sign in sign up
<<
Home , Conscription

and Retention in ’s New All-Volunteer Force

By Li-Chung Yuan

Post-Cold shifts to all-volunteer organizational formats in the West have provided a rich source of information for sociologists when they explore and expand on themes associated with the decline of mass armed forces. Drawing on experience and insights from these cases, it was found that shifting from conscription to an all-volunteer force (AVF) has not been easy, and countries are apt to face unanticipated problems during the implementation process. Acquiring sufficient numbers of volunteer service members has in nearly all cases been a major challenge for an incipient AVF, and this proves more difficult if young men and women do not think of , pay conditions and service environments in the military as attractive. Even where and when quantitative recruitment goals were met, quality usually becomes another major concern. In addressing these issues, armed forces in the West have instituted a number of creative recruitment and retention programmes. Monetary and in-kind incentives not only offer recruits better pay, but also often provide improved paths, post-service opportunities and various types of caring schemes for their families. In addition to incentives, other effective ways to attract more applicants or retain existing personnel have been developed, including flexible contracts to meet the specific needs of successive or mature cohorts, effective advertising and research on manpower issues. Expanding and diversifying recruitment pools helps recruitment as well. In other words, the armed forces should not put all eggs in one basket, and instead pay more attention to different (ethnic, immigrant, gender), so far untapped groups to fill their ranks. In her research regarding the race, class and immigration status of those who join the US military, Lutz (2008) duly noted that, with few incentives for upper class participation, the all-volunteer force continues to experience over-representation of the working and lower- middle classes.1 Kane (2006) also found that African-Americans are over-represented in the military.2 Apparently, American society cares about the extent of either over- or underrepresentation of certain social groups in its defence establishment. As a

matter of fact, so does the Republic of (RoC) : Taiwan’s new all-volunteer force, now engaged in earnest efforts to attract from all parts of society, considers representativeness to be an important issue. Akin to findings unearthed in the US and other Western countries, minority groups, especially aboriginal people, are also overrepresented in Taiwan’s military and others

1 Amy Lutz, Amy. 2008. “Who Joins the Military ? A Look at Race, Class, and Immigration Status”, Journal of Political and , vol.36, n°2, 2008, pp.167-188. 2 Tim Kane, Who Are the Recruits ? The Demographic Characteristics of US Military Enlistment, 2003-2005,

Center for Data Analysis Report n°06-09, Washington, DC, Heritage Foundation. Available online at : http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/cda06-09.cfm (accessed March 20, 2016).

Published/ publié in Res Militaris (http://resmilitaris.net), ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 2 mostly absent in the context of a dearth of applicants for enlistment. The issue of recruiting from minority groups is thus well worth examining in the RoC context. This is what the present article will attempt to do, based on data derived from secondary analysis of previous research efforts, not least into recruitment and retention of aboriginal people, and this author’s interviews with volunteer recruits. It will also use insights derived from the familiarity he has acquired with the subject over the years.

Taiwan’s AVF Transformation Origins and Context The RoC announced in 2009 its decision to abolish conscription and institute an AVF, against the background of a continuing military threat from mainland China in the Taiwan Strait. While this makes the country’s situation in many ways unique, the decision came in the wake of a lessening of tensions in cross-strait relations after 2008, as witnessed by a significant increase in economic exchanges between the two sides from then on. As a result, the RoC has to balance with economic development born of

enhanced trade relations with its once implacable foe : the People’s Republic of China. Such a dilemma hardly facilitates RoC , as exports to the mainland and the prosperity accruing therefrom now often take precedence over the need to counter the strategic threat to the country’s very existence. Parts of public opinion, especially among the young, question the need for a strong defence in such a context, sometimes to the extent of arguing that, given China’s growing military clout, all resistance would be futile.3 This was reflected in recent survey results showing that the Taiwanese people’s willingness to defend the country was weak.4 In light of this, young people start to ask the question

“Why join the military ?”. Although Taiwan’s political class was initially largely divided over the issue, the decision to abolish conscription and move to an AVF did not encounter significant political opposition. This was mainly due to the fact that (a) two major political parties (KMT and DPP) tried to gain votes from young cohorts by shortening the standard mandatory tour of conscript duty, or even suspending call-ups, and (b) the shortened period of conscript service caused problems in the military as modern systems require much longer operator training than conscript tours now allowed. Therefore, political consensus in terms of implementing an all-volunteer force, to some extent, was not too difficult to reach. After Ma Ying-jeou assumed the presidency of the RoC in 2008, in order to fulfil his campaign promise he pledged that the of conscription would become government policy. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) immediately embarked upon four- implementation plan for an AVF, which provided for a phased increase in the proportion of volunteer recruits, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and officers, until the

3 Peter Enav, “Taiwan Short of Volunteers for the Military”, Associated Press, 13 May 2013. Available at : http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/13/3394726/taiwan-short-of-volunteers-for.html#storylink=cpy, accessed 16 May 2013. 4 Common Wealth Magazine, 2011, http://media.cw.com.tw/cw/cwdata/pdf/2011-CW-2011edu.pdf, accessed 13 March 2016. Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 3 draft, by the end of 2014, could eventually be suspended. According to the government’s calculations, the policy was expected to create a force capable of responding to an armed while also being equipped to handle humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. Moreover, the AVF and its reduced manpower requirements were expected to solve Taiwan’s problem of having an insufficient supply of able-bodied men as a result of low birth rates. As in other countries before it, the government’s main focus to begin with was on numbers. In order to achieve immediate results in recruitment quantity, nations such as the US, or for instance, compromised the quality of recruits by lowering aptitude norms, thus causing problems such as reduced competence of soldiers later on. The early years of the AVF transition in the US had seen a generally poor quality of volunteer soldiers, resulting in what a then Chief of called a “hollow army”, and prompting former president Nixon to comment that “the volunteer army has failed to provide enough personnel of the caliber we need”.5 President Ma’s idea was to avoid such an outcome by making a virtue – enhance the quality of the armed forces, guarantee effective homeland defence, and develop a better deterrence capability – out of the necessity of having to rely on fewer personnel and resources. Reality decided otherwise in the first few years, however. Since the policy was first implemented, the MND has been struggling to recruit sufficient numbers of volunteers : while demand is high, supply has failed to materialize. The factors involved are still with us, and will decide the ultimate success or failure of the AVF transition. Although the number of serving personnel had been dramatically reduced after two major force downsizings in the late 1990s and mid-2000s, compulsory service was maintained and military manpower was still dependent on a mixed system comprising a dwindling majority of conscripts and an increasing share of volunteer servicemen, which temporarily guaranteed that the military’s manpower needs would generally be met. Yet, compared to force-reduction programmes in other countries, ending conscription and implementing an AVF in Taiwan is a far more daunting and challenging task because in Taiwanese society public support of the military is traditionally weak. has a generally lower level of respect in Taiwanese culture than it does in many other cultures. Serving as a soldier is traditionally regarded as being on the lower end of the social scale because it is widely believed that those who do are only there because they either did not perform well in school or are otherwise socially and/ or economically handicapped. RoC politicians rarely mention military service during election campaigns, as “if it were a badge of shame”.6 In a society that does not appreciate and value military service, it is more difficult for the armed forces to acquire sufficient volunteer personnel of the right quality.

Most measures conceived by the MND (including an auxiliary military downsizing and restructuring project, new military service legislation, adjustments in strategy and missions, and the creation of incentives) have all been ultimately aimed at building a

5 Richard Nixon, The Real War, New , Warner Books, 1980. 6 Enav, 2013, op.cit.accessed. Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 4 professional military. However, despite firm political commitment to push on with this reform, the main stumbling block remains : it seems as if Taiwanese youths are much less interested in signing up to serve than the government anticipated. This has many policymakers asking why. A variety of reasons have been advanced to account for such a phenomenon. In many developed nations, a common attractor to the armed forces is the search for adventure (a major selling-point in Western ). Participation in overseas operations, however, is almost entirely absent in Taiwan. The RoC military has not engaged in combat operations or international joint military exercises for more than half a century. In the absence of such operations, and with only remote prospects for war, the new generations start to re-evaluate the need for armed forces. Underlying these cultural and essentially political questions, there is the down-to- earth matter of pay and benefits. In Taiwan, as in many other developed countries, youth is relatively high, and as recruits earn higher pay than low-skilled sector workers on average, the military’s recruitment prospects should be good. This is not the case, however, because the labour market demand for the kind of skilled and bright recruits the military requires is strong, and the armed services cannot financially compete against the private sector at that level – especially in view of the military’s demanding lifestyle, deprived of the kinds of freedom that ordinary people take for granted. Indeed, an element which was almost entirely ignored when policymakers began planning for the AVF transition is the lack of taste on the part of Taiwanese youths for the military’s old authoritarian culture and leadership style. Owing to almost four decades of (from the early 1950s through the 1980s), Taiwanese society has a stereotyped view of the military, believing it to be punitive, dogmatic, and unproductive, which hardly elicits enthusiasm for joining up. While the new AVF does not so far seem to have strongly exacerbated conservative military values through self-selection in recruitment and retention (which would place it at odds with mainstream value orientations, and make its manpower problems intractable), it will take time for a traditionally conservative military to accept a more liberal way of thinking. This is likely to remain an important factor as AVF implementation moves forward. Moreover, the recruitment problem is compounded by the harsh coverage reserved for the military by the Taiwan media, who often (if not always) report on such negative aspects as notorious incidents and discipline issues, causing public perceptions of RoC armed forces to sink even lower. One such (tragic) incident dominated the headlines for an entire month after the death in July 2013 of an Army conscript corporal subjected to inappropriate training, thereby severely damaging the military’s public image and

reputation. The negative effect of this incident was broad and significant : it not only jeopardized the AVF transformation and damaged the morale of the armed forces, but also caused the suspension of the country’s court-martial system.

All these matters lead to the question of whether the decision to introduce an AVF in Taiwan was well-considered, and whether the necessary resources and funds have been Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 5 made available for it, even if its implementation has been delayed. There is clearly an argument to be made that Taipei has acted too rashly, or at the very least with unrealistic expectations and too little prior research.

Recruitment : A Major Problem While the high unemployment rate caused in 2008-2009 by the global economic downturn seemed the right sort of context for volunteer recruitment, it soon became clear that the results of recruiting drives through advertising and schools were less than satisfactory. In 2010, only 64.5 percent of the recruiting target was reached ; in 2011 and 2012, recruitment rates dropped even further, to around 50 percent of target. The worst result came in 2013, when the MND only recruited 8,600 volunteer soldiers – less than one third of its goal of 28,000 for that year. When recruits are broken down by gender, the recruitment rate for male soldiers

was even lower : the only favourable outcome of recruiting efforts was the higher than expected number of women. Female applications substantially exceeded the annual targets and the armed forces have been over-recruiting female soldiers for several years. Analyzing by , given that applicants can choose the branches and locations in which they wish to serve, unsurprisingly the most physically demanding and rigorous assignments such as are found in the Army and Marine Corps are those which find fewest takers ; the same applies to units located in remote locations or off-shore islands. In 2012, the Army only met 54% of its annual recruitment target, while the figures were even lower (45%) for the Marines and Military .7 Young men, women and especially their parents understand that serving in combat units demands more physical endurance and implies the need to cope with hardship, isolation, remoteness, and a more risky environment without a significant gain in extra compensation.8 An even more important consideration is that, compared to logistics or engineering specialties where useful skills can be acquired for later in the private sector, combat skills are less practical for soldiers’ post-military careers and people are thus discouraged from pursuing them. As a consequence, combat units have a distinctly lower share of volunteer soldiers (57%) than non-combat units (73%). This has become a serious concern for the MND.

The acuteness of recruitment problems also depends on the geographic areas considered. It is indeed difficult to recruit soldiers in northern Taiwan’s urban areas, where job opportunities are better, while conversely youths from central, southern, and eastern Taiwan’s less urbanized or rural areas are more likely to join the armed forces due to a scarcity of available jobs there.9 This a tendency for the majority of volunteer service

7 Gazette, 2013 ; Legislative Yuan, vol.102, n°8. 8 Those who serve in special forces units, on ships, in remote areas or off-shore islands receive hazard pay or bonuses, but these do not significantly compensate for the extra demands or sacrifices they can expect. 9 Apple Daily, 24 December 2012 : http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/forum/20121224/34725445/, accessed 27 December 2012. Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 6

members to come from families living in non-metropolitan areas has a downside : due to their relative poverty and lower educational levels, it has compromised manpower quality. To date, in terms of average educational attainment, the majority of volunteer soldiers (85%) only have high school or .10 As the armed forces are equipped with modern weapons technologies and carry out more complex operations, their capabilities cannot be enhanced if the educational level and quality of soldiers are not improved. While poor public perceptions of the military and an insufficient supply of applicants are tremendous challenges for any AVF, other countries’ defence establishments facing similar situations (, Spain, to cite but two) have been known to survive them. But Taiwan cannot rely on the same strong economic growth as Germany to sustain its , nor can it hope to recruit from young foreign residents with effective ties to national culture, as in Spain. In Taiwan, low fertility rates, the lack of available expedients to compensate for them, and mediocre economic performance in the past decade will inevitably force it to reduce the size of military establishment yet again, while simultaneously coping with a public relations problem and complicated national identity issues among its recruitment pool. Retention

Retention is obviously another headache for Taiwan’s AVF transition, as the armed forces have been losing more than half of their mature and trained soldiers every year, and it is increasingly difficult to make them stay longer in the military. General retention rates have rarely reached 50 percent since the AVF transition started : the figures for 2010 (44%) and 2011 (33.5%) set the tone early on. The Army seems more affected the other services by that unfortunate trend. Many factors contribute to the low retention rate, but soldiers’ dissatisfaction with military service, the poor service environment, and problems with leadership and management styles are among the top ones. To analyze the motivations at work behind their reluctance to prolong their contracts or pursue their careers, the MND surveyed more than 5,200 volunteer soldiers by asking them to indicate the factors that could positively influence their decisions to stay in the military. Among the factors considered, “job stability” (20.8%) topped the list, followed by “economic pressure” (14.8%), and “expectations from parents and families” (10.2%). Satisfaction with pay rates accounted for 8.9%, while 8.4% mentioned “proximity to home”. As shown in Figure 1 (see next page), few respondents chose “profession or

occupation” (4.6%) and ‘personal interest’ (3.2%) ; “influence from colleagues” was insignificant, as were “other” factors. The pay factor evokes mixed feelings. Given the social backgrounds of volunteers, one does not wonder if “economic pressure” plays the second most important part in their motivation to stay. A volunteer private receives a starting pay rate of 33,623 New Taiwan

10 Cf. https://www.new7.com.tw/SNewsView.aspx?Key=%E8%BB%8D%E4%BA%8B&i=TXT20170809172457LBU&p=2 , accessed 27 August 2017. Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 7

[NT$] dollars (1,060 USD) a month, not counting extra bonuses such as combat unit (3,000-5,000 NT$), off-shore island (4,640-20,000 NT$) and other kinds of add-ons.11 All in all, therefore, recruit pay is more competitive than the national minimum ,12 which may account for the fact that “satisfaction with pay” ranks in 4th place among the factors listed. But as will be seen, this needs to be relativized as such satisfaction does not extend to hourly rates.

Figure 1 : Factors Motivating Volunteer Soldiers to Stay in the Armed Forces (n=5,254)

Others 0.9% Can choose to serve near where I live 8.4% Good system 5.9% Expectations from parents and families 10.2% Satisfied with welfare benefits 5.6% Satisfied with pay 8.9% Promotion to NCO and shifting to permanent status 6.4% Opportunity to receive education & skill training 7.9% Encouragement from colleagues 2.4% Personal interest 3.2% Economic pressure 14.8% Profession or occupation 4.6% Job stability 20.8%

0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% Source: Drawn by author based on data from Comptroller Quarterly, 2010.13

The same economic pressure and low-income family backgrounds explain why the opportunity to learn new skills or study towards a degree also plays a role in motivations to renew contracts : volunteers cannot afford university tuition fees, and their enlistment reflected a strategy to seek a job first and pursue college degrees later. Providing

educational opportunities is thus a sound incentive – and for the military, it is bound to enhance personnel quality. Likewise, for service members from such low-income backgrounds, welfare or in-kind compensation in addition to direct pay can also be an attractive incentive. An Army corporal compared the compensation packages respectively offered by private firms and the military :

I switched from the private sector to the military because I saw its advantage in terms of welfare. In the long run, welfare in the military is pretty good. The pay I earned in the private sector was about the same as what I am earning now ; so welfare was my main reason to join the military. (…) My family and friends support my decision.14

11 Cf. the Ministry of National Defense website : https://rdrc.mnd.gov.tw/rdrc/Recruit/A-left02a05.aspx, accessed 7 April, 2016. 12 2012 National Survey, Council of Labor Affairs. The national average starting wage is NT 25,036, and NT 26,722 for university graduates. See : statdb.cla.gov.tw/html/svy01/i0000080139290.htm, accessed 17 March, 2016. 13 Huang, Chien-Hsiung, 2010, “A Study on Volunteer soldiers’ Willingness of Retention and Work Satisfaction, The Case of Combined Logistics Command”, Comptroller Quarterly, n°328, April 2010, pp.81- 103. 14 Author’s interview with a volunteer soldier. Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 8

The survey also explored the negative factors that prompted soldiers not to remain in service, and did so through 16 variables (Figure 2, next page). The most discouraging factor was “cannot go home/out after service hours” (15.6%), with “could not have regular holidays and leaves” not too far behind (8.0%) : in other words, lack of freedom obstructs soldiers’ willingness to stay longer. “Heavy workloads” (9.9%) and “uneven distribution of work” (8.7%) played a not insignificant role, while “attractive incentives from private firms” (8.1%) encouraged soldiers to leave. On the other hand, dissatisfaction with pay rates was found to be relatively unimportant in this survey.

Figure 2 : Factors Discouraging Volunteer Service Members from Remaining in the Armed Forces (n = 5,254)

Others 1.6% Service location far from home 4.4% Unsatisfied with the retirement system 1.6% Attractive external incentives 8.1% Family reasons 4.2% Unsatisfied with welfares 6.1% Unsatisfied with pay 4.1% Leadership of superiors 6.8% Unfair , selection for training, rewards and… 4.8% Unsatisfied with facility or leisure infrastructure in… 5.8% Assigned position not based on skill and occupation 4.3% No chance to study for a higher degree or certificate 6.1% Cannot go home/ out after work hours 15.6% Cannot have regular holidays and leaves 8.0% Uneven distribution of work 8.7% Workload too heavy 9.9% 0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 12.0% 14.0% 16.0% 18.0% Source: Drawn by author based on data from Comptroller Quarterly, 2010.15

The gap between expectations and the reality of voluntary military service is also apt to impact retention negatively for a majority.16 This was confirmed by a 2009 Army Bimonthly study on volunteer soldiers’ satisfaction with their military careers, which had shown that 64.4% felt their jobs and life in the armed forces were not what they originally expected. Lack of freedom was a factor, but so was compensation : satisfaction with pay was counterbalanced by longer work hours than in the private sector, which made hourly pay rates in the military much less competitive, and could account for the study’s other finding that soldiers were less than fully satisfied with their pay even after a raise. Finally, though that hypothesis remains to be documented, the expectations/ reality gap probably has to do with the so far unrealized hope that the AVF can induce a less authoritarian leadership style that potential recruits find palatable.

Extending the Transition Period : A Successful Move (?)

Faced with so many challenges, the MND decided to further cut down the active- duty force, and annual recruitment goals were again lowered. Many people started to doubt whether the 2014 deadline for completion of the AVF transition process could be met. With

15 Huang, 2010, op.cit. 16 Recruiting advertisements regularly highlight that military pay is higher than private sector rates, and imply that soldiers can take leaves and go outside after service hours on a normal basis. Disappointment, especially on the latter point, hardly fosters retention. Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 9 its back against the wall, in September 2013 the Ministry announced that the end of the transition period was postponed by two years, from December 2014 to December 2016. After suffering a new recruitment setback in 2013, the Executive Yuan (Cabinet) initiated a series of concrete measures to save the AVF transformation by boosting recruitment and retention of volunteer soldiers. The MND’s original plan was to raise the basic recruit pay to twice the legal set by the government. Other options included offering hardship bonuses, streamlining career paths, increasing educational opportunities, bettering service and living conditions, revising the retirement scheme and veterans’ welfare, and improving family care programmes. Similar measures and schemes were also adopted to retain existing soldiers, chief among which were reenlistment bonuses. Starting in 2014, volunteer soldiers became entitled to a monthly pay raise of NT$ 4,000 (128 US$). Furthermore, in July the same year, the MND requested that the Legislature authorize combat and hardship perks, as well as the reenlistment bonus just mentioned ; in November, a draft law was passed with AVF implementation in mind, that focused on (1) and benefits, (2) soldiers’ dignity, and (3) post-service job opportunities. Beginning in 2015, became eligible for retirement benefits after only four years, instead of 10 years previously. Improved job training, career planning, and medical care at veterans’ hospitals were thrown in for good measure. As a result, after the disastrous year of 2013, a total of 15,024 new volunteers were recruited in 2014, which exceeded the target announced (10,557) by 42.3%. And the figures for subsequent years have been encouraging.17 The retention rate has also seen a significant uptick. In the same year, of 10,493 volunteer soldiers who had completed their initial four-year contract, 6,440 (or 61.4%) decided to stay in the military, as against an average retention rate of 46.3% in 2012 and 2013. After years of improvement, halfway through 2017, the retention rate has increased to 75.6% (3,967 out of 5,245 prior-service soldiers chose to stay in the military).18 These figures suggest that the aforementioned measures have started to bear fruit. However, it should also be borne in mind that, while MND figures surpassed the recruitment goal for 2014, this objective had been set at a level that was lower by half than the 2013 goal, prompting questions as to whether Taiwan would one day be able to recruit enough soldiers.

Taiwan, a Country Defended by its Poor and Minority People ? Another recruitment issue is the diversity of new recruits. The issue of diversity of military personnel in Taiwan’s armed forces mainly centres on gender. The recruitment of female service members has so far been carried out successfully ; targets were not only met, but with 10% of force levels as early as 2014, results were significantly better than expected. Compared with male soldiers, female soldiers have higher motivation, are more satisfied with military service, and more likely to stay.

17 In the first half of 2017, the MND managed to recruit 8,042 new volunteers, or 53.9% of the goal (15,000) set for the entire year. Cf. http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20170801/1173024/, accessed 30 August, 2017. 18 Ibid. Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 10

The reason for this quasi-exclusive emphasis on gender where diversity is concerned is that Taiwan, with close to 98% people of (local or mainland) Chinese stock and only small immigration flows, is a strongly homogeneous society in terms of ethnicity. The only exception refers to the Aborigines, whose share in the country’s population does not exceed 2.3%. So that, to begin with, this sole ethnic minority was not specifically highlighted as a potential group to recruit from. The RoC military’s social composition is another matter, but as will be seen, Aborigines play a key role in it. A study found that between 2012 and 2014, as many as 98% of volunteer soldiers do not have college degrees, which strongly contrasts with only 31% in the general employed population. During the same period, for every 1,000 qualified Taiwanese young men and women, those from rural areas such as Hualien, Taitung, Pintung, Penghu and Kinmen Counties enlist into the AVF at the rate of 21.3%, 20.5%, 14.6%, 18.9%, and 18.9% respectively, in contrast with only 1% of those who live in the capital Taipei City (average household income NT$ 139,000). These counties are located in remote countryside areas with average lower monthly household incomes, for example, NT$ 60,000 in Taitung, 78,000 in Hualien, 74,000 in Pintung, 87,000 in Kinmen and Penghu – all below the national average household income of NT$ 94,000 (1 USD = 30 NT$). Interestingly, among other factors, because they combine such disadvantaged social characteristics, 29.6 Aborigines out of 1000 aged between 18 and 32 signed up for service in the AVF (an over-representation by some 30% when compared with the Aborigines’ share in the general population) ; the corresponding proportion of enlistees among non-Aborigines is only 4.6 out of 1,000.19 All in all, these figures bear out the notion that it is easier to recruit volunteer service members originating from the countryside and with lower average household income than from metropolitan areas and with higher household income. This result is confirmed by a 2014 study which surveyed 663 RoC Navy volunteer petty officers and sailors.20 Its findings show that those from low-income families have a higher . The same applies to female and married personnel – especially those born into low-income families – whose propensity to remain in the military happens to be higher

than average. This prompts a question : despite the fact that Taiwan’s population is quite homogeneous and the integration of minorities is not seen as a problem, can it be that Taiwan is potentially defended by people mainly from the margins, whether in society

(Aborigines and the poor more generally) or the military (women) ? The Situation of Taiwan’s Aborigines As already mentioned above, Taiwan’s population is made up of a tiny minority of Aborigines and a majority group of Chinese (Han) stock (which itself can be subdivided into Fukien, Hakka and Chinese Mainlanders). The Aborigines refer to Taiwan’s indigenous

19 Cf. www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20150623/634284/, accessed 28 February, 2016. Data gathered from the National Statistics, RoC (Taiwan), Ministry of National Defense, Department of Statistics, Ministry of the Interior, and Department of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Taipei City. 20 Yen, Chen-wen, Reenlistment Willingness in the Volunteer Force – The Case of the Southern Naval Forces, unpublished Master thesis, I-Shou University, 2014. Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 11 people, who were gradually marginalized by successive waves of immigrants in the course of the island’s history. As of today, there are a total of 548,025 Aborigines,21 who constitute 2.3% of Taiwan’s overall population and are divided into fourteen major tribes. As in other (e.g., North American) countries, Taiwan’s aboriginal tribes have been suffering from lower social status, higher unemployment rate, and lower incomes. Since the 1990s, a government decision to import foreign labourers has resulted in a massive loss of job opportunities for Aborigines ; non-aboriginal family income is 2.3 times as high as an aboriginal family’s.22 Despite the fact that educational opportunities for Aborigines have increased and improved in the past two decades, the gap between aboriginal and non- aboriginal education levels shows few signs of narrowing. Aborigines constitute merely 23 1.2% of the total population with “college degree and above” levels of attainment ; and their life expectancy – 66 years for men, 74.8 for women – is respectively 10 and 7 years shorter than for non-aboriginal males (76 years) and females (82.6).24 Discrimination and all kinds of difficulties faced by Aborigines in Taiwan’s society have indeed turned them into a minority group in the Western sense of that phrase.

Recruiting Aborigines to Serve in the AVF As in many foreign armed forces where over-representation of ethnic minorities is not unheard of (e.g., African-Americans in the US military), Taiwan’s Aborigines, now a de facto recruitment target group, are over-represented in its military :

Figure 4 : Percentage of Aborigines in Taiwan’s Population, AVF and Special Forces (rounded percentages)

120% 98% 93% 100% 80% 60% 60% 40% Aborigines 40% 20% 2% 7% Non-Aborigines 0% % of Aborigines in% of Aborigines in% of Aborigines in Taiwan's the AVF the Special Forces Population

Source : www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20150623/634284/.

A study concentrating on major factors that affect Aborigines’ career decisions to serve as volunteer soldiers is used for the purpose of secondary data analysis and as a reference for better recruitment strategies. A total of 417 aboriginal volunteers and conscripts 25 were surveyed to investigate what factors motivate them to serve in the military.

21 Council of Indigenous Peoples : www.apc.gov.tw, accessed 12 April, 2016. 22 2010 Status Survey of Indigenous 21 People, Taipei, Council of Indigenous Peoples, 2011. 23 Research Centre for Indigenous Education, 2009. The White Paper for Indigenous Education, Pingtung, National Pingtung University of Education. 24 Ministry of the Interior (2011) : http://www.moi.gov.tw/stat/life.aspx, accessed 09 April, 2016. 25 T.H. Ma, A Behavior Intention Study of ROC Aboriginal Young Men Choosing the Military as a Career, unpublished master thesis, National Defense University, 2011. Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 12

Table 1 (below) strongly suggests that economic factors play an essential role (see ranks n°1, 2, 4 and 5). A stable income and alleviation of their families’ financial burdens are considered top priorities, which the milieu in which they grew up, marked by low average income and high unemployment rates, is enough to account for. Aboriginal service members also believe the pay and welfare benefits offered by the military will allow them to be worry-free even during economic downturns. Perhaps due to their culture, Aborigines like to face and take on challenges (items ranked 3 and 6).

Table 1 : Factors Encouraging Aborigines to Serve as Volunteers (N = 417)

Standard Factors Mean Deviation 1. Stable income 4.19 0.718 2. Alleviating family’s financial burdens 4.17 0.786 3. Taking on challenges 3.89 0.844 4. Can avoid the impact of economic downturns 3.88 0.861 5. Good pay and welfare benefits 3.73 0.840 6. Like military training and its challenges 3.66 0.830 7. by protecting the country 3.61 0.868 8. Not easy to find a job in private sector 3.54 0.991 9. Feeling of achievement 3.51 0.883 10. Masculine heroism 3.49 0.909 11. Can realize my dream 3.44 0.873 12. Learning occupational/ professional skills 3.41 0.928 13. A career suitable for aboriginal youths 3.41 0.922 14. Can cultivate good habits 3.38 0.922 15. Can enhance social status 3.38 0.880 16. Military training is useful for a future career in private sector 3.36 0.948 17. Can satisfy my personal interests 3.09 0.947 18. Military uniform attracts me 2.97 0.970 N.B. Five-point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree, 3 = indifferent).

Furthermore, the study attempted to identify the motivators that inspire their career choices. Again, elimination of poor economic status encourages them to sign up for volunteer military service. Usually enjoying a fine physical condition and valuing it, aboriginal volunteer soldiers adjust well to the hardships of demanding military training – and indeed they constitute a large portion of Special Forces units. Influence from tribal (male and female) elders plays an essential role in Aborigines’ decision to serve in the military and subsequently helps them cope with the demands of military life. The armed forces’ participation in human assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions since the 2009 Marako typhoon disaster also especially inspires Aborigines, probably because they grew up in vulnerable homes built on mountain slopes. Performing HA/DR rescue operations not only improves the military’s public image, but also helps it recruit volunteer soldiers, which is why it heartily embraces such missions. Table 2 (next page) lists and ranks the motivators considered.

The study concludes that : 1. The parents of aboriginal volunteer soldiers have lower educational backgrounds. So do these service members themselves usually, with senior high school being their highest level educational attainment. Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 13

2. Aboriginal volunteer service members are more positive in terms of cognition and conception on “attitude towards prescribed behaviour”, “subjective social norms”, and “perceived behaviour control” than those who serve as conscripts. 3. 46.3% of aboriginal volunteers and 19.2% of aboriginal conscripts intend to choose the military as a career. On closer examination, it is found that the higher their educational backgrounds, the lower their desire to enlist.

Table 2 : Aborigines’ Motivation to Serve as Volunteers (N = 417)

Standard Motivators Mean Deviation 1. Poor family economic status 3.86 0.893 2. Better physical condition 3.70 0.833 3. Entering military service with colleagues from the same tribe 3.61 0.894 4. Military’s performance in human assistance and disaster relief 3.52 0.880 5. New lifestyle 3.48 0.859 6. Aborigines adapt better to military training 3.48 0.909 7. Aboriginal status can promote public relations 3.46 0.886 8. Barracks too far from home will depress my willingness to serve 3.44 1.075 9. Masculine heroism 3.35 0.899 10. Military movies 3.20 0.850 11. Family in need at home depresses my willingness to serve 3.19 0.940 12. More females joining the military 3.13 1.011 13. Military way of life cramps my style and habits 3.12 0.941 14. Lack of for Aborigines 3.05 1.021 15. The demands of strict training depresses my willingness to serve 2.90 0.902 N.B. Five-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree, 3 = neutral, 5 = strongly agree).

These results are supported by previous research on aboriginal Special Forces soldiers from the Paiwan Tribe (one of the major aboriginal tribes in Taiwan), which found that (1) their family’s economic situation is their main motivation to serve in the military ; (2) family expectations significantly motivate them to serve as volunteers ; and (3) such motivations are strong enough to induce them to change their life trajectory. Finally, low self-esteem at school and many positive images from their relatives and friends who serve in the military exert strong influence on their motivations.26 Retaining Aboriginal Volunteers As previously discussed, retention is as important as recruitment in order to achieve the goal of instituting a full-fledged AVF. Normally, after a few years of service, Taiwanese volunteer privates are encouraged by the MND to seek promotion to non-commissioned (NCO) rank. Table 3 shows that aboriginal volunteer service members have a relatively higher tendency than others to remain in the military and follow that route. This is now a common phenomenon as these volunteer soldiers are quickly becoming the backbone of a solid cadre corps (see Table 3, next page). The military is thus induced to recruit them as volunteers in the first place and prompt them to seek such promotion after a few years in order to save a significant amount of money, training and effort.

26 I.H. Lee, A Study on the Military Course of Aboriginal Volunteer Soldiers in Special Operation Forces : The Example of the Paiwan Tribe, unpublished master thesis, FHK College, 2015. Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 14

Table 3 : Aboriginal Soldiers Promoted to NCO Rank over the 2005-2010 Period, Hua-Don Defense Command, RoC Army

Existing Volunteer Aborigines Aboriginal Soldiers % of Aboriginal Soldiers Year Soldiers among them Promoted to NCO Rank Thus Promoted 2005 67 36 26 72% 2006 100 55 42 76% 2007 201 126 91 72% 2008 251 125 82 66% 2009 180 100 36 36% 2010 265 147 98 66% Total 1064 589 375 63%

Source : Ku, Chien-Ming, A Study on the Factors of Aboriginal Volunteer Soldiers’ Inclination to Serve in the Reserve Component Non-Commissioned Officer (RCNCO) Corps – The Case of the Huadong Defense Command, unpublished thesis, National Taitung University, 2011.

Ku’s 2011 research (see Table 3 source) surveyed 526 aboriginal volunteer soldiers in order to explore whether they were willing to remain in the military and serve as NCOs, as well as the factors that influenced their decisions. In terms of career intent, the study found that whereas 29% (153) of aboriginal volunteer soldiers did not wish to seek promotion to NCO rank, fully 71% (373) did (see Figure 5 below), which by far exceeds national average retention rates.

Figure 5 : Aboriginal Volunteers Broken Down by Intent to Serve as NCOs (N = 526)

400 373 350 300 250 200 153 150 100 50 0 IntendIntend to totransfer Move toUp NCO to DoDo not Not intend Intend to transferto Move to NCO Status Up to NCONCO Status

According to Ku, aboriginal soldiers’ consider their sense of and desire for further achievement as the most important motivator, followed by welfare benefits, contents of service jobs, opportunity for development, and recognition by the organization. With regard to job satisfaction, the contents of work become the priority, followed by sense of achievement, safety and protection, and recognition by the organization. In terms of career development, safety surpasses all other factors as the reason for Aborigines to pursue a military career ; it is followed by balance, challenge, promotion and freedom. To further investigate the reasons why aboriginal volunteer soldiers wish to move up the NCO ladder, 16 factors were listed for respondents to choose from. Among them, job security as a volunteer non-commissioned officer was considered the most important Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 15 reason to remain in the military. Other important factors included encouragement from relatives (12.9%), economic pressure from family (11.7%), good pay and welfare perks (10.5%), the possibility to serve near home (8.8%) and good pension scheme (6.5%). Obviously, financial and economic reasons constitute a greater part of aboriginal volunteer soldiers’ intentions for NCO transfer, see Table 4.

Table 4 : Factors Encouraging Aboriginal Volunteer Service Members to Seek NCO Status

Number of Factors % Soldiers 1. Job security 262 14% 2. Encouragement from family 240 12.9% 3. Economic pressure from family 219 11.7% 4. Good pay and welfare benefits 195 10.5% 5. Can serve near home 164 8.8% 6. Good pension scheme 122 6.5% 7. Personal interest 116 6.2% 8. Encouragement from superiors 104 5.6% 9. Sense of achievement 94 5% 10. Opportunity to pursue higher education 74 4% 11. Job can match specialty 71 3.8% 12. Patriotism 56 3% 13. Cannot find a job 51 2.7% 14. Recognition by the Organization 47 2.5% 15. Promotion 43 2.3% 16. Other 7 0.4% Total 1865 100% Source: Ku, Chien-Ming, 2011, op.cit.

On the other hand, factors discouraging aboriginal volunteer soldiers from aspiring to NCO rank included the “tremendous pressure” the military exerted on them (13.6%), followed by the mismatch between military reality and what was described in recruitment adverts (12.8%), general lack of interest in pursuing a military career any longer (11.8%), and difficulty in adjusting to life and service conditions in the armed forces. These results (see Table 5, next page) demonstrate that a poor service environment, old-fashioned leadership and management styles play a crucial role in terms of why (a minority of) aboriginal volunteer soldiers are unwilling to remain in the military. The study summarizes its findings by first emphasizing their sense of achievement as the most frequently mentioned reason why Aborigines are motivated to serve in the Army as volunteer soldiers. Second, job satisfaction among then derives mainly from actual job contents. Third, job security has high priority in career development. Fourth, economic considerations are the main reason why aboriginal volunteer soldiers transfer into the NCO corps. Fifth, the main reason for people not wanting such a transfer is the gap resulting from different information between their initial recruitment stage and the time of promotion. Sixth, aboriginal volunteer soldiers’ motivational structure affects their willingness to join the NCO corps. Seventh, because of a meagre degree of job satisfaction, aboriginal volunteer soldiers feel tremendous pressure on the job, which in turn affects Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 16 their willingness to seek NCO status. Eighth, conditional upon smooth promotions, job security, reasonable freedom, and the possibility of accumulating job experience, improved career development prospects are apt to maintain a high retention rate among them. Last, personal background specifics potentially play a role in aboriginal volunteer soldiers’ willingness to move up to NCO positions.

Table 5 : Factors Discouraging Aboriginal Volunteer from Seeking NCO Promotions

Number of Factors % Soldiers 1. Tremendous pressure 104 13.6% 2. Gap between recruitment advertisement and reality 98 12.8% 3. No longer interested in military career 90 11.8% 4. Cannot adapt to life and work in the military 77 10.1% 5. Do not get along with superiors 67 8.8% 6. Unfair distribution of rewards and punishment 65 8.5% 7. There are better chances elsewhere 59 7.7% 8. No future in the military 55 7.2% 9. No respect for the military 34 4.4% 10. Difficult promotion 33 4.3% 11. Pursuing higher education 31 4.1% 12. Cannot get along with colleagues 23 3.0% 13. Other 14 1.8% 14. Cannot serve near home 7 0.9% 15. Opposition from family 6 0.8% 16. Looking after children 2 0.3% Source: Ku, Chien-Ming, 2011.

Conclusion

In December 2015, the MND conducted an internal survey of boot camp trainees with regard to their motivation when they joined the AVF. After seven weeks of basic military training, all respondents claimed that they had adapted well to life at the boot camp. When asked through what channel they had received AVF recruitment information, they answered that it came from military recruiting staff (25%), military instructors at their schools (22%), and parents, family members and relatives (21%). As regards their motivations, 48% pointed out that pay and welfare perks helped relieve the financial burden placed on their families, 26% were driven by ambition, and 20% were encouraged by their parents or families. As for why the respondents were willing to give up pursuing higher education and serve as soldiers, 68% were attracted by the decent pay and welfare benefits offered by the military. The last item was about whether they planned to pursue university degrees : 66% indeed intended to do so at a later stage and take advantage of the subsidies and financial resources provided by the military for that purpose.

Evidence suggests that current recruiting channels and methods – recruitment drives in schools, recruiters and information centres, as well as use of media – can effectively help reach recruitment goals. Second, that those who give up pursuing higher degrees and choose to serve as volunteers are mainly motivated by wanting to alleviate their family’s financial burden. Third, that volunteer service members are aware that the MND offers Res Militaris, ERGOMAS issue n°5, November 2017 17 many opportunities to subsidize their pursuit of a higher education degree or professional license : most are interested in this kind of offer, which thus constitutes an effective way to enhance recruitment. In light of the Defence Blue Paper recently produced by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), President Tsai Ing-Wen aims to review the existing AVF implementation plan, in order to ensure overall policy coherence between national defence strategy, operational concepts, and tactical requirements. The Tsai administration stresses that the AVF system should reflect the particular characteristics of Taiwan’s social development and defence requirements ; it will henceforth emphasize the importance of the first year of service as “a year for review and preparation” in order to ensure a smooth 27 AVF transformation now in the final stages of its . Also, the party plans to raise the standard of professionalism among military personnel entering the military through established channels. The outcomes of the DPP’s efforts remain to be seen.

After a shaky start to the AVF transition, the MND has learned its lessons and recruiting results have seen some improvements. Some of that recent success results from determined government efforts to improve service conditions and career prospects, as well as from a two-year extension of the AVF transition period. But it also relates to the (far more than proportional) participation of Aborigines who, though recruitment was not deliberately aimed at them to begin with, have become a de facto target group because they combine and epitomize the social characteristics most frequently conducive to enlistments : countryside or small town residence, lower socio-economic and educational backgrounds, group norms that value challenges, and encouragements from relatives undeterred by the armed forces’ poor social standing in Taiwanese society. Aborigines have equally proved a precious resource in the provision of a now strong NCO backbone for the services – not least Special Forces.

Such improvements cannot be attributed to the MND’s efforts alone, as inter- departmental collaboration also played a key role. Most importantly, MND leaders need to realize that, in order to earn respect from society, simply raising soldiers’ pay will not suffice. A complete overhaul of current military culture by fundamentally eradicating excessive red tape and other unproductive practices is crucial. Efficient and effective command and management of manpower issues is equally important, and thus old ways need to be abandoned. When all is said and done, public recognition of military service and the intrinsic motivation to serve it is apt to generate are a precondition for successful recruitment and retention. Even if fragile, the past two years’ achievements are a positive sign. By following the right track, Taiwan’s armed forces may have a chance after all to reach the goal set for them back in 2009 of a 100% all-volunteer force.

27 New Frontier Foundation, Defense Policy Blue Paper n°9, Defense Policy Advisory Committee, May 2015.