ANNUAL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORT FY 1975 for Official Use Only Until Release on March 4, 1974
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Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger ANNUAL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORT FY 1975 For Official Use Only Until Release on March 4, 1974 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES R. SCHLESINGER TO THE CONGRESS ON THE FY 1975 DEFENSE BUDGET AND FY 1975-1979 DEFENSE PROGRAM MARCH 4, 1974 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402-Price $2.60 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page NlDIlber I. INTRODUCTION ".- " ,; ' .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 A. .THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT.............................. 1 1. The Strategic Nuclear Balance•...•.........•..• 3 2. The NATO-Warsaw Pact Balance.•.•.••..•..••...•. 6 3. U. S•-USSR Naval Balance........................ 11 4.. Middle Eas t Lessons " ' ".................................. 13 5. Settling Down for the Long Haul •••••••••••••••• 15 B. THE PROPOSED DEFENSE BUDGET •••••.•••.••••....•.•... 16 1. FY 1974 Supplementa1s •..•••.•••••••.•.••.•••... 16 2. The FY 1975 Budget •••••••••••••.••....•.••.•... 18 II. STRA..TEGIC FORCES 25 A. THE BASIS FOR THE STRATEGIC FORCES ••.••.•.••••..... 25 1. The Problem of Objectives 26 2. USSR and PRC Strategic Objectives ••..•.••..•.•• 29 3. Deterrence and Assured Destruction•.•..•.•••••• 32 4. The Need for Options........................... 35 5. Separability of Targeting Doctrine and Sizing of Forces .••••.•••••••..•••.••.•...• 41 6. Strategic Balance and International Stability 43 7. Principal Features of the Proposed Posture.•.•. 44 B. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STRATEGIC THREAT " .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. •• .. • .. • .. • .. .. .. .. •• .. • .. .. 45 1. Soviet Union 45 2. The Peoples' Republic of China 48 C. U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES AND PROGRAMS ••••••.•••••...•• 49 1. Strategic Offensive Forces and Programs ...••.•. 49 2. Strategic Defensive Forces 66 3. Com:mand and Control ~ ." II ••••••• I• 73 4. CiviI Defense It 78 iii Page Number III. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES •• ~ •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 81 A. THE NEED FOR GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES •••••••••••••••• 81 1 The Role of Theater Nuclear Forces •••••.••.•••• 81 2. Sizing the General Purpose Forces.•••••.•.••••• 83 a. The Planning Process •••••'••••.••••••••••••• 84 b. The Strategic Concept ••••••.•••••••.••••••• 85 3. The Planning Contingencies ••••.•.•••••••••••••• 86 a.The Center Region of NATO •••••••••••.•••.•• 87 (1) The Deployed Threat. ••.•••••••••••••••• 87 (2) The Mobilized Threat •.•••.•••••••••••.• 89 b. The Flanks of NATO ••..•••.•••••••••.••••••• 91 c. As ia . 91 d. Maritime Missions •••..••••.••.•••.••.•••••. 93 (1) Antisubmarine Warfare •••••..••.•••••••• 93 (2) Sea Control . 93 4. Other Planning Factors •.•••••.••••••••••••••.•• 94 a. Strategic Mobility ••••.•..•••••.••.•••••••. 94 b. National Guard and Reserve Forces •.•••••••• 95 5. StJIDIIlary ........................................ 96 B. LAND FORCES........................................ 98 1. Force Structure Changes ••••••.•••••••••••.••••. 99 2. Land Forces Modernization•••••••••••••••.•.•••• 101 a. Close Combat (Tank/Antitank) Program•.••... 101 b. At tack Helicop ters •••••••••••••.•••.•••••.• 108 c. Air Defense 110 d. Fire Support (Surface-to-Surface) Missiles. 113 e. Combat Support (Air Mobility-HelicoDter•••• 114 3. Equipment of the Reserve Components ••••••••.•.• 115 c. NAV~ FORCES ..•.•••••.....••.••.•••••••.•.•..••..•• 117 1. Aircraft Platforms 117 a. Aircraft Carriers .•••.••.••.•..••....••••••118 b. Sea Control Ship •..•••••••..••••••.••.••••.12l 2. ASW Aircraft -123 3. Other Surface Combatant Ships •.•.••••.•.•••..••l25 4. Attack Submarines 136 5. Undersea Surveillance Systems •••••.•••.•••.•••.138 6. Amphibious Lift and Mine CountermeaSure Forces.138 7. Underway Replenishment and Fleet Support Ships.140 iv Page Number D. TACTICAL AIR FORCES •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 142 1. Force Structure•••••• 143 2. Acquisition Programs. 144 E. l10BILITY FORCES.................................... 156 1. Strategic Airlift •••• 157 2. Sealift............•. 165 3. Tactical Airlift .••••.• 168 IV. MANPOWER FOR DEFENSE ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 171 A. THE VOLUNTEER FORCE •••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••• 173 1. Active Forces . 173 a. Strengths. 173 b. Accessions ••. 174 (1) Non-Prior Service Enlistments. 174 (2) Prior Service Reenlistments. 175 c. Qual!ty •.•••.•••• 175 d. Cos ts ••••.•••.• 178 e. Problem Areas. 181 (1) Army Recruitment••••• 181 (2) ~linority Accessions ••• 184 (3) Critical Skills Shortages ••••• 186 (4) Women in the Services. 189 (5) Civi1ianization. 190 2. Reserve Forces •••••••••• 190 a. Manning the Guard and Reserve ••••••••.••••. 191 b. The Future of the Guard and Reserve in the Total Force•...••••••••••••••••••••• 194 B. MANPOWER UTILIZATION •••••••••••••••••••••.•••.••.•. 196 1. Headquarters Reductions. 196 2. Base Closures •••••••••.• 197 3. Training . 197 C. MANPOWER REqUIREMENTS ••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••• 199 D. PERSONNEL POLICIES •.•••••••••••••••••.•••.••••••••• 201 1. Grade Structure•••••••• 201 2. Re tirement . 207 v Page Number 3. Compensation. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... .. .............. .. 208 a. Flight Pay................................. 208 b. Military Pay Adjustment System•.•..••..•••• 211 4. Civilian Employment ••••••••••••••.•••••••.••.•. 211 a. Grade Levels............................... 211 b. Selective Retirement•••••••••••.•••.•.•••.• 212 c. Minority EmployItleut ••••••...•.•.•.•••..••.• 213 E • SPE CI.A:L PROBLmIS................................... 214 1. Race Relations................................. 214 2. Drug Abuse Control 215 3. Alcohol Abuse.................................. 216 v. MAN'AGE11:ENT ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •• 217 A. PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE................... 217 B. FORCE AGING AND MODERNIZATION •••••••••••••••••••••• 218 C. THE WEAPONS ACQUISITION PROCESS •••••••••••••••••••• 222 1. Long Range Planning and Review •••••.•..••.••••• 222 2. Weapons System Cost Reduction••.•••••••.••.•••. 223 3. Project Managers 226 D. SUPPORT STRUCTURE.................................. 227 1. Base Realignments 227 2. Standardization of Management Systems •.•••...•. 228 3. Support Cost Accounting by Weapons System.•.••• 229 4. Logistic Support Aspects of Weapons Acquisition 229 5. Logistic Systems Management •••••••••••••••.•.•. 230 6. Reduction of Items in Inventory and Elimination of Duplicate Inventory Management ••.•.•.••..... 231 7. Productivity Program••••••••••.••..•.•.••.••..• 231 E. ENERGY MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION ••••••••••••••••• 232 TABLE 1 .,... DoD Financial Summary •••••••• ,......... ......... .. 235 TABLE 2 - Selected Active Military Forces ••••••....•••...•.. 236 TABLE 3 - Active Duty Military Personnel, Civilian Personnel and Reserve Component Strength••••...•.. 237 vi Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: It is my privilege to present to you the FY 1975 Defense Program and Budget. This is the first budget in a decade or more that does not include support of United States forces in combat. At the same time, it is a budget that must carry us, through maintenance of a military equilibrium, on the passage from the cold war toward a period of enduring peace. In such a difficult period of transition, I have a special duty to review with you the fundamental strategic issues that we face and the basis on which we are developing what we consider to be the lowest prudent peacetime defense posture. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will present his customary report on our military posture. He will discuss in more detail than I shall here the current and developing balance of military power. A. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT Our defense budget proposals, of necessity, reflect our perspective on the United States role in the world. It is under standable, of course, that there will be diveL~encies in judgment among Americans on that role, aud those divergencies will be reflected in different estimates of what the defense budget should be. As the Psalmist tells us, "Where there is no vision the people perish". Hence, I would like to share with you our vision. The United States today, as opposed to the period before 1945, bears the principal burden of maintaining the worldwide military equilibrium which is the foundation for the security and the sur vival of the Free World. This is not a role we have welcomed; it is a role that historical necessity has thrust upon us. The burden of responsibility has fallen on the United States, and there is nobody else to pick up the torch if the United States fails to carry it. In fulfilling this responsibility we recognize that we are dealing in a world which is militarily dominated by two states ours and the Soviet Union. There is no other nation that possesses a military capability comparable to these two states. Consequently, in judging the military balance, and in deciding upon our own force posture, we do so primarily with the Soviet Union in mind. This does not suggest that we are not hopeful with regard to the future peaceful evolution of world politics; quite the contrary. Considerable progress has been made during the last five years in improving the international political climate. The President has taken many important initiatives: opening up new lines of communication with the Soviet Union and with the Peoples' Republic of China, helping to settle long-standing disagreements between East and West such as Berlin, beginning in practical ways to put limits on armaments, and ending our military involvement in the hostilities in Indochina. There