Isaac Polqar – a Jewish Philosopher Or a Philosopher and a Jew?

Isaac Polqar – A Jewish Philosopher or a Philosopher and a Jew?

A Study of the Relationship between Philosophy and Religion in Isaac Polqar’s ʿEzer ha-Dat [In Support of the Law] and Teshuvat Apikoros [A Response to the Heretic]

A Thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Racheli Haliva Jewish Studies, McGill University, Montreal

Supervisors: Carlos Fraenkel Lawrence J. Kaplan

June 2015

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments..……………………………………………………………..…iv-vi

Abstract-English…..…………………………………………………….………....vii-ix

Abstract- French…………………………………………………………………... x-xii

Introduction……………………………………………………………………..….1- 14

Chapter One: The Literary form of ‘Ezer ha-Dat: between Dialogue and Essay...15-64

Introduction…………………………………………………………….....……...15-25

Treatise One………………………………………………………..…………..…25-29

Treatise Two………………………………………………………………….…..29-44

Treatise Three………………………………………………………………….…44-50

Treatise Four………………………………………………………………….…..50-57

Treatise Five……………………………………………………………………....57-64

Chapter 2: Philosophy and Religion…………………………………………....…65-148

2.1 The Harmonious Relationship between Philosophy and Judaism………..…65-71

2.2 Judaism against Christianity……………………….……………………..…72-130

2.2.1 The Existence of God…………………………………………..…..85-87 2.2.2 Monotheism vs. Trinity………………………………………….....87-93 2.2.3 The Incorporeality of God vs. the Incarnation of God…………..…94-101 2.2.4 The World to Come: Is the Soul Universal or Individual ?...... 101-105 2.2.5 The Messiah to Come vs. the Messiah Who Already Came……….105-114 2.2.6 The Exile and its Meaning…………………………………………115-127 2.2.7 The Authority of the Talmud and the Jewish Sages……….……....127-130

2.3 Jews and Non-Jews – Essential Superiority or Practical Difference?...... 131-148

ii Chapter 3: The Conception of God………………………………………………..149-197

3.1 God’s Will………………………………………………………………….. 149-160

3.2 God’s Foreknowledge and Man’s Free Will……………………….………..161-185

3.3 Divine Providence: Universal vs. Individual………………………..………186-197

Chapter 4: The Conception of the World……………………………………….....198-250

4.1 Cosmos: Creation Ex Nihilo or Eternity of the World?

between Religious Tradition and Aristotle………………………………….198-217

4.2 Astrology: True Science or Invalid and Dangerous Doctrine?....…………...218-235

4.3 Miracles Within a Natural Framework…………………………….………..236-250

Chapter 5: The Conception of Man……………………………………….………251-295

5.1 Between a Prophet and a Philosopher…………………………………...…….251-268

5.2 The Mosaic Commandments: A Necessary Means to

Man’s Ultimate Purpose …………………………………..………...………..269-282

5.3 Man’s Ultimate Purpose…………………………….……………...………….283-295

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………296-298

Bibliography…………………………………………………………………….....299-316

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Acknowledgments

This dissertation would have not been completed without the help and support of a number of wonderful individuals.

My first debt is to my advisors, Professors Carlos Fraenkel and Lawrence J. Kaplan. I am especially grateful to Professor Carlos Fraenkel, whose intellectual generosity knows no limits, and whose comments, insights, and suggestions were a source of valuable inspiration for me. My gratitude to Professor Lawrence Kaplan, The Rabbi, goes beyond words; his lectures and the meetings we had were always stimulating and thought-provoking, guiding me in articulating my arguments clearly. I am particularly grateful for the long hours he dedicated to clarifying my thinking, improving the dissertation, and oftentimes eliminating embarrassing errors.

I would also like to thank the members of my committee; Professors Zeev Harey,

Robert Wisnovsky, Gaëlle Fiasse, Yael Halevi-Wise, and Gershon D. Hundert, whose comments and insights brought much inspiration to this project.

I thank my teachers at McGill University who encouraged, challenged, and supported me during my years in Montreal, especially during the long long (long) winters. My sincere thanks to Professor Alison Laywine of the Department of Philosophy at

McGill University, who patiently shaped and sharpened my thinking, and to

Shokry Gohar and to David (Daoud) Nancekivell of the Islamic Institute at McGill

University, who improved my Arabic skills.

I wish to express my sincere thanks to the Faculty of Art at McGill University for providing me with all the facilities necessary for my research and for allowing me to travel to the Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts in Jerusalem, as well as for supporting my participation in the Dissertation Writing Workshop.

Many thanks, also, to the various libraries and librarians who assisted me in locating primary sources and allowed me to use these sources in my research: Breslau library,

Frankfurt library, London, Beth Din & Beth Hamidrash library, London British

Library, London Montefiore Library, Oxford Bodleian Library, Bibliotheque

Nationale in Paris, the Vatican’s Biblioteca Apostolica, and Warszaw’s Zydowski

Instytut Historyczny. I especially would like to thank Yael Okun at the Institute for

Microfilmed Manuscripts at the National Library of Israel. Finally, I thank Sonia

Smith at the McGill Library, who always quickly provided all the books and materials necessary for my research.

I also take this opportunity to express gratitude to the members of the Department of

Jewish Studies for their help and support:

To Professor Yael Halevi-Weise who opened her home and welcomed me into her family during my years in Montreal, and whose friendship and caring made this period wonderful.

To Professor Igor Holanda de Souza who gave me a place of refuge when I needed it the most, and simply for being part of my small world.

To Professor Daniel Heller who was there when I needed his feedback and whose comments made my papers better.

To Stefka, my friend, who was there for me in good and bad times, and who made my life easy when I had to face a complicated bureaucracy.

To Soroosh Shahriari, Bakinaz Khalifa and Briah Cahana who shared large parts of my journey, and whose comments helped me clarify my thinking.

To my students in the Department of Jewish Studies at McGill University who during the years often challenged me with profound questions and deep insights, and constantly reminded me what it is like to read a text for the first time.

To Marie McDonough who read every word of this dissertation, my sincere gratitude for her acute comments.

Last but not least, to my beloved parents to whom I owe everything else, I dedicate this work.

Racheli Haliva Montreal, 2015

Abstract

Isaac Polqar – A Jewish Philosopher or a Philosopher and a Jew? A Study of the relationship between Philosophy and Religion in Isaac Polqar’s ʿEzer ha-Dat [In Support of the Law] and Teshuvat Apikoros [A Response to the Heretic]

Racheli Haliva

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Jewish Studies McGill University

2015

Isaac Polqar, who belonged to the Jewish Averroist School, was active in northern

Spain in the first half of the fourteenth century. In addition to his main philosophical book ‘Ezer ha-Dat (In Support of the Law), preserved in its entirety in a single manuscript, he wrote several other works, most of which are no longer extant. Among his lost works are commentaries on the books of Genesis, Ecclesiastes, and Psalms. In his extant works, Polqar does not provide details about his own life; however, his correspondence with his former teacher, Abner of Burgos, reveals the tense and complicated relationship between them. The two were in continuous debate, especially after Abner of Burgos converted to Christianity and used his expertise in

Biblical, Talmudic, and philosophical texts to attack the faith of his birth.

The present study is dedicated to Polqar’s two extant works: ‘Ezer ha-Dat, his main philosophical text, and Teshuvat Apikoros (A Response to the Heretic), a letter he wrote to Abner of Burgos, expressing his objection to Christianity. Polqar aims to defend three positions. The first is to defend hermeneutically and philosophically the superiority of Judaism over Christianity by arguing that Judaism accords with philosophical principles and is therefore a true religion, while Christianity, which possesses irrational doctrines such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, cannot be

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considered a true religion. The second is to defend Aristotelian philosophy as taught by Averroes. And the third is to defend his philosophical interpretation of Judaism against the accusations of Jewish sects, such as the Kabbalists.

Influenced by Maimonides and Averroes, Polqar plays a unique role in giving a philosophical interpretation to Jewish principles. At first glance, Polqar appears to continue the Maimonidean project of reconciling Aristotelian philosophy with the principles of Judaism. Yet, despite the appearance of congruence between his ideas and those of Maimonides, my study brings to light their moments of divergence.

While Polqar did not wish to publicly contradict Maimonides, a close examination of

Polqar’s presentation of key concepts within the Jewish faith—the role of the commandments, creation vs. eternity of the world, and the difference between prophet and philosopher—shows that Polqar, owing to the influence of Averroes, consistently pushes Maimonides’ ideas in a more radical direction.

In addition to his initial goal of giving the principles of Judaism a radically naturalistic Averroistic interpretation, Polqar, in a more apologetic vein, sought to defend that interpretation from criticisms leveled against it by Christians and converts, as well as by members of his own Jewish community who held more traditional views. The tension between Polqar’s radical views and those held by Jewish scholars with more traditional commitments often led him to employ Maimonides’ method of directing contradictory messages to different audiences, as a preemptive defense against possible accusations of heresy.

My research highlights the influence that Muslim thinkers such as al-Fārābī,

Avicenna, Ibn Bājja, and Averroes had on Polqar, in addition to his Jewish teacher,

Maimonides, and his contemporaries, Isaac Albalag and Moshe Narboni. His twofold

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project – preserving Jewish principles, and defending Aristotelian philosophy as taught by Averroes – often put his thought at the center of controversy. Polqar thus emerges, alongside Narboni and Albalag, as a major representative of the Jewish

Averroist School—indeed, as arguably its most radical exponent.

Résumé Isaac Polqar – A Jewish Philosopher or a Philosopher and a Jew? A Study of the relationship between Philosophy and Religion in Isaac Polqar’s ʿEzer ha-Dat [In Support of the Law] and Teshuvat Apikoros [A Response to the Heretic]

Racheli Haliva

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Jewish Studies McGill University

2015

Isaac Polqar, qui appartenait au mouvement averroïste juif, fut actif en Espagne du

Nord dans la première moitié du quatorzième siècle. Outre son écrit philosophique principal, ‘Ezer ha-Dat (À l'appui de la Loi), entièrement préservé en un seul manuscrit, il écrivit aussi plusieurs autres œuvres, dont la majorité a disparu. Parmi ses œuvres disparues, il y a des commentaires sur les livres de la Genèse, de l’Ecclésiaste et des Psaumes. Dans ses œuvres existantes, Polqar ne dévoile pas de détails sur sa propre vie. Par contre, sa correspondance avec son ancien maître, Abner de Burgos, révèle leur relation tendue et compliquée. Les deux hommes étaient continuellement en débat, surtout après qu’Abner de Burgos se fut converti au

Christianisme et eut utilisé son expertise dans les textes bibliques, talmudiques et philosophiques pour attaquer la religion de sa naissance.

L’étude présente est dédiée aux deux œuvres existantes de Polqar : Ezer ha-Dat, son texte philosophique principal, et Teshuvat Apikoros (Une réponse à l’hérétique), une lettre qu’il écrivit à Abner de Burgos, exprimant ses objections au Christianisme.

Polqar tenait à soutenir trois positions. La première consiste à défendre de manière herméneutique et philosophique la supériorité du Judaïsme par rapport au

Christianisme, en démontrant que le Judaïsme est en accord avec les principes philosophiques et donc, qu’il est une religion vraie, alors que le Christianisme, qui possède des doctrines irrationnelles telles que celles de la Trinité et de l’Incarnation, ne peut pas être considéré comme une religion vraie. La deuxième consiste à défendre la philosophie aristotélicienne telle qu’enseignée par Averroès. Et la troisième consiste à défendre son interprétation philosophique du Judaïsme contre les accusations de sectes juives telles que les Kabbalistes.

Influencé par Maïmonide et Averroès, Polqar joue un rôle unique pour donner une interprétation philosophique aux principes du Judaïsme. À première vue, Polqar semble continuer le projet que s’était donné Maïmonide de réconcilier la philosophie aristotélicienne avec les principes du Judaïsme. Pourtant, malgré l’apparence de concordance entre ses idées et celles de Maïmonide, mon étude éclaire leurs points de divergence. Si on examine attentivement la façon dont Polqar présente certains concepts fondamentaux de la foi juive tels que le rôle des commandements, la création par opposition à l’éternité du monde et la différence entre un prophète et un philosophe, on montre que Polqar, influencé par Averroès, pousse constamment les idées de Maïmonide dans une direction plus radicale.

Au-delà de son but initial de donner aux principes du Judaïsme une interprétation averroïste radicalement naturaliste, Polqar, dans un mode plus apologétique, chercha à défendre cette interprétation contre les critiques portées contre elle par les chrétiens et les convertis ainsi que par les membres de sa propre communauté juive qui avaient des points de vue plus traditionnels. La tension entre les opinions radicales de Polqar et celles des intellectuels juifs ayant des engagements plus traditionnels le mena souvent à utiliser, comme Maïmonide, la méthode consistant à diriger des messages

contradictoires à des auditoires différents, comme défense préventive contre des accusations possibles d’hérésie.

Ma recherche souligne aussi l’influence qu’eurent les penseurs musulmans tels qu’Al-

Fārābī, Avicenne, Ibn Bājja, et Averroès sur Polqar, en plus de celle de son maître

Maïmonide et de ses contemporains Isaac Albalag et Moshe Narboni. Son double projet – préserver les principes du Judaïsme et défendre la philosophie aristotélicienne telle qu’enseignée par Averroès – plaça souvent sa pensée au centre de la controverse.

De cette façon, Polqar s’avère, avec Narboni et Albalag, être un représentant majeur du mouvement juif averroïste – en réalité probablement son représentant le plus radical.

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Introduction

Jewish thinkers who came after Maimonides were greatly influenced by his thought and particularly by the challenges his views presented to religious Jews.

Maimonides, whose goal was to reconcile philosophy with the principles of the

Jewish faith, left numerous questions with answers that proved to be equivocal. While outwardly seeking to defend Maimonides’ views, these thinkers developed independent positions that at times determined which of the several possible interpretations of Maimonides’ views they deemed correct, and at other times led them to contradict their great master’s views. Among these thinkers are Samuel ibn

Tibbon, Shem Tov ibn Joseph Falaquera, Isaac Albalag, Moses Narboni, and Isaac

Polqar. The present study analyzes Polqar’s thought, paying particular attention to the tension between his presentation of traditional Jewish views on the one hand, and the naturalistic views he wished to disclose to his more perspicacious readers on the other. My fundamental thesis is that a close reading of Polqar’s work brings to light a comprehensive philosophical interpretation of Judaism that oftentimes deviates from traditional viewpoints.

Isaac Polqar1 lived from the second half of the thirteen century to the first half of the fourteenth century in Northern Spain.2 Not much is known about Polqar’s life and family. A short poem, written in his honor by a contemporary poet, Samuel Ibn

Sasson, reveals that Polqar was known for his philosophical knowledge and his

1 For Polqar’s name in Hebrew and in foreign languages see: Moritz. M. Steinschneider, Catalogue 2 We do not have records that decisively determine where Polqar lived. Yitzhak Baer argues that Polqar resided in Burgos and “other Castilian cities.” See his History of the Jews in Christian Spain, v.1, p. 331 [English]; History of the Jews in Christian Spain, p. 194 [Hebrew]. According to Graetz, Polqar lived in Avila. See H. Graetz, History of the Jews, vol. iv (1894) p. 91.

expertise in the study of the Bible and the Mishnah. In addition, Sasson indicates that

Polqar was also a poet, a physician, and a respectable figure in his community.3

Polqar is perhaps best known as the student of Abner of Burgos, and one of his opponents. Abner (ca. 1265-1347) was a Jewish thinker who converted to Christianity between 1320 and1322,4 adopting the Christian name Alfonso of Valladolid.5 The fact that his teacher converted to Christianity seems to have been a shattering experience for Polqar, which resulted in a crisis that brought about his project to defend Judaism.

Polqar focused on defending his faith not only against native Christians, but also against Jewish apostates who were well versed in Biblical and Talmudic sources as well as philosophical and Kabbalistic texts. Although we do not know if oral debates took place between Polqar and Abner, we have records of their correspondence, which bears witness to a rigorous, lively, and personal engagement. An example of this philosophical debate, imbued with an emotional, even at times aggressive tone, is the Teshuvat Apikoros where Polqar addresses Abner, accusing him of pursuing political and social advantage:

I say that, what will happen to you, in my opinion, from the day your sins enticed you to do this thing, you do not have permission to change your mind (lehitnaḥem) in public and to speak or claim, except by the teaching of the faith to which you turned, in order to prove to the common folk that you have done this from wisdom. And even to me, and to people like me, you have no choice but to speak thus, lest you perish. Now, God’s grievance is not against the

3 See Yitzhak Baer, “Fragments from Castilian Poets on the Fourteen Century,” Minḥa le-David: Collected Studies Offered for the Seventieth Birthday of David Yellin, p. 200. 4 For discussions regarding Abner’s conversion to Christianity and his relationship with the Jewish community, see: Y. Baer, History of the Jews in Christian Spain, v.1, pp. 280; 327-354 [English]; History of the Jews in Christian Spain, 192-210 [Hebrew]; J. Hecht, Dissertation, 26-31; R. Szpiech, From Testimonia to Testimony: Thirteenth-Century Anti-Jewish Polemic and the Mostrador de Justicia of Abner of Burgos/Alfonso de Valladolid (2006) pp. 307-310. Hereafter: Dissertation; S. Ẓadik, Trinity and Determinism in the Thought of Abner of Burgos, pp. 3-9. Hereafter: Dissertation. 5 In Teshuvot la- Meḥaref p. 13b, Abner writes: “but everyone who knows you [Polqar], your relatives and friends, know that from the day you came into being you applied yourself diligently in my house of study (beit midrash) and I loved you as myself. Even if you now betray and trample and forget all this in (your) pride and arrogance, nevertheless, I am still your Rabbi.” However, in chapter one of his Minḥat Qenaot, Abner refers to Polqar as a “good friend: “…Moreover, because the aforementioned Isaac was my good friend formerly when we were companions in study and in learning, I did not deem it proper to quarrel with him or to arouse his hatred in any manner.”

stupidity of your ideas but against us, the people who are guilty because of your soul, because we did not object and did not pledge to humiliate you when you expounded in public, in your insolence: that primary matter is substance and possesses form; that there is a vacuum;6 that the angels are corporeal; and the other heresies and farces which you asserted in your detestable book that you called “The New Philosophizing.” When you saw that we had not paid attention to your teaching [and that] we did not reply to your absurdities, the truths became lightly esteemed and despised in your eyes and you attacked some of these [truths] until you despised and denied all of them.7 Do not think that you will rise to the rank on account of which you did this. “For the office (serarah) which you pursue flees from you.” 8 You were not born in a “time of sustenance.”9 In most of the matters that I have heard from you, I do not see in them anything but such absurdities and laughable things that it is not fitting for a man to waste his time responding to them. I am he, the one who speaks, / the author who addresses you, / the one who believes and trusts in the One God / whom I will praise with my choicest adorations and thanks. All my days I am/ with all my power and being, / a Jew.10

In this text we see Polqar mocking Abner’s attempts to show the inferiority of the Jewish faith, maintaining that his former teacher’s readers are wrong if they think that Abner’s conversion was the result of serious deliberation. Abner’s new role as a convert, as Polqar implies, dictated his writing against Judaism and against Jews.

Abner was compelled to do so lest he perish: his conversion threatened him with

6 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, IV 6-8; Narboni’s commentary of the Guide 1:73; 2:14; J. Hecht, Dissertation, p. 114, n. 105; H. A. Wolfson, Crescas’ Critique of Aristotle, pp. 400-401. 7 Polqar implies here that Abner denies all of the basic propositions of natural sciences. Thus, Polqar and other Jewish philosophers take responsibility and share the guilt of Abner’s conversion to Christianity. In addition, by taking responsibility, emphasizes the pedagogical and existential importance of critique. 8 Midrash Tanḥuma, Leviticus, chapter 1:3. ”בשעתא דמזוני“ .25a Ta‘anit Talmud, Babylonian 9 10 Teshuvat Apikoros, pp. 6b-7a. Polqar’s contemporary, Moses of Narbonne (Narboni), was harshly critical of Abner’s decision to convert to Christianity: “Now we regarded this man, called Abner, as quite sagacious “when His light flickered over his head” [Job 29:3]. So I do not believe that he erred in this [letter] but rather he deceived [others]. For when he saw that times were hard, and that his correligionists, far from supporting him, were opposed to him due to their indifference, their lack of wisdom, and their hostility and hatred towards the wise, he turned to the “arrogant and to the companions of deceit” [Ps. 40:5] in the guise of instruments that would press him on to the imagined felicity, as an instrument to achieve eternity. He was not one of the pious scholars, perfect in wisdom, who are content with a “weekly bushel of carobs,” for one should only turn to the objects of the senses as necessary, and the necessary here is quite sufficient. Rather he was one of the sages who provided for the preservation of the [material] substratum, since it is a part of the composite, and is the dwelling place for the formal essence. Once he had committed evil even in the eyes of Wisdom…he argued as a defender of the universal Decree that everything is determined. He did this to signify that although he was rinsed by the perfidious waters, his heart remained steadfast and unmoistened by the gentile spring…” Moses of Narbonne, The Treatise on Choice, Charles Manekin (trans.) Medieval Jewish Philosophical Writings, p. 151.

physical danger at the hands of the Christian establishment unless he pursued his new role as apologist for Christianity and polemicist against Judaism unceasingly. The

Christians were not really interested in Abner, the new defender of Christianity; their only interest was to use him as a tool vis-à-vis the Jews, drawing on his ability to prove that Christianity is superior to Judaism to cause as many Jews as possible to convert to Christianity.

Polqar accuses Abner of leaving his native faith and joining the dominant religion in order to attain political and social power. Indeed he suggests that Abner’s denial of philosophical principles was similarly motivated by personal gain.11 Abner’s discussions, in Polqar’s view, are absurd, laughable, and not deserving of a response.

Despite this, perhaps ironically, Polqar dedicates most of his works to debating his former teacher and proving him wrong.

Polqar concludes his epistle by proudly proclaiming his Jewish faith and praising the one God, alluding to the absurdity of the Christian faith’s concept of the

Trinity. His choice to conclude Teshuvat Apikoros with “I am a Jew” is exceptionally significant, for it indicates Polqar’s deep philosophical conviction that the only way to follow God’s word is through the Jewish faith, whose principles correspond to the teachings of the intellect.

Polqar criticizes Abner’s decision to convert to Christianity on purely philosophical grounds, rather than from a theological perspective. According to

Polqar, Christianity subscribes to irrational principles such as the Incarnation, the

Trinity, and salvation through the Messiah. In his view, since man’s ultimate goal is to attain the immortality of the soul through the study of the theoretical sciences, it

11 Since this quote concludes Teshuvat Apikoros, Polqar probably refers to the philosophical principles he discussed earlier, in the second chapter (sha‘ar) (pp. 2b-3a); these principles include God’s existence, God’s unity, and God’s incorporeality.

follows that Christianity, by its very nature, fails to lead its adherents to this ultimate purpose.

Polqar’s harsh accusations provoked Abner to explain and defend his decision to convert to Christianity. He concludes his long response with his unique way of quoting biblical verses:

“…Every man whose heart moves him”12 / “A man in whom there is the spirit of God”13 / “My name is in him.”14 / “All who are called to My Name,”15 / “assuredly, My people shall learn My Name,”16 / the Hebrews servant,17 / full of strength and vigor, / “lighter than an eagle, stronger than a lion”18 / in serving my Creator: / Alphonso, the Christian / “this shall be my name forever, this shall be my appellation”19… I will justify God’s judgment / in the presence of my friends and adversaries / who provoked me to my face. / “All the ways of a man seem right to him, / but the Lord probes the mind,”20 “For the Lord is an all knowing God.”21 / “God, God, the Lord,”22 “God of vengeance, the Lord.”23 / For this, God has imposed an obligation on every person / “to bless the bad / just as we bless the good.”24 / Therefore, with a clean and pure heart, / “In God, whose word I praise, / in the Lord, whose word I praised,”25 / I will say over everything which occurs, / “Blessed is the Lord, forever,” / amen and amen. The roar of the lion and his howling26 (will cause) / a (person with a) weak heart / to tremble in the distance. / Both his ears shall tingle when he hears it,27 what can help him when the “day of punishment” comes. 28 Trembling greatly, 29 “retching,” / “Isaac was seized with violent trembling.” 3031

Abner rejects Polqar’s allegations, according to which he – Abner –converted to

Christianity to pursue a high rank and to please Christians by brainwashing the

12 Exodus, 35:29. 13 Genesis, 41:38. 14 Exodus, 23:21. 15 Isaiah, 43:7. 16 Ibid, 52:6. 17 Genesis, 39:17. 18 Tractate Avot, 5:20. 19 Exodus, 3:15. 20 Proverbs, 13:12. 21 I Samuel 2:3. 22 Joshua 22:22; Psalms 50:1. 23 Psalms 94:1. 24 Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Berakhot 33b; 54a; 60b; Megilah 25a. 25 Psalms 56:11. 26 Job, 4:10. 27 II Kings, 21:12. 28 Hosea, 9:7. 29 Job, 39:24; Jeremiah 25:16. 30 Genesis 27:33. 31 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, pp. 64b-65a.

ignorant and by criticizing the philosophers among the Jews. Rather, Abner claims, it was God’s spirit that guided him to seek His word. For Abner, as opposed to Polqar,

God can only be truly worshiped through a full acceptance of the Christian faith.

Like Polqar, who argues that he is the one who truly worships and praises God,

Abner ascribes the true worship of God to himself. He argues that he devotes himself to God “with a clean and pure heart,” implying that his conversion was motivated solely by the search for God.

Abner concludes the epistle by identifying himself with a lion, whose powerful roar causes Polqar to tremble. By using the biblical verse “Isaac was seized with violent trembling,” Abner wishes to mock Polqar’s fear of debating him. Interestingly, in Polqar’s final composition ‘Ezer ha-Dat, he turns Abner’s use of this verse on its head, indicating that the “violent trembling” is not an act of fear, as Abner implies, but rather that it is Polqar’s reaction to the traditionalists’ accusation that the philosophers are heretics.32

Polqar wrote several books, most of which are lost. He mentions some of these books in his main work ‘Ezer ha-Dat (In Support of the Law):33 Peirush le-Sefer Bereshit

(Commentary on Genesis);34 Peirush le-Sefer Kohelet (Commentary on Ecclesiastes);35

Sefer Peirush le-Tehillot (Commentary on the Book of Psalms);36 and Musar ha-Banim

(Instruction of the Sons).37 Two of Polqar’s works are mentioned by Abner of Burgos in his Teshuvot la-Meḥaref (Response to the Blasphemer) and Minḥat Qenaot (A Jealousy-

32 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 101. 33 Shlomo Pines, in his article “Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and the Jewish Philosophical Tradition” (p. 502), suggests that it is most likely that the treatises of ʿEzer ha-Dat were initially written at different times and eventually edited together by Polqar himself. Shoshana Gershenzon makes a similar claim. See A Study, p. 23. 34 See ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 39. 35 Ibid, pp. 121-123. 36 Ibid, p. 131. 37 Ibid, p. 158.

Offering): Iggeret ha-Tiqvah (Epistle on Hope);38 and Sefer be-Hakḥashat ha-‘iẓtagninot

(Refutation of Astrology).39 Two of Polqar’s works are extant; Teshuvat Apikoros (A

Response to the Heretic), a letter he addressed to Abner,40 and his major work, ‘Ezer ha-

Dat (In Support of the Law). In addition, Polqar completed Isaac Albalag’s work Tiqqun

Deʿot ha-Philosophim, a free paraphrase of al-Ghazālī’s Maqasid al-Falāsifa (The

Opinions of the Philosophers), most of which consists of Albalag’s own ideas and of a critique of al-Ghazālī’s presentation of philosophical ideas.41

All the references to ‘Ezer ha-Dat in the present study are to Levinger’s Hebrew critical edition.42 In several places where I found Levinger’s text problematic, I consulted the Breslau Manuscript.43 The English quotations from Teshuvat Apikoros and Response to the Blasphemer are taken from Jonathan Hecht’s critical edition.44

The quotations from Sefer Minḥat Qenaot and the third part of ‘Ezer ha-Dat are taken from Charles Manekin’s unpublished English translations. I have on occasion

38 See Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, p. 14a. Shalom Ẓadik claims that Abner refers to Polqar’s Peirush le-Sefer Yesha‘yah (Commentary on Isaiah) in Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, p. 80a. There is no page 80a in Teshuvot la-Meḥaref. In any case, I did not find any reference to Peirush le-Sefer Yesha‘yah either in Polqar’s works or in Abner’s books. See Shalom Ẓadik, The Essence of the Will and the Philosophical Method of Rabbi Isaac Polqar, p. 4. Hereafter: Thesis. 39 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, p. 14a; Sefer Minḥat Qenaot chapter 1-2; Polqar also refers to this book in ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 123. Since Abner, in his Teshuvot la-Meḥaref (pp. 8a; 14a; 63a), mentions the previous correspondence between the two thinkers that consisted of Polqar’s work Sefer Be-hakḥashat ha- ‘iẓtagninot and Abner’s response Sefer Minḥat Qenaot, it is clear that Polqar’s Teshuvat Apikoros and Abner’s response Teshuvot la-Meḥaref were written and published after Sefer Be-hakḥashat ha- ‘iẓtagninot and Minḥat Qenaot; There is a debate regarding this book. While Baer claims that the Hebrew is lost and what we have is the Spanish translation, De Valle argues that the Spanish version is not Polqar’s work, so, in fact, we do not have records of Sefer Be-hakḥashat ha-‘iẓtagninot. See Y. Baer, The Book of Minḥat Qenaot and its influence on Hasdai Crescas, p. 189, n. 4; De Valle, La Contradiction Del Hereje De Issac Ben Polgar, p. 554, n.19. 40 In the Parma manuscript (2440), Polqar’s letter is untitled. However, Abner, in his reply Teshuvot la- Meḥaref, named this letter as Iggeret ha-ḥarafot (Epistle of the Blasphemies); see for example pp. 8a; 12b. Polqar refers to this letter in ‘Ezer ha-Dat as Teshuvat Apikoros (see, ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 30; 76). Aaron Hughes, in his book The Art of Dialogue in Jewish Philosophy, p. 83 mistakenly maintains that Teshuvat Apikoros is not extant. J. Hecht published both Teshuvat Apikoros and Iggeret ha-ḥarafot as part of his dissertation in 1993. 41 See G. Vajda, averroïste juif, traducteur et annotateur da̕l-Ghazâlî, p. 268. 42 Isaac Polqar, ‘Ezer ha-Dat, critical edition by Jacob Levinger (Tel- Aviv University, 1984). 43 For the list of manuscripts of ‘Ezer ha-Dat, see Levinger’s critical edition pp. 9-22. 44 Jonathan Hecht, Dissertation, 1993.

modified Hecht’s and Manekin’s English translations to make them correspond more closely to the Hebrew source.45

To date, the scholarly studies of Polqar’s thought have confined themselves to analyzing particular aspects of his thought. We can divide these studies into several general categories. Loeb,46 Belasco,47 Baer,48 Gershenzon,49 Sirat,50 Hecht,51 Roth,52

De Valle,53 and Szpiech54 focus on Polqar’s debate with Abner of Burgos and the latter’s critique of the Jewish faith. Sirat,55 Pines,56 and Schwartz discuss Polqar’s view of prophecy in comparison to that of Spinoza. Sirat,57 Pines,58 Menachem,59

Schwarz,60 and Ẓadik61 analyze Polqar’s repudiation of astrology. Their studies encompass Polqar’s discussions of man’s free will and its relation to God’s

45 I would like to thank Prof. Charles H. Manekin for allowing me to use his unpublished, preliminary translations of Abner of Burgos’ Minḥat Qenaot (A Jealousy of Offering) and Isaac Polqar’s ‘Ezer ha- Dat, treatise three. 46 Isador Loeb, “Polémistes Chrétiens et Juive en France et en Espagne“ (1889) pp.63-65. 47 George S. Belasco, “Isaac Pulgar’s “Support of the Religion” (1904) pp. 26-56. 48 Yitzhak Baer, “Fragments from Castilian Poets on the Fourteen Century”, p. 200; A History of The Jews in Christian Spain, pp. 327-360; “The Book of Minḥat Qenaot and its influence on Hasdai Crescas” (1940) pp. 188-206; “The Cabbalistic Law in Abner of Burgos’ Christological thought” (1909) pp. 280-289. 49 Shoshana Gershenzon, A Study of “Teshuvot la-Meḥaref” by Abner of Burgos, pp. 33-86. Hereafter: A Study; “Midrash and Exegesis in the Christological Argument of Abner of Burgos,” (1974) pp. 96-100. 50 Colette Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages (1985) pp. 315-317. 51 Jonathan Hecht, Dissertation, pp. 35-38; 50-59. On pages 463- 470 Hecht discusses Polqar’s dependence upon Maimonides. 52 Norman Roth, Conversos, Inquisition, and the Expulsion of the Jews from Spain (1995, 2002). 53 Carlos Del Valle, La Contradiction Del Hereje De Issac Ben Polgar (1999) pp. 552–560. 54 Ryan W. Szpiech, Dissertation (2006). 55 Colette Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages (1985) p. 319. 56 Shlomo Pines, “Some Topics on Polqar’s Treatise ‘Ezer ha-Dat, and their parallels in Spinoza” (1986) pp. 420-432; “Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico- Politicus and The Jewish Philosophical Tradition” (1987) pp. 499-521; Dov Schwartz, “Prophecy According to Rabbi Isaac Polqar, Rabbi Shlomo Al-Konstantin, and Spinoza” (1990) pp. 57-72. 57 Colette Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages (1985) pp. 93, 312, 315-322, 341 (Hebrew version: pp. 353-360); “Deux philosophes juifs répondent à Abner de Burgos à propos du libre-arbitre humain et de l’omniscience divine” (1975) 87–94. 58 Shlomo Pines, “Some Topics on Polqar’s Treatise ‘Ezer ha-Dat, and their parallels in Spinoza” (1986) pp. 399-405; “Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico- Politicus and The Jewish Philosophical Tradition” (1987) pp. 499-521; Dov Schwartz, “Prophecy According to Rabbi Isaac Polqar, Rabbi Shlomo Al-Konstantin, and Spinoza” (1990) pp. 57-72. 59 David Menachem, Freedom of Choice According to Rabbi Isaac Polqar, pp. 19-140. Hereafter: Thesis. 60 Dov Schwartz, “Astral Magic and Specific Properties (Segullot) in Medieval Jewish Thought” (2011) pp. 301-319; Astrology and Magic in the Medieval Jewish Thought (2004); “Different Forms of Magic in the Jewish Though in the 14th Century” (1991) pp. 17-47. 61 Shalom Ẓadik, Thesis, pp. 34-39.

foreknowledge. Guttmann,62 Urbach,63and Ẓadik64 expose Polqar’s approach to God’s will. Sirat,65 Kasher,66 Melamed,67 and Manekin68 analyze Polqar’s political and ethical philosophy. In addition to the topics mentioned above, Hughes examines

Polqar’s ‘Ezer ha-Dat as a dialogue, a literary genre that was very common during the middle ages.69

These scholars have ably elucidated individual aspects of Polqar’s thought.

And yet, none of them have attempted to offer a comprehensive examination that covers all the aspects of Polqar’s philosophical interpretation of Judaism. The present study seeks to fill this gap. In this study I also call into question some of the scholars’ conclusions, which, in my view, do not represent Polqar’s genuine position. I will trace and contextualize both Polqar’s Islamic sources, mainly al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes, as well as his Jewish sources, mainly Maimonides and Albalag, comparing the uses he made of these two traditions. This examination will bring to light the full scope of Polqar’s philosophical endeavor. Polqar emerges as an original thinker who does not slavishly follow his sources but rather creatively uses them to develop his own ideas, reinterpreting – and indeed rejecting – several of the Jewish traditional beliefs.

Polqar’s project is threefold: first, he seeks to defend Judaism as a true religion against Christianity. For Polqar, true religion coincides with philosophical principles.

62 Julius J. Guttmann, Philosophy of Judaism (1964) pp. 205-206 (Hebrew version: pp. 188-189). 63 Simaḥa Bonem Urbakh, The Pillars of the Israeli thought (1982) p. 1060. 64 Shalom Ẓadik, Thesis, pp. 12- 34. 65 Colette Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages, (1985) pp. 317-319. 66 Hannah Kasher, ““Why is the Land in Ruins?” (Jeremiah 9:11): Religious Transgression versus Natural Historical Process in the Writing of Maimonides and His Disciples” (1998) 154- 156. In this article Kasher discusses the political and ethical reasons that caused the Jews to be expelled from their land. I disagree with Kasher’s analysis of the reasons she lists. See my discussion below in chapter 2, pp. 115-127. 67 The Philosopher-king in Medieval and Renaissance Jewish Political Thought (2003) pp. 93-101. 68 Charles H. Manekin, Medieval Political Philosophy, Joshua Parens and Joseph C. Macfarland (eds.) (2011) pp. 208-209. 69 Aaron Hughes, The Art of Dialogue in Jewish Philosophy (2007) pp. 76-106.

His defense of Judaism against the Christian convert Abner of Burgos consists essentially in the claim that while Judaism coincides with true philosophy and hence is a true religion, Christianity contains doctrines such as the Trinity and the

Incarnation that contradict true philosophy and hence is not a true religion. In addition to his philosophical approach against Christianity, Polqar uses hermeneutical arguments to reinforce his position that Judaism is a true religion. Second, Polqar, similarly to his fellow Jewish Averroists, wishes to defend the discipline of philosophy. By philosophy, Polqar means Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle. As a consequence, he offers an Averroistic interpretation of Judaism and becomes one of the main representatives of Jewish Averroism. His Averroistic commitments also determine his interpretation of Maimonides – his preference for Maimonides' radical views over his harmonizing views, as well as his occasional deviation from

Maimonides. Polqar’s third aim is to defend his philosophical interpretation of

Judaism. From a social and political point of view, Polqar's unreserved embrace of philosophy raised problems within the Jewish community; he had to refute the Jewish traditionalists’ charge that he was a heretic, led astray by philosophy, to avoid weakening a community, already under considerable pressure in its Christian environment, through internal conflict stemming from views perceived as unorthodox.

This explains his use of an "esoteric" writing practice through which he conceals some of his more radical views from the non-philosophers among his readers. This strategy is explicitly highlighted in the introduction to ‘Ezer ha-Dat, where he declares that due to political and social circumstances he must conceal his genuine opinion in order to avoid being accused of heresy by those who are incapable of understanding his philosophical approach.70 Polqar's identification of Judaism and

70 See ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 27.

true philosophy, moreover, requires clarifying the difference between true science and pseudo-science (for example, astrology and divination), and between correct and incorrect interpretations of Judaism (among the latter, for example, those of the

Kabbalists). The major claim guiding my study is that Polqar advances a systematic naturalistic interpretation of Judaism, which in many cases does not agree with traditional Jewish views.

In support of my argument, I will examine Polqar’s philosophical interpretation of Judaism through a literary and thematic analysis. The first chapter focuses on the literary form of ‘Ezer ha-Dat, which is formally divided into dialogues and essays. The first and fourth treatises are written as essays, while the second, third, and fifth treatises are composed as dialogues. This combination, which at first glance seems arbitrary, is a literary device that advances Polqar’s ideas. The dialogical sections of ‘Ezer ha-Dat comprise several “voices” that serve to conceal the author’s philosophy. For that reason it is essential to single out Polqar’s genuine voice from the midst of the polyphonic presentation, for only thus will we be able to determine his true philosophical views, and the political conditions within which he had to express them and which prevented him from presenting them openly.

In the second chapter, I examine the relationship between philosophy and religion as reflected in both Teshuvat Apikoros and ‘Ezer ha-Dat. The chapter opens with Polqar’s theory of the necessity of both a social law and an ultimate leader. I argue that Polqar adopts al-Fārābī’s model of the perfect leader; however, for him, following Maimonides, the only perfect leader was Moses. After establishing the need for a law and for an ultimate lawgiver, I turn to Polqar’s objections to Christianity, specifically in response to Abner’s critique of the fundamental Jewish principles. The debate between the two concerns, inter alia, the concepts of monotheism, God’s

incorporeality, the messiah’s arrival, Jewish suffering through the ages, and the world to come. I conclude this chapter with an examination of Polqar’s attitude toward non-

Jews, arguing that Polqar does not differentiate Jews from non-Jews on the basis of religion. All men who are willing to dedicate their life to study can, in principle, obtain the ultimate perfection. Polqar argues, however, that, unlike Christian beliefs, the Jewish principles provide a proper starting point for the search for truth.

The third chapter is devoted to examining Polqar’s metaphysics. The chapter includes discussions of God’s will, His foreknowledge in relation to man’s free will, and individual providence as contrasted with universal providence. Here, especially,

Polqar’s naturalistic approach stands out, most clearly in his argument that God’s will is identical with the world’s natural order. The world’s organization consists of three types of events: natural, accidental, and voluntary. In Polqar’s view, only natural events occur necessarily, while accidental and voluntary events belong to the realm of the possible. Polqar’s primary aim here is the defense of man’s free will, as it provides the ground for his debate with Abner, whose arguments for radical determinism challenged Polqar and his contemporaries. Identifying God’s will with the natural laws and rejecting Abner’s deterministic view also entails discarding belief in personal providence; on Polqar’s view, if God’s will is unchangeable, how can He punish the wicked and reward the pious? Within this context, Polqar affirms the concept of free will in an attempt to answer the question of how we can claim that the criminal is responsible for his crime, or that the virtuous man is to be rewarded for his good deeds, if God determines everything.

In chapter four I examine Polqar’s naturalistic theory in relation to the issue of the creation of the world or the eternity of the world. Unlike Maimonides’s equivocal opinion regarding creation, Polqar, following Albalag, openly argues for “perpetual

creation” (ḥidush niẓḥi) and rejects the notion of creation ex nihilo. Polqar himself does not provide a full discussion in support of perpetual creation. Instead, he refers his readers to Albalag’s book Tiqqun Deʿot ha-Philosophim, which he himself completed. In Tiqqun Deʿot ha-Philosophim, Albalag argues for perpetual creation, providing philosophical arguments as well as biblical verses and rabbinic references in support of that view. In addition to the philosophical arguments and biblical and rabbinic proof texts, Albalag grammatically examines the first word of the Torah –

Bereshit –in order to demonstrate its non-temporal meaning.

Defending the theory of perpetual creation leaves no room, according to

Polqar, for miracles, unless we accept that the occurrence of miracles is to be understood within the natural order. If so, the “miracle” only appears to be miraculous in the eyes of the ignorant; however, the scientifically educated must understand it as an event that is unusual but that can be explained within the natural order.

The fourth chapter is also dedicated to a discussion of astrology, a discipline

Polqar rejects completely. In his view, astrologers cannot predict future events, because their method is not scientific. Moreover, Polqar discards the astrologers’ main claim, according to which the heavenly bodies influence man’s actions. In

Polqar’s view, heavenly bodies are material bodies and therefore cannot affect the intellectual, immaterial, part of man’s soul.

The final chapter focuses on Polqar’s concept of man. I begin the discussion with Polqar’s non-traditional theory regarding prophecy and the prophets. Here Polqar completely rejects the Maimonidean theory that every prophet is first and foremost a philosopher. Unlike Maimonides, Polqar distinguishes prophecy from philosophy; while the prophet uses his imagination and his intuition to attain true theories, the

philosopher’s sole tool is his intellect.71 Moses, for Polqar, was a unique figure who was perfect in both his intellect and his power of imagination, making him the ultimate philosopher, leader, and lawgiver. The connection between body and soul is revealed in the role of the Mosaic commandments, which lead one to attain both welfare of the body and welfare of the soul. Polqar clearly differentiates between two types of commandments – the light ones (kalot) and the weighty ones (ḥamurot). He boldly argues that once philosophers reach a high level of theoretical knowledge, they do not need to observe commandments that merely involve bodily restrictions. This discussion leads to Polqar’s view about man’s ultimate purpose – conjoining with the

Active Intellect, a concept with which I conclude this chapter. Polqar presents Moses as the perfect philosopher and the perfect leader whose overflow of Active Intellect emanates onto others, each receiving according to his rank of perfection.

Examining Polqar’s thought and contextualizing his philosophical theories discloses a radical naturalistic thinker who defends philosophy from internal and external critiques. Polqar’s emphasis on the superiority of philosophical learning over theological arguments and traditional understanding reveals an original and unique path, the path of a Jewish thinker whose primary goal was to defend Judaism by offering a specific interpretation of it which accords with philosophy.

Polqar’s philosophy should thus be seen as part of the Jewish Averroist school and as one of several attempts made by post-Maimonidean Jewish thinkers to use

Maimonides’ ideas and methods to bring the Aristotelian philosophy taught by

Averroes and the principles of the Jewish faith more closely together.

71 As we shall see, Polqar was aware of the Avicennian model of prophecy. However, in Polqar’s view, unlike in Avicenna’s view, the prophet’s intuition is a non intellectual process.

Chapter One: The Literary form of ‘Ezer ha-Dat: between Dialogue and Essay

Introduction

‘Ezer ha-Dat is made up of a short introduction and five treatises. At first examination, the work seems peculiar. Medieval Jewish works were composed either as essays or dialogues.72 In ‘Ezer ha-Dat, by contrast, treatises one and four are written as essays, while treatises two, three, and five take the form of dialogues. Each of the three dialogues focuses on one or two main ideas, outlining Polqar’s views and rejecting those of his opponents. Supplementing Polqar’s main texts, all five treatises include plentiful rhymed lines that assist him in formulating his view.73

In this chapter I will introduce the main idea(s) of each treatise. After a brief overview, I will analyze each section in detail, considering both its content and its literary form. I will also attempt to identify Polqar’s voice by differentiating it from the voices of the other characters.

In the opening treatise of the book, Polqar argues for the primacy of the

Jewish Law over other existing laws. For him, the Torah is the best law, and Moses, the lawgiver, is the paramount leader; together they provide Jewish believers with the necessary groundwork to attain their ultimate purpose: the world to come. In this treatise Polqar highlights particular themes, such as the exile and its meaning, faith in the messiah’s ultimate arrival, Talmudic methodology and its authority, and the

Sages’ interpretations. The choice of these themes seems to have been motivated by the Christians having made use of them in order to argue the superiority of

Christianity over Judaism.

72 See, for example, Shlomo ibn Gabirol’s Meqqor ḥayyim (Fons Vitae); Judah Halevi, ha- Kuzari, Shem Tov ibn Joseph Falaquera, Sefer ha-Mevaqqesh (Book of the Seeker); Iggeret ha-Vikuaḥ (The Epistle of the Debate). 73 For two of Polqar’s rhymed lines see, Peter Cole, The Dream of the Poem- Hebrew Poetry from Muslim and Christian Spain 950-1492, pp. 287-288.

The second treatise is composed of several different dialogues. The main dialogue depicts a lively debate between two men with disparate worldviews: one is an old man who represents a traditional and anti-philosophical approach, while the other is a young man who is strongly drawn to philosophy. The debate between these two figures reflects a well-known controversy between traditionalist Jews who were suspicious of philosophy and Jewish philosophers who aimed to reconcile the study of philosophy with revelation. In this dialogue, the traditionalist, as we shall see below, accuses the philosophers of holding heretical views such as denying God’s unity, His omnipotence, His omniscience and so forth, as a result of following Greek philosophy. The young philosopher, on the other hand, claims that no contradiction exists between the Jewish faith and Aristotelian philosophy.

The third treatise of the book is most likely based on the correspondence between Polqar and his former teacher, Abner, regarding astrology. The dialogue in this treatise is between a philosopher74 (ḥaver) and an astrologer (hover). Whereas the latter holds an extreme view of determinism, the former believes in man’s free will.

The fourth treatise of the book presents a typology of four different groups of people, who, according to Polqar, constitute the greatest enemies of Judaism and, as a consequence, of philosophy. The first group consists of the people who reject science while claiming to be true believers. The second includes the Kabbalists who claim to have access to esoteric knowledge reaching back to the prophets. They reject the philosopher’s methods (such as syllogism) as legitimate tools for evaluating knowledge claims. Third are those who accuse philosophers of holding radical naturalistic views. According to this group, philosophers assert that everything is

74 The philosopher presented in this treatise is not the same philosopher as in the previous section. As we shall see later, the young philosopher enthusiastically represents Aristotelian philosophy, without giving much space to his opponent. The philosopher in this section is, by contrast, older, mature, and very much aware of his opponent’s theories.

governed by nature and that even God cannot change the course of nature. For these traditionalists, then, philosophers have turned nature into God’s rival, not His intermediate. The fourth group includes people who believe in magic, witchcraft, and the like.

The fifth treatise closes the book and describes a conversation between a spirit and a man who lives in the material world. These two figures debate the question of what is preferable, to be alive when one can fully enjoy bodily and intellectual pleasures, or to be dead when one’s soul is free from bodily desire. Polqar concludes this section with a revelation: the two interlocutors hear the voice of the angel

Gabriel, who supports the spirit’s position according to which the soul’s detachment from the body is preferable.

The poetic style is present in all five treatises and often serves secondary goals. In some cases, the rhymed lines preface the main discussion, as seen in treatise one. In other cases, in particular in treatise two, they recapitulate the participants’ ideas before the author moves to present the opponent’s reply. I will analyze Polqar’s use of poetry only when it contributes to a better understanding of the arguments.

Although Polqar uses poetry in addition to dialogues and essays throughout ‘Ezer ha-

Dat, for the time being, I will focus on showing how dividing the book into dialogues and essays serves his primary purposes;75 namely, using essays to determine basic assumption such as the need for a law and a lawgiver; and writing in a form of a dialogue when he wishes to emphasize his interlocutor’s flaws on the one hand, and on the other to reinforce his philosophical arguments.

75 Writing in rhymed lines was a common practice in the Middle Ages and since the rhymed lines in ‘Ezer ha-Dat do not contribute to our purpose – establishing Polqar’s intention, I will not discuss this type of literary device here.

Writing the first and the fourth treatises of ‘Ezer ha-Dat in essay form and the others in dialogue form was a deliberate decision made by the author. Polqar’s choice to open the book with an essay is particularly important if we consider that non- philosophers constituted one of the audiences of ‘Ezer ha-Dat. A firm introduction whose purpose is to show that Judaism is superior to all other religions protects Polqar from potential attacks he might receive from the more traditionalist members of his community. Conversely, the dialogues of treatises two and three include controversial discussions that might provoke a negative response from traditionalists. Using the form of dialogue blurs the radical nature of Polqar’s views. Treatise four, an essay, focuses on people who see themselves as the defenders of the faith while, in fact, in

Polqar’s view, they severely damage the principles of the religion.

In order to situate ‘Ezer ha-Dat ’s contribution as a literary text, I will begin by examining the three treatises that are written as dialogues (treatises two, three, and five) in themselves and in relation to other dialogues during the middle ages.76 Lasker defines the dialogue genre in religious polemics77 as “polemics [that] attempted either to recreate a real disputation or to give the impression of a disputation, or at least a conversation that actually occurred.”78 Lasker’s definition applies to the dialogical sections of ‘Ezer ha-Dat. The apologetic stance of ‘Ezer ha-Dat has a twofold purpose. The first is to defend Judaism from native Christians and from apostates, like

Abner, whose aim is to undercut the principles of the Jewish faith. Recreating a real

76 For an extensive discussion of Judeo-Christian polemic, see David Berger, The Jewish- Christian Debate in the High Middle Ages, Philadelphia (1979); Robert Chazan, Church, state, and Jew in the Middle Ages (1980); Jeremy Cohen, Living Letters of the Law: Ideas of the Jews in Medieval Christianity, Berkeley (1999); Aaron W. Hughes, The Art of Dialogue in Jewish Philosophy (2007); Daniel J. Lasker, Jewish Philosophical Polemics Against Christianity in the Middle Ages (2007). Lasker refers to Polqar once (p. xv-xvi) as “additional important editions of polemical treatises.” David Novak, Jewish-Christian Dialogue: A Jewish Justification, Oxford University Press (1992). 77 Polqar’s ‘Ezer ha-Dat is a combination of two types of dialogue: dialogues as presenting religious polemics, and dialogues as presenting paradigms of philosophy. Clearly Polqar sees his dialogues as belonging more to philosophy rather than to religious polemics. 78 Lasker, Daniel J. Jewish Philosophical Polemics Against Christianity in the Middle Ages, p.20.

disputation or giving the impression of a disputation in the form of a dialogue echoes the debate Polqar had with Abner. Indeed, several of the arguments in treatise three are taken almost verbatim from Abner’s Minḥat Qenaot. The second purpose is an internal apologetic one; Polqar wrote ‘Ezer ha-Dat in Hebrew and he addressed his own community – the Jewish community. He realized that it was necessary to defend

Judaism from the Christians’ allegations. In fact, the discussions in ‘Ezer ha-Dat do not contain explicit criticism of Christianity; indeed the words “Christianity” (naẓrut) and “Christians” (noẓrim) do not appear in the book. However, when Polqar discusses the essential principles of Judaism – the existence of God, His unity, and His incorporeality – he intends to simultaneously demonstrate the falsity of Christianity to his readers, insofar as they accept these essential principles. For this reason, we do not find specific arguments that refute the doctrines of the Trinity or the Incarnation.

Instead, Polqar argues that every true religion must not contradict these essential principles. By pointing to the philosophical aspects of Judaism that were rejected by

Christianity, Polqar thereby implicitly demonstrates Judaism’s superiority over

Christianity.

Polqar uses the dialogue form in a manner close to Lasker’s third definition,

“to recreate…a conversation that actually occurred.” The dialogues in ‘Ezer ha-Dat largely recreate the letters exchanged by Polqar and Abner. Although we do not have any evidence of oral disputes that took place between them, we do know that they corresponded after Abner’s conversion to Christianity.79 Abner himself admits that for twenty-five years he had doubts regarding Judaism as the true faith; it is surely not impossible that this personal struggle found its way to the classroom, where his

79 In the next chapter I focus on Polqar’s Teshuvat Apikoros and Abner’s Teshuvot la-Meḥaref – the two extant letters.

pupils, Polqar among them, sensed Abner’s inner conflict.80 Hence, it is quite possible that their disagreement began even while on the surface they shared the same faith.

Perhaps, then, the dialogues in treatises three and five reflect familiar debates between the two men.81 And yet, this trajectory is inconsistent with the dialogue in treatise two. Except for treatise two, all the dialogues are imaginary conversations between two or more characters in which Polqar focuses on specific themes of a universal nature, for example, the immortality of the soul in treatise five, or God’s foreknowledge and man’s free will in treatise three. The dialogue that makes up treatise two, consisting of a general disagreement between two interlocutors who share the Jewish faith. The disagreements are between a young philosopher and an old traditionalist, broadly addresses the relationship between the principles of Judaism in particular and philosophy, an issue that was, of course, the subject of ongoing inner

Jewish debate. Polqar’s own stance on this question is clear: there is no contradiction between Judaism and philosophy.

Why, then, did Polqar turn to the form of a dialogue? What could he gain by presenting his worldview through the play of ideas conveyed by several characters?

Why did he divide the book into three dialogues and two essays? Can this partition point to an arbitrary division?

Writing in a form of a dialogue can serve the author in several ways. Hughes has already noted two possible advantages of presenting one’s thoughts in

80 Cf. Jonathan Hecht, Dissertation, pp. 27-31S; Yitzhak Baer, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, vol. 1, pp. 327-331 [English]; A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, pp. 192-193 [Hebrew]; Ryan Szpiech, Dissertation, pp. 217-220; 229-230; 270; Shalom Ẓadik, Dissertation, p. 262; 286. 81 Treatise three, as mentioned, depicts a dialogue between a mature philosopher and an astrologer. In ‘Ezer ha-Dat (p.123) Polqar himself referred to an epistle he named Sfer be-hakḥashat ha- Iẓtagninot (The Book of Denial of Astrology). As for treatise five, Abner, in his Teshuvot la-Meḥaref p.14a, addresses Polqar’s “third epistle” named Iggeret ha-Tiqvah (The Epistle of the Hope), in which he focuses on the issue of the immortality of the soul.

dialogues.82 First, the dialogue form allows the author to confront and rebut his opponent directly; in ‘Ezer ha-Dat one of the main opponents is Abner. In addition, it constitutes an entertaining and dramatic structure that can attract a wide readership.

Hecht, in agreement with Hughes’ first suggestion, maintains that the dialogue’s purpose as a literary device is primarily to allow the author to present and refute his opponent’s arguments.83

In addition, one may suggest that the dialogue form that we find in three treatises of ‘Ezer ha-Dat allows Polqar to explain and to clarify the stages of his arguments. The separation of the text into the various interlocutors’ interventions serves first and foremost to clarify the issues at stake and the exact points of disagreement. Then, inasmuch as a written dialogue, unlike a verbal one, permits the author to control the conversation as he pleases, he can eventually triumph over his opponent. On the one hand, Polqar had the freedom to determine the extent to which he would present his interlocutor’s arguments, all the while stressing the points he wished to emphasize, as Hecht suggests. On the other hand, by phrasing his opponent’s arguments in certain ways, Polqar sought to change the minds of the members of his community, who often defended the opponent's point of view. In some cases, Polqar demonstrates that the contradiction between his opponents’ views and his own is only imaginary: closer examination reveals that they are fundamentally in agreement and that the seeming opposition was only a misunderstanding on the part of his opponents.

Polqar also uses fictitious characters to present several views, deliberately refusing to identify his real position. Significantly, in the introduction to ‘Ezer ha-

Dat, Polqar indicates that he will write allegorically in several places in the book, in

82 Aaron W. Hughes, The Art of Dialogue in the Jewish Philosophy, p. 86-87. 83 Jonathan Hecht, Dissertation, p.6.

order to conceal his true opinion from those who might accuse him of heresy, thinking his views contradict the principles of Judaism.84 Thus, he writes in a contradictory fashion as he addresses different audiences. To his non-philosophical fellow Jews, he writes in a way that supports their opinions, while at the same time directing a different message to the potential philosophers in his community.

Let us now examine Polqar’s diverse stylistic approaches in greater depth, proceeding on the assumption that the five treatises of ‘Ezer ha-Dat were not put together arbitrarily.85 Can we detect Polqar’s own voice? After all, the dialogues often consist of more than two participants, and it is not always certain which character, if any single one, reflects the author’s genuine views.86 Perhaps Polqar’s voice is revealed in more than one voice.87 I would propose that in order to identify Polqar’s voice, we must take into consideration his views throughout ‘Ezer ha-Dat. Hence, I will now analyze the speaking characters in relation to the leading ideas displayed throughout the text.

‘Ezer ha-Dat’s introduction begins with a brief passage of six lines of rhymed prose that reflect one of the book’s purposes. Here, Polqar highlights the criticism directed against him by his former teacher, Abner of Burgos, and defends his own

84 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 27. Polqar’s reason for concealing his true opinion is different than Maimonides’ seventh reason; while Maimonides “planted” contradictions throughout the Guide of the Perplexed (Hereafter: the Guide), so that those whose level of knowledge and understanding was not suitable would not be able to sense the contradictions, Polqar’s reason reflects a social and political need to avoid confrontation. 85 Another option for reading ‘Ezer ha-Dat is to assume that it constitutes a collection of Polqar’s writings, put together into one book by Polqar himself or by someone else. See Yitzhak Baer, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, pp. 357-358 [English]; A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, p. 213 [Hebrew]. 86 Unlike David Menachem, who claims that there are no difficulties in identifying Polqar’s authentic voice, I argue that Polqar’s dialogical figures present several opinions that are not always in harmony with one another. See David Menachem, Thesis, p. 12. 87 See pp. 40-42. Here I argue that in treatises two and three Polqar introduces two types of scholars: in treatise two it is the young philosopher, and in treatise three it is the mature philosopher. Although I argue that Polqar agrees with the young philosopher’s opinion, he rejects his methods of discussion – mocking his interlocutor. The mature philosopher, on the other hand, represents the right path for creating meaningful dialogue between scholars and traditionalists.

views within the framework of Jewish faith and Aristotelian philosophy, which for him accord with each other:

To the teacher of righteousness and (to) all those who are engaged in inquiry. Sound the voice, oh ye intellectuals, and endow him with authority.88 May [the teacher of righteousness] reveal [to him i.e. to Polqar] the brightness of light, and teach the straight path, to defend the Torah, and raise support for the faith.89

These lines express the central ideas that Polqar reiterates throughout the book; the phrase “teacher of the righteousness” alludes to the title of Abner’s book, in which he presents himself as the man who speaks the truth. Here, Polqar uses Abner’s title in order to claim the function of “teacher of righteousness” for himself. As the protector of the Jewish religion, Polqar serves as the spokesman for the Torah in his time. He therefore turns to the intellectual members of his community, asking that they authorize him to serve as the faith’s true defender and protector. Polqar’s appeal to the intellectuals (maskilim) is deliberate, as it is the intellect that plays a central role when one wishes to defend his religion. Polqar thus portrays himself as the philosopher who asks for the Jewish philosophers’ authority in order to confirm the truth of the Torah, thereby showing that the foundations of the Torah harmoniously coincide with philosophy.

Although Jews, during the Middle Ages, were involved in polemical debate with Christians,90 Polqar makes it clear that he considered his opponents to be “those who rebel against the religion.”91 These “rebels,” Abner foremost among them, were viewed as part of the Jewish community, and they were accused of heresy for

is (העבירו לו דת) ”authority with him “endow expression the that notes Levinger obscure. is text The 88 based on Esther 8:13 and means to give someone the authority to speak on someone else’s behalf. The call in these lines, according to Levinger, is directed towards intellectuals, calling upon them to give Polqar the authority to speak on their behalf for the purpose of defending the Torah. למורה הצדק, ומחזיקי הבדק,תנו קול משכילים ,והעבירו לו דת. יגלה זיו אורה ,נתיב יושר הורה ,להגן התורה ,וקם עזר לדת 89 90 For example, Nachmanides, Barcelona Disputation; Pertus Alfonsi; Pablo Christiani, Joshua ha-Lorki. 91 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 25.

abandoning their faith of birth in favor of Christianity, while simultaneously using their Jewish instruction and knowledge to attack Judaism. Polqar argues vigorously against these apostates and claims that Jewish principles, unlike Christian doctrine, do not contradict philosophy. Hence, Jews have a better chance of attaining the ultimate human perfection. Indeed, Polqar aimed to show that the Torah’s purpose is “to perfect our souls [in order to] to attain the ultimate purpose, [true] happiness.”92 For him, one can attain the ultimate purpose only by acquiring philosophical and scientific knowledge. The Torah, in this case, constitutes an essential “starting point” for its adherents because it formulates a political and ethical basis on which a just society can be built, and at the same time it educates its adherents to pursue philosophical knowledge.93 The first section of treatise one shows that the Torah consists of both the proper praxis – the commandments – and true opinions, which are accepted by the intellect. The Torah provides its adherents with principles that do not contradict philosophy: God’s unity and His incorporeality, for example. It further encourages them to strive to attain the ultimate goal by achieving philosophical knowledge. Since it does not, however, describe the manner through which one can understand these principles philosophically, it cannot provide the ultimate goal. The rebels who deserted the Torah and its laws and adopted Christian doctrines have abandoned the starting point of the philosophical principles provided by the Torah.

Ascribing to philosophy and the study of science a key role in achieving one’s ultimate goal might be perceived as a controversial move. Such an endeavor is particularly difficult when living in a Jewish community that struggles to protect its

92 Ibid. 93 Polqar does not maintain that attaining the ultimate purpose is open only to those who subscribe to the Mosaic Law; rather, he argues that the principles of the Jewish faith serve as proper ground for attaining the ultimate purpose. Aristotle, al-Fārābī, Averroes and their like, for example, were certainly not prevented from attaining the ultimate goal simply because they were not part of the Jewish community. See pp. 131-148, where I extensively discuss Polqar’s view regarding Jews and non-Jews’ ability to attain the ultimate goal.

religious life and tradition primarily by practicing Jewish Law. On the one hand,

Jewish philosophers were concerned that traditionalist members of the community would accuse them of heresy for adopting Greek philosophy and deserting Jewish tradition. On the other hand, disagreements within the Jewish community could weaken its immunity to external pressures and assist Christians and Jewish apostates in fulfilling their mission – converting as many Jews as possible to Christianity.

Therefore, special care needs to be taken when discussing the connection between philosophy and religion.

Treatise one

All five treatises highlight an ongoing discussion in which Polqar strives to work out the relationship between his philosophical views and his traditional upbringing as an observant Jew. And yet, seeking to define the role of philosophy in regard to faith was not an easy task. As Polqar himself indicates in the introduction to

‘Ezer ha-Dat,94 his community was primarily composed of traditional members who often viewed the philosophers negatively, going so far at times as to see them as heretics. This negative attitude toward philosophy on the part of the traditionalists posed a threat to Polqar, who wanted to avoid being seen as a heretic. Hence, ‘Ezer ha-Dat begins with Polqar’s assertion that Judaism and philosophy are in agreement, in an attempt to allay the suspicion of his traditional readers and at the same time to alert the potential philosophers among his readers that they should pay close attention to how he describes that agreement.

The next chapter of this dissertation presents an extensive analysis of treatise one, especially with regard to Christianity. However, since the first treatise also

94 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 27.

contains discussions about the necessity of law and about the Lawgiver’s character, it is important at this point to clarify its role as the opening section and to closely examine its literary structure.

Polqar opens treatise one with an apologetic stance that reveals its significance only when one considers his potential readership. With this stance, Polqar skillfully achieves three things: to start with, he acts as a community leader and representative who responds to converts, first and foremost Abner. Second, he protects himself from attacks on the part of the traditionalists of his community by hiding his radical opinions. Last, by hiding his radical views, Polqar not only protects his own wellbeing, but also acts as a responsible philosopher, one who avoids presenting views to an audience that is not prepared or inclined to accept them.

This concealment also serves a very practical purpose. I will consider one example that demonstrates Polqar’s twofold message.95 In the second chapters

(shaʿar) of treatise one, Polqar stresses the importance of the Mosaic Law.96 After establishing the Mosaic Law’s significance, Polqar concludes with a definition of the true law. At first, he states that only “our Torah” is the true law and that other laws convey wrong opinions. Then, however, he changes his stance and presents a universal definition of a true law as any law comprised of true opinions and appropriate actions. It would follow that for Polqar a true religion is any religion which meets these two conditions. Finally, after setting forth this universal view,

Polqar returns to “our Torah,” stating that because it meets these two conditions, it is the best law that exists. The non-philosophical Jews will take away from this discussion the impression that Polqar maintains that the Jewish faith is the only true

95 In the next chapter, I analyze Polqar’s view of the relationship between Jews and non-Jews and I discuss more examples. See pp. 131-148. 96 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 34-40.

way to attain the ultimate purpose, and that no other religion can be compared to it.

More careful readers, on the other hand, will understand that this is not the case; they will realize that Polqar has concealed his more universal definition of the true law between his particularistic pronouncements. Polqar here goes one step beyond

Maimonides, who defines the divine law from a political point of view, and determines that Judaism is a religion that corresponds to this definition;97 but Polqar, in an even more radical fashion, does not want to argue that Judaism is the only true religion, but rather maintains that there is a possibility that a future religion whose basic principles will be similar to those of Judaism could be considered a true religion alongside it.98

Polqar’s evasion within this opening essay, also served the goal of establishing

Jewish principles as proper ones without exposing himself to criticism from the members of his community. The opening treatise is divided into eight chapters, each devoted to one important topic within Jewish theology. The first three sections stress the intimate connection between Mosaic Law and political philosophy, while portraying Moses as the supreme legislator. The last five sections attempt to respond to several accusations directed at the Jews by their Christian opponents. Among these topics are the discussion of the world to come, the coming of the messiah, the exile and its meaning, and the validity of rabbinic literature.

We see that throughout treatise one Polqar was cautious in formulating his arguments. The text, on its surface, appealed to traditional Jews who would be

97 Maimonides, the Guide, 2:40; 3:27. Cf. Mishneh Torah, Book of Judges, Laws of Kings and wars [Hilkhot Melakhim ve-milḥamot], 12:1; Mishneh Torah, Book of Holiness, laws of forbidden foods [Hilkhot Ma’akhalot Asurot], 11:7. 98 One might wonder why Islam is not considered a true religion by Polqar. While Polqar does not explicitly discuss Islam, he makes great effort to elevate Moses’ position. According to him, only Moses met all of the thirteen prerequisites for being the perfect leader. Muhammad, on the other hand, perhaps possessed some of these prerequisites but not all of them. See discussion on pp. 147- 148.

content with the general message of this treatise – the superiority of Mosaic Law.

Such superiority guaranteed the proper path for a believer to attain the ultimate purpose. However, the text also addressed the few individuals who engaged in the study of philosophy and would have identified and appreciated the philosophical clues the author concealed within it. As a result of tracing these clues, the Jewish philosopher would view ‘Ezer ha-Dat as a philosophical work written by a Jew who both wished to express his philosophical worldview and harmonize his philosophy and faith through a radical reinterpretation of that faith.

A dialogue is indeed an efficient way to simultaneously express one’s radical opinions and conceal radical views. However, in the opening treatise, Polqar uses the essay form to present the strength of Judaism in a decisive, non-dialogic way.

Moreover, had Polqar written these ideas in the form of a dialogue, he would have had to describe Christian doctrines; a dialogue would have required him, as the defensive character, to directly confront an imaginary Christian believer. However, presenting Christian principles (the Trinity, for example) as contradicting philosophical arguments, and as a consequence as untrue, might be a risky endeavor while living under a Christian regime. Hence, in ‘Ezer ha-Dat, Polqar avoids any direct Jewish-Christian confrontation so as to avoid stating explicitly that Christianity is a religion whose fundamental doctrines contradict philosophy.

I would like to suggest that Polqar sought to achieve yet another purpose: if his primary goal was to defend philosophy and use it as a universal measuring rod for ranking religions (in terms of the extent to which they cohere with its basic principles), attacking Christianity would narrow down the discussion to one religion.

Determining universal conditions for defining true religion allowed Polqar to confront present and future faiths whose principles might or might not be compatible

with philosophical investigation. By limiting himself to internal Jewish debate, he paradoxically sought to fulfill this treatise’s purposes: to harmonize Judaism with philosophy, while at the same time avoiding a direct discussion of Christian principles, and to explain how philosophy could be used as a universal yardstick for ranking religions.

Treatise Two

The second treatise includes several dialogues, written in rhymed prose, that deal primarily with a popular controversy, namely whether or not philosophy can be harmonized with faith. Six principal characters are depicted in its two major dialogues. The first features an exchange between a young philosopher and an old traditionalist, and an intervention by a king-judge. The second dialogue is between

Polqar, who identifies himself by his full name, a Maggid,99 and an unidentified person who sides with the traditional point of view that seeks to reject the study of philosophy.

In the first dialogue, the narrator presents an imaginary narrative that sets the stage for his ongoing search for the truth. He leaves his town and “the wind carries him on wings and brings him to Jerusalem.” Meandering through the city’s streets, he sees a mob flocking around two individuals: the first is a tall old man wrapped in his prayer shawl; and the second is a handsome young man whose “countenance shone like pearls, his complexion like roses, and whose lips were a beautiful red.”100

The dialogue consists of four rounds of disputations; in each round, the old man launches accusations to which the young man responds. The first round describes the

99 Polqar gives different meaning to the term “Maggid.” Here the Maggid is probably the narrator. See ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 98, n. 120. 100 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 69.

old man, who represents traditional Judaism, and emphasizes the Torah’s role in one’s life. According to the old man, the Torah stipulates that by observing the commandments one will attain the ultimate goal: the afterlife (ʿOlam haBa). The young man, who represents Greek philosophy, is perceived by traditionalist Jews as a heretic, since philosophy allegedly denies Judaism’s principles. According to the traditionalist, the young man sins, not only by reading and following writings external to the Jewish faith, but also by inciting his whole community to do so as well. Anyone who follows his path deserves death by stoning, fire, or excision (karret). The young man retorts by angrily mocking his opponent’s lack of intelligence in spite of his advanced age. According to the young man, religion does not provide wisdom but is necessary for the sake of the security of the community; conversely, wisdom does not undermine the social needs that religion meets. Thus, religion and philosophy have different but complementary aims. Religion serves a social need, while philosophy targets knowledge of the truth. The young man accuses his older opponent of misjudging the significance of philosophy without knowing its content.

The second round of the disputation focuses on proofexts. The traditionalist cites texts that, in his view, reject any reliance on external wisdom in interpreting biblical and Talmudic sources, such as “No wisdom, no prudence, and no counsel can prevail against the Lord,”101 “prevent your sons from [engaging] logic.”102 The traditionalist concludes that to serve God properly, we must distance ourselves from the study of logic, mathematics, physics, and metaphysics. Instead, we must deepen our faith in Mosaic law and the Sages’ teachings.

In response to the traditionalist’s statement, the young man argues that the latter citation applies, as is or ought to be evident from its content, only to young boys.

"אין חכמה ואין תבונה ואין עצה לנגד ה’“ :21:30 Proverbs 101 "מנעו בניכם מן ההגיון" :28b Berakhot Tractate Talmud, Babylonian 102

Only they are to be prevented from acquiring wisdom, not their fathers. This is because the young have changeable tempers and their comprehension is limited. They are compared to bats that have never been exposed to the sun – and could be blinded by it without proper preparation. While the young man seeks to contest the use of

Talmudic texts for anti-philosophical purposes, interestingly enough, he does not cite biblical or Talmudic sources in support of the study of philosophy. All he does is mock his old opponent by citing the following verse: “I said, let age speak, let advanced years declare wisdom.”103 This verse does not serve the young philosopher’s primary intention, which is to cite verses from the Bible supporting the study of philosophy; the young man thinks of nothing but winning the debate. Both the Talmudic text “prevent your sons from [engaging] logic” and the verse from Job seem to suggest that wisdom does indeed reside within the elderly. However, the old man’s speech obviously indicates that despite his advanced age, he is lacking in wisdom and therefore, ironically, he ought to be prevented from studying philosophy.

This ban, however, will not apply to most mature individuals, who, unlike the young, have attained wisdom. The young philosopher neatly turns the verse against the old traditionalist and gives it a different interpretation that is more coherent with his view, namely that studying philosophy is the only way to attain the world to come. Not everyone is able to develop this type of knowledge, especially young people whose apprehension is limited.

The young man then proceeds to argue that the commandments do not affect

God in any way, but serve only as a means to an end. Obeying the laws is not to be motivated by hope for an external reward; rather, the laws are intrinsically good

אמרתי ימים ידברו ורב שנים יודיעו חכמה :32:7 Job 103

insofar as they directly benefit humans.104 The person who realizes that the acquisition of intellectual knowledge requires performance of the commandments thereby acknowledges their instrumental aspects. Here Polqar cites the rabbinic phrase, “Do not be like servants attending a master in order to receive a reward, rather be like servants attending a master in order not to receive a reward And may the fear of Heaven be upon you.”105 In Polqar’s view, this phrase indicates that the commandments are not to be observed for the purpose of attaining external reward, but rather are intrinsically required to attain the world to come.

The third round of the debate emphasizes the importance of theoretical philosophy. The philosophers, claims the traditionalist, do not achieve anything meaningful. They are engaged in the study of the sciences, while their true goal ought to be observing the practical commandments – “the Midrash is not the essential

[thing] but rather the action is [what is] precious”.106 The young man refutes this allegation by recruiting the science of astronomy in order to demonstrate the connection between faith and philosophy. Our knowledge regarding the position of the moon or the occurrence of an eclipse depends on our knowledge of astronomy; on the one hand, therefore, the study of astronomy reveals how creation manifests divine wisdom, and on the other, knowing astronomy is necessary for proper observance of

Jewish Law.107 Only through the study of astronomy can one appreciate divine

104 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 76: "ולכן אל תקוה שכר אחר בעולם הזה על עשיית מצותיך, ולא טובה אחרת על פעולתך, כי השכר והטוב הוא עצם המצוה, אחר אשר לתועלת האדם בה נצטוה ואל תחשוב כי אליו תועיל אם במצותיו תדבק" 105 Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Avot, 1:3. As Levinger points out (‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 77), Polqar refers to Maimonides’s version. See Maimonides, Hilkhot Teshuvah, 10:4. 106 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 80-81. 107 One could suggest that Polqar believes that following the commandments requires studying the theoretical sciences; he might refer, for example, to the fact that the observant Jew must recite a blessing when he witnesses “the birth of the moon” or an eclipse. In order to show the traditionalist the essential nature of science, therefore, the young philosopher connects the study of astronomy with a practical conduct with which the traditionalist can relate. Furthermore, it is possible that Polqar, like Maimonides, sees the study of astronomy as essential for following the Jewish calendar.

wisdom; this view is both philosophical and Talmudic.108 By acquiring theoretical knowledge, the philosopher differentiates himself from the animals and preserves the image of God within himself. According to the young philosopher, the traditionalist praises the practical aspects of the commandments at the expense of their intellectual value. By longing to defend “impossible beliefs” (emunot nimna‘ot) and believing in exaggerations (guzmot), the traditionalist rejects scientific proofs (ḥokhmot shelemot).

The young philosopher compares his interlocutor to a sick man who desires to fill his stomach with disgusting phlegm – exaggerations and impossible beliefs.109 This longing for harmful food prevents him from enjoying tasty and healthy food: the theoretical sciences.110

The fourth and closing debate merges two topics: the limits of human knowledge and the exalted position of the prophets. The traditionalist follows

Maimonides’ view that prophecy is the highest rank one can attain. If one further asserted, with Maimonides, that this high rank is attained through intellectual perfection and a perfect imagination, it would follow that Aristotle, though an infidel, fully developed his intellect and could thereby have been a prophet. According to the traditionalist, however, even though Aristotle studied the theoretical sciences, he never achieved the rank of prophet. This shows, according to the traditionalists, that the intellect is limited and that therefore philosophers will always lack knowledge.

The only source of true knowledge is the tradition handed down from generation to generation, going back to the prophets themselves. Therefore, the traditionalists’ knowledge, based as it is on this tradition, is more complete and accurate than any

Cf. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Book of Seasons, Laws of Sanctification of the New Moon [Hilkhot Kiddush ha- ḥodesh], chapter 6. 108 Cf. Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Shabbat, 75a. 109 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 82. 110 Cf. Maimonides’s Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Deʿot 2:1; Eight Chapters, chapter 3.

knowledge acquired by the philosophers.111 Moreover, because of these limits, the knowledge acquired by human beings might yield erroneous information. The second topic, connected with the first, is the prophets’ exalted position, insofar as they attain transcendental knowledge that is beyond the capacity of human achievement. The prophets, asserts the traditionalist, have transmitted to him, via the chain of tradition, the knowledge of the secrets of Ezekiel’s Chariot, of the Urim ve-Tumim, of what is above and below, behind and in front, of the Garden of Eden, the messiah’s arrival, the ten Kabbalistic spheres and other esoteric beliefs. At this stage of the dialogue, the traditionalist confesses that in his youth he was drawn to Greek philosophy as well.

He believed that the human intellect was the only source of knowledge; in retrospect, he designates this experience as “falling into a pit.”112 In his youth, the old traditionalist was drawn to philosophy; then God saved him from being entrapped by its false teachings. The old traditionalist realized that if he wished to learn true knowledge of God, he must turn to the prophet who would teach him the secrets of the Torah.

The young man’s response to this declaration is, again, to insult his opponent for his age (“where have you seen or heard, during the many days you have lived on earth, a greater faculty than the intellectual, that can differentiate the truth from the ignorant…”?). He then proceeds to develop his theory of prophecy. The core difference between a philosopher and a prophet, in his view, lies in how he receives knowledge. While the philosopher understands each level of his research, because his intellect is like a spring that actualizes its own potential, the overflow of knowledge onto the prophet “leaps over” (be-derekh maʿavar) his intellectual faculty and acts on

111 The traditionalist’s position here echoes al-Ghazālī’s skepticism, according to which man’s intellect is limited. Cf. al-Ghazālī, Deliverance from Error, pp. 58-59. 112 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 87. The traditionalist does not indicate the reasons that led him to doubt the power of the intellect. He simply emphasizes that he studied Greek philosophy in his youth until God saved him and directed him to turn to the prophet, to hear from him “God’s secrets.”

his imagination alone. As a result, the philosopher is able to explain the knowledge he has attained, whereas the prophet is not able to do so.113 Hence, unlike the philosopher, the prophet cannot teach others;114 how can you learn from someone who cannot teach? Thus, concludes the young man, the traditionalist gains nothing by turning to the prophets for knowledge. The philosophers, on the contrary, set forth an argument; they propose premises (ẓiyyur)115 and justifications (heẓdek), namely, scientific grounds in support of their premises. Their conclusions are based on a logical analysis of those premises. The young philosopher concludes that a philosopher is superior to a prophet, since the prophet, unlike the philosopher, offers conclusions without delivering any justifications for them. This argument ends the first dialogue of treatise two, concluding with the young man’s suggestion that the old traditionalist return to wisdom.

Listening to this vigorous dialogue, the community turns to the king of Israel,116 asking him to intervene between the two agitated interlocutors and to adjudicate the legitimacy of their arguments. Hughes asserts that the king’s ruling, “attempts to harmonize the truths of philosophy and religion.”117 The king, according to Hughes, manages to reconcile the two disciplines; however, close examination of the king’s verdict discloses that he is closer to the young philosopher’s view than to the old traditionalist’s:

113 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 88. See also Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra Tractate 12,1: “Wise man is preferable to a prophet.” In chapter five of this dissertation I discuss Polqar’s deviation from the Maimonidean opinion of prophecy extensively. See pp. 251-268. 114 Polqar’s proposition that the philosopher can teach others while the prophet cannot seems to present an original view which has no precedent in rabbinic literature or in medieval religious philosophy. It appears, however, later in Spinoza’s thought. Cf. Theological-Political Treatise, chapter one annotation two; Zev Harvey, Spinoza’s counterfactual Zionism, ‘Iyyun 62 (2013) pp. 238-239, 244. 115 Cf. the Guide, 1:50. 116 Levinger claims that the King of Israel is a title Polqar ascribes to himself. See ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 91, n. 105. 117 Aaron Hughes, The Art of Dialogue in Jewish Philosophy, p. 96. On p. 84 Hughes makes a similar claim: “the king…rules in such manner that strikes a middle ground between the two antagonistic positions.”

And indeed, the divine providence’s compassion upon us, to guide us and to [direct] our ways so we will not be lost in our wickedness, guides us according to two paths, so that we do not walk in darkness. The first path is that of perfect theoretical wisdom; the other is that of God’s perfect religion. The first imprints in the soul the form of the intelligibles that are found in the created beings, and also that of the separate forms. The second seeks to straighten the deeds in our hands, and to direct our actions toward good and beautiful works, which bring about the perfection of [our ability to engage in philosophy]. However, there is no perfection in deeds alone, if the intellect cannot grasp the intelligibles and combine them…Therefore, one needs the two paths to attain perfection: obligatory action and theoretical science. Wisdom cannot exist outside of Torah, for in it everything is brought to light. A religious person without philosophy in his soul is lost, because ignorant people (ʿam ha-areẓ)118 are not righteous (ḥasid).119 In truth, the Torah is a prolegomenon and a preparation to draw the potential intellect to its actuality, and to cleave to it and to unite [with the Active Intellect]. Whosoever ascends to this level reaches eternity and this is the world to come.120 [emphases were added]

The king divides the two disciplines by ascribing a different purpose to each.

According to him, philosophy or theoretical wisdom leads one to “imprint in the soul the form of the intelligibles that are found in the created beings, and also that of the separate forms.” Religion, on the other hand, educates us “to direct our actions toward good and beautiful works,” which is a necessary step in achieving intellectual perfection. In other words, philosophy alone leads one to attain true knowledge; at the same time, in order to attain true knowledge, one must first posses the morality provided by the Torah. The Torah, however, does not teach one true knowledge. It

118 Polqar clearly plays with the expression “ʿam ha-areẓ,” for usually it refers to those who are ignorant in halakhic matters, whereas in this context it means those who are not engaged with wisdom. 119 Mishnah Avot 2:5 120 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 93. Hughes translated this part in his book The Art of Dialogue in Jewish Philosophy, p. 84. I used his translation with several modifications. ואמנם ברוב חמלת ההשגחה האלהית עלינו להדריכנו ולהישירינו פן נאבד ברשעתינו הדריכתנו בשני דרכים לבל נלך חשכים. האחד הוא דרך החכמה העיונית השלימה והאחר דת האל התמימה והראשון מאלה יצטרך להטביע בנפש פתוחי המושכלות אשר בנמצאים נכללות גם מהצורות הנבדלות והשני להישיר את מעשה ידינו ולכונן את מפעלינו במעשים הטובים והנאים אשר לשלמות החלק הראשון מביאים. כי אין שלימות האדם במעשים לבדם מבלי השגת השכל את המושכלות והתאחדם ואי אפשר להטבע ולראות במראה כל הצורות המתנגדות אליה בהיות טומאתה בשוליה עד אשר תרחץ ותנקה מטינופיה וסיגיה. ולכן יהיו שני הדרכים לשלמות האדם מוצרכים מחוייבים ומוכרחים. ואין החכמה מתקיימת כי אם בתורה ובה תגלה ותצא לאורה. גם בעל הדת מבלי חכמה נפשו מפסיד כי אין עם הארץ חסיד. ובאמת התורה הנאמנה היא זמון והכנה להוציא את כח השכל החומרי אל פעלו ולהדביקו והתאחדו בפועלו. אשרי מי שעלה במדרגה הזאת ועדיה בא הן הם חיי העולם הבא.

would thus appear that the king presents a view according to which the realm of the

Torah is solely moral, not even providing Its adherents with true principles such as

God’s unity and God’s incorporeality.121 In this sense the Torah is a preparation; it offers the ethical, practical, and political tools necessary to attain true knowledge.

Kaplan maintains that Hughes’s claim -- that the king’s role is to reconcile the truths of philosophy and Judaism after initially differentiating them -- is inaccurate.

Kaplan argues that a careful reading of the king’s verdict confirms that “Polleqar appears here to be carefully covering his tracks, giving the impression that the king splits the difference between the young philosopher and the old traditionalist, when in truth he is considerably closer the former.” 122 The king’s solution only appears to view both approaches as equals that can be harmonized. In truth, while specifying the functions of wisdom, the king briefly states that religion is merely an instrument for attaining the ultimate goal; this goal – conjoining with the Active Intellect, can be attained by intellectual perfection alone. It seems as if Polqar has set a trap for the naïve reader who, after a superficial reading, is likely to conclude that these two disciplines are not simply equivalent in significance, but also equally dependent on one another. In fact, although they complete each other, they are not equally important; philosophy is the only path that leads to true knowledge, while religion serves as a means to true knowledge.

Later on, the king defines who the true heretics are – the mitpalsefim, the pseudo philosophers who pretend to be philosophers – in order to distinguish them from the true philosophers. Unlike the true philosophers, the pseudo philosophers fail to realize that philosophy and religion require different means; while philosophers use

121 The king here rejects Maimonides’ view that the Torah consists of true principles such as monotheism and God’s incorporeality. Cf. the Guide, 2:40; 3:26-27. Polqar himself indicates that the Torah (dateinu) consists of philosophical truths; Cf. Teshuvat Apikoros, p.2b; ‘Ezer ha-Dat, 34-40. 122 See Lawrence Kaplan’s book review: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=23604.

syllogism to demonstrate arguments, theologians apply techniques of religious legal interpretation, such as analogy (gezerah shava)– methods that are unacceptable for the philosophers. The king accuses the pseudo philosophers of mixing these two methods

– the legal reasoning and the formal logical reasoning – and of not understanding that the two disciplines employ different means.123 Distinguishing between these two methods emphasizes that the goal of religion is inferior, but necessary, to the goal of philosophy. According to the king, there must be a clear distinction between philosophy and religion, both in terms of purpose and of method; while the former uses logical tools, such as syllogism, for the purpose of attaining true knowledge, the latter exploits the thirteen hermeneutical modes of interpreting the Torah (shlosh

ʿesrei middot) to determine Halakhic issues.

After introducing this distinction between the disciplines of philosophy and religion, and presenting the real infidels, the king proceeds to pronounce his (first) verdict. Here Polqar prepares a surprise for the reader: despite the king’s apparent support of the philosophical view, the young philosopher is imprisoned after the traditionalist accuses the young man of violently assaulting him. Nonetheless, the disputation is not quite over. After spending some time in jail, the young man persuades the king to listen to his own allegations against the traditionalist and proves that he was unjustly sentenced. As in a real trial, the king requests the presence of all the witnesses who attended the debate. Examining the facts of the event leads the king to exonerate the young philosopher of all allegations leveled at him by his opponent.

One might wonder why the king had not summoned the witnesses before issuing his first verdict; it is noteworthy here that the king, in his first verdict, sentences the

123 Polqar uses the word religion (Dat) to contrast it with philosophy (Tushiyya), but the discussion clearly revolves around the different tools these two disciplines are using – religion uses the thirteen hermeneutical modes of interpretation (shlosh ʿesrei middot) to establish the Jewish Law, while philosophy uses logic to attain true knowledge.

young philosopher to prison without consulting anyone first, while in the second verdict, in which the young philosopher is exonerated, he consults the wise men

(maskilim u-mevinim). These different verdicts might be Polqar’s way of condemning the criticisms that traditionalists leveled against philosophers: the traditionalists unfairly accused the philosophers of heresy without first hearing their justifications for their arguments. The two different verdicts might also reflect a dual perspective: the first verdict is based on the young philosopher’s apparently improper ethical conduct – his mocking tone, his anger, and his humiliation of the old man. The second judgment is rooted in intellectual examination and focuses on the substance of the young philosopher’s position. Here, the young philosopher, after overcoming the appearance of unacceptable behavior, had the opportunity to present his arguments to the ostensibly impartial ruling king.

The king’s second verdict stems from his view regarding the two disciplines.

According to him, a philosopher without Torah is like a lonely human being who stands in the middle of a desert without a society. A social being by nature, the individual needs the support of his society to exist as a natural creature.124 On the other hand, the religious man, who possesses no philosophical knowledge, is like a beast with no shepherd guiding its way to the meadow.125 According to Polqar’s reading of this metaphor, the philosopher, although he is a natural creature, can

124 Cf. Ibn Bajja’s Taḍbir al-Mutawaḥid, chapter 17: “…It is clear from the situation of the solitary that he must not associate with those whose end is corporal nor with those whose end is the spirituality that is adulterated with corporeality. Rather, he must associate with those who pursue the sciences. Now since those who pursue the sciences are few in some ways of life and many in others – there even being ways of life in which they do not exist at all – it follows that in some of the ways of life the solitary must keep away from men completely so far as he can, and not deal with them except in indispensable matters and to the extent to which it is indispensable for him to do so..” (English translation: Lawrence Berman, “The Governance of the Solitary,” Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook second edition, Joshua Parens and Joseph C. Macfarland (eds.) p. 104); the Guide 1:72; 3:51. 125 Cf. the Guide, 1:7 where Maimonides writes: “whoever is not endowed with this [intellectual] form… is not a human being, but an animal having the shape and configuration of a human being”; in addition, in the Guide 3:51 Maimonides describes those who have no doctrinal belief as being in “a rank lower than the rank of a human being but higher than the rank of apes.”

temporarily separate himself from society in order to gain the knowledge with which he can find the way to the meadow. Temporary separation is required because being part of society means being part of the political-social environment, not the ideal condition if one wishes to conjoin with the Active Intellect. Afterward, he can return to society to fulfill his basic needs. In contrast, by maintaining a healthy social, political, and ethical life, the traditional Jew who observes the commandments sees to the welfare of the body. The meadow is the final destination for which one must strive, a metaphor for the world to come. Here, the shepherd corresponds to one’s intellect, the faculty that guides one to the meadow. As long as the religious man fails to use his intellect, he amounts to a wandering beast; however, the religious man has the potential to change his situation by gaining theoretical knowledge.

The king’s final ruling is that of an optimistic leader who orders the two parties to cooperate and accept one another, in the apparent belief that his order will be implemented. For the king, joining forces can only strengthen the practical, political, and ethical role of the Torah. He also instructs the two debaters to accept his sentence and to put his judgment into practice. The king thereby concludes by accepting the view of the young philosopher, but at the same time, he rejects his aggressive behavior towards the old traditionalist. Instead, the philosopher and the traditionalist must abandon their antagonism toward one another and join forces. In this way the religion will achieve Its purpose of serving as leading one to attain the ultimate goal, while the philosophers who have undergone the rigorous course of moral purification provided by Torah will be able to attain true knowledge that leads to the immortality of the soul.

It would appear at this juncture that the king represents Polqar’s true opinion.

Indeed, the course of the dispute reflects Polqar’s dual goal of defending philosophy

and at the same time arguing that there is no contradiction between its principles and the Jewish religion. The young man’s enthusiasm prevents him from reconciling religion and philosophy. His rigid opinions exhibit his overriding desire to win the debate by refuting his interlocutor’s arguments. His behavior – mocking the old man, speaking angrily, and insulting his opponent – shows that he is not interested in any reconciliation between the two disciplines. Polqar, then, agrees with the young man but not with the way in which he conducts the debate. As a mature Jewish philosopher, he cannot burn the bridges connecting him with his fellow Jews. Polqar’s rejection of the aggressive debating style of the young philosopher was intended to teach a lesson that finding a common ground between philosophers and traditional

Jews is more important than winning any debate.

At the end of the first dialogue, after the king threatens anyone who violates his decision with punishment, Polqar introduces himself by name as an opponent of the pseudo philosophers and a person who dedicates his life to studying the sciences.126

Immediately afterward, a new figure – the Maggid,127 the narrator – is introduced; his appearance opens a second dialogue which features the Maggid and an anonymous figure.128 Polqar therefore concludes the first dialogue with the king’s verdict and begins the second with the Maggid seeking to harmonize philosophy and tradition; between the two, he presents himself by his full name. This dramatic transition

נאם שומע אמרי דת אל ולחזות במחזה החכמה כל יום שואל ובפתבג המתחכמים הכופרים בלתי מתגאל עוסק בתורה ותאב 126 למדע המחקר יצחק ב'ר יוסף נע'ן פלקאר. 127 The Maggid appears in two other places in ‘Ezer ha-Dat. The first appearance is at the end of treatise three (p. 146), as the narrator of the diviner story; the second is in treatise five, toward the end of the book (p. 177), as an additional character who appears in the dialogue between the spirit and the living man. The role of the Maggid here and in treatise five is similar in many ways: in both cases he summarizes the preceding dialogue with the obvious predilection for philosophy. On the other hand, the Maggid in treatise three is a neutral figure, a narrator who merely describes events that occurred, in preparation for the story of the diviner. For the analysis of the diviner story see pp. 48-49. 128 The anonymous person appears at first as a shouting voice which the Maggid approaches. At the end of this dialogue, the author refers to the voice as a man (‘ish). This dialogue appears in ‘Ezer ha- Dat pp. 99-104.

suggests that Polqar’ true opinion is presented by both the king and the Maggid: the

Torah, although lower in rank than philosophy, serves as a necessary prolegomenon to intellectual life. The king has the authority to execute his judgment on all his subjects

– both traditionalists and philosophers. As king and judge, he must consider his community as a whole, namely, as one society comprised of individuals, only some of whom have the potential to achieve the ultimate goal. The Maggid recapitulates the king’s view that philosophy and religion are sisters. The latter precedes the former in time, but not in importance.129

The first dialogue, between the young philosopher and the old traditionalist, consists of a debate of the immature young philosopher against the specific interpretation of the old man to religion. The second dialogue, by contrast, presents a traditionalist critique of certain philosophical views. Using the figure of the Maggid allows Polqar to distance himself from the dialogue, but, indirectly, the Maggid serves as his spokesman. The Maggid does not confine himself to generalities but rather tackles theological difficulties such as the afterlife, man’s ultimate goal, and the problem of evil in the world130 in his attempt to demonstrate that no contradiction exists between philosophy and the Jewish faith. Despite his aim to address these complex theological issues, at this point Polqar refrains from directly presenting his own arguments and conclusions.

The Maggid proceeds to describe the tribulations that beset him on his journey.

Having arrived at a city gate, he hears a voice haranguing those who are unfaithful to the Torah. The voice, echoing the traditionalist’s viewpoint, accuses those individuals

129 Cf. al-Fārābī, Book of Letters, book 2: “…Religion, if rendered human, comes after philosophy, in general, since it aims simply to instruct the multitude in theoretical and practical matter that have been inferred in philosophy, in such a way as to enable the multitude to understand them by persuasion or imaginative representation, or both.” (English translation of book two in Medieval Islamic Philosophical Writings, Muhammad Khalidi (ed.) p.1.) צדיק ורע לו רשע וטוב לו 130

who attempt to place the Torah and wisdom (tushiyya) on the same plane. This voice reinterprets al-Ghazālī’s efforts, in his book The Incoherence of the Philosophers, to question certain philosophical arguments and to uncover their weaknesses. The philosophers’ “heretical” opinions, in Polqar’s reinterpretation of al-Ghazālī’s view, are: (1) that the world is eternal; (2) that God acts by nature of necessity and not according to His will, and therefore, that the world operates within a deterministic framework; (3) that God is passive and unchanging, as a result of which He does not reward the pious or punish the wicked; (4) that God knows only universals and not particulars; (5) that the world operates according to chance, without any divine intervention.131

After presenting these allegations, the narrator – who is later named as “Isaac” and therefore represents Polqar himself – describes this voice as coming toward him, threatening and blaming him for his efforts to harmonize the Torah and philosophy.132

Reproving this voice of ignorance, Polqar now briefly replies to it, and thereby to al-Ghazālī’s accusations. First, Polqar retorts, it is well known that Averroes authored The Incoherence of the Incoherence (Tahāfut al- Tahāfut) to refute al-

Ghazālī ‘s charges. It is also possible, stresses Polqar, that al-Ghazālī wrote his book in such a way that it conceals his true opinions, on account of his contemporaries; that is, because of his traditionalist audience, he had to hide his true opinions – opinions

131 This list of themes does not correspond to al- al-Ghazālī’s three accusations against the philosophers whom he identifies with the heretics (kuffar). According to him, a heretic is one who denies (1) that God created the world ex nihilo, (2) that God knows only universals, and not particulars, and (3) that after death, the human soul never returns into the body. See al-Ghazālī, Deliverance From Error, p. 26; The Incoherence of the Philosophers, mainly First Discussion, pp. 12-46; Thirteenth Discussion, pp. 134-.143; Twentieth Discussion, pp. 208- 225. It is possible that Polqar chooses to modify al-Ghazālī’s accusations so that they cohere with his own debate with Abner. These five allegations, leveled against the philosophers, were the core of the dispute between Polqar and Abner; in this way, although ostensibly directed against al-Ghazālī, refuting each one of them allows Polqar to address Abner’s arguments against the philosophical method. 132 The voice here accuses the Maggid – Polqar – with these attempts, even though in the narrative the king, rather than the Maggid, was the one who attempted to reconcile the two methods.

that side with the philosophers – on these matters.133 If Polqar is right and al-Ghazālī could not openly express his true views, al-Ghazālī’s public criticism of the philosophers carries no weight. In his Sefer Tiqqun Deʿot ha-Philosophim, a commentary he wrote on al-Ghazālī’s Maqaṣid al- Falāsifa, Isaac Albalag first presents and then refutes al-Ghazālī’s accusations.

Second, in response to al-Ghazālī’s accusation that the philosophical affirmation of the eternity of the world is heretical, Polqar replies that it is more reasonable to believe in perpetual creation (ḥidush niẓḥi) than to assert that the world was created ex nihilo.134 By affirming perpetual creation and denying God’s act of creation in time,

Polqar thus strengthens the philosophical view according to which God is unchangeable: He did not change by creating the world at a particular moment in time, since creation is an eternal act. Similarly, He does not change when one prays or sacrifices to him. The purpose of prayer and sacrifice is to change ourselves, not

God.135

Treatise Three136

In treatise three, Polqar introduces the longest dialogue in ‘Ezer ha-Dat. The dialogue consists of a dispute between an astrologer, most likely Polqar’s teacher,

Abner, and a scholar, presumably Polqar himself. The astrologer vehemently defends

133 Cf. Alexander Treiger Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought (2014); The Science of Divine Disclosure: al-Ghazālī’s Higher Theology and Its Philosophical Underpinnings (2008). Treiger’s main argument is that al-Ghazālī was in fact a philosopher who had to conceal his true opinion. 134 Cf. Albalag, Tiqqun Deʿot ha-Philosophim, chapter 30, pp. 50-51; Averroes, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, discussions one and three. 135 In chapter four I discuss Polqar’s view of the cosmos and his arguments in favor of perpetual creation extensively. See pp. 198-217. 136 The first section of the dialogue deals with astrology. As Levinger has noted, the text is missing one or several pages; see ‘Ezer ha-Dat pp. 12-14 and 107 n. b. Isaac Baer argued that the astrologer’s claims are presented by Abner in his book Minḥat Qenaot; see Baer, “The Book of Minḥat Qenaot to Abner of Burgos and its influence on Rabbi Hasdai Crescas,” p. 189 n.4; David Menachem, Thesis, p. 27.

the validity of astrology and the planets’ ability to influence the sublunar world. He also defends determinism and denies that humans possess free will, claiming that all events have a cause that ends with God Himself.137 Therefore, if God is the First

Cause of all created beings, no action can take place that He Himself has not caused.

The scholar, on the other hand, rejects these ideas. He claims that both the Torah and judgment (shikkul ha-Daʿat) forbid us from reading astrological books138 and that not all events are pre-determined. He also places great importance on possible events

(efshar), in the category of which he includes man’s free choice.

Polqar begins the dialogue with an imaginary narrative that describes his travels while searching for truth in “God’s big city.” By following the sound of a crowd, he finds a group of people listening to an address by an astrologer. The astrologer claims to follow the movement of the stars, using peculiar devices to determine their position and direction. He “reads” these movements as predictions of the future. He criticizes the philosophers for lacking the defining characteristic of a prophet – the ability to predict the future; instead, they “waste their time studying logic and natural divine sciences,” which do not develop this critical ability to predict future events. At this point, the narrator attests that one man in the crowd, who appears to be an

“intellectual man who protects God and His truth zealously,” begins a dialogue with the astrologer.

When the wise man asks the astrologer what differentiates his art from other arts, the latter declares that he, like the prophets, “knows and understands things before they happen.” Prophecy, on this view, is nothing but knowing how “to read” future events by charting the movement of the stars.

137 Cf. the Guide, 2:48. 138 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 116.

The astrologer continues his explanation by claiming that the planets possess human attributes (some of them give birth, some are sterile, etc.), and each one of them is “responsible” for changes in human actions. The sphere (galgal) that holds all the planets is divided, at any given time, into four periods; each of these periods is divided into three smaller parts, and each of these smaller parts is called a “house”

(bayit). The sphere is therefore comprised of twelve “houses” altogether.139 Now, claims the astrologer, each “house” possesses certain qualities. For example, the second represents fortune, life and death; the twelfth stands for fear, concern, deceit, and the animal aspect.140 The scholar replies that ascribing qualities of the four elements (heat, cold, humidity and dryness) to heavenly bodies is complete nonsense.

The four elements are finite, while the heavenly bodies are made of the fifth element, which “cannot possess one of the four qualities responsible for decay in the sublunar world.”141

At this point in the dialogue, the scholar shows an interest in the fundamental premises upon which the astrologer constructs his astrological theories. According to the scholar, these premises must originate from one of three different sources - they are intellectual (muskalot), empirical (murgashot), or traditional (mequbbalot).

Basing the “science” of astrology on the zodiac system elicits a mocking response from the scholar: “Who is the one who elevated himself to the heavenly bodies and saw the shape of a Capricorn, Aries, and Taurus and alike? How is it possible he saw these figures and not, for instance, a cow or a sheep?” If our ancestors saw those signs, then we must say that they knew them to be true only by the intellect. For how

139 The twelve signs of the zodiac. 140 The scholar replies to this assertion later. According to him, ascribing human attributes to a planet is equal to a children’s game in which they ascribe to each other different roles such as king, minister and so on. The difference between the children and the astrologers is that the former are aware they are playing a game and that all the personalities they adopt are fictional. The astrologers, on the other hand, believe their fictional theories to be true. See ‘Ezer ha-Dat, 111. 141 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 109.

can one argue that our senses are so inferior that we fail to see these shapes? It is possible, claims the scholar, that the power of the intellect decreases from one generation to the next - but not the senses. Therefore, the astrologer’s assertions cannot be proven either by empirical or traditional premises.

The astrologer tries to anchor his method in Ptolemy’s texts, which in his view provide strong evidence for his argument. The astrologer asserts that Ptolemy, in his book Quadripartite, succeeds in proving the connection between natural weather patterns and the four periods of the year. The heat of the sun and the humidity of the moon influence our world during the year; as a result, some months are characterized by fertility, while others are characterized by darkness and cold.

Astrology and predestination (gzerah)

The astrologer in this dialogue ascribes forces to the heavenly bodies that can actively influence the sublunar world, including human actions. In response, the scholar raises several objections to this assertion. First, one’s soul is the source of free will. The soul is superior to material objects, including the spheres (galgalim). Indeed, if the heavenly bodies are made of matter and one’s soul is incorporeal, how, can a material object affect a non-material object? Second, how it is possible that many individuals who were born at different times can share the same destiny? He offers the example of a group of people who sail on a ship that sinks, or of a legion of soldiers, many of whom die on the same day.

In order to defend his view against the scholar’s criticism, the astrologer distinguishes between two types of predestination : general and individual. The general always takes precedence over the individual. The people on the boat or the soldiers in the battlefield possess individual predetermined judgments; however, the

4 7

astrologer claims that in these cases the predetermined judgment applies to the boat as a whole, not to the individual; similarly, it applies to the battle in general, not to each soldier.

The scholar, who rejects any predetermined judgment, criticizes the astrologer’s response. It is absurd to think, he replies, that several predetermined judgments exist at the same time but only one is actualized. What distinguishes one predetermined judgment from another? It would follow from the astrologer’s view, the scholar continues, that God changes His mind in response to specific events. At this point, the scholar pronounces himself the victor in this disputation; he concludes by arguing for the existence of possibility and of man’s free will.

The Diviner’s Story

The last part of treatise three appears to be a late addition. It describes Polqar’s meeting with a group of people who narrate the story of a diviner (me‘onen). This story is divided into two parts, with the first part describing a disputation that occurs in a king’s garden. The debate takes place between a diviner who strongly supports astrology and a contemplator (mitbonen) who rejects any astral force and advocates instead for scientific studies. In the second part, the diviner is forced by the king to prove his arguments empirically. He fails and as a result is executed by the king who, in addition, expels all the astrologers who reside in his kingdom.

The contemplator’s opening argument summarizes the scholar’s main point in the previous dialogue: possibility exists. To claim that God knows future events entails their being necessary rather than possible; yet this contradicts the very nature of possibility, which has already been established. There are three types of actions: natural, accidental, and voluntary. While the first two types are beyond human

control, the third type, by its very nature, is in human hands. In this domain, man acts freely and consequently can be held responsible for his actions.

The king here is similar to the king in the second treatise: he functions as a judge whose role is to rule in favor of one of the parties. He allows the diviner three opportunities to defend his claim by proving his argument empirically. The diviner receives three opportunities: first, a nobleman consults him about the correct season to build a fortress that will protect him from his enemies. After reading the movements of the stars, the diviner advises the nobleman to build the fortress at a certain time.

This prediction fails: immediately after the first wall is built, a legion of soldiers burns the fortress down, destroying it completely. Next comes a farmer who asks his advice regarding the correct season to plant a vineyard. After analyzing the movement of the moon, the diviner orders him to start planting at a particular time. The farmer obeys, but not long after, he finds thorns instead of grapes in his vineyard. Last comes a man who asks the diviner to advise him about the correct date for his wedding. Again, after reading the stars’ movements, the diviner renders his judgment and the groom hastens to set the date for the wedding. On the wedding night, the house collapses, killing all the family and guests.

After seeing the failure of his three predictions, the diviner flees. While he is traveling, he chances upon a medical clinic (beit rofe ḥolim). When one of the patients arrives with his urine test, the doctor orders him to be bled. Hearing this conversation, the diviner convinces the patient to avoid the bloodletting on the basis of the moon’s movement. The sick man dies the same night. Deeply troubled by the diviner’s failed prognostications and their disastrous consequences, the community turns to the king and requests that he prevent the diviner from making any future predictions. The king,

as noted above, responds positively to the community’s request, and all diviners are expelled from the kingdom.

While amusing and quite violent, this story about the diviner does not seem to add anything substantial to Polqar’s critique of astrology. It does, however, show that astrology is not merely scientifically false, but very dangerous and sometimes lethal.

It would appear that Polqar added this fictitious story only to support his previous assertions by giving them a piquant empirical touch.

Treatise Four

As previously noted, the first and fourth treatises of ‘Ezer ha-Dat are written in essay form. And yet, while the first treatise was partly based on the correspondence between Polqar and Abner regarding what principles any true religion should adopt, this treatise focuses on several Jewish ignorant sects,142 with the goal of refuting four different types of charges against “those who are engaged in the true sciences.” The apologetic stance that characterizes the first treatise reappears here, addressing now

Jewish sects rather than Christian converts; Polqar wishes to achieve two things by composing this treatise. The first is to continue persuading his readers that philosophy is the true method of attaining one’s ultimate purpose. The second is to show that the principles of Judaism do not contradict reason. The four Jewish sects under scrutiny threaten and imperil proper faith, because they lead the masses astray by teaching incorrect principles of Judaism. Polqar cites as an example the Kabbalists whose doctrine of the ten sephiroth annuls the idea of God’s unity. Further, Polqar claims

142 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p.155. Hughes identifies these sects as the “enemies of true Judaism.” See The Art of Dialogue in Jewish Philosophy, p. 85; Zadik refers to these sects as the multitudes [hamonei ha-ʿam). See Shalom Ẓadik, Thesis, p. 7. Polqar refers to these sects as “ignorant” (sekhalim).

that these sects prevent the true worshipers – the philosophers – from presenting their views, accusing them instead of holding heretical opinions.

The treatise opens with the following declaration: “the author said” (amar ha- meḥaber). Polqar’s stance in this section stands out in comparison to the other treatises of ‘Ezer ha-Dat, where it is more difficult to identify his voice. This section, like the first treatise, offers the reader Polqar’s opinion without the uncertainty created by the additional characters in the three dialogues.

Polqar first turns to the traditionalists. The sect is composed of those who see themselves as adherents of the true Judaism. These traditionalists confuse true philosophers with pseudo-philosophers (ha-mitpaksefim), who, Polqar notes, embarked upon the study of logic but never fully attained knowledge of the sciences.

The traditionalists see the behavior of the rhetoricians and think that the study of philosophy leads to belittling and disrespecting the commandments. The traditionalists, however, do not understand that the true philosophers, in truth, appreciate the true value of the commandments. As they see it, studying leads the philosophers to obey some of the commandments, especially those that are related to knowledge of God; at the same time, their limited obedience is revealed in their lack of respect for the ceremonial commandments.

The true philosophers, those who have attained or approach true knowledge, keep all the commandments because they understand their rationale. God bestowed these rules in order to confer great benefit on humans; to claim that some are important and others are less significant is tantamount to claiming that God granted us some commandments that have no purpose. What the philosophers understand, and the traditionalists fail to realize, is the true reason why God gave the commandments.

The philosophers appreciate the true value of the ceremonial commandments insofar

as they lead one to attain the true human perfection. Unlike the traditionalists, who obey while making no effort to understand their conduct, the philosophers understand why one must initially observe the ceremonial, the political and the ethical commandments.143 Therefore, the philosophers worship God in the most proper way.

The second sect is the Kabbalists, who mock the philosophers’ determination to study the sciences as unattainable. Since the human mind is limited and incapable of discovering sublime truths, they view the philosophers’ striving for scientific knowledge as fundamentally misguided. For the Kabbalists, the use of logic, syllogism, and other philosophical tools does not suffice for attaining true knowledge, which was passed down in the teachings of the prophets. The Kabbalists’ main error, claims Polqar, is their assertion that they alone are the bearers of a true prophetic message. In addition to their unwarranted monopolization of true knowledge, Polqar further points to the Kabbalists’ inability to justify the validity of their knowledge.

Polqar sees the Kabbalists’ inaccurate knowledge as resulting from the great calamities of history through which a great deal of knowledge was lost.144 They rely solely on undemonstrated beliefs, he asserts, without considering the reasoning that supports them.

Polqar also condemns their attempt to place their books on the same level as the

Holy Scriptures. In his view, the Kabbalists claim to possess accurate texts, which were preserved from one generation to another precisely as the five books of Moses were accurately preserved. With reference to the Holy Scriptures, Polqar notes, there is clear historical evidence that the Jewish Sages made great efforts to preserve the

143 According to Polqar, once they attain the ultimate purpose, the philosophers do not need to observe the ceremonial commandments. However, since they still live in the community, they must keep all commandments for the sake of their wellbeing. See the discussion on pp. 269-298, where I analyze Polqar’s discussion of the commandments and the difference between the young philosopher who is enthusiastic and the mature philosopher who considers the social and political order of his community. 144 The Guide, introduction; 1:71.

perfect accuracy of the Scriptures. However, even these attempts did not succeed entirely. Since we find slightly different versions in different places in the biblical text, Polqar’s point here is not entirely clear: is he making a historical claim that there is no evidence of any attempt to preserve the alleged Kabbalistic textual tradition?

Alternatively, is he making an a fortiori argument that, if even with regard to the preservation of the Torah, the Sages could not entirely succeed, we cannot imagine that these supposed Kabbalistic traditions were accurately preserved?145 It seems as if

Polqar is using a historical argument – the improbability of preserving an accurate text – to justify his critique of the Kabbalists.

Moreover, Polqar continues, the Biblical text is extant in slightly different versions, which exhibit only minor changes. This is not the case with Kabbalistic texts, which are imbued with foreign terminology that makes no sense to the reader, whether from a linguistic perspective or in terms of common sense. In addition, the interpretations the Kabbalists provide of their texts contradict internal logic (higgayon penimi) and occasionally pure heresy (kefirah gemurah). For example, the concept of

God’s unity is refuted in their discussion of the ten spheres or their ascribing divinity to male and female figures.146

145 Cf. Spinoza, Theological- Political Tractate, chapters 5, 8, 9, 10. In the medieval period, there were several attempts, mainly made by Muslims, whose aim was to discredit the authority of the Biblical text, to claim that it had been corrupted and falsified. Ibn Hazm, for example, argues that since the Qur’an is true it follows that the biblical texts (Old and New Testaments) are false. Nevertheless Muhammad commands Muslims to respect the biblical texts. Therefore, Ibn Hazm concludes that the present text must have been corrupted by after the time of Muhammad. See Ibn Hazm, Kitab al-fasl fi'l-milah wa'l ahwa'l nikhal, II,6; Camilla Adang, Muslim writers on Judaism and the Hebrew Bible: from Ibn Rabban to Ibn Hazm, especially chapters one, six, and seven. 146 To emphasize the absurdities found in Kabbalah, Polqar relates a story about Meistri Markush He away. far resided who man wise a about heard who philosophy in engaged man a ,( מאישטרי מרקוש) lived with this wise man, served him and came to appreciate his wisdom. Before returning to his country, he secretly copied his master’s book, even though it was forbidden, and studied its contents. journey The .(קפיצת הדרך) words few a whispering by journey his shortened he home, back way his On lasted a few hours rather than the four months it would have taken otherwise. Polqar tells this story in order to argue that, unfortunately, many such stories are widespread among his community and that one must do everything in one’s power to avoid superstitious tales, focusing instead on the right tool for obtaining knowledge – one’s intellect.

The third group consists of those who accuse the philosophers of unduly elevating the status and role of nature.147 According to them, the philosophers affirm that all events occur in accordance with nature and that God has no power to change them. It would follow, then, that there would be no room for miracles, because they are perceived as changes to natural law. In other words, there is a sort of

“competition” between God and nature. Polqar argues that according to this sect,

“God hates nature,”148 for it acts independently and without subordination to God’s will. Polqar replies that this indictment rests on a misunderstanding of the concept

“nature” (tevaʿ). In Polqar’s view, nature is a term that describes the process of conjunction of a form with an object (nitbaʿ).149 The beginning of movement starts with the unification of form and substance (ʿezem ha-Nitbaʿ). Nature, then, is an internal rather than external force of substance. Now, nature, the beginning of movement of an object, is part of the natural order to which the object belongs.

However, the beginning of the movement of an object is one link in a causal chain that goes back to the diurnal movement of the outermost sphere (ha-Tenuʿah ha-

Yomit), whose mover is the First Cause. It follows, Polqar maintains, that true philosophers admit that everything depends on God’s will.150

The fourth and last sect includes those who believe in exaggerated and farfetched events. These people, possessed by a primitive imagination, take delight in conceiving of all types of strange and improbable wonders. The followers of this

147 Hughes incorrectly identifies this sect with “those who elevate the laws of nature to a position equal or superior to God.” Clearly the criticism is not pointed towards those who elevate nature but towards the traditionalists who accuse the philosophers of elevating nature and of claiming that God cannot change nature, should He wish to. See The Art of Dialogue in Jewish Philosophy, p. 85. "הטבע שנואו של הב"ה ופועל ועושה כנגדו כאלו הוא אלוה אחר" :p.158 ha-Dat, Ezer‘ 148 149 Cf. Spinoza, Ethics, I, 29, scholium). 150 One might fail to see how Polqar’s approach differs from al-Ghazālī’s: if the beginning of the movement ends, eventually, with the First Cause, how can we not admit that this is a determined chain? I believe Polqar would ascribe the active action to the diurnal rather than to God Himself. The diurnal depends on God’s existence in the sense that it is a contingent creation and not a necessary one.

group believe that events that are beyond nature can be brought about by employing certain actions or whispering certain words. Such “magical” actions -- for example, causing a woman to desire a certain man -- are, in Polqar’s view, nothing but superstition.151

Like the astrologer featured in the previous treatise, who uses the stars in order to determine how to act, these wizards use certain events in order to precipitate others.

Polqar provides two examples to illustrate the absurdity of magic. I shall mention one here: a man plays dice and wins while he sits on a spindle. According to the magicians, there is a causal connection between these factors: sitting above a spindle guarantees triumph when playing dice. Therefore, the man should make sure that all the conditions are identical the next time he plays dice.

Although Polqar refers to four groups whose opinions are to be refuted, he turns now to discuss a fifth group:152 those who claim that God prohibited idolatry due to

His jealous character. According to this view, there is a benefit to worshiping other gods, yet God forbade it as an act of infidelity. This view thus leads to the assumption that God “needs” and delights in human prayer and sacrifice. Polqar recounts that there was a Jewish intellectual – whom he does not identify by name – who held these opinions, and who sought to support this view by citing the verse “For I the Lord your

God am a jealous God” (Ex. 20:5; Deut. 5:9). Such a view, claims Polqar, ascribes human attributes to God, failing to understand the profound difference between God and humans in two ways. First, it denies the concept of God’s perfection inasmuch as it assigns external needs, such as our worship, to Him; it follows that God manifests an initial lack in need of human fulfillment. Second, it ascribes jealousy, the most

151 Cf. Maimonides, the Guide 3:37; Mishneh Torah, Book of Knowledge, Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 11. 152 It seems as if Polqar sees those “who believe in absurdities” as a subgroup of those who believe in exaggerated things and farfetched events. He accuses these types of people of believing in irrational things and simultaneously of accusing the philosophers, who possess beliefs that can be proven rationally, of heresy.

despicable human attribute, to God. Polqar notes how Moses distanced himself from this ignoble trait: “And Moses said to him, are you jealous on my account? Would that all the Lord’s people were prophets, that the Lord put His spirit upon them (Num.

11:29). Thus, according to Polqar, it is impossible to ascribe jealousy to God, or indeed any human attribute, for by doing so we challenge God’s perfection.

Moreover, by maintaining belief in intermediaries that act independently of God and contrary to His will, they undermine Him as the First Cause. In truth, Polqar asserts,

God is the only necessary thing in reality, and all creatures, including of course human beings, depend on His will.

Those who claim that there is an intrinsic benefit in worshiping other gods base their justification on the Sages’ obsessive preoccupation with this subject. According to them, if worshiping other gods were intrinsically inefficacious, there would have been no need to consider the topic with such seriousness.153 Polqar’s argument is divided into two parts: first, he indicates that the multitude – both Jews and gentiles – is inclined to believe in impossible things, and therefore cannot differentiate truth from falsehood. Second, unlike the gentiles, the Jews had prophets in ancient times to guide them onto the right path. Due to the large number of idolaters, then, there was a great need for prophets whose role was to prevent the vulgar from going astray with regard to the Jewish principles of God’s existence, unity, and incorporeality. The prophets had to rebuke these idolaters constantly in order to preserve the belief in one

God. In Polqar’s time, on the other hand, few idolatrous practices persisted; hence, there was no need for prophets. Prophetic engagement was not necessary because little exposure to idolatry remained. However, Polqar noted that both the vulgar and

153 Polqar here opposes Maimonides’ view, presented in the Guide 1:36, that worshiping other gods “leads to the disappearance of the belief in His existence from the multitude. For the multitude grasp only the actions of worship, not their meanings or the true reality of the being worshiped through them.”

intellectual gentiles of his time, possessed false opinions (reḥoqot nifsadot meod min ha-emet) because they did not have prophets who denounced idolatrous opinions.154

After describing the named and unnamed sects, Polqar concludes this treatise by summarizing the differences between the philosophers, who delve into the true sciences, and the multitude, who believe that they hold ultimate happiness while being led astray. Polqar uses the noun “multitude” as a general term to designate all of the sects and bearers of groundless opinions who were presented throughout the treatise.

While varied in content and stance, the multitude includes all those who disparage the discipline of philosophy and its true holders. Polqar attributes this attitude to the mob which is ruled by its imagination and its inclination toward the material aspects of life, which occludes their human intellect.

Treatise Five

Polqar chose to conclude his book with an epistle dedicated to the discussion of ultimate happiness and the potential for achieving it in the material world. This epistle can roughly be divided into two sections; the first155 is an endeavor to establish which world is preferable – the material one, where an individual is comprised of body and soul, or the world after death, where the soul is detached from the body. The second section156 concludes the text with a discussion of the several parts of one’s soul, seeking to determine which is immortal.

154 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 163. 155 Ibid, pp. 166-174. 156 Ibid, pp. 174-180.

Section One: Physical vs. Spiritual World

The first section of this dialogue begins with a fictitious story about an ongoing search for truth that leads the narrator to seek it in distant places. One such place is

Israel, “Land of the Deer” (ereẓ ha-ẓvi), where the narrator encounters a man “with a beautiful face and a leather belt around his waist, looking like the angel of God.”157

Following a short conversation in which the narrator states his intention of finding life’s true pleasure, he joins the man at Mount Gilboʿa, where the latter promised to teach the former great secrets. They rest in a cemetery, between two tombs. While they are preparing their food, they hear two spirits talking to one another. “Hush, my friend,” says one of the spirits, “for things are heard among the living, and they have put a tent between us.”158 The man, now standing before the spirit, asks him not to be afraid. He admits that he left his home with the goal of having a conversation with the spirit. Polqar uses this dialogue to dramatize the conversation between the living man and the spirit. Although characterized by the author as the figure who holds the key to the truth, the living man now operates as the “spokesman” for the material world and makes an attempt to convince the spirit of the material world’s advantages.

Considering that the living man invited his companion to the cemetery in order to reveal great secrets, we realize that he already possessed great secrets, namely, the knowledge that the narrator had been seeking. Nevertheless, although the living man defends the idea that the immaterial world is preferable over the material one, in order to balance the dialogue, he adamantly defends the presumptive opinion that the material world is preferable. This opening dialogue is but the first stage of the broader discussion that closes this treatise.

157 Ibid, p. 166. 158 Ibid, p. 167.

The spirit barely accedes to the man’s request, angrily asking why the man insists on his leaving the spiritual world to join him in the despicable one. The man, or the living person, as the narrator calls him from now on, functions as the spirit’s opponent. He begins by asserting that no world exists except for the material one.

After the spirit argues that the material world is finite, he asks the man to list the pleasures he finds most delightful on earth, only to refute them one by one:

The pleasure of sight: human eyes are granted the ability to observe the finest colors and the beauty of nature. This type of sight, according to the spirit, is imaginary; it does not help one to avoid damaging sights, and most of the time the eyes see only evil.

The pleasure of taste: the desire for good food and wine are, according to the spirit, the foremost reasons for physical illness, predominantly because of excessive consumption.

The pleasure of listening: the delicate sounds of a harp or organ might be pleasing to the ear; however, they are not the only sounds the ear encounters. It hears frightening sounds that are very overpowering in this world – so overpowering that one’s ears might “get burnt.”

The pleasure of smell: the smell of a field might be a blessing to the human senses; yet, most of the time our noses are filled with putrid smells.

The pleasure of touch: one might enjoy the feeling of warmth or cold; however, the sense of touch is also the source of all pains and wounds.

The pleasure of sexual intercourse: the spirit perceives sexual pleasure with a woman as the greatest cause of man’s physical weakness for two reasons. The first is physical: the sexual encounter expels one’s natural moistness. The second is intellectual: sexual activity prevents one from developing one’s intellect. The spirit

accuses the living man of devoting himself to his appalling desire for a woman and thus of neglecting his sublime faculty –his intellect.

The pleasure of power and authority: the temporary joy of authority is, according to the spirit, false because (1) people’s respect is motivated by external things and (2) it makes no difference after one’s death.

The pleasure of wealth: wealth might seem to fulfill man’s needs, but whoever possesses a great fortune is constantly preoccupied with preserving it in the face of thieves and robbers. His wealth, in addition, does not guarantee he will survive catastrophe.

The pleasure of vengeance: the ostensible joy of vengeance is also false: since the damage is already done, and there is no turning back the clock, occupying oneself with revenge is irrational.

After refuting the living man’s arguments, the spirit concludes with a description of man’s earthly life: he spends half his life sleeping, which is akin to being dead; during the other half he is preoccupied with hunger, thirst, and other bodily functions. Man’s lifespan, approximately 70 years, is divided into four parts: during the first quarter, while he is a child, he is comparable to an animal who cannot differentiate between good and evil. The next two quarters are characterized by constant worries, anxieties, and tribulations, while the last quarter of life is mainly devoted to dealing with bodily ailments.

After this highly negative portrait of man’s physical existence, the first part of the treatise concludes on a positive note by presenting the living man’s perception of his “superior faculty – the image of God within him.” He states that this element is what distinguishes him from animals. It allows him to abstract forms out of matter and leads him to actualize his potential knowledge. The spirit, outraged by this

analysis, accuses his interlocutor of ascribing to himself attributes he does not possess. The living man, maintains the spirit, misunderstands the concept of the intellect: one cannot claim a superior spiritual faculty if one’s main goal is to fulfill bodily desires.

Section Two: The Immortal Part of the Soul

The second section of this treatise takes a turn when the living man and the spirit cease to discuss earthly desires. The living man is convinced by the spirit’s arguments and no longer defends the material world. Now their debate is about the essence of the soul – its practical part and its acquired part.159 The practical part of the soul is attached to the body and the senses; it is active when man is awake and dormant when man rests. The acquired part is what merges with the active intellect.

During the merging, no difference appears between one’s soul and the active intellect; what differentiates one from the other are their bodies.

At this point, the narrator describes the angel Gabriel preaching to the two interlocutors about the difference between earthly and spiritual existence.160 The angel declares that he is the tree of life in the Garden of Eden and identifies Satan and the angel of death with the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Before delivering his judgment on the matter, Gabriel lists three groups of human beings: (1) the vulgar people who consider bodily appearance to be most important and show contempt for the spiritual realm. These people, asserts Gabriel, are dead in spirit while their bodies continue to live; (2) the people who strive to resemble spiritual entities, yet are still

השכל המעשי והשכל הנקנה/הקנוי .175 p. ha-Dat, Ezer‘ 159 160 Polqar does not discuss Islamic principles at all; he mentions Avicenna and Averroes with regard to philosophical issues and not with regard to Islam. Mentioning Gabriel, who according to Muslim tradition passed the Quran to Muhammad, at this point is perhaps a conscious choice indicating that both Jews and Muslims defend the position of the immortality of the soul.

attached to physical matter; their soul has not reached the highest stage of purity and clarity; (3) the few individuals who are constantly engaged in intellectual happiness – they are the ones who distance themselves from the material world, and focuses on the ultimate goal of uniting with the active intellect.

In light of this, Gabriel pronounces in favor of the spirit’s viewpoint: as long as one’s soul is trapped in a physical body, it is impossible to elevate oneself to eternal life. After Gabriel’s preaching, the narrator mentions another speaker, the Maggid, who, as in treatise two, appears to serve as Polqar’s spokesman. Enchanted by

Gabriel’s presence and words, the Maggid follows the angel and requests his guidance. In response, Gabriel puts his hand on the Maggid’s mouth and passes his knowledge on to him. The Maggid then recites a poem addressing his soul, asking it to neglect all earthly pleasures and to concentrate instead on its divine source, in order to merge with the Active Intellect. As in treatise two, where Polqar introduced several characters, including himself by name, here he utilizes a dialogue between multiple people in order to present various positions and eventually to defend one. The same structure repeats itself: a main dialogue with two interlocutors, only one of whom seems to represent the author’s opinion, an authoritative figure who judges between the parties, and Polqar himself, who appears once under his own name and at other times as the Maggid. In this dialogue, Gabriel takes on the role of the king in treatise two, as the high judge whose verdict must be obeyed.

Some scholars161 maintain that the closing treatise of ‘Ezer ha-Dat is a late version of the lost letter Polqar wrote to Abner, Iggeret ha-Tiqvah (Epistle of the

Hope). While I agree that Iggeret ha-Tiqvah is the basic text that underlies treatise five of ‘Ezer ha-Dat, close examination of the writing style and of the topics

161 Cf. Shoshanna Gershenzon, A Study, pp. 25-26; Aaron Hughes, The Art of Dialogue in Jewish Philosophy, p. 85.

discussed in this treatise suggests that the text in ‘Ezer ha-Dat differs from Iggeret ha-

Tiqvah both in form and in content. In support of this claim I shall point to two arguments. First, treatise one of ‘Ezer ha-Dat, as we shall see in the next chapter, is an edited version of Teshuvat Apikoros, the third letter Polqar wrote to Abner.162 The treatise follows, more or less, the structure we find in the letter, although Polqar added several topics when he edited ‘Ezer ha-Dat; still, the text is written as an essay from beginning to end. Additionally, all the issues mentioned in Teshuvat Apikoros are included in the first treatise. For its part, Iggeret ha-Tiqvah is a letter he addressed to

Abner, presenting his argument for the immortality of the soul. We can reasonably assume that this letter was not written as a dialogue, but rather in a manner similar to

Teshuvat Apikoros, which is to say that it mentions Abner by name, addresses him in the second person, and presents a series of arguments one after the other. It would follow that treatise five in ‘Ezer ha-Dat extensively modifies Iggeret ha-Tiqvah; while the issue – the immortality of the soul – is the same in the letter and the treatise, the style of the two differs entirely. Moreover, in the treatise Polqar provides new arguments that support his view.

Second, Abner provides the only testimony pointing to the existence of Iggeret ha-Tiqvah. In his Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, the reply to Polqar’s Teshuvat Apikoros, he writes:

Likewise, this is similar to what you wrote in the third letter, which you called “The Letter on Hope,” that “what is left of the soul of Reuben after death is nothing other than what is left of the soul of Simon.” Following this, it is necessary to say that there is no reward or punishment and that neither the

162 In Teshuvat Apikoros p. 14a Abner refers to Iggeret ha-Tiqvah as the third letter (“Likewise, this is similar to what you wrote in the third letter, which you called “The letter on Hope”). On the next page (14b) Abner writes, “…In these, your three letters, your sin is soiled, written, and sealed…” If Abner’s testimony is correct, then we must assume that there were four letters that Polqar wrote to Abner, one of which is lost. The first letter is Sefer be-hakḥashat ha-iẓtagninot; the second letter is not extant; the third letter is Iggeret ha-Tiqvah; and the fourth letter is Teshuvat Apikoros. See Jonathan Hecht, Dissertation, pp. 140-141, and n. 230; Ryan Szpiech, Dissertation, pp. 330-331.

righteous nor the evil souls have any advantage when compared to one another in that there are no differences between them.”163

In this statement, Abner clearly describes Polqar’s view as endorsing the immortality of the soul as a general, rather than an individual, attribute. This suggests that Abner himself considered this particular topic to be an important part of Polqar’s

Iggeret ha-Tiqvah; perhaps it was the only topic mentioned in it. The fact that in treatise five of ‘Ezer ha-Dat Polqar barely mentions the discussion of the general vs. individual immortality of the soul suggests, again, that the text in ‘Ezer ha-Dat is a different text, in both content and form, from Iggeret ha-Tiqvah.

163 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, p. 14b. Cf. Maimonides, Letter on the Resurrection of the Dead, chapter two; the Guide 1:74. Shlomo Pines argues that Maimonides accepts ibn Bajja’s view that nothing individual remains after one’s death; see the Guide, introduction, pp. ciii-civ.

Chapter Two: Philosophy and Religion

2.1 The Harmonious Relationship between Philosophy and Judaism

‘Ezer ha-Dat is an attempt to defend philosophy, in particular Aristotelian philosophy as taught by Averroes. According to Polqar, studying philosophy is the only way for man to attain the ultimate purpose. Along with securing the position of philosophy, ‘Ezer ha-Dat aims to demonstrate the solid link between philosophy and the Jewish faith. Polqar’s philosophical interpretation of Judaism in ‘Ezer ha-Dat constitutes an attempt to respond to both the external critique leveled against the

Jewish religion by non-Jews and converts and the internal critique leveled against philosophy by Jewish sects, mainly orthodox traditionalists and Kabbalists. While the former group’s goal was to subvert the authority of Jewish law, that of the latter was to weaken the importance of philosophy in Jewish life.

In his twofold project – on the one hand, defending Judaism from native

Christians and converts to Christianity such as Abner, and on the other, defending his particular philosophical interpretation of Judaism – Polqar sought to demonstrate that the principles of the Jewish faith are in harmony with philosophy. He fashions his philosophical interpretations within the Maimonidean tradition in order to confront a variety of Jewish opponents.

For Polqar the validity of any true religion is verified by the true opinions it teaches and the proper actions it educates its adherents to perform. Judaism, Polqar argues, possesses both these prerequisites. Judaism’s fundamental principles and ethical code are established by their lawgiver, who must have been a perfect philosopher, possessing the proper physical, ethical, and intellectual characteristics.

Moses, Polqar continues, was that ultimate lawgiver, inasmuch as he had reached perfection in these three categories.

This chapter’s purpose is to show in what sense Polqar deemed Moses to be the perfect lawgiver, and to determine whether or not Polqar allowed for future lawgivers to establish new religions which could be viewed as true.

We find Polqar’s demonstration that Moses was indeed physically, ethically, and intellectually perfect, and therefore should be viewed as the perfect lawgiver, in the third chapter (sha‘ar) of treatise one.

The third chapter opens as follow:

The philosophical sages have explained that the man who is worthy of being appointed ruler and sovereign over the admirable and virtuous city must fulfill twelve conditions.164

Polqar’s words clearly echo al-Fārābī’s analysis of the qualifications of the perfect man. He accepts all of al-Fārābī’s prerequisites, listing them in the same order.165 The ultimate legislator must meet all twelve of the prerequisites166 which al-Fārābī lists:

(1) he must have a fit and healthy body, namely, perfect limbs that are suitable for his actions; (2) he should be capable by his nature of apprehending things as they really are, of understanding a speaker’s intention precisely; (3) he should always remember what he hears and apprehends, without forgetting a thing; (4) he should understand and apprehend hidden matters from the hints and chapter headings that have been transmitted to him, so that he is capable of understanding their concealed meaning; (5)

164 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 41. Manekin’s translation in Medieval Political Philosophy p. 214 has a typographical error; it is written “ten conditions” instead of “twelve conditions.” 165 Al-Fārābī, Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila (The Principles of the Opinions of the Citizens of the Virtuous City), chapter 15, ¶12 (translation by Richard Walzer, pp. 247-249); here al-Fārābī enumerates twelve natural qualities for a ruler who will establish the virtuous city. As we shall see, Polqar adds one more. 166 Abraham Melamed notes that Polqar, unlike Ibn Latif and Falaquera, chooses to use the neutral term tenaʿim (prerequisites) and not middot (attributes) to list the twelve prerequisites the ultimate lawgiver must possess. See Abraham Melamed, The Philosopher-king in Medieval and Renaissance Jewish Political Thought, pp. 94-96.

he should have fine diction, to be able to educate others by expressing his ideas in straightforward speech; (6) he should be eager and willing to instruct and benefit other people with his wisdom. He should not be lazy, envious of others, or experience teaching as a painful chore; (7) he must, by his nature, love truth and truthful people; he must hate falsehood and those who possess it; (8) he should not be immersed in bodily pleasures, such as eating meat, drinking wine, lewdness, listening to music and idle stories, which do not benefit him; (9) he should take pride in his soul. He should, by his nature, surpass all others; (10) he should detest wealth and fortune, and similarly reject earthly contingencies such as governing others (serarah), being vengeful, and so forth; (11) he should by nature love justice and law (mishpat); he should, as a result of his love and passion for justice, hate injustice and oppression, and seek to rescue the poor from the hands of the strong, with the proviso that he does not act in a cruel and wicked manner but rather from his love and passion for justice;

(12) his actions should proceed from strength, and not from fear and anxiety.

In principle, the perfect man – the Imām, according to al-Fārābī – should possess all these natural qualities.167 However, al-Fārābī himself admits that it is almost impossible to find a man who possesses all twelve prerequisites, and therefore, the ultimate man needs to posses only most of them. Unlike al-Fārābī, Polqar maintains that his exemplar of the perfect man, Moses, in fact possessed all these prerequisites in the most perfect way.168 In support of his claim, he cites examples from the biblical text that exemplify each prerequisite: (1) Moses had a strong body, as illustrated by the stories of his killing the Egyptian who beat the Hebrew slave, and his saving the daughters of Jethro. Moreover, his body remained in perfect condition, even when he

167 For extended background on the concept of perfection, see Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context, pp. 21-144. 168 Cf. Robert Wisnovsky and Stephen Menn, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī’s Essay on the Four Scientific Questions regarding the Three Categories of Existence. Divine, Natural and Logical. Editio princeps and translation, Mélanges - Institut dominicain d'études orientales du Caire, pp. 73-96.

died at the age of 120;169 (2) his natural perception is well known among all nations and his writing the Torah is proof of that; (3) the detailed stories found in the

Scriptures are evidence of his extraordinary memory; (4) his cleverness, intelligence, and sharp intuition are mentioned many times in the Pentateuch. For example, when

Moses watched the burning bush he inferred that it was an angel of God speaking to him; Moses also realized that God’s self-identification by the name Ehyeh (Ex. 3:14) implies His necessary existence and His being the First Cause of all creatures.

Furthermore, in order to conceal this sublime and sacred matter, Moses replaced the first person “Ehyeh” with a third person “YHVH.”170 (5) Moses’ elegant and articulate language is shown in the Ha’azinu poem (Deut. 32).171 (6) Moses was endowed with the ability to pursue true knowledge and pass it on to Aaron, his brother, to Joshua, and to the seventy elders.172 (7) and (11)173 – Moses (7) loved truth and hated falsehood, and he (11) loved justice and hated inequity, as evidenced by his righteous laws and teachings. (8) and (10) – Moses (8) neglected bodily desires, and

(10) he despised worldly pleasures and riches, as evidenced by his remaining forty days and forty nights without any food and sending away his wife. These character traits reflect Moses’ devotion to an immaterial world, and his general focus on spiritual pleasures. (9) and (12) – While at first glance it would appear that Scriptures’ declaration: Moses was a very humble man, more humble than anyone else on the face of the earth (Num. 12:3) indicates that Moses lacked the ninth prerequisite of taking

169 Deut. 34:7 “And Moses was a hundred and twenty years old when he died: his eye was not dim, nor his natural force abated.” 170 Judah Halevi, Kuzari, 4:3. See also Z. Harvey, Judah Halevi on Tetragrammaton, (2007). 171 It should be noted that Polqar, not surprisingly, neglects to mention Moses’ stutter; had he mentioned Moses’ stutter, perhaps he would have had to conceive the rightness of the al-Fārābīian view according to which one cannot posses all twelve prerequisites. 172 Al-Fārābī mentions pursuing true knowledge alone, and does not mention the action of passing this knowledge on to others. Polqar, I believe, wanted to stress Moses’ unselfishness in sharing his knowledge with those who can understand. 173 These attributes appear as numbers 8 and 10 in al-Fārābī’s text.

pride in his soul, nevertheless Polqar argues that Moses’ duty as the leader of the people indicates that he possessed the twelfth prerequisite – the harshness and anger necessary to intimidate wrongdoers.

The thirteenth and last attribute, possessed by Moses and absent from the al-

Fārābīan list,174 is Moses’ ability to prophesize whenever he wished. He isolated himself from his community from time to time in order to actualize his intellect; his return to society enabled him to deal with each individual in accordance with the latter’s ability. This attribute of prophecy reflects Moses’ complete transcendence of matter and cleaving to spiritual beings, which enabled him to fully understand the natural order, to perform miracles,175 and to prophesize whenever he wished.

Polqar adds this thirteenth prerequisite (middah), citing the following reason:

in order to perfect this man to the utmost, and to uplift him to a degree than which there is none higher, an additional attribute must be found in him to complete the thirteen necessary for the perfect man and it is that all his actions should proceed from the human (enoshi) part of him, and not from the bestial (behemi).176

The thirteenth attribute necessitates that all the perfect man’s actions derive from his human part, not from his animal one. The lawgiver therefore acts from his intellectual faculty, the same faculty which makes him a man, rather than from any other faculty, which he shares with the beast.

Interestingly, a few lines after summarizing the thirteenth prerequisite, Polqar argues that:

When a man makes all his activities human, that is, not the result of any passion arising in his soul or bestial activity, even though he desires very much to perform it, he is the perfect man. However, if there exists a man whose soul is moved towards an action, or who desires something, solely because his intellect considers it to be appropriate for the pursuit of a certain end or a known benefit; then it is

174 Erwin I. J Rosenthal, in his book Political Thought in Medieval Islam, 276, n.50 argues that the thirteenth attribute, as Polqar formulates it, exists in the al-Fārābī text. 175 See discussion below pp. 236-250. "להשלים את האיש הזה כדי להגיעו עד התכלית האחרון ולהעלותו אל המדרגה אשר אין למעלה ,42 p. ha-Dat, Ezer‘ 176 ממנה צריך להמצא בו מדה אחרת לתשלום שלש עשרה מדות אשר בהן יידרש האיש השלם והוא שתהיין כל פעולותיו באות מצד החלק האנושי אשר בו לא מצד הבהמי"

not fitting to call him merely perfect, but rather divine and the angel of the Lord of Hosts.”177 [emphases were added]

We see from this that Polqar, in fact, divides the thirteenth prerequisite into two levels. The first level is that of the perfect man. This man possesses all thirteen prerequisites and acts in accordance with his human part, not his bestial part. The actions of the perfect man are motivated by both intellect and desire, which are in harmony, however the primary motivation is intellectual. The intellectual faculty controls and governs the bestial part, which includes senses and desires, but those senses and desires are not annulled.178 The second level is that of the divine man.

Because his intellectual level is so high, the actions of the divine man are motivated by his intellectual part; all of his actions derive solely from pure reflection.

Polqar’s discussion of the thirteenth prerequisite reveals a notable deviation from the al-Fārābī theory regarding the perfect man. Since for al-Fārābī it is impossible for one person to possess all twelve prerequisites fully, it follows that the al-Fārābī perfect man can never exist. For Polqar, by contrast, it is not only possible to possess all of the qualities which would make one a perfect man, it is even possible to possess a thirteenth prerequisite which would make one a divine man. Moses, the only man so far to possess the thirteenth prerequisite, is consequently the only person so far who can be termed a divine man, assuming that he has attained the second level of the thirteenth prerequisite. Moses’ divine quality expressed itself in his intellect completely controlling his body, as a consequence of which he extinguished all bodily desires.

177 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 42-43 (Manekin’s translation, pp. 214-215). See discussion below on man’s ultimate purpose, pp. 283-295. 178 Aristotle makes a similar distinction between the continent man and the temperate person. According to him “the temperate man will not be continent nor the continent man temperate; for a temperate man will have neither excessive nor bad appetites. But the continent man must.” [Nicomachean Ethics, book 7, 2, 1146a 10-12]. Cf. Maimonides, Eight Chapters, chapter 6. See also discussion on man’s ultimate purpose, pp. 283-295.

From Polqar’s view regarding the uniqueness and superiority of Moses as the ultimate lawgiver, it follows that Judaism is a true religion. What remains to be determined is his position regarding potential new lawgivers who might establish religions that would meet all the conditions of a true religion.

Since all thirteen prerequisite are universal in type, which is to say that they are not connected with a particular religious law, it would follow that for Polqar, at least in theory, the existence of another perfect lawgiver is indeed a possibility.

However, while it is important for Polqar to emphasize that such a possibility exists,

Moses will always remain a divine man who founded a true religion which endows its adherents with the true opinions and practical commandments on the basis of which the Jews live their lives in the best way.179

179 ‘Ezer ha-Dat p. 46. Cf. Falaquera, Sfer ha-maʿalot, p. 17; Plato’s Republic 405a. Here Plato asserts that a perfect nation does not need judge or doctor; Averroes, Commentary on Plato’s Republic 405 (Rosenthal’s translation p.31); Avicenna, The Governance of the Solitary, chapter one (Lawrence Berman’s translation p. 100); Shlomo Pines, Polqar and Spinoza p. 409-410, mainly n. 71; 428-429.

2.2 Judaism against Christianity

Developing a philosophy as a Jewish thinker in the fourteenth century, under

Christian rule, was a challenging task. As mentioned above, Polqar faced a genuine crisis when his teacher, Abner of Burgos, converted to Christianity. Now Polqar had to defend his faith not only from external criticism, for example from native Christians, but also from apostates who were often experts in the Hebrew texts, principally the

Bible, the midrashim, and the Talmud. Abner’s expertise in the Jewish primary sources allowed him, when having polemical discussions with Jews such as Polqar, to use those primary sources to undermine the credibility of his faith of birth.180

Polqar takes two different paths in his debate with Abner. First, he discusses

Jewish principles from a hermeneutical standpoint. This standpoint leads Polqar to describe and defend a traditional understanding of these principles. However, he also presents a philosophical examination of these principles to his more careful readers, one that puts forward a distinctly non-traditional understanding of these principles.

The debate between Abner and Polqar is unique. Since Abner was very well educated in both Jewish sources and Greek philosophy, as they were taught in the

Middle Ages, he was familiar with the rabbinical teaching and the philosophical premises set forth by Polqar. Abner’s use of rabbinic and philosophical texts is

180 Although he was Abner’s most known interlocutor, Polqar was certainly not the only scholar to debate Abner. Polqar’s contemporaries, among whom are Joseph ben Shem Tov, Moses ha-Cohen of Tordesillas, Shem Tov Ibn Shaprut, Moses Narboni, Joseph Shalom, Isaac Albalag, Isaac Israeli, Samuel Ibn Sasson, Hayim ben Yehuda Ibn Musa, and Judah Leon of Modena, among others, also wrote against Abner. The great interest in Abner’s writings lies in the fact that he wrote mainly in Hebrew and Spanish, languages that were familiar to Jews, rather than in Latin, which was an uncommon language among Jewish communities at that time. In contrast, other converts, such as Petrus Alfonsi, addressed the Christian community and published their works in Latin, as a consequence of which they barely received responses from Jews. The Jewish thinkers identified the potential risk involved in Abner’s books circulating in Jewish communities in accessible languages. Setting forth strong objections against Abner on the one hand, and strengthening Judaism, on the other hand, was one of their primary goals. See Norman Roth, Conversus, Inquisition and the Expulsion of the Jews from Spain, p. 191.

extensive; he draws on midrashim, biblical verses, and philosophical arguments, interpreting them in such a way as to agree with his agenda: defending his new faith, and persuading as many Jews as possible to follow in his footsteps and convert to

Christianity.

Both the disciple and his former teacher lived in a period when polemic disputations181 were predominant, and when it was necessary to prove which religion was closer to the truth. Obviously, there are no objective criteria to determine who

“won” the debate. In any event, I hope to show that in addition to his obvious desire to

“win” the debate, Polqar had a personal stake in replying to Abner’s justifications for converting to Christianity and to his accusations against Judaism.182

Polqar, who was educated by Abner himself,183 stood against his former teacher with a twofold purpose: first, he wished to refute Christian accusations against Judaism; second, he wanted to defend Judaism by arguing that, unlike Christianity, it teaches its adherents true opinions and educates them to proper actions. According to Polqar, a true religion must not contradict philosophical principles, and by proving that the main doctrines of Christianity are inconsistent with philosophical investigation, Polqar sought to demonstrate the falsehood of Christianity. On the other hand, following Aristotelian philosophy as taught by Averroes, Polqar sought to demonstrate that the principles of

Judaism do not contradict Aristotle’s philosophy. Such a complicated task required him to draw upon a wide variety of distinctive themes, many of which are not part of the

181 The most famous disputations are: The disputation of Paris (1240); the disputation of Barcelona (1263); and later on (15th century) the disputation of Tortosa (1413-1414). 182 One might ask: how can we determine who won the dispute? The acceptable reply would suggest that the one who won is the thinker who answered and clarified all the questions and difficulties raised by his opponent. In our case, Abner and Polqar exchanged at least three letters, while the last work composed by Polqar was completed after Abner’s death. 183Abner, in his response letter Iggeret ha-ḥarafot (The Epistle of the Blasphemies), addresses Polqar personally: “know that from the day you came into being you applied yourself diligently in my house of study (beit midrashi) and I loved you as myself even if you now betray and trample and forget all this in (your) pride and arrogance, nevertheless I am still your Rabbi.” See Iggeret ha-ḥarafot p. 13b.

standard polemical repertoire, in order to defend his unique philosophical interpretation of Judaism.

This chapter’s aim is primarily to identify the flaws of Judaism according to

Abner and other Christian opponents. Polqar was concerned about the danger of addressing these flaws, yet he felt the need, or perhaps the obligation, to respond to these accusations. Polqar’s fear appears to have been related to a common phenomenon in his time, that of Jews converting to Christianity. Both born Christians and converts sought to prove that the poor situation of the Jews attested to the superiority of

Christianity over Judaism, and called for immediate conversion. Additionally, the great responsibility Polqar felt for his community encouraged him to protect the principles of

Judaism, and in doing so, to reinforce the faith of the members of his community.

Polqar’s genuine concern can first be seen in the introduction to treatise one of ‘Ezer ha-

Dat, where he presents the main argument against Judaism that was then widely circulated by Christians – that God had abandoned the Jewish nation, which is why the

Jews were suffering in a long and painful exile, and that the oppressed and persecuted condition of the Jews disproved their claim to be the chosen people.184

Polqar’s choice of subjects for discussion is neither obvious nor typical. If one might wonder what guided Polqar to choose these specific topics over others, perhaps we can suggest that Polqar addresses the issues which were at the core of the dispute between Judaism and Christianity. By explaining and elaborating on topics such as the messiah who has not yet come and the long and painful exile, Polqar sought to strengthen the spirit of the members of his community. He wished to show them the

184 Augustine already argued that “to the end of the seven days of time, the continued preservation of the Jews will be a proof to believing Christians of the subjection merited by those who, in the pride of their kingdom, put the Lord to death.” See Contra Faustus, 12:12. Cf. Peter Brown, “St. Augustine’s Attitude to Religious Coercion,” pp.107-116; Jeremy Cohen, Living Letters of the Law- Ideas of the Jew in Medieval Christianity, pp. 54-55; David Nirenberg, Anti-Judaism- The Western Tradition, pp. 129- 132.

truth of Judaism, and, at the same time, to undercut the principles upon which

Christianity is based.

Choosing from numerous “popular” issues that were an important part of the philosophical and interreligious discourse of his day, Polqar focuses on several themes in order to defend his beliefs. These are found in two texts: Polqar’s exchange of letters with Abner, and his book Ezer ha-Dat. Examining these two texts and comparing the themes that appear in both of them will illuminate two crucial features. First, it will show that the text in ‘Ezer ha-Dat is an edited and polished version of Polqar’s

Teshuvat Apikoros (A response to the Heretic) – his letter to Abner.185 Second, analyzing the topics chosen by Polqar will lead to a better understanding of Polqar’s position with regard to the Judeo-Christian debate, especially as we observe how Polqar modified his arguments in light of Abner’s reply.

Teshuvat Apikoros opens with a direct address to Abner:

To Alphonso who turned from the ways of the religion of the Hebrews, who was called Rabbi Abner…My soul will wage war and do battle against you for where the Name [of God] is defiled, the Rabbi is not honored.186

185 Polqar wrote at least three letters to Abner: 1) Sefer be-hakḥashat ha-Iẓtagninot (The Book of Denial of Astrology), where he expresses his rejection of astrology; 2) Iggeret ha-Tiqvah (The Epistle of the Hope), where Polqar discusses the eternity of the soul; and 3) Teshuvat Apikoros (A Response to the Heretic). This letter aims to explain why Mosaic Law is the true law and is examined in this chapter. Letters one and two are not extant, but in treatise three of ‘Ezer ha-Dat, a dialogue between a scholar and an astrologer, Polqar rejects astrology and presumably presents the ideas expressed in first letter. Treatise five of ‘Ezer ha-Dat, which contains a dialogue between a spirit and a living man, reflects Polqar’s view of the world to come. It is likely that this treatise, although written in a dialogue form and not as an essay, is a formulation of the lost Iggeret ha-Tiqvah. The third letter, Teshuvat Apikoros, does not appear with this title in the letter. However, in treatise one of ‘Ezer ha-Dat (p. 30), which is an extant version of this letter, Polqar specifically refers to a letter he wrote, under the name Teshuvat Apikoros. Abner then writes the Sefer Minḥat Qenaot (A Jealousy Offering) as a response to the first letter, and perhaps also to Polqar’s third letter. In Sefer Minḥat Qenaot, he explicitly mentions Polqar’s Sefer be-hakḥashat ha-iẓtagninot (in chapters one and two) and Iggeret ha-Tiqvah (in chapter eight). He also maintains, in chapter two, that before composing Teshuvat Apikoros, Polqar read his Sod ha-Gemul (Secret of Recompense), for “it appears that he [Isaac] took from it [Sod ha-Gemul] the words and sayings about the truth of the recompenses, because he wrote what he wrote in his Teshuvat Apikoros.” Abner’s Teshuvot la-Meḥaref (Responses to the Blasphemer) is a response to Polqar’s Teshuvat Apikoros; both letters are found in manuscript Parma 533. Abner, in Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, refers to Polqar’s letter as Iggeret ha-ḥarafot (The Epistle of the Blasphemies), not as Teshuvat Apikoros. See Hecht, Dissertation (1993), pp. 36-38; Sirat, History of Jewish Philosophy, pp. 93-97; Szpiech, Dissertation (2006), p. 330, n.53. 186 Teshuvat Apikoros, P. 1a.

Abner, then, as the Christian Alfonso, desecrated God’s name by embracing

Christian doctrines and by repudiating the beliefs of his former faith. Abner threatened the fundamental principles of the Jewish faith by adopting Christian beliefs in the

Trinity or the messiah, beliefs that, according to Polqar, are completely inconsistent with the rational principles and rabbinic literature that Abner himself used.

Next, Polqar presents, in five parts, five issues that he views as fundamental for his debate with Abner: (1) the necessity of having a law, (2) the agreement between the

Mosaic Law and the principles of reason,187 (3) the Mosaic Law as a source of necessary social behavior, (4) the world to come, and (5) the messiah and the proofs that he has not yet come. In his Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, Abner testifies that he received

Polqar’s letter – Teshuvat Apikoros ten years after it was published. Abner’s self- serving explanation for this delay is that his interlocutor concealed this epistle from him, in order to avoid the public humiliation that would have followed from Abner’s response.188

The discussions regarding Christianity in ‘Ezer ha-Dat are found mainly in two treatises, treatises one and five. Treatise one is made up of eight chapters (sheʿarim), which are principally dedicated to the Judeo-Christian dispute. They tackle, in order: (1) the need for a leader and for laws, (2) proving the truth of the Torah, (3) Moses as the ideal leader and his virtues, (4) the world to come, (5) the exile and its meaning, (6) the

187 As we shall see, Abner argues that he could refute Polqar’s allegations using the tools Polqar himself uses: biblical sources, rabbinic texts, and philosophical arguments. Abner’s method is to give his own interpretation to biblical verses, rabbinic sources and philosophical arguments in order to harmonize them with Christian doctrines. 188 Hecht has shown that Abner’s claim that he received the letter ten years after it was composed cannot be entirely true. According to Hecht, evidence for such a claim is found in Abner’s response, Minḥat Qenaot, to Polqar’s first and third letters – Sefer be-Hakḥashat HaItztagninot and Iggeret HaTikvah. Here Abner mentions Polqar’s “Libro de la Contradicion de Hereje,” which is close in name to “the Response to the Heretic” mentioned in ‘Ezer ha-Dat (p.30). See: Hecht, Dissertation, p. 37; Szpiech, Dissertation, p. 331.

belief in the messiah, who has not yet come, (7) a defense of Talmudic teachings, and

(8) a defense of the rabbinic literature. The eight chapters in this treatise overlap with the topics Polqar presented in his Teshuvat Apikoros.189 These eight chapters present

Polqar’s position within a religious context.

It seems as though Polqar modified treatise one in ‘Ezer ha-Dat in light of his correspondence with Abner. His discussion in treatise one covers, in addition to the topics we find in Teshuvat Apikoros, several topics which are absent from Teshuvat

Apikoros. These additional topics, however, constitute an extensive part of Abner’s response to Polqar in Teshuvot la-Meḥaref. Polqar’s discussion includes questions such as: what are the principles of a religion? What is the world to come (‘Olam ha-Ba) and is it preferable over this world? What is the meaning of the long and painful exile? Has the Messiah already arrived? What is the authority of the Talmud and the Jewish sages?

Treatise five of ‘Ezer ha-Dat, on the other hand, is an extended discussion about how to conceive the world to come. The debate is written as a dialogue between a living man and a soul that is no longer in a body; the two interlocutors try to convince each other that the world in which each of them “lives” is the best world in which to exist.190

Analyzing these questions and comparing Polqar’s work with that of other Jewish thinkers will help, I believe, to better understand his interest in these particular topics.

Moreover, it will cast light on Polqar’s contribution to the polemic between the two religions.

189 Chapters one and three of Teshuvot Apikoros, about the necessity of a law and the Mosaic Law as a source of necessary social behavior, correspond to chapter one in treatise one of ‘Ezer ha-Dat; chapter two of Teshuvot Apikoros, about the principles of true religion, corresponds to chapter two in treatise one of ‘Ezer ha-Dat; chapter four of Teshuvot Apikoros, about the world to come, corresponds to chapter four in treatise one of ‘Ezer ha-Dat; finally, chapter five of Teshuvot Apikoros corresponds to chapter six in treatise one of ‘Ezer ha-Dat. 190 See discussion in chapter one, pp. 57-64.

Polqar vs. Abner

The tension between Polqar and Abner was clearly related to the latter’s decision to abandon the faith of his birth and to accept Christianity. Polqar’s basic view that the principles of a true religion must not, under any circumstances, contradict basic philosophical principles serves as the ground for his objection to Abner’s conversion:191

The essential principle and the purpose of all knowledge in the view of all the nations, is the knowledge of the existence of God, may He be blessed, through whose power the encompassing sphere is moved. This has been explained first by our religion in the verse, “I am the Lord” [Exod. 20:2]. The second principle is His unity. It is explained there in the verse, “you shall have no other gods before me” [Exod. 20:3] and in the verse, “Hear O Israel! The Lord is our God, the Lord is One” [Deut. 6:4]. The third principle is that He has no body. This is also known and revealed in the verse, “Take therefore good heed to yourself: for you saw no manner of form” [Deut. 4:15]. And also that He is not a force within a body, in a sense that nothing that happens to dark bodies can be verified of Him. This is known and evident from the verse, “I the Lord have not changed” [Mal. 3:6]. It is known by every intelligent person that these beliefs are explained with firm proofs and full demonstration in the books about physics and metaphysics written by Aristotle, as is obvious to those who make the efforts and study them,192 so that no one will reject them and deny them unless he is a denier of the first principle, for which the ancient sages required stoning.193

The philosophers, claims Polqar, have already demonstrated “these beliefs,” that is, the three philosophical principles that were fully maintained by Jews and that

Christians sought to reconcile with their doctrines, in Polqar’s view imperfectly.194

191 Polqar’s position clearly goes against Thomas’ position. According to Thomas, Christianity contains doctrines such as the Trinity and the Incarnation that neither contradict reason nor are truly accessible to human reason. See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Chapter 3:2: “There is a twofold mode of truth in what we profess about God. Some truths about God exceed all the ability of the human reason. Such is the truth that God is triune. But there are some truths which the natural reason also is able to reach. Such are that God exists, that He is one, and the like. In fact, such truths about God have been proved demonstratively by the philosophers, guided by the light of the natural reason.” -ha ‘Ezer in text The (p.35). ha-Dat ‘Ezer in appears it as "משתדלים" not and "משתילים" copied Hecht 192 Dat is clearly the correct one, and we should read: “those who make the efforts and study [Aristotle’s physics and metaphysics] so no one will reject them and deny them…” 193 Teshuvat Apikoros, p. 2b; Cf. ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 35-36. 194 Cf. Daniel Lasker, Jewish Philosophical Polemics Against Christianity in the Middle Ages, pp. 19-20; 25-28.

These three fundamental principles are the existence of God, His Unity, and God’s being neither a body nor a force in a body.195

Clearly influenced by Maimonides’ approach to the fundamental principles that should form the core of a true religion, Polqar emphasizes the former’s view of the principles of Judaism. Maimonides lists several versions of those principles. I will first present the three texts by Maimonides that examine the principles of Judaism:

Commentary on the Mishnah, Mishneh Torah, and the Guide of the Perplexed. After presenting these three texts, I will explain why I argue that Polqar was aware of all three Maimonidean texts, and yet chose none of these versions as he developed his own position. He adopts Maimonides’ ordering of the principles, namely, God’s existence, His unity, and His incorporeality. However, unlike Maimonides, who elaborates on each principle, Polqar introduces the three principles in a very brief and concise manner.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides enumerates thirteen principles that constitute the foundations of the Jewish faith. Polqar, in both Teshuvat Apikoros and ‘Ezer ha-Dat, cites only the first three, which are strictly philosophical:196

The first fundamental principle: To believe in the existence of the Creator. That there is an Existence complete in all the senses of the word “existence.” He is the cause of all existence…The second fundamental principle: we are told to believe that God is one, the cause of all oneness…The third fundamental principle: we are to believe that He is incorporeal, that His unity is physical neither potentially nor actually. None of the attributes of matter can be predicted of Him, neither motion, nor rest, for example. They cannot refer to Him accidently or essentially.197

195 See the Guide, 1:35; 3:28; Mishneh Torah, Book of Knowledge, Laws of the Foundation of the Torah, 1:1-8. Cf. Menachem Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought, From Maimonides to Abravanel, pp. 10-34. 196 The thirteen principles of the Commentary are: 1) the existence of God, 2) God’s unity, 3) He is incorporeal and He is not a force in a body, 4) He is eternal, 5) only He is rightfully to be worshiped, magnified, and obeyed, 6) the belief in prophecy, 7) the belief that Moses was the chief of all other prophets, before and after him, 8) the belief that the Torah came from God, 9) the authenticity of the Torah as transcribed from God, 10) God’s knowledge of all man’s actions, 11) reward and punishment, 12) the belief that the messiah will come, and 13) the belief in the resurrection of the dead. 197 Commentary on the Mishnah, Helek: Sanhedrin, chapter 10 (Twersky, p. 417).

In Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodey ha-Torah (The Laws of the Foundations of the Torah), Maimonides opens with:

The basic principle of all basic principles and the pillar of all sciences is to realize that there is a First Being who brought every existing thing into being. All existing things, whether celestial, terrestrial, or belonging to an intermediate class, exist only through His true existence…To acknowledge this truth is an affirmative precept, as it is said, “I am the Lord your God” (Ex. 2-:2; Deut. 5:6). And whoever permits the thought to enter his mind that there is another deity besides this God, violates a prohibition; as it said, “You shall have no other gods before Me” (Ex. 20:3; Deut. 5:7), and denies the essence of religion – this doctrine being the great principle on which everything depends. That the Holy one, blessed be He, is not a physical body, is explicitly set forth in the Pentateuch and in the Prophets…and a physical body is not in two places at one time…if He were a body, He would be like other bodies.198

Finally, in the Guide of the Perplexed, where Maimonides discusses the issue of concealing the divine sciences from the masses, he specifies the principles that should be taught to common men, despite their lack of understanding:

Do not think that all we have laid down in the preceding chapters regarding the greatness and the hidden nature of the matter, the difficulty of apprehending it, and its having to be withheld from the multitude, refers also to the denial of the corporeality of God and to the denial of His being subject to affections. It is not so. For just as it behooves to bring up children in the belief, and to proclaim to the multitude, that God, may He be magnified and honored, is one and that none but He ought to be worshiped, so it behooves that they should be made to accept on traditional authority the belief that God is not a body; and that there is absolutely no likeness in any respect whatever between Him and the things created by Him; that His existence has no likeness to theirs; nor His life to the life of those among them who are alive nor again His knowledge to the knowledge of those among them who are endowed with knowledge.199

The three sources cited above were all known to Polqar, and yet, he preferred to present the principles as short statements rather than long discussions. Scholars have already argued that Polqar selects the version of Maimonides’ Commentary on the

198 Mishne Torah, Book of Knowledge, Laws of the Foundation of the Torah, chapter 1, 1-8. 199 The Guide, 1:35. See also the Guide 3:28.

Mishnah because of its simplicity and its Halakhic style;200 in my view, this argument is incorrect. The version in the Commentary is indeed written in a simple form, but the text in Mishneh Torah is written in no less simple a style. Moreover, the text in the

Commentary is by no means written in a more Halakhic manner than the text in the

Mishneh Torah. On the contrary, in the Mishneh Torah Maimonides uses extensive biblical and rabbinic texts to give it Halakhic authorization. One possible explanation for Polqar’s rephrasing of the three principles is that, unlike Maimonides, he was not concerned about Halakhic language. For him, it was more about a universalizing, concise expression of fundamental principles. Presenting brief statements as without mixing them with Halakhic elements serves Polqar’s purpose better, because his main argument against Abner is that Judaism does not contradict philosophy, which by its very nature is universal. Judaism, then, teaches its adherents true opinions, which are universal and not bound to a specific tradition.

One might ask why Polqar did not embrace all thirteen of Maimonides’ principles, especially since most of them support his attempt to show that Christianity is not a true religion. To answer this question, we must recall that Polqar’s primary goal in this debate was to defend the Jewish faith by showing that there is no contradiction between its principles and philosophy. By canonizing the three fundamental principles, he is universalizing their validity, claiming that they must apply to any true religion regardless of its history and tradition. In this sense, principle twelve, for example, the belief in the arrival of the messiah and the messianic era, cannot be proven demonstratively; it can only be accepted on the basis of scriptural and rabbinical texts.201 This does not mean that the belief in the coming of the messiah is not vital

200 Shoshana Gershenzon, A Study, p. 77. 201 It is also possible that the large number of converts in Polqar’s time led him to omit the arrival of the messiah from the list of the Jewish principles. Cf. Crescas, Or Adonai, introductions to sections 2 and 3; Joseph Albo, The Book of Principles, I: 23:7; XIII: 1:3.

belief of the Jewish faith; rather it only means that it cannot be considered one of

Judaism’s fundamental principles.202 An alternative explanation for not listing the thirteen principles would be that perhaps Polqar assumed his Jewish readers are sufficiently familiar with Maimonides’ text, an in order to clarify his point it suffices to mention only the first three.

Polqar was inclined to embrace the Maimonidean attitude on the question of whether to educate the multitude about the principles of faith:

Now, since true and correct beliefs are incumbent upon us on account of us being rational and wise, and since man in his youth – and, for most men, all the days of their lives – lack requisite time to prepare themselves to know these truths from their roots and their sources which lie in the true science, it was absolutely necessary for the lawgiver of revealed religion to establish all the principles of true beliefs without which the perfection of man and his fulfillment would have been impossible. He gave them by the way of tradition, in order that man would not die with his soul lacking them, as is the case of the foolish nations which came in darkness.203

Similarly to Maimonides,204 Polqar espouses teaching the Jewish fundamentals to the masses uncompromisingly, even if they are unable to fully understand them philosophically. Not educating the multitude about the Jewish principles would result in their “soul lacking them” when they died. By adopting the

Maimonidean view, Polqar rejects the approach of Averroes, who insisted on not

202 Polqar clearly goes against Maimonides in arguing that the belief in the messiah is not a fundamental principle of Judaism. In chapter six of treatise one in ‘Ezer ha-Dat (p. 57) and chapter five in Teshuvat Apikoros (p. 4b) he writes: “it is not appropriate for any intelligent person to believe that our faith is dependent upon the coming of the messiah. Indeed even if some man possibly had a doubt concerning his coming, none of the beliefs in our Torah would be weakened.” 203 Teshuvat Apikoros, 2ab; the same idea is articulated in ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 32. Cf. the Guide of the Perplexed, 1:34. The question of whether teaching the fundamental principles is enough for one to attain the world to come is discussed below on pp. 204 The Guide of the Perplexed, 1:35. Many scholars, based on what seems to be a contradiction between 1:26 and 1:35 of the Guide, apply Maimonides’ developmental model, which he sets forth with respect to sacrifices, to religious beliefs as well. In their view, in the biblical period Moses only taught the people the truth of God’s existence and unity, not His incorporeality. It was only in his own time, Maimonides believed, that people could be taught the truth of God’s incorporeality. It is not clear whether or not Polqar agrees with this analysis, for he clearly states that Moses, the lawgiver, taught “true and correct beliefs,” including God’s incorporeality. Cf. Carlos Fraenkel, “Legislating Truth: Maimonides, Almohads, and the Thirteenth Century Jewish Enlightenment,” pp. 216-231.

disclosing these principles to the masses.205 Averroes’ concern was that most people are incapable of comprehending the true meaning of these principles, as a result of which there is a high probability of their rejecting them altogether, and consequently becoming heretics.206

Christianity, as perceived by Polqar, accepts only the existence of God, while rejecting the others principles – God’s unity and incorporeality – by virtue of its acceptance of the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. Hence, the Christian faith cannot be accepted as a true religion. Polqar presents his critique of Christianity chiefly in the second chapter of Teshuvat Apikoros, where he enumerates the three principles that should form the foundation of any true religion. Although he does not explicitly mention Christianity, we can confidently assume, based on Abner’s reference to this chapter, that the addressee of these claims is the Christian believer.

Polqar repeats these assertions in treatise one of ‘Ezer ha-Dat, adding several other subjects in order to reinforce the foundations of his philosophical work.207

In his response to Polqar’s second chapter in Teshuvat Apikoros, Abner accepts

Polqar’s premises and composes his answer in a “Christian-Maimonidean” fashion, seeking to prove that, contrary to Polqar’s accusations, Christianity is in harmony with philosophy and accepts rational principles. However, in addition to the three principles mentioned by Polqar, which as we have just seen, Abner argues that

Christianity fully accepts, Abner lists four other principles which, in his view, both

Judaism and Christianity also accept:

We also believe in two other beliefs which you deny. I mean, divine providence and retribution.208 We also believe in two other beliefs which you did not

205 Cf. the Guide, 1:35; Ibn Rush, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut. ¶ 356-363. 206 Falaquera, unlike Polqar, justified Averroes’s approach over Maimonides’. See the Guide of the Guide, 1:35. 207 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 34-40. 208 Polqar rejects the classical view of providence, according to which God knows universals and particulars. See my discussion on providence on pp. 186-197.

understand and do not want to understand because your intellect is fettered by the bonds of your will. They are true beliefs according to the Torah, the Prophets, the sages, and the great philosophers. You think they are the opposite of those four209 beliefs which were mentioned. But the matter is not as you think or wish. The first of these two beliefs is the three substantive attributes of God, blessed be He. The second is the belief in the incarnation of divinity in humankind. It seems that with these two beliefs alone would come about the perfection of humanity, its establishment and felicity, in both worlds… I say that what the Christians believe – in describing the Trinity of the one God – is exactly what the Talmudic sages affirm and prove from the Torah, the Prophets, and the Writing.210

Interestingly, Abner separates the four additional principles into two groups; the first group includes divine providence and retribution, while the second group includes the Trinity and the Incarnation. It is reasonable to assume that this division was intentional, insofar as the first two principles are directed explicitly against

Polqar. Abner seems to suggest that Polqar, on account of his philosophical principles, rejects these two principles – providence and retribution – which are otherwise accepted by Jews. Abner introduces the last two principles in a more general fashion: while most, if not all, Jews believe in the first two principles, none of them accept the last two. This is an example of Abner’s missionary attempt to show the Jewish community its error. Furthermore, by addressing the last two principles to the Jewish community as a whole, Abner seeks to demonstrate that there is essentially no difference between his new faith and the faith held by the Jewish sages, whom he exposes as crypto-Christians.211

Stung by Polqar’s accusations, Abner seeks to articulate profound, systematic arguments that will address scholars and the multitude alike. In order to accomplish

209 Abner understands Polqar’s principles to be four: (1) God’s existence, (2) God’s unity, (3) God’s incorporeality, and (4) that God is not force in a body. 210 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, 15a-15b (Hecht 143-144). 211 Abner continues on to argue that “the universal type of incarnation of God in the world has already been mentioned by the sages of the Talmud when they said The Shekhinah is in every place and There is no place in the world without the Shekhinah.” (Teshuvot la-Meḥaref 21b). Abner’s main argument is that the Talmudic sages had to conceal the truth from the Jewish community because its members were not ready to accept these truths. Abner, in a sense, sees himself as disclosing to the Jews what the sages could not.

this, he turns to two different sources. For the masses, he uses scriptural arguments taken from texts known to the Jewish community – the Bible, the Talmud, and the midrashim. For the philosophers, he uses philosophical arguments, drawing on the writings of Plato (to whom he ascribes Plotinus’ ideas), Aristotle, Themistius, al-

Fārābī, Avicenna, Averroes, and Maimonides.212 By integrating these two types of texts and arguments and demonstrating the validity of Christian doctrines through them, Abner believes that he has proven that Christianity is the truest religion and thereby justified his own conversion.213

2.2.1 The Existence of God 214

Polqar does not provide a detailed explanation of his theory regarding the principles of the Jewish faith. Instead, similarly to Maimonides in the Guide, he sets forth the three principles that represent the conclusion achieved by the philosophers. As he accepts Maimonides’ first three principles in the Commentary on the Mishnah, it is reasonable to assume that he also judged Maimonides’ analysis of the Aristotelian method to be correct. Beginning with the belief that God exists, Polqar argues that “The essential principle and the purpose of all knowledge according to all nations, is the knowledge of the existence of God, may He be blessed, through whose power the

212 Robert Chazan, in his article “Maestre Alfonso of Valladolid and the New Missionizing,” argues that despite the lack of evidence that Abner knew Raymond Martin’s Fugio Fidei, he utilized the same missionizing technic in order to convince Jews to follow in his steps and convert to Christianity. The technic was mainly using rabbinical sources to defend Christianity, although philosophical arguments were also common. Chazan asserts that using Jewish texts had a psychological effect on the members of the Jewish community. Moreover, the probability of convincing Jews to convert is higher when one uses sources they are familiar with rather than philosophical texts. 213 Abner held a radical view of determinism in order to justify his conversion. See Baer, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, p. 332-333 [English]; A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, pp. 194-195 [Hebrew]. 214 Cf. Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy, pp. 237-242; Carlos Fraenkel, The Existence of God and Attributes; Mercedes Rubio, Maimonides’ Proofs for the Existence of God and their Aristotelian Background in the “Guide of the Perplexed”, pp. 914-921; Harry Wolfson, “The Plurality of Immovable Movers in Aristotle, Averroes, and St. Thomas”, reprinted in Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, Vol. I, pp. 1-21.

encompassing sphere moves. This has been explained first by our religion in the verse, I am the Lord.”215 Polqar offers this brief statement as the conclusion of the philosophical arguments demonstrating the existence of God. He alludes here to Maimonides’ (and

Aristotle’s) cosmological proof of God’s existence, which is necessarily connected with the proof of His incorporeality.216 The heavenly bodies, being corporeal, are by definition finite, for no infinite body exists; it follows that they, as finite bodies, can contain only a finite amount of power. That power can be the cause of motion only over a finite period of time. However, since the heavenly bodies have been in motion eternally, we must conclude that an infinite power is the cause of their eternal motion; for any corporal body, being finite, cannot contain infinite power. An infinite power cannot be connected to corporeal things, and it is not subject to division or change; thus the eternal motion of the heavenly bodies is dependent on an infinite being that is neither a body nor a force in a body.

Abner does not discuss the issue of the existence of God, simply because he and

Polqar fully agree that God exists. Their disagreement is about the concept of God, namely, His unity and incorporeality. For Polqar, God’s unity and incorporeality are philosophical truths. For Abner, on the other hand, God’s unity and incorporeality are open to interpretation, and Polqar’s is only one manner of understanding them.

Next, I will discuss Abner’s analysis of the Trinity and the Incarnation. His discussion regarding these two issues is almost exclusively hermeneutical, barely drawing on philosophical sources. Polqar does not reply to any of Abner’s

215 Teshuvat Apikoros, p.2b; Exod. 20:2. In ‘Ezer ha-Dat Polqar lists two types of acquired knowledge; the first is man’s knowledge of God and His attributes, which also appears in Teshuvat Apikoros. The second type of knowledge, which is absent from Teshuvat Apikoros, is man’s knowledge of his own soul and his ultimate purpose as a created being. The second corresponds to the way man should act in order to get closer to his creator – to distance himself from idolatry, to love God, and to aim to conjoin with the Active intellect – while the first part corresponds to the content of the metaphysical knowledge. 216 The Guide, 1:68-69; 71-76; 2: Introduction; 1-31.

hermeneutical attempts to defend the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. In both Teshuvat Apikoros and ʿEzer ha-Dat, he keeps his arguments brief and concise, indicating that the philosophers have already proven God’s absolute unity and incorporeality.217

2.2.2 Monotheism vs. Trinity 218

By adding the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation to Polqar’s three principles, Abner asserts not only that the additional principles do not contradict the principles of God’s unity and incorporeality, but also that we can only explain the existence of created beings through these doctrines. That is, only by accepting the three substantive attributes of God signified by the Trinity can we account for the multiplicity present in the world.

Abner’s long argument justifying the existence of the Trinity is based on several midrashim, to which he adds prooftexts from the philosophical literature. He quotes midrash on Psalms 50:1:

This is what is written in the midrash on the verse which says: “God [El], the Lord [YHVH] God [Elohim] spoke and summoned the world.”219 Why did it mention the Name three times? To teach you that the Holy One, Blessed be He, created the world with these three names which stand for the three attributes with which He created the world. And these are they: Wisdom [Hokhma], Understanding [Tevunah], and Knowledge. [Daʿat] ‘Wisdom from whence? Because it is said, ‘The Lord founded the earth by wisdom, etc.…’Understanding’? because it is said, He established the heavens by

217 Teshuvat Apikoros, pp. 2b-3a; ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p.35. 218 In this discussion I only consider Abner’s la-Meḥaref, since it was Abner’s direct response to Polqar’s Teshuvat Apikoros. For extensive discussion regarding the Trinity in Abner’s thought, see Isaac Baer, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, vol. 1, pp. 335; 343-348; The Use of Kabbalah in the Christological Thought of Abner of Burgos, pp. 280-289; Herbert Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy, pp. 248- 249; Shoshana Gershenzon, A tale of Two Midrashim: The Legacy of Abner of Burgos, pp. 133- 145; Study, pp. 74-136; Jonathan Hecht, Dissertation, pp. 64, 484-493; Daniel Lasker, Jewish Philosophical Polemics against Christianity, pp. 45- 105; Ryan Szpiech, Dissertation, pp. 357-365; Shalom Zadik, Dissertation, pp. 41-70. Baer and Gershenzon strongly argue for Kabbalistic influence on Abner’s thought. אל אלהים יי דבר ויקרא ארץ ,50:1 Psalms 219

understanding. ‘Knowledge’? Because it is said ‘by His knowledge the depths burst apart…’220 One must conclude from this passage that the world could not have been created unless the Creator possessed these three attributes which are indicated by His three names, “God (El), God (Elohim), the Lord (YHVH),” because they are three (parts) of the one divine substance. They are indicated by those three names (“Wisdom” [Hokhma], “understanding” [Tevunah], and “knowledge” [Daʿat]) because of their essential characteristics. For it would not be fitting to say that the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world by means of the power of “names,” as the fools think, or by means of any other thing other than Himself and His truth. Indeed, He Himself is His wisdom, and He Himself is His understanding, and He (Himself) is His knowledge.221

God created the world with three divine attributes: Wisdom [ḥokhma], denoted by His name YHVH (Lord); Understanding [Tevunah], denoted by His name El

(God); and knowledge [Daʿat], denoted by His name Elohim (God).222 I will first cite

Abner’s definitions of each of the three divine attributes, after which I will examine his concept of the Trinity in light of these definitions. Wisdom (ḥokhma) is:

the absolute primary knowledge.223 As they say, the Holy One, blessed be He, does not give wisdom except to one who has wisdom. From this, it follows necessarily that there is wisdom which has not been given by any giver, and which is in man. It is the wisdom of the Holy One, blessed be He, which is the cause of everything. This is in accordance with what Aristotle wrote (that) the active intellect is a part of the human soul and it alone is eternal, never dying.224 Because it is an absolute and universal wisdom, the Christians called it "Father" (Av). This is by way of metaphor, as a universal principle is called "father" (Av).225

Understanding (tevunah) is:

is born from "wisdom" (ḥokhma). For, through it, one thing is understood from another thing. It is the particular wisdom which is born from the universal wisdom. The details of the world come from its (understanding’s) absolute particular wisdom, just as the rules of the world (klalei ha-ʿolam) come from its (wisdom’s) absolute universal wisdom. The Christians ascribe

220 Here Abner adds several verses that mention the triune nature of God; Exodus 20:5 “for I The Lord Your God” and Josh. 22:22 “God The Lord God.” Hecht notes that Abner utilizes the verse in Exodus because of the pronoun “I” at the beginning, followed by the other two names; see Hecht, Dissertation, p.145, n.254. 221 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, pp. 15b-16a. 222 According to Gershenzon, these identifications were already made by Moshe de Leon and Joseph Giqatilla. See Shoshana Gershenzon, A Study, pp. 120-123. ידיעה משולחת ראשונה 223 224 See Aristotle, De Anima, 3:5. 225 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, p. 16a.

the name "son" to the understanding of the Holy One, blessed be He, because it is “born” from wisdom. Thus, "son" (ben), “sagacity” (binah), and "understanding" (tevunah) are from one (Hebrew) root. Thus, in the verse which says, "Has counsel vanished from the children"? [Jer. 49:7] the commentators explained as "Has counsel vanished from the ones who understand? in a sense of, "you understood my thoughts." [Psalms. 139:2] Likewise, he words of Agor son (ben) of Jakeh (that is,) "sagacity" (Binah). And this follows the pattern of the name, Joshua ben Nun.

Knowledge (Da'at) is:

knowledge of the syllogism. The relationship (is that) between "wisdom" which gives birth to "understanding" and "understanding" which is born from "wisdom." It is like the specific difference which unifies the species under the genus. It is like the middle term between the major term and the minor term in a demonstrative proof. "Knowledge" which is between wisdom and understanding—indicated by the two names, Lord (YHVH) and God (El)—is hinted at in Tractate Sanhedrin [92a] where it is written, "Great is knowledge, since it was placed between two letters, ‘For the Lord is an all-knowing God.”' It is like the relationship between two correlates, for "knowledge" (Da'at) and "knowing" (De'ah) are the source and the relationship between the "knower" (yodea') and the "known" (yadua') as in, "That you may know (lada'at) that I the Lord," [Exod. 31:13] (and) "to know (lede'ah) what would befall him." [Exod. 2:4]. Similarly, the intellect is, as it were, the relationship between the intellectually cognizing subject (maskil) and the thing that is intellectually cognized (muskal). For this reason the Christians called this characteristic the "Holy Spirit," just as the sages called it the "Holy Spirit." This is what is written in the midrash on Proverbs and, likewise, in the midrash on Exodus: "To know what would befall him, ‘know’ means the Holy Spirit, as it is said, ‘for the Lord is an all-knowing God.226

Abner identifies ḥokhma with universal wisdom, which is eternal and separate from matter. The Christians call this characteristic the “Father.” God’s wisdom, which is “the cause of everything” (sibbat hakol), is the primary “source” of all created beings. Tevunah is the particular knowledge that is “born” from the universal wisdom and is acknowledged by the Christians as the “Son.”227 Daʿat is placed between the two attributes; it is the intermediate between ḥokhma and tevunah, between universal and particular wisdom. It has a role similar to the syllogistic middle term, which

226 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, p. 16b. 227 Abner connects the Hebrew words tevunah (understanding) and binah (sagacity), whose root is b.n.h, with the word Ben (son). The resemblance between the three words serves Abner’s purpose in connecting God’s second attribute to “son.”

connects the major term and the minor term. Later on, Abner states that Daʿat denotes

Elohim because of its grammatical plural appearance:

Since "knowledge" (Daʿat) is between the two names, God (El) and Lord (YHVH), in the verse, "For the Lord is an all-knowing God"—and it is the "Holy Spirit," as has been mentioned, it is fitting that the name "God" (Elohim) is related to (knowledge), since it is between the two other names— El and YHVH— in that verse, "God (El), God (Elohim), the Lord (YHVH).” For this reason, it is in the plural, like the words, "God" and "knowledge." It teaches about itself and the other two, just as the relationship teaches about itself and the two related things altogether. For this reason, the name "God" (Elohim) by itself teaches about the three attributes together.”228

The plural form Elohim indicates a relation which is derived from the other two divine names, El and YHVA. Daʿat, which denotes God’s name Elohim, is what the

Christians refer to as “The Holy Spirit.” Using this Midrash serves Abner’s goal: demonstrating the existence of the Trinity from rabbinic sources. He argues that the whole point of the Sages in this midrash is to demonstrate that the names of God parallel the existence of three aspects in Him, without damaging His unity. He reinforces this claim by using Aristotelian notions such as “Active Intellect” and syllogism, thus supporting his argument from a philosophical point of view as well.

Abner reinforces his claim by suggesting that the justification for the Trinity – intellect (sekhel), the intellectually cognizing subject (maskil), and the thing that is intellectually cognized (muskal) – is accepted by Aristotelians and therefore, the

Trinity does not imply multiplicity in God.

Continuing to support his idea that the Divine is composed of three persons,

Abner proceeds to quote two midrashim that clearly show, in his opinion, that this was the position genuinely held by the Jewish sages. Naturally, claims Abner, the sages could not openly teach their disciples to believe in three persons of God, for they would be charged with heresy. Instead they concealed their opinion and only obliquely alluded

228 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, p. 17a.

to their point of view.229 Here, Abner implies that the Sages used the Maimonidean method of concealing true knowledge from the multitude because of the latter’s inability to understand it. However, while for Maimonides the knowledge that the Sages concealed from the multitude was philosophical knowledge, for Abner the knowledge they concealed was the fundamental doctrines of Christianity.

I will focus here on the second midrash Abner cites from Exodus Rabbah; his reading of this midrash focuses on the grammatical analysis of the plural name Elohim and the singular verb bara’ that follows it. Abner’s main purpose in this midrash is to demonstrate that Elohim alludes to the Trinity:

Some sectarians once asked R. Simlai:230 ‘Are there not many deities in the world?’ He replied, ‘What makes you think so?’ ‘Because, they said, ‘it is written, “Did ever a people hear the voice of God [Elohim in the plural form]?” To which he replied, “It does not say Madabberim but “medaber”. ‘Whereupon his disciples said to him: ‘O teacher, you have thrust those off with a broken reed, but what answer will you give to us?’ R. Levi then offered this explanation. It says, ‘Did ever a people here the voice of God?’ What does this mean? Had it said, ‘The voice of God in His power,’ the world would not have been able to survive, but it says instead, The voice of the Lord is with power (Ps. 29:4) – that is, according to the power of each individual [each one] according to the power of the young, the old, and the very small ones.231

The name Elohim in the plural form appears to suggest, so the heretics claim, that there are many gods, which raises vital theological questions. Rabbi Simlai’s

229 One might wonder why the Sages could not have explained to their disciples that these three persons do not contradict God’s unity. Perhaps we can suggest that acknowledging the three persons was so closely identified with Christianity that the rabbis, even if they possessed the “true” knowledge of the Trinity, could not disclose this knowledge to their disciples. Since they would have been accused of heresy, they could only allude to God’s three persons. 230 Rabbi Levi is referring to the midrash in Genesis Rabbah 8:9, which states: “The heretics (minim) asked Rabbi Simlai: ‘How many deities created the world?’ I and you must inquire of the first day,’ replied he, as it is written, For ask now of the first days (Deut. 4:43) Not ‘since the days gods created (bar’u) man’ is written here, but God created (bara’). Then they asked him a second time: why is it written in the beginning Elohim [plural] created? In the beginning baru Elohim is not written here,’ answers he, ‘but bara’ Elohim the heaven and the earth. Rabbi Simlai said: wherever you find a point [apparently] supporting the heretics, you find the refutation at its side. They asked him again: ‘What is meant by And God said: Let us make a man?’ ‘Read what follows,’ replied he: ‘not, “And god created [va-yevr’u] man,” is written here, but “And God created – va-yivra’ (Gen. 1:27) when they went out his disciples said to him: ‘Them you have dismissed with a mere makeshift, but how will you answer us?” Cf. Hecht, Dissertation, pp. 489-491. 231 Exodus Rabbah, 29:1. Cf. Philo of Alexandria, ; Shalom Ẓadik, Dissertation, pp. 47-51.

grammatical explanation that the use of the form medaber in the singular form indicates that Elohim should also be understood as referring to one God is not satisfactory for his disciples.232 Abner emphasizes that Rabbi Simlai’s students did not accept their Rabbi’s simple reply. This is crucial, for it suggests that his genuine opinion differed from the answer he offered to the heretics: Rabbi Simlai must have believed that the true meaning of the biblical verse needed to be hidden from outsiders.

Abner analyzes the midrashim for one main reason. He wishes to emphasize

Rabbi Simlai’s and Rabbi Levi’s attempt to stress that the plural form of Elohim indeed carries with it a plural meaning, but that this plural meaning refers not to God’s “honor and exaltation,” but to “relationships and actions”:

Then Rabbi Levi came and explained it. He said: "If ‘the voice of the Lord (YHVH) in His power’ had been written, the world could not have stood. Rather: ‘the voice of God (Elohim) (is written). Each and every one according to his power, the young man according to his power and the old man according to his power." His answer was that the plural form of the name, Elohim, of the one God was not for honor and exaltation—just as it was not for the plurality of His substance, according to the opinion of us who believe in unity—for then the students would have required a different answer (for them) from the questioner, [the question being] why this plurality is mentioned in the name "God." Neither Rabbi Levi nor Rabbi Simlai answered that it was for honor and exaltation, rather it was because of the relationships and the actions (between the names). Our rabbi, Moses Maimonides, wrote in chapters 51 and 52 of the first part of the Guide of the Perplexed that it is possible to attach (a notion of) multiplicity of attributes to the Creator, since a change in relationships does not necessitate a change in His essence… Rather, Rabbi Levi interpreted the "voices" as a metaphor to all the changing actions coming

232 In Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, pp. 17a-17b, Abner also examines the midrash in Genesis Rabbah and states, “It is explained in Genesis Rabbah, and also in Exodus Rabbah, that the name "God" was not written in the plural form for embellishment and exaltation as the commentators who argue with us thought. It is not as they understand from Rabbi Simlai, when he argued with the heretics who believed in the plurality of deities, when he said, "In every place that the heretics profane, the answer to them is at their side: ‘When the Gods began to create . . . ’ is not written here, rather: ‘(When God began to) create.’ And the Gods created man . . . is not written, rather: ‘And (God) created.’ ‘The voice of Gods are speaking’ is not said, rather ‘(the voice of God) is speaking.’ Thus it is in every case like this." They (the students) wished to say that this response is not convincing. That is to say because of the mention of unity, plurality cannot be understood in it in any way. For the students say to Rabbi Simlai: "You have put (the heretics) off with straw. What do you say to us?" (The students) called that particular response concerning His uniqueness, "straw," and a weak response. It is not a convincing answer. This is because there still remains doubt so they ask him, saying, ‘if the deity is one, why is the name ‘God’ (Elohim), which indicates plurality because it is in the plural form, used. After all, we have found the name, ‘God’ (Eloha), in the singular?”

from the Holy One, blessed be He. So, although there is no multiplicity in His essence, the verse uses the singular form, "speaking out of a fire," and not "speaking" in the plural form. Thus, "God created," "and God created," (are written) and not "Gods created," nor "and Gods created, "and others besides these. Rather, because the power of the Holy One, blessed be He, is actually infinite, and the world—because it is created—is not actually infinite, it must be that the power of the Holy One, blessed be He—which is actually infinite must in actuality perform an infinite number of actions—one after the other— which are the details of existence. Thus, the world will be one, qua totality and purposive, appropriately coming from the One; and (the world) it will be (filled with) multiplicity by virtue of the many parts which deserve to exist because He is a power without end.233 [emphases were added]

Abner employs Maimonides’ view of God’s attributes, which stresses that God’s unity is not diminished because these attributes do not cause any change in Him. Rabbi

Levi explains that the verse states “the voice of God [Elohim]” and not “the voice of the

Lord [YHVH] is with power” in order to affirm God’s unity and at the same time allow for His actions and relationships, which do not diminish His unity and perfection. The

“voices,” according to Rabbi Levi, are the sum of all the actions that occur in the world.234 However, as we saw earlier, the only way in Abner’s view to explain the multiplicity of actions in the world is to accept the three aspects of Elohim. If we combine Abner’s explanation of the midrash on Psalms with his explanation of Rabbi

Levi’s reply, we arrive at Abner’s conclusion that the Talmudic Sages possessed the knowledge that Elohim in its plural form alludes to the three aspects in God. However, they had to conceal it from the people for social and political reasons, namely, that the people were not ready to accept these truths and consequently could believe that God is not one, but thee.

233 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, p. 17b. 234 See Jonathan Hecht, Dissertation, p. 489.

2.2.3 The Incorporeality of God vs. the Incarnation235 of God236

For Maimonides and Polqar, the belief in the unity of God is the fundamental principle of any true religion. For Abner, on the other hand, the Incarnation is the most important doctrine in Christianity – the belief in the Trinity being not an independent doctrine, but just a prerequisite for believing in the Incarnation:

First of all, the Christians are not required to maintain the belief in the Trinity except that it is necessary for the belief in the Incarnation of God in human form because of the attribute “Son” which creates particulars in the existence, as has been explained. For without this, neither the immortality of the souls after death, nor their receipt of reward and punishment in the world to come, could be established. In this way the Torah, which gives existence and permanence to the existence of the human species and individual personalities according to what is possible, is established. Further, as I proved above, the beliefs which cause the performance of the commandments, are (the ones which are) "incumbent upon us to believe in.237

This statement emphasizes two things: the first of which is the Incarnation’s key role in the existence of particulars in the world. In other words, if there were no

Incarnation, there would be no created things. Belief in the three substantive attributes is essential for existence because it explains the becoming of the world and the existence of multiplicity through the “Son.” Second, Abner stipulates that the fulfillment of two important theological principles – retribution in the form of rewards and punishments and the immortality of the soul, two Jewish principles – is dependent on belief in the

Incarnation. God as an active force in the world governs individuals, namely, each person is rewarded or punished according to his deeds. Thus, only accepting the doctrine of God’s Incarnation in the Son makes it possible to believe in the immortality of the soul and the redemption of human beings.238

235 Abner uses the word “hitlabshut” (clothe oneself) to describe the Christian doctrine of Incarnation. 236 See Herbert Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy, pp. 242-248; Shoshana Gershenzon, A Study, pp. 137-169; Jonathan Hecht, Dissertation, pp. 493-500; Shalom Ẓadik, Dissertation, pp. 70-99. 237 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, p.21b. 238 Cf. Hecht, Dissertation, p. 494.

Abner lists two types of the Incarnation: universal incarnation (min hitlabshut klali) and particular incarnation. Universal incarnation refers to the incarnation in all created beings. Abner compares it to the Shekhinah, the presence of God in the world; this type of Incarnation includes the Incarnation of God in the human species (hitlabshut ha-Elohut ba-min ha-enoshi). Particular Incarnation (min ha-hitlabshut ha-perati) refers to incarnation in such a manner that “the soul of each human (that) would remain in its particularity, each one separate from the other… in order that each one will receive his fitting recompense according to (the nature of) his deeds in the world.”239

Universal Incarnation (min hitlabshut klali)240

The belief in Universal Incarnation was common, according to Abner, among

Talmudic sages, philosophers, and theologians:

Truly, the universal type of Incarnation of God in all creations has already been mentioned by the Sages of the Talmud when they said “The Shekhinah is in every place,” and “There is no place in the world without the Shekhinah.” and Every place where the angel is seen the Shekhinah is seen 241 Likewise, Saint Augustine said, “the divinity, which is the true essence of the Messiah, is in every place.”242 In the Chapters of Plato it is written that "it is not possible to say that God has power or powers rather He is all power in relation to creation.243 The sage Thales said that "all things are filled with God, blessed

239 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, p.25b. 240 Gershenzon translates min hitlabshut klali as “divine immanence.” I will keep the literal meaning of the Hebrew. See her discussion of the Incarnation in A Study, pp. 137-169. 241 Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra Tractate, 25a; Song of Song Rabbah 3, 10:2; Numbers Rabbah 12:4. See also Hecht, Dissertation, p. 173, n.389; 367, n.310. 242 Augustine, The Soliloquies of St. Augustine, I, 1, 3, p.7, Thomas A. Gillian (ed.); Retractions, IV,3, p. 11; St. Augustine On the Psalms, Vol. 2, Ps. 30:21, Dme. Scholastica Hebgin and Dme. Felicitas Corrigan (eds.). See also Gershenzon, A Study, p. 142, n. 12. 243 Hecht ascribes this source to Plotinus, Enneads, V, tract. 8, 9: "Call on God, maker of the sphere whose image you now hold, and pray Him to enter. And may He come bringing His own Universe with all the Gods that dwell in it-He who is the one God and all the gods, where each is all, blending into a unity, distinct in powers but all one god in virtue of that one divine power of many facets. More truly, this is the one God who is all gods; for, in the coming to be of all those, this, the one, has suffered no diminishing. He and all have one existence while each again is distinct. It is distinction by state without interval: there is no outward form to set one here and another there and to prevent any from being an entire identity; yet there is no sharing of parts from one to another. Nor is each of those divine wholes a power in fragment, a power totaling to the sum of the measurable segments: the divine is one all-power, reaching out to infinity, powerful to infinity; and so great is God that his very members are infinites." See Hecht, Dissertation, p. 173, n. 392.

be He.” Our sages, may their memory be blessed, said that the Holy One, blessed be He, “fills the world like the soul fills the body.”244 Scripture says, “For I fill both heaven and earth.” 245 Avicenna, like Themistius and Alexander,246 said that the Active intellect is in all bodies and nothing endures in the world except the divine for all other things disintegrate. Abu’l Walid ben Rushd (Averroes) wrote in his of Incoherence of Incoherence, "None of the philosophers are opposed (to the theory) that there is in the elements heavenly warmth and that this is the substratum for the potencies which produce animals and plants.”247 Galen calls it the forming power and the Creator. From this Plato said that it (the soul) is the faculty which creates and forms the body, and if a body was a pre-condition for the existence of this faculty (the soul) it could not create it or form it." Averroes said that this is the origin of their saying that demons exist.248

Abner identifies the Sages’ Shekhinah, the presence of God in the world, with

Universal Incarnation; this means that the presence of God is present in all of creation, both in its material and non-material aspects. It is important to note that the Sages never identified Shekhinah with God Himself; God is perceived as transcendent or above the world, while the Shekhinah is perceived as a divine present that nevertheless does not directly connect God to the world.

244 Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot, 10:a. Polqar uses the same analogy, but for Polqar the analogy relates God’s will to the world and the soul to the body. See discussion below, pp. 149-160. 245 Jeremiah. 23:24. 246 Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on De Anima, 80, 16-92; Mantissa, 106, 19-113, 24. 247 Averroes, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, About the Natural Sciences, vol. 1, ¶ 577-578 (English translation, pp. 357-358: "And none of the philosophers is opposed to the theory that in the elements there is heavenly warmth and that this is the substratum for the potencies which produce animals and plants, but some of the philosophers call this potency a natural heavenly potency, whereas Galen calls it the forming power and sometimes the demiurge, saying that it seems that there exists a wise maker of the living being who has created it and that this is apparent from anatomy, but where this maker is and what His substance is too lofty a problem for human understanding. From this Plato proves that the soul is separated from the body, for the soul creates and forms the body, and if the body were the condition for the existence of the soul, the soul would not have created or formed it. This creative soul is most apparent in the animals which do not procreate, but it is also evident in the animals which do. And just as we know that the soul is something added to the natural warmth, since it is not of the nature of warmth qua warmth to produce well-ordered intelligible acts, so we know that the warmth which is in the seeds does not suffice to create and to form. And the philosophers do not disagree about the fact that there are in the elements souls creating each species of animals, plants, and minerals that exists, and that each of them needs a directing principle and preserving powers for it to come into existence and remain. And these souls are either like intermediaries between the souls of the heavenly bodies and the souls in the sensible bodies of the sublunary world, and then no doubt they have absolute dominion over these latter souls and these bodies, and from here arises the belief in the Jinn, or these souls themselves are attached to the bodies which they create according to the resemblance which exists between them, and when the bodies decay they return to their spiritual matter and to the subtle imperceptible bodies." 248 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, pp. 21b-23a.

Interestingly, Abner only briefly mentions the rabbinic saying about the

Shekhinah and the link Augustine draws between the messiah and the Incarnation, while, elaborating upon the philosophers’ concept of the Active Intellect, identifying it with Universal Incarnation. I suggest reading Abner’s discussion in the context of the debate with Polqar, insofar as Polqar would not have taken theological attempts to justify the Incarnation seriously. He could not, however, dismiss references to philosophical writings by Plato, Avicenna, and, most importantly, Averroes.

Now, in what sense is the Active Intellect God’s incarnation? While it is not entirely clear in what way the Active Intellect is the Universal Incarnation, Abner seems to ascribe to Aristotle the view, which he accepts, that “the Active Intellect is a part of the human soul and it alone is eternal, never dying.249 Universal incarnation, then, is identified by Abner as the eternal part of the soul, namely, the acquired intellect.

Abner employs the above cited rabbinic, theological, and philosophical sources to reply to Polqar’s accusation that Christians reject the principles of a true religion:

This is what caused you to err, Rabbi Isaac, saying that the Christians believe that “God is corporeal or a faculty in a body and is not one” and that their belief, which I chose, is “the opposite of those four beliefs” which you mentioned – among them, that “God is an Existent, who is unique, incorporeal, and not a force in a body.” For you thought that nothing is joined to corporeality except a body or a force in a body and that there could not be a multiplicity of attributes in the one God. (You said) this because you did not understand the nature of the separation predicated of the separated intellect, nor the nature of multiplicity predicated of the one God. For the matter is not as you think. For though the philosophers say that the active intellect is in all bodies they do not believe that it is corporeal or a faculty in a body. Even those who say that (the active intellect) is corporeal or that God is corporeal and measurable and that He has three attributes, it is not fitting to assume that they said this except in the sense mentioned. That is the true way which the Christians believe, and which I have chosen.250

Polqar, argues Abner, criticizes Christians for defending the doctrine of

Incarnation, which describes the divine – a non-material being – as embodied within a

249 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, p. 16a. 250 Ibid. p. 23a. Cf. Shalom Ẓadik, Dissertation, pp. 77-78.

material body. In this passage Abner applies the philosophers’ view regarding the

Active Intellect to the Incarnation: the Active Intellect is separate from matter, but even the philosophers accept that It is present in the world. Polqar himself accepts that the emanation from the Active Intellect onto the sublunar world is a process in which forms, non-material aspects, are unified with physical bodies. According to Abner, saying that “the active intellect is in all bodies” does not necessarily mean that the

Active Intellect is a body or a force in a body. He agrees with Polqar that God is neither a body nor a force in a body; nevertheless, the Incarnation of a non-material force in a physical body is indeed possible. If Polqar rejects this idea, then he must also reject the philosophers’ claim that the Active Intellect is present in all created beings. Abner concludes that although the divine presence exists in the world,251 it is neither a body nor a force in a body.

The Incarnation of God in human species [hitlabshut ha-Elohut ba-Min ha-Enoshi]252

According to Abner, Universal Incarnation includes Incarnation in the human species. Here too, Abner employs the Active Intellect as an important factor in the

Incarnation:

There is a species of divine incarnation below this first type [universal Incarnation] which I discussed. This is the divine incarnation in the human species. It occurs because the active intellect enters the realm of man. As Aristotle said, “the active intellect is a part of the human soul; and when it will separate [from the body] it will be something.”253 Themistius said, “I am the active intellect.”254 Avicenna wrote in Oriental Philosophy, that “the perfect

251 Cf. Gershenzon, A Study, pp. 140-155. Here Gershenzon, as she does in other discussions in her work, maintains that the Kabbalistic movements in northern Spain influenced Abner. In this conception, the Active Intellect, discussed in the universal Incarnation, is parallel to the Sephiroth. Ẓadik disagrees with her argument. See Ẓadik, Dissertation, p.6, mainly n. 23. 252 Cf. Shalom Ẓadik, Dissertation, pp. 82-83. 253 Hecht suggests that this quotation is from Aristotle’s De Anima, III,5. See Jonathan Hecht, Dissertation, p. 180, n.423; p. 370, n. 336. 254 Hecht suggests that this quotation is from Themistius’ Commentary on De Anima, 100.37. See, Jonathan Hecht, Dissertation, p. 180, n.424; p. 370, n. 337.

man has a separate intellect so that, if it were possible for the active intellect to become divisible we would say that it were part of him.255

It would appear that the Active Intellect’s role occurs on two different levels.

The first, Universal Incarnation, applies to all created beings, inanimate things, plants, animals, and human beings; it is made up of the substantial forms that emanate from the

Active Intellect onto the sublunar world. The second, a unique Incarnation in the human species, applies only to humans. Abner clearly accepts the philosophers’ claim that through his intellect, man is able to perform the highest possible activity in the sublunar world – conjoining with the Active Intellect. Incarnation in the human species, then, is higher in importance than Universal Incarnation, for it allows man to elevate himself to his divine aspect.

The Particular Incarnation [hitlabshut perati]256

Particular Incarnation, according to Abner, is responsible to retribution; this means that “experiencing” Particular Incarnation each soul remains in its particularity so that it will receive the reward or punishment that follows from these deeds:

But the type of incarnation, which supports the establishment of the Torah and the receiving of reward and punishment in the world of the souls is particular incarnation. That is to say, the soul of each human would remain in its particularity, each one separate from the other, for a long period of time in order that each one will receive his fitting recompense according to (the nature of) his deeds in this world. There is no need for a proof here concerning particular immortality. For this is not part of the dispute between the Christians and the Jews because this is well known and agreed upon by all those who possess religion. Anyone who denies this is like one who denies the entire Torah. Also I have already explained this at length in the book, Teacher of Righteousness. Since it is possible that this type of particular incarnation would cause the belief in idolatry and multiplicity of deities—as the first two heresies caused—since the particular does not exist without the universal. Because these are two different levels of existence, the Torah of Moses— which comes to remove the belief in idolatry from human beings—concealed

255 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, p. 23b. 256 Cf. Shalom Ẓadik, Dissertation, pp. 82-100.

particular incarnation, even though it would have been very helpful for the establishment of the commandments and for the achievement of the world to come.257

Abner indicates that the conclusion drawn from this type of Incarnation is very dangerous because it can lead people to idolatry. Had the Torah of Moses taught the principle of the Universal Incarnation to the Israelites after they left Egypt, that principle could easily have led them to idolatry or even to pantheism. Unfortunately,

Abner does not discuss the nature of Particular Incarnation at length. Instead, he refers his readers to his book Moreh Ẓedeq (Teacher of Righteousness):

In the Midrash on Psalms [90:1] it is written: "A prayer of Moses. Man of God.” We may understand: man and divine; for [Moses was] from the middle and below, he was a man; from the middle and above, he was God. For they called one half the divine element, and the other half the human element… However, the messiah possessed this [type] of incarnation in a higher level and in a more marvelous manner than all the pious people. This is why he is not on the same level as the other pious people. And this is said in Bava Batra [75a]: “Three were called by the name of God; blessed be He, and they are the following: The pious men, the Messiah and Jerusalem,” and even though the messiah is listed among the pious…the text implies that he nevertheless was [on a] higher [rank] than Abraham, and [on a] higher [rank] than Moses, and [on a] higher [rank] than all angels.258

Abner begins this discussion by describing Moses, who, according to Jewish philosophers, was unequivocally the man who attained the highest rank a human being can reach. Jewish philosophers, including Maimonides and Polqar, explained their claim that Moses was the perfect man259 by asserting that he conjoined with the

Active Intellect more than any man in history. Here Abner indicates that Moses was

“half” divine and “half” human; Christ, and here Abner adds his own interpretation to the midrash, exceeds his rank; Christ also exceeds the rank of Abraham and the angels. It would appear that, for Abner, Christ exceeds even the rank of the Active

257 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, pp.25b-26a. 258 Moreh Ẓedeq, v.1 pp. 151-152. I used Shalom Ẓadik’s translation. See his Dissertation, p.89. 259 In fact, Polqar defines Moses as “divine man.” See discussion pp.

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Intellect, for he was above “all angels” and conjoined with God directly. Abner does not explain in what way Christ’s rank exceeds that of the pious and the angels.

Perhaps, as opposed to Abraham, and Moses, who is half divine and half human,

Christ according to the classical Christianity, is entirely divine and entirely human.

2.2.4 The World to Come: Is the Soul Universal or Individual?260

Abner connects the concept of ‘Olam ha-Ba with the belief in retribution in the form of reward and punishment:

This is similar to what you [Isaac] wrote in the third letter, which you called “The Letter of Hope,” [Iggeret ha-Tiqvah] that “what is left of the soul of Reuben after death is nothing other than what is left of the soul of Simon.” Following this, it is necessary to say that there is no reward or punishment and that neither the righteous nor the evil souls have any advantage when compared to one another in that there are no differences between them. How could these things be reconciled with the belief in the resurrection of the dead?261 When we see, generally, in this world righteous men receive as if they acted as evil men, while the evil receive as if they acted as righteous, if there is no recompense for them in the world to come because of their actions in this world then, by necessity, there will not be any recompense at all for the commandments and the warnings – not in this world and not in the world to come. This is a denial of the entire Torah and the resurrection of the dead, as is agreed by all who possess religion.262

Abner accuses Polqar of rejecting the traditional view of retribution, according to which those who observe God’s commandments in this world necessarily gain a reward in ‘Olam ha-Ba (the World to Come), and those who forsake God’s word are punished.

According to Abner, Polqar denies the entire Torah by diminishing the significance of actions (commandments) in this world. Even though Abner does not spell it out, his objection seems to be that the root of Polqar’s mistake is the latter’s rejection of

260 Cf. Shoshana Gershenzon, A Study, pp. 83-85; Shalom Ẓadik, Dissertation, pp. 83- 92. 261 It is not entirely clear if Abner distinguishes between the resurrection of the dead and the world to come. It appears in this passage that these two concepts are interchangeable. 262 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, pp. 14a-b.

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particular incarnation which guarantees reward for good deeds and punishment for bad deeds.

Further, Abner raises a powerful theological argument against those who do not see the commandments as a divine decree. Since, as we observe, there is no equity in this world, insofar as the pious suffer and the wicked prosper, we must assume that there is recompense in the world to come; otherwise the entire notion of divine justice would be overturned. Moreover, if man is not to be judged according to his deeds in this world, why would God have given the commandments to be followed? It follows from

Abner’s theological objections that the immortality of the soul is individual, which is to say that each individual is rewarded or punished according to his obedience or disobedience to God’s word.

Polqar was aware of Abner’s objections in his Teshuvot la-Meḥaref; this is precisely why, although he does not discuss the concept of ‘Olam ha-Ba in Teshuvat

Apikoros, he dedicates two separate sections of ‘Ezer ha-Dat to addressing Abner’s accusations. The first discussion occurs in chapter four of treatise one, and the second consists of treatise five in its entirety.263

As noted earlier, Polqar does not include the belief in ‘Olam ha-Ba in his list of the fundamental Jewish principles – God’s existence, His unity, and His incorporeality.

In order to understand his view of ‘Olam ha-Ba, we must first clarify his position on man’s ultimate purpose in this world, for only those who achieve this goal gain the

“right” to attain ‘Olam ha-Ba.264

Before introducing his position concerning the ‘Olam ha-Ba, Polqar lists three views held by three different groups.265 The members of the first group consider life in

263 Treatise five of ‘Ezer ha-Dat is a modification of Polqar’s Iggeret ha-Tiqvah. See discussion on pp. 264 I extensively discuss Polqar’s view of man’s ultimate purpose in the last chapter of this dissertation. See pp. 283-295. 265 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 47.

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the world to come to be the same as life in this world. According to them, people enjoy pleasures in the same way, with the exception that life in the next world is eternal.266

The members of the second group consist of those who deny the immortality of the soul altogether; they see no difference between the death of humans and the death of beasts.

The members of this group, states Polqar, reject “the law of truth” (kefirah ‘aẓummah be- ḥoq ha-emet).267 The members of the third group, among whom Polqar includes himself, are those who understand the complexity of humans, namely that humans are comprised of a bodily part (containing the four elements) and a spiritual part. The bodily parts can be divided into three categories: first, the common attributes shared by humans and inanimate objects; second, the attributes common to humans and plants – such as the nourishing faculty of the soul; and third, the bestial part shared by humans and animals, insofar as both are driven essentially by the faculty of desire and the power of imagination.268

However, Polqar continues:

Only (that) exalted divine intellect which does not need a body and does not function within a material organ is the image of God and His likeness… And do not think that man’s happiness and purpose is attained [in the same manner as] the pleasures of this world [are attained]… Thus, this is the purpose of the ultimate happiness, which is, in truth, the life of the world to come (ḥayye ha- ‘Olam ha-Ba), namely, attaining this perfection, which is [possible] for one to attain [only] when [the divine intellect] separates (kshe-itpashet) from the despicable body…269

Polqar maintains that the intellectual component of the soul is immortal. It follows that only the people who actualize their intellect attain immortality. Unlike

Abner, who argued that reward or punishment in the world to come is the outcome of obeying or disobeying God’s commandments, Polqar seems to argue two things: first,

266 Perhaps Polqar alludes here to the view of popular Islam that in the world to come there is physical pleasure. 267 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 47. 268 Ibid, p. 48. Cf. Maimonides, Eight Chapters, chapters 1 and 2. 269 Ibid, pp. 48-49.

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that attaining intellectual perfection is the expression of the commandment to love

God; and second, that the immortality of the intellectual soul is a person’s reward.

Those who do not actualize their intellect are punished in a sense that intrinsically they are unable to attain immortality.

Man’s ultimate purpose is “to attain the true and exalted intelligibles, for they are the activities of the intellect. And in this it [man’s intellect] will conjoin with the

Active [Intellect] and they become one.”270 Achieving this activity is what Polqar describes as “returning to the Garden of Eden”; any bodily interference amounts to eating the forbidden fruit, which results in the punishment of being expelled from the

Garden.271

Accordingly, the only way to attain ‘Olam ha-Ba is through “studying the true wisdom with which the soul will be perfect and will enjoy the eternal perdurance that is the life in the next world.”272 Attaining ‘Olam ha-Ba, then, is the natural outcome of the individual achieving his purpose. The achievers of this goal are those whose intellectual power moves from potentiality to actuality. Polqar’s approach, which follows Averroes’ view, leaves no room for the individual immortality of the soul, but only for a collective immortality. The individuals who actualize their intellect conjoin with the Active

Intellect, their intellect becomes one in the universal sense. The intelligibles are eternal by their very nature; therefore, those who gain knowledge of them through conjunction with the Active Intellect also gain immortality of the soul. It is only bodily existence that differentiates one person from another, and attaining eternal knowledge frees the

270 Ibid, p. 50. 271 Ibid, pp. 49-50. Cf. Abner’s interpretation of the Garden of Eden, Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, pp. 24b- 25a. 272 Ibid, p. 67.

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soul from its connection to the body; therefore the acquired knowledge that is the eternal aspect of one’s soul is necessarily universal and not particular in nature.273

2.2.5 The Messiah to Come vs. the Messiah who Already Came 274

Determining whether or not the messiah to whom Hebrew sources refer has already come cannot be demonstrated through philosophical investigation. It can only be demonstrated by interpreting scriptural verses and rabbinic texts well known to both

Abner and Polqar, and by examining how the picture of the messiah and the messianic era that emerges from that interpretation coheres or does not cohere with past empirical events. In other words, Polqar chose prophetic verses that show that Jesus did not bring about the messianic era described by the prophets. On the other hand, Abner, who sought to prove just the opposite, used the same verses, as well as others, to demonstrate that Jesus and the messianic era he inaugurated did in fact correspond precisely to what the prophets had described.275

One of the main differences between Judaism and Christianity is rooted in each religion’s approach toward the messiah. While Christianity considers the messiah both divine and human, Judaism sees in the messiah a human being of extraordinary character. Christian dogma educates its believers to live their lives as if the messiah has already come; their way of living is a preparation for the world to come. In

273 Ibid, pp. 175-176. Cf. Maimonides, Letter on the Resurrection of the Dead; The Guide, 1:74. 274 Cf. Hecht, Dissertation, pp. 69-78; Szpiech, Dissertation, pp. 391-405. Szpiech, despite any conclusive evidence that Abner knew Martini, compares Martini’s Pugio Forei and Abner’s Moreh Ẓedeq. 275 It is important to note at this point that Polqar cites classical hermeneutic arguments for his claim that the messiah has not yet come, while Abner sets forth original and creative arguments. It is clear that Polqar was not a halakhic figure, and that he was not familiar with rabbinic texts and hermeneutical arguments. However, he could not have ignored the issue of the messiah completely, for he was concerned with the reaction of the members of his community. There is a clear difference between Polqar’s hermeneutical arguments, which often are not satisfying, and his philosophical arguments, which reflect his profound knowledge of the philosophical literature.

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Judaism, the messianic era is located in the future, and it features the restoration of

Jewish sovereignty over the land of Israel and a world in which all nations dwell in peace with one another. Thus, if the Jews accept the view that Jesus is the messiah, it follows that any hope they maintain for that restoration is only folly and illusion.

Polqar presents his theory with regard to the messiah in the fifth chapter of his

Teshuvat Apikoros and in the sixth chapter (sha’ar) of treatise one of ‘Ezer ha-Dat. The texts presented in both works are almost identical, and differ in only two places. The first difference is that the first paragraph in ‘Ezer ha-Dat contains a reference to Bilʿam that is omitted from Teshuvat Apikoros,276 while the second difference is that it is only in Teshuvat Apikoros that Polqar refers to the Muslims (Ishmaʿelim); this reference is absent from ‘Ezer ha-Dat.277

Rejecting the claim that the messianic era has already begun, Polqar focuses on three prophetic predictions concerning the nature of the messianic era; none of these,

Polqar maintains, have come to pass. The first is Ezekiel’s prophecy that the Israelites will reside in the land of Israel. Ezekiel foresaw that “they [the Israelites] shall remain in the land which I gave to my servant Jacob…they and their children and their children’s’ children shall dwell there forever, with my servant David as their prince for all time.” Reality, however, shows that the Jews do not reside in the land of Israel. On

276 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 57: “And although these sayings [this is the king messiah] are the sayings of Bilʿam who was not a prophet but praising himself for seeing the sight of Shaddai.” 277 Teshuvat Apikoros, p. 6a: “Now the matter “imitating one in the center” is a wonderful allusion to those who sanctify themselves by the cross [Sheti va-‘erev] who are the ones that eat the flesh of the swine and the reptile. And the matter of those who purify themselves to enter the groves”– that is, the “basins” – “is also an allusion to that nation, well known to us, who purify themselves in this way, and they are the Ishmaelites.” (the emphasized words are missing in ‘Ezer ha-Dat). Levinger (p. 60, n. 4) is wrong to ascribe “those who purify themselves in this way” to Christian baptism. Besides the explicit reference to Muslims, it is clear that Polqar’s intention is to interpret Isaiah 66:17 [“Those who sanctify and purify themselves to enter the groves imitating one in the center eating the flesh of the swine the reptile and the mouse shall one and all come to an end declares the Lord”] in a certain way. Here he wishes to show that Isaiah’s prophecy regarding the messianic era promised the destruction of the Christians, who sanctify themselves by the cross and who eat the flesh of swine and reptiles, and of the Muslims whose ritual was to wash their feet in basins before entering the mosque for prayer. See Hecht, Dissertation, p. 112, notes 96, 97.

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the contrary, they have suffered a long and painful exile, while foreigners settled in the land.

The second prediction concerns the war between Gog and Magog. Ezekiel prophesized that only after that war, “I [LORD] will be zealous for My holy name”278 and “I will never again hide my face from them.”279 The Jews’ dreadful condition proves that the war has not yet occurred, and therefore that the messiah cannot have come. Finally, the third prediction concerns the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the holy temple; as Amos states, “In that day I will set up again the fallen booth of David.”280 He also predicts the third ingathering of the Jews: “And I will plant them upon their soil nevermore to be uprooted from the soil I have given them says the Lord your God.”281

The first ingathering was connected with the building of the first temple; the second was connected with the second temple; the third is to occur upon the building of the third temple. Polqar cites these verses to indicate that Jerusalem and the Temple have not yet been rebuilt; it follows that this third ingathering has not yet occurred.

Before quoting the relevant verses from the prophetic books, Polqar sets forth two principles that must be taken into account when examining the prophecies. First, he declares that any prophecy stating that the Jews will never again be exiled cannot be applied to the second temple period, especially if the word “forever” [leʿolam] appears in it, insofar as the current situation shows that the second temple period was followed by exile. Second, Polqar states that all of the prophecies concerning the second temple period which predict the building of Zion and Jerusalem cannot be applied to Jesus, for

“those who believe in him [Jesus] are further from him than they are from ruling over

278 Ezekiel 39:25. 279 Ibid 39:29. 280 Amos 9:11. 281 Ibid. 9:15.

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that land.”282 Merging these two principles with his interpretation of the prophetic message serves Polqar’s goal: rejecting Christianity as a true religion. Abner, not surprisingly, applies these very prophecies to the second temple period and to Jesus.283

According to him, the arrival of the messiah was the final stage in establishing the correct beliefs, which is to say the fundamental Christian theological doctrines, in the hearts of human beings. The Trinity, he states, was originally concealed from the people of Israel due to its complexity and to the risk it posed: if it were misunderstood, it might lead the Jews to worship idols. The final Incarnation, namely the Incarnation in Jesus, would guarantee the people’s belief in reward and punishment in this world and the next.

Residing in the land of Israel284

The return of the Israelites to their homeland and the promise that they will never be expelled from it again are among the key prophecies describing the peaceful time expected in the messianic era. Polqar quotes Ezekiel, who described the days when

“My sanctuary abides among them forever [leʿolam], the nations shall know that I the

Lord do sanctify Israel.”285 If we follow Polqar’s first principle, according to which the gathering of Israel cannot be related to the second temple period, then we must read

Ezekiel’s prophecy as pertaining to an era that has not yet come. However, in his interpretation, Abner286 focuses on the word forever [leʿolam] in the verse cited from

282 Teshuvat Apikoros, p. 4b. 283 Cf. Joseph Shalom, Third letter, published by Judah Rosenthal in: Studies in Bibliography and Booklore V (1961) pp. 42-51. 284 Polqar mentions the prophecy in Joel 4:17, “And Jerusalem shall be holy, nevermore shall strangers pass through it,” as another indication that the Jews do not reside in the land of Israel, since in his days foreign nations inhabited the land. He continues on to cite the prophecies from Amos 9:11-15; Obadiah 1:17, 19-21; and Nahum 2:1 to express the same idea. 285 Ezekiel 37:28. 286 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, pp. 40b-41a.

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Ezekiel, connecting it with the verse from Exodus 3:15, “this shall be My name forever”.287 As Abner explains in his discussion of the Trinity, the name of God in this verse from Exodus refers to all three substantive attributes of God. He bases his

is written in a defective (לעולם) argument on a statement of the Rabbis that leʿolam

and that the correct interpretation of the word leʿolam does not refer to ,(לעלם) manner the temporal meaning of leʿolam – forever – but rather should be understood as deriving from the word lehaʿalim – to conceal.288 Abner argues that reading leʿolam as meaning

“concealing” reveals the Rabbis’ need to hide the truths of the Trinity and the

Incarnation from the multitudes for an allocated period of time [zeman Kaẓuv] because the people were not ready to accept them. Similarly, just like the word leʿolam did not mean “forever” in Exodus, here too, when Ezekiel promised that God’s sanctuary would abide among the Israelites, he referred to an allocated period of time, namely that of the second temple.289

The War between Gog and Magog

Several prophecies predict the occurrence of a war between Gog and Magog that would precede the arrival of the messiah. Polqar argues that because there is no empirical evidence that this war has already occurred, it follows that the Christian belief that the messiah has already come is incorrect:

And it is written in the section on the war of Gog and Magog ‘and I will be zealous for my holy name.’290 And it is written ‘I will never again hide my face from them.’291 No heretic can say that this war, which is to happen in the future before the coming of our messiah, has happened and occurred, not during the second temple [period] and not in the days of Jesus.292

287 Ibid, pp. 26b-27a. Cf. Minḥat Qenaot, chapter 9. ”.לעלם“ as ”לעולם“ word the reads Abner 288 289 Abner does not refer to the verse in Ezekiel, but only interprets Polqar’s quotation of this verse. 290 Ezekiel 39:25. 291 Ibid, 29. 292 Teshuvat Apikoros, p. 5a; ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 58.

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The heretic is the one who interprets these prophetic verses as referring to the time of Jesus as fulfilling the prophecies. Reality proves the opposite: God’s “face” is still hidden from the Jews as they suffer a long and painful exile, and no one can argue that the war between Gog and Magog occurred either in the second temple period or in the era of Jesus.

In his response, Abner accuses Polqar of rejecting the prophets’ true message as understood by all commentators:

However, concerning what you said that this “this war between Gog and Magog will happen in the future”…I say that the one who denies the words of the prophets and the sages is the true heretic. Since it is written in the prophecy of Joel “Let the nations rouse themselves and arch up to the valley of Jehoshaphat, for there I will sit in judgment over all the nations (Joel 4:12). According to the opinions of all the commentators this is said concerning the war between Gog and Magog. It is said because “the day of the Lord is at hand in the valley of Decision.” (Joel 4:14) Thus, the war between Gog and Magog was to be in the future, before the future coming of the messiah, close to the time of the prophets as has been explained from the words of the prophets and sages.293

Abner argues that it is clear from these predictions that the prophets believed that the war between Gog and Magog would occur close to their time. In support of this, he finds in Rabbi David Kimḥi’s interpretation of Joel 4:1-2 a clear basis for maintaining that Jesus was the messiah, and that the Jews’ wait for the messiah is based on a vain hope.294 According to Abner, the war between Gog and Magog was the war that began when Antiochus, king of Greece, and the Persians attacked the Jews in the land of Israel at the beginning of the Hasmonean rule. This war, then, represents the

293 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, 43a-b. 294 Joel 4:1-2: “For, behold, in those days, and in that time, when I shall bring back the captivity of Judah and Jerusalem (2) I will gather all nations, and will bring them down into the valley of Jehoshaphat; and I will enter into judgment with them there for My people and for My heritage Israel, whom they have scattered among the nations, and divided My land.” According to Abner, David Kimḥi interprets these verses as follows: Those days refer to the times of the messiah when all the nations - Greeks and Persians - will gather to attack Israel. In Abner’s view, Joel describes Gog and Magog (Greeks and Persians) as attacking the Jews precisely during the messianic era.

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fulfillment of the prophets’ visions of the end of days taking place before the arrival of the messiah.295

In sum, the three points about which Abner and Polqar argue are: first, the prophetic predictions, which Abner claims fully came to pass and Polqar argues have not yet come to pass; second, the rabbinic texts, which according to Abner, support the claim that the messiah already arrived, but according to Polqar support the opposite view; and finally, which war the biblical verses refer to. For Abner, Gog and Magog stand for the Greeks and Persians fighting against the Jews, while for Polqar, the biblical verses refer to a war between two nations – Gog and Magog – which has not yet occurred.

The Rebuilding of Jerusalem and the Third Ingathering of Israel

The prophecies that predict the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the third ingathering serve not only to prove the falsity of the Christian faith, but also to ensure that the Jews will continue to wait for the promised redemption. Polqar cites several verses to show that the prophets foresaw that in the time of the messiah, Jews would reside in the land of Israel. For example, Hosea said, in two days He will make us whole again; on the third day He will raise us up and we shall be whole by His favor.296 For Polqar, this prophecy refers to God redeeming the Jews a third time.297 Polqar rejects Abner’s claim that the ingathering promised in the Bible applies to the second temple period and that the appearance of Jesus fulfilled the prophetic message.298 Polqar uses this verse

295 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, 43b-44a. Interestingly, Polqar’s notion of Gog and Magog differs from that of Abner. For Polqar, the war will occur between Gog and Magog, while for Abner, the war already was between Gog and Magog, who attacked together, and the Hasmoneans. 296 Hosea 6:2. 297 Teshuvat Apikoros, 5a; ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 58. 298 Ibid. Cf. Jonathan Hecht, Dissertation, p. 107, n. 68.

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specifically to argue that if the messiah had already come, it would follow that Hosea’s prophecy of a third redemption would be false, which obviously cannot be the case.

In response to Polqar’s explanation of the third redemption, Abner cites a rabbinic text to show that the second and final redemption has already begun with Jesus:

Concerning what you mentioned from the prophecy of Hosea, “In two days He will make us whole again; on the third day He will raise us up, and we shall be whole by His favor. (You said) that this teaches about your redemption and deliverance a third time. I say that the plain meaning of the verse does not teach the interpretation that you gave…rather, the matter is found to be the opposite. This is what is written in Eliyahu Rabbah in the name of Rabbi Simon bar Yohai, ‘after the coming of the messiah Israel shall dwell in security for two thousand years, they will be gathered for judgment, as it is said ‘in two days He will make us whole again; on the third day He will raise us up, and we shall be whole by His favor.”299 He explained the verse by way of exegesis: ’two days are two thousand years according to the understanding of “a day of the Holy One, blessed be He, as a thousand years. As it says in Eliyahu Rabbah, “The world shall exist for six thousand years; two thousand desolation [without the Torah]; two thousand, Torah, and two thousand, messiah. Now, more than a thousand years have already taken place beyond those “two thousand of the messiah that they related to this verse. Therefore it is necessary to assert that this verse does not teach about the third redemption, as you said, but rather, the opposite…300

Abner refers to two midrashim that prove, in his view, that according to the

Rabbis, Hosea’s prediction of redemption applies to Jesus. The first midrash on Hosea

6:2 interprets “two days” as referring to two thousand years during which Israel will dwell in security. After two thousand years have passed, the messiah will arrive on

Hosea’s “third day,” with the beginning of a third millennium. The second midrash, from Tana de Rabbi Eliyahu, states that “The world shall exist for six thousand years; two thousand desolation [without the Torah]; two thousand, Torah, and two thousand, messiah.” According to Abner, this midrash proves that the messianic era started at the end of the two thousand years of the Torah.301 On the other hand, Polqar understands

299 Bereshit Rabbah, 56:1; Midrash Tehilim, 22:5; Oẓar Midrashim, pp. 465-466. 300 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, pp.44a-b. 301 Jonathan Hecht, Dissertation, pp. 76-78. Hecht correctly maintains that Abner may have sought to create doubt in the members of the Jewish community with theological issues such as the third redemption. The potential theological doubts, together with the physical and material degradation of

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the Rabbis to be indicating that the arrival of the messiah will occur at the end of the last two thousand years. This means that Jesus could not have been the messiah to whom the

Rabbis were referring.302

Polqar concludes his discussion of the messianic era by offering an interpretation of Isaiah 66:17:

The most faithful proof is the teaching of Isaiah at the end of his prophecy, which will occur in the future, may it be quickly in our days. That is his saying, Those who sanctify themselves and purify themselves in the groves imitating one in the center eating the flesh of the swine, the reptile, and the mouse shall perish together says the Lord.303 Now the matter “imitating one in the center” is a wonderful allusion to those who sanctify themselves by the cross [shety vaʿerv] who are the ones who eat “the flesh of the swine and the reptile.” And the matter of “those who purify themselves in the groves” – that is, the “basins” – is also an allusion to that nation, well known to us, who purify themselves in this way, and they are the Ishmaelites. And it is written…they shall go out and gaze on the corpses of the men who rebelled against Me: their worms shall not die [Isaiah 66:24].304

Polqar suggests that this verse has an esoteric meaning (remez), according to which a certain event must occur before the arrival of the messiah. The people who sanctify themselves in the groves imitating one in the center are the Christians who consider the act of making the cross an act of sanctification. The Christians are the people of the first group, who eat the flesh of the swine, the reptile, and the mouse.

Those who purify themselves in the groves are the Muslims who wash themselves in basins before praying.305 According to Polqar, then, this verse indicates that when the messiah comes and the Jews are redeemed, they will see the corpses (pigrei) of the

Christians and Muslims: in the messianic era, these two religions will perish. the people through taxation, could lead to a crisis among the Jews, as a consequence of which they would leave the Jewish faith and join the Christian church. Abner’s goal was to prove to the Jews that the messiah, in fact, had already arrived, and that their suffering was a consequence of their rejection of Jesus. 302 It should be noted that Polqar does not respond to Abner’s argument that the third day refers to the third redemption. ”המתקדשים והמטהרים אל נותהג אחר אחד בתוך אכלי בשר החזיר והשקץ והעכבר יחדו יספו נאם ה‘“ 303 304 Teshuvat Apikoros, p. 5b. .(basins) אגנות as it reads and groves)) ”הגנות“ word the with plays Polqar 305

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Abner responds at length, and quite persuasively, to Polqar’s interpretation. First he points to Polqar’s grammatical error: the word “groves” [ganot] is from the root g.n.n, while the word “basins” [aganot] is from the root a.g.n; these two terms are not interchangeable.306 Abner cites Isaiah 65:3-4 in order to set forth the true meaning of

“groves” [ganot] and the true identity of “those who sanctify and purify themselves”:

“the people who provoke My anger, who continually, to My face, sacrifice in gardens

[ganot] and burn incense on tiles; who sit inside tombs and pass the night in secret places; who eat the flesh of the swine with broth of unclean things in their bowls.” The groves, then, refer to the Israelites who provoke God and worship idols in their gardens.

They are the sinners who disobey God’s commandments, hiding themselves, so that, when they are in public, they appear sanctified but in their homes they deny God’s word by “eating the flesh of the swine.”

Polqar does not discuss the following two topics in Teshuvat Apikoros: the

Jewish exile and the authority of the Talmud and of rabbinical sources.307 By adding these topics in ‘Ezer ha-Dat, after examining Abner’s response in Teshuvot la-Meḥaref,

Polqar is able to modify his arguments so that they address Abner’s’ objections. Since

Abner elaborated on these two topics in his discussion of the messiah, Polqar seeks to address Abner’s accusations on the one hand, and on the other to achieve his goal – proving the falsity of Christianity.

306 Abner refers to Rabbi David Kimḥi’s commentary on Isaiah’s verse. According to Kimḥi, the “groves” refer to water pools that were usually found in the gardens. However, Abner claims, these water pools do not implicate the Muslims, since washing themselves is not one of their commandments. 307 Polqar refers to these topics in ‘Ezer ha-Dat, treatise one, chapters five, seven, and eight.

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2.2.6 The Exile and its Meaning 308

The discussion of the exile and its meaning is entirely omitted from Polqar’s

Teshuvat Apikoros. However, in his Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, Abner connects the discussion on the messiah with Jewish exile, claiming that the Jews are punished because they rejected Jesus as the true messiah. Consequently, only those who accept the messianic law deserve to be called Israel. Those who refuse to accept it are destined to suffer a long and painful exile.

The traditional Jewish view of the exile is that it is a divine punishment for forsaking God’s commandments.309 Among the many explanations of this transgression-punishment nexus, the naturalistic one offered by Maimonides stands out. For Maimonides, the Jews’ practice of astrology, forbidden in his view by Jewish law, led to their neglect of the art of war, which, in turn, resulted in the loss of their land. While Maimonides’ view became widely accepted among Jewish philosophers,

Polqar challenged this explanation. His argument culminates in a seemingly paradoxical conclusion: the dispersion of the Jews is not the outcome of disobedience to God’s law, but of strict obedience to it. Polqar’s explanation of Jewish exile offers a radically new way of thinking about one of the greatest calamities to befall the

Jewish people. In questioning well-established beliefs about the Jews’ role in their own destiny, Polqar shows himself to be an independent-minded disciple of

Maimonides.

308 Cf. Shlomo Pines, “Some Topics on Polqar’s Treatise ʿEzer ha-Dat and their parallels in Spinoza’s view,” pp. 432-440; “Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico- Politicus and The Jewish Philosophical Tradition,” pp. 507-508. 309 For the traditional meaning(s) of the Jewish Exile, according to which the Jews are punished for disobeying God see: Augustine, Contra Faustus, 12:12; Judah ha-Levi, The Kuzari, 2:23, 3:11, 4:23, Nachmanides, Kitvei ha-Ramban, A p.294; and Cf. Moshe Halbertal, By Way of Truth- Naḥmanides and Creation of Tradition, pp. 230, 246 (Hebrew); Shlomo Pines, “The Probability of the re-establishment of the Jewish State According to Joseph Ibn Caspi and Spinoza,” pp. 289-317; James, M. Scott, Exile: Old Testament, Jewish, and Christian Conceptions.

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Traditional views of the Jewish Exile

Jewish exile is conventionally perceived by traditional Jews as a divine punishment resulting from the Jews’ disobedience to God’s will. Christians, on the other hand, explained that the situation of the Jews was the result of their rejection of

Jesus as the true messiah. Restating the classical Christian argument used to demonstrate the falsity of Judaism, Abner claims that the truth of Christianity follows from the oppressed and degraded state of the Jews.310 In his introduction to Moreh

Ẓedeq (Mostrador de Justicia), where he describes his internal struggle regarding his conversion to Christianity, he writes:

I saw the burden of the Jews, my people from whom I am descended, who are, in this long captivity, oppressed and broken and burdened heavily by taxes, this people that has lost the honor and glory it once had, which has no help or strength in itself. And it happened one day, as I was thinking much on this plight, that I went into the synagogue with great cries and bitterness of heart, and I prayed unto the Lord, speaking thus: “I ask you, Lord God, for mercy that you be aware of the tribulations we are in, and why this is, and on what basis this is, and on what the basis is for your great anger and fury which you had for your people for a long time, your people and the lambs of your flock. Why will the nations say: Where is their God? Now, Lord, hear my prayer and my supplications, and shine on your sanctuary, which is destroyed, and have mercy on your people Israel. And in the great anxiety, which I had taken upon myself I grew tired and fell asleep. And I saw in a dream vision a great man who said to me: “why are you asleep? Understand the words I am speaking to you, and straighten up, for I say to you that the Jews have been in this captivity for such a long time because of their folly and stupidity and for lack of a teacher of righteousness through whom they may know the truth. This is what God said to you, Go in peace.311

Traditional Jews explained the misery of exile as stemming from the Jews’ transgression of God’s commandments. As we see in this passage, Abner accepted

310 Several Christian thinkers already emphasized the well-established argument, according to which Jews suffer and Christians prosper due to the formers’ refusal to accept Jesus as the messiah. Cf. Augustine, Contra Faustum, 12:12. 311 Abner of Burgos, Mostrador de Justicia, 12r/1:13, translated by Ryan Wesley Szpiech in his dissertation, p. 216. See also Szpiech’s discussion of this paragraph, pp. 214- 226. Cf. Isaac Baer, A History of The Jews in Christian Spain, pp. 328-330 [English]; A History of The Jews in Christian Spain, p. 202 [Hebrew].

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this traditional view of exile as punishment for a sin. However, for him the real sin of the Jews, for which they were exiled from their homeland, was lacking a teacher who would lead them along the right path.312 The teacher, in this case, could be Jesus who, during the time of the second Temple, conveyed teachings and a message that were rejected by his fellow Jews. The teacher might also refer to Abner himself, the Moreh

Ẓedeq – the teacher of Justice, whose role was to save the Jews by convincing them to convert to Christianity.

Abner offers two theories in addition to this explanation of why the Jews have suffered such a long exile. In the Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, Abner discusses the Jews’ current situation in relation to an internal Jewish theological matter:

In the midrash on Psalms it is written, “Rabbi Joshua ben Levi said, ‘Why is it that Israel prays in this world and is not answered? Because they do not know the ineffable Name. But in the time to come the Holy One, blessed be He, will make His name known…In Genesis Rabbah (13:2) it is written, “All the prayers of Israel are for the Temple, ‘When will it be built? As they pray everyday, “Look upon our affliction, and fight our battles. Quickly redeem us to complete redemption”…Rabbi Joshua said, “They were not answered concerning this prayer because they did not know the ineffable Name. The Name is the knowledge of the internal relationship of the Holy One, blessed be He, which alludes to the three essential attributes: “wisdom,” “understanding,” and “knowledge.” Through these He creates the world. From this the incarnation of God in every single human being and human salvation in two worlds follows necessarily, as has been explained... On account of this sin [not knowing the ineffable name] the Temple was destroyed and they fell into this exile. Because of this sin their end [the end of their exile] was not revealed and they did not leave this exile. They did not repent for this sin because they did not know it was a sin.313

Here Abner no longer claims that the Jews’ rejection of Jesus as the true messiah caused their state of exile. He relies on rabbinic accounts, stating that the

312 In another chapter of the Mostrador de Justicia (230v/2: 198), Abner makes the classic Christian accusations, according to which the Jews have suffered a long and painful exile because the Talmudic Sages rejected Jesus as the true messiah. In Abner’s view, only those who accepted the Christian messianic revelation deserved to be called Israel, while those who rejected this revelation and Jesus as its fulfillment were condemned to suffer exile. Cf. Szpiech, Dissertation, pp. 383-384. 313 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref pp. 28ab. The same argument appears in Abner’s Third letter to Rabbi Joseph Shalom. See Third Letter of Abner of Burgos, published by Judah Rosenthal in Studies in Bibliography and Booklore VI, pp. 43-44.

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wellbeing of the Jews is directly dependent on their knowledge of God’s ineffable name. Since they no longer possess this knowledge, they lack the promised wellbeing.

This theological explanation takes a turn when Abner argues that this lost knowledge is that of the Trinity – “wisdom,” “understanding,” and “knowledge.” The Christians who received the teaching of Jesus now possess the key to a prosperous life, which is unequivocally confirmed by their current political, economical, and religious position.

Later in Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, Abner presents an entirely different explanation for the Jews’ long period of exile:

They [the Jews] said, based on the teachings of the Talmud, that salvation did not come with the messiah, because of the groundless hatred (sinaat ḥinam) they had for the messiah, thus the Talmud was the reason for their not being saved and for remaining in eternal exile.314

The rabbinic idea according to which the second Temple was destroyed and the Jews were exiled due to groundless hatred gets an interesting twist here: gone is the classical view that interprets the destruction of the Temple and the dispersion of the Jews as the result of groundless hatred amongst themselves. Rather, the groundless hatred is directed from the Jews, and from the Talmudic Sages in particular, toward

Jesus. Their refusal to accept and love the true messiah has thus brought about their disaster.

In addition to countering the criticisms expressed by both native Christians and converts to Christianity, Polqar believed it was important to re-examine the traditional explanation for the Jewish exile to which his own community subscribed.

As mentioned, traditional Jews viewed their current situation as stemming from their violation of God’s commandments. According to them, following the commandments guarantees their safety and wellbeing, while failing to obey God’s law leads to divine punishment, such as dispersion among the nations. In this respect, we see an

314 Teshuvot la-Meḥaref p.33b.

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interesting convergence of the reasons offered for the Jewish exile by Christians and

Jews. Both agree that it was a punishment for a sin; they only disagree about the nature of the sin. For Christians, it lay in the rejection of Jesus as the true messiah, while for the Jews the sin lay in the violation of Mosaic law.

Maimonides addressed this issue extensively; therefore, before we turn to

Polqar’s argument, let us first examine Maimonides’ approach to this question. While this approach has much in common with Polqar’s, careful examination reveals that they differ significantly in a number of critical respects.

In his Letter on Astrology, written to the Sages of Montpellier, Maimonides links the Jewish dispersion with the Jewish leaders’ engagement with astrology during the period of the second Temple:315

This [namely, the pursuit of astrology] is why our kingdom was lost and our Temple was destroyed and why we were brought to this [namely, exile]; for our fathers sinned and are no more because they found many books dealing with these themes of the stargazers…they did not busy themselves with the art of war or with the conquest of lands, but imagined that those studies would help them. Therefore the prophets called them “fools and dolts” (Jer. 4:22). And truly fools they were “for they walked after confused things that do not profit” (I Sam. 12:21and Jer. 2:8).316

Here, Maimonides attempts to explain the destruction of the Temple and the subsequent exile as a natural outcome of the Jewish leaders’ sin. Instead of studying the art of war in order to protect the people and to expand their territory, the Jewish

315 It is not clear whether Maimonides refers to the destruction of the first temple, the destruction of the second temple, or, in the most likely interpretation, the destruction of both temples understood as a continuous event. 316 Maimonides, Letter on Astrology, pp. 464-473. Cf. Gad Freudenthal, “Cosmology: the heavenly bodies,” pp. 302-361; “Maimonides’ stance on astrology in context: cosmology, physics, medicine, and providence,” pp. 77-90; Michael Katzman, “Maimonides’ Rejection of Astrology,” pp. 105-120; Howard H. Kreisel, “Maimonides’s Approach to Astrology,” pp. 25- 32; Tzvi Langermann, “Maimonides’ Repudiation of Astrology,” pp.123-158; Ralph Lerner, “Maimonides’ Letter on Astrology,” pp.143-158; Sarah Pessin, “Maimonides’ Opposition to Astrology: Critical Survey and Neoplatonic Response,” pp. 1-15; Aviezer Ravitzky, “"The ravings of amulet writers:" Maimonides and his disciples on language, nature and magic,” pp. 93-130; Shlomo Sela, “Astrology in Medieval Jewish Thought (Twelfth- Fourteenth centuries)” pp. 292-300; Queries on Astrology Sent from Southern France to Maimonides: Critical Edition of the Hebrew text, Translation, and Commentary, pp. 89-190.

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leaders focused on astrological books and astrological practices, which in

Maimonides’ view are forbidden by Jewish law; they mistakenly thought that they were protected by the stars as a result of these practices. Later in this letter,

Maimonides argues that, unlike the study of astronomy, which presents true knowledge of the heavenly bodies, their positions, and their movements, astrology is a false science which must therefore be rejected.

Maimonides’ halakhic justification of his argument in the Letter on Astrology is elaborated in the Mishneh Torah:

These practices [astrology and sorcery] are all false and deceptive and were means employed by the ancient idolaters to deceive the people of various countries and induce them to become their followers... Whoever believes in these and similar things and, in his heart, holds them to be true and scientific but the Torah has forbidden them, is nothing but a fool, deficient in understanding, who belongs to the same class with women and children whose intellects are immature. However, the intellectual People who possess wisdom, who are complete in knowledge, know by clear proofs that all these practices, which the Torah prohibited, have no scientific basis but are chimerical and inane; and that only those deficient in knowledge are attracted by these follies and, for their sake, abandon the ways of truth. The Torah, therefore, in forbidding all these follies, exhorts us, “You shall be wholehearted with the Lord your God” (Deut. 18:13).317

According to Maimonides, there are two different reasons why one must reject astrological practices. The first is philosophical, though he does not elaborate on this argument here, and the second is historical-theological. First, he determines that astrology is scientifically false and therefore, whoever follows astrologers “is nothing but a fool, deficient in understanding.” Then, he points to the historical connection between astrological practices and idolatry. Charismatic idolaters, who sought to deceive the multitude, used astrology as a tool to strengthen their position. They

317 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Idolatry and Ordinances of the Heathens, 11.16 (Twersky, Maimonides Reader, pp. 75-76 with some changes). Maimonides expresses the same idea in the Epistle to Yemen, chapter 3, where he discusses the computation of the date of the redemption and claims that despite the attempts to predict this date, “no human being will be able to determine it precisely.”

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attributed special powers to themselves, such as predicting the future318 and healing the sick by soothsaying,319 and claimed to possess the proper knowledge of how to use the stars’ emanations for these purposes.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides presents an extended scientific demonstration of the falsity of astrology:

You need to know that the perfected philosophers do not believe in talismans. They laugh at them and at the people who believe that they have an influence [on the physical]. And this explanation is long. I already said this because I know that most people, indeed possibly all, are fooled by this great deception, and by many other similar things, considering them to be true. They are not. [The deception is so great] that even the best of the pietists among our people of Torah, think that they are true but forbidden because the Torah forbids them. They do not realize that they are nonsensical false things that the Torah warned against, just as it warned us against [believing in] falsehoods. They honored the stars, attributing to them actions that were not theirs. They [the early idolaters] are the ones that established the laws [that apply to the use of the powers] of the stars, magic, incantations, the bringing down of spirits, talking with the stars, the demons (sheidim), ghosts, [dealing with] magic of all types, consultation with the dead and many similar matters that the True Torah unsheathed its sword and destroyed. They are at the root of idolatry and its offshoots. The first deception was [the establishment of] astrology, whose basic premises we can disprove empirically and scientifically. For they [the astrologers] say that this specific star augurs good while the other augurs bad. They also say that a certain part of a sphere is compatible with a certain star and incompatible with another although they [the spheres] are one body without parts or compositions. These two propositions are the basis for astrology and if disproved—and they have been—all their details to the last, will fall apart.320

It has been scientifically established, Maimonides stresses, that each of the celestial spheres is a homogeneous and unchanging body.321 The astrologers, however, hold two main assumptions that contradict this truth: first, that some stars

318 Mishneh Torah, Laws of Idolatry and Ordinances of the Heathens, 11:6. 319 Ibid, 11:12. 320 Maimonides, Commentary on the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 4:7. 321 Langermann, in his article “Maimonides’ Repudiation of Astrology” (p.132), offers one possible explanation for this argument’s omission from the Guide. He argues that Maimonides, in the Guide 2:19, discusses the nonuniformity of the sphere in order to explain the creation of the world by the Divine Will.

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are beneficial and others maleficent;322 and second, that for each star there is a “place” on the celestial sphere that corresponds to it. Given the scientific errors that underlie the fundamental premises of astrology, it follows that the soothsayers, diviners, and astrologers base their predictions entirely on accidental connections that could produce different results in the exact same situations.

At first glance, Polqar’s own explanation does not appear to deviate from the traditional point of view of exile as punishment – whether divine or natural – for a sin.

This is because Polqar borrows a page from Maimonides’ method of addressing different messages to different audiences. Thus, throughout his discussion of the exile, we find Polqar setting forth two explanations for the Jewish people’s dispersion. The first espouses the traditional view and is, not surprisingly, directed to traditional

Jewish readers. Polqar presents this argument in such a way that the traditional reader would believe that Polqar agrees with the traditional point of view. The second argument offers a naturalistic explanation of the exile and is directed toward the philosophical reader. This twofold message is in line with Polqar’s declaration, in the introduction to ‘Ezer ha-Dat, that in several places he will conceal his true opinion in order to avoid being misunderstood by the members of his community who might accuse him of heresy.

Polqar opens his discussion of the Jewish exile in ‘Ezer ha-Dat as follows:

There is no need for the thinker to view our long exile and troubled daily existence, so abhorrent to our souls, as proof that the justification for our Law is deficient and that the truth of our beliefs is nonexistent. On the contrary, he should believe that this is a mark and sign of the truth of our religion, the equity of our Law, and the justness of our regulations. You should know, if you are discerning, that the more subtle, refined, and marvelous a religious belief is (as attested by the intellect’s true nature, which is the correct judge), the less likely it is to be accepted by the majority of the multitude.323

322 Polqar uses the same argument in ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 112. 323 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p.51. Contrary to Polqar’s view that the small number of Jewish adherents attests to the truth of Judaism, Christian thinkers such as Origen argued that the number of adherents a religion

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Here Polqar observes that an intelligent man must not conclude that the long exile is a direct outcome of the false content of the Mosaic law. On the contrary, the

Torah reflects the ultimate truth; however, few have the ability and the capacity to grasp its true meaning. Most people chase after bodily desires and do not engage in the study of the theoretical sciences. As a result, they fail to understand the natural chain of causes and effects that results in the occurrence of a particular event – in this case, the Jewish exile.

As the careful reader can see, Polqar, like Maimonides, at first presents a naturalistic explanation of the exile. However, unlike Maimonides, Polqar states that the Jews were exiled not because they committed a sin but because they strictly observed the commandments. Polqar notes that in following God’s law, the Jews were bound by an ethical code, while other nations were not thus constrained. Therefore, claims Polqar:

Inasmuch as our perfect Law forbids us from, and admonishes us against, walking in these worthless ways, and prevents us from acquiring the evil of the aforementioned despicable trait [envy]; it follows that we shall belong to the ranks of the oppressed, rather than the oppressor; the offended rather than offender.324 However, inasmuch as bodily desires are not forbidden to the nations including this trait [envy], it follows that they will be the oppressors and the offenders. For the evil inclination of their heart, which is the cause of desire, does not allow them to guard against committing evil. They do not apprehend that evil is indeed evil.325 [emphases were added]

The irony, described here by Polqar, is that the exile is the unavoidable outcome of the Jews following the commandments. As long as the Jews faithfully has proves its truth and validity. Cf. Origen, On First Principles, in Origen: An Exhortation to Martyrdom, Prayer and Selected Works, book iv, chapter one, 2, pp. 172-173. 324 Hannah Kasher argues that Polqar’s view expresses an attitude of submissiveness and humility from the Jewish point of view. As we shall see later, I will argue that Polqar’s argument expresses solely an ethical consideration to which the Jews are bound insofar as they observe the commandments. See Hannah Kasher, ““Why is the Land in Ruins?” (Jeremiah 9:11): Religious Transgression versus Natural Historical Process in the Writing of Maimonides and His Disciples,” pp. 154- 156. Hereafter: Hannah Kasher, “Why is the Land in Ruins?” 325 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 55.

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observe God’s law, they will always belong to the “oppressed” and to the “offended.”

This radical view, then, explains the exile as the result of the Jewish people’s obedience to God rather than as the result of any sin they might have committed.

Polqar elaborates this idea by describing the historical events that led to the destruction of the second Temple and the exile. In a surprising passage, he writes:

When we were in our own country, rooted in our lands, we were separated and elevated above all the surroundings nations. We observed the commandments of our praiseworthy Law that forbid and prevent us from all sorts of bodily desires... Then we ceased from oppressing others. Moreover, we were obligated and compelled and commanded to exert and occupy ourselves with the Law, and with various sorts of sciences, day and night. Now this weakened and sapped our strength326... As a result of this, [the waging of] wars was forgotten by us, and weapons were abolished. The Israelites and the Judeans forgot what they had learned of the bow... For our intention was to turn away from evil and to do good, to seek peace and to pursue it. Now, the trait belonging to the nations that surrounded us was the opposite of the trait of justice... Their heart was full of hardness and cruelty because of their overwhelming desire and jealousy of what we possessed, as David said: I am [a man of] peace; but when I speak, they are for war [Ps. 120:7]… for their manner is to attack like beasts, bears, and lions. They did not talk of peace with us, but rather gritted their teeth and gathered in force against us, destroyed our temple, and carried off our captives. The tiny few of us that survived were scattered and dispersed among all the lands.327

Polqar’s original approach to the Jews’ condition after the destruction of the temple gives rise to a harsh critique of the other nations for harming the Jews, who had sought nothing but peace. The present situation, asserts Polqar, points to the principal distinction between the laws of the Jews and those of other nations. He severely criticizes the gentiles who persecuted Jews during the temple period. The gentiles are accused of lacking an ethical law that would regulate both their behavior within their own community and their behavior vis-à-vis other nations.

Polqar’s explanation, like that of Maimonides, seeks to account for the exile in naturalistic terms. However, while Maimonides criticized the Jewish leaders for their

”תורה מתישה כוחו של אדם“ :26:b Sanhedrin, Tractate Talmud, Babylonian Cf. 326 327 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 55-56.

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reliance upon stargazing, Polqar defends the Jews’ ethical conduct and blames other nations for lacking an ethical law. More importantly, for Maimonides, the exile results from the Jews’ violation of the law. For Polqar it results from faithful adherence to the same law. Moreover, Polqar agrees with Maimonides that the Jews failed to develop war strategies and conquer lands. However, for Maimonides the Jews did not occupy themselves with developing arts of war because they busied themselves with astrological practices, although in his view these are forbidden by Jewish law. The

Jews’ sin, then, was that they relied on forbidden practices, as a result of which they were punished – exiled from their homeland. For Polqar, by contrast, the Jews did not occupy themselves with developing war arts and strategies because they busied themselves with studying the Torah and the sciences, as a result of which they were weaker than the other nations, who eventually waged war on them and exiled them from their land.

In the closing paragraph of this discussion, however, Polqar appears to replace his radical naturalistic explanation of the Jewish exile with a more theological- traditional one. A superficial reading suggests that he prefers the traditional view that sees exile as a punishment for sin:

I have now explained for you by means of a demonstration and an argument based on nature why we are immersed in sorrow and exile, although we accepted the true belief in God, and we are sanctified above all other nations. As for those who are envious of me, let them not suspect that I have deviated from the strict line of faith by composing an argument based on nature. For, indeed, I only composed it in order to “know what to respond to the heretic.” I believe that I should make known that our cities were destroyed because of our sins, that our temple was laid waste because of our abundance of transgressions, and that we were exiled from our land because of our offenses.328 God in His mercy will atone for our many acts of atonement and

328 Kasher argues that Polqar’s genuine opinion follows the traditional view, according to which exile and the destruction of Jerusalem were the outcome of the Jews’ sin of transgressing God’s law. It is surprising that Kasher does not appreciate the clearly apologetic nature of this argument. Contrary to Kasher’s view, I argue that it is very unlikely that Polqar, after taking the trouble of formulating an original and unique explanation for the Jewish catastrophe, would present eventually the theological/traditional justification. In my view, Polqar deliberately presents this traditional view to

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will gather together our dispersed. He will save us and lead us upright to our land.329

Here, Polqar claims, disingenuously in my view, that he is presenting his naturalistic view “only” as a response to the heretic, who the context implies is Abner of Burgos. However, it is clear from his mention of those who are “envious” of him – those who might accuse him of defending philosophical views rather than theological ones – that he is concluding the section in this way for apologetic reasons.

Consequently, he does not conclude by blaming the gentiles for lacking an ethical code and taking advantage of the Jews’ observance of the law, but rather by emphasizing that the gentiles persecuted the Jews on account of the Jews’ own sin, then destroyed their cities and expelled them from their land.

In the closing paragraph of his discussion of the Jewish exile, Polqar addresses the traditionalist. He chooses apologetically and, I would claim, disingenuously to praise the traditional approach, at least in part. At the end of his discussion, then,

Polqar chooses to revert to the traditionalist approach, which sees the exile as a punishment for abandoning God’s law. By concluding his discussion with this traditional point of view, Polqar sought to strengthen the spirits of the members of his community who accepted the traditional explanation in defiance of the Christians’ and the converts’ accusations. If Abner and his ilk followed the theological Christian claim that God abandoned the Jews because they did not accept Jesus as the true

Messiah, here Polqar stresses the parallel Jewish argument. He turns to the traditional theological Jewish claim that the exile was a punishment for the Jews’ failure to observe God’s commandments. The conclusion is that the Jews must continue to keep prevent members of his community from accusing him of contradicting the traditional and theological point of view. See Hannah Kasher, “Why is the Land in Ruins?”; Shlomo Pines, “Some Topics on Polqar’s Treatise Ezer ha-Dat and their parallels in Spinoza’s view,” pp. 432-438; “Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico- Politicus and The Jewish Philosophical Tradition,” pp. 506-508. 329 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 56.

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God’s law, to reject Jesus as the true messiah and to bear their current situation with patience. They should do this until God, in His mercy, and as a reward for their faithful observance of the law, redeems them.

Insofar as it was the outcome of the Jews’ strict obedience of God’s commandments and of the unethical behavior of the nations, the exile would end, according to this logic, when one of two events came to pass: either the Jews would disobey God’s commandments, and, as a result, become just as unethical as the other nations, or the nations would adopt an ethical code that would bind them to behave morally towards others, the Jews among them.

2.2.7 The Authority of the Talmud and the Jewish Sages

In Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, Abner consistently uses Jewish sources in order to prove that the doctrines of the Christian faith are true. He aims to show that although the Jews of his own time reject Christianity altogether, the Talmudic Sages, upon whom they rely, tacitly accepted Christianity’s fundamental beliefs. Once again, this topic is omitted in Teshuvat Apikoros; however, Polqar devotes two different chapters in ‘Ezer ha-Dat to illustrating the erroneous use the Christians made of these texts.

In his Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, Abner discusses rabbinic texts in extensive detail.

When it suits his purposes, he cites rabbinic texts to show that the Talmudic Sages did in fact accept Christian doctrines; however they could not disclose them to the people, who were not ready to accept these beliefs.330 In other cases, Abner accuses the Jewish

Sages of behaving unethically.331 In ‘Ezer ha-Dat, Polqar does not offer a detailed response to Abner’s hermeneutical attacks. Instead, he proposes a general solution that clarifies the role of the Talmud and the significance of the rabbinic texts.

330 Cf. Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, 15b; 16b; 17a; 18ab. 331 Ibid, 33b; 34b.

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The closing sections of treatise one in ‘Ezer ha-Dat exemplifies Polqar’s threefold method; first, he sets forth the importance of the Oral law, which is necessary for filling out the written law. While the written Torah only sketches out the general features of the law, the Oral law explains in detail how man should interpret and apply that law. Second, he narrates the historical events that led Rabina and Rav Ashi to write down the Oral law – the exile and the great risk of losing Talmudic foundations, rulings, and interpretations.332 Third, Polqar proclaims that the Talmud has many layers of meaning; some assertions must be taken at face value, while other must be understood in an esoteric sense.

In addition to the Talmud, Polqar lists other texts that were written by the Jewish

Sages but cannot be considered “Talmud,” since this word refers only to the rabbinic interpretations of the commandments. Because these texts are only of aggadic and not halakhic nature, they do not possess any intrinsic authority, but have value only if they accord with or can be interpreted to accord with fundamental philosophical principles.333

Polqar argues forcefully, in a general fashion, that all of Abner’s allegations are, in principle, invalid. Polqar lists two main justifications for his wholesale rejection of

Abner’s allegations. According to Polqar, if rabbinic passages contradict fundamental philosophical principles, they should be viewed as non-halakhic midrashic texts. Insofar as all the quotations that Abner uses in Teshuvot la-Meḥaref are not considered “Law,” we need not accept the conclusions drawn from them.

332 Here Polqar refers to Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah and stresses that this work systematically and apodictically presents all practical laws, leaving out the Talmudic discussions. It seems that Polqar tends to agree with Samuel ibn Tibbon, implying that studying the Mishneh Torah is sufficient and there is no necessity to study the Talmudic text. 333 If these texts are in harmony with scientific truths, we must accept them. However, if they contradict scientific truths, we must claim that “they are true however we are unable to understand them.” See ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 63.

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Moreover, look at the confusion of your thought in your dependence upon a few legends of the Talmud that one cannot explain and take in any manner one wishes. Even if they are elucidated and explained correctly according to your opinion, they are (just) the teachings of individuals on account of which we will not turn aside nor deviate in any direction from the belief in the Torah of Moses, may peace be upon him. They do not suffice for Jews, since he [Moses] was the master of all the prophets and the Sages, according to the belief of all the nations. All the more so (they do not suffice) for negating and overturning [the Torah].334

Not only are we not obliged to accept the sources cited by Abner, but, and this is

Polqar’s second reason for dismissing Abner’s claims, Abner’s reading of these sources, according to Polqar, is tendentious. Abner deliberately reads these passages so that they cohere with his line of thought, without considering the possibility of other interpretations.

In the process of invalidating Abner’s use of the Talmudic passages, Polqar reveals his sense of the hierarchy of Jewish sources. Naturally, he ranks the “Torah of

Moses” as the highest source. Unlike the Sages of the Talmud, whose legal teachings are incumbent only upon Jews, the Torah of Moses offers fundamental universal truths accepted by both Judaism and Christianity.

Polqar concludes his discussion regarding the Talmudic Sages335 by rejecting the opinions of the heretics (epicursin) who mock and deny the veracity of some of the Talmudic stories, interpretations, and rulings. The Talmud is a source of knowledge for two types of students; the first is intelligent, perceptive and a quick learner, 336 while the second has a limited understanding, and therefore depends on traditional knowledge without developing the urge to discover its profound meanings.337 The Talmudic Sages, Polqar maintains, deliberately included popular

334 Teshuvat Apikoros, p. 6b. 335 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 65-67. 336 An example of this type is the people to whom Moses revealed God’s reply, “Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh” (Exodus 3:14). 337 The limited disciples are, for example, the multitude who forced Aaron to create the Golden Calf.

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knowledge in their teachings as a pathway for the second type of student, so that he, too, could have a part in true knowledge.

The Sages’ goal was to provide each student with knowledge that suited his abilities. The perceptive disciple grasps the true meaning that will, eventually, lead him to the ultimate goal – the eternity of his soul. The other disciple remains at a lower level of attaining knowledge, and is guided by the Sages for educational purposes only.

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2.3 Jews and Non-Jews – Essential Superiority or Practical Difference?

We previously saw that Polqar’s harmonization of Jewish faith and philosophy led to his rejection of Christianity as a true religion. Polqar’s positing of the superiority of Judaism over Christianity as presented by Abner raises an important question: what was Polqar’s view, throughout his apologetic writings, of the non-Jewish nations?

To understand Polqar’s position with regard to non-Jews we must examine the connection he draws between the concept of Olam HaBa (“the world to come”), as discussed in the previous section, and the significance of the

Mosaic commandments, to be discussed in detail in chapter 5. Since man’s ultimate goal is to attain the world to come, and since Polqar asserts that the

Mosaic Law guides its adherents to this goal, we need to determine whether, in

Polqar’s view, the Mosaic Law is the only law that can lead to achieving this purpose, or whether, while the Mosaic Law is the best law for attaining the world to come, there may be other laws, present or future, that can also lead a person to this end.

Neither of Polqar’s works, Teshuvat Apikoros and ‘Ezer ha-Dat, directly discusses the relationship between Jews and non-Jews. To uncover Polqar’s view, the reader must read between the lines, identify scattered passages, and reconcile them with other ideas that Polqar offers in his works. I suggest dividing the references to this matter into three groups of texts. The first group presents the view that one can only attain one’s ultimate purpose by following the Mosaic

Law. The second group contains general statements identifying the people who achieve the ultimate goal and describing how one can attain it. This group of passages does not ascribe an essential superiority to a particular religion. The

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third group merges two elements: a general statement about what a true religion must contain in order to lead the individual to attaining the world to come, followed by a declaration that the Mosaic Law is, in fact, the preeminent canon to follow.

These three groups of passages seem to contradict one another. Yet in light of Polqar’s explicit declaration, in his introduction to ‘Ezer ha-Dat, that he will sometimes conceal his true opinion in order to avoid misunderstanding, the contradictions between these three groups of passages should not surprise us.

The first group of passages reflects an elitist Jewish point of view, according to which the Jewish law is superior to all other laws, and one can only attain the world to come by observing the Mosaic commandments. These passages are addressed to non-philosophical readers and are apologetic in nature. The second group presents Polqar’s uncompromising naturalistic opinion that views the study of philosophy as a universal discipline. This naturalistic approach is also found elsewhere, such as in his position regarding prophecy that, contra

Maimonides, ascribes a higher position to the philosopher than to the prophet.338

The third group of passages seeks to answer the question of whether the practical life is part of the path that leads to true happiness. Pines rightly indicates that the first two treatises of ‘Ezer ha-Dat do not display an inconsistent message with regard to the role of the commandments in one’s life.339 In treatise one, where

Polqar discusses Judaism as a religion, he maintains that the Mosaic commandments are necessary if one is to achieve the ultimate goal. In this context, the commandments serve an intellectual purpose. In treatise two, on the

338 See Shlomo Pines, “Some Topics on Polqar’s Treatise ʿEzer ha-Dat and their parallels in Spinoza’s view,” p.426-429. The topic of prophecy will be discussed in chapter 5. See pp. 251-268. 339 Shlomo Pines, “Some Topics on Polqar’s Treatise ʿEzer ha-Dat and their parallels in Spinoza’s view,” p. 436.

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other hand, in the dialogue between a young philosopher and an old traditionalist, the youthful philosopher maintains that the commandments serve the purely social function of ensuring the safety of the community. It follows that the practical commandments, although are not the end for human perfection, are still necessary for the process of attaining intellectual perfection; for a safety and well-functioned society is a prerequisite for attaining intellectual perfection.

Social interpretation of the commandments, then, serve the purpose.

Following Polqar, I will start with the first group of passages, which maintains that the Mosaic Law is the only way to attain one’s goal:

The fourth Sha‘ar is to explain that the hope of man that is called the life of ‘Olam ha-Ba [the world to come] is acquired by and reserved only for those who believe in our law340

Here, Polqar presents a traditional position that leaves no possibility for people who do not follow the Mosaic Law to achieve the ultimate goal.

However, in judging the sincerity of Polqar’s traditionalism here, we must take into account that many readers of ‘Ezer ha-Dat who were not scholars – indeed many of them were most likely traditionalists.341 Polqar’s declaration near the very beginning of ‘Ezer ha-Dat presents a particularistic mode of thought that works in tandem with the superiority of Mosaic Law. However, nowhere else in the text do we find such extreme wording attributing the Jews’ superiority over other nations solely to their following Mosaic Law. This supports our contention that Polqar’s traditional presentation in the introduction reflects a marginal apologetic stance, rather than his genuine viewpoint. It is a tactical concession to his traditionalist readership.

340 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 30. 341 In the introduction to ‘Ezer ha-Dat Polqar implies that some of the readers of his book share the profile of what the calls the “traditionalists.” The introduction of ‘Ezer ha-Dat ends with Polqar’s accusation against those “who take pride in the belief of the Torah, however, in truth, they are far away from it.” See ‘Ezer ha-Dat p. 27.

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The second group of passages, which contains Polqar’s natural philosophy, presents an opposite approach. Here, Polqar does not focus upon the importance of religious observance but rather on individual achievement. In one of these passages Polqar quotes a famous Talmudic saying, universalizing it so as to accord with his view:

Rabbi Yohannan said: Israel are not subject to fate [e’in mazal le-Israel] as it said (in Jeremiah 10:2) Do not learn the ways of the nations or take alarm at the heavenly signs, alarmed though the nations may be at them.342 And it is known that “Israel” mentioned here and in the rest of the Aggadot refers to the intellectuals [Maskilim] among the people who are with God, and “nations” [mentioned here] refers to the ignorant multitudes who do not know and do not understand, I mean that they do not follow the ways of their intellectual soul to perform the commandments and to apprehend the intelligibles [Muskalot]. But they follow the stubbornness of their own heart, like all those animals that are not rational (Medabrim). Hence it is not fitting for the heavenly bodies to rule, judge, or decree over ‘Israel’, i.e. the rational soul, just as it is not fitting for an ugly immaterial thing to act upon something holy, which is separate from matter.343

Polqar makes the above assertion in treatise three of ‘Ezer ha-Dat, in which, as we saw in chapter one, a scholar and an astrologer debate the validity of astrology. The principal discussion concerns the question of whether the planets can influence the human intellectual soul and, consequently, affect human choices. The scholar, who surely represents Polqar’s own view, resolutely opposes astrology on the basis of the following argument: the planets are composed of physical matter – ether. The intellectual part of human soul, in contrast, is non-material. And since physical matter is subject to change, it is lower in rank than a non-material faculty. Given these assumptions, it is absurd

342 Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sabbath, 156a. 343 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 124. Cf. pp. 139-140. It is interesting to note that Falaquera, by rephrasing ibn Bajja’s idea from Tadbir al-Mutawaḥid, chapter 1, claims that the foreigners [gerim] are the philosophers who dwell in their houses with their relatives, but their thoughts go beyond and they become strangers to their brothers and foreigners to their mothers. See Falaquera, the Guide of the Guide, 3:51; Sefer ha-Maʿalot, pp. 65-66.

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to claim that physical matter can control man’s intellectual faculty, which is non- material in nature.

To return to Polqar’s interpretation of “there is no fate [mazal] to Israel,”

Polqar reads the Talmudic reference and the biblical verse cited in it so as to cohere with his philosophical point of view; it is important to note that Polqar does not explicitly say that the intellectuals (maskilim) represent the intellectuals among the Jews. On the face of it, it might seem as though Polqar is making a distinction within the Jewish people: Jewish intellectuals are the true Israel, and the ignorant Israel are like the gentiles. However, this does not represent the unqualified universalism Polqar sought to defend. Crucially, the term “Israel” in this verse, as he understands it, does not point to the Jewish nation. The Jewish traditionalists understood this rabbinic statement literally, and perhaps Polqar wanted the common man to follow them in identifying “Israel” with the Jewish nation; however, Polqar’s intellectual addressees would realize his true intention.

Therefore, while traditionalists might read Polqar’s text as identifying the people who are with God as Israel, and thus the intellectuals as Jewish intellectuals, in truth, the term intellectuals refers to anyone who has attained intellectual perfection. This becomes clear at the end of the passage, when Polqar maintains that “Israel” is the intellectual soul (nefesh ha-hoga). “Israel,” then, is a name ascribed to the philosophers (or intellectuals) in general,344 with no reference whatsoever to religion.345 The philosophers possess true knowledge and therefore reject false disciplines, among them astrology, with its claim that the planets influence all of man’s decisions. Because the ignorant multitude – the

344 Interestingly, Abner also mentioned the term “Israel,” maintaining that it refers to those “who cleave to Him, the people of the nation are called the Israel and the spiritual Jerusalem which is called by the name of the Holy One, blessed be He,” in Teshuvot la-Meḥaref, pp. 39a-b. It seems as if Polqar and Abner agreed that “Israel” represents the individuals who conjoin with the Active Intellect. 345 Cf. David Menachem, Thesis, pp. 82-89.

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nations mentioned in the Talmudic passage – are not engaged in acquiring true wisdom, the astrologers are able to convince them that their false view is true.

Polqar’s naturalistic view makes it highly unlikely that the interpretation of “Israel” mentioned here refers to the intellectuals among the Jewish community alone. Can one seriously suggest that Polqar subscribes to the view that the intellectuals among the nations are at the same level as or below ignorant

Jews? Certainly, if man’s purpose is to attain the world to come by conjoining with the Active Intellect, it would follow that this possibility is open to all individuals who actualize their intellectual potential and not just to those individuals who belong to a particular nation.

This analysis raises the following question: if Polqar’s view is universal, insofar as he presents philosophers, whatever their religion, as the only individuals who can achieve the ultimate goal, why, then, does he continuously link the idea of Man’s ultimate purpose with observing the Mosaic Law? The third group of passages contains both universalist statements and statements maintaining the superiority of the Mosaic Law. An examination of these passages reveals that they form the largest group by far within ‘Ezer ha-Dat.346

Polqar’s repeated combination of universalist and particularist statements reveals, I believe, his true opinion with regard to the relationship between Jews and non-Jews. Polqar justifies the Mosaic Law not because it is the word of God in any supernatural manner but because it leads an individual to achieve two goals: welfare of the body and welfare of the soul. While Mosaic Law is perhaps

346 See ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 32; 34; 36-37; 40; 50-51; 53; 76; 155.

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the best law, other laws can, in principle, lead their adherents to the same end result.347

Polqar expresses this view in three passages where he links the particular advantages of the Mosaic Law with the ultimate human goal – attaining the world to come by acquiring true opinions. It is here, I believe, that Polqar’s genuine viewpoint is to be found. I shall begin with the opening passage of the second part of treatise one, where Polqar seeks to establish the truth of the

Mosaic Law:

Man possesses corporeal faculties…namely, the faculties of sense perfection, imagination, and cogitation as well as another spiritual and holy faculty, that is, the intellect. When this [latter] faculty is completely perfected it does not need any instrument or body, for its end is nothing but the perfect apprehension of knowledge and true beliefs, as I will explain in this chapter. Hence, if a man is perfect with respect to both these kind of faculties [corporeal and spiritual] it follows that his actions and behavior will be moderate, correct, and equitable to the utmost, and that he will know and believe and apprehend the intelligibles of things as they really are. Now, when a scholar examines our acclaimed Law he will find therein most of the true and necessary matters that man must know at the outset [Rishonah]. These are the ones whose subjects are weighty, and whose demonstrations are clearly cogent. He will also find right qualities, good and correct actions, and righteous statutes and laws that are moderate, correct, and equitable to the utmost.348 [emphases were added]

Polqar’s argument here reflects his attitude toward the individual who possesses two faculties: corporeal and spiritual. The purpose is to attain perfection in both. Corporeal perfection is achieved by habituating oneself in the

347 Polqar does not analyze, as Maimonides does, the criteria by which a law can be defined as a divine law. However, by ascribing a political role to the Mosaic Law, insofar as it concerns itself both with the welfare of the body and the welfare of the soul, Polqar adopts the Maimonidean definition of divine law. For an extended discussion of Maimonides’s view of divine law, see Zev Harvey, Political Philosophy and Halakha in Maimonides, pp. 47-64; Lawrence Kaplan, ““I Sleep, but my heart waketh”: Maimonides’ Conception of the Human Perfection.” 348 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 34.

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“Golden Mean” as it was presented by Aristotle and Maimonides.349 Perfection of the body is a necessary condition for attaining perfection of the soul, since, to use Maimonides’s explanation, a man cannot represent to himself an intelligible if he is hungry or thirsty or in pain.350 Polqar gives the impression that the Torah provides one with perfection of the body and perfection of the soul. In truth, while he maintains that the Torah contains true opinions, such as the existence of

God and His unity, believing in God’s existence and His Unity is not identical with knowing that God exists and that He is one. The Torah provides one with a baseline of knowledge leading to knowledge of the intelligibles; however, it does not, and by its very nature, cannot provide one with the knowledge of the intelligibles themselves. Only that knowledge, which can be obtained by constant philosophical study, will endow one with perfection of the soul. Since man, as an embodied agent, cannot constantly be in a state of apprehension of the intelligibles, this spiritual perfection applies only to the periods of time when he cognizes the intelligibles. It would follow that in the times during which man achieves this perfection, he is not in need of perfection of the body, imagination, and ethical virtues, for the “[spiritual faculty’s] end is nothing but the perfect apprehension of knowledge and true beliefs.”351 Therefore, Polqar argues that the

Law or the religion that leads to the achievement of these two perfections is the true one and should be followed.

Maimonides argues that any law that aims at the welfare of the body and the welfare of the soul must be a divine law. The Mosaic Law, he continues, leads its adherents to these two types of welfare; therefore, the Mosaic Law is

349 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book II chapters 6-9; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws Concerning Character Traits, chapter 1; the Guide, 2:39; Eight Chapters, chapter 4. 350 The Guide 3:27. 351 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 34.

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divine. Though Maimonides does not state it explicitly, it would follow from his definition that any law that leads to the achievement of these two goals would be divine. The Law of Moses is not the only law that is perfect, and here Polqar follows Maimonides’ argument here, giving it a universal content. Any present or future law that guides its adherents to the two types of welfare – of body and soul –will count as a divine law. The Mosaic Law, claims Polqar, successfully meets the criteria for a divine law, and thus is the most appropriate canon to follow; moreover, any philosopher who examines the Mosaic Law and sees its correct opinions and proper practical laws will acknowledge this truth.

The second citation is taken from the conclusion of the second part of

‘Ezer ha-Dat’s first treatise:

Inasmuch as every religious law is composed and made up of different beliefs and patterns of activities, the more the beliefs of such a law are true and manifest, and its activities proper and well founded, the more that law will be sound and true. Now, the beliefs of our religious law are so true and valid that nobody denies them. Its activities also display the utmost order and correctness, as I explained. The conclusion to be drawn is that the religion of the Jews is the most correct and valid of all the religions. How goodly is our portion, and how pleasant our fate! Through my explanation it becomes known that any religion whose customs and beliefs have become removed from the ways of our Law, or altered in the slightest, will have its distance from the truth commensurate with its specific distance and alteration [from the ways of our Law]. This is what we wished to explain.352 [emphases were added]

Unlike the previous passage, in which Polqar indicates how the Mosaic

Law leads the individual to achieve the ultimate purpose, with this statement he makes explicit the universalistic implication of Maimonides’s approach, though he is careful to cover his tracks. A true religion must contain correct beliefs that promote the welfare of the soul, as well as a system of practical laws that ensures that the community is safe and that its members treat each other ethically. Such a

352 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 40.

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system constitutes the first stage in attaining true happiness. If, however, a religion fails to offer one of these two features, we must reject it altogether.

Consequently, inasmuch as Christianity rejects true beliefs by adopting the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and of Jesus as the Messiah, it cannot be a true religion. In Polqar’s view, these false beliefs prevent Christians from attaining the world to come, even if their practical law fulfills their social needs and purposes. The Mosaic Law, on the other hand, serves both purposes: endowing its believers with correct opinions and providing them with practical commandments that ensure political and social welfare. Whereas the Law of

Moses is absolutely perfect, other religions are also more or less perfect, depending on how much they deviate from the Law of Moses. Since the Mosaic

Law is unique in its intellectual and ethical perfection, and since Polqar argues that any law that provides true opinions and proper actions can be considered true religion, how can he advocate for a universal approach that theoretically allows the possibility of the existence of another true religion? It would seem that for Polqar a true religion must espouse true opinions, however, if it possesses a less perfect ethical system, it can still lead its adherents to intellectual perfection. The practical laws which are the specifics of the law do not have to be identical to the practical laws of the Mosaic Law; therefore, two religions can be true by virtue of the opinions they teach, and yet differ from one another with respect to their practical laws.

Elevating the Mosaic Law above all other laws echoes Maimonides’s

Guide, which maintains that the Torah fosters the welfare of the body and the

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welfare of the soul. It is a canon353 that allows individuals to achieve their ultimate purpose while living within society, although isolation is also recommended in certain situations:

The Law as a whole aims at two things; the welfare of the soul and the welfare of the body. As for the welfare of the soul, it consists in the multitude’s acquiring correct opinions corresponding to their respective capacity. Therefore some of them [namely, the opinions] are set forth explicitly and some of them are set forth in parables. For it is not within the nature of the common multitude that its capacity should suffice for apprehending that subject matter as it is. As for the welfare of the body, it comes about by the improvement of their ways of living one with another…Know that as between these two aims, one is indubitably greater in nobility, namely, the welfare of the soul – I mean the procuring of correct opinions – while the second aim – I mean the welfare of the body – is prior in nature and time.354

The welfare of the soul in this text is achieved by each person according to his own ability. The grandeur of the Mosaic Law, according to Maimonides, is that its commandments enable all Jews to achieve these two goals. In particular, it provides common people with true opinions to a certain extent, even if they do not apprehend them philosophically. Clearly influenced by the Maimonidean approach, Polqar also emphasizes the superiority of the Mosaic Law, insofar as, unlike other religions, it serves as the best starting point for achieving the ultimate purpose – perfection of the soul. Like Maimonides, Polqar gives precedence to the perfection of the soul over the perfection of the body.355

353 Analyzing Polqar’s criteria for a true religion clearly reveals that Christianity, because its principles are based on false opinions, cannot be taken as true. As for Islamic law, Polqar does not address it in his works. It is possible that he was concerned mainly with the Christian faith under which he lived and focused on rejecting Abner’s allegations. However, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that Islamic Law met Polqar’s criteria, granting Muslims the means to attain the welfare of the body and welfare of the soul, similarly to the Mosaic Law. 354 The Guide, 3:27. See also 2:39-40; 3:28. 355 It is noteworthy to mention here that while Maimonides draws a clear distinction between the welfare of the body and the welfare of the soul on the one hand and perfection of the body and perfection of the soul on the other, Polqar does not differentiate between the two. See Lawrence Kaplan, ““I Sleep, but my heart waketh”: Maimonides’ Conception of the Human Perfection,” pp. 130- 166.

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The last quote I will use comes from treatise four of ‘Ezer ha-Dat, where

Polqar rejects the opinions of several groups of people, including Kabbalists and magicians. This excerpt expresses, I will argue, Polqar’s true opinion.

And indeed the one who attains the purpose of the true science, or gets closer to it, and he is the one [that is called] the philosopher and the sage, he will perform and will act and will do all the proper [Metukanot] commandments of our law, light and weighty, for he sees that they are correct and suitable according to the judgment [Shikul Daʿat] and [that they] agree with the truth and with the equity [Yosher] that man will do them and lives by them (according to them) and he will detach [himself] from the sins for they are [equivalent] to evil, to damage and to corruption [Hefsed].356 [emphases were added]

The philosopher who “attains the purpose of the true science” takes part in society and must observe the commandments, not because Scripture orders him to do so, but because his judgment leads him to act in accordance with them. The philosopher, as Polqar hints here, is not obligated to follow all the commandments mentioned in the Torah. Instead, he is instructed to determine which commandments are proper and to observe them for their intrinsic value.

Polqar expresses the same idea in a passage we find in treatise two, where the young philosopher differentiates between the “weighty” commandments and the

“light” ones. In this passage, the young philosopher asks the old traditionalist not to judge him if he, the old traditionalist, observes the philosopher neglecting some of the “light” commandments. In this instance, the young philosopher’s neglect of the “light” commandments makes it possible for him to engage with the “weighty” commandments, that is, studying the theoretical sciences.357

Moreover, as long as the philosopher lives within society, he must conduct himself accordingly. He ought to obey ethical laws, have contact with other people and concern himself with physical things such as food, shelter, and

356 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 155. 357 Ibid. pp. 77-78. I discuss Polqar’s approach to the commandments in chapter five. See pp. 269-282.

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security. This passage, I argue, is directly related to two statements Polqar makes in treatise one, where he presents the philosopher with an alternative to social life. In both places he advises the potential philosopher, who wants to achieve his ultimate goal, to isolate himself. Polqar makes the first of these statements before presenting the thirteen prerequisites for the ultimate leader.

Now when considered from his own viewpoint this divine man (who possesses complete felicity and true perfection) ought to live separate and apart, solitary and isolated, from the rest of man – for no one is like him or comparable to him. From the view point of the general divine providence of the human species, and with respect to his own trait of generosity to overflow upon others, however, it is necessary that, like a shepherd over his flocks, he dwell and be immersed in their midst and bear their troubles; so that he may govern them and rectify their ways, each one according to his rank and his potential – to such an extent that the city in which he dwells will have no need for any other judge or physician, as I mentioned.358

As an individual, it would seem, the philosopher will flourish if he isolates himself. However, Polqar lists two reasons for the philosopher to return to social life—“general divine providence” and the need for the philosopher’s “generosity to overflow upon others.” Unlike individual providence, according to which

God, the divine artisan, knowingly plans and orchestrates all the effects that constitute the created universe, general divine providence reflects God conceived as a general cause. God’s acting as a general cause means that He acts through intermediaries to bring about a particular event; He cooperates with secondary causes. In this sense, the causes of the occurrence of a particular event can be traced not to God’s direct actions, but to the action of the relevant immediate causes. Now, Polqar argues that the philosopher returns to society because of general divine providence.359 This means that for one to gain “general divine

358 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 44. 359 I discuss this topic at length in chapter three and chapter five of this monograph. See pp. 283-295.

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providence,” he must understand how nature operates. By going back to the community, the philosopher can share his knowledge of natural laws with the community members, according to each person’s rank and potential. He does this so that they will act in accordance with the proper opinions, even if they do not understand them. The second reason for the philosopher’s return to society is his intrinsic generosity, a prerequisite to become the ultimate leader.

The second passage I will analyze from treatise one appears, at first glance, to contradict Polqar’s view expressed above. Here Polqar states that the philosopher

must isolate himself and hide in order to think and intellectualize with his intellect so that he will apprehend the true and the noble intelligibles, for they are the actions of the intellect, and with this he will conjoin with his Active [Intellect] and they will become one360

The philosopher who seeks to unite with the Active Intellect must separate himself from society. Society is, of necessity, engaged with bodily pleasures on the one hand and with daily material concerns on the other.361 However, Polqar notes, the philosopher cannot live in isolation throughout his life. The king gives the reason for this in treatise two: while presenting his judgment to the philosopher and the traditionalist, he concludes that a philosopher who does not follow any of the laws of the Torah is comparable to a lonely person who stands in the middle of a desert without a society. The lack of social engagement is akin to the lonely experience of the desert, and must be overcome by taking part in society; this is necessary for the existence of the philosopher, insofar as he is a

360 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 50. 361 Cf. Ibn Bajja, Tadbir al-Mutawaḥid, chapter 12 (Lawrence Berman’s translation, in Medieval Political Philosophy, pp.102); Ibn Tufayl, Ḥayy ben Yaqẓan, chapter XXX; the Guide, 2:37;3:51. Howard Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political Though, Studies in Ethics, Law, and the Human Ideal, pp. 136; 177; 179- 181.

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natural and social creature.362 Theoretically, the ideal situation for the philosopher would be solitude, since his purpose of uniting with the Active

Intellect requires him to distance himself from social life. And yet, in practice,

Polqar maintains that it is impossible for one to live completely isolated from social life. It follows that according to Polqar there are two kinds of optimal state: one is the best possible state, given that we are embodied rational agents, and the other is an ideal state in which the perfect philosopher is constantly isolated. The second state is possible only in theory.

Isolation, then, is a temporary situation for the philosopher.363 As long as the philosopher is isolated, the practical commandments are not obligatory, for if we connect Polqar’s discussion of the perfection of the body and of the soul with his discussion of the philosopher’s solitude, “When this [spiritual] faculty is completely perfected it does not need any instrument or body, for its end is nothing but the perfect apprehension of knowledge and true beliefs.”364

Therefore, there is no contradiction between these two passages. Yet, Polqar adds, when the philosopher eventually returns to live among people, as he must, he will choose to observe the Mosaic Law, for it provides the best way of operating within society.

It therefore follows that Polqar sees no essential difference between Jews and non-Jews other than the law that they observe.365 Observing the Mosaic

362 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 96-97. 363 The Guide, 3:51; Ibn Bajja, followed by Falaquera, holds a different position from the one presented here. According to Ibn Bajja and Falaquera, the philosopher is required to stay isolated, on his own or with other philosophers, and fulfill his individual purpose. His return to society comes with a risk that his soul will be corrupted by bodily desires. See Falaquera, the Guide of the Guide, 3:51; Sefer ha-maʿalot, pp. 49-50. 364 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 34. See also p. 6. The fact that the intellectual faculty” does not need any instrument or body” does not necessarily mean that other faculties of the soul do not need the body. 365 This view clearly contradicts Halevi’s sense of the uniqueness of the Jewish law and its superiority to all other laws.

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commandments does not automatically guarantee that a human being will attain the ultimate purpose. However, it provides adherents with the necessary tools to achieve the welfare of the body, which is to say individual bodily health, as well as a sound political life and the ethical virtues. And, second, operating within this law, one has a better chance of achieving a higher purpose – the welfare of the soul. Other religions fail to provide conditions that are as good as those provided by the Law of Moses, law that is necessary for achieving the ultimate purpose. As has already been suggested, Polqar does not view the Christian faith as a true religion, and he justifies his argument by pointing to the false opinions it teaches its adherents.366

How would Polqar view a Muslim philosopher such as al-Fārābī, whom he quotes almost verbatim when he writes about the prerequisites for the ultimate leader ? Would he claim that Averroes, whose influence pervades Polqar’s works and whom he even mentions by name, did not attain the ultimate purpose because he was not Jewish?367 Similarly, what would be the fate of philosophers,

366 Even with regard to the welfare of the body, there is also a difference between these two faiths. While Judaism enumerates 613 commandments one must follow, Christianity demands much less of its believers. However, reducing Polqar’s views to numerical criteria for which religion is the better route to attaining the ultimate purpose does not do justice to the philosopher; the quantity of laws presented by a religion does not make it truer than others. For Polqar, as he notes very clearly (‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 40), any religion that offers true opinions and “proper activities” is considered a true religion, regardless of the number of its commandments. It follows that Polqar, in principle, accepts other religions that offer their adherents true opinions and proper activities. Zadik, in his thesis, p. 115, argues that Polqar does not feel the need to criticize the Christian practical laws since the Mosaic Law provides many more commandments than the Christian faith and clearly helps people to correct their actions and as a result, improve their society. 367 Maimonides, in his letter to Samuel Ibn Tibbon, offers highly praise for the philosophical achievements of Aristotle and his Greek commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, and the Muslim Aristotelians, al-Fārābī, Ibn Bajja, and Averroes. He encourages Ibn Tibbon to study from their texts in seeking the truth. Interestingly, Ibn Sinna is not as highly praised as the other three: “his books... are not like those by al-Fārābī, but are useful.” For Maimonides’ opinion of Ibn Sinna, see Steven Harvey, “Did Maimonides’ letter to Samuel Tibbon Determine Which Philosophers would be Studies by later Jewish Thinkers?” pp. 51-70; Mauro Zonta, “The Role of Avicenna and of Islamic ‘Avicennism’ in the 14th-Century Jewish Debate around Philosophy and Religion,” pp. 647-657.

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such as Plato and Aristotle, who did not subscribe to any religion based on divine revelation?

No doubt, Polqar believed that great philosophers such as Plato and

Aristotle apprehended intelligibles, even though they did not separate meat and dairy or fast on Yom Kippur. They achieved this high philosophical level by using their intellect to examine the world. Their study of political life, ethical virtues, physics, and metaphysics was well anchored in speculative knowledge, and they were able to live in their society by implementing these theories in their practical life.

In the same way, since Polqar does not provide us with his views regarding whether Muslims can attain the ultimate purpose, we must deduce them from his discussion of the Mosaic Law in contrast to Christianity.

Polqar would not accuse Muslims, as he did Christians, of rejecting the four principles that should be the basis of any true religion. Muslims, like Jews, believe that God exists, that He is One, that He is incorporeal and that He is not a force in a body. In this respect, the Quran provides the correct opinions required by Polqar for establishing a true religion. Muslims also share some of the practical commandment of the Jewish Law (circumcision, prayers, the prohibition against eating pork, etc.). If excellent philosophers such as al-Fārābī and Averroes, frequently quoted by our author, apprehended the intelligibles, we can reasonably assume that the practical law of Islam is able to provide its adherents with the social rules that allowed them to gain higher knowledge and hence to attain ʿOlam ha-Ba (the world to come). These principles are affirmed by Jews as well as Muslims. It follows, on the basis of Polqar’s universalistic approach, that the Talmudic reference, “there is no fate to Israel” or “Israel is not

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subject to fate,” means that Muslims, Greeks, and all those who attain knowledge of intelligibles deserve to be called Israel.

Of course, Polqar could not write openly that the Muslim philosophers could attain the ultimate goal, for the traditionalist members of his own community would have accused him of heresy or of denying the essential difference between the two religions. However, as we have seen, by deliberately writing in a contradictory manner in his discussion of theologically delicate topics, Polqar succeeded in concealing his true opinions from the multitude, while at the same time covertly revealing them to his more sophisticated readers.368

368 Maimonides alludes to the same idea in his Mishneh Torah, Mishneh Torah, 1-4. Cf. Lawrence Kaplan, Maimonides on the Singularity of the Jewish people, Daʿat, Collection of Maimonides Studies- on the Occasion of the 800th Anniversary of His Death, 2004, pp. 31-53.

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Chapter Three: The Concept of God

3.1 God’s will

In order to understand Polqar’s approach to issues such as creation, prophecy, miracles, determinism, providence, man’s ultimate purpose, and the like, we must first clarify his view about God’s will. Indeed, Polqar’s conception of the divine will determines his understanding of these fundamental philosophical issues; they comprise the main body of ‘Ezer ha-Dat, and each of them is directly connected to the concept of God’s will (raẓon or ḥefeẓ). As an Averroist, Polqar is committed to following Maimonides in defending Aristotle’s philosophy, which identified God’s unchanging essence with His unchanging will and unchanging knowledge. In contrast, the traditional view is that God’s will is a dynamic force that is directly connected to everything that occurs in the world, including human actions.

Is God’s will identical with His knowledge? Are there several aspects of the divine will? What is the connection between the laws of nature and God’s will? These questions guide the discussion of this section. My analysis of these issues leads to the conclusion that Polqar remains faithful to his naturalistic approach, according to which everything occurring in the world occurs within the natural order.369

I shall begin by inquiring into Polqar’s use of the concept of “God’s will.” We will see that Polqar uses this term in various ways, often with different meanings.

369 Shalom Ẓadik suggests that “God’s will” has three meanings. The first is “the giver of forms” (noten ha-ẓurot); this definition of God’s will describes the divine will as an eternal force that guarantees the existence of the world by continually giving form to matter. The second, “the will that created the world and determined the laws of nature,” is related to creation, namely, the will that creates the world and the natural laws. The third, “the force that moves things” (ha-koaḥ ha-meniaʿ et ha- devarim), is in a sense, according to Ẓadik, a mix of the two. While I agree with Ẓadik that Polqar gives several meanings to “God’s will,” I argue that, in fact, there are four different ways in which Polqar uses this concept. In addition, I disagree with Ẓadik’s conclusion, according to which God’s will dictates natural laws. In my view, Polqar identifies God’s will with natural laws, so that God’s will is not superior to the laws of nature. See Ẓadik, Thesis, pp. 13-34, in particular pp. 31-32; “The Essence of the Will and Polqar’s Philosophical Way,” pp. 12-15.

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Then, after discussing the different conceptions of God’s will, I will examine the contexts in which this term is used. Contextualizing the idea of God’s will reveals that, in truth, Polqar subscribes to one meaning of the concept of “God’s will,” that of the laws of nature. He uses the concept instrumentally in other contexts, either for theological purposes or to cover up his radical view regarding the divine will.

Let us first examine Polqar’s definition to the term “will.” According to him, the scholars (ḥakhmei ha-meḥqar) understand the term “will” in one of two ways:

And as for those who laugh and mock, [those] who deny will from the creator, you should know that those [few] scholars who remain admit that there are two types of wills which differ from one another. [The first is] the will to reach a certain goal… [And the second is] the will to bestow good upon (le-heitiv) mankind, and to emanate existences (havayyot). Indeed, He [God], our creator, who directs (mekhonen) our actions, willed to bestow loving-kindness onto our actions. [the need for external thing] is absent from Him, for He is perfect and complete in excellence and glory. Therefore, everything is according to His word and will, and our will agrees with His will, for they become bound, unified, and united together. Everything returns to one place.370

We apprehend the concept of “will” in one of two ways: the first is will which leads to a certain end, the desire to reach a specific goal. The second way of understanding the term “will” is as a force which is not motivated by any external aim or need, but rather acts upon others purely from loving-kindness. Bestowing loving- kindness benefits the recipient without diminishing the giver. Naturally, Polqar ascribes only the second meaning of “will” to God, arguing that since God is a perfect being, His act of loving-kindness towards His creatures is derived necessarily from

His own goodness and not from an external need or aim.371

Polqar’s claim that “everything is according to His word and will, and our will agrees with His will, for they become bound, unified, and united together” is part of

370 ʿEzer ha-Dat, p. 103. 371 Although Polqar does not state explicitly that the second meaning of “will” also applies to the separate intellects, it is clear that they act neither according to external need nor according to desire. The difference between God’s will and the will of the separate intellects is that their existence is dependent on God’s will, and therefore their will is at a lower rank than God’s.

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his solution to the question: how can man act freely if everything occurs according to

God’s will? However, in order to understand this solution, we must first clarify the different conceptions of God’s will.

Polqar presents four different conceptions of God’s will. The first is introduced in treatise two as part of the dialogue between the young philosopher and the old traditionalist. The young philosopher sets forth his view of God’s will as part of a larger discussion that connects God’s will with His knowledge of universals and particulars:

And how can one believe that God is ignorant of particulars…He [God], according to His eternal will, has created them [the creatures], imprinting (be- hatbiʿo) forms in their matter. He is [the one] who faces (poneh) [them] and governs all, particulars and universals. His knowledge of them is according to their true essence (ʿal derekh mahut amitatam), and their continuous existence is assured [by His knowledge of them]. Then, He will know everything, [whether] necessary, possible, and even the impossible whose existence is unreasonable (asher meẓiuto lo ikhshar). [He knows] each one, according to its nature of existence, in accordance with His thought about it. And this [is the reason] why He faces [them] and governs each and every one of the created beings.372

In this passage, Polqar links God’s will with His knowledge of universals and particulars and His governance over all created beings. God’s will in this context is defined as eternally “imprinting forms in matter.” We learn three important ideas from this passage. First, the existence of created beings is dependent on “God’s eternal will.” Second, the nature of the existence of created beings involves the process of imprinting forms in matter. Third, the definition of God’s will in this context does not include the separate intellects, whose existence does not involve physical matter.

372 ʿEzer ha-Dat, p. 102.

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Polqar examines the second conception of God’s will in connection with man’s will. In this discussion he explains how both wills, God’s and man’s, unite at the moment of one’s action:

You would not find this issue difficult were you to know the truth about these matters. It is known that the external sphere encompassing everything is like one individual, and all within it are like its limbs. Therefore, the general will of God373 – whose relationship to the world as a whole is like the relationship of the soul to the body, as the Sages said – comes about and originates together with the will of man, who is like a particular and a limb of the world. Do you not see that the sinew moves a finger through its will, and one says that man moves his finger through his will, with the result that both wills are together. Hence the meaning of the sage's statement, “Everything is observed but choice is granted” (Abot 3.15) is that everything is revealed and known to the Creator (blessed be He), and it comes about and originates through His will and desire. Nevertheless, choice is granted to humans to perform their actions through their will and desire. 374

In this quotation, Polqar discusses God’s will only in relationship to its role with regard to man’s free will, and not with regard to the separate intellects. Here Polqar seeks to reconcile between two seemingly incompatible concepts: God’s foreknowledge and man’s ability to choose his actions freely.375 Polqar’s innovative

be can ”ולזה יהיה רצון האל הכללית אשר ערכו אל העולם כולו כערך הנשמה אל הגוף“ text Hebrew The 373 interpreted in two ways: either that “God to the world is that of the soul to the body,” and this is how Guttmann reads the text (see next footnote). The second option, and it is the option I believe to be correct, is that “God’s will to the world is that of the soul to the body.” Reading the text in light of the second option accords with Polqar’s view according to which God is remote from the world. 374 ʿEzer ha-Dat, p. 119. J.J. Guttmann found Polqar’s solution to God’s foreknowledge and man’s free will unique. According to Guttmann, “the relation of man’s freedom of choice to God’s omniscience and omnipotence is what primarily concerned him [Polqar]; he overcame this dilemma by a semi-pantheistic conception of the relation between God’s will and man’s will. The divine will is the power by which anything and everything is decided in the world, and the powers on which individual action depends are related to it in the same way that the powers which move any individual limb of man are related to the will which motivates his entire body." Guttmann’s proposal suggests that Polqar holds the position that human will is connected to God’s. In other words, when an action takes place, man’s will resembles God’s will, and the latter’s absolute knowledge is the cause of the former by creating all the causes to such act. Guttmann offers two possible ways of reading Polqar’s connection between God and man. The first points to the predetermined harmony between these two wills, God’s and man’s. The second points to the identification of the two wills. Guttmann asserts that either way free will is withheld from man because man’s action depends on God’s knowledge and will. See J.J. Guttmann, Philosophy of Judaism, pp. 205-206. I argue, unlike Guttmann, that Polqar’s solution is free of any pantheistic aspect if we accept that for Polqar God’s will is identical to the natural laws, which are in no way identical with God Himself. 375 For the discussion of God’s foreknowledge and man’s free choice, see below, pp. 161-185.

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analogy between the divine will’s relationship to the world and the soul’s relationship to the body suggests that man’s decision to act and God’s will that he so decide occur simultaneously; the combination of the two wills allows the action to happen. This analogy further suggests that what distinguishes a man from a corpse is the non- material part of his soul. In this sense, the soul is man’s essence. In a similar fashion, without natural laws the world would be nothing but a collection of inanimate objects with no essence. In this light, one could interpret Polqar’s claim that “both wills are together” as arguing that man’s will must accord with the laws of nature; even if he wished to do so, he would be unable to perform an action that contradicts the natural laws.

Polqar introduces the third conception of God’s will in his discussion of God’s will in relation to nature. In the following long passage, Polqar offers his own definition of the term “nature” (tevaʿ) and explores the connection between nature and

God’s will:

And now consider well and know; have you not heard that the word “nature” indicates in our language (in this place) an imprinting of a form within the imprinted object to indicate that the beginning of the power of the form’s movement and its action is within the object, which is imprinted, not outside of it. [This is] as opposed to all other things whose movement is caused by movers external to them. And this power, which is sunk within it, is called either angel or seraph (mal’akh o seraph), or a demon or any other name you wish to call it, because there is no difference376 in names. And, in general, it [=the power] is the messenger of a creator (yoẓer) and is subjugated to him in such a way that if he [yoẓer] desires that his command be fulfilled – it will fulfill (his desire). And if [the yoẓer does] not [desire that this power fulfills this command], it will cease doing so. And this is the place that makes miracles possible and the wondrous things that do not occur [in the course of nature]. And this is in accordance with the primordial wisdom of God. And since nature is the beginning of the movement of everything that moves and the rest of everything that rests, and that beginning is the effect of and the messenger of the Blessed be He, as I already indicated; therefore, as all movements come one from the other and reach to the movement that is the beginning of all movement, namely, the diurnal revolution, the one who causes it to move being the First Cause

the ”מחלוקת“ word Hebrew the uses Polqar although that comments view, my in correctly Levinger, 376 meaning is not controversy but difference. See ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 158, n.8.

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among all causes, namely, the Creator, blessed be He, on account of all this it should be known in truth that the true philosophers believe and declare that everything depends on the will and the desire of the Creator blessed be He. And nature is one of His messengers and one of His intermediates, which acts in accordance with His restraint, [with] His will and [with] His desire. It is impossible for anyone to consider the idiocies which the members of the multitude possess about nature.377

This argument is aimed at those who accuse the philosophers of elevating nature, as a consequence of which nature is perceived as God’s “enemy” (senuo shel ha-barukh hu), acting against God. According to this accusation, the philosophers reject God’s sovereignty and supremacy by treating nature as an independent force not subjugated to God. The philosophers also deny supernatural events, such as miracles, and any divine interference with the natural order, since everything occurs according to that natural order; according to them, no external force, including God, can change these occurrences.

Polqar responds to this accusation by maintaining that nature is not a set of laws we use to analyze existence, but rather a force within an object. As this intrinsic force, nature is the source of the motion and rest of any object. Any motion is necessarily dependent on a proximate external agent, which, via a causal chain, is dependent on the diurnal sphere, the beginning of all motions. The motion of the diurnal sphere, in turn, is generated by God, “the First Cause.” God is thus the cause of all causes and is

377 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 158-159. ועתה התבוננו היטב ודעו, הלא שמעתם כי מלת "טבע" מורה בלשוננו במקום זה על התעמקות צורת החתימה ושקיעתה בנטבע להורות כי תחלת כח תנועת הצורה ההיא ופעולתה הוא תוך עצם הנטבע לא חוצה ממנו כשאר המתנועעים בסבת מניעים חוצה להם. והכח הזה הנשקע בקרב ותוכו יקרא מלאך או שרף או שד או איזה שם שיחפוץ הקורא, כי אין מחלוקת בשמות. רק - בדרך הכלל הוא שלוחו של יוצר ומשועבד אליו בענין כי כשיחפוץ שתעשה מצותו על ידו יעשנה ואם לא ישבות מלעשות או יעשה הפכה על ידי אחר וזה מקום ידוע למעשה הנסים והדברים הנפלאים הבלתי נהוגים וכל זה כפי חכמתו הקדומה ב"ה. ולהיות הטבע הוא התחלת תנועה כל מתנועע והשקט כל שוקט. ואותה ההתחלה היא מסובבו ושלוחו של הב"ה כאשר זכרתי להיות כל התנועות משתלשלות זו אחר זו ומגיעות עד התנועה אשר היא ראשית כל התנועות, והיא היומית אשר המניע אותה מסובב לראש כל הסבות אשר הוא היוצר ב"ה, ולזה יודע באמת כי הפילוסופים האמתיים יאמינו ויגזרו כי הכל תלוי ברצון וחפץ היוצר ב"ה וכי הטבע אחד משלוחיו ומן האמצעיים אשר יפעלו ברסנו ורצונו וחפצו, לא יתכן לשום אדם לחשוב באותם ההבלים אשר ידברו בהם המוננו על הטבע. I also discuss this passage in the section dedicated to Polqar’s view of miracles. My main argument in this chapter is that, according to Polqar, miracles only appear supernatural to the multitude; the philosophers, however, understand the scientific causes of such events and therefore know that all the events that seem “miraculous” to the vulgar can be explained scientifically. See below, pp. 236- 250.

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connected to the world not directly, but only through intermediaries. Nature is one of these intermediaries, one of God’s messengers. God “has” several “messengers,” among which are the separate intellects, and on a lower rank, nature1.

Polqar asserts in this passage that “the true philosophers believe and declare that everything depends on the will and the desire of the Creator,” and that nature, as

God’s messenger, “acts in accordance with His restraint [be-risno], with His will, and with His desire.” This idea seems to contradict Polqar’s anti-deterministic view, particularly since he claims here that everything depends on God’s will, including man’s actions. Perhaps we can suggest that Polqar’s motivation, in this particular passage, is to refute the accusations against the philosophers by asserting that all events happen in accordance with nature and are subject to God’s will. At this point it suffices for Polqar to briefly explain the ontological connection between God and the sublunar world and the latter’s dependence on God as the First Cause, setting aside for the moment the issue of man’s free will, which, according to Polqar, is not known to God.

This leads us to Polqar’s key claim, which in my view reveals his genuine opinion. In this passage, which is part of his discussion of the three types of events – natural, voluntary, and accidental – Polqar argues that God only knows natural events, whose occurrence is necessary; voluntary and accidental events, which are only possible, are not known to God:378

Perhaps you are bothered by some of the disturbing accidents that occasionally befall the righteous man in a haphazard manner, as when a stone slips off a roof and falls on his head, or when his foot is wounded while walking. Or by the good accidents that happen to the wicked, like finding hidden riches, etc. There is no need to consider things like these because they occur rarely, and they will be known (only) when they happen to exist, since they come about via a

378 In the next section I discuss Polqar’s position regarding God’s knowledge. It suffices to say at this point that according to Polqar, God does not and cannot know possible events, including man’s actions. See discussion below, pp. 161-185.

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succession of causes, one after another, which in turn come about haphazardly. They do not arise through the intention of the Intending Agent, who supervises the last existent from the time that his first intention originated. For in that case, the accidental actions would be natural ones. Causes such as these are called “unintentional.” Don’t answer me with your common arguments, as when you “show” those who examine matters superficially that I deny God’s providence over accidental particulars. Heaven forbid that I think thus! Only the intellectuals understand that I am the one who sustains and upholds the special providence of the Creator in the manner appropriate for Him to watch over each of the existents: over natural and voluntary things in the manner of intention and supervision until the last existent, and over accidental things in the manner of (their coming about) haphazardly and suddenly. Now just as His providence is true of natural and voluntary things, since their aim is to bring forth familiar things, so, too, it will be true of accidental things, so that they come about haphazardly. Now His intention and will are completed through these accidental things that come about haphazardly. For He is the One who wills and desires the arrival of some things suddenly and by chance, just as He desires the arrival of some things by nature and others by volition. Whoever seeks an explanation of this desire is like one who seeks an explanation of the downward motion of the earth and the upward motion of fire.379

Polqar identifies God’s will with the initial intent of nature and particularly with its configuration into three different types of events: natural, volitional, and accidental, each coming to pass in the manner appropriate to its intrinsic character.

The world exists in such a way that some of the events are accidental, some are natural, and some are voluntary. God’s will in this paragraph is connected, in Polqar’s view, to the question of the problem of evil in the world. Polqar’s argument here seems to suggest that divine providence applies only to natural and voluntary things.

Accidental things, on the other hand, come about haphazardly.380

In my opinion, Polqar’s identification of God’s will with the initial intent of nature, rather than the first three views I presented, best reflects his true position, since it applies to all aspects of reality. The first conception – God’s will as the giver of forms – applies only to material objects, for [God’s eternal will] imprints forms in

379 ʿEzer ha-Dat, pp. 130-131. 380 Polqar makes the same argument in ʿEzer ha-Dat, p.118.

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their matter,381 and does not include God’s will in relation to non-material entities such as the separate intellects. The second perspective – God’s will in relation to man’s will – displays, again, only a particular aspect of God’s will. The third – God’s will in relation to nature – is somewhat closer to Polqar’s genuine opinion that nature is one of God’s intermediaries. In the section of the text where he presents this view, however, for the apologetic reasons stated above, Polqar disingenuously maintains that everything depends on God’s will and desire, including possible events – voluntary and accidental. In the first two instances he portrays God’s will in a limited matter. The third, in contrast, portrays His will in an encompassing and undifferentiated manner.

The fourth perspective, which describes God’s will in relation to the three types of events, natural, accidental, and voluntary, is the only one that encompasses God’s will in relation to existence as a whole. All of the things in the world and all creatures except for God result from either natural, accidental, or voluntary causes. Inasmuch as voluntary and accidental events are part of the domain of the possible, they are not part of the chain of necessary causes that determine natural events. Only natural causes – and here Polqar includes both the sublunar world, which is governed by the

Active Intellect, celestial spheres, and the separate intellects, excluding God – are predetermined and therefore known to God, since their occurrence is necessary and directly connected to Him.

God’s will, then, is not to be identified with God Himself, but with the force that “allows” natural events (in the sublunar world, as well as in the intermediary world of the separate intellects and celestial spheres) to occur necessarily; this force also “allows” possible events (accidental and voluntary) to occur in such a manner

381 ʿEzer ha-Dat, p. 102. God is indeed the cause of the separate intellects’ form, however, the process of imprinting forms in matter does not apply to them.

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that before their occurrence they are not known to any knower, including God.

However, once these events occur, they are no longer in the realm of the possible, but of the actual, and therefore they are known to God.382 Polqar stresses that the fact that

God does not know possible events before their occurrence does not diminish His perfection. On the contrary, it points to His absolute perfection: possible events are by their nature not necessary, and ascribing knowledge of possible things to God is tantamount to claiming that God knows things that cannot be known.383

Having identified Polqar’s genuine view regarding God’s will, I will now examine two additional passages where it seems as though Polqar contradicts his genuine view. I will argue that he does so for theological and apologetic purposes.

These two passages are from treatise three, which consists of a debate between a scholar and an astrologer. In the first passage, the scholar replies to the astrologer, who has accused him of denying that man’s will is dependent on God’s will:

Scholar: Heaven forbid me from thinking that solely through my endeavor and application I will achieve any desired end. I already told you that my will is bound up with my Creator's will, and that the two unite in an instant because my will is a part of His. Thus I am drawn after Him, and the moment at which He wishes and desires to act, then I too will wish. All this applies to voluntary activities but not to natural and accidental ones. For God gave me no dominion over the latter.384

A superficial reading of the scholar’s reply suggests that God’s will determines man’s actions, for “the moment at which He wishes and desires to act, then I too will wish.” God first decides to act, after which man wishes to do the same. That means that man’s possible actions are necessitated by God’s decision to act in a certain way.

382 Polqar’s unique solution regarding the question: how can God come to know actualized possibilities when they are actualized has a crucial weak point; for how can God not know X when it is in the realm of the possible, and know X when X is actualized, if God’s knowledge is perfect and unchanging? It would seem as if God’s knowledge is changing all the time. 383 ʿEzer ha-Dat, p. 135. 384 Ibid. p. 120.

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The apologetic stance clearly stands out here in Polqar’s indication that man’s will is dependent on God’s will. However, in light of Polqar’s previous discussion of natural, accidental, and voluntary events, we should take the scholar’s assertion here with a grain of salt. When the scholar declares that God dictates man’s actions, he only means to assert that man’s will is dependent on God as a remote cause. When man decides to do X, God knows it at the very moment that the action takes place; He does not, however, determine that the action will be actualized at a certain moment. We can see that this is the case from an inner contradiction within this passage, when

Polqar has the scholar allude to his genuine view later in the dialogue.385 His explanation that some events are necessary and some are possible – “all this applies to voluntary activities but not to natural and accidental ones” – is asserted in the same breath as his deterministic view that “the moment at which He wishes and desires to act, then I too will wish.” But in light of Polqar’s later discussion regarding necessary and possible events, it is clear that if an event is volitional, it is not determined by

God. Therefore, we can only conclude that Polqar covers his traces because they point to his radical view: his denial that God knows possible events.

In the second passage, the scholar addresses the astrologer’s argument that God knows necessary, possible, and even impossible things, and therefore humans do not possess the ability to choose their actions freely. Here the scholar argues that

As is well-known, since His Eternal knowledge is the cause of the existence of everything, then the time at which He knows something, and not beforehand, will be the very time at which the thing's existence will be necessitated and compelled. For if it were necessitated and compelled beforehand, then that necessity and compulsion would only proceed from something other than Him. Therefore a thing must be completely possible before it exists or comes into existence, either because some of its causes exist and others do not, or because there exist hindrances that prevent some causes from drawing near to the others, if they exist. At the time when the Creator (blessed be He) wishes to originate and bring something into existence, He originates and brings into existence all

385 Ibid. pp. 130-131.

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of its causes, if they were absent, or he draws some of them nearer to the others, if they were apart. He fortifies the agent and prepares the recipient to receive its action, and then He originates the thing which occurred to Him to create. All this is through His knowledge, which is His very activity, i.e., the universal Eternal knowledge, which neither changes nor originates in time (bi-zeman bilti zeman). We are not permitted to describe it or to liken it in any manner of likeness to our inferior knowledge, for we can only know and apprehend a thing from its actual existence. That is to say, after we have apprehended its existence we endeavor to know its essence and its attributes.386 [emphases were added]

In order to reveal Polqar’s intention in this passage, we must divide it into two sections. The first supports Polqar’s genuine view, according to which God cannot know events beforehand.387 Although Polqar does not explicitly indicate to which events he is referring, it is clear that he is referring to possible rather than to necessary events. In the second part of the passage, however, we are told that whenever God wishes something to come into existence He creates all the causes, immediate and remote, needed to make it happen. This process of creating all of the causes corresponds to God’s eternal knowledge, which does not change. Here, again, Polqar presents two opposing views: the first is that God cannot know, within the domain of possible events, something which has not yet occurred; the second is that if God wishes X to happen, including if it is a possible event, He will create all the causes that will assure that X will happen. Similar to the apologetic stance in the previous passage, here Polqar, in the first part of the passage, aims to introduce his radical view that God does not know possible events to his careful reader, and at the same time, in the second part of the passage, seeks to appease his traditional reader by asserting that

God’s omniscience applies to both necessary and possible things.

386 Ibid. pp. 135-136. 387 Ibid, pp. 130-131.

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3.2 God’s Foreknowledge and man’s Free Will 388

It would appear that a religious person, especially one who belongs to the

Jewish faith, which stresses praxis, must affirm the position that human beings have free will; for if free will were denied, it would necessarily follow that the commandments have no meaning. But how can this religious affirmation co-exist with the fundamental religious affirmation of God’s omniscience?

In this section I will examine this tension between God’s foreknowledge and man’s free will, through an analysis of Polqar’s consistent rejection of the radical determinism of his former teacher, Abner of Burgos. As previously discussed, Polqar’s ‘Ezer ha-Dat seals the long correspondence between Abner and himself. In his Sefer Minḥat Qenaot (The

Book A Jealousy-Offering), Abner explicitly refers to Polqar’s Sefer be-Hakḥashat ha-

Iẓtagninot (The Book of Denial of Astrology) and Iggeret ha-Tiqvah (The Epistle of Hope) and defends his radical view of determinism. According to the theory of radical determinism, any action taken by us only appears to be the result of our choosing that particular action over others. In truth, however, our choice is the outcome of various predetermined factors that cause it to happen in a certain time and place. For Abner, determinism is entailed by God’s omniscience, His absolute knowledge of past, present, and future. Any affirmation of one’s liberty in making decisions and choosing specific actions is incompatible with this idea of God’s perfect knowledge. In sum, for Abner, ascribing free will to human beings denies God’s omniscience.389

In opposition to his former teacher, Polqar attempts to reconcile the idea of man’s ability to choose with the concept of God’s perfect knowledge. Polqar

388 Cf. Yitzhak Baer, “The Book of A Jealousy-Offering,” pp. 188-206; David Menachem, Thesis, pp. 141-181; Shalom Zadik, Dissertation, pp. 201-240. 389 Shlomo Pines, in his article “Some Topics on Polqar’s Treatise ʿEzer ha-Dat and their Parallels in Spinoza’s View,” pp. 397-398, points to similarities between Polqar’s view of God’s foreknowledge of future events and his contemporary Christian thinkers, among whom are Durand de St. Pourçain and Alexander of Alexandria.

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rejects Abner’s view and contends that allowing man’s free will alongside God’s omniscience is the only way to defend God’s perfection.

I will begin by discussing Abner’s summary of three arguments which, in his view, constitute the pivotal points upon which Polqar’s view is based. Each argument will be followed by Abner’s critique of and attempt to refute Polqar’s position. After examining Abner’s critique, I will clarify Polqar’s position that voluntary and accidental actions and events take place within a framework of complete and absolute possibility, and consequently are not known and cannot be known beforehand to anyone, including God.

First argument: the existence of absolute possibility

Abner presents his reading of Polqar’s three philosophical arguments in the second chapter of Minḥat Qenaot and addresses them principally in chapter four.390

Polqar’s basic idea, according to Abner, is “that the actions of men, and other mundane accidents, are neither known nor understood by any knower before they come to be in the world.”391 Abner describes the first argument supporting this assumption as follows:

I say therefore that in his book Isaac listed three arguments, which he claimed to establish as certain through syllogisms and manifest proofs. He also said that they include and encompass the activities of all the heavens and their stars, and that although there are many more arguments, these refute demonstratively the

390 Indeed, in treatise three of ‘Ezer ha-Dat Polqar presents three arguments. However, the content of these arguments does not correspond to Abner’s presentation of Polqar’s assertions. There are two plausible reasons for this discrepancy. First, Abner might have been aware of Polqar’s arguments as they appear in Sefer be-hakḥashat ha-iẓtagninot. Minḥat Qenaot, which was written after Sefer be- hakḥashat ha-iẓtagninot, could represent Abner’s modification of Polqar’s views so that they would susceptible to his own critique. In doing so, Abner sought to strengthen his radical view of determinism, while weakening Polqar’s defense of man’s free will. The second option is to read Minḥat Qenaot as a direct response to Sefer be-hakḥashat ha-iẓtagninot, and to read ‘Ezer ha-Dat as a response to Minḥat Qenaot. This would mean that in ‘Ezer ha-Dat, Polqar refines and modifies the arguments that he had made in Sefer be-hakḥashat ha-iẓtagninot in light of Abner’s critique in Minḥat Qenaot. 391 Minḥat Qenaot, chapter 1.

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[doctrine of] the Necessary Decree… The first argument is from the aspect of the possibility existing in recipients [of actions.] He thought to prove from this that there cannot be a decree that obligates or compels one of two possible alternatives to exist in a definite manner. He said that were this true then the nature of the possible would be replaced with that of the necessary.392

According to Abner, Polqar’s key assertions are that absolute possibility exists and that the claim that any event or action results from a pre-determined decree entails that all events and actions occur necessarily.393 Absolute possibility, then, must be completely distinguished from the necessary if we wish to maintain absolute possibility as an independent domain. Abner emphasizes that in this argument possibility is ascribed to the recipient alone who, theoretically, can act in two mutually incompatible ways. To cite Abner’s (and Polqar’s) example, before the wax takes on a certain form, it is possible for it to take on any form. If the form it actually takes on was predetermined, then it would not have been genuinely possible for the wax to take on another form. It would be only “relatively” possible, that is, relative to the contemplator who is ignorant of the causal chain that determines the form that the wax takes on. In Polqar’s view, before the wax takes on a certain form, it is possible for it to take on any form. On the other hand,

Abner distinguishes between possibility within eternal existence and possibility within temporal existence:

Although it is the decree that necessitates and compels the possible thing to be one of two possible alternatives, this does not imply that the nature of possibility is replaced by the necessary as Isaac maintains in his first argument. On the contrary, the nature of possibility always remains in the possible because what belongs to a thing's substance never leaves it. And because the thing is possible in itself, an external agent has to compel it to be one of the two possible alternatives, as I mentioned above in the case of the body of wax. Now the possibility that departs from it when it is one of the two possible alternatives is

392 Ibid, chapter 2. 393 Later I return to Polqar’s distinction between two types of events – necessary event, which can be known before their occurrence, and possible events which are not known to any knower, including God. See pp. 161-185.

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not the possibility that it has in itself. Rather the possibility that it has by another leaves at a certain time, and is replaced by necessity at that time. However, this is the temporal necessity in temporal existence; [the possibility in itself] is the eternal possibility in eternal existence, which does not fall under time. This is the manner of the possibility belonging to prime matter to receive all forms, even though at every time it possesses a certain particular form.394

Though he is a determinist, Abner does not deny the existence of possible and accidental events. Instead, he offers a different conceptual framework within which these terms are to be understood. He distinguishes between the eternal possibility in eternal existence that exists in a thing qua substance and a temporal possibility in temporal existence, which “leaves at a certain time and is replaced by necessity at that time.” The wax, for example, is similar to the primary matter that theoretically could receive any form before the chain of causes and effects acts upon it. The body of the wax is capable by itself, as a substance, of receiving different shapes equally. It would follow, then, that before the chain of causes and effects unfolding in time determines that the wax will take on form X, it is also possible for the wax to take on form Y. This is the eternal possibility, the possibility that exists before the causal chain causes the wax to take on form X.

However, once the wax takes on form X, the possibility of it being Y is replaced by the necessity of its being X. However, qua substance—considered independently of the causal chain—it remains eternally possible for the wax to take both forms, X and Y.

394 Minḥat Qenaot, chapter 4.

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Second argument: Accidental events occur without being known and conceived by any knower

As we just saw, Polqar bases his first argument, as Abner understands it, on the assumption that absolute possibility exists. He applies this same reasoning to the occurrence of accidental things:

The second argument is from the aspect of accidental things. For he [Isaac] did not believe that they can be known in any way, nor conceived by any knower, before they exist. He said that were this true, then an accident would not be an accident, nor would things happen by chance. Now since a special volition is an accident of some will, it also follows that the will won’t be the will, if it is known before it exists.395

According to Polqar, accidental things cannot be known to any knower, including God, before they exist. If a knower knew accidental things before they occurred, then the knowledge of their causes would necessitate their occurrence, as a consequence of which they would not be accidental things occurring by chance, but rather necessary things. To this claim, Abner replies as follows:

Because of this error [not differentiating eternal existence from temporal existence] Isaac erred likewise in his second argument, inasmuch as will and accidental things are possible.396

In chapter seven of Minḥat Qenaot Abner argues that Aristotle, Avicenna, al-

Ghazālī, Ibn ‘Ezra, and Maimonides held the view that God knows particulars, and hence that they believed in a deterministic worldview. Then Abner explains the nature of Polqar’s error with regard to accidental things, which, according to

Polqar, occur without intention:

Isaac erred when he said that accidental actions are those which are done or performed without intention and without seeking an end, and that if accidental actions were decreed and came about in a necessary manner, then they would be at the same time performed with the intention of one who necessitates; hence they would be voluntary actions. In that case, the accidental would be at the

395 Ibid, chapter 2. Here Abner claims that according to Polqar accidental things are part of volitional things. When we discuss Polqar’s response, we will see that Polqar clearly distinguishes between accidental and voluntary things. Cf. Shalom Zadik, Dissertation, pp. 206-207. 396 Minḥat Qenaot, chapter 4.

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same time non-accidental. For this shows that he did not understand what accidental actions are. For they are not considered to be without intention and without seeking an end simpliciter, since it would be heretical to deny the order of the Orderer, and of the Eternal knowledge! They are rather devoid of the intention of a particular agent in relation to whom they are accidental actions. But insofar as accidental actions are possible things, they are judged to be necessary by other external [causes] in this temporal existence.397

Here, Abner advances two main arguments: first, accidental actions must be performed with intention and seeking an end. Indeed, if there were neither intention nor an end for these actions, the concepts of God as the world Orderer and of His eternal knowledge would be void. Abner further argues that possible things include accidental actions, and therefore that the distinction between eternal existence and temporal existence applies here as well: the eternal possibility exists within the accidental action itself. Again, however, once the action occurs in the world, its occurrence is necessitated by an external cause who is part of a necessary chain, and therefore within temporal existence accidental actions are also determined. In other words, an accidental action is an action whose outcome was not intended by its doer; however, once this action occurs, it is constrained by a determined and necessary causal chain, and thus, these accidental actions reflect the intention of the Orderer of all things.

I shall illustrate Abner’s argument with an example. Let us assume that I have a pen in my hand and I accidently drop it on the floor. Polqar would argue that I had no intention of dropping the pen on the floor; my arm might have accidently hit the table, as a result of which I dropped the pen. In this case, I can point to the near cause – hitting the table – that caused me to drop the pen. However, Polqar would continue to argue, there was no intention or seeking of an end involved in dropping the pen. Abner, by contrast, would argue that the action of dropping the pen only

397 Ibid, chapter 7.

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seems without intention to me because I do not know the causal chain that caused this action. In other words, for Abner dropping the pen is accidental in relation to me, because it was not my intention. However, it is at the same time an expression of God’s intention, which is manifested in the order of the universe.

Third argument: endowing humans with voluntary freedom

In the third argument, concerning endowing humans with free will, Abner points to a new argument, which, according to Polqar, proves the existence of man’s free will:

The third argument, particular to man, is from the aspect of the intellectual soul. He [Isaac] said that the intellectual soul is separated and distinct from matter, and that the heavenly bodies, insofar as they are material, lack the power to act upon it through any thing. And because one could object that a separate power can act upon the intellectual soul by compelling it to act or to receive an action, and to will at times or not to will at times, he bolstered his utterances in this third argument by saying that if human accidents came about through necessitation and decree, then the propositions of our Holy Law would be destroyed; and all its commandments and prohibitions would be in vain; and it would not be proper for the righteous man to receive reward for his good deeds, nor would it be proper to punish the wicked, since all their acts would be necessitated. Isaac took this support from the statements of Moses the Egyptian and the other early theologians who spoke about this matter.398

Material objects cannot influence things that are separate from matter. Since the intellectual soul is separate from matter, material objects – and here Abner is referring to the heavenly bodies – cannot act upon it. However, Abner responds, while Polqar’s argument explains why material bodies cannot act upon man’s intellectual soul, it fails to explain why the separate intellects cannot act upon it.

Because of the weakness of his argument, Polqar needed, according to Abner, to

398 Minḥat Qenaot, chapter 2.

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strengthen it from a theological point of view;399 therefore, he supplemented his original argument with the claim that the Mosaic commandments have no validity unless we assume that humans have free choice. Therefore, Abner concludes that:

Isaac not only wished to do away with astral decrees, but also he wished to do away with God's knowledge and His decrees concerning all accidental and possible things. Because of this he said in his book that we ought not to believe in any way that such things can be known, or observed by any knower, before they exist. Hence he implied that they cannot be known nor observed by God.400

To support his contrary conclusion, Abner quotes verses from the Old and New

Testaments that in his view clearly show that God, with His eternal knowledge, governs things in a particular manner. For example, Job 34:21-22 states: for His eyes are upon a man's ways; He observes his every step. Neither darkness nor gloom offers a hiding-place for evildoers; and Psalms 33:13-15, The Lord looks down from heaven; He sees all mankind. From his dwelling-pace He gazes on all the inhabitants of the earth ---- He who fashions the hearts of the all, who discerns all their doings. Presumably, since Polqar’s last point here is in Abner’s view purely theological, it is sufficient for Abner to respond to it by citing biblical proof texts.

399 Polqar, who was greatly influenced by al-Fārābī, might have been aware of the argument presented by the latter in his Aristotle’s De Interpretatione (¶98, lines 11-20), where he argues that if we deny free will then “All religions will be committed to the conclusion that man does not choose to do whatever he does. Whatever punishment befalls him in this world or the next will not be on account of acts of free will and choice. It would follow that God Most High, who rewards and punishes, acts unjustly. This again is altogether absurd, rejected by all religion and very, very detrimental for people to believe.” 400 Minḥat Qenaot, chapter 2.

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Polqar’s Response to Abner’s Critique401

As noted above, the three arguments in ‘Ezer ha-Dat do not correspond to the three arguments Abner presented in Polqar’s name in Minḥat Qenaot.402 Polqar addresses Abner’s three arguments, presenting his own views; however he combines the first two arguments – the existence of absolute possibility and the idea that accidental things cannot be known or conceived by any knower – into one, because, in his view, these two issues are connected to one another. Polqar, in his guise as the scholar in ‘Ezer ha-Dat, discusses God’s foreknowledge and man’s free will with the astrologer who presumably represents Abner: his arguments are taken almost verbatim from Minḥat Qenaot. From the outset, this dialogue aims to refute and reject two main arguments. The first is the Ashʿarite’s conviction

(especially as advocated by al-Ghazālī) that directly connects God’s will with any action that occurs.403 According to Polqar’s understanding of the Ashʿarite, God knows universals and particulars in the same manner. To this claim, the scholar replies as follows:

In my opinion Abu Hamid al-Ghazālī was the one who laid the trap for you, snaring your mind with this corrupt and evil opinion, through what he wrote in the [section on] Metaphysics in the Opinions of the Philosophers. 404 He thought to explain that the Creator (blessed be He) knows the particulars of all things inasmuch as He knows their genera. This matter led him to become brazen and to conclude that God knows possible things in a necessary manner, and that the astrologer knows them and apprehends them in a manner like His apprehension. Now had you understood the answer made by R. Isaac Albalag

401 David Menachem, Thesis, pp. 141-181; Shalom Zadik, Dissertation, pp.202, n. 989. 402 Polqar addresses Abner’s first two arguments (the existence of absolute possibility and the idea that accidental events occur without being known and conceived by any knower) mainly in his first argument in ‘Ezer ha-Dat. Abner’s third argument corresponds to Polqar’s second argument in ‘Ezer ha-Dat. In his third argument, Polqar emphasizes the difference between natural will and human will. 403 The second aim is to reject astrology as a valid tool for predicting future events. I discuss this topic in chapter 4. See pp. 218-235. 404 Interestingly, Polqar refers to The Opinions of the Philosophers as al-Ghazālī’s book in which he discusses the views of Kalām. In The Opinions of the Philosophers, however, al-Ghazālī sets forth the views of the philosophers, not of Kalām.

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in his translation, you would not have dared to believe in such a false doctrine that invalidates true beliefs as this one.405

According to Polqar, Al-Ghazālī’s deterministic view includes two different types of determinism: metaphysical determinism, or God’s knowledge of possible things in a necessary manner, and astral determinism, the astrologer’s ability to know possible things and apprehend them in a manner similar to God. Polqar rejects both claims.406 His defense of the Aristotelian idea that future events cannot be known before their occurrences forms the basis of his accusation that Al-

Ghazālī misleads his readers, including Polqar’s interlocutor Abner. Aristotle’s conclusion on the subject of God’s knowledge rests on his preliminary discussion of topics such as the nature of divine knowledge, its perfection, and whether God’s knowledge is subject to change:

Evidently, then, it [divine thought] thinks that which is most divine and precious, and it does not change; for change would be change for the worse, and this would be already a movement. First, then, if it is not the act of thinking but a capacity, it would be reasonable to suppose that the continuity of its thinking is wearisome to it. Secondly, there would evidently be something else more precious than thought, viz. that which is thought. For both thinking and the act of thought will belong even to one who has the worst of thoughts. Therefore if this ought to be avoided [...] the act of thinking cannot be the best of things. Therefore it must be itself that thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking.407

God, or divine thought if we are to use Aristotle’s words, knows only Himself; for if the divine intellect were to think something other than itself, it would follow that this divine intellect, before knowing “something other than itself,” only potentially knew it. Now, since ascribing to divine thought knowledge of something other than itself implies potentiality in the divine thought. It would no longer be a divine thought, for, by definition, divine thought is always in actuality.

405 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 118-119.Cf. al-Ghazālī’s, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, thirteenth discussion (pp. 134-143). 406 See my discussion of Polqar’s repudiation of astrology in chapter 4, pp. 407 Aristotle, Metaphysics, book XII chapter 9, 1074b 25-34.

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Polqar manifests the direct influence of Isaac Albalag in his use of the

Aristotelian view. Traces of this influence are found throughout ‘Ezer ha-Dat, where Polqar refers admiringly to Albalag’s book Tiqqun Deʿot ha-Philosophim numerous times. This independent work, written mainly by Isaac Albalag and completed by Polqar himself, is a rough translation of al-Ghazālī’s book The

Opinions of the Philosophers, supplemented with the authors’ presentation of their own views. This book serves as an important source for Polqar, and as just mentioned, he refers his readers to it many times. For our purpose, I will quote

Albalag’s discussion concerning God’s knowledge:

Said the author: this argument, namely, that God’s knowledge is dependent on universals, I mean the species and genus, is a new view put forward by the Ishmaelites but is not in accord with the approach of the earlier scholars and their principles.408 And the reason why they [Ishmaelites] had to affirm this position is that in their view there can be knowledge of only particulars or universals. And if they would maintain that neither of the two is known to Him then knowledge would be negated from Him entirely. Therefore, they were compelled to ascribe to Him knowledge of one of them. However, they did not see fit to ascribe to Him knowledge of particulars inasmuch as they are changing and coming into existence and perishing. Therefore, they were compelled to ascribe to Him knowledge of universals; because, according to the well-known distinction [of universals and particulars] there is no third category upon which knowledge will be dependent. And this indeed is true [that there is no third category] with regard to the human intellect inasmuch of its being material. However, with regard to the knowledge of the separate [intellect] there is a third category which is neither universal nor particular. And its existence has been shown through a demonstrative argument to exist, just as the demonstrative argument for the existence of other things, which appear to be impossible... And the proof of the existence of this intermediate category derives from the knowledge that has already been demonstrated, that each separate [intellect] has knowledge. And it was already clarified that substances are two types; first is particular, which is found externally like Reuben and Shimon; and the second is the matter, which includes these two particulars. And it is stated there that the second is found only in the intellect. And if the first one would not be apprehended by the senses, the second one would not be apprehended by the soul, for the soul needs external images (meshalim) in order that it could transform them into intelligibles. And if

408 Albalag offers two arguments: the first is that God cannot know particulars since knowing them means knowing matter, and God is incorporeal. The second argument relates to God’s knowing universals. Albalag rejects this type of knowledge, for if it is proven that God does not know particulars, how can we claim that He knows universals?

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not for them, the intelligibles would not be found in it [in the soul]; just like if there were no bodies existing in front of a mirror, there would not be a reflection in the mirror. Therefore, whoever does not feel the particular substance, the external feeling, would not be able to feel the universal in an internal manner. Therefore, the blind person does not understand the species of color, because he never sensed the particular. And if the creator would apprehend the particulars in a particular sensual manner, since it was already clarified that He is not in a body, it would necessarily follow that He would not apprehend the universals in a universal manner. However, that apprehension is really a deficiency with respect to God, even more so the particular [apprehension] which is even more deficiency, in addition to its being impossible…409

In this long paragraph, Albalag follows Aristotle’s view, which was also accepted by Maimonides,410 that God has perfect knowledge. According to Albalag

God does not know universals and particulars in the same way human beings know them – via senses and abstraction, for this would be a deficiency. God knows them in a perfect manner. Albalag adopts Maimonides’s view that ascribes to God

“perfect knowledge” entirely dissimilar to human knowledge. Although Albalag does not make this point explicitly in Tiqqun Deʿot ha-Philosophim, he probably would agree with the Maimonidean theory of equivocality, namely, that the word

“knowledge” is equivocal with reference to what God knows and what humans know. Thus, any comparison between these two sorts of knowledge is inappropriate, since the difference between God’s knowledge and ours is one of quality and not just quantity.

409 Tiqqun Deʿot ha-Philosophim, chapter 44. pp. 70-71. 410 The Guide, 3:21; Mishneh Torah, Book of Knowledge, Laws of the Foundation of the Torah, 2:10. Maimonidean scholars have disagreed as to whether Maimonides should be viewed as a determinist or as an anti-determinist; Cf. Alexander Altmann, “The Religion of the Thinkers: Free Will and Predestination in Saadia, Bahya, and Maimonides,” Religion in a Religious Age (1974) pp. 25-51; Jerome I. Gellman, “Freedom and Determinism in Maimonides’ Philosophy,” Moses Maimonides and His Time (1989) pp. 139-150; Norbert Samuelson, “The Problem of Free Will in Maimonides, Gersonides and Aquinas,” CCAR Journal 17,1 (1970) pp. 2-20; David Shatz, “Freedom, Repentance and Hardening of the Hearts: Albo vs. Maimonides,” Faith and Philosophy, 14,4 (1997) pp. 478-509.

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First Argument: defending the theory of the existence of possible and accidental things

The first argument Polqar presents is a response to the first two of Abner’s claims. Polqar uses Maimonides’s distinction, in the Guide of the Perplexed 2:48, between three types of causes: natural, voluntary and accidental. Polqar enumerates these types while emphasizing the second:

My first argument is as follows: It has been demonstrated in the true sciences that actions come about through various causes, some natural, others voluntary, and others accidental. Some natural actions cannot be prevented from acting, such as the eclipses of the two orbs at the proper time. This sort of action is truly necessitated by virtue of the First Cause, and it is proper for it to be known before it comes into existence. Other natural actions can be prevented by acting, either through natural, voluntary or accidental hindrances. The growth of produce, for example, can be prevented by a grasshopper, which is a natural hindrance. Or [it can be prevented] by an accidental or voluntary [hindrance], such as a man's willingly burning his field, [which is a voluntary hindrance], or by the ground being flooded, which is an accidental hindrance. One should not believe that matters of this sort can be known by any knower before they exist. For if that were the case, then the possibility of a natural hindrance coming into existence would itself not exist, the will would be compelled and necessitated, and hence it would not be will, as I mentioned above, and the accident would not be accident and would not be affected by what simply happens to occur.411

In this unclear paragraph, Polqar first maintains that all actions are the result of natural, voluntary, or accidental causes.412 He then states that natural actions are divided into two groups. The first group consists of actions that occur necessarily, which is to say that no hindrance can prevent them from happening. An eclipse, for instance, necessarily occurs at a specific time due to natural causes. The astronomer knows these causes and can predict the exact time of the eclipse’s

411 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 133-134. 412 One might argue that according to Polqar all actions (peʿalim) are natural in a sense that they occur within the natural realm. These actions might have different causes; some have natural causes, some voluntary, and some accidental.

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occurrence. The eclipse cannot be prevented from happening, since its natural chain of causes results from the First Cause.413

The second group consists of actions that are possible. Due to their contingent nature, the actions in this group can be prevented by either natural, voluntary, or accidental hindrances.414 Polqar illustrates his view as to what counts as a natural, voluntary, or accidental hindrance with the example of a natural process: the growth of grain. When a hungry grasshopper, taking part in different natural processes, eats the grain, this constitutes a hindrance (monea‘). The grasshopper’s predisposition to eat the grain reflects its nature. As a consequence of the grasshopper’s nature, the grain will not “fulfill” its natural end – to grow. An accidental hindrance, for example, would be an accumulation of water on the ground that prevents the seeds from germinating. Here the water’s nature is not to prevent the grain from growing – quite the contrary. Yet it still prevents the natural process from taking place. And finally, a voluntary event would be man’s act of burning the grain. It is clear that the third type is fundamentally different from the previous two, insofar as it hinges on man’s choice. A man can choose whether to light a fire or not.415 Polqar’s intention here is to exclude God’s knowledge of future events resulting from all three hindrances.

413 Polqar would probably include the necessity for humans to digest or to breathe in the category of natural events that occur necessarily. Even though they are endowed with free choice, humans cannot decide not to breathe or to stop digesting, for these actions are part of the nourishing faculty of the soul. Natural actions that occur necessarily must be performed within a natural framework, unlike voluntary actions, which are subjugated, according to Polqar, to the intellectual part of the soul. Cf. Maimonides, Eight Chapters, chapter one. 414 Here we have the distinction between three different types of hindrances within the broader category of natural actions. 415 One can read the text as if Polqar meant to say that the three hindrances are related only to the grasshopper. If so, the natural cause can be a wind bringing the grasshopper near the grain. An accidental cause can be the grasshopper’s arrival to the grain by accident rather than by natural causes. And finally, the voluntary cause ascribes will to the grasshopper so that the grasshopper’s will brought it to come near the grain and eat it.

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Temporal Existence vs. Eternal Existence

According to Abner, Polqar did not distinguish between temporal existence and eternal existence. This means that while Abner accepted that eternal possibility exists, “the possibility that it has by another does not exist, since it is necessitated by an external agent who is a part a natural chain that ends with the First Cause.”416

The scholar’s reply to this accusation, which is presented by the astrologer in ‘Ezer ha-Dat, is clearly a response to Abner’s main argument in Minḥat Qenaot. This reply is divided into two parts:417

Your audience should not be seduced by the truth of the eternal possibility mentioned by the philosophers. For it is not what you think it is. Eternal possibility exists only in prime matter, i.e., that which cannot resist, on its own, the activity of the agent and the giver of forms. Other things that come about by chance or by accident cannot possess eternal possibility, neither by virtue of itself nor by virtue of anything else. For in order to determine the actualization of one of the alternatives there must be agreement [between the agent and recipient], and an appropriate nature existing in each of the two causes, the efficient and the recipient, i.e., the material. The possibility existing in the recipient lasts as long as the alternative is not actualized. At the time when the alternative becomes actual, and the matter receives its form, all of the possibility will be removed and will become absent, even by virtue of itself, and the thing will become necessary. For were it to resist the intention of the agent, and were it to incline to the other alternative, the thing would not be generated and originated.418

According to Polqar, Abner failed to understand the nature of eternal possibility: eternal possibility exists only in prime matter and cannot be applied to any other thing. I shall use Polqar’s example to illustrate his argument:

As for what you said concerning the eternal possibility that exists in prime matter, and also in the body of wax, which you used as an illustration -- well, I am

416 In chapter four of Minḥat Qenaot, Abner refers to “the possibility that it has by another” also as “the external temporal possibility.” In both cases he refers to possibility within a temporal framework, unlike eternal possibility, which is non temporal. 417 In the first part of his argument, the scholar explains the nature of God’s knowledge and the way it differs from human knowledge. I chose to begin with the second part of the scholar’s reply so that it would correspond to the order of arguments posed by Abner. The analysis of the first part of the scholar’s argument is discussed below. 418 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 137-138.

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astounded how you found any comparison between this and the possibility that exists in the alteration of mundane accidents. For at the time when the form resides in prime matter, or the shape in the wax, they will possess the possibility of receiving other forms and shapes that are the contraries of the ones. But with respect to the accidents occurring in the world -- when one of the contraries exists, it will prevent and remove the existence of the other contrary. For example, when a man rides a boat to his destination, then as long as he is riding it he will possess the possibility of drowning in the ocean or of continuing and arriving safely. Only once he has arrived at his destination will he be calm; the possibility of drowning will be removed and absent. Now this is so because prime matter, and wax, cannot resist the activity of the agent and not receive the form and shape it wants. Only the man who, as I mentioned, reached his destination, was able to resist the agent of drowning at sea as long as he was traveling, and for this reason he arrived safely. For the agent could not drown and kill him. Similarly with the rest of the recipients.419

Polqar clearly distinguishes between the possibility of imprinting a form in the body of the wax and the possibility that “exists in the alteration of mundane accident” (efsharut ha-nimẓa be-shinnuy miqrei ha-ʿolam). For Abner, there are two possibilities with respect to the wax, the eternal possibility and “the possibility that it has by another.” When we consider the eternal possibility, the body of the wax is capable of receiving each possible form; if we consider “the possibility that it has by another,” the wax is imprinted by an external agent in a necessary manner, at a specific time and with a specific form. On the other hand, Polqar rejects the distinction between eternal possibility and “the possibility that it has by another”; he justifies his rejection by maintaining that the example of the body of the wax reflects a static state. As long as the body of the wax takes on the form X, it is impossible for it to take on a form Y. The second example Polqar uses to emphasize his point – when a man rides a boat to his destination – reflects a dynamic state.

When a man rides a boat, he is in constant danger of drowning. In Polqar’s view, this means that when a man rides a boat, the other possible event – that of drowning

419 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 138.

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– exists as long as he is in the ocean. Only when he gets to a safe harbor is the possibility of drowning annulled.

God’s knowledge vs. human knowledge

In light of his distinction between eternal possibility and temporal possibility,

Polqar supplements his critique of Abner’s argument that God, as the First Cause, necessarily knows both universals and particulars. Let us recall the first part of the scholar’s first argument, where Polqar presents his solution to the tension between

God’s foreknowledge and the existence of possible and accidental things in the world:

You have certainly destroyed the pleasantness of God's perfect providence, and the magnificence of His knowledge when you say that God does not know things as they are in themselves, because He knows the possible as long as it is possible in some substratum where that possible will rest necessarily. You also predicate of Him knowledge that falls under [the category of] time, which is disallowed by all knowledgeable people, as I have mentioned to you. All this is [established] through conclusive proofs that do not need even to be mentioned here, since they are so well known. Don't think that the deceptive words of Abu Hamid [a al- Ghazālī] the Ishmaelite will save you from this mistake. He thought to attribute an inferior knowledge to the creator when he said that God’s manner of apprehension is through knowing that when something is such, then something else follows from it, and in no other manner (does He know things.) But actually His knowledge is not like our knowledge in any way, and the term “knowledge” is only said of both equivocally. Nay, I am the one who exalts and elevates the powerful rank of His wisdom, and I establish His individual providence for every individual existent. For, as is well known, since His Eternal knowledge is the cause of the existence of everything, then the time at which He knows something, and not beforehand, will be the very time at which the thing's existence will be necessitated and compelled. For if it were necessitated and compelled beforehand, then that necessity and compulsion would only proceed from something other than Him. Therefore a thing must be completely possible before it exists or comes into existence, either because some of its causes exist and others do not, or because there exist hindrances that prevent some causes from drawing near to the others, if they exist.420

420 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 135-136.

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In the first part of his response, the scholar rejects the view, held by al-Ghazālī and his followers, that God necessarily knows possible things; for al-Ghazālī, God knows both universals and particulars due to His eternal knowledge of all causes of reality. However, claims Polqar, if God necessarily knows everything, it would follow that He knows not only eternal things, eternal possibility included, but also knows possible things, which occur in temporal existence. Polqar contends that by claiming that God knows things in temporal possibility, al-Ghazālī, followed by

Abner, negates God’s eternal knowledge of things as they are in themselves.

True philosophers, concludes Polqar, are the only people who safeguard God’s perfect knowledge and perfect wisdom. God cannot know something before it occurs, because if He knew it, He would have needed external causes (both near and remote) to make it happen. In this context, what does Polqar mean by claiming that God’s eternal knowledge is “the cause of the existence of everything?” In what way, then, does he reject al-Ghazālī’s and Abner’s view according to which God’s knowledge is the cause of everything?

In order to answer these questions, we need to go back and examine the first part of the Scholar’s argument, where Polqar distinguishes between God’s knowledge and human knowledge on the one hand, and the limitation of human understanding on the other:

If we were to ascribe to God (may He be blessed) the knowledge that you thought, i.e., knowledge of something before it exists, we would err greatly, and we would deny the principle of God's knowledge, which is His essence. For since this knowledge is the cause of a thing's being compelled to exist, it will be compelled to exist at the instant He knows it. If we say that He knew it before its existence in time, it would be as if we were to say that the thing exists before the thing exists. Or we could deny God's knowledge (Blessed be He) and say that It is not the cause of that thing's coming into existence. I already mentioned that this does not imply any alterations in Him, or in His knowledge, which is His essence. But it does imply alterations in us, for there is no likeness between our knowledge and His knowledge, nor is there any relation between the two. Therefore we have no right at all to inquire whether God knows things before

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they come about. Rabbi Moses ben Maimon, of blessed memory, wrote at length about this in his well-known book.421 What we can say is that God desires (ḥafeẓ) possibility as long as [the possible] exists, and then He produces things from this absolute potentiality and possibility when he so desires. Just as he knows and desires that the nature of stone be to descend, and of fire to ascend, so too he desires that possible things, before they are compelled to exist via God's knowing them, be completely and absolutely possible. He also desires that accidental things be completely by accident.422

Polqar, in this discussion, argues that even God cannot know X before X exists.

He explains that if God knows X, God necessarily causes X, for His knowledge of

X is the cause of X’s existence. Therefore, to be known by God would necessarily mean to exist. In other words, God cannot know things that come about in the future.

Moreover, Polqar continues, if God’s knowledge of X necessarily causes X to exist, then we cannot argue that God knows X before X exists because that would mean that X would have to exist before it exists, since God’s knowledge causes it to exist. I will clarify Polqar’s idea with an example: can God know one’s un- conceived child? If yes, as al-Ghazālī and Abner argue, then it means that the un- conceived child already exists through God’s knowledge. On the other hand,

Polqar argues that God cannot know the un-conceived child for two reasons: (1) if

God knows the un-conceived child, His knowledge would necessitate the child’s existence – knowing something necessitates its existence. God’s knowledge of the un-conceived child would necessarily cause the physical existence of the un- conceived child in the world. And (2) if we presuppose that God knows the un-

421 The Guide, 3:20-21. 422 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 136-137. Polqar repeats this idea earlier (p. 135) when he writes: “Now His intention and will are completed through these accidental things that come about haphazardly. For He is the One who wills and desires the arrival of some things suddenly and by chance, just as He desires the arrival of some things by nature and others by volition. Whoever seeks an explanation of this desire is like one who seeks an explanation of the downward motion of the earth and the upward motion of fire.”

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conceived child before the child comes to be in time, it is as if we are saying that the un-conceived child exists before it actually exists.

Polqar follows Maimonides in arguing that God’s knowledge and human knowledge have nothing in common.423 Therefore, we cannot even ask whether or not God knows things before they come to be. After establishing that the knowledge of God essentially differs from that of humans, Polqar seems to contradict his own view that God’s knowledge does not change. According to the passage quoted above, God “desires (ḥafeẓ) possibility as long as [the possible] exists, and then He produces things from this absolute potentiality and possibility when he so desires (yaḥfoẓ).” How can Polqar claim that God “desires” something, when desiring something implies an external need? Here, I argue, Polqar uses the word “desire” to indicate the laws of nature;424 natural, accidental, and voluntary causes are within the natural laws. Just as there are natural causes in the natural order, similarly, claims Polqar, the natural order contains possibility. Thus, asking why possibility exists is similar to asking why a stone falls down when we throw it

– it falls because that is its nature.

Accidental events

Abner’s second argument(s), that according to Polqar accidental events occur without being known by any knower and without intention or end, is not addressed directly by Polqar. In light of my analysis of Polqar’s first argument, I would maintain that Abner’s representation of Polqar’s view in Minḥat Qenaot is misleading. According to Polqar, accidental events have an intention and an end;

423 The Guide, 3:20: “Between our knowledge and His knowledge there is nothing in common, as there is nothing in common between our essence and His essence.” 424 See discussion on God’s will on pp. 149-160.

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however, hindrances might prevent them from seeking their end. Returning to the example of accidently dropping my pen: having a spasm would count as a natural hindrance; someone placing the table at a specific angle and a specific distance would be an accidental hindrance; and someone deliberately pushing me, as a result of which I drop the pen, would be a voluntary hindrance.425

Accidental events, by Polqar’s definition, may or may not occur. They are one type of possible event, and as Polqar has already demonstrated, possible actions cannot be known by any knower before they come to pass.

Second Argument: man’s intellectual soul – free from determinism

So far, we have explained Polqar’s conception of natural events that are necessary (for example, the eclipse) and events that result from three types of causes – natural, accidental, and voluntary. However, we have not yet clarified how man’s will is completely free from predetermination. If God’s knowledge is eternal, unchangable, and complete, how can Polqar argue that men are free to choose their actions? In his second argument, Polqar argues that men do have the liberty of choosing, but restricts this ability to intellectuals. If a man does not actualize his intellect, he is no different from an animal which acts on instinct alone:426

The second argument is that it has been demonstrated that the existence of something separate and distinct from matter is more excellent and worthy than something material. Similarly, acts that are separate from matter are greater and more powerful than material acts. Also, the regression of the series of all agents terminates at a thing that is utterly separated from matter; so that we truly say

425 Polqar follows Aristotle’s definition of the accidental: “the accidental, then, is what occurs, but not always nor of necessity, nor for the most part.” See Metaphysics, XI:8, 1065a1-2. 426 Not all animal actions determined; indeed they are often accidental. However, the discussion here is about the voluntary things, namely, man’s free will. Polqar, although would agree that some of the animal actions may be accidental; he would reject the idea that animals possess free will.

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that [only] separate things are truly agents, and material things are acted upon. Now man's rational soul, from which desire and volition are produced, is separate from matter, and is analogous to the supernal agents. Hence it is impossible for a material body to act upon it [man’s rational soul]. This is what the rabbis meant when they said (Sab. 156a): “Israel are not subject to fate” and “The gentiles are intimidated, but Israel is not intimidated,” as I explained above.427 Hence those who maintain that the qualities of the soul proceed from, and are decreed by, the heavenly bodies simply err and are mistaken.428

Israel, Polqar’s term for intellectuals, refers to those people who use their intellectual faculty, the non-material part of their soul, in order to know God.

According to Polqar, most human beings are like animals, enslaved to their desires, and consequently lack freedom of choice; controlled by their desires, they differ from the intellectuals who live in accordance with the intellectual soul and who therefore can choose proper actions. Paradoxically, however, if the intellectuals constantly follow their rational faculty, they are, similar to the separate intellects, prevented from choosing how to act because they are directed constantly by the rational force. It would then follow that living according to the intellect does not guarantee unconditional freedom. The intellectuals are still subject to reason. That said, it seems likely that Polqar would agree that following the intellect necessarily leads one to make rational decisions in one’s life, which is the proper way to live.

Now let us recall Abner’s allegation in chapter two of Minḥat Qenaot that

Polqar “not only wished to do away with astral decrees, but also he wished to do away with God's knowledge and His decrees concerning all accidental and possible things.” Polqar certainly did away with astral decrees, insofar as he demonstrated that the heavenly bodies do not influence man’s intellectual soul, because heavenly bodies are material bodies, and material bodies cannot act upon man’s non- material soul. Abner’s second argument, that the separate intellects can act upon

427 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 124. 428 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 139-140.

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one’s soul even if we accept that the heavenly bodies do not, is presented in slightly different form by the astrologer:

The activities of the rational soul are not generated from it by virtue of its being rational. Therefore, I can reply to my critic that a material agent may act upon it from the aspect of its not being rational, a fortiori that an immaterial agent may act upon it. Moreover, the human soul is not entirely separate from matter, but only the acquired intellect, which is the agent intellect. Its activity takes place only through the intermediary of the intellect that is acted upon, which Aristotle considered to be subject to generation and destruction.429

Interestingly, in his objection the astrologer includes activities (pe‘ulot ha-

Nefesh) which clearly belong to the practical part of the soul in the intellectual part of the soul (ha-nefesh ha-hoga). In his view, one’s activities, since they do not derive from the intellectual soul, are subject to being changed by a material agent, here the heavenly bodies. These activities are even more subject to an immaterial agent – the separate intellect. The human soul, argues the astrologer, is not entirely separate from matter, and therefore the claim that heavenly bodies can act upon it stands.

Polqar, well aware of Abner’s objection in Minḥat Qenaot, replies to the astrologer as follows:

From what you have written in your astrology, the activity of wisdom in the human soul is decreed from the heavens. Now will you say of this activity that it is not generated and originated in the soul by virtue of the latter’s being rational? As for your remark in your answer that “a fortiori an immaterial agent can act upon it,”

429 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 140. This argument by the astrologer seems to be borrowed from the fourth chapter of Abner’s Minḥat Qenaot: “What Isaac said in his third argument, that the rational soul is separate and apart in such a way that the celestial bodies cannot at all act upon it, is another error. This is so because the human soul's actions do not arise from it in so far as it is rational and intellectual. Consequently his opponent can say that a material agent may act on the soul from the aspect of its not being rational, all the more so that an agent separate from matter can act upon it. Furthermore, not all of the human soul is separate, as he thought, but solely the acquired intellect, which is itself the agent intellect, according to Averroes. This intellect does not effect anything without the mediation of the passive intellect, as Aristotle says, which is generated and destroyed. And so wrote Rabbi Moses the Egyptian in the seventy-sixth chapter of the first book of the Guide, that the rational power is potential in the body, and neither separated nor apart from it.”

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well you know that our only disagreement concerns the activity of the heavenly bodies, and not the activities of the separate entities.430

Polqar clearly considers Abner’s objection to be valid, and therefore he narrows his argument. Here he makes it clear that he rejects only the idea that the heavenly bodies, or any other material body, act upon one’s intellectual soul. In contrast, the

Active Intellect acts upon one’s intellectual soul; indeed, separate intellects are the only entities that can act upon man’s intellectual soul. The Active Intellect acts upon one’s soul according to one’s level of study of the theoretical sciences: the more one occupies oneself with studying the sciences, the more the Active Intellect acts upon one’s intellectual soul. Therefore, Polqar argues, his argument rejecting astrology is valid.

Third Argument: man’s will vs. natural will

In the last argument, the scholar clarifies to the astrologer the main differences between the human will and the will of “natural things”:

The third argument: It is known that natural things behave in one manner without the possibility of their being able to change their function and to act in a manner opposite to what they are accustomed. Soul’s actions [mifʿalei ha- nafshyyim] are those that occasionally effect one thing and occasionally effect its opposite, according to their choice. If the acts of the soul were necessitated and compelled and decreed, then they would be similar to natural acts, with absolutely no difference between them. If this were so, then how could the soul be considered to be the perfection of a natural body? For then the perfection of a body would only be through its natural deeds, which would abolish the existence of every soul. All these are sophistries, calumnies, and follies.431

Polqar argues that depriving humans of free choice, as Abner suggests, would entail that natural things and things endowed with souls would operate in a similar manner. This would mean that human actions would not only be similar to natural

430 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 140. 431 Ibid, p. 140.

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actions, such as the occurrence of the eclipse or the rising of the sun, but that human actions would be also essentially similar to the actions of the separate intellects. In other words, there would be no difference between the actions of perfect beings, such as the separate intellects, and the actions of imperfect beings, such as humans, who are comprised of material and non-material parts.

Moreover, if man’s “voluntary” actions were determined in the same way as the actions of natural things, there would be no essential difference between man’s perfect part, his soul, and his imperfect part, his body; for if all actions of man’s soul, bodily and intellectual, happened necessarily, such a distinction would no longer exist.

In sum, Polqar’s discussion of God’s foreknowledge and man’s free will is a direct reply to the arguments raised by Abner in Minḥat Qenaot. Polqar clearly modified his arguments so as to make them more efficient against Abner’s objections. Polqar concludes the debate between the scholar, presumably presenting his own view, and the astrologer, presumably representing Abner, as follows: first, possible and accidental things are not predestined and cannot be known by any knower (including God) before they happen. Second, man’s intellectual soul is free from determinism. Finally, natural things are essentially different from psychic things; the former act in a necessary way, while the latter act in a contingent manner.

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3.3 Divine Providence: Universal vs. Individual

The previous discussions – about God’s will, and His foreknowledge, and man’s free will – will assist in clarifying Polqar’s view regarding divine providence.432 Establishing that God’s will does not function in the world in a personal manner and that God does not know possible things allows Polqar’s unique view concerning divine providence to emerge.

As with several other topics, Polqar presents two seemingly contradictory opinions: on the one hand, God governs universals, and on the other, in addition to governing universals, God also governs particulars. Polqar refers to divine providence in several different sections of ‘Ezer ha-Dat; in each of these cases, he discusses a different topic and then connects it with divine providence. Interestingly, he advocates for universal providence, which represents Aristotle’s position, in only one paragraph.

The majority of his discussions, however, defend what he viewed as the true nature of particular providence.

This chapter consists of four sections. In the first section I will briefly summarize Maimonides’ discussion of providence, since his presentation of the different theories concerning divine providence forms the basis of Polqar’s own view.

In the second section I will present the traditionalists’ allegations against the philosophers, as Polqar understands these allegations; in particular, the traditionalists accuse the philosophers of rejecting the belief that God knows particulars. In the third section I will discuss Polqar’s view of particular providence. As we shall see, Polqar rejects the traditionalist view that God knows particulars, and he articulates a unique

432 There are two main theories regarding divine providence: individual and universal. Individual providence, according to the traditional view, is directly connected to God as the creator of the world. As the creator, God governs and controls all that occurs in the world, including governing particulars; this entails rewarding those who observe God’s commandments and punishing those who disobey them. Universal Providence is the view that God, in addition to governing the celestial spheres, also governs the species of the sublunar world.

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approach to the matter. This approach, in my opinion, represents Polqar’s genuine view. Finally, in the last section I will return to the passage in which Polqar appears to advocate for universal providence, and I will show how this apparently inconsistent passage is in accordance with Polqar’s unique solution to the question of divine providence. The analysis of all passages further shows how Polqar’s view solves the problem of evil in the world (ẓadik ve-ra‘ lo, rasha‘ ve-tov lo): why do pious people suffer and the wicked prosper?

Divine Providence in Maimonides’ Thought433

In the Guide 3:17 Maimonides lists five different views on divine providence.

The first of these, which according to Maimonides represents the view of Epicurus, denies altogether that providence exists. Everything that occurs in the world occurs randomly. Maimonides rejects this view, for “Aristotle has demonstrated that this opinion is inadmissible; that it cannot be true that all things should have been generated by chance; and that, on the contrary, there is someone who orders and governs them.”434

The second view is attributed to Aristotle by Maimonides. According to this view, God governs species in addition to governing the spheres; this means that while human beings are governed as a species, individuals are subjects to random chance.

While Maimonides accepts Aristotle’s view that the world possesses a natural order, he rejects his view that all things in the sublunar world are governed in the same manner. For example, Maimonides maintains that according to the Aristotelian view

433 Cf. David B. Burrell, “Maimonides, Aquinas and Gersonides on Providence and Evil,” pp. 335-351; Gad Freudenthal, “Maimonides’ Stance on Astrology in Context: Cosmology, Physics, Medicine, and Providence,” pp. 77-90; Moshe Halbertal, Maimonides, Life and Though, pp. 335-341; Steven Nadler, “Theodicy and Providence,” pp. 619-658; Dov Schwartz, “The Debate over the Maimonidean Theory of Providence in Thirteenth-Century Jewish Philosophy,” pp. 185-196. 434 The Guide, 3:17.

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there is no difference “between the fall of the leaf and the fall of the stone, on the one hand, or the drowning of the excellent and superior men that were on board a ship, on the other.”

The third view is that of the Ash‘arites, one of the most popular movements of

Kalām. According to their view, everything in this world is the result of divine will, including human actions; the fall of a leaf, for example, does not result from the wind blowing, rather each and every leaf which falls from a tree when a wind is blowing falls by virtue of the divine will. Therefore, in a reverse mirror image to Epicurus, the

Ash‘arites maintain that nothing occurs in the world by chance, but rather that everything is predetermined by divine will. Maimonides rejects the Ash‘arite view because it denies the existence of man’s free will, which is the basis of the Mosaic commandments. He also rejects this view because the Ash‘arites abolish the idea of nature.

The fourth opinion is that of the Mu‘atazilites, another popular movement of

Kalām. According to this movement, divine will controls everything that occurs in the world, except for human actions. Humans are free to choose their actions, and consequently are subject to divine reward and punishment. The Mu‘atazilites further argue that divine justice applies to both humans and animals: “Even when a flea and a louse are killed, it is necessary that they have a compensation for them from God.”435

Maimonides rejects this opinion because, in his view, divine justice does not apply to animals. Moreover, while according to Maimonides not every event is directly connected with the divine will – he cites accidental actions for example –, the

Mu‘atazilites maintain that divine will is directly connected to all actions, except for human ones.

435 Ibid.

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The fifth opinion is that of the Torah, which Maimonides adopts. According to this view, the world operates according to a natural order. The only exception is human actions, which are the result of human choices to act in a certain way. Unlike

Aristotle, Maimonides argues that, to use Halbertal’s words, “perfected human beings are subject to providence as individuals.”436 Providence in this sense is understood as the closeness between the Active Intellect and a person’s intellect. Maimonides differentiates between the Torah’s opinion as it is popularly understood, and the

Torah as he understands it. The traditional Jew maintains that God knows and governs particulars in a personal manner. For Maimonides, on the other hand, as he states explicitly in the Guide 3:18, the extent to which man is governed depends on his intellectual development.

Polqar accepts Maimonides’ interpretation of the Torah’s position on divine providence. However, before we analyze Polqar’s approach, let us first present

Polqar’s account of the traditionalists’ accusation against the philosophers. The following paragraph is from treatise two, where the main dialogue between a young philosopher and an old traditionalist is followed by what Polqar describes as an obscure voice, presenting an anti-philosophical viewpoint:

[And the voice said]: (and) every philosopher continues to make things worse…by arguing that God does not know particulars and [that] He does not attain the (created) particulars, only [the] species, because He knows the particulars in their universal manner.437

436 Moshe Halbertal, Maimonides, Life and Thought, p. 338. 437 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 100. Polqar expresses the same objection through the astrologer: “It appears from your words that you do not wish only to do away with astral decrees, but also to abolish God's knowledge and His decrees concerning all accidental and possible things. Thus you will also remove his special providence from all things.” See ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 134. Cf. Abner of Burgos, Minḥat Qenaot, chapter three.

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These objections, spoken by an enigmatic voice, represent al-Ghazālī’s allegations against the philosophers.438 The voice thus stands in for an opponent, perhaps Abner, who accuses Polqar of denying that God knows particulars. In this way, the voice serves as a link between al-Ghazālī and the Jewish traditionalist.

We now turn to the four passages which set forth Polqar’s view with regard to particular providence. The first is from chapter five of treatise one, where Polqar describes the difficult situation of his nation – by “nation,” here, he means his fellow philosophers:

When you have examined and contemplated these matters [the behavior of the ignorant people], you will not find it difficult to explain the plethora of troubles and misfortunes that beset the virtuous nation (umat ha-nikhbadim), as well as the paucity of their members. For that nation’s beliefs are wondrous, sacred, remarkable, and distinct from those of the other nations, since they are derived and follow from reason, which is remote and despised by them… Hence, most of the ignorant will avoid them and despise the commandments. This is indeed a clear proof of the truth of their belief, because fools only choose folly… Now throughout history the boors have mocked and cursed the thinkers (maskilim) for failing to accept their vanities…There are so few of these people [the people of “Israel” i.e. the intellectuals] that they are scarcely worth being called a nation. Do not be astonished at this. For the thinkers are never more than a small number at any time, as our blessed sages have said, “One in a generation.”439 Still, because of the great amount of pity that God shows us, and the individual providence within us, He will not abandon or deliver us into the hands of our enemies, though we live amidst those who seek our harm…440

Polqar is deliberately vague in this passage; on the face the virtuous nation

(umat ha-nikhbadim) seems to refer to the Jewish people as a whole. In truth, however, he refers to the Jewish intellectuals. These Jewish intellectuals (maskilim) suffer from two different exiles: one, as Jews who do not reside in the land of Israel,

438 A few lines before this quotation, the voice refers to al-Ghazālī as the “Ishmaelite pietist (ha-ḥasid ha-Ishmaʿeli) who composed the Incoherence of the Philosophers, [wrote] his proper and beautiful things, he will reveal the [philosophers’] sources of error, and he refuted the evil of their thought.” See ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 100. 439 Polqar repeats this idea in treatise four, p. 163. 440 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 53-54.

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and the second, insofar as the philosophers “deviate” not only from the surrounding gentiles, but also from the members of their own community. In this striking paragraph, Polqar describes the natural progress of the intellectuals’ path to attaining knowledge. Since external conditions can be challenging when one wishes to study, nevertheless these intellectuals still manage to dedicate time and effort to apprehending intelligibles. When these intellectuals apprehend intelligibles, the particular providence is “within” them, keeping them away from harm and pain.

The second paragraph in which Polqar advocates for particular providence relates to his discussion of God’s will:441

And how can one believe that God is ignorant of particulars…He [God], according to His eternal will, has created them [the creatures], imprinting (be- hatbiʿo) forms in their matter. He is [the one] who faces (poneh) [them] and governs all, particulars and universals. And by the means of this his knowledge of them is according to their true essence (ʿal derekh mahut amitatam), he emanates their existence, and their continuous existence is assured. Then, He will know every thing, [whether] necessary, possible, and even the impossible whose existence is unreasonable (asher meẓiuto lo ikhshar). [He knows] each one, according to the nature of its existence, in accordance with His thought about it. And this [is the reason] why He faces [them] and governs each and every one of the created beings.442

Divine providence is described in general terms in this passage: the Active

Intellect443 “emanates their [created beings] existence,” namely, the existence of all created beings, universals and particulars. Divine providence governs universals, which is a view that was already accepted by both Aristotle and Maimonides; and divine providence is also expressed with regard to governing particulars by God’s knowledge of them, which is “according to their true essence.”

441 Cf. discussion on God’s will on pp. 149-160. 442 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 102. 443 It is clear that Polqar does not refer here to God, for the Active Intellect governs the sublunar world, ensuring that “their continuous existence is assured.” True, God, as the First Cause, is the remote cause for their existence; however the continuous overflow is from the Active Intellect.

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The third and the fourth passages are from treatise three and present more or less the same argument. In the third, Polqar connects divine providence with God’s knowledge.444 In his view, God knows only necessary events (natural events); possible events cannot by their nature be known to anyone, including God:

Do not answer me with your common arguments, as when you “show” those who examine matters superficially that I deny God’s providence over accidental particulars. Heaven forbid that I think thus! Only the intellectuals understand that I am the one who sustains and upholds the special providence of the Creator in the manner appropriate for Him to watch over each of the existents: over natural and voluntary things in the manner of intention and supervision until the last existent, and over accidental things in the manner of haphazardly and suddenly. Now just as His providence is true of natural and voluntary things, since their aim is to bring forth familiar things, so, too, it will be true of accidental things, so that they come about haphazardly.445

In the fourth passage, Polqar elaborates on the connection between God’s knowledge and divine providence:

The scholar: You have certainly destroyed the pleasantness of God's perfect providence, and the magnificence of His knowledge when you say that God does not know things as they are in themselves, because He knows the possible as long as it is possible in some substratum where that possible will rest necessarily. You also predicate of Him knowledge that falls under time, which is disallowed by all knowledgeable people, as I have mentioned to you. All this is [established] through conclusive proofs that do not need even to be mentioned here, since they are so well-known. Don't think that the deceiving words of Abu Hamid [al-Ghazālī] the Ishmaelite will save you from this mistake. He thought to attribute an inferior knowledge when he said, “[God’s] manner of apprehension is through knowing that when something is such, then something else follows from it, and in no other manner (does He know things.)” But actually His knowledge is not like our knowledge in any way, and the term “knowledge” is only said of both equivocally. Nay, I am the one who exalts and elevates the powerful rank of His wisdom, and I establish His special providence for every individual existent. For, as is well-known, since His Eternal knowledge is the cause of the existence of everything, then the time at which He knows something, and not beforehand, will be the very time at which the thing's existence will be necessitated and compelled. For if it were necessitated and compelled

444 See discussion above regarding God’s foreknowledge and man’s free will, pp. 445 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 130-131.

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beforehand, then that necessity and compulsion would only proceed from something other than Him.446

In these two paragraphs Polqar directly connects divine providence with God’s knowledge. The traditionalist, following al-Ghazālī’s view, argues that God knows both necessary things (natural events), and possible things (accidental and voluntary).

The scholar, in response to this allegation, accuses the traditionalist of undermining

God’s perfect knowledge: if possible things, by their nature, are not known to anyone, ascribing such knowledge to God means that He knows false things.

Only the philosophers who accept that possible things cannot be known to any knower, including God, truly defend the concept of divine providence. According to the philosophers, divine knowledge is eternal; therefore, only those who apprehend intelligibles, which are eternal, are “known” and governed by divine providence.

Polqar’s statement that only the philosophers “establish His special providence for every individual existent” demonstrates his and Maimonides’ view regarding particular providence precisely. Humans are the only creatures who theoretically can be governed in an individual manner; those few intellectuals who use their divine aspect are those who are governed in actuality by divine providence.

The only paragraph that appears to support universal providence is found in treatise one, where Polqar discusses man’s ultimate purpose:

Now when considered from his own viewpoint the divine man (who possesses complete felicity and true perfection) ought to live separate and apart, solitary, from the rest of men – for no one is like him or comparable to him. From the view point of the general divine providence (ha-hashgaḥa ha-Klalit ha-Elohit) of the human species, and with respect to his own trait of generosity and excessive goodness that continues unceasingly to overflow upon others, however, it is necessary that, like a shepherd over his flock, he dwell and be

446 Ibid, p. 135.

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immersed in their midst and bear their troubles so that he may govern them and rectify their ways, each one according to his rank and his potential…447

It would appear from this paragraph that Polqar accepts Aristotle’s position that only species are governed. Polqar adds that as an individual, the divine man would want to isolate himself from society in order to unite with the Active

Intellect as much as possible. However, two things prevent him from doing so: universal divine providence, and an intrinsic character trait – generosity.448

What does Polqar mean by “general divine providence”? In light of our analysis, we can conclude that in addition to accepting the Aristotelian view,

Polqar accords great importance to the intellectual, and most of all to the divine man. According to Polqar’s definition of particular providence, Moses, the only divine man so far, was the most “governed” individual, for he maximally conjoined with the Active Intellect. The “general divine providence of human species” allows for particular providence, which was exemplified in its most perfect manner in Moses.

In sum, the traditionalist and the philosopher, each according to his own method, come to different conclusions with regard to divine providence. The traditionalist argues that every action that occurs in the world is predestined and necessarily known to and governed by God. In contrast, Polqar, who rigorously defends the existence of man’s free will, rejects the idea of particular providence in the traditional sense. According to him, divine providence is individual, insofar as the individual is governed according to his level of understanding and contemplating the natural order. As long as he studies the theoretical sciences, he is

447 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 44. See discussion on man’s ultimate purpose, pp. 283-295. 448 I discuss this paragraph at length in the last chapter of this dissertation (pp. 290-292). For our purpose here, I will focus on the issue of divine universal providence.

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in a state of conjunction with the Active Intellect. During this conjunction, his body is not subject to random chance, and therefore he cannot be harmed.

Moreover, understanding how natural laws operate helps the scholar determine how to avoid danger and keep himself safe.

Understanding Polqar’s view of particular providence allows us to explain the problem of evil in the world (ẓadik ve-ra‘ lo, rasha‘ ve-tov lo):449

I say that the intention of the precepts of the Law is to direct us to walk in the paths of rectitude, and to guide our activities according to what is requisite for living. It is also to distance us from transgressions, so that we may be saved from harm and corruption. The righteous man is one who endeavors and makes an effort to perform the precepts, and who shuns and avoids transgressions; the wicked is the opposite. The righteous always enjoys good by virtue of his righteousness, and the wicked suffers evil by virtue of his wickedness. Let me provide you with a parable to which this may be likened. Two travelers who were walking on the road came upon a great river, which they were fearful of crossing. They found a man on the riverbank, and they asked him where they might cross it. He said to them, “Know that this river is too deep to ford. Make your way over there, and you will see a bridge across the river; you may pass over it in peace.” Now when one of them heard these words he crossed the river via the bridge, and he was safe. But the other man defied his instructions and waxing angry and confident (cf. Prov. 14:15) crossed the river in its midst, whereupon he sunk into its depths and died. Now it is known that the one who crosses over the bridge, heeding the words of the admonisher, is a righteous man and an intellectual who is saved by his rightness. But the angry and confident man who defies his admonition is a wicked man, who is destroyed in his wickedness. You see, I have revealed to you in a general way how one who performs precepts is rewarded, and how one who performs transgressions is punished, and how the one who performs precepts, knowingly or unknowingly, deserves to be rewarded for them since they constitute his good and his benefit. Likewise, the wicked deserves to be punished for his transgressions, for they are his evil and harm, as the Sage says, Can one tread upon hot coals and his feet not be burned? (Prov. 6:28) Now all this is evident and well-known in your writings, my adversary [Abner], that rewards follow the precepts, and punishments follow the transgressions, as the consequences follow the causes. Thus I have explained and demonstrated to you conclusively that a righteous man who suffers cannot exist, and a wicked man who prospers cannot exist, insofar as they walk in the ways of righteousness or wickedness.450

449 Cf. Abner of Burgos, Minḥat Qenaot, chapter 6; Maimonides, The Guide 3:16; Shalom Ẓadik, Dissertation, pp. 233-240; Thesis, pp. 110-113. 450 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 129-130.

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The traditionalist would understand this passage as follows: the commandments are the purpose of one’s life, therefore, those who observe the commandments are necessarily rewarded and those who forsake God’s commandments are necessarily punished.

The philosopher would understand Polqar’s argument as follows: the Mosaic commandments are indeed prerequisites for one to attain the ultimate goal – conjoining with the Active Intellect. The commandments, then, are means to an end rather than ends in themselves. The problem of evil in the world cannot be understood in the traditional way, for in reality the pious suffer and the wicked prosper. However, according to Polqar, the pious man, which is to say the intellectual, cannot come to harm as long as he is engaged in studying. For example, sailing a boat safely is very much dependent on the weather. A scientist who studies meteorology can make an intellectual decision based on scientific investigation. If bad weather is predicted, he will not travel. Studying meteorology and concluding that traveling is ill- advised reflects Polqar’s notion of particular providence. During the process of studying the situation and deciding not to travel, the scientist is governed as an individual.

Nevertheless, Polqar reminds us that both the pious and the wicked (the intellectual and the vulgar) are subject to accidental events which cannot be predicted. The intellectual can make assessments of risk, but since accidental events belong to the realm of the possible, they cannot be predicted. It would follow that as a bodily being, the intellectual is in a similar position as the wicked and can never be fully governed, because his bodily parts are subject to accidental events that could cause him harm.

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Moreover, since even intellectuals are human beings with bodily needs, it would follow that divine providence governs over these intellectuals only when they conjoin with the Active Intellect. Divine providence does not govern over them when they are occupied with their bodily needs.

Polqar’s example is particularly interesting. The two individuals who wish to cross the river ask for advice; one man accepts this advice and is saved, while the other rejects the advice and consequently is harmed. The advice offered here has nothing to do with the performance of ritual commandments; rather, it is a matter of common sense based on an analysis of the current situation in which the proper course of action is based on the analysis of the situation. Although the pious man is subjected to accidental things in the world, Polqar argues, he still operates at a higher level than the wicked man, for apprehending reality and learning how to act within it is undoubtedly preferable to not understanding reality at all and leaving all occurrences to chance.

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Chapter 4: The Concept of the World

4.1 Cosmos: Creation Ex Nihilo or Eternity of the World? between Religious

Tradition and Aristotle

The question of whether the world is created – ex nihilo or from preexistent matter – or eternal was of central interest to medieval philosophers and commentators.

Numerous attempts were made by scientists, philosophers, and theologians to explain creation. Positioning themselves with regard to this crucial issue was particularly significant for medieval thinkers of all religions, because it indicated their relation to one of the fundamental principles of their faith.

Polqar does not present his theory of the cosmos in extensive detail.451 He remarks that Averroes and Albalag have already examined this topic in depth, in their discussion of al-Ghazālī’s work. Indeed, in many of his works, al-Ghazālī criticized the philosophers with regard to three main ideas; according to him, the philosophers deny (1) that the world had a beginning in the past and that it was created in time, (2) that God knows particulars in addition to knowing universals, and (3) that after death, human souls return into bodies. Al-Ghazālī argues that the philosophers were not able to provide demonstrative proofs to support their arguments. In his Tahāfut al-tahāfut,

Averroes sought to refute the accusations against the philosophers that al-Ghazālī presented in his book Tahāfut al-falāsifa. Albalag, following Averroes, maintained that al-Ghazālī’s objections regarding the “unscientific” nature of philosophical arguments were invalid and, in fact, that they had succeeded in demonstrating the eternity of the world. Moreover, for Albalag, the philosophical doctrine of the eternity

451 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 101-102: “regarding your first question, which you misunderstood, I will tell you my words, let me instruct you, because God has awakened my spirit, and I have studied the fundamentals of religion. Indeed, It is better to maintain an eternal ongoing creation than to believe that [God] acted and then withdrew…[God] acted, acts, and will act below and above.”

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of the world was equivalent to perpetual creation, which was taught by both scripture and the Rabbis. Albalag titled his work Sefer Tiqqun ha-De‘ot; on the face of it, it aims to translate and discuss al-Ghazālī’s Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa. In fact, the book is an independent work comprised of Albalag’s radical views. The author frequently critiques thinkers whose philosophical views do not follow a rigorous philosophical methodology for being influenced by traditional views; among these thinkers, Albalag daringly includes Maimonides. Although Polqar offers his readers only conclusions drawn from Averroes and Albalag’s discussions, and although he does not add new arguments to support these conclusions, it is important to understand the views he advocated. Similarly to Albalag, Polqar favored Aristotle’s philosophy as explained by Averroes, with its affirmation of the eternity of the world – or, as Albalag and

Polqar refer to it, its affirmation of perpetual creation (ḥidush niẓḥi).

In order to explain the approach of the Jewish Averroist School, and in particular Albalag’s view, we must first discuss Maimonides’s view on the matter.

Indeed, the Jewish Averroists attempted in numerous cases to harmonize the thought of Averroes with that of Maimonides. In order to do so, whenever possible they interpreted Maimonides’s opinion so as to make it accord with Aristotelian philosophy as presented by Averroes. Here, Polqar follows Albalag’s radical philosophical approach in criticizing what he deems to be Maimonides’s equivocal voice regarding creation, and instead advocates Averroes’ Aristotelian theory, namely, the eternity of the world.

Maimonides, who was determined to reconcile Mosaic Law with scientific investigation, devoted a large portion of the Guide to discussing the question of creation. Yet despite this extensive discussion, both medieval thinkers and later commentators, up to the present day, have been unable to agree on Maimonides’

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genuine view – the traditional view according to which the world was created ex nihilo, or one of the Greek theories.452

This chapter’s aim is not to determine which of the scholarly opinions is more accurate, but rather to present Polqar’s interpretation of Maimonides in light of his own philosophy. The tendency of Polqar and his contemporaries – Joseph Ibn Caspi,

Moses Narboni, and Albalag – to embrace Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotelian philosophy illuminates the difference between their approach and that of Maimonides.

Unlike the ambiguous view of Maimonides, these Jewish thinkers suggested that

Genesis 1 be read as affirming Aristotle’s view of the eternity of world.

In this section I shall first present three alternative methods of reading

Maimonides’ view on the origin of the world. The fact that Maimonidean scholars have never agreed whether Maimonides held the traditional exoteric view, namely, creation ex nihilo, or an esoteric opinion, whether Platonic or Aristotelian, indicates one of two things: either he believed it was unsafe to reveal his true opinion – one of the Greek opinions – to the vulgar, so he may have favored one view, but felt it was not safe to disclose it; or he could not demonstratively prove either opinion, using scientific and philosophical means, and therefore presented the alternatives without decisively endorsing one.

Unlike Maimonides, whose philosophical loyalty to Aristotelian philosophy is questionable, Polqar and his contemporaries openly rejected the traditional approach by identifying its philosophical flaws. Instead, they sought to show that their view of perpetual creation could easily be harmonized with scriptural and rabbinic texts.

Debating Maimonides’s True Opinion

452 In the Guide, 2:13, Maimonides mentions Plato’s and Aristotle’s views. Plato claimed that the world was created by the demiurge from preexisting matter, whereas Aristotle and his followers argued that the world is eternal and therefore is not subject to generation and passing away.

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An analysis of Maimonides’s view regarding the origin of the world divides

Maimonidean scholars into four groups. The first group includes scholars who suggest ascribing to Maimonides its traditional view, according to which God created the world in time after the nonexistence.453 The second group consists of scholars who maintain that Maimonides remained loyal to Aristotle’s philosophy and that despite his apparently ambiguous attitude, he advocated de facto the theory of the eternity of the world.454 The third group includes scholars who maintain that Maimonides presented the two, or three, possibilities without committing himself to any particular view, because he found it impossible to provide demonstrative and conclusive proofs.455 The fourth group consists of scholars who assert that Maimonides adopted the Platonic view according to which the world was created from preexisting matter.456

Determining Maimonides’ view regarding the origin of the world depends to a large extent upon which texts one chooses to examine. While the Mishneh Torah,

453 Cf. Herbert Davidson, “Maimonides’ Secret Position on Creation,” pp. 16-40; William Dunphy, “Maimonides’ Not-so-secret Position on Creation,” pp. 151-172; Julius Guttmann, Philosophy of Judaism, pp. 165-169; Warren Z. Harvey, “A Third Approach to Maimonides’ Cosmogony- Prophetology Puzzle,” pp. 287-301; Lawrence Kaplan, “Maimonides On the Miraculous Element in Prophecy,” pp. 233-276; Sara Klein-Braslavy, “The Creation of the World and Maimonides’ Interpretation of Gen. i-v,” pp. 65-78; Barry Kogan, “The Problem of Creation in Late Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” pp. 159-173; H.A. Wolfson, “The Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic Theories of Creation on Halevi and Maimonides,” I, 234-239, 247-48. 454 Zev Harvey, “A Third Approach to Maimonides’ Cosmogony-Prophetology Puzzle,” pp. 287-301; J. Becker, “The Secret of the Guide of the Perplexed”; L. Berman, “Ibn Bajja and Maimonides” Dissertation, pp. 156-163; A. Nuriel, “The Question of a Created or Primordial World in the Philosophy of Maimonides,” pp. 372-378; H. Kreisel, “Maimonides on the Eternity of the World,” pp. 157-188; Roslyn Weiss, “Natural Order or Divine Will : Maimonides on Cosmology and Prophecy,” pp. 1-26; M. Halbertal, Maimonides, Life and Thought, pp. 202-208. 455 Lawrence Kaplan, “Maimonides on the Miraculous Element in Prophecy,” pp. 253; S. Sarah Klein- Braslavy, “The Creation of the World and Maimonides’ Interpretation of Gen. I-V,” pp. 65-78. 456 Herbert Davidson, “Maimonides’ Secret Position on Creation,” pp. 16-40. Roslyn Weiss, in her article “Natural Order or Divine Will: Maimonides on Cosmogony and Prophecy,” suggests asking whether Maimonides intended to present two or three opinions on both issues. Her conclusion, that Maimonides intended to present two opinions – Creation ex nihilo and eternity – is not directly related to Polqar’s reading of Maimonides’s discussion of Creation, and therefore will not be discussed here.

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Maimonides’ main legal work, unequivocally endorses an Aristotelian view, that of the eternity of the world, the Guide of the Perplexed has an unclear approach: on the one hand, Maimonides espouses Aristotelian physics, and on the other, he makes a great effort to establish the belief in creation as one of the fundamental principles of

Judaism. Maimonides’ main idea in the Guide is that neither creation nor the eternity of the world can be proven demonstratively; however, according to the Guide, since neither of these theories can be proven, we should accept creation on the basis of the prophetic message.

In 2:13 of the Guide, Maimonides presents three opinions on the subject of the creation or eternal existence of the universe:

The opinion…of all who believe [Kul man i‘tiqad] in the Law of Moses… [which is] that the world as a whole…after absolute pure nonexistence (ba‘ad al-‘adam al-maḥḍ al-mutlaq- aḥar ha-he‘der ha-gamur ve- hamuḥlat)…through [God’s] will and volition, [was] brought into existence out of nothing… The… opinion of… [Plato]… [which is]… that there exists a certain matter that is eternal as the deity is eternal. …It [does not have] the same rank in what exists as He…but… He is the cause of its existence; and… He creates in it whatever He wishes. Thus He sometimes forms out of it a heaven and an earth, and sometimes He forms out of it something else…The… opinion… of Aristotle, his followers, and the commentators of his books… He thinks that this being as a whole, such as it is has never ceased to be and will never do so; that the permanent thing not subject to generation and passing-away, namely, the heaven, likewise does not cease to be; …and that thing subject to generation and passing-away, namely, that which is beneath the sphere of the moon, does not cease to be.457 [emphases were added]

457 The Guide, 2:13. Maimonidean scholars often link this chapter with 2:32 of the Guide, the chapter where Maimonides discusses the phenomenon of prophecy. Such a connection stems from Maimonides’s own words: “The opinions of people concerning prophecy are like their opinions concerning the eternity of the world or its Creation in time.” The scholars who connect these two chapters assume that Maimonides thus guides his careful readers to perceive more than just a numerical identity between the two sets of opinions. Kaplan, for example, argues that the thematic correspondence should be read in the following way: the first view of creation, that of those who believe in the Law of Moses, namely, who believe in creation after absolute pure nonexistence, corresponds to the third opinion concerning prophecy, namely, that prophecy is the outcome of a natural process, but that God can miraculously intervene in the natural process and prevent one from prophesying; the second opinion, the Platonic view according to which the world was created from preexisting matter, corresponds to the first opinion concerning prophecy, that God can turn whoever He wishes into a prophet. The third opinion about creation, the Aristotelian view according to which the world is eternal and has no beginning and no end, corresponds to the philosophers’ opinion according to which prophecy is a natural process. Kaplan follows Kafiḥ and argues that Maimonides

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The second and the third opinions are ascribed to Plato and Aristotle respectively. The Platonic view is that heaven and earth were created in time out of eternal matter; conversely, Aristotle and the Aristotelians believed in the eternity a parte ante of heaven and earth. The first opinion, that of the Mosaic Law, holds that heaven and earth were created after absolute nonexistence.458 In this view, all who follow the Mosaic Law, whether the philosophers or the vulgar, share a similar opinion regarding the origin of the world. One might wonder whether Maimonides genuinely thought that common men and philosophers could hold the same opinion, especially since he warned his readers at the beginning of the Guide:459

Thus we have mentioned there [in our legal compilations] that the Account of the Beginning is identical with natural science, and the Account of the Chariot with divine science. For my purpose is that the truths be glimpsed and then again be concealed, so as not to oppose that divine purpose which one cannot possibly oppose and which has concealed from the vulgar among the people those truths especially requisite for His apprehension… know that with regard defends the idea that the world follows a fixed natural order; miracles are possible in this fixed natural order. Davidson argues that Maimonides secretly holds to the Platonic view concerning the question of the origin of the cosmos. According to him, the first opinion concerning creation (ex nihilo) corresponds to the first opinion – the vulgar – concerning prophecy (God can turn anyone into a prophet). The Platonic view (creation from preexisting matter) corresponds to the third opinion – that of those who follow the Mosaic Law – that prophecy is a natural process but can miraculously be prevented by God. And finally, the Aristotelian view (the eternity of the world) corresponds to the “philosophers’” view on prophecy, according to which prophecy is the result of a natural process. Finally, Harvey argues that Maimonides remained an Aristotelian on this question. According to Harvey, the first opinion on creation (“the opinion…of all who believe in the Mosaic Law”) corresponds to the first opinion regarding prophecy (“the vulgar”); the second opinion on creation (the Platonic) corresponds to the philosophers’; and the third opinion on creation, that of Aristotle, corresponds the opinion of Mosaic law (Prophecy is a natural process, but God can miraculously prevent it). 458 Maimonides uses two different terms to describe creation – “after absolute pure nonexistence” (ba‘ad al-‘adam al-maḥḍ al-mutlaq) and “not from a thing” (la min shay). Harvey notes that creation “after absolute pure nonexistence” is not identical with creation ex nihilo, for creation ex nihilo is compatible with the theory of the eternity of time while creation “after absolute pure nonexistence” is incompatible with it. Creation “after absolute pure nonexistence” implies that there had been nonexistence prior to creation. See: W.Z. Harvey, “A Third Approach to Maimonides’ Cosmogony- Prophetology Puzzle,” p. 289, n. 9. S. Klein-Braslavy, Maimonides' Interpretation of the Story of Creation, pp. 81-90. 459 Note that in the Guide 1:35 Maimonides insists that the vulgar should be taught that God is one and incorporeal. Although both the philosopher and the vulgar say they believe in one and incorporeal God, their level of understanding the statement “God is one and incorporeal” fundamentally differs.

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to natural matters as well it is impossible to give a clear exposition when teaching some of their principles as they are. For you know the saying of [the Sages]… The Account of the Beginning ought not to be taught in the presence of two men.460

If we consider Maimonides’s statement of purpose as described above to be genuine, then we must reject the idea that philosophers and the vulgar hold the same opinion with regard to The Account of the Beginning. Moreover, if we examine

Maimonides’s legal works – the Mishneh Torah461 and the Commentary on the

Mishnah462 – as he suggests, we will find that the opinion of “all who believe [Kul man i‘tiqad] in the Law of Moses” refers to the vulgar alone, not to the philosophers who, in fact, follow the Aristotelian line of thought.

Halbertal, for example, argues that Maimonides’ genuine opinion is revealed in his halakhic work, the Mishneh Torah. In Halbertal’s view, Maimonides deliberately formulated the first halakha in the Book of Knowledge with two sentences that on the surface appear to be contradictory:

The basic principle of all basic principles and the pillar of all sciences is to know that there is a First Being who brought every existing thing into being. All existing things, whether celestial, terrestrial, or belonging to an intermediate class, exist only through His true existence.463

The first sentence states that God actively brought every existing thing into being. In the second sentence it is only implied that God, as the First Cause, of the existence of all [existing] things. In order to make the connection between these two these two part of the halakha Maimonides, in the next two halakhot, unpacks and elaborates on the second part of the first halakha:

If it could be supposed that He did not exist, it would follow that nothing else could possibly exist. If, however, it were supposed that all other beings were

460 The Guide, Introduction to the first part, pp. 6-7 461 Mishneh Torah, Laws Concerning the Foundations of the Torah, 1:1-7. 462 Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Hagigah, chapter 2. 463 Mishneh Torah, Laws Concerning the Foundations of the Torah, 1:1.

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non-existent He alone would still exist. Their non-existence would not involve His non-existence. For all beings are in need of Him; but He, blessed be He, is not in need of them nor of any one of them.464

To establish the relationship between God and the world, Maimonides suggests performing a thought experiment. In this experiment, we are asked to imagine that

God does not exist. According to Maimonides, in such a case nothing else would exist, for God is the cause of all existing things, and all created things are dependent on Him. However, it is completely possible for us to imagine that God exists without the world or any other created thing. Halbertal correctly argues that these two halakhot echo Avicenna’s distinction between a Necessary Existent and possible existents. God is the only Necessary Existent and does not need anything in order to exist. All other things, on the other hand, are contingent, in the sense that their existence depends on the existence of God.

Halbertal goes on to argue that Maimonides deliberately links the theory of the eternity of the world with the proof for God’s existence:

This being is the God of the Universe, the Lord of all the Earth. And He it is, who controls the Sphere (of the Universe) with a power that is without end or limit with a power that is never intermitted. For the Sphere is always revolving; and it is impossible for it to revolve without someone making it revolve.465

The perpetual motion of the sphere demonstrates the existence of an unmoved mover, God. According to Halbertal, the fact that Maimonides chose to use the theory of the eternity of the world to prove the existence of God shows that Maimonides, at the time he wrote the Mishneh Torah, held the Aristotelian view.466 One could add to

Halbertal’s argument that Maimonides in Mishneh Torah 1:7 argues that God’s unity

464 Mishneh Torah, Laws Concerning the Foundations of the Torah, 1:2-3. 465 Ibid, 1:5. 466 Moshe Halbertal, Maimonides, Life and Thought, p. 206. In his analysis, Halbertal does not discuss the Guide 1:71.

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and incorporeality can be proven only if we accept the eternity of the world.467 We should also mention at this point that Albalag refers to the same halakha (Laws

Concerning the Foundations of the Torah 1:5), wondering what prevented

Maimonides from admitting the theory of perpetual creation and why instead he presented such a vague attitude in the Mishneh Torah:

This, the opinion of perpetual creation, is an opinion concerning which the Torah and wisdom are in agreement. I wish I could know why Maimonides (ha-rav ha-moreh) did not reveal his opinion on this matter, but rather speaks [in a way of] cunning. Sometimes he implies and testifies that this is his belief and he bases his proofs upon it, as he did in The Book of Knowledge when he wants to explain that the power of the Creator is unlimited [as] he explained it on the basis of the perpetual motion of the sphere, as he states, the power of God does not have an end or a limit, for the sphere moves continuously. And sometimes he [Maimonides] replies to the philosophers with false intellectual arguments, and he strives to contradict their opinion by [using] syllogism; and [he] says that the creation of the world is one of the Torah’s principles that cannot be denied. And I reply to him in the name of the philosophers that as he spoke [in the Guide namely, that creation of the world is one of the principles of the Torah] indeed it is so. However, [this principle refers only to the] adequate [concept of] creation, not to the inadequate one. And the philosophers have no doubt that [the conception of] creation which begins from a particular moment in time is inadequate [while the idea of creation] which has no beginning and end is a perfect one.468

According to Albalag, then, there was no reason why Maimonides should not have adopted the theory of perpetual creation in the Guide. Defending this position, in

Albalag’s view, not only does not contradict any of the fundamental principles of

Judaism, but on the contrary, reveals perpetual creation as the fundamental principle.

According to Albalag, this is obviously Maimonides’ view. However he –

Maimonides – had reasons to publicallyy refute the philosophers’ arguments in favor of the eternity of the world and to insist that creation ex nihilo is one of the Jewish

467 In this passage (1:7) Maimonides argues that since God’s power is infinite (because the sphere moves continuously), it follows that He is not corporeal. And since God is not a body, if follows that He is simple being that cannot be divided and therefore, He is one. 468 Tiqqun Deʿot ha-Philosophim, chapter 30 (pp.50-51). Note that Halbertal refers to Laws Concerning the Foundations of the Torah 1:5 while Albalag refers to 1:7 (which provides a stronger argument). Because the sphere moves perpetually, it follows that God’s power is proven through the concept of the eternity of the world, and not creation in time.

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faith’s fundamental principles. Albalag enumerates three reasons for defending the theory of perpetual creation, even though the Torah concealed this truth from the vulgar, while also explaining why Maimonides could not use them. First, Maimonides wants to identify the plain sense of the Torah regarding creation with the philosophical truth. Albalag, on the contrary, introduces his view of “two levels of truth” – separating philosophical truth, which is demonstrated by the intellect, from the truth of the plain meaning of the Torah regarding creation – the low level of truth

– which is used to educate the vulgar. Second, the Guide, according to Albalag, was addressed to the vulgar (ha-hamon), a strange assertion since Maimonides explicitly says that the Guide is not to be read by the vulgar. Albalag’s Tiqqun Deʿot ha-

Philosophim, on the other hand, is a strictly philosophical book, based on human knowledge rather than on faith (derekh yediʿa enoshit lo ʿal derekh emunah). Third, in

Maimonides’ time the Aristotelian view of the eternity of the world was considered heretical. In Albalag’s time, however, the vulgar people identify the view that the world was eternal with that of Epicurus that it came about by chance.469 However, if they would have been exposed to the Aristotelian view, that of perpetual creation, they would have not consider it to be heretical.

Unlike Albalag, who, as we have just seen, criticizes Maimonides’ ambiguous manner of writing, Halbertal justifies Maimonides’ cautious approach, remarking that had he been open in his espousal of eternity, the members of his community might have viewed him as a heretic. Writing on two levels serves Maimonides’s purpose perfectly: “one who sees the creation of the world as proof of God’s existence understands God to be a sovereign personality possessed of will, while one who bases

469 Albalag distinguishes between the Epicurean view, according to which the world is eternal without having a cause, and the view taught by Averroes – perpetual creation with God as its non-temporal cause.

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the proof on the enduring movement of the sphere and the eternity of the world understands the divinity as a being from whose very existence the entire world follows.”470

Cosmogony within the Jewish Averroist School

Maimonides’s equivocal voice with regard to the question of Cosmogony/

Cosmology is interpreted unequivocally along Aristotelian lines by the Jewish

Averroist School, mainly by Isaac Albalag, who is then followed by Polqar. The challenge facing the Jewish Averroists, to use Feldman’s words, was “either to reject

Maimonides in favor of Averroes or to read Maimonides as secretly teaching the doctrines of Averroes.”471

Therefore, if we wish to understand Polqar’s view about the Cosmos, we ought first to examine the sources that influenced him, particularly Albalag’s reading of

Averroes and his – Albalag’s – attempt to show that Maimonides in fact agreed with

Averroes’ approach. However, in Albalag’s opinion, Maimonides thought it was dangerous to reveal his true opinion on creation, for the vulgar could perceive these truths as heretical; in this reading, the multitude was better off believing in a simple notion of creation. Albalag, in a more radical way, openly and continuously advocates the theory of “two levels of truth”: the truth of the Torah, in its simple meaning, and the truth of philosophy. These are two modes of teaching used for different audiences:

The Torah aims at the happiness of the vulgar and at keeping them far from evil and [seeks] to teach them the truth, as far as their spirit is capable of [grasping], for their lack of knowledge…prevents them from understanding the truth of the intelligibles… as they are, [and they understand them] with material attributes … [This case] is similar to a blind person who cannot understand the essence of a color or to a deaf person [who cannot understand the] essence of a sound

470 Moshe Halbertal, Maimonides, Life and Thought, p. 207. 471 Seymour Feldman, An Averroist Solution to Maimonidean Perplexity, p. 19.

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because [they are] lacking the means, so it is impossible for them [the vulgar] to intellectualize the essence of the intelligibles because they are lacking the means, which is the intellect…However, philosophy’s purpose is not the teaching of the vulgar and not their happiness, but the happiness of the perfect [individuals]. And [this purpose] depends on the knowledge of the true existence and of each thing as it is.472 [emphases were added]

Committed to philosophical investigation, Albalag argues that one can only achieve true happiness through the study of philosophy. Philosophical inquiry leads the wise man to know the true essence of reality. On the other hand, although it contains philosophical truths, the purpose of the Torah is primarily to keep political and ethical order among the multitude, which does not have the ability to understand the true essence of reality. Indeed, in Albalag’s view, the vulgar have a deficient rational faculty and are in constant need of their imaginative faculty. Albalag draws an analogy between the vulgar and a blind person to suggest that the vulgar cannot understand the true essence of things because they are lacking the proper tool – reason. In their deficiency they resemble a blind man who lacks sight and therefore cannot understand the essence of color. The masses lack the means to understand the essence of reality. Therefore, the Torah uses physical descriptions and attributes in order to construct a simplified version of the truth (or at least, some of it) that is accessible to the vulgar. In Albalag’s view, the Account of Creation effectively illustrates the two levels of understanding: the vulgar can understand only the idea of creation ex nihilo, because they cannot imagine an infinite action. In contrast, the philosophers are able to understand and to provide demonstrative proofs for the

Aristotelian theory. In Albalag’s view, then, the Torah could not openly introduce an idea that would be difficult for the vulgar to grasp. Instead, the Torah painted a picture that the vulgar could understand in accordance with their limited capacity,

472 Tiqqun Deʿot ha-Philosophim, Introduction, pp. 2-3.

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while the philosophers, for their part, would understand the esoteric conception of creation. The Torah, then, teaches The truth esoterically and something that is not genuinely true exoterically, in this case, creation ex nihilo.

Albalag continues to argue in favor of the theory of “two levels of truth,” asserting that the Torah contains both types of doctrines – philosophical and prophetic. Both present true message, however, understanding them and being able to pass them on to others are two different matters:

It is known that expounding the truth had some utility for the vulgar, or if this truth would bring about the realization of the aim [the material felicity] designed for them, the Torah would not have hidden it and would not have held the benefit from those entitled to it. Besides, there is no true philosophical thesis which the Torah has not mentioned by some allusion in a manner that would arouse the attention of the wise, while the ignorant do not notice it. Moreover, the Torah even alludes to the prophetic doctrines, which are above syllogistic reasoning and natural speculation. The mysteries of the Torah are thus of two kinds: philosophical doctrines and prophetic doctrines.473

By virtue of its divine source, the Torah contains true principles that can be truly comprehended only by philosophers. Later on, Albalag maintains that philosophical knowledge can be taught to anyone with intellectual capacity, unlike prophetic messages which can only be understood by prophets.

Albalag’s rigorous approach in favor of philosophical investigation leads him to openly advocate the Aristotelian view on the question of creation, notwithstanding that he does not refer to it as “eternity of the world” but as perpetual creation (ḥidush niẓḥi). He supports his theory of perpetual creation with philosophical arguments and rabbinic and biblical prooftexts as he understands them.474 Interestingly enough, although Albalag’s project is to defend Averroes’ Aristotelian philosophy, he does not merely seek to prove his theory of perpetual creation from a philosophical point of

473 Ibid, pp. 3-4. 474 Ibid, chapter 30.

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view. As we shall see, similarly to Averroes, who did not wish to contradict verses from the Quran, Albalag and Polqar make an effort to convince traditional Jews and biblical commentators that the key biblical verses regarding creation actually refer to perpetual creation.

Philosophical Arguments supporting Perpetual Creation

Albalag begins his discussion of Creation by referring to al-Ghazālī’s two notions of agency: “natural agent” and “voluntary agent.”475 In doing so, Albalag follows Averroes’ argument that neither natural agent nor voluntary agent can be applied to God:

…For we observe in the empirical world two kinds of agents, one which performs exclusively one thing and this essentially, for instance warmth which causes heat and coldness which causes cold; and this kind is called by the philosophers natural agents. The second kind of agents are those that perform a certain act at one time and its opposite at another; these, acting only out of knowledge and deliberation, are called by the philosophers voluntary and selective agents. But the First Agent cannot be described as having either of these two actions, in so far as these are ascribed to transitory things by the philosophers. For he who chooses and wills lacks the thing which he wills, and God cannot lack anything He wills. And he who chooses makes a choice for himself of the better of two things, but God is in no need of a better condition. Further, when the willer has reached his object, his will ceases and, generally speaking, will is a passive quality and a change, but God is exempt from passivity and change. God is still farther distant from natural action, for the act of the natural thing is a necessity in its substance, but is not a necessity in the substance of the willer, and belongs to its entelechy.476

A natural agent, according to Averroes, can perform only one thing, while a voluntary agent can act in either. We cannot identify God as a natural agent for if we claim that He performs one thing we imply that there is a necessity in His substance.

God cannot act as a voluntary agent either, for acting as a voluntary agent, by

475 Cf. Tiqqun Deʿot ha-Philosophim, chapter 30. See also chapter 23. 476 Averroes, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, third discussion ¶ 148-149 (English translation, p. 88). Tiqqun Deʿot ha-Philosophim, Chapters 23; 30.

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definition, requires a cause external to God that as a consequence would cause Him to act. Moreover, acting voluntarily implies that after the willer achieves his object he no longer wills it. This transition indicates a change in God, something Averroes,

Albalag, and Polqar are not willing to accept.

If God is neither a natural agent nor a voluntary agent, what kind of agent is He?

And consequently, what is the relationship between God – the divine agent – and the world, and how can we understand the existence of the world within the context of a third type of agency?

Averroes does not address these questions. After having defined natural agent and voluntary agent and having shown that neither can apply to God, Averroes does not define a third type of agency that can apply to God. Instead, he ascribes to God the attributes of will, choice, power, and wisdom in the following way:

He [God] is necessarily endowed with will and choice in their highest form, since the insufficiency which is proper to the empirical willer does not pertain to Him. And these are the very words of Aristotle in one of his metaphysical treatises: We were asked how God could bring forth the world out of nothing, and convert it into something out of nothing, and our answer is: the Agent must be such that His capacity must be proportionate to His power and His power proportionate to His will and His will proportionate to His wisdom. And if some of His powers were weaker than others, there would be no difference between His powers and ours, and imperfection would attach to Him as to us – a very blasphemous theory. But in the opposite case each of these powers is the outmost perfection. When He wills He has the power, and when He has the power He has the capacity and all this with the greatest wisdom. And He exists, making what He wants out of nothing. And this is only astonishing through this imperfection which is in us. And Aristotle said also: everything that is in this world is only set together through the power which is in it from God; if this power did not exist in the things, they could not last the twinkling of an eye.477 [emphases were added]

According to Averroes, since there is an essential difference between God and human beings, we must conclude that that there is unity of choice, capacity, will, power, and wisdom in God. These attributes exist in God in a perfect manner, while

477 Averroes, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, third discussion ¶151-152 (English translation, p. 90).

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they exist in human beings in an imperfect form. Otherwise, the difference between

God and humans would be effaced. Moreover, because human beings cannot fully grasp the true meaning of the unity of choice, will, power, and wisdom in God, they ascribe human attributes to God. God, concludes Averroes, is the sole cause of the existence of the world, and the existence of all created things necessarily depends on

God’s will, power, choice, and wisdom.

Albalag accepts Averroes’ distinction between human attributes and the attributes we ascribe to God. However, he feels that the problem of divine agency has not been fully resolved. In what way is the divine agent different from a natural or voluntary agent? The fact that there is a complete unity in God’s attributes does not mean that God cannot be perceived as a natural agent who can act only in one way; also, it does not mean that God cannot act as a voluntary agent who perpetually acts in accordance with His wisdom. So, in order to justify the third type of agency – divine agency – Albalag maintains that since the human attribute of choosing is essentially different from God’s choosing, we must conclude that God always chooses the best.

In theory, God could choose to do something that is not the best, however, he never chooses to do so. God’s actions are constant. In other words, God combines the two kinds of agency: on the one hand, He is a voluntary agent and can, theoretically, choose to act in a certain way rather than another, and, on the other hand, He acts as a natural agent by always choosing the best action.478

Biblical and Rabbinic Justification of Perpetual Creation

Albalag uses numerous examples from biblical and rabbinic texts, but we need to cite only a few sources in order to make our point. The most important example for

478 Cf. the Guide, 3:25, where Maimonides argues that God necessarily acts in the best way.

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our purposes is from Shaḥrit, the Morning Prayer, which proclaims that God “renews

His Creation continuously every day.”479 Since Polqar quoted the same line from

Shaḥrit, he probably thought that this quotation most accurately captured the theory of perpetual creation. According to Albalag and Polqar, the Jewish Sages fully understood the nature of the relationship between God and the Universe. God did not act at a certain point in time to bring the world into existence, for this sort of action would imply, as we already indicated, change in God. God created, He creates, and

He will always create the world by virtue of being its cause. A perpetual action demands a perpetual effect. Inasmuch as God exists, He will be the perpetual cause of the world; Creation, in this sense, continuously occurs.

Albalag also attempts to show that biblical verses, in their esoteric meaning, imply perpetual creation as well. He quotes Genesis 2:8, “The Lord God planted a garden in Eden from eternity (mi-keddem).” According to Albalag, the Torah alludes here to two important issues. First, the garden is the world of generation and passing away (‘olam ha-havayya ve-hahefsed), and Eden represents the infinite heavens

“where infinite pleasure endures.”480 The river mentioned two verses later – “A river issues from Eden to water the garden and it then divides and becomes four branches”

– is in Albalag’s view “the general and natural form” that perpetually emanates from heaven to the sublunar world. The heavenly world continuously overflows from its general form into the world of the four elements (four branches). The second matter alluded to in this verse is the tight connection between heaven and earth; both exist eternally, with no beginning (mi-keddem). Albalag is aware that the simple and popular meaning of mi-keddem is in the east or from the east, however, according to

appears line the 12:2, Hagiga Tractate Talmud, Babylonian the In ".מחדש בכל יום תמיד מעשה בראשית" 479 without the word “continuously” (tamid). 480 Tiqqun Deʿot ha-Philosophim, chapter 30, p. 47.

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his theory of “two levels of truths,” this is precisely a case where the Torah only hints at the truth regarding cosmogony. The vulgar understand these verses as referring to an actual garden, Eden, and a river, both of which are located in the east. However, the philosophers understand the deep meaning of these verses and realize that in fact they imply perpetual creation, exactly in accordance with the philosophers’ understanding of cosmogony.

Interpreting “Be-re’shit”

Albalag also follows Averroes with respect to interpreting Scripture; of course, for Averroes the scripture is the Quran, while for Albalag it is the Hebrew Bible.

Averroes argues that the Quran does not explicitly teach Creation ex nihilo:

In addition to all this, these opinions about the world do not conform to the apparent sense of the Law. For if the apparent sense of the Law is scrutinized, it will become apparent from the verses comprising a communication about the coming into existence of the world that, in truth, its form is generated, whereas being itself and time extend continuously at both extremes – I mean, without interruption. That is because His statement (may He be exalted): And He is the one Who created the heavens and the earth in six days, and His throne was on the water [11:7], requires, in its apparent sense, an existence before this existence – namely, the throne and water – and a time before this time, I mean, the one joined to the form of this existence, which is the number of the movements of the heavenly sphere…Nor do the dialectical theologians conform to the apparent sense of the Law in what they say about the world, but interpret it. For it is not [said] in the Law that God was existing along with sheer nothingness; no text whatever to this effect is to be found. So how is it to be conceived that the dialectical theologians’ interpretation of these verses would meet with consensus when the apparent sense of the Law with respect to the existence of the world, which we have stated, has already been stated by a faction among the sages?481

Here, Averroes provocatively argues that the theologians, the supposed defenders of the faith, deviated from the apparent meaning of the text and forced their interpretation onto the verses of the Quran in maintaining that the sacred text teaches

481 Averroes, Faṣl al- maqāl, 21-22; Cf. the Guide 2:26.

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the theory of creation ex nihilo. It follows from Averroe’s analysis that, ironically enough, the philosophers’ view is closer to the apparent sense of the text than the view of the dialectical theologians. Moreover, since the theologians’ interpretation of a verse contradicts reason, the philosophers ought to reject this interpretation and explain this verse in accordance with the intellect.

Following Averroes’ line of thought, Albalag also interprets verses in accordance with the intellect, suggesting that the meaning of Be-re’shit is “with wisdom.” The bet, or the Arabic bi according to Albalag, is to be understood as

“with,” namely, “with” as implying instrument (bet ha-Keli). Be-re’shit as “with wisdom” supports the theory of perpetual creation, for it denies temporal creation, and instead proclaims that God’s wisdom (which is also His will, Power, and choice, in keeping with Averroes’ analysis) is the instrument of perpetual creation.

Albalag also offers another interpretation of Be-re’shit. Like Maimonides, he maintains that be-re’shit can be interpreted in two ways: in a temporal manner

(ibtada’; teḥilah) or in a causal sense (mabda’; ‘illah).482 The first option, temporal creation, is, according to Albalag, the opinion of the vulgar (hamon) who believe that the world was created at a certain time. The second interpretation is espoused by

Albalag; he emphasizes that his view not only does not contradict the biblical verse but actually accords with it.

As mentioned above, Polqar does not offer any of Albalag’s arguments. Yet, in the short passage in ‘Ezer ha-Dat where he mentions the theory of perpetual creation, he briefly summarizes Albalag’s three conclusions. First, he argues that perpetual creation is more intellectually plausible than the vulgar belief in creation ex nihilo.

482 The Guide 2:30. Albalag notes that the translator (i.e. Ibn Tibbon) translates Maimonides’ mabda’ as hatḥlah. Albalag prefers the word ‘illah, perhaps because he believed that Ibn Tibbon’s hatḥlah might be understood within a temporal context.

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Second, although unlike Albalag he does not spell this matter out, he very briefly and obliquely suggests that the line in the morning prayer “renews His Creation continuously every day” indicates that the sages perfectly understood the true relationship between God and the world. Third, basing his argument on Albalag’s interpretation of Be-re’shit, he argues that God is the creator of the world in the causal rather than in the temporal sense.

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4.2 Astrology: True Science or Invalid and Dangerous Doctrine?

During the medieval period, and in particular from the eleventh century until the fourteenth century, intellectuals -- Jews and non-Jews alike -- turned to astrology and its derivatives: practical magic, astral magic, predicting future events and the like. The astrologers’ basic assumption was that the stars are connected to the sublunar world and influence it. Those who defended the practice of astral magic advanced this idea, claiming that humans can use the stars’ emanations for their benefit by identifying specific constellations and applying special tools in order to actively “bring down”

[horadah] the desirable emanation (ruhanyuut).

Opposing the school of thought which perceived astrology as a scientific discipline to acquire knowledge and power were the Aristotelian thinkers who rejected astrology, both as a science and as religious practice. The main leader of this opposition, Maimonides, radically rejected any involvement with astrology and astrological practices, for two main reasons. First, from a theological perspective, he noted the historical connection between the practice of astrology and that of idolatry.

Second, from a philosophical point of view, he characterized astrology as a false science on two levels: physical and metaphysical.483 In Maimonides’s view, astrology could not be proven either empirically or demonstratively. And yet, we find that in spite of Maimonides’s repudiation of astrology, he had a positive view of the theory of specific occults (segullot).484 Though the Aristotelians could not prove the

483 Tzvi Langermann, “Maimonides’ Repudiation of Astrology,” pp. 128-129. 484 The Specific Properties (Segullot) is a doctrine according to which some substances possess hidden qualities that are not known through demonstration but only through experience. For example, the magnet’s properties are revealed only when we put it next to iron. And yet, we are unable to provide a rational explanation for the existence of this phenomenon. Excluding the Segullot from astral magic is essential. This is because while the Aristotelian philosophers rejected astrology as a true science, they could not ignore the results of the empirical phenomena such as the magnet or the utilization of certain herbs that cure a specific disease.

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soundness of Segullot in a demonstrative manner, they nevertheless could not reject its empirical validity.

In order to determine Polqar’s position with regard to astrology, I will first present Maimonides’ view on the subject, a view from which Polqar drew his own approach. Following the Maimonidean discussion, I will argue first that Polqar did not differentiate between the various types of astrological practice. In his view, all astrological practices must be rejected. Further, I will show that for Polqar astrology and its derivatives are scientifically groundless; therefore, astrology must be considered as a false discipline altogether. The comparison between Maimonides and

Polqar will serve as a basic building block in my argument, for I wish to show that

Polqar, in his discussion of astrology as in other sections of the text, holds a more radical view than his master.

Maimonides as Polqar’s Primary source

Maimonides’ uncompromising stance against astrology is presented throughout his work.485 In the Mishneh Torah he sets forth his general rejection of astrology:

These practices [astrology and sorcery] are all false and deceptive and were means employed by the ancient idolaters to deceive the people of various countries and induce them to become their followers... Whoever believes in these and similar things and, in his heart, holds them to be true and scientific while the Torah has forbidden them, is nothing but a fool, deficient in understanding, who belongs to the same class as women and children whose intellects are immature. People who possess wisdom, who are complete in knowledge, know by clear proofs that all these practices, which the Torah prohibited, have no scientific basis but are chimerical and inane; and that only those deficient in knowledge are attracted by these follies and, for their sake, abandon the ways of truth. The Torah, therefore, in forbidding all these follies,

485 For scholarship concerning Maimonides and astrology, see Gad Freudenthal, “Maimonides’ Stance on Astrology in Context: Cosmology, Physics, Medicine, and Providence,” pp. 77-90; Howard Kreisel, “Maimonides’s Approach to Astrology,” pp. 25- 32; Tzvi Langermann, “Maimonides’ Repudiation of Astrology,” pp. 123-158; Ralph Lerner, “Maimonides’ Letter on Astrology,” pp. 143-158; Sarah Pessin, “Maimonides’ Opposition to Astrology: Critical Survey and Neoplatonic Response,” pp. pp. 1-15; Shlomo Sela, “Queries on Astrology Sent from Southern France to Maimonides: Critical Edition of the Hebrew text, Translation, and Commentary,” pp. 89-190.

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exhorts us, “You shall be wholehearted with the Lord your God” (Deut. 18:13).486

In his Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides presents an extended scientific demonstration of the falsity of astrology:

You need to know that the perfected philosophers do not believe in talismans. They laugh at them and at the people who believe that they have an influence [on the physical]. And this explanation is long. I already said this because I know that most people, indeed possibly all, are fooled by this great deception, and by many other similar things, considering them to be true. They are not. [The deception is so great] that even the best of the pietists among our people of Torah, think that they are true but forbidden because the Torah forbids them. They do not realize that they are nonsensical false things that the Torah warned against, just as it warned us against [believing in] falsehoods. They honored the stars, attributing to them actions that were not theirs. They [the early idolaters] are the ones that established the laws [that apply to the use of the powers] of the stars, magic, incantations, the bringing down of spirits, talking with the stars, the sheidim, ghosts, prestidigitations of all types, consultation with the dead and many such similar matters that the True Torah 21 unsheathed its sword and destroyed. They are at the root of idolatry and its offshoots. The first deception was [the establishment of] astrology, whose basic premises we can disprove empirically and scientifically. For they [the astrologers] say that this specific star augurs good while the other augurs bad. They also say that a certain part of a sphere is compatible with a certain star and incompatible with another

486 Mishneh Torah, Laws of Idolatry and Ordinances of the Heathens, 11:6. 487 Ibid. 488 Ibid, 11:12.

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although they [the spheres] are one body without parts or compositions. These two propositions are the basis for astrology and if disproved—and they have been—all their details to the last, will fall apart.489

It has been scientifically established, Maimonides stresses, that each of the celestial spheres is a homogeneous and unchanging body.490 The astrologers, however, hold two main assumptions that contradict this truth: first, that some stars are beneficial and others maleficent;491 second, that for each star there is a “place” on the celestial sphere that corresponds to it. Given the scientific errors that underlie the fundamental premises of astrology, it follows that the soothsayers, diviners, and astrologers base their claims only on accidental connections that could lead to different results in the exact same situations.

From a theological and historical point of view, Maimonides’ concern was with what astrology might lead to, as he explains in the third section of the Guide, where he offers reasons for the commandments:

In order to keep people away from all magical practices, observing any of their [idolatrous] usages has been prohibited, even those attached to agriculture and pastoral activities and other activities of this kind. I mean all that is said to be useful, but is not required by speculation concerning nature, and takes its course, in their opinion, in accordance with occult properties (segullot). This is the meaning of its dictum: And ye shall not walk in the customs [huqqoth] of the nation(s), these being those that are called by [the Sages], may their memory be blessed, Amorites usages. For they are branches of magical practices, inasmuch as they are things not required by reasoning concerning nature and lead to magical practices that of necessity seek support in astrological notions. Accordingly the matter is turned into a glorification and a worship of the stars.492

For Maimonides, the Torah seeks “to keep people away from all magical practices,” even though those are considered beneficial. While such practices, as

489 Commentary on the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 4:7. 490 Tzvi Langermann, in his article “Maimonides’ Repudiation of Astrology” (p.132), offers one possible explanation for this argument’s omission from the Guide of the Perplexed. He argues that Maimonides, in the Guide, 2:19, discusses the nonuniformity of the sphere in order to explain the creation of the world by the Divine Will. 491 Polqar uses the same argument in ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 112. 492 The Guide, 3:37.

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Maimonides indicates later in the text, are not in themselves astrology or astral magic, they are “branches of magical practices.” Still, they are prohibited for theological reasons. Maimonides realized that occupying oneself with astrological practices would “lead to magical practices that of necessity seek support in astrological notions,” and eventually to idolatry, a risk he was not willing to take. The magical practices are therefore not intrinsically prohibited; however, insofar as they lean on astrological practices which could lead to idolatry and thereby damage one’s monotheistic belief, the Torah forbids magic as a matter of precaution. In this way it prevents the masses from focusing on the heavenly bodies and worshipping the stars, which would inexorably lead to their abandoning their knowledge and worship of the one true and incorporeal God. Furthermore, in another text Maimonides stresses that the preoccupation with astrology leads to devastating outcomes, because it is based on false knowledge. An example of such a consequence is the importance the Jewish sages gave to astrological studies and practices during the second Temple period.

In his Letter on Astrology, which was sent to the Jewish sages of Provence,

Maimonides associated the destruction of the Temple and the long painful exile with astrology;493 he writes:

This is why our kingdom was lost and our Temple was destroyed and why we were brought to this; for our fathers sinned and are no more because they found many books dealing with these themes of the stargazers, these things being the root of idolatry, as we have made clear in Law Concerning Idolatry. They erred and were drawn after them, imagining them to be glorious science and to be of great utility. They did not busy themselves with the art of war or with the conquest of lands, but imagined that those studies would help them. Therefore the prophets called them “fools and dolts” (Jer. 4:22). And truly fools they were,

493 In this treatise Maimonides refers to the first and the second temple. During the period of the first temple, the Israelites had their own country so they were occupied with astrology rather than expanding their territory. However, the destruction of the second temple brought about their exile— perhaps, therefore, Maimonides sees the duration of the first temple and the second temple as one period.

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“for they walked after confused things that do not profit” (I Samuel. 12:21 and Jer. 2:8).494

Occupying themselves with astrology caused “our fathers” to neglect learning war strategies and skills. They considered astrological practices to be demonstratively true, and as a consequence they believed that these practices infallible. Leaning on false “science,” asserts Maimonides, can only lead to false results; since astrological knowledge is not based on natural laws, it cannot help us predict outcomes.

Now, since the sages of Montpellier were inclined to accept astrology, it did not suffice for Maimonides simply to use rational arguments to undercut their belief; rather, he had to connect with them on an emotional level. He did this by evoking traumatic events from Jewish history, which, according to Maimonides, were a consequence of the Jewish people’s positive inclination toward astrology. The leaders of the Israelite nation relied on uncertain knowledge based on falsehoods, instead of analyzing the political situation in a rational manner. As a result, the nation found itself unable to protect itself militarily, much less to expand its territory; in a natural but inevitable manner, this would lead to the destruction of the temple and to the exile. Yet here too, as in the Guide, Maimonides was careful not to assert that astrology is an act of idolatry, but rather describes it as “the root of idolatry.” The

Torah does not forbid stargazing; it forbids worshipping intermediaries, such as stars, rather than God. Claiming that stargazing is “the root of idolatry” implies that it tends to lead to worshipping other gods, not that it is intrinsically wrong.

While Maimonides’ rejection of astrology is universally accepted among scholars, they disagree about the reason for this rejection. Here, I will discuss two

494 Letter on Astrology (Isadore Twersky’s translation, p. 465). For the letters from the sages of Provence to Maimonides, see Shlomo Sela, “Queries on Astrology Sent from Southern France to Maimonides: Critical Edition of the Hebrew text, Translation, and Commentary,” pp. 89-190. Davidson has argued that Maimonides did not write the whole letter but part of it. See H.A. Davidson, Moses Maimonides, The Man and His Work, pp. 494-501.

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main issues; Maimonides’ reasons for rejecting astrology, and the extent of

Maimonides’ disagreement with astrological practices.

Langermann argues that “Maimonides’ primary objection to astrology arises from the scientific falsehood of that art.”495 The critical point for Langermann is that according to Maimonides, there is a perfect identity between Jewish principles and philosophical investigation. Hence, the Torah prohibits astrological practices because they are false. The theological and historical explanations are significant but minor considerations compared to the scientific one.496

On the other hand, Kreisel497 maintains that the Torah chiefly forbids any engagement with astrological practices on religious grounds. Central to Judaism, in

Maimonides’ view, are two assertions: the existence of one incorporeal God, and the idea that man’s ultimate perfection is intellectual and his highest purpose to know

God scientifically, i.e., to understand creation. It follows that for Maimonides, the

Torah’s main objection against astrology is that it poses great danger to monotheism and to one’s ultimate purpose. Further, pursuing false science is a great obstacle to attaining intellectual perfection.

With regard to the extent of Maimonides’ repudiation of astrology, Kreisel argues that although Maimonides shares some of the astrologers’ views, such as the influence of the heavenly bodies on the sublunar realm, he fundamentally objects to astrology and its practices. For his part, Schwartz suggests that despite his extreme view that astrology is an imaginary phenomenon lacking scientific demonstration,

Maimonides accepted the Segullot.498 First, Maimonides defines Amorite Usages as:

495 Tzvi Langermann, Maimonides’ Repudiation of Astrology, p. 126. 496 As we shall see, the scientific explanation constitutes Polqar’ main argument. 497 Howard Kreisel, Maimonides’s Approach Toward Astrology, pp. 157-184 498 Dov Schwartz, Astrology and Magic in Medieval Jewish Thought, pp. 92-110; “Astral Magic and Specific Properties (Segullot) in Medieval Jewish Thought- Non-Aristotelian Science and Theology,” in Science in Medieval Jewish Cultures, pp. 306-307.

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…all that is said to be useful, but is not required by natural speculation, and takes its course, in their opinion, in accordance with occult properties. This is the meaning of its dictum: And ye shall not walk in the customs [ḥuqqoth] of the nation (Lev. 20:23), these being those that are called by [the Sages]…Amorite Usages. For they are branches of magical practices, inasmuch as they are things not required by natural speculation and lead to magical practices that of necessity seek support in astrological notions.499

Generally, Amorite Usages are actions whose results, while beneficial, are not supported by demonstrative/scientific explanations of their efficacy. Maimonides cites agriculture as an example of Amorite Usage: Jews are not allowed to imitate the nations’ ways of improving their crops, since these methods cannot be explained by the intellect. This is consistent with Maimonides’ general definition of magical practices as practices that lack scientific grounding. Thus, Maimonides states:

They [the Sages] say explicitly: All that pertains to medicine does not pertain to the Amorite usages. They mean by this that all that is required by natural speculation is permitted, whereas other practices are forbidden… or to do similar things that are not required by reasoning, it is forbidden as pertaining to Amorite usages.500

Maimonides affirms here that we are permitted to engage in practices only if we are able to explain these practices with demonstrative proofs. This appears to imply that even if a practice is shown to be medically useful, it cannot be permitted without a scientific argument to account for its effectiveness. However, Maimonides surprisingly goes on to say that there are certain medical practices that the Sages permitted even though they were not justified by natural speculation.

Maimonides differentiates between practices that pertain to medicine and other practices. According to him, the Amorite Usages do not include healing activities even if we are unable to justify them intellectually:

499 The Guide, 3:37 (p. 543). Pines translates “They mean by this that all that is required by speculation concerning nature is permitted,” while the Arabic text states clearly al-naẓar al-ṭabi‘i. Hence, I corrected the text to “natural speculation.” 500 The Guide, 3:37.

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You must not consider as a difficulty certain things that they have permitted, such as for instance the nail of one who is crucified and a fox’s tooth. For in those times these things were considered to derive from experience and accordingly pertained to medicine and entered into the same class as the hanging of a peony upon an epileptic…For it is allowed to use all remedies similar to these that experience has shown to be valid even if reasoning does not require them. For they pertain to medicine and their efficacy may be ranged together with the purgative action of aperient medicines.501

Maimonides’ position seems inconsistent. Perhaps his occupation as a physician led him to acknowledge therapeutic powers that are revealed through experience alone. Even though empirical outcomes can only be statistically efficient, they are considered “natural speculation.” Therefore, any medical practice which is proven empirically to be effective, even if it cannot be explained by natural speculation, is not judged as belonging to “the Amorite usages” and is permitted. Segullot similarly possessed intrinsic properties that were medicinally beneficial, even though medieval scientists were not able to identify them. These scientists could not rationally explain the phenomenon of a magnet attracting iron. The fact that they could not provide an explanation does not mean that such an explanation does not exist. Here, too, the assumption was that the magnet intrinsically possesses a specific property that causes the physical reaction.

The Maimonidean distinction between astrology and astrological practices on the one hand and Segullot on the other, as proposed by Schwartz, is essential for our discussion in two ways. First, Polqar was one of the few philosophers, if not the only one in the post-Maimonidean era, who maintained Maimonides’ uncompromising rejection of astrology. Second, Polqar dedicated the first section of treatise three of

‘Ezer ha-Dat to a critique of astrology. It seems that unlike Maimonides, Polqar did not differentiate between astrology and the use of Segullot. For Polqar, astrology and

501 The Guide, 3:37.

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everything associated with it, including the theory of the Segullot, were non-scientific theories, and consequently false, dangerous, and deserving of rejection.

Polqar’s Position – Taking Maimonides One Step Further502

Despite his repudiation of astrological practice, Maimonides acknowledged, as discussed above, the existence of undemonstrated remedies found in medical practices. Contrary to Maimonides, Polqar emphasized that both medical Segullot and astrology lack any philosophical grounding, and continued to reject any connection between scientific knowledge and astrology and its derivatives.503

Despite his radical rejection of astrology, or perhaps precisely because of it,

Polqar thought it was important to dedicate a discussion to the topic. The first section of treatise three of ‘Ezer ha-Dat504 is devoted to this theme, with the purpose of justifying his repudiation. This treatise consists of a dialogue between a scholar, who defends philosophical principles, and an astrologer, whose arguments overlap with those presented by Abner, who claims to possess prophetic abilities, mainly the ability to predict future events by “gazing at the stars.” Despite Polqar’s rejection of any astrological practice, he did not underestimate its appeal and effect on his

502 For Polqar’s approach on astrology see David Menachem, Thesis, pp. 27-43; Dov Schwarz, Astrology and Magic in the Medieval Period, pp. 262-266. 503 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 164-165. Here Polqar implies that there is a difference between medical Segullot, as discussed by Maimonides, and undemonstrated phenomena such as the magnet, which he also calls Segullot. He acknowledges that these phenomena occur in nature and that we cannot explain them; however, we must reject them, as the Torah commands us, because they lack scientific grounds. 504 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 107-124. Treatise three includes various topics, among which we find discussions of astrology as scientific discipline, prophecy, determinism, God’s knowledge, and man’s free will. Here I wish to establish Polqar’s repudiation of astrology as a scientific method, a view that is found mainly in the first section of treatise three.

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contemporaries Consequently, as this dialogue reveals, he took pains to acquire detailed knowledge of the astrologers’ practices, tools, and ceremonies.505

One might point to an essential difference between Polqar and Maimonides’ motives for studying astrology. For Maimonides, the main purpose of studying astrology is to explain the reason for the commandments: many commandments were given for the purpose of eradicating astrology, inasmuch as astrological practices might lead its adherents to idolatry, thereby jeopardizing their monotheistic belief in

God. For Polqar, however, engaging with astrological knowledge is necessary in order to prove its lack of philosophical and scientific value.

In order to understand Polqar’s rejection of astrology, we must clarify first how astrology is presented in ‘Ezer ha-Dat and how Polqar himself refers to astrological practices and grasps their meaning. In the beginning of the dialogue, Polqar’s astrologer portrays his “discipline” in a broad sense as the study of the relationship between the heavenly bodies and the sublunar world. In the astrologer’s understanding, the movements of the heavenly bodies and their positions influence all events occurring in the sublunar realm. Even the Aristotelian philosophers, claims the astrologer, could not deny the connection linking the moon and the sun to the sublunar world.506 Polqar’s general interpretation of this connection, however, must be understood within Aristotelian physics: there is a physical connection between the moon and the sun and the sublunar world, but it is bound to the natural order and cannot be changed by anyone.

505 And yet, the first section does not present astrological content, namely, the process of how astrological knowledge is achieved. As Levinger already showed in his edition (pp. 13-14 and p.107 note b), the first section of treatise three is missing one or several pages that contain the astrologer’s arguments in defense of astrology. However, despite the missing passages, we are able to reconstruct the astrologer’s assertions by analyzing the scholar’s responses to his opponent’s preaching. The scholar’s reply is depicted as a long monolog divided into several main claims, presumably presenting the scholar’s response to each of his opponent’s arguments. 506 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 109.

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As the most radical opponent of astrology after Maimonides, Polqar adopts

Maimonides’ two justifications for rejecting astrology, philosophical and theological.

The philosophical arguments clarify intellectually why one must reject astrology as a false discipline; however, Polqar observes that even if astrology is proven to be scientifically wrong, the vulgar will not be convinced. For that, theological arguments are needed. Indeed, these arguments have an educational goal – to strengthen the vulgar’s faith. The theological explanations do not focus on the danger that astrology will lead to the great sin of idolatry. The multitude, because of its imperfect understanding, is unable to appreciate the scientific objections to astrology. Thus,

Polqar, or more precisely the scholar who preaches the philosophical view, tackles his interlocutor in these two modes – the philosophical and the theological.

Refuting Astrology Using Philosophical Arguments

At the beginning of the dialogue, the astrologer presents the basic theory upon which astrology rests. In order to succeed in his practice, namely “reading” the planets’ motions and “predicting future events before their occurrence,”507 the astrologer uses an astronomical map, in the shape of a circle, that corresponds to the diurnal sphere. The sphere is divided at any given time into four equal quarters by horizontal and vertical lines. Each quarter contains three houses (battim), generating the twelve signs of the zodiac.508 The twelve houses constitute a “dwelling place” for the seven “wandering” stars509 that move in a circle around them.

507 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 106. 508 Ibid, p. 108. The first of these houses is called ‘Grower.’ This house denotes vitality, the commencement of activities, questions, thinking, reasoning, and the mind of the questioner. The second house denotes wealth, sustenance, and old age. The third is the house of brothers, relatives, sons-in-law, religions, laws, and journeys. The fourth, which is the second pillar, denotes fathers, lands, the end of things, and hidden and esoteric matters. The fifth denotes sons, emissaries, and gifts. The sixth denotes illnesses, slaves, and beasts. The seventh denotes women, sexual intercourse,

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Unfortunately, the manuscript is incomplete and we only know the astrologer’s arguments from the scholar’s reply. In his response to the astrologer’s arguments, the scholar presents seven different arguments, most of which he refutes with the philosophical method. During his presentation, he indicates that astrology must be examined in light of one (or more) of the three acceptable sources of knowledge510:

(1) intelligibles (muskalot) – can astrology be defended by using philosophical/scientific arguments?; (2) sensibles (murgashot) – can one demonstrate empirically the validity of astrology?; (3) acquired knowledge given by an authorized source (ish muḥzak ve-nodaʿ be-hasagat ha-Amitiyyot) – are there any reliable and authoritative figures who defend astrological practices? With reference to the second source, Polqar tackles astrology and idolatry historically. As the astrologer’s arguments are in the missing pages, as noted above, I shall address first the astrologer’s argument, as it is summarized by the scholar, before addressing his reply.

The astrologer’s first argument, which constitutes the most serious attempt to challenge the philosophers, points to the physical connection between the heavenly bodies and the sublunar realm. In this sense, the astrologer notes, everyone admits that the heat of the sun and the moisture of the moon are connected to the sublunar world and have an effect on the events occurring in it.511 So why would the philosophers reject the broader influence of the heavenly bodies on the sublunar world? The scholar replies by explaining these relations on the basis of Aristotelian physics. In his

partnership, and disputes. The eighth denotes death, fear, and inheritance. The ninth denotes inns, Torah, worship, the various sciences, the wisdom, stories, and riddles. The tenth, which is the upper pole, is the house of the king, ministers, advisors, and occupations. The eleventh is the house of companions and profit by them. The twelfth is the house of enemies, fear, worry, deceit, and domesticated animals. Each one of the seven planets has revealed and hidden powers, and its activities when it is stationed in one of the houses are well known. 509 The seven planets are: Sun, Moon, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, and Venus, Mercury. 510 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 110. 511 Aristotelians do not argue that the sun in hot and the moon is moist, for ether – the fifth element – does not possess these qualities but the sun nonetheless is the source of heat.

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view, it is a well-known fact that light and motion are the cause of heat, and that the excess and deficiency of the oceans’ water originate from the moon’s moisture.

However, the heat of the sun and the moisture of the moon can only influence events that require the combination of the elements and the mixture of the four qualities. If we take the growth of a “moist fruit” as an example, we see that the moon’s light causes the fruit to grow, while the deficiency of its light causes its decay. But, the philosopher argues, “sober reflection cannot tolerate the thought that they [the events that require the combination of the elements and the mixture of the four qualities] result from the heavenly bodies, or from the alteration in their motions.”512 Therefore, other events that are not dependent on the combination of the elements and the mixture of the qualities, are not influenced by the sun or by the moon. Additionally, the accidental events that are not dependent on the sun’s heat and the moon’s moisture cannot be influenced by the fifth element. The ether as an eternal element cannot possess any of the corruptible (kalim) sublunar qualities and as a consequence cannot affect them in any way.513

In the second argument the astrologer ascribes attributes to the orbs, such as

“cool temperament of Saturn” and the “heat of Mars,” and the “unstable” temperament of Jupiter when it is situated between them. Saturn and Mars are considered maleficent stars, while Jupiter is beneficial, for it “balances” the two unbalanced stars. Here, the scholar does not bother to offer an intellectual refutation, but simply refers to the astrologer’s claim as “baseless dreams” (Divrei Ḥalomot) and

“delusionary fancies” (Dimyonei Taʿatuʿim).514

512 Ibid, p. 109. 513 Mishneh Torah, Laws of the Foundation of the Torah, 3:10, 11; 4:3-5. 514 David Menachem notes in his thesis (p.33) that the second and the fifth arguments, as opposed to the other five arguments, do not entail any philosophical explanations. The scholar merely expresses his contempt for the ideas that the stars possess “good” or “bad” qualities (second argument), and

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In the third argument, the astrologer claims that the positions of the stars and the distances between them determine whether or not they gaze upon each other with a positive or negative attitude.515 In this case, the scholar notes that this argument constitutes the astrologer’s fundamental premise, upon which he constructs all of his astrological theories. In response, besides referring to this idea as “laughable” (Divrei

ẓeḥoq), the scholar enumerates the three acknowledged sources of knowledge, discussed above, that he is willing to accept: intellectual apprehension, empirical evidence, and authoritative traditional knowledge. None of these can serve to demonstrate such a claim, and therefore it must be rejected.

In the fourth argument, the astrologer claims that the strength and weakness of the signs’ activity are determined by their position among the wandering stars and that the twelve signs are named according to their “shape.” This idea evokes a mocking response from the scholar: “Who is the one who ascended heaven and grasped the shapes of a Goat and not a Lamb? An Ox rather than a Cow? A Lion rather than a

Lioness? A Virgin rather than a Non-Virgin? How is it possible he saw these figures and not, for instance, a cow or a sheep?”516 According to Polqar, if our ancestors saw those signs, then we must say they knew them only by the intellect, for how can one argue that the reason we fail to see these shapes is that our senses are significantly inferior to our ancestors’? It is possible, claims the scholar, that the power of the intellect decreases from one generation to the next - but not the senses. Therefore, the astrologer’s assertions cannot be proven either by empirical or traditional premises.

The fifth argument is connected to the second one, where the astrologer ascribes different attributes to the stars. Here the astrologer describes the twelve signs as “male that there is a great importance for the twelve houses’ position and to the “dwelling place” for the seven wandering orbs (seventh argument). 515 The same argument is mentioned in treatise four of ‘Ezer ha-Dat, where Polqar ascribes this belief to “the ignorant people and the women.” See pp. 159-160. 516 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp.110-111. See also Mishneh Torah, Laws of the Foundation of the Torah, 3: 7.

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or female” and “terrestrial or heavenly.” As noted above, Polqar does not bother to refute this idea philosophically. Instead, he continues in his contemptuous humoristic vein, comparing the astrologer’s practice to a children’s game. Just as the astrologers ascribe human attributes to a planet, children ascribe different identities and roles such as kings, ministers and so on, to each other. The difference between the children and the astrologers is that the former are aware they are playing a game and that all the personalities they adopt are fictional. The astrologers, on the other hand, believe their fictional theories to be true.

The sixth and the seventh arguments are paraphrases of claims already made by

Maimonides. These arguments seem to be developed by the scholar independently of the astrologer’s claims. In the sixth argument, Polqar accuses the astrologers of reading books that were written by deceptive authors and of favoring them above true books. These authors – or according to Maimonides’ identification in the Mishneh

Torah,517 false prophets who sought to deceive the people and induce them to become their followers – use their charisma to attract the multitude, including the ignorant, women, and astrologers in order to gain power. Their writings contain no true opinions, only imaginary ones. The seventh argument echoes Maimonides’ rejection of astrology as expressed in the Commentary on the Mishnah.518 Here, too, Polqar argues that if the sphere is homogenous, it follows that ascribing different power to each sign is absurd, unless we claim something equally absurd, that a “resting” star (a star that is not moving within the sphere) is found in each and every degree.

In sum, the astrologer has failed miserably to provide intellectual and empirical proofs that could justify his occupation. The only “authoritative” texts on which he

517 Mishneh Torah, Laws Concerning Idolatry and the Ordinances of the Heathens, 1:4. 518 Commentary on the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 4:7.

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bases his profession are misleading and replete with imaginary and groundless theories. Accordingly, astrology must be rejected first and foremost by reason.

Refuting astrology using theological/historical arguments

We now turn to Polqar’s theological/historical argument. Like Maimonides,

Polqar links astrology and idolatry. According to Polqar, the theological/historical connection between astrological practices and idolatry is related to astral determinism that undermines the concept of God’s will:

It is known and revealed among all nations that our father Abraham and our master Moses strove and endeavored to remove and to eliminate from the gentiles the opinions of the idolaters and the ignorance of the Sabian nation, the Canaanite lands, and the Egyptian magicians, which were popular in those times. They [Abraham and Moses] declared that all things come from one Creator through His simple volition an instant before they begin to exist, and not through necessity or compulsion. Yet despite all their efforts, traces of those malicious opinions persisted in a few places. They are found in various books of Hermes and Apollonius on the subjects of magic and images [of the zodiac], in the book of Egyptian [agricultural] labor known in Arabic as al-Filâḥa al-nabatiyya and in several epistles concerning the imaginary activities of the names of angels and demons, in accordance with the views of the people of Germany (anshei Ashkenaz) and France and their ilk. Praise be to the Creator that so few of our nation read and devoted themselves to such books, the names of which can scarcely be remembered. And these days we do not have among us those criminals but only the readers of those books of astrological nonsense, [books that are] forbidden [to] us both by the Torah and common sense. And the Lord, who removed the obstacle of the foolish gentile opinions of yore from us, will hurry and hasten to bring us a redeemer for our souls, and will lead us to hold and to affirm the Truth, and to refute and deny this corrupt and perverse opinion so that all the nations of the earth will know that the name of the Lord is called upon us.519

The attempts of Abraham and Moses to abolish idolatry are evidence that the

Jewish nation possesses the proof for the unity of God. Unlike other nations, the Jews have distanced themselves from idolatrous practices, including astral determinism.

Polqar’s effort to refute astral determinism is only alluded to here.

519 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 114-116.

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Polqar cites as evidence the success of Abraham’s and Moses’s attempts to abolish idolatry. Only a few people of “our nation” still follow astrological practices or read books of astrology. Most non-philosophical Jews are traditionalists, meaning that they follow the Mosaic Law and abandon astrological practices. Here, the emphasis is on God’s word: the believer is required to forsake books of astrology if he wishes to redeem his soul.

Langermann’s analysis of Maimonides’ repudiation of astrology corresponds to

Polqar’s own interpretation. The centrality of the scientific argument in ‘Ezer ha-Dat demonstrates that we must reject astrology on philosophical grounds. The theological/historical argument, while important to Polqar for religious purposes, takes second place to his primary objection that astrology is based on false theories and is thus scientifically groundless.

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4.3 Miracles within a Natural Framework

The issue of naturalism, discussed earlier in connection with perpetual creation and astrology, challenges religious thinkers when they need to explain the phenomenon of miracles. Those thinkers who argue that God created the world ex nihilo have no difficulty explaining the occurrence of miracles: if God is personally responsible for the creation of the world after its absolute nonexistence, then obviously He is able to act again and to change anything He wishes. Other thinkers, however, mainly those who advocate the theory of the eternity of the world, or, as in

Albalag and Polqar’s wording, “perpetual creation,” need to provide an explanation regarding the occurrence of miracles that coheres with their philosophical worldview as opposed to the traditional approach which views miracles as being supernatural.

Those thinkers who espouse the theory of the eternity of the world have to argue that miracles or “miraculous” events that appear to violate the natural order of things can be explained within the natural order of the world.

Polqar distinguishes between three types of miracles: (1) exaggerated and farfetched events that the vulgar believe to be supernatural; (2) miracles performed by the prophets, excluding Moses; and (3) miracles performed by Moses. According to

Polqar, the difference between these three types of miracles rests on the intellectual degree each of the group’s members possesses.

Miracles, according to the vulgar, are all events that go beyond what they understand to be the natural order. Their tendency to approach anything their deficient intellect cannot understand with blind belief leads them to ignore the true aspects of their faith:

You should know, if you are discerning, that the more subtle, refined, and marvelous a religious belief is (as attested by the intellect’s true nature, which is the correct judge), the less likely it is to be accepted by the majority of the

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multitude. Women and the ignorant, because of the inaction of their theoretical intellect, incline and tend to believe all sorts of exaggerated and inflated wonders having to do with corporeal matters, whose existence is impossible – this, because they think that they thereby honor and magnify the rank of God, may He be blessed. For by virtue of their corrupt representation and weak intelligence, they say that if God were only be able to act within [the realm of] possible things, then how would people view his marvel and miracles? And what would be the difference between His actions and our actions, with respect to doing things that are impossible? In fact, they believe this not only in His case, but also in the case of those savants whom they consider wise, that is, that their wisdom is for naught if they cannot alter nature and perform marvels and impossibilities. Some of these simpletons testify to others that they saw a certain man, whom they consider wise, perform miracles and marvels by reciting the name of a heavenly prince or angel or demon; they tell ludicrous stories that properly provoke derision. Now the inclination of man’s heart is evil from his youth [Gen. 8:21]. Unless he educates and exerts himself in the ways of the intellect, and the various true sciences, it [the evil inclination of his heart] will direct and incline him to admire and give credence to these corrupt beliefs and vain exaggerations. For, as I mentioned above, he has no intellect in actu that serves as a judge to distinguish for him the true from the false, the plausible from the far-fetched. He simply determines his mind to believe everything that leaves the preacher’s (Maggid) lips, especially when he sees it written – for the fools think that you cannot write or affirm anything in a book unless it is decorated with the truth…520

A religion that is based on philosophical principles is unlikely to attract many adherents, for the majority of people are not engaged in the study of philosophy. On the contrary, claims Polqar, it is precisely the religion that offers its adherents marvelous and exaggerated wonders that will flourish and attract a multitude of followers, since it is easier to influence the ignorant who lack the proper education and therefore believe in these false and impossible events.521 An occurrence of an

520 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 51-52. 521 Here Polqar clearly criticizes Abner of Burgos who justified his conversion to Christianity after the alleged appearance of crosses in Avila at a time when the Jews were praying and striving for the coming of the messiah. Cf. Yitzhak Baer, pp. 213; Loeb, pp. 54-58; Norman Roth, Conversos, Inquisition, and the Expulsion of the Jews from Spain, p. 194. Polqar’s idea that the vulgar is easily persuaded is echoed in Spinoza’s thought; Spinoza stresses that the power of religious claims is not to be identified with their truth. Cf. Spinoza, Theological-Political Tractate, Introduction (English translation p.391): “they [men who utterly despise reason] do not even glimpse the divine nature of Scripture, and the more enthusiastic their admiration of these mysteries, the more clearly they reveal that their attitude to Scripture is one abject servility rather than belief. And this is further evident from the fact that most of them assume as a basic principle for the understanding of Scripture and for extracting its true meaning that it is throughout truthful and divine – a conclusion which ought to be the end result of study and strict examination; and they lay down at

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event is perceived by the ignorant as being miraculous simply because they are not able to explain it.522 Judaism, as a religion based on rational principles, is less

“accepted by the majority of the multitude.” It follows from this that belief in miracles cannot be a fundamental principle of Jewish faith, since Judaism is based on rational principles. Hence, irrational beliefs in the miraculousness of events are not fundamental parts of Judaism. Thus, Judaism’s small number of adherents is precisely what points to its true nature.523 Moreover, the majority of the multitude believes that

God and human beings are essentially distinguished by the actions they are able to perform: while human beings can perform only possible things, God can do impossible things, for otherwise “how would people view His marvel and miracles?”

God’s omnipotence manifests itself precisely in His ability to act in a non-natural manner. It follows that Polqar, by rejecting the view of the vulgar, advocates for the opinion that the orderly process of the natural world is itself a proof of God’s omnipotence, and the claim of the vulgar, in fact, damages God’s essence as a perfect being, though Polqar does not state this explicitly.524

Polqar proceeds to argue that education is the key to free oneself from belief in exaggerated and farfetched events, for these contradict basic rational principles.

Education does not guarantee the attainment of rational principles, but it is a necessary condition for being a rational being. While educated individuals are able to

the outset as a principle of interpretation that which would be far more properly derived from Scripture itself, which stands in no need of human fabrication.” 522 If miracles were one of the fundamental principles of Judaism, or any other religion for that matter, Polqar would have to admit that all religions, and Judaism in particular, have miserably failed in their purpose. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam teach that miracles were performed publicly. And yet, not all people followed Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad. 523 Polqar’s claim that Judaism, since it is based on philosophical principles, cannot attract numerous adherents, stands against thinkers such as Origen. Origen, contrary to Polqar, argued that the fact that Christianity expanded rapidly and attracted many adherents bears witness to Its truth and validity. See Origen, On First Principle, book IV chapter one (English translation, p. 172). 524 Cf. Shlomo Pines, “Some Topics on Polqar’s Treatise ʿEzer ha-Dat and their parallels in Spinoza’s view,” pp. 414-418.

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explain these “miraculous events,” or at least most of them as being in accordance with nature, the vulgar consider these events as resulting from supernatural intervention.

Polqar also refers to people “who believe in exaggerated and farfetched things” in the fourth treatise of ʿEzer ha-Dat, where he criticizes several groups of people who reject anyone who is engaged in the study of philosophy:

The fourth argument is the argument of those who believe in exaggerated and farfetched things and in strange and impossible actions. And they [these believers] yearn for these [sort of] things and they desire to bring them into existence. They take delight and pleasure in conceiving them in their imperfect imagination and they cause them [the exaggerated and farfetched things] to pass through their weak [and] deficient thought. And generally, they incline to believe those things, which occur [in the world] [to be] beyond nature, [the same nature] that the philosophers favor [and claim that those things] occur against its [=nature] will (be‘al korḥo).525

Later on Polqar explains that the same fallacious reasoning that leads ignorant people (ḥasrei ha-daʿat) to believe in magic and exaggerated things also leads them to believe in astral determinism – interpreting the stars’ positions and movements as the cause of a particular event’s occurrence. Both astrologers and magicians embrace a false type of causality: astrologers believe that the positions, movements, and alignment of the stars in relation to each other causally influence future events.

Therefore, their ability to analyze these stars’ positions, movements, and alignment enables them to predict correctly future events. In a similar manner, magicians believe that if a series of events occurs in a certain order, there is a necessary causal connection between them. As a result, these magicians believe that certain results may be obtained by performing a series of events in a predetermined order. Polqar illustrates this idea with an example: if man sits on a spindle (pelekh) while he plays

525 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 159. והטענה הרביעית היא טענת המאמינים בענייני ההפלגות והגוזמות והפעלים הזרים והנמנעים ומשתוקקים אליהם ומתאווים להמציאם ונהנים ומתעדנים בציירם בדמיונם הגרוע והעבירם ברעיונם החלש הנפסד. ובדרך הכלל יטו להאמין על המתנהג לפי מחשבתם חוץ מן הטבע אשר ידמוהו אוהבם (אהובם?) של הפילוסופים, רק בא ומתחדש בעל כרחו.

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dice and wins, it follows that the next time he plays dice he must also sit on a spindle, and he will certainly win. The three events, i.e. playing dice, sitting on a spindle, and winning the game, are not connected to one another, and yet, continues Polqar, most people are convinced that the outcome is inevitable. Members of this group, in

Polqar’s view, believe in sheer nonsense (ma‘asei havalim) and are easy to influence.526 Philosophers, on the other hand, reject both astral determinism and magic, for they rationally understand that there is no causal connection between the movements and positions of the stars and worldly occurrences.

The second type of miracles includes the miracles performed by the prophets, with the exception of Moses:

Now I am not referring here to the miracles and marvels that were performed by our prophets (of blessed memory), which were publicized and well known to all. For the possibility of the occurrence of miracles at the hands of the prophets is a matter known to thinkers, as is the manner in which prophets act through their souls, and sometimes change the course of nature, as is explained in its proper place.527 (emphases were added)

At face value it seems as if Polqar concedes that the prophets, while performing miracles, changed the natural order of the world. How can the view that prophets could, through the use of their souls, alter natural law be reconciled with Polqar’s strict naturalistic worldview? Furthermore, if the prophets were able to change the course of nature, in what sense and to what extent are the miracles they performed different from the miracles performed by Moses?

To answer these questions I will analyze two paragraphs in which Polqar discusses (1) the function and the role of the prophets and (2) the nature of their prophecies, namely what type of knowledge the prophets possessed.

526 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 159-161. 527 Ibid. pp. 52-53. By “the proper place” Polqar probably refers to pp. 158-159 where he provides us with his definition of “nature.”

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In the third treatise, where Polqar presents a controversy between an astrologer, most likely Abner of Burgos, and a scholar, presumably Polqar himself, he discusses the prophets’ role. The astrologer accuses the scholar of defending the idea of man’s free will and consequently of denying the validity of the prophetic message, the main part of which is predicting future events. The scholar, in reply, spells out his view regarding prophecy and its primary role:528

Know that through the intellect that emanates from God (may He be blessed) to the imaginative faculty of the prophet or dreamer, and by virtue of His light that He shines upon him, the prophet sees and apprehends the levels of existing things. He also cognizes and knows the existence of the causes that bring about and originate existing things when [i] the causes draw near, [ii] when the agent acts and the recipient is acted upon, and [iii] all the impediments and hindrances are removed and eliminated. When the prophet or the dreamer perceives [all] this, he emerges to make his prediction. … Do you not see that most of the words of Jeremiah and the other prophets were nothing more than rebuke and reproach? After all his harsh prophecies spoken against the inhabitants of Jerusalem he said that if they repented of their ways and their stubborn practices then God would give them respite from evil, and would bestow good upon them once again.529 [emphases were added]

It appears, at first glance, that Polqar contradicts himself: on the one hand he argues that the prophet’s message emerges from the divine intellect shaping the prophet’s (and the dreamer’s) imaginative faculty alone. On the other hand, however, he goes on to argue that the prophet “cognizes and knows the existence of causes that bring about and originate existing things.” How can the prophet intellectually cognize the causes of existence if the overflow from the Active Intellect emanates on the power of imagination and not his intellectual faculty? In the next chapter I discuss in detail Polqar’s approach toward prophecy and philosophy. Here, however, I wish to point to several other passages throughout ‘Ezer ha-Dat in which it is clear that

528 In the next chapter I discuss Polqar’s view of prophecy in detail. Here it suffices to indicate that Polqar’s position regarding prophecy completely contradicts Maimonides’ view. While Maimonides holds an opinion that the prophets were first and foremost philosophers, Polqar distinguishes the prophetic message from philosophical investigation. 529 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 116-117.

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according to Polqar, the prophet does not understand reality in a purely intellectual manner.530

The prophet and the dreamer are alike with regard to gaining knowledge: both prophesy only through their power of imagination, not through their intellectual faculty.531 Clearly Polqar’s approach to prophecy deviates from the Maimonidean view on the matter.532 According to Maimonides, the prophet is necessarily a philosopher, but not every philosopher is necessarily a prophet. Prophets, according to

Polqar, are politicians, people who have true dreams, governors, and make statistically true prediction of future events.

Prophets, then, belong to the realm of politics by virtue of receiving prophetic knowledge in direct proportion to their power of imagination, and they intuitively pass this knowledge onto the people. The political role of the prophet is presented in a clearer way in the second part of the paragraph – the prophets’ role is to guide the vulgar to act according to the Mosaic Law by using methods of rebuke and warnings.

Unlike philosophers who are able to pass their knowledge to others, the prophets cannot rationally explain the nature of their prophetic experience. It follows, then, that since the prophet’s prediction is only partially true, he would occasionally predict events that would not occur. True philosophers, by contrast, would arrive at different and more accurate conclusions than the prophets through their study of the causes of existence.533

To explain the distinction between the second and third types of miracles – the difference between the Mosaic miracles and miracles performed by other prophets – I propose that we first examine Polqar’s view of Mosaic miracles, for only then will we

530 See discussion on the difference between prophet and a philosopher on pp. 251-268. 531 Polqar also makes a similar claim on pp. 88-89; 118; 158. 532 The Guide, 2:36-38. 533 According to this, philosophers in the times of the prophets would not blindly follow the prophetic message.

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be able to point to the essential difference between these two types of miracles.

Clarifying this difference has much to do with Polqar’s original definition to the term

“nature.”

One might wonder why Polqar makes such a great effort to elevate Moses over all other prophets. Why would he argue that Moses is the only prophet who was also the perfect philosopher? And why would he maintain that the prophets’ prophesizing, excluding that of Moses, is based on their power of imagination alone? He could have followed in Maimonides’ footsteps, claiming that the prophets were philosophers, although on a lower rank than Moses. In my view, Polqar draws a clear line between

Moses and the other prophets in order to create a qualitative difference and not merely a quantitative one. Moses was the ultimate lawgiver who, through his law, turned the

Israelites into a nation. His law educates its adherents so that they can profess true opinions and perform proper actions – the two basic requirements of any divine law.

The other prophets’ role is to reproach and rebuke the people to ensure that they observe the Mosaic Law. The difference, then, between Moses and the other prophets is an essential one.534

In treatise one, at the end of chapter three, where Polqar determines that Moses is the ultimate leader who possessed all the necessary character traits and intellectual requirements, he writes:

As for the thirteenth trait, it is fitting and obligatory for us to believe that Moses possessed the perfection and the completeness to reach the aforementioned final end. For his soul, which isolated and separated itself from his matter, despised by it, changed the customs of nature and produced the well-known miracles (just as the separate forms change the material objects, and do what they will with them) and was able to prophesy at any time that he wished, as is written: Stand by, and let me hear what instructions the Lord gives about you [Num. 9:8].535 [emphases were added]

534 For a discussion of Moses as the perfect leader, see chapter two, pp. 65-71. For an extended discussion of the Mosaic commandments, see chapter four of this thesis, pp. 269-282. 535 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 46. Ravitsky mistakenly includes Polqar among the Jewish thinkers who did not base miracle working by man on intellectual apprehension. According to him, “Most Jewish scholars

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Moses, as we shall see later, was the only human being who could “change the customs of nature.” Most people would consider Moses’ “changing the course of nature” to be miraculous wonders. Polqar informs us that Moses was able to change the natural order because his soul was isolated from his body and could act like a separate form that changes a physical object. Polqar later on provides an example of a

Mosaic miracle:

Do you not see that our Master Moses was obliged to cause the people to hear a voice from heaven speaking with them, as it is written: The Lord said to Moses, “I will come to you in a thick cloud, so that the people may hear when I speak with you and so believe in you ever after” [Exod. 19:9].536

In what sense could Moses change the course of the natural order? Does this mean that according to Polqar Moses could cause a stone to go up? In this example, it is clear that normally the heavens do not have a voice. Moses, however, was able to perform an unusual act, which was miraculous in the eyes of the people, by causing them to hear voices from heaven. Polqar’s example should be examined in the context of the rigorous natural philosophy that he presents throughout his writings. In order to do so, we must first clarify his definition and use of the term “nature.” However, before we do this, we must discuss first one important paragraph where he expresses his opinion regarding the difference between the prophets’ miracles and the miracles performed by Moses. Polqar includes this paragraph in treatise two, where the young philosopher explains to his traditionalist interlocutor why philosophy is the only discipline through which one can achieve true knowledge:

of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (adherents of the anthropological theory) based miracle working by man on knowledge and apprehension (with the exception of ben Adret and Polqar). See Aviezer Ravitsky, “The Anthropological Theory of Miracles in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” p. 247, especially note 44. 536 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 53.

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Surly it is enough for us to hear and to accept the opinions of the truthful religion of Moses (dat Moshe ha-ne’emanah) who spoke to us with truth and with faith and to bind ourselves to it with covenant; and it further suffices for us to believe in the miracles that were performed by our prophets. [As opposed to] you who tend to believe in anything, which is exaggerated and farfetched that evil and deceitful people will cunningly tell you. And generally all that your ears hear, they [your thoughts] accept and believe, except for the clear and true things that were clarified and [logically] derived in the books of knowledge. Only [these true things] you consider to be heresy and foreign belief.537 [emphases were added]

In this striking paragraph, Polqar clearly distinguishes between the function of the Mosaic message – true opinions – and the function of the prophecy of other prophets in whose performed miracles we ought to believe. The true content of the

Mosaic Law can be demonstrated through philosophical investigation; however, the prophets’ miracles remain in the realm of faith and might be open for a debate. The young philosopher then declares, apologetically in my view, that he believes in the miracles that were performed by the prophets, while, in truth, as we shall see later, the

“performance” of miracles requires true knowledge of nature, a knowledge the prophets did not possess. Moses, then, is pictured here as the only figure who knew the ultimate truth and was able to teach it to others.

As I mentioned earlier the key passage in order to understand Polqar’s view of miracles in general, and the difference between the Mosaic miracles and miracles performed by other prophets in particular, features Polqar’s unique definition of the term “nature.” This passage is taken from treatise four, where Polqar describes the third group that criticizes the philosophers:

The third argument is the argument of those who think to defend the power of the creator and His rule over things. And they declare and agree among themselves that the view of the philosophers is that all things act in accordance

537 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 82-83. הלא די לנו לשמוע ולקבל בדעות דת משה הנאמנה אשר דבר עמנו באמת ובאמונה והיינו אתה באמנה ולהאמין בנסים אשר על ידי נביאינו נעשים כי תחזיק להאמין בכל הפלגה וגוזמה אשר יגידו אליך בערמה אנשי עול ומרמה. ובדרך הכלל יקבלו ויאמינו רעיוניך כל אשר תשמענה אזניך זולתי הדברים האמתיים הברורים אשר בספרי המדע מובאים וגזורים רק תחשבם לכפירה ולאמונה זרה.

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with nature and in a necessary manner. So that the divine governor’s will lacks the power to change it. And they further believe that nature is the enemy of God (senuo shel ha-barukh hu) and acts and performs in opposition to Him as if it – nature – were another God. As a result of this they level libelous arguments against the philosophers, and they say that they [the philosophers] do not believe in the decrees of the Creator and in miracles. And now consider well and know, have you not heard that the word “nature” indicates in our language (in this place) an imprinting of a form within the imprinted object to indicate that the beginning of the power of the form’s movement and its action is within the object, which is imprinted, not outside of it. [This is] opposed to all other things whose movement is caused by movers external to them. And this power, which is imprinted in it, is called either angel or seraph (mal’akh o seraph), or a demon or any other name you wish to call it, because there is no difference538 in names. And, in general, it [=the power] is the messenger of a creator (yoẓer) and is subjugated to him in such a way that if he [yoẓer] desires that his command will be fulfilled – it will fulfill (his desire). And if [the yoẓer does not desire that this power fulfills his command], it will cease doing so. And this is the place that makes miracles possible and the wondrous things that do not occur [in the course of nature]. And this is in accordance with the primordial wisdom of God. And since nature is the beginning of the movement of everything that moves and the rest of everything that rests, and that beginning is the effect of and the messenger of the Blessed be He, as I already indicated, therefore, as all movements come one from the other and reach to the movement, which is the beginning of all movement, namely, the diurnal revolution, the one who causes it to move being the First Cause among all causes; namely, the Creator, blessed be He, for this reason it should be known in truth that the true philosophers believe and declare that everything depends on the will and the desire of the Creator blessed be He. And nature is one of His messengers and one of His intermediates, which acts in accordance with His restraint, [with] His will and [with] His desire. It is impossible for anyone to believe these idiocies, which the members of the multitude speak about nature. Moreover, the bodily agent (po‘el gufani) or that which is a force in a body, it is fitting that the bodily agent results from the spiritual cause, and therefore man’s intellectual soul rejects the heavenly decrees and will not be acted upon by the heavenly bodies. And therefore choice is given to every man to incline to which side he chooses without any constraint. In this way, nature is subjugated to the action of the soul.539

538 See mote 364 539 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 158-159. והטענה השלישית והיא טענת החושבים להגן בעד כח היוצר בזה ושלטונו בדברים וגוזרים ומסכימים ביניהם כי דעת הפילוסופים היא שכל הדברים באים ונוהגים בטבע ובדרך הכרח בענין שאין יכולת ברצון המנהיג לשנותו וחשבם כי הטבע שנואו של הב"ה ופועל ועושה כנגדו כאלו הוא אלוה אחר. ועל זה יוציאו עליהם דבות רעות ויאמרו כי אינם מאמינים בגזרות היוצר ובמעשה הנסים. ועתה התבוננו היטב ודעו, הלא שמעתם כי מלת "טבע" מורה בלשוננו במקום זה על התעמקות צורת החתימה ושקיעתה בנטבע להורות כי תחלת כח תנועת הצורה ההיא ופעולתה הוא תוך עצם הנטבע לא חוצה ממנו כשאר המתנועעים בסבת מניעים חוצה להם. והכח הזה הנשקע בקרב ותוכו יקרא מלאך או שרף או שד או איזה שם שיחפוץ הקורא, כי אין מחלוקת בשמות. רק בדרך הכלל הוא שלוחו של יוצר ומשועבד אליו בענין כי כשיחפוץ שתעשה מצותו על ידו יעשנה – ואם לא ישבות מלעשות או יעשה הפכה על ידי אחר וזה מקום ידוע למעשה הנסים והדברים הנפלאים הבלתי נהוגים וכל זה כפי חכמתו הקדומה ב"ה. ולהיות הטבע הוא התחלת תנועה כל מתנועע והשקט כל שוקט. ואותה ההתחלה היא מסובבו ושלוחו של הב"ה כאשר זכרתי להיות כל התנועות משתלשלות זו אחר זו ומגיעות עד התנועה אשר היא ראשית כל התנועות, והיא היומית אשר המניע אותה מסובב לראש כל הסבות אשר הוא היוצר ב"ה, ולזה יודע באמת כי הפילוסופים האמתיים יאמינו ויגזרו כי הכל תלוי ברצון וחפץ היוצר ב"ה וכי הטבע אחד משלוחיו ומן האמצעיים אשר יפעלו ברסנו ורצונו וחפצו, לא יתכן

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According to the members of this group, the philosophers’ “sin” is twofold: first, they consider nature as an independent entity that is not subjugated to God.540

Second, nature, according to the philosophers, represents the natural order of the world, and even God cannot change its laws. Because it leaves no room for miracles, the philosophical view reveals, according to the members of this group, the heretical nature of the philosophers.541

Polqar understands these objections, but interprets the term “nature” as representing not an external set of laws governing the occurrence of all things, but rather the intrinsic form of an object – “the form in the imprinted object.” Since the beginning of all movements is the outermost celestial sphere and all movements come one from another, the power of an object to move is dependent on this external chain of causes. The creator (yoẓer) to whom Polqar refers in the beginning of the paragraph is not God, who is constantly referred to as yoẓer barukh hu, but the wise man who achieved the knowledge necessary to understand the nature of an object – in this case,

Moses.542 In Polqar’s discussion of creation, God functions as the First Cause upon which all other existing things are dependent. Polqar continues Averroes’ line of

לשום אדם לחשוב באותם ההבלים אשר ידברו בהם המוננו על הטבע. ועוד כי הפועל הגופני או אשר הוא כח בגוף ראוי לו להתנהג ולהתנועע בסבת הפועל הרוחני. ועל כן תהיה נפש האדם ההוגה דוחה את הגזרות ובלתי מתפעלת מגופי השמים ותהיה רשות כל אדם נתונה בידו להטות לאי זה דרך שירצה מבלי שיעכבנו מכריח והיה אז הטבע משועבד לפעולת הנפש. 540 It is possible that Polqar here criticizes thinkers like Nachmanides, who writes, for example, in his introduction for the book of Job, “Nature is not the governor [of the word]” (ha-tevaʿ eino manhig). Here Nachmanides discusses the subordination of nature to God in the context of Individual Providence, miracles, and the problem of evil in the world. He clearly argues that everything that occurs is an act of God’s volition, and that arguing that everything occurs according to nature is heresy. See Nachmanides, perush ha-Torah, Exodus 13; Cf. David Burger. 541 If al-Fārābī is the source for such claim, we must note that according to him God cannot change the laws of nature. 542 Shalom Ẓadik argues that according to Polqar, miracles are the phenomena in reality that human beings are unable to explain. These miracles include the miracles performed by both Moses and other prophets. In my view, the connection between the theory of miracles and prophecy clearly establishes that according to Polqar no prophet, except for Moses, performed miracles. Miracles, then, are not supernatural events but rather represent Moses’ ability to fully understand the intrinsic nature of an object – resulting in something that is perceived by the vulgar as supernatural. Cf. Shalom Ẓadik, Thesis, pp. 99-104.

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thought with regard to the natural aspect of understanding and interpreting what seem to be miraculous events:

I say: The ancient philosophers did not discuss the problems of miracles, since according to them such things must not be examined and questioned; for they are the principles of religions, and the man who inquires into them and doubts them merits punishment…Not everything which in its nature is possible can be done by man, for what is possible to man is well known. Most things which are possible in themselves are impossible for man, and what is true of the prophet, that he can interrupt the ordinary course of nature, is impossible for man, but possible in itself; and because of this one need not assume that things logically impossible are possible for the prophets, and if you observe those miracles whose existence is confirmed, you will find that they are of this kind. The clearest of miracles in the Venerable book of Allah, the existence of which is not an interruption of the course of nature assumed by tradition, like the changing of a rod into a serpent, but its miraculous nature is established by way of perception and consideration for every man who has been or who will be till the day of resurrection. And so this miracle is far superior to all others.543

In light of Polqar’s interpretation of the term “nature,” we can now understand the meaning of the last sentence in this paragraph, “in this way then nature is subjugated to the action of the soul.” Obviously, “the action of the soul” means the action of the rational soul that cognizes the true existence of things. Here we return to

Polqar’s distinction between the miracles performed by Moses and the miracles performed by the other prophets. Even Moses, who was the perfect philosopher and understood the natural order in the most perfect way, did not perform miracles in the sense of changing the course of the natural order. Rather, with his perfect intellect, he fully cognized the essence of physical objects, and as a consequence was able to accurately predict natural events. He could, to use the example we mentioned earlier, precisely predict the loud noise (perhaps a thunder) in the cloud at the specific moment the Israelites would hear it. Moses, on the basis of his meteorological knowledge, could predict this loud noise. For Moses it was a natural process that could be known beforehand if one possessed the proper knowledge. The Israelites, on

543 Averroes, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, ¶514-515 (English translation, p.315).

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the other hand, perceived this event as miraculous because they could not explain it.

The other prophets also could predict future events, but their predictions were based on the imagination and therefore only statistically true; these predictions were not based on their intellectual power.

In conclusion, Polqar’s claim that the prophets’ miracles “are known to the thinker (maskil), as is the manner in which prophets act through their souls,”544 refers to the “miracles” predicted by Moses alone, and not to the other prophets. For in order to “change the course of nature” i.e., presenting a prediction to the vulgar so that in their eyes it would seem a changing the course of nature, one must know and apprehend intellectually the laws of nature as the intrinsic nature of any object. The prophets, excluding Moses, received the prophetic message through their power of imagination. Their intellectual faculty did not play any role when they prophesied.

Moses was endowed with the perfection of the imaginative faculty, like the other prophets; however, more importantly, contrary to other prophets, he was a perfect philosopher who understood reality as it really is. Moses, then, performed

“miracles” such as announcing God’s voice at Mount Sinai by virtue of being a philosopher rather than a prophet. A prophet is unable to understand all causes of things and the nature of all objects, while a perfect philosopher not only understands these causes and natures, but also is capable of making accurate predictions based on this knowledge.

Polqar, then, understands the Mosaic miracles as occurring in accordance to natural order. God does not intervene in the world in any way. He remains the First

Cause from which all existing things continuously are brought into existence. Indeed, keeping God distant from the physical world ensures His status as a perfect Being.

544 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 52-53.

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The Mosaic ability to “perform” miracles is not supernatural from a philosophical point of view, but only from the perspective of the multitude.

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Chapter 5: The Conception of Man

5.1 Between a Prophet and a Philosopher

In the previous chapter we briefly discussed the phenomenon of prophecy with regard to performing miracles. We also noted that, according to Polqar, there is an essential difference between Mosaic prophecy and the prophecy of other prophets. In this section, I will examine how Polqar approaches prophecy in relation to philosophical knowledge. Polqar presents his theory of prophecy in a manner similar to other topics in ‘Ezer ha-Dat, namely, by juxtaposing two opposing opinions: one opinion according to which the philosopher’s rank is superior to that of the prophet; and an opposite opinion, influenced by Avicenna’s model, according to which the prophet effortlessly attains the same level of knowledge as the philosopher. In none of the passages that discuss this matter are prophets and philosophers identified with one another; the sole exception is Moses, who was both a perfect philosopher and a perfect prophet.

In this chapter I will argue that Polqar introduces an original view of prophecy and of the character traits of the prophets. On the one hand, he clearly rejects the traditional view, according to which God chooses whomever he wishes to be a prophet and to receive divine messages. On the other hand, he deviates from the al-

Fārābīan, Ibn Sinian, and Maimonidean view, according to which the prophet receives the emanation from the Active Intellect in two stages: first, the emanation overflows onto the intellect, on account of which the recipient is a philosopher. Second, after the emanation overflows from the Active Intellect onto the receiver’s intellectual faculty, it overflows onto his imagination, on account of which he is a prophet.

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My argument in this chapter focuses on Polqar’s radical stance, which differentiates entirely between the character traits of the philosopher and those of the prophet. In my view, Polqar deliberately presents contradictory opinions, placing them in different sections of ‘Ezer ha-Dat in order to conceal his extreme view. To support my argument, I will begin by analyzing two ambiguous passages from ‘Ezer ha-Dat, which can be interpreted either as being within the al-Fārābīan/Ibn Sinian mold or as deviating from it. Then, I will examine two additional passages which in my view reflect Polqar’s true opinion regarding the essential difference between a philosopher and a prophet.

Polqar’s conception of prophecy clearly diverges from the idea of the philosopher/prophet advocated by al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and Maimonides. Maimonides maintains (1) that all prophets are necessarily philosophers, and (2) that the prophets were endowed with both a strong imagination and an unusually strong intellectual power:

… You should know that the case in which the intellectual overflow overflows only toward the rational faculty and does not overflow at all toward the imaginative faculty – either because of the scantiness of what overflows or because of some deficiency existing in the imaginative faculty in its natural disposition, a deficiency that makes it impossible for it to receive the overflow of the intellect – is characteristic of the class of men of science engaged in speculation. If, on the other hand, this overflow reaches both faculties – I mean both the rational and the imaginative – as we and others among the philosophers have explained, and if the imaginative faculty is in a state of ultimate perfection owing to its natural disposition, this is characteristic of the class of prophets. If again the overflow only reaches the imaginative faculty, the defect of the rational faculty deriving either from its original natural disposition or from insufficiency of training, this is characteristic of the class of those who govern cities, while being the legislators, the soothsayers, the augurs, and the dreamers of vertical dreams.545

545 The Guide, 2:36. See also 2:35; Averroes expresses the same idea in the Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, ¶583 (English translation pp. 360-361): “and therefore it is the truest of all sayings that every prophet is a sage, but not every sage is a prophet; the learned, however, are those of whom it is said that they are the heirs of the prophets.”

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Maimonides explicitly identifies three categories with regard to receiving the emanation: there are (1) the philosophers, who receive the emanation solely on their intellectual faculty, (2) the statesmen, whose imaginative faculty receives the emanation, and (3) the prophets, who receive the emanation both on their intellectual and imaginative faculties.546 Thus, for Maimonides there is an overlap between the prophet and a philosopher in terms of their intellectual perfection, and between the prophet and the statesmen in terms of their perfect power of imagination. As we will see later, Polqar questions this Maimonidean classification and proposes instead to separate prophecy from philosophy altogether.

I shall begin by analyzing two paragraphs in which Polqar presents an Ibn

Sinian view as understood by Maimonides and his followers, claiming that the prophet attains knowledge by means of the Active Intellect.547 Avicenna presents two types of prophecies: imaginative prophecy which is received by the prophet’s imaginative faculty, and intellectual prophecy which is received by the prophet’s rational faculty. Maimonides and his followers interpreted Avicenna’s concept of prophecy as a process which occurs in two levels: at the lower level of prophecy, the prophet receives the emanation from the Active Intellect onto his power of imagination. The emanation at this level passes through the undeveloped rational faculty of the receiver, such that the prophet grasps truths; however, he cannot explain how he knows them. In prophecy at the higher level, Avicenna notes, the knowledge that the prophet receives from the Active Intellect enters into his fully developed intellect, in a more perfect manner. The prophet’s knowledge at this level, like the philosopher’s knowledge, has a syllogistic structure. The difference between the

546 Davidson, al-Fārābī, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect, pp. 203-204 and also n. 405. 547 Avicenna, Kitāb al-Najāt, translated by F. Rahman in Avicenna’s Psychology (book II, chapter six. English translation pp. 35-37). Cf. Michael Marmura, Avicenna's Psychological Proof of Prophecy, pp. 49-56.

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prophet and the philosopher at this stage is that the former grasps the knowledge at once, in an effortless manner, while the philosopher invests time and effort to obtain true knowledge.548

Examining the passages in ‘Ezer ha-Dat that present Avicenna’s position reveals that Polqar was aware of the Ibn Sinian distinction between the two types of prophecy. Although neither of them, in my view, represents his genuine opinion, I have chosen to examine them for two reasons; first, identifying Polqar’s purpose in presenting this view at the place in which it appears in ‘Ezer ha-Dat, shows, I believe, that it is motivated by apologetic aims and does not describe his true opinion. Second,

Avicenna’s model of prophecy, which was already accepted by Maimonides, was already familiar to the Jewish community. Polqar therefore uses this model twice: first when presenting the debate between the scholar and the astrologer in treatise three, and then when criticizing the Kabbalists in treatise four. Treatise three, as I already indicated, is an attempt to present a more moderate philosophical approach. The

Scholar in this dialogue must consider his community’s level of understanding and its suspicion of radical philosophical views. Therefore, in this dialogue Polqar has the scholar present Avicenna’s second form of prophecy, namely, the prophet effortlessly receives knowledge that has the same content as the knowledge of the philosopher. In treatise four, however, Polqar criticizes the Kabbalists for accusing the philosophers of heresy. Then, on account of the more theological/polemical nature of the debate, it suits his purposes better to draw on Avicenna’s first form of prophecy, according to which the emanation overflows through the prophet’s undeveloped intellect to his power of imagination, in order to reject the Kabbalists’ accusations.

548 Hebert Davidson notes that according to Avicenna, prophecy at either level cannot produce genuine theoretical knowledge. See “Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect,” p.116.

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I will begin by analyzing the passage in treatise four, for Polqar’s motivation here is clear – rejecting the Kabbalists’ accusations. The attempt Polqar makes in treatise three is more significant from both a theological and a social point of view; hence I will discuss it at length later.

In treatise four, where Polqar lists several groups that criticize the philosophers, he replies the following to the second group of people, the Kabbalists, who claim to possess the true prophetic message:

And those ignorant [Kabbalists] do not know and do not realize that there is no more superior and perfect power (in us) than the intellectual power by which we are able to attain the hidden [things]. And attaining this power is [achieved] only through seeking the middle term (gevul emẓa‘i) and [through the] construction of a demonstration. However, the prophet’s apprehension (hasagat ha-navi) is not [achieved] through the gathering of premises and seeking for demonstration, but [it is achieved] in a superior and more perfect way; except that the apprehension of those who listen to him and those who accept [the prophetic message] from him does not resemble [the prophet’s apprehension] in any way.549

The Kabbalists mock the philosophers’ efforts to attain knowledge of the theoretical sciences solely through the human intellect. Rather, according to Polqar, they maintain that the knowledge they possess is identical to the knowledge the prophets taught. Polqar responds to this Kabbalistic allegation by asserting that, unlike the Kabbalists, the prophets could not have held opinions that contradict the intellect and common sense (shikkul ha-Daʿat).550 The intellectual faculty is the highest and most perfect faculty human beings (can) possess. Attaining knowledge through the intellect requires the learner to dedicate time and effort to the task. The prophet, as described above, attains knowledge in a different way, “a superior and

549 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p.158. Cf. the Guide, 2:38. 550 For example, Polqar accuses the Kabbalists of possessing a polytheistic view of God, which completely contradicts the demonstrated argument that supports monotheism. See ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p.157.

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more perfect way.” If the intellect is the highest tool through which one attains knowledge, as Polqar indicates clearly, in what way is the prophet’s path superior?

One could suggest that Polqar endorses here the Maimonidean idea, presented in the Guide 2:38, that the prophet’s knowledge is superior to that of the philosopher because of the overflow from the Active Intellect on both faculties, intellectual and imaginative. Indeed, the second part of the quotation describes the prophet as

“skipping” the stage of extended study, the stage that requires time and effort. The prophet intuitively grasps reality, and in this sense his understanding is superior to that of the philosopher, who dedicates a great part of his life to learning the theoretical sciences. The prophet, however, does not grasp this truth through “seeking the middle term (gevul emẓa‘i) and [through the] construction of a demonstration.” Therefore, he is incapable of passing his knowledge on to others.

However, a careful reading of the text cited above reveals that Polqar is deliberately adopting an apologetic stance. Polqar’s argument here constitutes part of his response to the Kabbalists’ accusation that the philosophers, among other things, deny the prophets’ message. His purpose, then, is merely to refute the Kabbalistic argument by showing that the prophets could not have held the same irrational opinions as the Kabbalists: even though they skip the long and difficult stage of studying, the prophets cannot teach opinions that contradict reason. Polqar uses two examples to make his point: first, the Kabbalists deny the unity of God, and, second, instead of focusing on studying philosophical books, they focus on reading books filled with absurdities and nonsensical things, such a miraculously “jumping” from point A to point B (kefiẓat ha-derekh).551

551 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 158. Polqar severely criticizes the “many respectable people of our nation” for believing in what he calls “nonsense stories” (sipurei havalim).

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It follows, then, that the “superior and more perfect way” in which the prophet grasps knowledge is limited to his prophesying rapidly, without devoting the greater part of his life to intense study. In this way alone is his apprehension superior to and more perfect than that of the philosopher. However, as Polqar emphasizes in treatise two, the prophet’s inability to provide demonstrated proofs for his apprehension and, consequently, his further inability to teach others is exactly why the prophetic message remains a private experience and therefore inferior to the universal method of philosophy; I will return to this point at length later.

The second passage, which presents Avicenna’s higher type of prophecy, appears in a dialogue between a scholar and an astrologer in treatise three. Among the many themes under discussion, prophecy plays an important role insofar as the astrologer accuses the scholar of denying the veracity of the prophetic message, understood as the ability to predict future events. According to the astrologer, by advocating man’s free will, the scholar completely negates the prophet’s ability to predict future events, for if man acts freely, the prophet’s vision becomes a possibility rather than a necessity.552 The scholar replies:

Know that through the intellect that emanates from God (may He be blessed) to the imaginative faculty of the prophet or dreamer, and by virtue of His light that shines upon him, the prophet sees and apprehends the levels of existing things. He also cognizes and knows the existence of the causes that bring about and originate existing things when the causes draw near, when the agent acts and the recipient is acted upon, and all the impediments and hindrances are removed and eliminated. When he [the prophet or the dreamer] perceives [all] this, he emerges to make his prediction. However, because of the nature of the eternal possibility that exists within everything, as I previously mentioned, neither the prophecy nor the prediction will be necessitated or compelled to exist until the time when the necessitating and compelling Will (which is God, blessed be He) is realized. This may on occasion become altered, with the result that the prediction will not come to pass… Now these [cases when a prediction is not fulfilled] happen likewise to the prophet and to the dreamer. For, as I mentioned, the light that flows from God (may He be exalted) to his imagination will show and inform him of the causes of future

552 See discussion on determinism and free will in chapter 3, pp. 161-185.

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things, as well as the immediate effect that emerges and originates from these causes, subject to the conditions I mentioned above with respect to the thinker (ḥoshev ha-maḥshavot). Then he will prophesy about this thing and will predict its appearance. However, what happens to the thinker will occasionally happen to the prophet or dreamer, namely, that something will contravene because of the nature of the possible. Still, there are two differences between these two apprehensions: first, the thinker apprehends the visible and apparent causes, whereas the prophet apprehends the concealed and obscure ones. Hence, it is said, The concealed things concern the Lord our God, but the visible ones are for us and for our children forever. (Deut. 29:28) Second, the thinker apprehends some, but not all, of the causes, whereas the prophet apprehends all the causes and hindrances without ignoring anything. For this reason he is correct in most cases.553 (emphases were added)

Here, similarly to the passages we will discuss later, where Polqar argues for the superiority of the philosopher over the prophet, Polqar maintains that the prophet’s imaginative faculty is the faculty which receives the overflow from the

Active Intellect. However, in this passage, unlike in the other treatises, Polqar argues that “God’s light” shines upon the prophet so as to enable him to “see and apprehend the levels of existing things.” It is no longer simply a case of the prophet’s intuition and vivid imagination leading him to attain knowledge without study. Rather, predicting the future requires that both the wise (ḥoshev ha-maḥshavot) and the prophet know the causes of existence as well as potential impediments that might prevent or “change” the occurrence of a particular event.

The prophet described in this passage corresponds to Avicenna’s second type: the prophet of the highest rank, who grasps with his intuition (al-hads) not only conclusions but also syllogistic structure, middle terms, and the causes of reality.

Moreover, the second part of the passage indicates that the prophet ranks above the philosopher for two reasons: first, the thinker (ḥoshev ha-maḥshavot) apprehends immediate and apparent causes, while the prophet apprehends hidden and obscure

553 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 116-118.

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ones. Second, the thinker apprehends some, but not all, of the causes, whereas the prophet apprehends all the causes and impediments, without ignoring anything.

It would therefore appear that this passage supports Avicenna’s model of the highest level of prophecy. However, we must recall that this dialogue takes place between the astrologer and the mature philosopher, who must consider the political and social situation of his community. He cannot present an extreme view that goes against his community’s traditional stance, or even against the Maimonidean view that was known. Still Polqar does not identify the prophet, who receives the emanation onto his power of imagination, with the philosopher.

Before we discuss Polqar’s radical view, let us first examine one more passage in which it seems that Polqar presents a rigorous dichotomy between philosophy and prophecy. In treatise one, he argues that the philosopher receives the overflow from the Active Intellect onto his intellectual faculty, while the prophet receives it onto his imaginative faculty. This paragraph is found in the third chapter of treatise one, where

Polqar enumerates the thirteen prerequisites of a perfect leader.554 The thirteenth prerequisite, argues Polqar, is the ability of the perfect man (ha-adam ha-shalem) to act according to his “human part” (ḥelek enoshi) and not according to his “bestial part” (ḥelek behemi).555 Acting according to one’s “human part” means transforming the hylic intellect from potentiality to actuality, in order to conjoin with the Active

Intellect. Cognizing the intelligibles is what Polqar terms man’s “acquired intellect:”556

When this acquired intellect is considered as something like matter with respect to the Active Intellect, and all the intelligibles collected together become another thing, namely, the Active Intellect itself; then man becomes

554 See my discussion of Moses as the perfect leader in chapter 2, pp. 65-71. 555 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 42-43. 556 Ibid. p. 43: “For the Active Intellect that he [=the perfect man] cognizes intellectually is not approached with respect to those intelligibles existing at one time potentially, but rather with respect to their being at that time completely in act. Then this intellect is called “acquired intellect.”

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[truly] man and something else, namely, a separate intellect, and all is united… When such a man, who is the end and first intention of the human species, is found to have had an emanation from that glorious intellect received by his rational faculty, he is a sage and a philosopher; when [he is found to have an emanation received] by his imaginative faculty, he is a prophet (navi ve- ḥozeh).557

One might suggest that in this passage Polqar does not distinguish clearly between the philosopher and the prophet. This passage could be interpreted as stating that the philosopher acquires the intelligibles intellectually, while the prophet acquires imaginative power, which is the distinctive feature of prophecy. I argue instead that to analyze this passage we must focus on the idea of one’s ultimate goal – when “man becomes [truly] man and something else, namely, separate intellect.” Man becomes a separate intellect when he conjoins with the Active Intellect; this conjunction occurs when he intellectualizes the intelligibles. During the time of the conjunction, there is no room for imagination – only for intellectual apprehension. The perfect man, the man “who is the end of the human species,” is the man whose intellect conjoins with the Active Intellect and becomes one with it. The prophet whose imaginative faculty receives the overflow from the Active Intellect cannot be considered a perfect man, for, as Polqar asserts, the conjoining occurs only when the two intellects unite – man’s intellect and the Active Intellect – not when the power of imagination meets the

Active Intellect.

If we try to interpret Polqar’s position in this passage in light of the al-

Fārābīan/Avicennian/Maimonidean method, we see that it differs fundamentally from that of Maimonides. For Maimonides, the prophet is first and foremost a philosopher, while for Polqar, it is clear that one can be a prophet without being a philosopher; indeed, in this passage Polqar distinguishes between the philosopher, who receives the emanation from the Active Intellect onto his rational faculty, and the prophet, who

557 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 43-44.

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receives the emanation onto his power of imagination. It is true that he does not maintain that a prophet cannot be a philosopher, and Moses is a good example of this combination; nevertheless, it is clear that for him, the prophet is not necessarily a philosopher. This position clearly goes against the Maimonidean view according to which the prophet is a philosopher simply by virtue of being a prophet. In fact, as in the next paragraph we will discuss, Polqar ranks the philosopher above the prophet.

Although the prophet has an intuitive grasp of reality, he does not unite with the

Active Intellect and consequently does not attain the ultimate purpose. Conjoining with the Active Intellect is the result of the long process of studying the theoretical sciences.

Finally, it is in treatise two of ‘Ezer ha-Dat that we see Polqar positioning himself completely against the position according to which the prophets attain knowledge in a superior and more perfect way than the philosophers. The following paragraph forms part of a dialogue between a young philosopher and an old traditionalist. This paragraph constitutes the most explicit argument in favor of the superiority of the philosopher over the prophet in ‘Ezer ha-Dat:558

558 Abraham Melamed completely ignores all of Polqar’s other discussions of prophecy vs. philosophy and focuses merely on the third chapter of treatise one, where Polqar discusses Moses as the ultimate leader. See his book The Philosopher-King in Medieval and Renaissance Jewish Political Thought, pp. 93-101. Shlomo Pines, in his analysis of Polqar’s view of prophecy, argues that Polqar, anticipating Spinoza, differentiates completely between philosophy and revelation, namely the prophet’s knowledge and the philosopher’s knowledge. However, Pines’ analysis, while correct as far as it goes, does not refer to the paragraphs from treatise four, where Polqar maintains that the prophet attains knowledge in a superior way than the philosopher. Hence, Pines concludes that according to Polqar, prophetic knowledge – the Torah – teaches only ethics and politics, and does not provide one with theoretical knowledge. See Shlomo Pines, “Some Topics on Polqar’s Treatise ʿEzer ha-Dat and their Parallels in Spinoza’s View,” pp. 420-432; Idem, Spinoza’s Tractates Theologico- Politicus and the Jewish Philosophical Tradition, pp. 499-504; Dov Schwartz agrees with Pines’ general claim that Polqar’s view of prophecy is closer to Spinoza’s than it is to that of the medievalists. However, Schwartz argues, correctly in my view, that unlike Spinoza, whose view of biblical prophecy takes in all the biblical prophets, including Moses, Polqar explicitly distinguishes between Mosaic and non-Mosaic prophecy. According to Polqar, Mosaic prophecy is first and foremost philosophical, while in Spinoza’s view Moses, like all other prophets, was endowed solely with a vivid imagination, and not with a strong intellectual power. See Dov Schwartz, Prophecy according to Isaac Polqar, Rabbi Shlomo Al-Konstantin, and Spinoza, pp. 57-61, especially pp. 60-61. Shalom Ẓadik agrees with Schwartz’s

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And indeed there is a difference between the wise man (ḥakham) and the prophet, with regard to their apprehension and the manner of their perfection; for the wise man grasps the hidden things and he grasps [the way] by which he truly grasps them, for the intellect is like a spring and a source [which] enables one to understand the hidden [knowledge] from what is known; it cognizes the middle term (gevul emẓa‘i) 559 and it makes it clear, he connects the major [premise] and the minor [premise] and ties them, so that he formulates the seeker’s question into a syllogism and removes any trap (mokkesh). The prophet [on the other hand] grasps a thing, but he does not know how [and] the way he grasps it and why it was bestowed upon him. And if one raises an objection [against] him, he cannot answer him, for he does not know the route [of his grasping], for prophecy rests solely upon the imaginative faculty and not on the intellectual faculty. And do not make a mistake about this.560 Therefore, an intelligent man mentioned the [following saying] the wise man is superior to the prophet.561 This is a complete argument and clear evidence, [in favor of what I have stated above] that it is a fact that it is impossible for the prophet to teach other[s] [the content] of his prophecy and the path through which he achieved [his knowledge]. Thus, [we] ought to mock and laugh at you [=traditionalist], and [we are] astonished at your assumption [that] you could be taught by one who is unable to teach.562

As in treatise four, quoted above, Polqar stresses that the philosopher uses philosophical tools, such as syllogism, to seek truth. In treatise four, Polqar implies that the philosopher’s knowledge is inferior to that of the prophet because he uses syllogism and searches for the middle term; the long process of study and its

criticism and argues that although Polqar generally distinguishes between the knowledge of the philosophers and the knowledge of the prophets, Moses is an exceptional case. Moses is both a perfect philosopher and a perfect prophet and the combination of these two characteristics enabled Moses to write the Torah. See, Shalom Ẓadik, Thesis, pp. 93-98. My analysis in this chapter takes into account all the passages where Polqar discusses prophecy, and is not limited to a specific paragraph. In my view, it is crucial to examine Polqar’s opinion in relation to the al-Fārābīan/Ibn Sinian and Maimonidean view. It is also important to study the four paragraphs within the context in which they appear in ‘Ezer ha-Dat; otherwise, Polqar’s discussion of prophecy would be inconsistent. 559 Maimonides, Introduction to Logic, chapters 6-7. 560 Breslau manuscript (the manuscript on which Levinger bases his critical edition), adds the following sentence here: “except insofar as [the intellectual faculty serves as] a passageway when [the prophet] needs to conceive something.” In four manuscripts (Oxford, Vatican, Paris, and London) this sentence is missing. Even if we take this sentence into account, it is possible that Polqar is indicating here that the intellect is a “passageway” in the sense that the prophets’ predictions cannot be irrational. "חכם עדיף מנביא“ :12:1 Batra, Bava Talmud, Babylonian 561 562 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 88-89. Interestingly, Polqar’s view differs from that of Albalag with regard to the prophet’s apprehension; while Albalag argues that the prophet’s knowledge is superior to that of the philosopher, Polqar maintains that the prophet does not understand the content of his vision. Further, according to Polqar, the prophet’s rank is inferior to the philosopher’s because the prophet is unable to teach others. Albalag argues the opposite, namely, the prophet teaches the content of his prophecy to all men, each according to his level of apprehension. See Albalag, Tiqqun Deʿot ha- Philosophim, Introduction, pp. 3-4; chapter 42, p. 67. It seems that Polqar is in agreement with the esoteric stance presented by Narboni. See Narboni’s Commentary on the Guide, 2:38.

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complexity make the task of seeking truth difficult and complicated for the philosopher. On the other hand, the prophet grasps reality quickly because his knowledge is intuitive. Here, in treatise two, however, it seems that Polqar reverses this argument: it is precisely because the philosopher uses philosophical means that his knowledge is superior to that of the prophet. Polqar emphasizes that the prophet is unable to teach others, inasmuch as what he grasps by imagination is not intellectual knowledge. Unlike him, the philosopher is the teacher par excellence.

Our analysis has brought to light three different opinions expressed by Polqar in ‘Ezer ha-Dat regarding the difference between a prophet and a philosopher. The first position I discussed, found in treatise four, states that the prophet’s apprehension is superior to the philosopher’s apprehension; the second position, found in treatises one and two, argues the opposite, namely, that the philosopher, by virtue of the nature of his knowledge and of his ability to teach others, is superior and more perfect than the prophet; finally, the third opinion, found in treatise three, is a compromise position whose aim is to soften the strict distinction drawn in the preceding two views on prophecy and philosophy. The prophet, according to this third opinion, is no longer one whose imaginative faculty alone receives the overflow, but rather, he intuitively apprehends the causes of reality through his intellectual faculty.

In order to understand how Polqar can apparently espouse three inconsistent views, I suggest that each paragraph be analyzed in terms of the context in which it is found. Such a contextual analysis will enable us to identify Polqar’s purpose in each treatise and thereby to understand his reasons for introducing three different opinions.

It is in treatise four that Polqar presents several groups of people who criticize the philosophers for deviating from traditional views. The way in which he presents the second group, the Kabbalists, allows us to understand Polqar’s anti-Kabbalistic

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view. I would argue that Polqar’s main purpose in referring to the prophet’s superiority over the philosopher here is not to present a philosophical explanation of the phenomenon of prophecy. Rather, he wants to beat the Kabbalists, the anti- rationalists, “at their own game,” – to show that, even granting the traditionalist framework adopted by the Kabbalists, the allegations they level against the philosophers are ridiculous. Presenting the Kabbalists as denying the prophets’ teaching, especially since they maintain that they are the only ones who possess the prophetic truth, suffices in terms of Polqar’s goal of defending philosophy.

In treatise three, it appears that Polqar attempts to bridge the gap between the two opinions. The scholar wishes to preserve the philosopher’s superiority to the prophet, and at the same time to strengthen the prophet’s position in line with the traditional view. And indeed, if this passage is taken at face value, it appears that

Polqar believes that the prophet has knowledge inaccessible to the philosopher.563

Contrary to this superficial reading of this paragraph, however, I would argue that

Polqar expresses an opinion here that is closer to the one he advocated in treatises one and two. In my view, Polqar is determined to distinguish between the way one becomes a prophet and the way one becomes a philosopher. The former becomes a prophet by possessing a vivid imagination. The latter devotes his life to the ongoing and constant study necessary to attain philosophical knowledge.

The Ibn Sinian view, presented in the third treatise, emphasizes the prophet’s unique intuition which allows him to grasp the causes of reality. It is not clear here whether Polqar is arguing that the prophet, whose imaginative faculty plays a central role, is able to conjoin with the Active Intellect. Moreover, the discussion of prophecy

563 Here I refer mainly to the last part of the quotation, where Polqar argues that (1) the philosopher apprehends the visible and apparent causes and the prophet apprehends the concealed and obscure ones and that (2) the philosopher grasps only some of the causes, while the prophet apprehends all the causes and impediments.

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in this treatise focuses on one of its aspects: predicting future events with respect to the “nature of the possible” (tevaʿ ha-efshar). Polqar rejects, as he does throughout

‘Ezer ha-Dat, the theory of determinism, which necessitates the occurrence of all events in the sublunar world. Contrary to the theory of determinism, the prophet’s prediction is constrained by the nature of eternal possibility, so that his prediction only comes true if all the conditions are fulfilled.564 Polqar uses biblical examples to illustrate that prophetic predictions do not necessarily come to pass: for example, when upon returning home Jacob is about to meet his brother Esau, from whom he has stolen the birthright and blessing, he remembers God’s promise:” O Lord who said to me return to your native land and I will deal bountifully with you” (Gen.

32:10). Two verses later, Jacob reveals his fears: “[God] deliver me, I pray, from the hand of my brother, from the hand of Esau; else I fear he may come and strike me down, mothers and children alike” (Gen. 32:12). Jacob had a prophetic dream in which God assured him that no harm should come to him if he were to return to his homeland. He realizes, however, that this prophetic assurance does not entirely guarantee his wellbeing, for Esau possesses free will and therefore the ability to kill him. Therefore, Jacob prepares to protect his family and himself in case the prophecy would not be fulfilled, due to the nature of the eternal possibility. Because of his ability to grasp causes in a more intuitive manner, the prophet can apprehend and predict future events more rapidly than the philosopher, whose learning process requires tremendous effort over long periods of time, and in particular focus on one course of study.

As an apologetic introduction to ‘Ezer ha-Dat, treatise one seeks mainly to placate the members of the Jewish community and to prevent them from accusing

564 Cf. Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 4:a; Hasdai Crescas, The Light of the Lord, Treatise 2:4, chapter 2; Gersonides, The Wars of the Lord, Treatise 6, chapter 3, pp. 75; Rashi on Exodus 13:11; 15:16.

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Polqar of heresy. This treatise as a whole, mainly aims to prove that philosophical principles do not contradict Judaism. In particular, chapter three, which clearly distinguishes between the philosopher’s apprehension and the prophet’s apprehension, seeks to establish that Moses alone could unite with the Active Intellect. Moses’ conjoining with the Active Intellect represents the highest degree a human being can attain, and it follows that Moses was certainly both a perfect philosopher as well as a perfect prophet.

With regard to the radical view Polqar presents in treatise two, we already suggested, in chapter one of this dissertation, that the young philosopher’s opinions represents the radical approach to philosophy often held by young and enthusiastic scholars. By using the voice of the young philosopher, Polqar was able to express radical and unique views that were unpopular both in the Maimonidean era and before. It is also possible that the young philosopher reflects the opinions of the young

Polqar, who at that time was keen to defend philosophical principles, even at the expense of positioning himself against his community. In this case, protecting philosophy means separating, in a manner that foreshadows Spinoza, philosophical investigation from traditional/theological beliefs; they become two disciplines that use different means to achieve different purposes. Indeed, the tension between the opinion presented in the second treatise by the young philosopher and the opinion presented in treatise three by the mature philosopher mirrors the different methods of aligning philosophy and tradition. The young philosopher does not use any hermeneutical tools for the purpose of reconciling the two disciplines. Rather, he focuses only on the tension between reason and revelation, between philosophical principles and tradition.565 On the other hand, the mature philosopher, precisely because of

565 Cf. the Guide, Introduction.

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responsibility he feels toward his fellow Jews, has developed the hermeneutical tools necessary to soften this tension. His concern is not merely to justify philosophical ideas; he also feels responsible for the peace of his community, and in other cases, as

Polqar attests in the introduction to ‘Ezer ha-Dat, for his own safety as a philosopher.

In sum, we find different opinions about the rank of the prophet in ‘Ezer ha-

Dat. The first opinion had already been introduced by Avicenna. According to him, there are two types of prophecy, a lower and a higher type. In the lower type of prophecy, the emanation overflows from the Active Intellect through the recipient’s undeveloped intellectual faculty and onto his imaginative faculty. In the second and higher type of prophecy, the prophet receives the emanation from the Active Intellect onto his fully developed intellectual faculty, as a result of which he effortlessly obtains all the knowledge that the philosopher possesses. While in treatise one Polqar only alludes to holding a different view from Avicenna, he fully develops this view in treatise two. Here he introduces the radical view, through the young philosopher, according to which there is an essential distinction between the philosopher and the prophet. While the philosopher receives the emanation from the Active Intellect onto his intellectual faculty, the prophet receives it onto his imagination.

We can point to three main differences between Avicenna’s and Polqar’s views. First, Avicenna argues that both types of prophet obtain knowledge effortlessly, yet in a natural manner. Polqar partially rejects the idea of achieving knowledge without investing time and study. For him, the natural stance of apprehending the causes of existence should be attained through the demanding study of the natural sciences; the highest level of knowledge can only be reached through constant philosophical investigation. Second, following from this disagreement,

Avicenna and Polqar also differ regarding man’s ultimate goal; for Avicenna, this

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goal is to attain the highest level of prophetic ability, while for Polqar, it is to dedicate one’s life to philosophical study and to minimize the use of the imagination as much as possible. Moses, the perfect man and a perfect prophet, is also the model of perfection for everyone else. Lastly, and most importantly in my view, Polqar accords great importance to the ability to pass one’s knowledge on to others. In the dialogue between the young philosopher and the traditionalist, we find Polqar insisting that the prophet is incapable of passing on his knowledge to others, and that this is why the scholars mock those who are engaged in the laughable endeavor of seeking to learn from a prophet who cannot teach them.

With the exception of Moses, then, all prophets rank lower than philosophers, for the wise man is superior to the prophet. Moses, for his part, was both a perfect philosopher and a perfect prophet. It was Moses’ skill as a philosopher that allowed him to know existence as it is, philosophically, while his skill as a prophet possessed of a fully developed imagination, combined with his fully developed intellect, enabled him to act as both a teacher and a leader of his people.

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5.2 The Mosaic Commandments: A Necessary Means to Man’s Ultimate Purpose

We have already established that Polqar advocated a universal approach to the question of who can attain man’s ultimate purpose: he argues that anyone, Jew or non-Jew, has the potential to achieve the ultimate goal – attaining the world to come by conjoining with the Active Intellect.566 In chapter two of this thesis, I examined

Polqar’s view of the Mosaic Law as a whole, in comparison with other laws.

According to Polqar, a true religion must meet two requirements: first, it must teach its adherents true opinions, and second, it must educate them to perform proper actions. The Mosaic Law as a whole, according to Polqar, meets these two conditions; it is the best existing Law insofar as it leads its adherents to the welfare of both the body and the soul.567

This section has a twofold aim: first to examine the Mosaic commandments, not in relation to the laws of other faiths but rather as a particular set of rules that are binding solely for the Jewish people; and second, to understand the commandments’ function in the life of the multitude and in the life of the philosophers. Since, according to Polqar, the intellectual apprehension of the philosophers and of the vulgar naturally differs, each group will observe the commandments according to its level of understanding. Because true opinions are acquired through philosophical investigation, I argue that for Polqar, observing the commandments is only a step necessary to attain true happiness. True, observing the commandments is a necessary prerequisite for attaining this goal. The commandments educate a person to behave properly and to hold true opinions, such as the unity of God; however, they do not

566 See chapter 2, pp. 131-148. 567 Polqar does not differentiate between the perfection and the wellbeing of the body (and the perfection and the wellbeing of the soul).

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provide the philosophical tools to fully comprehend these truths – that is the role of philosophy.568

Polqar defends the Mosaic Law by arguing that it endows all its adherents with true opinions. However, while the vulgar are content to understand these opinions on a superficial level, the few individuals who have the potential of engaging in philosophical study use the true opinions taught by the law as a starting point for attaining a higher level of knowledge. Once they have done so, their approach to the function of the commandments and to true happiness fundamentally differs from that of the multitude.

In the first chapter (shaʿar) of treatise one, Polqar argues that any society necessarily needs a lawgiver who is qualified to establish a set of rules that ensures both individual and collective happiness. Then, in chapter two, Polqar categorizes laws by type, insofar as they seek to regulate different modes of human behavior:

The kind of human action that is unavoidable, as I noted above, can be divided into three classes: how a man acts toward himself; how he acts toward his household; and how he acts toward the men of his city. When the intelligent man (maskil) looks at what actions our Law (minhagei torateinu) [mandates], examining each one of them, he will find them to contain the most superior actions and excellent practices.569

The three classes that Polqar lists here present, in my view, the three prerequisites for an individual to attain his goal. Interestingly, Polqar includes the commandments concerning impure foods and garments in the commandments related to the first class, arguing that the impurity of the body necessarily leads to intellectual deficiency:

In the first class one finds that the Law mandates bodily cleanliness and the avoidance of impurities, such as contact with a carcass… In order to accustom our souls to accept those truths that constitute our ultimate felicity, we are admonished to perform and to carry out everything that we have undertaken…And in order to sanctify and benefit us further, all of the coarse and thick foods that corrupt the body and render it ill are forbidden to us: foods that dim the bright light of the

568 Cf. the Guide, 1:3 569 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 36; Cf. Teshuvat Apikoros, 3a-3b; Aristotle, Physics, book 1, chapter 1 1252a.

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intellect, through whose perfection and purity the soul cleaves to its Creator, and returns to the place from which it was taken.570

In order to attain ultimate felicity – knowing the truths that constitute man’s ultimate happiness – man needs to reach a high level of theoretical knowledge, a level that is achieved solely through the study of the theoretical sciences. If a person is not careful with what he eats (dietary laws), or with the objects and people with whom he comes into contact (leprosy or carcass laws), his body is in danger of becoming sick, and consequently he will not be able to dedicate himself to studying the theoretical sciences. Keeping our body healthy by staying away from contaminating food, objects, or people is a necessary condition for one’s soul to “cleave to its Creator.”

For man to be physically healthy and consequently able to focus on philosophical study, he also needs to maintain excellent interactions with his closest relatives – his family. The second class of law, then, concerning man’s behavior toward members of his household, consists of rules whose goal is threefold: proper health, an orderly household, and moral virtue. The rules necessary for maintaining proper health include commandments forbidding sexual relations with menstruating women; to use

Polqar’s words, “this practice [refraining from such relations] is the cause of cleanliness and purity, as well as the preparation of the semen for generation; it is also the cause of our being saved from the tremendous illness of leprosy.” The rules necessary for maintaining an orderly household include, for example, the commandment to respect one’s parents. Finally, the laws leading to the acquisition of moral virtue include such commandments as acting mercifully and generously toward one’s servants and maids.571

570 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 36. Cf. the Guide, 3:25-49. 571 Ibid. Cf. the Guide, 3:38.

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A healthy and orderly domestic life is possible only if one lives in a safe environment. The third class of law, thus, regulates the interaction between the residents of one’s city.572 Here Polqar enumerates five types of laws: (1) loving your neighbor for the sake of peace; (2) avoiding greed and jealousy, which lead directly to violence and theft; (3) being forgiving rather than resentful; (4) being generous and gracious,573 particularly to the poor; 574 and (5) observing all judgments and laws that regulate men’s dealings with each other.

It follows, then, that the peaceful city that guarantees the wellbeing of its citizens provides the ideal conditions for preserving a healthy domestic life. Both are necessary preconditions for one to be healthy; this healthy state, in turn, is required in order to pursue the highest human goal – conjoining with the Active Intellect through the study of the theoretical sciences. This also offers good living conditions to non- philosophers, who benefit too.

Later on in the same discussion, Polqar uses the Ten Commandments to show how the Mosaic Law fulfills the requirements for living a good ethical and political life and for properly grasping true opinions.575 The Ten Commandments, argues Polqar, are divided into two groups: the first group consists of the commandments that “are necessarily required for belief in what is true, solely insofar as it is true.”576 The second group consists of the commandments that “are required for man’s life and

572 The third class appears to allude to the people of the city (she’ar anshei ‘iro) in general and not to the members of the Jewish community. Cf. the Guide 3:48. 573 It seems that for Polqar, not being greedy is a necessary gateway to being generous. One begins by not seeking to infringe on the rights of others; only afterwards does one rise to the level of genuine generosity. 574 The first four laws constitute a direct response to Abner’s critique of the Jewish law. According to him, Mosaic Law educates Jews to be just only to their own community and be exclusionary toward gentiles. See Yitzhak Baer, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, pp. 206-208. 575 Polqar does not claim here that the Torah teaches one how to attain true opinions. Instead, he claims that the Mosaic Law contains true opinions. 576 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 38. Cf. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Repentance, 10:2: “one who serves [God] out of love occupies himself in the Torah and the mitzvoth and walks in the paths of wisdom for no ulterior motive: not because of fear that evil will occur, nor in order to acquire benefit. Rather, he does what is true because it is true, and ultimately, good will come because of it.”

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survival in this world alone, since he cannot exist without them.”577 The reason for this division is to distinguish the intellectual laws - the true opinions - from the social laws that are essential to keep a community whole. It is not entirely clear whether

Polqar follows Maimonides’ theory according to which the vulgar must be educated to believe in truths such as God’s unity and incorporeality, even though they cannot philosophically understand them.578 In giving great importance to the Mosaic Law’s role in teaching true opinions, Polqar appears to lean toward Maimonides more than toward Averroes, who openly argued for concealing philosophical truths from the multitude.

Polqar stresses the importance of the order of the commandments, arguing that the location of each commandment reflects its significance relative to the others.579 To him, the first commandment, I am the Lord your God, is most important insofar as it indicates God’s existence. The second, You shall have no other gods besides Me, denotes God’s unity. Acknowledging God’s unity is secondary to acknowledging His existence. Polqar links the third, You shall not take in vain the name of the Lord your

God, with recognizing “God’s Truth” (amitat ha-El), insofar as a person who swears falsely in the name of God denies His being true. From a philosophical point of view, this would seem to be problematic, for God’s attribute – Truth – is identical to His being a necessary Existent (meḥuyav ha-meẓiut). All other created beings are contingent and therefore are dependent on God’s Truth. Polqar follows the

Maimonidean School that identifies God’s existence with His unity. So how can

Polqar argue that the third commandment – His truth – can be distinguished from His existence and His unity? Perhaps we can suggest that Polqar’s ranking expresses the

577 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 38. 578 Cf. the Guide, 1:35; Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh 1:35. 579 Several commentators have argued that the first five commandments reflect the laws between man and God, and the last five reflect the laws between men toward one another. Cf. Abarbanel, Commentary on the Torah, Exodus 20:3; Nachmanides, Commentary on the Torah, Exodus 20:13.

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importance of the commandments as perceived by human beings; this is to say that while denying God’s truth by swearing falsely is metaphysically equivalent to denying His existence, in the eyes of human beings, it is considered a different, less serious matter. The fourth commandment, Remember the Sabbath day and keep it holy, expresses the essence of one’s soul. By virtue of his intellectual faculty, man surpasses other creatures, and observing the Sabbath symbolizes this unique virtue.580

The last commandment of the first group, Honor your father and your mother, is related to the second group as well. However, Polqar stresses that the reason this commandment is located among the first five commandments is because it, too, teaches true opinions. More precisely, for Polqar, the proper attitude one should assume with respect to God is connected with the idea that the father contributes the form, the mother contributes the matter, and both are associated with God in bringing the child into being. Since the parents serve as God’s partners in bringing an individual into existence, dishonoring one’s parents is equivalent to dishonoring

God.581

The second group of the Ten Commandments shows the severity of murder relative to adultery, theft, lying, and coveting a married woman, even in one’s thoughts.582 This group of commandments, ranging from murder as the most severe to

580 Polqar does not explain exactly how the Sabbath symbolizes man’s superiority over the other creatures, and refers his readers to his essay Interpretation of the Book of Genesis, a book that is unfortunately lost. It is possible that for Polqar, God “resting on the Sabbath” serves as symbol that the goal and purpose of creation has been attained. Since God’s “resting” follows upon the creation of man, it follows from this that it is man who is the crown of creation and its goal and purpose. While this explanation is a fairly standard trope, Polqar gives it a characteristically philosophical twist, maintaining that it is man’s intellectual faculty which is responsible for his superiority over the other creatures. 581 Cf. Babylonian Talmud Tractate Kiddushin, 30:2; Tractate Nidah 31:1; Sifra Kedoshim 1:4-10. 582 Maimonides follows the authoritative halakhic view, according to which coveting includes action. Cf. Sefer ha-Miẓvoth, negative commandments 265-266; Mishneh Torah, Laws of Robbery and Lost Property, 1:9-11. Other commentators follow a more peshat oriented approach and maintain that according to the plain sense of the verse, one should not covet one’s wife even in thought. Cf. Ibn ʿEzra, Commentary on the Torah, Exodus, 20:2; David Kimḥi, commentary on Micha, 2:2. Polqar follows the approach of Ibn ʿEzra and David Kimḥi, interpreting the verse in a peshat manner.

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desiring another’s wife as the least, ensures the physical and moral safety of society.

Clearly, this second group of commandments precedes the first group in terms of when they are applied, but not in importance.

Polqar claims that both groups of commandments, intellectual and social, were given to us for our own benefit, and that we should neither seek an external reward for obeying the commandments nor expect an external punishment for disobeying them.

Polqar now proceeds to generalize from his discussion of the Ten Commandments, applying his analysis to all the Torah’s commandments:

Thus we have demonstrated for you how pristine and sacred our Law is in all three of the aforementioned classes, and that all its commandments and the admonitions have been mandated for our benefit and our good. As Solomon said: He that keeps the commandment keeps his own soul; but he that despises his way shall die [Prov. 19:16]. Now if the commandments were not mandated for our benefit and good, as I just mentioned, but rather were royal decree that expressed the will of the Lord, blessed be He, as the opinion of some of our vulgar fools, then we would not be permitted to change anything about them, nor could our sages say, “one who is in distress is exempt from the requirement of sitting in the Festival Booth.”583

All of the commandments have true value insofar as they lead one to attain the

true human perfection, and one should not perform them in a spirit of submission

to an incomprehensible divine decree, but rather out of understanding that by

following these laws, both individual and collective happiness can be achieved.

Polqar remarks that the fact that the law is flexibly applied in many situations

supports his view. If the commandments simply represent divine decrees, they

should be applied in an inflexible manner. It is only because the commandments

serve the human good that the law suspends their application in special

circumstances. Now, since the needs of human beings change from one situation

to another, and since the commandments were granted to us for our own benefit,

583 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 37-38. Polqar does not discuss retribution in the form of reward and punishment here. Cf. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Shabbat, chapter 2.

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the social commandments’ specifics must allow for variation and change.584 Many

of the commandments, as they were given to the Israelites through Moses, must

not be perceived as static laws. In fact, claims Polqar, we can find exceptions to

many of these rules. A particularly striking example is his interpretation of “an

eye for an eye”: while the peshat meaning of “an eye for an eye” is retaliation, the

flexible application of the law allows monetary compensation instead.

The relationship between the ethical and political commandments on the one

hand, and the intellectual commandments on the other, is now clear; in order for

an individual to observe the intellectual commandments, he must first maintain his

health, act in a moral way, and live safely in his community. For if he is sick or in

constant pursuit of material fortune, for example, he will not be able to focus on

studying the theoretical sciences. Similarly, he will not be able to devote time to

study if he lives in fear and needs to use his time and effort to protect himself and

his relatives.

What, however, of the case where one has already attained theoretical

knowledge? In such a case, what would the importance of observing social

commandments be? Polqar offers his answer to this question at the very beginning

of the second chapter of treatise one:

When this [the spiritual and holy faculty] is completely perfected it does not need any instrument or body, for its end is nothing but the perfect apprehension of knowledge and true belief.585

Here Polqar suggests that if a man attains intellectual perfection, then the social, medical, ethical, and political commandments become completely useless. As long as man’s intellect unites with the Active Intellect, he no longer has to provide for bodily

584 For example, the sixth commandment “you shall not murder” is the general rule; however, this rule is overridden in the case of self-defense. 585 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 34. Cf. the Guide 2:40. One can see Polqar’s suggestion as implying that this option is a theoretical one which no human being, with the exception of Moses, can actually attain.

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needs. However, man’s conjoining with the Active Intellect is an intermittent rather than a constant state. When man’s intellect is no longer united with the Active

Intellect, he must “return” to society, and as part of this return keep the social commandments.

Polqar also discusses the importance of the commandments in treatise two of ‘Ezer ha-Dat. The old traditionalist serves as Polqar’s mouthpiece for expressing the traditional point of view regarding the commandments: he accuses the philosophers of neglecting the observance of the practical commandments, such as praying, and of treating the sages’ teachings with contempt.586 The young philosopher responds that it is not that the philosophers devalue the commandments – they value them as much as the traditionalists. However, while for the traditionalist the value of the commandments inheres in their being divine decrees, for the philosophers they have true value and are for our benefit. The young philosopher employs the same argument as Polqar in treatise one, namely, that the commandments are intrinsically good; they were given to us to guide us to a better life, and not because God “needs” us to follow

His commandments.587

If you had sinned, will it affect Him? And [even] if your transgressions are multiplied, will it have an impact on Him? If you are righteous, how it will affect Him? Or what does He receive of your hand (of your actions)? Your wickedness may profit may hurt a man as you are; and your righteousness may profit a human begin (Job. 35: 6-8). And if you consider this well, you will know that it is impossible that there should be a case where a righteous person is in adversity, and the wicked person prospers588 inasmuch as the commandments are for the benefit of man while sins are detrimental for him. And how marvelous is the sage’s saying: be not like slaves who serve their master for the sake of compensation, but be like slaves who serve their master not for the sake of compensation589 except for that portion that through the commandments one

586 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 73-75. 587 In treatise one, the intrinsic rationality of the commandments is constructed with royal decrees, while in treatise two the commandments are constructed with degrees of importance; few “light” commandments are not (or less) observed for the greater “weighty” commandments. צדיק ורע לו ורשע וטוב לו 588 589 Tractate Avot 1:3. Polqar uses Maimonides’s version in the introduction to the Tractate Avot.

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attains the world to come. And now who has appointed you to be my advisor to encroach upon my domain and who is he and where is he who seeks to chastise a person for [the latter’s] benefit [and who rebukes him even if he rejects your reproach] except for a father who rebukes his son or his daughter. Spare me your reproaches and do not seek, through your speeches, to show me the path to my own benefit through your speeches.590

Intriguingly, the young philosopher does not conclude his reply with the above argument, but continues:

And if you see me being lax with reference to a few of the lighter commandments in order to occupy myself with the weighty and praiseworthy ones which God the great (nora’ ʿalilot) commanded me for my own good, do not suspect me of turning aside from my paths and do not criticize my character traits.591

The young philosopher divides the commandments into two classes: the

“weighty” commandments and the “light” commandments. Taking Polqar’s philosophy as a whole, it is reasonable to argue that he does not consider, for example, the study of astronomy and sitting in the Sukkah as equally significant. He has already argued in numerous places that man should aspire to conjoin with the

Active Intellect, and that this conjoining is not the direct result of observing the practical commandments, but rather that it is attained through the study of the sciences. This passage ends with the young philosopher’s request that the traditionalist should not judge him if he, the young philosopher, seems to neglect some of the “light” commandments.592 According to the young philosopher, who represents the radical philosophical view, the ostensible neglect of the “light” commandments makes it possible for him to engage with the “weighty” commandment: studying the theoretical sciences. Even if the young philosopher does

590 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 77. 591 Ibid. 592 Polqar is probably leaning on Pirkei Avot 2: “Be as careful with a minor mitzvah as with a major one, for you do not know the rewards of the mitzvoth.” sages the sources, rabbinic the in Already ”.והוי זהיר במצוה קלה כבחמורה שאין אתה יודע מתן שכרן של מצות“ admit that there is a difference between “light” commandments and “weighty” commandments, and that one should observe them with equal seriousness.

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not represent Polqar’s genuine view, he does seem to represent a certain type of philosopher who, Polqar admits, do not observe all the commandments with the same seriousness.

The traditionalists consider all commandments to be “weighty.” For them, unlike for the philosophers, the practical commandments are not simply a necessary stage for gaining theoretical knowledge and thus attaining man’s true happiness. That is, the commandments are not just a means to an end, but rather an end in itself. Failing to observe a practical commandment, then, constitutes a blatant violation of the divine law.593 This traditionalist view, according to the philosophers, fails to take in the whole picture as a result of focusing on a very narrow aspect of observing the commandments. It follows that the traditionalists, for whom the observance of the practical laws is paramount, will never attain the true end, that is, ultimate happiness, for they see the commandments as the end, rather than as the means to the end of ultimate happiness.

In treatise one (chapters one and two) Polqar expresses the traditional approach, according to which the Mosaic commandments as a whole guarantee the attainment of true felicity. In treatise two, by contrast, Polqar espouses a radical view, according to which the Mosaic commandments are divided into two types – the “important” ones, the true opinions expressed in the Torah, and the “less important” ones, laws that do not have a direct connection with gaining true opinions. As we saw earlier, in the second sha’ar of treatise one, Polqar maintains that the law itself allows for a certain inbuilt flexibility in its application. I would suggest that we view the young

593 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 80-81: “And how can one compare the speed of the hero to one who stumbles and by the same token the reward of he who performs the commandments is not the same as that of the one who is lax performing it. Why did you assume that you will find favors in the eyes of your Lord considering that His commandments are light and despised in your eyes and do not say inasmuch as I occupied myself with the praiseworthy knowledge. I have no need for any deed, for the study is not the main thing but the action is what is precious.”

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philosopher in treatise two as extending this idea and taking it one step further. That is, since the philosophers attain a high level of knowledge, they may apply the law flexibly to their own situations and exempt themselves when they feel it is necessary or beneficial to do so.

In light of these two opposing views – the traditional, according to which the commandments are divine decrees, and the radical view, according to which some commandments are more important than others – the next paragraph from treatise four is particularly interesting:

And indeed the one who attains the purpose of the true science, or gets closer to it, and he is the one [that is called] the philosopher and the sage, he will perform and will act and will do all the commandments that are proper [Metukanot]594 of our law, light and weighty, for he sees that they are correct and suitable according to the judgment [Shikul Daʿat] and [that they] agree with the truth and with equity [Yosher] that man will do them and lives by them (according to them) and he will detach [himself] from the sins for they are [equivalent] to evil, to damage and to corruption [Hefsed]595

There are two ways of reading this paragraph; one, interpreting it in accordance with treatise one, and the other, reading it in accordance with treatise two.

If we interpret this passage in light of treatise one, we could argue that Polqar agrees with the traditional point of view, according to which all the commandments, light and weighty, must be observed. Polqar nevertheless differentiates between the mode of observation of the vulgar and of the philosopher. The former follows the commandments unthinkingly, without apprehending their true purpose; he does not understand the real reason why he should observe them. The latter, on the other hand, observes the Mosaic Laws because he understands their importance. It follows that the vulgar has a mistaken extrinsic conception of the reasons for keeping the

in interpreted be can (”כל המצוות המתוקנות“) ”proper that commandments the “all wording Polqar’s 594 two ways: (1) all the commandments, which are proper. According to this interpretation the philosopher must observe all the Mosaic commandments because all of them are proper; (2) all the commandments that are proper. According to this interpretation the philosopher should observe only the commandments which are proper, meaning that not all of them are. 595 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 155.

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commandments, while the philosopher has an intellectual apprehension of their intrinsic reasons for being.

However, in my view, reading this paragraph in light of the second treatise reveals Polqar’s esoteric opinion: unlike the vulgar, the philosophers are exempt from following all the commandments. Because they apprehend the intrinsic meaning of the commandments, they can decide whether or not obeying a certain commandment in a particular situation assists him in acquiring true opinions. In this case, “all the proper commandments” does not refer to the 613 commandments but rather to all the laws among the 613 commandments that the philosophers determine as “proper.” For example, in a case when a student faces two options, attending the afternoon prayer or his mathematical lesson, it seems that Polqar would recommend that the student participate in his math lesson.596

Why does Polqar express three different opinions regarding the importance of the Mosaic commandments? The three views, I would argue, correspond to three types of Jews. The first approach, the traditional, is clearly appropriate for the vulgar.

The fact that Polqar chooses to express this view in the first part of ‘Ezer ha-Dat, the apologetic introduction to his book, indicates that traditional Jews are the audience being addressed.

The second, radical view, expressed by the young philosopher, reflects the stage of young and the enthusiastic philosophers who pursue philosophical knowledge without considering the political and social situation of their community. The young philosopher constantly mocks and embarrasses the old traditionalist by pointing to the latter’s ignorance and to his unjustified attempts to accuse the philosophers of heresy.

An enthusiastic philosopher may lose sight of the reality that focusing on

596 The Life of Avicenna: A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation, pp. 30-31. Here Avicenna defends the action of drinking wine to allow him to study philosophy.

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philosophical study and, consequently, rejecting traditional views may ultimately undermine the communal order.

The mature philosopher, unlike the radical philosopher, strives to observe all the commandments. However, insofar as the mature philosopher is ultimately the judge of which commandments he should observe, the option of suspending the observance of some of the commandments, as indicated by Polqar’s statement about

“commandments that are proper,” remains open to him.

The true and mature philosopher, as Polqar describes him in treatise four, has complete autonomy to act according to his judgment, for he is on a higher level than both the vulgar and even the young philosopher. Unlike the vulgar, the mature philosopher observes the commandments on account of their intrinsic rationality. But unlike the young philosopher, he considers not only his own intellectual perfection but also the wellbeing of the community. Thus, he can determine which of the alternatives is better for him to act upon; in some cases, he will postpone his studies if the communal good demands it. By seeing the whole picture, the mature philosopher preserves a sort of a “status quo” within his community, with the long-term purpose of attaining his individual happiness.

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5.3 Man’s Ultimate Purpose

In the previous sections, we clarified Polqar’s position with regard to the essential difference between the prophet and the philosopher and with regard to the commandments’ role in the life of both the vulgar and the philosophers. As we saw, with reference to the difference between the prophet and the philosopher, it is clear that, for Polqar, the philosopher is intellectually superior to the prophet: the philosopher is endowed with intellectual perfection, achieved through constant study, and with the ability to pass his knowledge on to others, whereas the prophet is endowed with perfect imagination. With reference to the function of the commandments, we saw that Polqar distinguishes between two types of commandments – the “light” and the “weighty” ones – and argues that both should be observed. True, the philosophers who dedicate their lives to attaining knowledge in order to conjoin with the Active Intellect have no intrinsic need to follow the “light” commandments, inasmuch as these are not directly connected to studying the theoretical sciences. Nevertheless, Polqar argues that, having reached his high level of knowledge, the mature philosopher would follow the “light” commandments, at least in public, in order to set an example for his community, as well as for his own self protection. As a political being, as Averroes notes, the philosopher depends on the good political order to which these commandments contribute, which might be undermined if he failed to observe them. These analyses will now allow us to examine

Polqar’s notion of man’s ultimate purpose.

As we shall see in this chapter, Polqar agrees with the Maimonidean model, according to which man’s ultimate purpose is to receive the overflow from the Active

Intellect by actualizing his intellect. However, his view deviates from that of

Maimonides in two crucial respects. The first concerns the identity of the virtuous

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man, which for Maimonides is the prophet and for Polqar the divine man (ish elohi); the second concerns the nature of this virtuous man and the question of how an individual can reach this level. According to Maimonides, the prophet is connected to the people by his nature, insofar as he brings them God’s word. His return to society is the last stage of what defines him as a “prophet.” For Polqar, on the other hand, the divine man is the perfect philosopher who conjoins with the Active intellect as much as possible. His return to the people as their leader is not his ultimate purpose, but rather a necessary outcome of the rank he has achieved. The divine man is the leader of the people not because he is a prophet who has perfected himself intellectually, ethically, and in terms of his power of imagination; he is the leader of the people because his intellectual rank necessitates his returning – he has no choice to act in a different manner. Polqar lists two reasons why the divine man returns to society: the first is “divine universal providence” (hashgaḥa kalalit elohit), and the second is the divine man’s generosity (midat ha-nedivut asher bo).

As we have already argued, Maimonides and Polqar hold different views regarding prophecy, the nature of the prophet, and the way he can be distinguished from the philosopher. According to Maimonides, the prophet is the perfect man because he has attained perfection in both his intellectual and imaginative faculties, as well as in his moral virtue. The true nature of prophecy, according to Maimonides,

consists in its being an overflow overflowing from God, may He be cherished and honored, through the intermediation of the Active Intellect, towards the rational faculty in the first place and thereafter toward the imaginative faculty. This is the highest degree of man and the ultimate term of perfection that can exist for his species.597

597 The Guide, 2:36.

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The prophet prepares himself to receive the emanation from the Active

Intellect first by improving his ethical virtue and then by devoting himself to acquiring knowledge of the theoretical sciences. At that point,

[When] his imaginative faculty, which is as perfect as possible, acts and receives from the intellect an overflow corresponding to his speculative perfection, this individual will only apprehend divine and most extraordinary matters, [and he] will see only God and His angels, and will only be aware and achieve knowledge of matters that constitute true opinions and general directives for the well-being of men in their relations with one another.598

The overflow received from the Active Intellect, as Maimonides argues in the next chapter (2:37), either suffices to perfect the prophet alone or, in addition, causes him to make others perfect. In a similar fashion, when a philosopher receives the emanation from the Active Intellect onto his intellectual faculty, this emanation is either sufficient to perfect him alone, or in addition serves to make others perfect:

It is known that in each of these three classes [philosophers, prophets, and cities’ governs] there are very many differences of degree and that each of the first two classes is divided into two parts, as we have explained. For the measure of the overflow that comes to each of these two is either such as only to render the individual who receives it perfect and to have no other effect, or such that from that individual’s perfection there is something left over that suffices to make others perfect. With regard to the first class – that of the men of science – the measure of the overflow that reaches the rational faculty of the individual is sometimes such that it makes him into a man who inquires and is endowed with understanding, who knows and discerns, but is not moved to teach others or to compose works, neither finding in himself a desire for this or having the ability to do it. And sometimes the measure of the overflow is such that it moves him of necessity to compose works and to teach. The same holds good for the second class.599

The philosopher and the prophet, each in his own domain, cannot choose whether or not to emanate onto others; if the measure of emanation they receive has something left over, after perfecting themselves, which is sufficient for perfecting others, it is impossible for them to prevent the overflow from emanating onto others

598 The Guide, 2:36. 599 Ibid. 2:37.

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“until it reaches an individual beyond whom this overflow cannot go and whom it merely renders perfect.”600 To strengthen his argument, Maimonides cites Jeremiah’s words: the word of YHWH has meant for me insult, derision, all day long. I used to say, I will not think about him, I will not speak in his name any more. Then there seemed to be a fire burning in my heart, imprisoned in my bones. The effort to restrain it wearied me, I could not bear it [Jer. 20:8-9]. Jeremiah’s cry demonstrates that the prophets had no choice but to emanate the overflow onto others when the emanation was meant to overflow in this way.

The end goal for the virtuous man – the prophet, according to Maimonides – is to return to society as its leader, establishing the proper political order with which to govern the people. Possessing the power of imagination and having perfected himself morally and most importantly intellectually, the prophet must emulate God’s governance of the world. In the Guide1:54, one of his most famous chapters on the limits of the human intellect, Maimonides adopts al- Fārābī’s view that the prophet should strive to imitate God’s actions:601

It behooves the governor of a city, if he is a prophet, to acquire similarity to these attributes, so that these actions may proceed from his according to a determined measure and according to the deserts of the people who are affected by them and not merely because of his following a passion. He should not let loose the reins of anger nor let passion gain mastery over him, for all passions are evil; but, on the contrary, he should guard against them as far as this lies within the capacity of man. Sometimes, with regard to some people, he should be keeping anger and jealous and avenging in accord with their deserts, not out of mere anger; so he may order an individual to be burned without being angry and incensed with him and without hating him, because he perceives the deserts of that individual and considers the great benefit that many people will derive from the accomplishment of the action in question… We have gone beyond the subject of this chapter, however, we have made clear why Scripture, in enumerating His actions, has confined itself here to those mentioned above, and that those actions are needed for the governance of cities. For the utmost virtue of man is to become like unto Him, may be

600 The Guide, 2:37. Cf. the Guide 2:11-12. 601 Cf. the Guide, 1:31; al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-milla [the Book of Religion], ¶27 (English translation pp. 111- 113).

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exalted, as far as he is able; which means that we should make our actions like unto His, as the sages made clear when interpreting the verse, Ye shall be holy... The purpose of all this is to show that the attributes ascribe to Him are attributes of His actions and that they do not mean that He possesses qualities.602

As a virtuous leader, the prophet should guide the people dispassionately, similar to God who governs the world in the best way possible. The prophet’s actions, in instituting the laws proper to the best political order, correspond to his implementation in society of his philosophical investigation. In the concluding chapter of the Guide, Maimonides sets forth the actions the perfect man performs in order to govern the people, actions which resemble God’s governance over the world:603

When explaining in this verse604 the noblest ends, he [Jeremiah] does not limit them only to the apprehension of Him…But he says that one should glory in the apprehension of Myself and in the knowledge of My attributes by which he means His actions… In this he makes it clear to us that those actions that ought to be known and imitated are loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness…He means that it is My purpose that there should come from you loving-kindness, righteousness, and judgment in the earth in the way we have explained with regard to the thirteen attributes: namely, that the purpose should be assimilation to them and that this should be our way of life…It is clear that the perfection of man that may truly be gloried in is the one acquired by him who has achieved, in a measure corresponding to his capacity, apprehension of Him…and who knows His providence extending over His creatures as manifested in the act of bringing them into being and in their governance as it is. The way of life of such an individual, after he has achieved this apprehension, will always have in view loving-kindness, righteousness, and judgment, through assimilation to His actions… just as we

602 The Guide, 1:54. Cf. the Guide 1:54; 3:54; Mishneh Torah: Laws of Character Traits, 1:6; Howard Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political Thought – Studies in Ethics, Law, and the Human Ideal, pp. 14-15, pp. 125-158 (particularly pp. 128-132); Shlomo Pines, “The Limitation of the Human Knowledge,” pp.99- 100. 603 Note that in the Guide Maimonides does not refer explicitly to the prophet; however, in light of the discussion in 1:54, it is reasonable to assume that he had the idea of the prophet’s actions resembling God’s governance over the world in mind. 604 Jeremiah 8:22-23: “Thus saith the Lord: Let not the wise man gory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty man glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in his riches; but let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me that I am the Lord, who exercise loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness, in the earth; for in these things I delight, saith the Lord.”

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have explained several times in this treatise.605

The virtuous man – the prophet, according to Maimonides – imitates God’s actions in three ways: loving-kindness (ḥesed), righteousness (mishpat), and judgment

(ẓedaqah). God governs all created beings, including the separate intellects. The

Active Intellect, the last intellect among the separate intellects, governs the sublunar world in its entirety, including the prophet who governs the cities. Although has reached the highest level man can attain, the prophet is still in a body; he constitutes the link between the Active Intellect and the sublunar world. In this sense, he is an extension of the Active Intellect, imitating God by governing the people on the basis of loving-kindness, righteousness, and judgment.

Let us now return to the first issue on which Polqar departs from Maimonides: the identity of the virtuous man, who, according to Maimonides, is the prophet. We have already argued that Polqar rejects Maimonides’ idea according to which a prophet possesses perfect intellectual power in addition to a perfect imaginative faculty and moral perfection. The prophet, Polqar argues, possesses no more than a vivid imagination; and because conjoining with the Active Intellect requires intellectual perfection, he cannot be viewed as the virtuous man. Polqar reveals his opinion regarding the identity of the virtuous man in treatise one, where he asserts that the category of “divine man” contains Moses alone. Moses is the only man, so far, who has possessed all the prerequisites to be a divine man.606 Interestingly, before

Polqar presents his theory of the divine man, he addresses the questions “who is the

605 The Guide, 3:54. Cf. Shlomo Pines, “The Limitation of the Human Knowledge,” p. 99; Sarah Klein- Braslavy, The Creation of the World and Maimonides’ Interpretation of Gen. i-v, p. 77. 606 Interestingly, Polqar does not determine that Moses was and will be the only divine man. Instead he argues that, based on his analysis, Moses possessed all thirteen prerequisites to be divine man: “After I have recounted for you the qualities of the man that render him fit to be appointed ruler and sovereign over the pure and worthy city, and the measure of his [intellectual] apprehension, I shall inform you truly that Moses our Master was the one who possessed these qualities, and that he also ascended to God, that is, the most supreme rank possible.” See ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 44.

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perfect man?” and “what is the difference between the perfect man and the divine man?”

Polqar clearly distinguishes between the perfect man (ha-ish ha-shalem) and the divine man (ish elohi ve-malakh Elohim), though the nature of this distinction is somewhat obscure. The actions of the perfect man are motivated by both intellect and desire, which are in harmony, however the primary motivation is intellectual. His actions derive from a clear apprehension, while his bodily desires are under the control of practical reason. On the other hand, the divine man easily succeeds in completely eliminating any animal desires he possesses as a human being. He has no bestial desire to perform any biological activity. All his activities derive from purely rational considerations unaccompanied, in contrast with the perfect man, by any human passions. In this sense the divine man acts similarly to the separate intellects, whose actions occur in accordance with rational principles.608 Therefore, just like the separate intellects, the divine man’s conduct is necessarily rational.

The second point on which Polqar deviates from Maimonides – the nature of the virtuous man and the way an individual can reach this level – is related to the

607 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 42-43. 608 Cf. Maimonides, Introduction to Pereq Ḥeleq, principle 7: “He [Moses] was the chosen one of all mankind, superior in attaining the knowledge of God to any other person who ever lived or ever will live. He surpassed the normal human condition and attained the angelic. There remained no veil he did not rend and penetrate; no physical obstacle prevented him [from doing so], no deficiency, great or small, to confuse him. All his powers of imaginations and senses were repressed, and pure reason alone remained. This is what is meant by saying that he spoke to God without angelic mediation”; in the Guide 3:51, Maimonides also emphasizes that for Moses there was no struggle between his intellect and his senses – his intellect easily triumphed over his desires: “And because of his [Moses] great joy in that which he apprehended, he did neither eat bread nor drink water. For his intellect attained such strength that all the gross faculties in the body ceased to function.”

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terms “ḥesed” [loving-kindness] and “nedivut” [generosity]. Maimonides uses both terms, while Polqar is reluctant to use ḥesed, perhaps because of the widespread

Jewish-Christian debate in his time. According to Maimonides, the prophet imitates

God’s governance over the world and implements it for the people:

To no being, the governance of which overflows or confers a force, does any profit accrue in any respect from that which is ruled by it. For its giving the gifts it gives is like the giving of gifts of the man who possesses loving- kindness and good, and he does it because of the generosity of his nature and the excellence of his disposition, not because of a hope for a reward: this is to become like to the deity, may His name be exalted.609

The prophet’s emanation resembles God’s overflow of loving-kindness onto the totality of creation, and of the Active Intellect onto the sublunar world. Loving- kindness is the natural outcome of the prophet’s successful attempt to imitate God’s governance over the world. The process of emanation from God onto the separate intellects continues with the overflow from the Active Intellect onto the prophets’ intellect and imaginative faculty. At this point, the prophet’s character trait of generosity causes him to overflow onto others. All three emanations – from God to the separate intellects, from the Active Intellect onto the prophet, and from the prophet into others – are actions motivated not because they benefit the agent but because they benefit the recipient. Inasmuch as God’s emanation does not diminish

His perfection, the prophet’s emanation does not cause any deficiency in him.

In his discussion of the ultimate purpose of the divine man, Polqar links two elements which, in his view, cause the divine man to return to society as its virtuous leader:

609 The Guide, 1:72.

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elohit) of the human species, and with respect to his own trait of generosity (midat ha-nedivut asher bo) and excessive goodness that continues unceasingly to overflow upon others, however, it is necessary that, like a shepherd over his flock,610 he dwell and be immersed in their midst and bear their troubles; so that he may govern them and rectify their ways, each one according to his rank and his potential – to such an extent that the city in which he dwells will have no need for any other judge or physician, as I mentioned.611 [emphases were added]

Theoretically, the divine man ought to isolate himself from society and to devote his life to studying the theoretical sciences, thereby uniting with the Active

Intellect as much as possible. However, Polqar argues, two reasons prevent him from doing so. The first is the “divine general providence” that governs the human species, and the second is the divine man’s generosity.

I discussed Polqar’s concept of general providence in chapter three of this thesis.612 Here it suffices to indicate that Polqar rejects the classical conception of individual providence according to which God governs particulars in a personal manner. If the divine man acted in the way he ought as an individual – detaching himself from society – all human beings would be prevented from knowing divine law. Consequently, when such a man died, the divine wisdom and law would die along with him. Since this rank of the divine man represents the highest level a human being can attain, it is necessary that it be actualized in at least one man. This man, according to Polqar, was Moses. Moreover, from a divine (and general) point of view, the divine man must serve as an intermediary between God and the people by being their leader; otherwise human beings would act without having any end. In other words, general divine providence is the natural guarantee of the continuous existence of the human species, actualized via the divine man.

610 Cf. Mishneh Torah, Laws Concerning Kings and Wars, 2:11. 611 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 44. 612 See pp. 186-197.

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The divine man’s second motivation for participating in society is what Polqar terms “his trait of generosity.” As Polqar notes earlier,613 the divine man is an individual who keeps his body healthy and perfects himself morally and intellectually, as a result of which he fulfills the highest human purpose, namely conjoining with the

Active Intellect. Once the divine man attains this level, he emanates the overflow of the Active Intellect onto others, as part of the natural chain. As in Maimonides’s theory, this emanation results from an external necessity. His generosity is not perceived as a voluntary act, as the term “generosity” implies, but rather as an attribute inherent in his personality; for a divine man cannot attain this highest level without possessing the character trait of generosity.

Moreover, once the divine man reaches this high level, he is free from earthly and bodily desires, and he becomes a separate intellect whose actions are completely detached from his physical body and desires. While it is true that the divine man possesses the character trait of generosity and theoretically, since he is still in a body, he possesses the ability to choose in a specific instance that involves his bodily functions, he has no choice but to act generously.

One might suggest that Polqar describes a metaphysical necessity in an anthropomorphic manner. It is striking, however, that in contrast to Maimonides, he does not speak explicitly of the necessity of overflowing onto others. Rather, he mentions only the necessity of dwelling among others. Moreover, as the head of his community, the divine man does not lead his people only during his own life. He continues to teach others through his works after his death:

It is also necessary with respect to his [the divine man’s] overflow of generosity that, when he becomes advanced in years and elderly, he will write for them a book in order to teach and to guide those who come after him and who never knew him personally the way in which they should walk, as well as

613 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, pp. 42-44.

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his commandments and statues to which they should conduct their lives, so they will live by them.614 This writ should stand before them in place of his own form and shape, so that they fear him as if they saw him with their own eyes. That is the true essence of the sanctified Law. Happy is the people who has it so! [Ps. 144:15].615

The generosity discussed in this passage expresses the divine man’s deep understanding of the human need to follow divine law. As a result, he composes books whose intellectual, moral, ethical, political, and practical laws convey the perfect law, the divine law. It is noteworthy to mention at this point that for

Maimonides, men of science are those who compose books when the measure of emanation impels them to do so.616 On the other hand, prophets, with the possible exception of Moses, do not write books, but rather are impelled to “address a call to the people, teach them, and let [their] own perfection overflow towards them.”617 In contrast, by maintaining that the divine man composes works, Polqar remains consistent with his view that only the philosopher is capable of teaching others. The divine man is first and foremost a perfect philosopher whose knowledge of the theoretical sciences is acquired through continuous study. As a consequence, he is able to pass his knowledge onto others. In a similar way, Moses, the only divine man, mastered the theoretical sciences in a perfect manner, and therefore was the only man who could compose works for future generations. When Polqar emphasizes that the divine man composes works when he is “advanced in years and elderly,” he is clearly

614 It is interesting that Polqar borrows the Islamic distinction between a messenger (rasul) and a prophet (nabi); the former bears a new revelation or religion, while the latter’s mission involves reinforcing an existing religion. It would follow that according to Polqar, Moses corresponds to the definition of a messenger, who establishes a new religion based on a peculiar revelation, as a result of which he composes a book that will be the milestone for the future prophets. See Ian R. Netton, Encyclopedia of Islam, “Prophets,” pp. 515-516. 615 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 44. Polqar clearly wishes to distinguish Moses from all other human beings by arguing that Moses’ actions as a whole were done for the best. Already in the previous chapter he refers to Moses as the angel of God, “Let us examine…the Ten Commandments…which God’s angel brought down from heaven to us...” (p. 38). 616 The Guide, 2:37. 617 Ibid.

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thinking about Moses, who spoke the “words of this poem in the ears of the people.”618 One might ask how Polqar would explain the books of the prophets that contain rebukes and reproaches. We can only speculate that Polqar would distinguish the books of the prophets from the books ascribed to Solomon, for example. The prophetic books, he might argue, repeat the Mosaic Law one way or another, without adding anything new to it.619 On the other hand, as a wise man, Solomon could compose works such as Ecclesiastes, for unlike the prophets he is capable of teaching others.620

One might ask why Polqar would differentiate between the perfect man and the divine man. Perhaps we can suggest that the division between the perfect man and the divine man enables him to maintain the essential distinction between Moses and all other human beings. Only Moses has reached the level of the divine man; all other human beings, at least to the present, have attained at best the degree of the perfect man. Emphasizing that Moses is the only man whose leadership and actions were the result of pure intellectual investigation, serves Polqar’s both apologetic and pedagogical purposes. Once Moses, the divine man, attained this ultimate level, his bodily desires no longer existed. His approach to worldly life – including political, ethical, and all other domains of human life – was wholly free from non-rational considerations.

So far no one except for Moses has reached the level of the divine man. Even those who were capable of fulfilling themselves as human beings and who prepared themselves morally and intellectually for this task only reached the level of the perfect man. Indeed, even the actions of the most perfect philosopher have not been derived

618 Deut. 32:44. 619 According to Polqar, it is not clear that the prophets wrote the books. In any event, whether the prophets wrote their books or not, they are not conveying new messages but rather reinforcing the Torah of Moses. 620 ‘Ezer ha-Dat, p. 44.

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purely from rational consideration. The divine man is devoid of bodily desires, while the philosopher may be able to control his bodily desires but never to annul them.

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Conclusion

This dissertation focused on Isaac Polqar, who throughout his works ʿEzer ha-

Dat and Teshuvat Apikoros defends three interconnected approaches to philosophy and Judaism.

The first is Polqar’s more theological defense of the superiority of Judaism over

Christianity insofar as the former, unlike the later, coincides with philosophical principles. Polqar’s role in the Jewish-Christian debate was a result of his personal dispute with his former teacher, Abner of Burgos. In responding to Abner’s attempts to influence other Jews to follow in his footsteps and convert to Christianity, Polqar and other Jewish thinkers were faced with a great challenge – defending the Jewish faith from a former Jew who was an expert in Jewish sources. Similarly to several

Jewish philosophers of his time, Polqar had to operate on two fronts; first, he had to strengthen the faith of the members of his community, even those who were not in danger of converting, in light of Abner’s attempts to show that Jewish sources such as the Bible and rabbinic texts in fact hold that Christianity is the true Religion. This dispute between Polqar and Abner is primarily theological in nature; however, occasionally we find the two interlocutors using philosophical arguments to support their claims. Second, Polqar and other Jewish thinkers had to make great efforts to reject Christianity as a true religion because of the genuine risk of Jews converting to

Christianity. Since converting to Christianity was a common phenomenon, there was a great need to prove that the Christian faith, despite its success and prosperity, could not be considered a true religion, insofar as it espouses doctrines that contradict philosophical principles.

The second approach that Polqar defends is Averroes’ interpretation of

Aristotle. As we saw Polqar, following Albalag’s view, often adopts Averroist views

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concerning physics and metaphysics that clearly contradict traditional Jewish ones.

This is evident, for example, in the discussion on creation. However, although I identify Polqar as a radical Averroist, I by no means wish to argue that Polqar always strictly adheres to Averroes’ philosophy. On the contrary, this study shows that Polqar occasionally departs from Averroes’ philosophical framework, developing instead an original position that rejects the thought of both Averroes and Maimonides. We saw an example of such a deviation in Polqar’s discussion of prophecy, where he clearly distinguishes between the knowledge of the philosopher and that of the prophet; while the philosopher attains true knowledge through ongoing study, the prophet operates on the basis of his intuition. Unlike Averroes and Maimonides, Polqar concludes that the rank of the philosopher is superior to that of prophet, with the exception of Moses, who was both a perfect philosopher and a perfect prophet.

The third approach Polqar defends is his particular philosophical interpretation of Judaism. His motivation for presenting this defense is the criticism directed by orthodox sects within the Jewish community against philosophical attempts to harmonize philosophy and Judaism. Polqar identifies these sects, among whom he includes the Kabbalists, with the traditional view. Attempting to harmonize Averroes’ philosophy with traditional Judaism creates a clear tension, on the basis of which traditional Jews accuse Jewish philosophers of heresy. This tension, for Polqar, is not real. For him the apparent tension between Mosaic Law and philosophical investigation is dissolved once the philosopher discloses the true meaning of the

Mosaic Law. By interpreting Judaism philosophically, and only by interpreting it philosophically can one understand the true nature of the Torah.

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*************

The Jewish Averroists, who include Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Shem Tov Ibn Joseph

Falaquera, Joseph Ibn Caspi, Moses Narboni, Isaac Albalag, and Isaac Polqar, sought to reconcile Averroes’ confident rationalism with Maimonides’ skepticism. They were no longer bound by the theological and traditional considerations and convictions which they believed motivated some of Maimonides’ views that were in tension with

Averroes; rather, they saw themselves as philosophers first and foremost. One of their primary goals was to show that Maimonides’ more traditional views did not represent his genuine opinions which, in truth, are in accord with those of Averroes. By doing so, they wished to show that the principles of Judaism, as presented by Maimonides, did not contradict philosophical claims, understood in an Averroestic mold.

The principal aim of the Jewish Averroists was to reestablish the authority of

Aristotelian philosophy as taught by Averroes and to reconcile it with the principles of Judaism. Since they also saw themselves as the intellectual heirs of Maimonides with regard to the philosophical interpretation of Judaism, they had to respond to the skeptical elements in Maimonides’ thought which often serve to traditionalist goals.

The efforts of the Jewish Averroist School to bridge the gap between Maimonides and

Averroes in general, and to respond to Maimonides’ skepticism in particular, has not been adequately researched to date, and requires further study.

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