The Bitterlemons Guide to the Arab Peace Initiative

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The Bitterlemons Guide to the Arab Peace Initiative The Bitterlemons Guide to the Arab Peace Initiative The Bitterlemons Guide to the The Bitterlemons Guide to the Arab Peace Initiative New thinking on a key Middle East proposal Edited by Yossi Alpher, Ghassan Khatib and Charmaine Seitz The Bitterlemons Guide to the Arab Peace Initiative is a comprehensive examination of the peace proposal made by the Arab League in March 2002. In this compilation of 65 New thinking on a key Middle East proposal short essays, leading thinkers and politicians in the Arab world, Israel and beyond examine the text line-by-line for meanings and possibilities and explore the initiative’s strengths, weaknesses and broad ramifications. The Bitterlemons Guide to the Arab Peace Initiative New thinking on a key Middle East proposal Edited by Yossi Alpher, Ghassan Khatib and Charmaine Seitz Copyright © 2011 by bitterlemons-api.org All Rights Reserved Printed in Jerusalem, 2011 ISBN: 978-965-91842-0-0 Table of Contents Preface 9 Palestinian Foreword 11 Ghassan Khatib Israeli Foreword 13 Yossi Alpher The Text of the Arab Peace Initiative 15 1. Conceiving the Arab Peace Initiative 17 “To gain support for this initiative at all levels” Genesis, development and present status 17 by Nabeel Shaath Not only still relevant, but desirable 20 by Marwan Muasher Happy to be proven wrong 22 by Ezzedine Choukri Fishere We come in peace 24 by Amre Moussa 2. Responding to the Arab Peace Initiative 27 Consistent support 27 by Ghassan Khatib The iron wall 28 by Tamar Hermann Putting opponents of the API on the defensive 31 by Nizar Abdel-Kader Stillborn 33 an interview with Salah Bardawil Resistance tooth and nail 34 by Heiko Wimmen American public opinion and the Middle East peace process 36 by John Zogby The real issue is political leadership 39 by David Pollock Two-plus-two is four 42 by Mark Perry 42 3. Examining the Text 45 This chapter examines the wording of the Arab Peace Initiative, one section at a time. Everybody but Israel 45 by Yossi Alpher The Arab states were never that interested 47 by Ferry Biedermann A view from Russia 49 by Irina Zvyagelskaya Pakistan: in lockstep with Saudi Arabia 52 by Irfan Husain Only then 54 by Faiza al-Araji Arabs yearn to move on 56 by Hussein Ibish The illusion of normalization 58 by Dan Schueftan The API prize: full normalization or just normal relations 61 by Koby Huberman “Security for all the states of the region” Middle East security from a Palestinian perspective 63 by Mkhaimar Abusada The API and the regional security deal 65 by Amor Boubakri The Arab world cannot deliver 67 by Efraim Inbar The API promise of security is insufficient 69 by Shlomo Brom “End of conflict and peace agreement” Not a clear enough incentive 71 by Yossi Alpher The magic Arab clause 73 by Adil Awadh Ending the conflict 75 by Laila el-Haddad If not now, then when? 77 by Elias Samo On refugees Solution to Palestine refugees imperative for peace 79 by Chris Gunness The API and the Palestinian refugees 81 by Nadim N. Rouhana Rethinking Palestinian refugeehood 83 by Ruba Salih Permission to return or right of return? 85 by Maurice Stroun Clarifications needed 87 by Itamar Rabinovich The refugee issue in the API: contradictory or complementary? 90 by Matti Steinberg Divergent views from Lebanon, but one common goal 93 by Franklin Lamb Not at Jordan’s expense 95 by Hassan Barari On borders A package deal 97 by Ghassan Khatib A double standard 99 by Shlomo Brom A Palestinian state within the 1967 borders: settlements vs. sovereignty 101 by Philip C. Wilcox Settlements, borders and the Israeli plan 104 by Khalil Toufakji The border is not the heart of the conflict 106 by Yisrael Harel The politics of illusion 108 by As’ad Ghanem Syria’s two red lines 110 by Elias Samo A Syrian perspective 112 by Imad Moustapha On Jerusalem Arab demand for East Jerusalem is an obstacle to peace 114 by Efraim Inbar Jerusalem challenges the API 116 by Daniel Seidemann What state without Jerusalem? 119 by Huda Imam Protecting my rights 121 an interview with Jamil Hamammi “A sovereign independent Palestinian state” The nature of Palestinian sovereignty 123 by Mkhaimar Abusada A perspective from Jordan 125 by Hassan Barari The initiative vs. the reality 127 by Shlomo Gazit Just Arab wishful thinking? 129 by Ghada Karmi 4. Israeli Ideas on the Arab Peace Initiative 133 Why the API was ignored by Israel in 2002 133 by Yossi Alpher Save a generation 135 by Omar Rahman A sensible future 137 by Mennat Maassarani We need a very different Arab League approach 138 by Mordechai Kedar The best policy alternative for Israel 141 by Alex Mintz and Yosi Ganel Accept with minor interpretations 143 by Yossi Alpher The IPI, a pragmatic yes to the API 145 by Yuval Rabin and Koby Huberman The best possible deal 147 by Saleh Abdel Jawad What peace process? What peace? 149 by As’ad AbuKhalil 5. Arab Revolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative 153 The API in thrall to the Arab spring 153 by Nathalie Tocci Saudi dilemmas and the API 155 by Madawi al-Rasheed Time for a positive Israeli response to the API 158 by Mark A. Heller An empowering Arab peace plan 160 by Akram Baker 6. Contributors 163 8 Preface The Arab Peace Initiative, brainchild of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, offers Israel normal relations with the Arab world in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from land occupied in 1967 and a just solution to the refugee problem based on United Nations Resolution 194. The initiative was adopted by the Arab League at its March 27, 2002 summit in Beirut, and support for the proposal has been renewed numerous times. US President Barack Obama’s administration also adopted the API as part of its Middle East policy and the Quartet, a working group on the Middle East that comprises the European Union, Russia, the United Nations and the United States, has backed the initiative in its statements. Despite these nods to its importance, the API has gained little traction on the ground. Believing the initiative is key to regional peace efforts, the creators of the bitterlemons publications, Yossi Alpher and Ghassan Khatib, dedicated editions of the web magazines to the initiative during the years 2002-2010. Still, they felt more effort was needed. The bitterlemons publications were born in 2001 with bitterlemons. org, a weekly web magazine featuring Israelis and Palestinians writing on contemporary issues. Bitterlemons-international.org began in 2003 to offer a similar space for issues concerning the wider Middle East, now including authors from all over the world. In 2005, the now dormant bitterlemons-dialogue.org was added to the family, publishing correspondence between two authors of different backgrounds on a chosen subject. Bitterlemons seemed the natural home for a publication dedicated to the API. In 2010, funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European Union enabled the bitterlemons publications to establish a new web magazine, bitterlemons-api.org, dedicated exclusively to issues involving the Arab Peace Initiative. In November 2010, guest authors began analyzing the API—itself a short, concentrated document—clause by clause and word for word, and exploring broader, related issues. With the explosion of revolutions in the Arab world in the spring of 2011, however, the editors began to sense that the API was being pushed aside. New realities were taking hold. By then, 16 editions of bitterlemons- api had been published, creating a unique and comprehensive set of 9 analyses of the document and related issues. The editors decided to stop production and create an online book of the findings. The European Union, now bitterlemons’ exclusive funder, readily recognized the value of publishing a virtual book about the API in line with The Best of Bitterlemons book produced in 2007. To that end, bitterlemons has established a fifth website, bitterlemons-books.org, accessible at the portal, bitterlemons.net. This website will house the full set of bitterlemons books available for free download, including this Bitterlemons Guide to the Arab Peace Initiative. This volume commences with separate forewords by Khatib and Alpher. Subsequent essays and interviews are divided into subject areas exploring the birth of the API, responses to the initiative and a comprehensive analysis of its text. They serve as both an analytic record and an investment in the possibilities for a peaceful resolution of the broader Middle East conflict. 10 Palestinian Foreword Never completely out of style What is happening today in the Arab world—the toppling of dictatorial regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, the mass protests that continue to rock Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain, and the hesitant reforms underway in Jordan and Morocco—places the Arab world at a crossroads. It is an intersection that I have been warning of for a long time. On the one hand, for the first time in decades, the Arab peoples have an opportunity to decide their own destiny through democracy and by simply raising their voices to demand freedom and opportunity. On the other hand, the shift underway looks very likely to bring to power Islamist movements that have gained credence and organization by preaching to the downtrodden and against the West for its support of Israel and of cruel dictators throughout the Middle East. For years, many of us have said that the international community’s lack of attention to the rights of Palestinians was causing moderates to lose ground in the region. Among Palestinians, the contest between Hamas and Fateh is a prime example.
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