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New Criterion for Aircraft Susceptibility to Infrared Guided Missiles

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New Criterion for Aircraft Susceptibility to Infrared Guided Missiles New criterion for aircraft susceptibility to infrared guided missiles G. Arvind Rao, Shripad P. Mahulikar ∗ Department of Aerospace Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, Mumbai 400076, India Abstract This paper assesses aircraft susceptibility from the first principles, with respect to the threat posed by passively guided infrared homing missiles; with an objective of gaining insight into the comprehensiveness of the relationship between aircraft susceptibility and aircraft infrared signature level. The conventional criterion of aircraft susceptibility assessment based on its lock-on envelop is found to be inadequate, and a new criterion termed here as the Lethal Envelop is presented. The proposed susceptibility assessment criterion is more relevant for coming generation of infrared-guided missiles, because of advancements in the infrared detection technology. A threshold infrared signature level is also proposed as benchmark to be satisfied by all infrared signature suppression systems; if aircraft susceptibility to infrared guided missiles is to be reduced. This analysis is vital for gauging the effectiveness of infrared signature suppression systems. A typical air-to-air combat situation is simulated, and the results that lead to aircraft susceptibility assessment are obtained from this model, which illustrates the comprehensiveness of the redefined aircraft susceptibility assessment approach. Keywords: Aircraft; Guided missile; Infrared; Lock-on; Stealth; Susceptibility 1. Introduction tional escorts, jammers, SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defence) aircraft and tankers [16]. Control of air is achieved by air missions, including air- As demonstrated in the Gulf war (1991), and reiterated to-air and air-to-ground operations by fighter aircraft. Air-to- in the Kosovo Conflict (1999) and Afghanistan War (2001– air conflicts in WW-I and WW-II were limited to close range 2002), the key to success in Modern Warfare lies in estab- encounters like the classical dogfight, in which ‘gun’ was lishing Air Superiority at an early stage of the war [3,5,9]. To the only weapon used. In Korean War (1950), Vietnam War achieve air superiority, an aircraft should exhibit a high de- (1964–1972) and Yom Kippur War (1973), the majority of gree of survivability in a human-made hostile environment, kill in air-to-air encounters were by guns [21]. Even though which is possible by incorporation of stealth features in the the development of guided AAMs dates back to late 50’s aircraft. Aircraft Stealth Technology primarily deals with re- and early 60’s, it was only in the 80’s that the technology ducing aircraft observables (both, active and passive), thus matured enough to be used reliably in a tactical warfare. making it difficult for the enemy detectors to detect and track the aircraft [17]. The conjugate qualities of accuracy 1.1. Background and survivability of stealth aircraft enables them to strike targets effectively that otherwise would require larger force packages of not only multiple strike aircraft, but also addi- The IR-guided missiles have emerged as one of the most potent threats to aircraft, especially in recent years. They acquire and intercept aircraft by passively detecting IR- radiation (heat signatures) from them. Thus, they do not require active impingement of radio signals on the target as in the case of Radar Homing or Semi Active Radar Homing 702 Nomenclature A area/envelop............................ m2 θ angle of missile with target aircraft axis at Dima distance between missile and target aircraft at missile launch . deg missile launch. m τ transmissivity ............................ - Dma distance between missile and target aircraft at ξmin minimum signal to noise ratio required by anygiveninstantoftime.................. m detector for lock-on . - f mathematical function of listed parameters incremental operator . - 2 I radiantintensity................... W/m Sr ω solid angle . Sr L¯ fundamental dimension of length . m Subscripts m velocity ratio, Vac/Vm ..................... - N number of discretised elements . - ac aircraft PA probability that threat is active and ready to atm atmosphere engage................................... - bg background PDIT probability that aircraft is detected, identified bo missile burnout and tracked by threat . - d detector PH aircraft susceptibility . - eng engagement PH/LO conditional probability of missile hitting target fuse fuselage aircraft after lock-on . - LO lock-on PLGDt probability that threat propagator is m missile launched/fired possibly guided, and may hit air- max maximum craft directly or detonate sufficiently close pl plume enough to cause damage . - lethal lethal envelop P probability of target aircraft being locked-on by LO th threshold threat propagator . - R range . m tp tailpipe λ spectral quantity Rblast missileblast-killradius................... m t time..................................... s Abbreviations T fundamental dimension of time . s AAM Air-to-Air Missile V velocity............................... m/s IR Infrared Greek scripts IRSL Infrared Signature Level φ instantaneous angle of missile with target IRSS Infrared Signature Suppression aircraftaxis............................ deg WW World War (SARH) missiles, and therefore have truly fire and forget ca- tivity IR-detectors; operating in the Short Wave IR (SWIR) pability [22]. The IR-guided AAM can be launched from the band of 1.9–2.6 µm. However, they had a tendency to home parent aircraft, as soon as it locks-on to the target aircraft. on to the Sun, or the Sun’s reflection in water; or any other The parent aircraft can then continue engaging other targets, intense source of IR-radiation. They were also erratic in their unlike in the case of SARH missiles [11]. behaviour, and failed to achieve positive lock-on unless fired The IR-seekers passively detect the contrast generated be- from close range in the rear aspect of the target aircraft [10]. tween aircraft IR-emission and the background, as transmit- ted by the atmosphere. All IR-missiles have fire and forget 1.2. Motivation capabilities and carry their own passive homing and guid- ance system onboard. This enhances their lethality because they do not inadvertently give prior information to the tar- The combat effectiveness of an aircraft in a hostile en- get aircraft like the radar homing missiles, which illuminate vironment depends on many factors, like threat characteris- the target aircraft with radio waves. Thus, the target air- tics, aircraft capabilities and the operational environment. It craft has less time to take countermeasures against IR-guided has been observed that linear changes in aircraft survivabil- missiles, as compared to radar-guided counterparts. The re- ity produce exponential changes in force effectiveness and straint on aircraft flight envelop imposed by a ground based aircraft attrition rates [25]. Thus, stealth technology helps IR-guided Surface to Air Missile (SAM), based on the con- aircraft to avoid high aircraft loss rates and complete the ventional aircraft susceptibility assessment criterion of lock- mission objectives effectively [12]. Modern air superiority on range, is provided by Mahulikar et al. [15]. The very first fighters are designed for multi-role missions, with greater generation of IR-guided missiles used uncooled, low sensi- situational awareness and readiness. 703 The air-to-air battle scenario has changed in recent times fighter aircraft, from the frontal aspect (head on), the air- with confrontation shifting from gun firing in the short frame, especially the stagnation region of the aircraft nose range, to using missiles in both visual and beyond visual and the leading edges of the wings are prime sources of range. In order to reduce detection by enemy missiles, air- IR signature. The fuselage, tailpipe and exhaust plume are craft and helicopters use infrared signature suppression tech- not visible from the frontal aspect. From the side aspect, niques. Some of the popular IRSS systems reported in lit- some parts of the airframe, the rear fuselage, and the ex- erature for helicopters are: the Centre Body Tailpipe used haust plume are the main sources. From the rear aspect, the on Bell 205-UH-1H [23,24], and the Black Hole Ocarina engine tailpipe, and the afterburner flame holders (if visible), used on Apache AH-64 helicopter [2]. Though such systems emit IR-radiation like a blackbody. While a typical fighter are known to have reduced helicopter signature level, their aircraft will have tailpipe as the main source of IR-radiation, effect in reducing the helicopter’s susceptibility is uncer- a hypersonic aircraft will have the aerodynamically heated tain, as there is no model reported in literature that provides airframe as the main source of IR signature. Therefore, for a well-defined relationship between these two parameters. a fighter aircraft, the signature level is more in the rear as- While designing IRSS systems/techniques for aircraft or he- pect, whereas for a hypersonic aircraft, the signature level licopters, it is of paramount importance to evaluate the effec- is more prominent in the frontal aspect. The IR signature tiveness of such systems on the survivability of the aircraft level of an aircraft also varies with the operating conditions (which is the main objective of signature reduction), so that and its mission profile. Hence, the lock-on range, which is signature reduction options can be objectively compared and a function of the aircraft IR signature level, also varies with selected. aircraft
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