ operational directive. 6 Redefining The Role of Firepower and Manoeuvre

Indian Army’s Operations in East Pakistan in 1971: An Epitome of Manoeuvre and Firepower in Military Warfare by Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar (Retd) delivering a talk on “Indian Army’s Operations in East Pakistan in 1971: An Epitome of Manoeuvre and Firepower in Military Warfare” Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, a 1971 war veteran, gave a firsthand account of the War. Calling the 1971 operations a “real military victory”; the speaker narrated his personal experience of the operations. Elaborating on the wide-flanking move to capture the Jamalpur Garrison, the speaker mentioned that this Operation was especially dear to him as he had submitted a similar solution which entailed moving a on footwell behind the enemy position to cut him off and compelling him to surrender or forcing him to attack the speaker’s position or in the last resort, attacking the enemy from the rear. This idea was not accepted then, but the same idea was implemented for the capture of the Jamalpur Garrison. The Jangi Paltan of the achieved its first battle honour after World War II for the capture of the Jamalpur Garrison. The units and formations exercised the option of manoeuvring wherever possible, by the following means: Detailed Report 7

• By foot. • By country boats and bullock-carts. • Use of helicopters (as in the case of the Fourth Corps). • Para-dropping.

Giving details of various raids, the speaker mentioned how the Indian Army went along with mortar, machine gun, and ammunition on bullock-carts and crossed the river on country boats. In view of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) air superiority and Indian Army’s artillery support, the Garrison Commander of Jamalpur was given a note asking to surrender. He returned the note with a message saying that he was looking forward to the fight. This was a miscalculation on his part as the entire Garrison was decimated in the 4 hours 30 minutes firefight that ensued from midnight to 04:30h. The Pakistanis surrendered and the Indian Army commandeered the vehicles at the Garrison and used them for further mobilisation. Elucidating on how this operation was an excellent example of manoeuvre, deception, exploitation of surprise, and outstanding steadfastness under fire, the speaker mentioned how the Pakistani Army tried to break out as the hierarchy in Dhaka had become aware of the Indian Army’s presence in their rear at Jamalpur and the Indian plan of para-drop. The Pakistanis were misinformed that it would be a para-drop rather than a battalion para-drop

1971: Outstanding Operations by India The 1971 operations by the Indian Army are a subject of study all around the world. The most important aspects were the preparation that went into the conduct of operations including training and equipping of Mukti Bahini, co-opting the regular units and sub-units that disassociated themselves from the Pakistani Army. Recounting an instance when an entire Pakistani heavy mortar battery was decimated, the speaker mentioned that, India subjected Pakistan to significant attrition prior to the conduct of operations in October- November. On the nights of December 16/17, 1971 in Dhaka, the Indian troops were outnumbered by their Pakistani counterparts by over ten times. The weapons and equipments that the Indian Army 8 Redefining The Role of Firepower and Manoeuvre had at that time were only marginally better than what it had in 1962. It was the professionalism, commitment, sincerity of the troops and formations, tactical manoeuvres, and the highest standards of senior and junior leadership of the Indian Army that was central to the success of the operations.

Superlative Role of the Bangladeshis

The role of the East Bengal Rifles Regiment, Mukti Bahini and the local population were as important a determinant of the success of the operations as the gallant actions by the Indian Army. The unconditional surrender of Pakistani garrisons including Dhaka had much to do with the justifiable fear that the Pakistanis had that they would have been butchered by the locals had they not taken the protection of the Indian Army. A special mention of Abdul Kader Siddique, also known as the “Tiger of Tangail”, was also made.

Manoeuvres in Future

Manoeuvres in the future will be more simultaneous than sequential and over larger spaces. Therefore, the stress will be on faster, lighter, and more lethal forces that require relatively small logistics. The available technology must be used to give commanders surveillance, target acquisition, and real-time responsiveness. This will enable commanders, perhaps for the first time in history, to manoeuvre firepower rather than forces, over long ranges and execute attacks on the key assets of the adversary while keeping his/her forces relatively safe.

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Advice for Young Officers The speaker advised the young officers to be honest in the analysis of the success of their achievements. Clarifying that, contrary to what is put out in reports, 1962 was no “trauma” to the soldiers of his generation. He mentioned that despite being poorly equipped, the questionable political leadership of that time and, in some cases, questionable senior military leadership, the Indian Army gave a Detailed Report 9 bloody nose to the Chinese, barring a few aberrations. The right lessons learnt from the encounter subsequently proved beneficial at Nathu la in 1967 and Sumdorong Chu in 1987. On 1947/48 operations, the speaker asked whether the operations can be termed victory when despite pushing back raiders in Jammu and Kashmir, a significant portion of the State remains with the Pakistanis. In the Kargil War (1999), the performance of young Indian Army Officers was outstanding, yet all the Army did was recapture the occupied heights. The speaker concluded by asking the young officers to use training courses to develop tactical aspects, operational concepts, philosophies, and strategic doctrines so that no matter who the adversary is, our young soldiers get an even chance, if not a better one, than what they got during Kargil.

Presentation of Awards to the Winners of CLAWS National Essay Writing Competition by the Chief of Army Staff Explaining the genesis of the idea behind the competition, Director, CLAWS, mentioned that CLAWS as an organisation would endeavour to promote strategic culture among the youth of the country. Presenting the awards to the winners, the COAS said he expected this maiden venture by CLAWS to continue and grow. Motivating the youth, he said that national security was not the concern of just the government, but each one of us. Only when the students in colleges and schools begin to understand the relevance and importance of strategy and national security would our education be totally meaningful. The details of the prize-winners are given as follows:

Category Name Institute Prize Jawaharlal Nehru University, Divya Malhotra First Delhi Manekshaw Tata Institute of Social Mahesh Misal Second Paper Sciences, Mumbai OP Jindal Global University, Tamanna Dahiya Third Sonipat 10 Redefining The Role of Firepower and Manoeuvre

Jawaharlal Nehru University, Sachin Tiwari First Delhi Udaynarayanpur Issue Brief Saswati Banerjee Madhabilata Second Mahavidyalaya, Howrah University of Mumbai, Utkarsha Mahajan Third Mumbai

The COAS with all the winners of CLAWS National Essay Writing Competition

SESSION I

Opening Remarks by the Chairperson: Lieutenant General AK Singh, PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM (Retd) Despite all the attention, manoeuvre warfare remains a subject of much conjecture and confusion. Some call it a fancy term, others term it as common sense tactics. A lot of terms are thrown around in our operational discussions like auftragstaktik/mission-type orders, Detailed Report 11 dislocation, recce pull, schwerpunkt, etc., without understanding their significance and how they are an intrinsic part of the understanding of Manoeuvre Warfare. It should also not be confused with the tactical connotation of “Fire and Movement”, which is a restricted low-level tactics to achieve a position of advantage. Manoeuvre theory is a way of thinking about warfare, rather than a particular set of tactics/techniques and its essence is “Defeating the Adversary’s will to fight, rather than his ability to fight.” Firepower, on the other hand, is the destructive capability of force through multiple means like guns, missiles, etc., which not only degrades the enemy’s ability to fight when combined with manoeuvre but also saps enemy’s will.

Lieutenant General AK Singh (Retd) delivering the Opening Remarks of Session I Manoeuvre Warfare is not new. The defeat of the rigid Spartan phalynx, Hannibal’s defeat of the Romans at Canne (216 bc) are examples; but in recent times, the Blitzkreig of Germans in World War II, Manstein’s operational manoeuvre to trap large Soviet forces at Kharkiv, and in more recent times, the Arab-Israeli campaigns 12 Redefining The Role of Firepower and Manoeuvre and the Gulf wars, not to forget, Indian Army’s brilliant campaign in Bangladesh (1971) are recommended reading to understand Manoeuver Warfare.

Auftragstaktik/Mission Type Orders Talking about the insecurities resulting from the “Fog of War”, the speaker mentioned that Manoeuvre Warfare involves not only accepting confusion and disorder, and operating successfully within it through decentralisation, but also generating confusion and disorder. The “Recce Pull” tactics of the German Blitzkreig in 1940 were inherently disorderly. Higher Head Quarters could neither direct nor predict the exact path of the advance. Mission type orders are key to the decentralisation necessary for a rapid Observe, Orient, Decide and Action (OODA) cycle. A mission type order focuses on what is to be achieved and not how-which is left to the subordinate. As the situation changes, the subordinate commander does what he thinks is necessary for mission accomplishment. He informs his chain of command but doesn’t wait for permission to act. It cannot be done during a war unless adopted and practiced as a philosophy during peace. It requires operational commanders to have broad shoulders and the capacity to take mistakes in their stride. War history bears testimony that mission type orders in an environment conducive to Manoeuvre Warfare have rarely failed.

Schwerpunkt or Point of Main Impact Schwerpunkt is not just the main attack—it is more a conceptual focus, not just a physical one. When a force is designated, the focus of effort, all other units/formations support it. Schwerpunkt can also be understood as the harmonising element that pulls together the efforts of all subordinates and guides them towards the goal, towards achieving the mission of the Senior Commander.

Operational Art There is a very close relationship between Manoeuvre Warfare and Operational Art. This is not to be confused with the operational Detailed Report 13 level of warfare which is the synergising level between strategy and tactics. Operational Art is a concept of war fighting which optimises firepower and manoeuvre to obtain optimum results. There is a symbiotic relationship between the two, each furthering the effect of the other. Firepower, apart from its destructive effect can also be used as a means to enhance manoeuvre, by blocking/channelising the enemy to the chosen critical space for destruction/surrender.

Nuances of Manoeuvre in the Twenty-first Century Manoeuvre Warfare as a concept and methodology for optimum application of force remains valid in the twenty-first century, not only for traditional conventional conflict but also for the twenty-first century avatar of Hybrid Warfare. To tie down the understanding of manoeuvre to just a positional advantage is unfair to its potential and application. If the ultimate aim is to defeat the enemy psychologically to sap his will to resist, then manoeuvre needs to encompass the full range of capabilities/assets available, which influences the battlespace. This would include direct influencers like third dimension capabilities, unarmed/armed UAVs, EW, etc. Equally relevant would be the indirect influencers like space, cyber warfare, and social media in all its dimensions, non-government organisations, and even inter- government organisations that have and can influence the battlespace. Increasingly the term “Multi Domain Battle” is being used to describe the earlier-mentioned diverse influencers on the twenty-first-century battlespace. Targeting the minds of a select audience, both domestically, as also internationally has become an important instrument in tackling Hybrid Warfare. The exchanges between India and Pakistan, post the Balakot strikes is a good case study. Post-conflict consolidation will also require a very imaginative use of all capabilities and elements, to avoid being bogged down, this may also be considered a part of the overall Manoeuvre Warfare concept in the twenty-first century. Operational experience in tackling hybrid warfare, post-cold war, has highlighted that success is dependent not only on the direct application of firepower and manoeuvre, but also on the synergised application of all diverse assets, not only against an identified 14 Redefining The Role of Firepower and Manoeuvre adversary, but also the environment as a whole. Thus, it can be seen that in the twenty-first century, we have to look at an expanded definition of manoeuvre, even beyond the confines of the direct tactical and operational effects. In conclusion, it would be best to remember what could be achieved through the synergy of firepower and manoeuvre: • Disrupt the well-planned battlefield orchestration of the adversary. • Create doubts/confusion in the enemy’s mind. • Allowing us to occupy the critical space and threaten the enemy’s centre of gravity. • And finally, facilitate the synergy between the shaping and destructive forces to dislocate the enemy and sap his will to resist.

“Complementarity and Orchestration of Firepower and Manoeuvre in Future Conflicts” by Lieutenant General Vinod Vashisht, AVSM, VSM** (Retd) Lieutenant General Vinod Vashisht commenced by mentioning that we may have modernised, but not transformed. Breaking the cohesion and destruction of forces will remain the prime objective of war, whatever level it is prosecuted, and the role of the Navy and the Air Force will remain unchanged and immense. The speaker underscored that firepower by ground forces in the near future will not be adequate by itself to shape the battlespace, and firepower and manoeuvre complementarity are impractical unless the platform of Air Force is factored in. Weapon-systems like the BrahMos which cause a devastating effect are dependent on accurate coordinate-feeding and there is an absolute void of precision inventory in the Army. Two very important aspects that have to be borne in mind while talking about capability and command-and- control system are as follows: • Sensor-shooting integration. • Targeting as the prime deliver-enabler for efficacy. Detailed Report 15

Elaborating on first salvo effectiveness, the speaker mentioned that at a range of 30 km, no gunner is sure that he will be able to shoot without collateral damage. Longer ranges alone do not serve the purpose. The speaker mentioned how manoeuvre warfare was aggressive planning and involved integrating the shaping force, the supporting force, and the destructive force. Firepower has to be integral in all these three.

Lieutenant General Vinod Vashist delivering a talk on “Complementarity and Orchestration of Firepower and Manoeuvre in Future Conflicts” The speaker concluded with the following recommendations: • The peace-time Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and targeting need to be strengthened. Every IPB preparation must have a decision-support matrix. • Army-Air Force jointness requires a lot to be achieved. The Air Force’s Search and Rescue (SAR) capabilities are not shared and integrated into the Army’s requirements. Even the Air Force Net is not connected to the Army. • There is a variation of unspecified extent in the grid of any location taken from the satellite imagery and the Global 16 Redefining The Role of Firepower and Manoeuvre

Positioning System (GPS). Without accuracy, delivery will not have the desired effect. • Network mapping is glossed over and taken for granted in the formations. Network management needs to be synchronised and real-time. • Satellite service is an important issue. This capability is a fiction and much below the power that we need to have. All imageries of actual war conditions have distortions of some magnitude or the other. Satellite surveillance needs to look at these issues. • Defence Image Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC) should be upgraded or there should be more than one agency, and more importantly, for every theatre there should be as near real-time downloads as available. Surveillance is inadequate and penetration is non-existing. • The force-multipliers of the enemy need the same amount of attention in terms of our contact surveillance means. • The autonomy of movement is presently restricted. Grouping of resources is left to gunners which do not happen. • There is a need for precision inventory and armed UAVs. After Krasnopol, no new ammunition has been added to the inventory. • Combat survival for men merits a definite upgrade. Combat survival an essential to artillery is an extreme criticality.

“Technology-Enabled Manoeuvre Warfare: Future Perspective” by Lieutenant General AB Shivane, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd) Lieutenant General AB Shivane mentioned that the proliferation of precision and firepower and its distribution must translate from the operational to the tactical level, i.e. from precision application to adaptive application to a holistic application in conjunction with manoeuvre forces. Stressing on the need for integration, he mentioned that the Integrated Battle Groups must be equipped as one force and have complementarity in mobility, arming, and logistics. Detailed Report 17

Lieutenant General AB Shivane (Retd) delivering a talk on “Technology-Enabled Manoeuvre Warfare: Future Perspective”

Only then it would become a combined-arms force translating from manoeuvre to decisive manoeuvre. Technology should be integrated to enable the tempo of operations. There is also a need to go from a 2-D to a 3-D manoeuvre. Manoeuvre Warfare must also result in dislocation. Speaking on firepower and manoeuvre, the speaker made the following points: • The requirement to win future wars quickly and decisively would necessitate adaptive precision fires and decisive manoeuvres. • Precision engagement is only one of the five factors of combat power that contribute to success; the others being: manoeuvre, firepower, leadership, protection, and information. • While manoeuvre and firepower are critical, what is more important today is the informed and connected commander and that is the key in the aspect of manoeuvre warfare. • Urbanisation is a reality and not a limitation in Manoeuvre War. Means such as 3-D manoeuvre should be found. Integration and mindsets are the key limitations, not the terrain. 18 Redefining The Role of Firepower and Manoeuvre

Talking about the need for targeting the will of the enemy through superior leadership and training and technology-enabled manoeuvre, the speaker mentioned that there are two areas at which force should be directed. These are the capability of the enemy and his will to fight. Underscoring the need for a technology-enabled light tank, the speaker mentioned that India has benefited immensely from light tanks—be it Chushul, Kohima, Zoji La or Bangladesh. The speaker believed that contradictory signals are sent when we talk about splitting and disintegrations as part of the restructuring of Director General, Mechanised Forces Directorate by integrating at the base and disintegrating at the top. This contradiction needs to be set right. Long-range lethal fires have resulted in dispersion and expansion of the battlespace. This means that the enemy is decentralised with no geographical centre, while manoeuvre is a system based on concentrating the force on targets. Manoeuvre in future wars will be based on multiple manoeuvres by IBGs or sovereign manoeuvres which are complementary. The days of traditional muscle manoeuvre are gone. Talking about ISR integrated technology, the speaker mentioned about four levels of battlefield awareness—reality level, computer information which has been generated and kept, staff view, and mental view given to the commander. The speaker mentioned that manoeuvre will be empowered by information dominance and battlefield transparency and would also be a function of the Commander’s capabilities and intuitive decision-making. The speaker concluded with the way forward as given next:

• Increase the tempo and velocity of combined-Arms Forces. • Manoeuvre land forces by battle groups integrated with all aspects (manning, arming, training, logistics, etc.). • Manoeuvre in 3-D at operational and tactical levels. • Establish an unblinking eye over the battlefield. • Supplement manned with unmanned reconnaissance. • Structure, equipment, train, and manoeuvre as a combined arms group at the lowest tactical level. Detailed Report 19

• Establish a band of brothers’ approach. • Move beyond jointness to true interdependence of services.

SESSION II

Opening Remarks by the Chairperson, Lieutenant General Vinod Bhatia, PVSM, AVSM, SM (Retd)

Underscoring the point that India’s strength at the tactical level should not be eroded, the speaker mentioned that good strategy with bad tactics may lead to defeat, but good tactics, even with poor strategy, could win a lot of wars. Recounting the wars fought by India, the speaker remarked that the Indian Army was mostly a mountain army. While talking of Manoeuvre Warfare, the focus is generally on mechanised warfare, but the mountains give the best terrain for manoeuvre—incursion, infiltration, breaking the adversary’s OODA loop, etc. One can cause disruption and decision dilemmas by fighting the adversary on one’s choice of ground and time. The speaker mentioned that even though India’s focus along the northern borders is on war prevention rather than war-waging, it

Lieutenant General Vinod Bhatia (Retd) delivering the Opening Remarks for Session II 20 Redefining The Role of Firepower and Manoeuvre should look at manoeuvre, as it has the assets for it in the form of SF, air-power, and the Special Frontier Force. During war-gaming, it has been noticed that there is more and more demand for SF as they are cost-effective, game-changers and can contribute to the operational plans. They can work from the strategic to the tactical levels and are trained, equipped, and mandated to insert and manoeuvre. Manoeuvre is in the mind and can be achieved by multiple means. During the 1971 operations, despite the numerical superiority, the Pakistanis could not manoeuvre. Manoeuvre is not limited to the mechanised forces but can be achieved by the infantry and the artillery too. Talking about how Hybrid Warfare has been practised all along, the speaker mentioned that Hybrid Warfare manoeuvres come with a possibility of peacetime intervention. Elaborating on how the change in Manoeuvre Warfare was brought about by David Sterling, the speaker mentioned that the adversary’s decision-making can be targeted by inducing fear psychosis. The speaker remarked that each infantry battalion had a Ghatak and it was perhaps time to get the Ghatak to do special operations at the tactical level. The speaker concluded by stressing on the need for integrating technology into war-fighting. He opined that while we talk of geo- strategy, geo-economics, etc., it is time to talk about geo-technology and its impact on nation-building.

Options for Economic and Diplomatic Manoeuvres: Intrinsic Part of Effect-Based Operations by Dr. G Balachandran Highlighting the need for non-military manoeuvres, the speaker mentioned that the following points should be kept in mind while targeting the adversary:

• The move should be within the confines of international law. • It should be within India’s capabilities. • India should factor in the adversary’s capabilities. Elaborating on a few moves vis-à-vis Pakistan, the speaker made the following compelling points: • Withdrawing the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status will not hurt Pakistan’s economy significantly. Detailed Report 21

Dr. G Balachandran delivering a talk on “Options for Economic and Diplomatic Manoeuvres: Intrinsic Part of Effect-Based Operations”

• Stopping excess water flow into Pakistan’s territory will not help either. • Focusing too much on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is futile as the decisions there are taken by consensus and not by majority. China is a member of the plenary. • India should do unto Pakistan what it cannot do unto India.

Vulnerability of Pakistan Elaborating on the state of the economy of Pakistan, the speaker mentioned how Pakistan was in a debt-trap and how its net reserves were down. The only way to manage the situation is through earning of foreign exchange and service exports. This is the vulnerability of Pakistan that must be exploited.

The Need for Multi-lateral Action Against Pakistan The speaker elucidated that unilateral actions against Pakistan will not help much. Quoting the example of the United States’ (US’) sanctions, the speaker mentioned that it is the secondary sanctions that have more effect and India, at the moment, lacked the desired 22 Redefining The Role of Firepower and Manoeuvre capacity to enforce it. Underscoring the need to build uncertainty into India’s moves, the speaker mentioned the following areas that can be exploited by India: • Generalised System of Preferences. Giving statistics of Pakistan’s exports to the US under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), the speaker mentioned that according to the US law, granting of GSP is the President’s discretion and he/she may choose not to grant the same. This would require some diplomatic manoeuvring on India’s part. The European Union (EU) is the second biggest importer of Pakistani goods and about 80 to 85 percent of Pakistani exports come under GSP. While the EU does not have laws similar to the US in denial of GSP to sponsors of terrorism, it maintains a separate list of countries that support terrorists. Pakistan was added to that list last year. India should use its close relations with the EU and the strong civil society to get the GSP privileges to Pakistan withdrawn. • Countries of Concern. The US maintains a list of Countries of Concern (CoC) and has a law stating that any citizen of a country who visits a country listed under CoC will not get a visa waiver. Given that almost all European countries enjoy the visa-waiver programme and that Pakistan is looking to promote tourism if India could get Pakistan listed in CoC, perhaps the Europeans might think twice before visiting Pakistan. The speaker concluded by mentioning that India’s strength lay in the non-military area and underscored the need for experts on adversarial countries’ economy and industrial strength.

Victory Through Third Dimension in Future Conflicts: Army Aviation by Lieutenant General BS Pawar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) Adding to what the previous speaker mentioned about manoeuvre in the mountains, Lieutenant General BS Pawar said that it was the Army Aviation Corps (AAC) that provided the element of manoeuvre, other than infiltration, in mountainous terrain. All major armies have a full-fledged AAC and this Corps is built on helicopters. The modern helicopters have all capabilities that one can look for in manoeuvre Detailed Report 23

Lieutenant General BS Pawar (Retd) delivering a talk on “Victory Through Third Dimension in Future Conflicts: Army Aviation” and firepower, and their vulnerabilities have also decreased. Giving the example of the US experience in Iraq, the speaker mentioned that attack helicopters have to be part of all-arms teams and cannot be flown in isolation. The mobility that the AAC brings in sets the tempo of war. Not only does it provide the capacity to move and support the military force, but also allows seeking out the enemy, pursuing him, and surprising him by fire and force, thus achieving the dual purpose of both physical and psychological effect. The AAC is a force-multiplier that enables the ground commanders to exploit the third dimension, thereby contributing immensely to the control and influence over the twenty-first century battlefield. It is also ideally suited for Cold Start and pre-emptive strikes. Elaborating on how mobility and firepower capabilities of helicopters can become a decisive advantage, the speaker made a case for the need for state-of-the-art helicopters capable of operating both day and night, given the operational diversity of the Indian military along with the variety of terrain. Emphasising on the need 24 Redefining The Role of Firepower and Manoeuvre for training and integration right from the beginning, the speaker talked about the lack of the desired level of integration between the Army and the Air Force, as also, the AAC and the Army’s land forces.

Role in Sub-Conventional Operations Stating that India does not use attack helicopters during sub- conventional operations, the speaker mentioned that some Western countries use them while operating in other countries, while Pakistan uses not just attack helicopters, but also fighter aircrafts in sub- conventional conflicts. The speaker highlighted that whether there is a case to use helicopters—armed or attack—in remote areas will need detailed deliberations.

Close-Air Support

The speaker mentioned that there could be a case for the Army not be too dependent in the tactical battle area on the Air Force and use its own firepower. Elaborating on manned-unmanned teaming, the speaker also made a mention of the Black Hawk helicopter that can fly manned and unmanned. India presently lacks this capability. Another helicopter, K-Max, has armour protection and can fly in adverse weather.

Airspace Management There is no permanent organisation that exists today which will manage the airspace in a tactical battle area during the war. For less than 100 ft, the land force commander is responsible for airspace management and the arrangement comes into being once the operation starts.

Current Status The Army is saddled with two hundred 1960s vintage helicopters. These are a lifeline of soldiers in Siachen and other mountainous areas even today. The Mi-17s which form the backbone of the special operations for manoeuvre are all with the Air Force. The majority of attack helicopters continue to be with the Air Force despite Detailed Report 25 a government order that attack helicopters should form part of AAC. We have signed a contract for Ka-226, a twin-engine Russian helicopter. The speaker concluded by stating that the AAC should be fully integrated into the process of restructuring that is carried out.

Closing Remarks by Director, CLAWS, Lieutenant General (Dr.) VK Ahluwalia, PVSM, AVSM**, YSM, VSM (Retd) In his concluding remarks, the Director emphasised on the difficulties involved in flying in high altitude areas (HAA). All that notwithstanding, the aviators always found a way to operate when the need arose. He also commended the role of the Ladakh Scouts who operate with great efficiency in the high altitude terrain of the Ladakh region. Manoeuvre is mental mobility and one needs to establish where to strike, whether at the vulnerability of the enemy or the source of strength of the enemy. Mentioning how all instruments of national power can be used to manoeuvre, the Director restricted to the military realm. Manoeuvre Warfare, on the other hand, is a military strategy or part of the military strategy to defeat the enemy, destruction being a part of it. Mentioning how one should be able to create a dilemma in the mind of the adversary and delay his OODA loop, he gave the example of Rommel and how he could induce fear psychosis in his enemies by effective use of manoeuvre in the battles of Gazala and Benghazi. Underscoring the need for integration, he mentioned that there was a need to have the political will to ensure integration among the three services. Concurring with the point made on Ghatak platoons during the course of the Seminar, he mentioned that the Ghatak platoons were one of the most potent forces available to the Commander and they can take action at very short notice. Making a mention of the complexities of today’s Digital Age which involves data, information, narratives, etc., he explained how Newton’s Second Law of Motion can be applied in this context. The Director concluded by mentioning that a series of tactical successes will lead to success at the strategic level. CONCEPT NOTE

Introduction No one can rule out large conventional wars in the future, but their probability declines as they are too overt, destructive and costly, whereas Hybrid War can be a weapon of choice for those smaller countries that face a much more powerful enemy, which cannot be defeated in a conventional war. Considering the geo-political- strategic environment in Asia in general and Indian subcontinent in particular, the flash point remains the fragile Indo-Pak relationship. Furthermore, the nature and character of future conflicts are being influenced by new concepts and technologies. Meanwhile, the revolution in military affairs in the field of advanced weapon systems and technology in the last two decades has changed the way future conflicts will be contested. The most significant developments for land warfare are simultaneity and non-linearity, lethality and dispersion, volume and precision of fire, advance technology, mass and effects, and invisibility and detectability. The elements of meeting these tenets are Firepower and Manoeuvre. While Manoeuvre Warfare accepts (and even encourages) risk-taking, with Firepower, risk elimination is a higher virtue. In addition, the world over the modern armies is employing the concept of “Land-Air operations” leading to exponential gains in the battlefield. Similarly, the Indian Army Aviation is taking big leaps in modernisation and in future, is likely to occupy its much-awaited space in the battlefield in both conventional and sub-conventional conflicts.

Indian Subcontinent Security Paradigm In the Indian subcontinent, the regional stability revolves around India and Pakistan. Due to unsettled borders and territorial disputes with Pakistan and China, the probability of a conventional conflict with hybrid content remains high. The inter-state relations in the subcontinent are characterised by the existence of the number of bilateral disputes. Moreover, nowhere in the world, the two powers Concept Note 27 have a flashpoint (of Kashmir) that is the cause of disagreement between the two nuclear states. The continued proxy war cum cross- border terrorism from Pakistan has all the ingredients to spill over to a larger area/region of conflict. The Indian Army has to contend with two adversaries in three distinct terrains which divide the capability on a functional basis, besides the strategies of the two adversaries differ vastly adding to the complexity of devising means to the ends.

Role of Firepower and Manoeuvre in Future Conflicts With the induction of Agni missile, BrahMos, Smerch and Pinaka missile system, ULH, smart munition, recently inducted gun systems and state of art Heron UAV in the Regiment of Artillery, the concepts like shaping the battlefield, non-linearity of battlefield, effect-based operations, etc., which did not have effective weapon system to achieve the desired result till a few years back, has now got the potency and wherewithal to deliver. In addition, the revolutionary Drone swarm technology—the ability of drones to autonomously make decisions based on shared information, has the potential to revolutionise the dynamics of future conflicts. The Manoeuvre theory, on the other hand, is a way of thinking about warfare rather than a particular set of tactics or techniques. Manoeuvre is applicable at all stages of warfare. Strategic manoeuvre incorporates the coordinated application of all elements of national power in support of national strategic objectives. Operational manoeuvre places forces, including their administrative support, in a favourable position relative to the enemy, and occurs within a theatre of operations. Tactical manoeuvre employs physical and non- physical means to achieve a position of relative advantage over the adversary to accomplish the assigned mission. World over, Army Aviation has been inter-woven into land battles as an intrinsic part to achieve surprise and increases the tempo of operations. It has become a vital ingredient of both firepower and manoeuvre which can influence the battle swiftly. The modernisation of Indian Army Aviation is being undertaken with a long-term perspective, wherein it graduates from the conventional role of “recce and observation” to combat. The capability development of 28 Redefining The Role of Firepower and Manoeuvre

Army Aviation primarily includes induction of Attack helicopters and state-of-art light and medium helicopters to augment combat, tactical lift, and surveillance capabilities. Enhancing capabilities to carry out Manned Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) involving Attack helicopters and drones will revolutionise the effect-based operations in all kinds of conflicts. In our operational context, the Indian Army’s likely area of operations extends over different types of terrain, which include riverine plains, deserts, and hilly and mountainous regions. The terrain with respect to our Western adversary has undergone vast changes, due to the extension of the network of canals/water bodies in areas close to the borders. Similarly, the terrain opposite Jammu and Kashmir is hilly and rises to become mountainous as it moves North, thus posing challenges for a large-scale military movement. On the Northern and Eastern borders with China, Tibet acts as a buffer territory interspersed with plateaus whereas China’s major Economic Zones and cities are located deep inside the heartland and biased towards its Eastern coast, at larger distances from border/Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Fundamental Questions The Indian Army though has been following the tenets of both Manoeuvre and Firepower in theory as well as in practice for quite some time but is yet to be fully adopted. In addition, its efficacy in sub-conventional operations is yet to be thoroughly analysed and adapted. Similarly, the employment of Army Aviation assets in “Air- Land battle” is yet to be tested during exercises in a classical sense. Hence, the following fundamental questions need to be analysed and deliberated upon: • Has advancement in firepower, both in terms of range and payload, acted as an end game for the doctrine of Manoeuvre Warfare and all the components which form the part of this doctrine? OR There is no replacing the operational and tactical battlefield that includes maneuvering and conquering territory? • Is Firepower going to play an all-important role in future conflicts, and shape the conflict zone? OR Due to limitations inherent Concept Note 29

in standoff fire capability, Firepower is generally incapable of bringing the enemy to strategic collapse? • How effective will both firepower and manoeuvre be in sub- conventional conflict scenario? • Is the restricted real estate on the Western front denies conventional manoeuvre? • How can the Indian Army interweave Firepower and Manoeuvre in the sub-conventional conflicts in the Indian context? • Is Army Aviation ready to occupy its long-awaited role of “manoeuvre arm in the third dimension”? Would it be correct to say that Army Aviation, despite limitations of delayed procurement, has arrived as an effective force multiplier?

Objective Following was the primary objective of this Seminar: • To analyse and deliberate on the redefined role of Firepower and Manoeuvre including the role of Army Aviation, SF, and non-military manoeuvres in all future conflicts in the Indian subcontinent.

Programme The proposed programme and session details are attached separately.

Participants The participants will be from the Indian Army, strategic community, and veterans.

Venue CLAWS, Delhi Cantonment, New Delhi

Seminar Coordinator The coordinator for the seminar is Colonel Anurag Bhardwaj, Senior Fellow, CLAWS. Email ids: [email protected] and [email protected] PROGRAMME

09:00-09:30h Tea and Registration INAUGURAL SESSION 09:30–09:40h Welcome Remarks by Lieutenant General (Dr.) V K Ahluwalia, PVSM, AVSM**, YSM, VSM (Retd), Director, CLAWS 09:40–09:55h Keynote Address by Lieutenant General PS Rajeshwar AVSM, SM, CISC 09:55–10:15h Indian Army’s Operations in East Pakistan in 1971: An Epitome of Manoeuvre and Firepower in Military Warfare by Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd) 10:15h The Arrival of The COAS and Patron CLAWS 10:15–10:45h Award Presentation by The COAS to Winners of CLAWS Open Essay Competition on “National Security” SESSION I Future Conflict Scenario: Complementarity of Manoeuvre and Firepower 10:45–11:05h Chairperson Opening Remarks and views on Manoeuvre: Efficacy in all Forms of Conflicts by Lieutenant General AK Singh, PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM (Retd) 11:05–11:25h Complementarity and Orchestration of Firepower and Manoeuvre in Future Conflicts by Lieutenant General Vinod Vashisht, AVSM, VSM** (Retd) 11:25–11:45h Technology-Enabled Manoeuvre Warfare: Future Perspective by Lieutenant General AB Shivane, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd) 11:45–12:10h Questions and Answers 12:10–12:30h Tea Break SESSION II Army Aviation, Special Forces, and Non-Military Manoeuvres: War Winning Assets in Future Conflicts 12:30–12:50h Chairperson: Opening Remarks and views on Special Forces and Manoeuvre: Larger Role and Reliance in Future Conflicts by Lieutenant General Vinod Bhatia, PVSM, AVSM, SM (Retd) Detailed Report 31

12:50–13:10h Options for Economic and Diplomatic Manoeuvres: Intrinsic Part of Effect Based Operations by Dr. G Balachandran, Consultant IDSA 13:10–13:30h Victory Through Third Dimension in Future Conflicts: Army Aviation by Lieutenant General BS Pawar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) 13:30–13:55h Questions and Answers 13:55–14:00h Closing Remarks by Lieutenant General (Dr.) V K Ahluwalia, PVSM, AVSM**, YSM, VSM (Retd), Director, CLAWS 14:00h Lunch and Dispersal onwards