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Countermeasures.Pdf Countermeasures Study group organized by the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Countermeasures A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System Andrew M. Sessler (Chair of the Study Group), John M. Cornwall, Bob Dietz, Steve Fetter, Sherman Frankel, Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, Lisbeth Gronlund, George N. Lewis, Theodore A. Postol, David C. Wright April 2000 Union of Concerned Scientists MIT Security Studies Program © 2000 Union of Concerned Scientists Acknowledgments All rights reserved The authors would like to thank Tom Collina, Stuart Kiang, Matthew Meselson, and Jeremy Broughton for their comments and assistance. The authors owe a special note of The Union of Concerned Scientists is a partnership of citizens and gratitude to Eryn MacDonald scientists working to build a cleaner environment and a safer world. For and Anita Spiess for their more information about UCS’s work on arms control and international contributions and dedication, security, visit the UCS website at www.ucsusa.org. without which this report The Security Studies Program (SSP) is a graduate-level research and would not have been possible. educational program based at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies. The program’s primary task is educating the next generation of scholars and practitioners in This report and its dissemina- international security policymaking. SSP supports the research work of graduate students, faculty, and fellows, and sponsors seminars, confer- tion were funded in part by ences, and publications to bring its teaching and research results to the grants to the Union of Con- attention of wider audiences. cerned Scientists from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The John Merck Cover illustration: An artist’s rendition of two kill vehicles approaching Fund, The New-Land Founda- a cluster of balloon decoys, one of which might enclose a warhead. tion, Inc., Ploughshares Fund, and the W. Alton Jones Foundation; and to the MIT Security Studies Program from This report is available online at www.ucsusa.org. To order printed copies: the W. Alton Jones Founda- tion, The John D. and • Email [email protected] • Call 617-547-5552 Catherine T. MacArthur • Write to Foundation, the Ford Founda- Publications Department Union of Concerned Scientists tion, and the Carnegie P.O. Box 9105 Corporation of New York. Cambridge, MA 02238-9105 Printed on recycled paper. To Henry Kendall, who was part of the study group, and whose intellectual contributions and personal involvement we greatly missed in preparing this report. vi Contents in Brief Contents in Detail ix Figures xiv Tables xvi Boxes xvii Executive Summary xix 1. Introduction 1 2. The Existing and Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States 5 3. The Planned NMD System 19 4. Countermeasures to the Planned NMD System: Why the Attacker Has the Advantage 31 5. Countermeasure Programs in the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China 35 6. An Overview of Emerging Missile State Countermeasures 39 7. Emerging Missile State Countermeasures 1: Submunitions with Biological or Chemical Agents 49 8. Emerging Missile State Countermeasures 2: Anti-Simulation Balloon Decoys for Nuclear Warheads 59 9. Emerging Missile State Countermeasures 3: A Nuclear Warhead with a Cooled Shroud 81 10. Testing the NMD System: Requirements and Recommendations 91 11. Past US Tests Against “Countermeasures” 103 12. The Security Costs of NMD Deployment 107 13. Deterrence and Diplomacy 115 Appendices A. The Thermal Behavior of Objects in Space 119 B. The Measurement and Discrimination Capabilities of SBIRS-Low 125 C. The Radar Cross Section of Warheads and Other Objects 131 D. The Measurement and Discrimination Capabilities of the NMD Ground-Based Radars 135 E. Countermeasures to Ballistic Missile Defenses: Past and Current Programs in the United States, France, and Britain 145 F. The Reentry Heating of Submunitions 149 G. NASA Air Density Explorer Series Inflatable Balloon Satellites 159 H. The Thermal Effects of a Warhead Inside a Balloon 161 I. Shroud Cooling Requirements 167 J. Exoatmospheric Hit-to-Kill Intercept Tests 169 Contributor Biographies 173 vii viii Contents in Detail Figures xiv Tables xvi Boxes xvii Executive Summary xix 1. Introduction 1 Purpose of the Study 1 Scope of the Study 2 Criteria for Deployment 3 Sources and Methods 4 The Structure of This Report 4 2. The Existing and Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States 5 An Accidental, Unauthorized, or Erroneous Launch by Russia 5 Size of the Future Russian Nuclear Arsenal 8 An Accidental, Unauthorized, Erroneous, or Deliberate Attack by China 9 The Threat from Emerging Missile Powers 10 Warheads Available to Emerging Missile Powers 12 Conventional Warheads 13 Chemical Warheads 13 Biological Warheads 15 Nuclear Warheads 16 3. The Planned NMD System 19 How the NMD System Would Evolve over Time 19 How the NMD System Is Designed to Operate 20 Launch Detection 21 Warhead Detection and Tracking 26 Warhead Discrimination 27 Interceptor Guidance 28 Kill Vehicle Homing 28 Battle Management 28 4. Countermeasures to the Planned NMD System: Why the Attacker Has the Advantage 31 Defense Will Commit First 31 Defense Must Work First Time 32 Defense More Technically Demanding than Offense 32 Standards of Success for Defense Are High 32 ix 5. Countermeasure Programs in the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China 35 Past and Current Countermeasure Programs to Ballistic Missile Defenses 35 United States 35 Countermeasures for ICBMs 35 Countermeasures for SLBMs 36 France 36 Britain 36 Russia 36 China 37 6. An Overview of Emerging Missile State Countermeasures 39 Overwhelming the Defense: Submunitions for Biological and Chemical Weapons 41 Decoys: Overwhelming the Defense with False Targets 41 Replica Decoys 42 Decoys Using Signature Diversity 43 Decoys Using Anti-simulation 43 Metallized Balloons 44 Shrouds of Multilayer Insulation 44 Chaff 44 Electronic Decoys 45 Late Deployment of Decoys 46 Reducing Radar Signatures 46 Prevent Hit-to-Kill by Infrared Stealth 47 Low-Emissivity Coatings 47 Cooled Shroud 47 Prevent Hit-to-Kill Homing by Hiding the Warhead 48 Warhead Maneuvers 48 Preemptive Attacks on Defense Components 48 7. Emerging Missile State Countermeasure 1: Submunitions with Biological or Chemical Agents 49 Should the Baseline Threat Include Chemical and Biological Weapons? 49 Submunitions 49 The Design, Construction, and Use of Submunitions 53 Details of Dispensing Bomblets 54 Details of Heat Shielding of Bomblets During Reentry 55 Heating or Cooling of Bomblets During Midcourse 57 Releasing the Agent 57 8. Emerging Missile State Countermeasure 2: Anti-Simulation Balloon Decoys for Nuclear Warheads 59 Design, Construction, and Deployment of Balloons 61 How Anti-Simulation Balloon Decoys Would Prevent Midcourse Discrimination 63 Discrimination by Infrared Sensors 64 Daytime Attacks 64 The thermal behavior of empty balloons 64 The thermal behavior of a balloon containing a warhead 65 Nonuniform balloon temperatures 67 x Nighttime Attacks 67 Decoys Effective for Both Daytime and Nighttime Attacks 69 Discrimination by Radars: Mechanical Interactions Between Warhead and Balloon 69 Discrimination and Intercept During Early Reentry 70 Measures the Attacker Could Take to Prevent Discrimination 73 Denying High Precision Velocity and Position Measurements 73 Exploit the Defense Geometry 75 Cold-Gas Thrusters 76 Spinning or Oscillating Balloons 76 Tethered Clusters of Balloons 77 Exploit Defense Limitations in Determining the Target Position 77 9. Emerging Missile State Countermeasure 3: A Nuclear Warhead with a Cooled Shroud 81 The Design Details 81 Reduced Infrared Detection Range 84 Detection Using Reflected Radiation 85 Reflected Infrared Radiation 86 Reflected Visible Light 87 10. Testing the NMD System: Requirements and Recommendations 91 Testing Military Systems 91 Confidence Levels and Effectiveness 92 The Operational Requirements for the Planned NMD System 94 Determining the Single-Shot Kill Probability 95 Independence of Failure Modes 95 Testing and Countermeasures 96 The Planned Testing Program for the NMD System 97 An NMD Testing Program to Assess Operational Effectiveness 100 1. Ask the right question: Accurately define the baseline threat 100 2. Make it possible to get a valid answer to the question: Provide for the best in countermeasure testing 100 3. Answer the question well: Conduct enough tests 101 4. Make sure the answer is correct: Provide for objective, independent test assessment 101 11. Past US Tests Against “Countermeasures” 103 The Use of “Decoys” in ERIS Tests 103 MSX Experiment 103 Sensor Fly-by Tests for NMD 104 Tests of Ground-based Radar at Kwajalein 105 First NMD Intercept Test 105 Second NMD Intercept Test 106 An ERINT Test Against “Submunitions” 106 xi 12. The Security Costs of NMD Deployment 107 Russia 107 China 111 Emerging Missile States 112 Other States 113 Conclusions 113 13. Deterrence and Diplomacy 115 Emerging Missile States 115 Export Controls 115 Cooperation 116 Deterrence 116 Prelaunch Destruction 117 Boost-Phase Defenses 117 Russia and China 118 Russia 118 China 118 Appendices A. The Thermal Behavior of Objects in Space 119 The Physics of a Blackbody 119 The Physics of a Graybody 120 The Physics of Real Targets 120 Equilibrium Temperatures in Space 121 Objects in daylight
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