Art Criticism
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VOLUME 19, NUMBER 1 ;' ART CRITICISM Art Department State University of New York at Stony Brook Stony Brook, NY 11794-5400 The editor wishes to thank Art and Peace, The Stony Brook Founda tion, President Shirley Strumm Kenny, Provost Robert L. McGrath, and the Dean of The College of Arts and Sciences, James V. Staros, for their gracious support. Copyright 2004 State University of New York at Stony Brook ISSN: 0195-4148 2 Art Criticism Founding Co-Editors Lawrence Alloway DonaldB. Kuspit Editor Donald B. Kuspit Advisors lames Rubin Mel Pekarsky Managing Editor Robert R. Shane Business Editor Gediminas Gasparavicius Art Criticism is published by: Department of Art State University of New York at Stony Brook Stony Brook, NY 11794-5400 Prospective contributors are asked to send abstracts. However, if a manuscript is submitted, please include a self-addressed stamped envelope for its return. Manuscripts accepted for publication must be submitted on a PC computer disk. Please contact the managing editor for a style sheet. Subscriptions are $20 per volume (two issues) for institutions and $15 per volume for individuals in the continental United States ($20 outside the continental U.S.). Back issues are available at the rate of $10 per issue. vol. 19, no. I 3 · } 4 Art Criticism 1! Table of Contents Another ~ay Out of the Cage: An Anti-theory for Epistemology and Art in the Charles Eliot Norton Lectures of John Cage Joseph Cunningham 6 "image and word, object and idea, inside and outside": Excavating Robert Smithson's Art from under His Writings Joseph Cunningham 28 Newman's The Statiolls of the Cross: Lema Sabachthalli, A Jewish Take Matthew Baigell 52 Aesthetics of Photography: Combining the Viewer's and the Artist's Standpoints Chong Ho Yu 62 Freud -Vitruvius Dialogue Eugene Mahon 75 Approaching the Critic's Psychology through the Artist's Negative Representation of Him Donald Kuspit 93 Beat Sensibility: Verbal or Visual? Donald Kuspit 106 vol. 19, no. 1 5 Another Way Out of the Cage: an Anti-theory for Epistemology and Art in the Charles Eliot Norton Lectures of John Cage Joseph Cunningham The Charles Eliot Norton Lectures delivered by John Cage at Harvard in 1989 are among the most enigmatic of all of his writings. Written in the mesostic stylel and based on "Source Texts" ranging from quotations from Henry David Thoreau and Marshall McCluhan to selections from the New York Times and from Cage's own books, and dominated by excerpts from Ludwig Wittgenstein's writing, the Lectures, which baffled listeners at the time of their delivery, remain largely uninterpreted. The mysterious if not downright impen etrable mesostic form, in which they were originally delivered, demands an alternative method for examination, namely, analysis of the Source Text. These quoted sections suggest perhaps the central, if not the only, path for tracing out any meaningful interpretation of the philosophical content and signifi cance of Cage's Lectures. The extent to which Cage's Norton Lectures and related expressions of his philosophical viewpoint are influenced by Wittgenstein's writings on the philosophy of language, mathematics and psychology and aesthetics, is not entirely clear, despite Wittgenstein 's preeminence in the quoted material of Source Text. Because this supply of quotations is saturated with passages from many of Wittgenstein's various philosophical texts, investigation of the exact compatibility of these statements with the views presented by other quoted materials (especially those quoting McLuhan), and more importantly with various expressions of Cage's own views, provides a useful backdrop for tracing out a meaning in these dense and complex lectures. Likewise, careful analysis of the Cage's quotations from Wittgenstein's writings elucidates Cage's own philosophical views, especially with respect to topics like language, mind and art. The general affinities between the approaches of Wittgenstein and Cage seem clear enough. Cage's preoccupation with removing the ego from 6 Art Criticism the creative process and emphasis on art experience can be connected to Wittgenstein's subjugation of personal first-person mental state attributions in favor of external criteria for evidence of, for example, meaning and other intentional states. Cage's celebration of chance operations in his composi tional methods as well as in the performance of his pieces can be correlated to Wittgenstein's reinterpretation ofthe actual use oflanguage in terms offamily resemblance and language-games. They both reject a universally justified in tention-based semantics in favor of a more decentralized community-view theory of meaning and signification. They also share a more general anti-essentialist inclination: Cage in his willingness to leave so much of performance practice up to individual musicians and his commitment, in many cases, of part or all of the practice of composition to chance operations, and Wittgenstein in his assertion that (as Cage knowingly paraphrased Wittgenstein's famous formu lation) "the meaning of something is in its use, not in itself [essentially]," and his extreme suspicion of reductive theories claiming to get at the essences of things.2 While these resemblances between the work of the two suggest a path for looking at intertextuality between the two, the goal of this paper is to trace out, among other conceptual links, the similarities and differences in Wittgenstein's and Cage's respective pronouncements on anti-essentialist and indeed anti-theoretical stance, their respective views of knowledge and mind, and finally concepts related to the theory of art. Emphasis will be placed on the significance of their anti-theoretic stance toward epistemological, aesthetic, as well as more general philosophical issues. Finally, a framework for grasping the implications ofWittgenstein's and Cage's associated formulations regard ing intention, mental states and knowledge will be explored with a view to locating to their foundational status within a new concept of art. An Anti-theory There are quite a variety of ways in which connections between Cage's and Wittgenstein's similar views on language and mathematics,3 suggest a path toward a more general understanding of an anti-theoretic approach they share: Nonintention (the acceptance of silence) leading to nature; renun ciation of control: let sounds be sounds. Each activity is centered in itself, i.e., composition, performance, and listening are different activities. (Music is) instantaneous and unpredictable; nothing is accomplished by writing, hearing, or playing a piece of music; our ears are now in excellent condition. A need for poetry. Joyce: "Comedy is the greatest of arts because the joy of comedy is freest from desire and loathing." Affirmation of life. Purposeful pur poselessness. 4 vol. 19, no. 1 7 The freedom engendered by Cage's approach ("renunciation of control," "pur poseful purposelessness") as outlined here connects beautifully to Wittgenstein's anti-theoretic formulation; philosophical clarification of ordi nary language by means of another language does not add to the sense present in a word or sentence of ordinary language. And theoretical speculation about or explanation of a piece of music does not add to the sense present in a performance of it. For Cage, intention, control, composition cannot clarify sounds or silence - they cannot add to it. The principle underlying all of the solutions acts in the question that is asked. As a composer, I should give up making choices, devote myself to asking questions. Chance-determined answers'll open my mind to world around, at the same time changing my music. Self-alteration, not self-expression. Thoreau said the same thing over a hundred years ago. I want my writing to be as clear as water I can see through so that what I experienced is told without my being in any way in the way.5 ' Art is indeed" not discovery ("giving answers"), but paying attention ("open[ing] my mind to world around"). Questions are at the center of philo sophical inquiry and aesthetic analysis - not answers - something that is true for Cage and Wittgenstein alike. As Cage writes in the Source Text for the Norton Lectures: In philosophy it's always a matter of the application of a series of utterly simple basic principles that any child knows, and the - enormous - difficulty is only one of applying these in the confu sion our language creates. It's never a question ofthe latest results of experiments with exotic fish or the most recent developments in mathemati~s. But the difficulty in apply.ing the simple basic prin ciple shakes our confidence in the principles themselves.6 It is wrong to say that in philosophy we consider an ideal language as opposed to our ordinary one. For this makes it appear as though we thought we could improve on ordinary languages. But ordinary language is all right. Whenever we make up 'ideal lan guage' it is not in order to replace our ordinary by them but just to remove some trouble caused in someone's mind by thinking that he has got hold of the exact use of a common word. 7 The "latest results," or "most recent developments," cannot get us anywhere either in understanding the fundamental nature of our world or in the making of art. Nor can comparison to an "ideal." As Wittgenstein puts it 8 Art Criticism ... everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden is of no interest to us.8 The philosophical clarification of ordinary language without recourse to any other language than itself cannot be a further regularization of our ordinary language. And this is interestingly connected to Cage's anti-interventionist, non-comparativist view of music and art: To sober and quiet the mind, so that it is in accord with what happens, the world around it open rather than closed ..