Differing Motivations in the International System

Uppsala Universitet Statsvetenskapliga Institutionen Year: Spring 2020

Differing Motivations in the International System A Comparative Case Study of Sweden and Poland regarding participation in the international interventions in Iraq 2003 and Libya 2011

Name: Adam Gadd Supervisor: Joakim Kreutz Words: 11551

Abstract The purpose of this thesis is to examine what factors cause states to engage or not engage in military interventions. More specifically this thesis aims to highlight these factors by focusing on the contrasting decisions of Sweden and Poland regarding the 2003 Invasion of Iraq and the 2011 Intervention in Libya. The research question of this thesis is as follows: Why did Poland participate in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq whilst Sweden did not and why did Sweden participate in the 2011 military intervention in Libya whilst Poland did not? The theoretical departure point is that norms influence the decisions of states when deciding on intervention or non-intervention. The empirical analysis is performed through a qualitative text analysis of a combination of Swedish and Polish materials. The analysis shows the results that Sweden is more heavily influenced by the norms of humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect than Poland and that Poland has a more emphasized focus on improving territorial defence through participation in military interventions.

Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

1.1 BACKGROUND ...... 1 1.2 RESEARCH AIM & RESEARCH QUESTION ...... 2 1.3 PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...... 2 1.3.1 Theoretical Framework ...... 6 2. METHOD ...... 8

2.1 CASE STUDY ...... 8 2.2 COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ...... 9 2.2.1 Selection of Cases ...... 9 2.3 QUALITATIVE TEXT ANALYSIS ...... 10 2.4 MATERIALS ...... 11 2.5 OPERATIONALIZATION ...... 13 2.6 VARIABLES ...... 14 2.6.1 Authorized by the United Nations Security Council ...... 14 2.6.2 National Security Benefits ...... 14 2.6.3 Humanitarian Goal and/or R2P ...... 14 3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ...... 15

3.1 BACKGROUND TO THE INTERVENTIONS ...... 15 3.1.1 Case 1: The Invasion of Iraq ...... 15 3.1.2 Case 2: The Intervention in Libya ...... 16 3.2. SWEDISH PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS ...... 17 3.3 SWEDISH NON-PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ ...... 18 3.4 SWEDISH PARTICIPATION IN LIBYA ...... 19 3.5 POLISH PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS ...... 20 3.6 POLISH PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ ...... 21 3.8 POLISH NON-PARTICIPATION IN LIBYA ...... 22 3.9 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ...... 23 4. CONCLUSIONS & FURTHER RESEARCH ...... 26 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 28 APPENDIX ...... 34

1. Introduction

1.1 Background Ever since the end of the Second World War, interstate wars have become less and less common. States have however continued to participate in armed conflicts, often far from their own borders through various military interventions. For many states in Europe, the only experience of armed conflict during the 75 years since the end of the Second World War has been in the form of participating in armed interventions (Roser, 2020). This begs the question, why do states that do not need to experience armed conflict continuously engage in interventions in conflict zones around the world?

During the Cold War, European states tended to focus their armed forces on territorial defence and preparation and deterrence for potential conflict against Nato or the Warsaw Pact, depending on which side of the Iron Curtain a state happened to find itself. This would however change with the end of the Cold War as the focus for many states shifted to participation in expeditionary operations around the world (Rickli, 2008, p. 307). This new focus was however not uniform in the sense that European countries have chosen to participate and not participate in different interventions, often creating a divided map.

Two European states that have been active in armed operations around the world throughout the three decades since the end of the Cold War are Sweden and Poland (Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, undated, & Försvarsmakten, 2020). As is the case with all European countries, Sweden and Poland have chosen to intervene in different conflicts, but what are the reasons for Sweden and Poland to participate in such interventions? What has motivated Swedish and Polish policy makers when making decisions to participate or not participate in armed conflicts? Whilst these two countries have been part of various different interventions, there are also two that for several reasons stand out amongst the rest. Those are Poland’s participation in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq and Sweden’s participation in the 2011 Libya Intervention. Noticeably as well is that in both of these cases the other country chose not to participate. The contrasting decisions made by Swedish and Polish policy makers in these two cases highlights that there must exist some difference or differences in why Sweden and Poland participate in interventions.

1.2 Research Aim & Research Question The importance of gaining a deeper understanding of why states choose to intervene is twofold. Firstly, understanding the motivations of states in intervening is imperative to being able to evaluate under what conditions states will intervene or abstain from intervening. Secondly, the motivations of states when intervening can influence the actions of intervening states in conflicts, and thus result in different consequences. Military interventions have resulted in widely different outcomes ranging from ending a conflict, prolonging a conflict or creating a conflict. Thus gaining insight on the motivations of intervening and non- intervening states has significant real world relevance.

Whilst the subject of military interventions is broad with an abundance of cases, focusing on specific cases and actors may help us understand these issues on a deeper and more complex level than an overview of a large number of cases would bring. By highlighting the decision making of two states, Sweden and Poland during two interventions this thesis strives to explore the motivations states when intervening or abstaining from intervening. Gaining a deeper understanding of why Sweden and Poland chose to participate or not participate in the two interventions may therefore also bring with it a deeper understanding of why states choose to participate in military interventions in general. Furthermore this thesis aims to contribute to the previous literature on the causes and motivations of states participating in military interventions by exploring the motivations of Poland and Sweden and why they made such contrasting decisions in 2003 and 2011.

The research question is therefore as follows: Why did Poland participate in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq whilst Sweden did not and why did Sweden participate in the 2011 military intervention in Libya whilst Poland did not?

1.3 Previous Research and Theoretical Framework In order to study the participation in military interventions it is first important to clearly define what a military intervention is. According to Pearson and Baumann, a military intervention can be defined as “the movement of troops or forces of one country into the

2 territory or territorial waters of another country, or military action by troops already stationed by one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute.” (Pearson & Baumann, 1988). According to Pearson and Baumann, all wars are preceded by some form of military intervention but not all military interventions end up causing war (Ibid). It is also important to draw a distinction between two forms of military interventions which can be done by defining under what authority a military intervention is undertaken, i.e. if the intervention was authorized by an international body like the United Nations or if the intervention is undertaken unilaterally without such authorization. Likewise it is important to distinguish between the concepts of an intervention and an invasion. Whilst an intervention does not have to be an invasion and an invasion does not need to be classified as an intervention, these two concepts can overlap. A final important definition is that of a “humanitarian intervention”, which Martha Finnemore defines as “deploying military force across borders for the purpose of protecting foreign nationals from man-made violence” (Finnemore, 2013, p. 65).

Military interventions is a topic that is widely debated with different cases drawing different levels of debate and controversy. The concept of a military intervention is complicated in the sense that they can be more or less costly and more or less condoned by the international community. Military interventions have been extensively studied in the field of Political Science and International Relations. Various explanations for why states choose to participate in military interventions have been put forward.

Although military interventions can vary widely, these conflicts often take the form of civil wars with third party intervention or multilateral interventions by coalitions of states against another state. The two cases this thesis aims to examine, the 2011 intervention in Libya and the 2003 Invasion of Iraq falls into these categorizations. Whilst the 2011 intervention in Libya was an intervention in a civil war the 2003 Invasion of Iraq was an intervention against the regime of one country by a coalition of other states. These interventions also have varied widely in their scope and in what they aim to achieve. The decisions of states to participate in such conflicts often far from their own borders has been studied and potential explanations given differs widely. From the realist perspective in international relations, military interventions have often been explained as a foreign policy tool used to serve national interests (Lechner, Silviya, 2010, p. 437). This holds true for both offensive realists and defensive realists. Whilst states in the offensive realist perspective aim to downgrade the

3 power of other states through interventions and defensive realists hold the view that states try to increase their own power in order to deter encroachment by other states, military interventions serve the interests of both these perspectives by benefiting the strategic interests of the intervening state (Boke, 2019). Participating in military interventions have been explained in terms of strategic interests. These explanations have argued that states will participate in military interventions if it benefits national interests (Regan, 1998, p. 754). These models for explaining military interventions consequently view participating in military interventions as one of many available tools for states to improve their own strategic situation. In this vein, the factors that influence the decisions of actors to intervene are purely material in that states will participate in an intervention if participation helps maximize the intervening state’s power and security or minimize threats to the security of the intervening state (Boke, 2019). Some studies taking their starting point in the realist school of thought have examined military interventions using a large sample size and explain decisions to partake in material terms that align with the realist explanation of military interventions. These studies have found that the main contributing factors for a state intervening in conflicts is the military power of the intervening state, the distance between the intervening state and the conflict zone and the previous ties between the intervening state and the state that is the target of the intervention. In cases where a third party intervenes in an internal conflict, the characteristics of that conflict have also been found to influence decisions to partake (Corbetta, 2010, & Regan, 1998).

Whilst realist theory have focused on purely material explanations for participation in military interventions, liberal scholars have explained the phenomenon in several different ways. Liberal theorists in general do not acknowledge the realist assumption that only geostrategic considerations play into the motivations of intervening states (Boke, 2019). Instead liberal theory points to the possibility of altruistic motives of intervening states. Liberalism espouses the principle that humanitarian needs are the primary legitimizing reason for an intervention and rejects unilateralism and self-interest in interventions on the grounds that this would harm the stability of international cooperation (Ibid). Studies have found that motivations influence the type of intervention, with self-interest being related to unilateral interventions and humanitarian motives being related to multilateral interventions. Moreover it has been found that states with humanitarian goals in their interventions are less likely to use unnecessary force and are less likely to pursue self-interest goals in situations where a humanitarian disaster is present (Kim, S. K., 2012, p. 636). In line with liberal theory,

4 empirical studies have pointed to liberal ideals having relevance in the decision making of intervening states. For example, the interventions of the United States have been studied finding that while threats to democratic institutions, terrorist activity and human rights abuses all are contributing factors to US involvement in a conflict it is human rights protection that is the main predictor for US intervention (Choi, James, 2014, p. 913).

Other studies have examined intervention and non-intervention from the perspective of neo- colonialism. These have often rejected the liberal arguments of the importance of R2P in states determining to intervene or not intervene in conflicts. For example, Catherine Gegout (2017, p. 293) in examining European states participation and non-participation in armed conflict in Africa, finds that the main determinants for intervention is possible gains of prestige and security for the intervening state and not humanitarian or economic factors. Interventions have also been discussed as a form of risk management arising from the uncertainty of a world in which clear territorial threats are no longer there but have instead been replaced by a variety of threats that are hard to manage (Rickli, 2008, p. 316).

The behaviours of small states specifically and their participation in military interventions has also been studied, showing for example that smaller states tend to be dependent on cooperation with larger partners for their own security, this cooperation often being gained through participation in interventions (Edström, Gyllensporre, Westberg, 2018, & Rickli, 2008). It has also been shown that the period following the cold war has changed these policies amongst small states, often making non participation impossible while cooperation with larger states and organizations have become necessary (Rickli, 2008, p. 307-308). The behaviour of small states in military interventions have been examined through the dichotomy of neutrality and autonomy on one hand and cooperation and influence on the other. According to this view of the security dilemma small states find themselves in, the option to participate in military interventions falls into the cooperation option giving the state greater influence whilst non participation falls into the autonomy option signifying a focus on sovereignty (Ibid, p. 309).

1.3.1 Theoretical Framework This comparative case study takes its basis in the constructivist school of international relations research. The constructivist thought stresses the importance of history and culture in international relations and makes the claim that much of international relations is socially constructed. This means that aspects of international relations that the traditional neorealist school of thought would consider material in its origins are according to constructivist thought, socially constructed and influenced by ideas. From the constructivist viewpoint policymakers can be expected to make decisions that align with their ideas, beliefs, norms and their culture (Cristol, 2019). The central proposition of the constructivist perspective on international relations is that the interests of actors can not be taken for granted or assumed to be the same in all situations (Eriksson et.al, 2014, p. 99). Instead these interests should be seen as the result of a combination of material and immaterial factors that vary from situation to situation (Ibid, p. 104). This means that one state can have different interests in different contexts and that these interests can change over time. Viewing military interventions through the constructivist lens, involvement in interventions cannot be assumed to be aligned with a fixed conception of national interests. The constructivist perspective naturally lends itself to analysis of rhetoric and language, especially in the context of war rhetoric (Ibid, p. 107).

The constructivist focus on the role of norms have traditionally not been acknowledged in realist and neorealist literature in international relations. Norms in the constructivist view of international relations is defined as an existing shared understanding of what the limits of state action are and an acceptance that the actions of states should be justified. This implies that actors follow the norm and are influenced by it since it is seen as legitimate (Wheeler, Nicholas J., 2003, p. 3). Constructivist theorizing in international relations defines a norm as the existence of shared understandings as to the permissible limits of state action, and an acceptance that conduct should be justified and appraised in terms set by the norm. The implication being that actors comply with norms because they accept them as legitimate. From the neorealist perspective, norms do not matter by themselves, instead norms are viewed as reflections of the power of actors. Thus, from the neorealist perspective it is the power of actors that influence or back norms, not the other way around. In the rationalist tradition in international relations, norms are often treated as affecting strategies of actors, but not the underlying interests of actors (Hurrell, MacDonald, 2013, p. 14). From both these

6 perspectives, norms do not affect outcomes making its importance marginal at best. Constructivism however, challenges this by questioning the view that actors only make decisions perfectly in line with strategic interests. Moreover, constructivists argue that when norms become sufficiently diffused in the international system and accepted, norms become an important part of how actors calculate consequences (Ibid, pp. 14-15).

The role of norms in determining why states join interventions has been described by Martha Finnemore (2013). Finnemore ties the willingness of a state to participate in an intervention based on R2P and humanitarianism with norms on the use of force. The diffusion of these norms has been facilitated by changes in three different factors. The first factor is that who can claim a right of humanitarian protection has changed. This is no longer limited by the religion or ethnicity of the group needing protection but has been extended to all (Finnemore, 2013, p. 64). The second change is in how interventions take place with unilateralism having been replaced with multilateralism. The final change is in the goals of interventions, with the practice of seeking benefits for the intervening state through installing a friendly government or other similar methods no longer seen as legitimate. The question of why states would participate in interventions in places of no strategic value to them can in this view instead be explained by the norms of the participating state (Ibid, p. 63). R2P or responsibility to protect, has evolved as a norm following the lack of response to atrocities in Rwanda and the Balkans during the 1990s. R2P affirms that states have a responsibility to protect the welfare of their populations and that states have an obligation to protect populations outside their borders if necessary (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, pp. 11-14). While the foremost responsibility for the protection of people lies with the state they reside in according to R2P, there is also a responsibility amongst all states to protect populations that is activated when states fail to fulfill their responsibility. The norm of R2P was further accepted when in 2005, UN member states committed to the responsibility to protect (A/RES/60/1, 2005).

An understanding of why states participate in humanitarian interventions based in norms contributes to an explanation of why interventions do not always seem to conform to the traditional realist expectation of states intervening when there are some form of strategic gains to be made from doing so (Finnemore, 2013, p. 66). This theoretical outlook challenges the realist and neorealist conception of military interventions since the motivations of states to participate in interventions do not need to be related to security and power balance. This

7 outlook does however also raise an important question, namely how these norms of multilateralism and humanitarianism differ in their importance across borders. Through the constructivist lens, the changing and varying norms that influence foreign policy and vary from country to country also applies to military interventions. This allows for an examination of the different outcomes decisions on participation in military intervention can have depending on the importance of normative ideas on humanitarianism and R2P in the foreign policy of different countries. Based on these arguments of the role norms play in influencing decisions pertaining to military interventions and the constructivist conception of changing and varying norms the following hypothesis is formulated:

States where foreign policy to a greater extent is norm-based will be more likely to join international interventions based around humanitarianism and R2P.

2. Method

2.1 Case Study The research question of this thesis will be answered through a case study. A case study can be defined as an intensive study of one or a small number of cases with the hope of being able to generalize to a larger set of cases (Gerring, 2006, p. 1). This method has been chosen for this thesis with respect to the research question and purpose of this study. It is a specific occurrence this study aims to examine, the participation in military intervention. This thesis is also a form of “interpretive” case study that while focusing on the cases also is based on a theoretical foundation and one or several hypotheses (Kaarbo, Beasley, 1999, p. 374). This describes the framework of this thesis that is based on a theoretical framework.

2.2 Comparative Case Study While a traditional case study concerns one specific case, a comparative case study examines at least two instances (Campbell, 2010). There are however important differences as compared to the traditional single case study since the comparative case study aims to discover and examine differences and similarities between the cases. These examinations or discoveries may contribute to the confirmation of theory (Ibid). Utilizing a comparative case study is suitable to answer the research question posed since this thesis aims to examine the differences in Swedish and Polish decision making concerning military interventions. Through a comparative case study this thesis will demonstrate the differences in Swedish and Polish decisions concerning the two cases of military intervention and answer the research question.

There are however also important limitations or problems that might arise through this method. One is that time lag may make comparisons difficult or misleading (Goodrick, 2014, p. 11). In this case this problem arises through the time lag between the 2003 Invasion of Iraq and the 2011 Intervention in Libya. The time lag may have brought with it significant changes in Swedish and Polish decision making and attitudes towards military interventions. In this case these changes are however also relevant to the research question since they can highlight the central aspects of each country’s decision making. Further challenges in using a comparative case study method concerns the selection of cases. How cases have been selected will be further discussed in the following section.

2.2.1 Selection of Cases The cases selected to examine the difference in Swedish and Polish motivations for participation in military interventions are the 2003 Invasion of Iraq and the 2011 Intervention in Libya. The cases help illustrate the potential differences in Swedish and Polish motivations for participating in military interventions since one of the countries chose to participate in both cases whilst the other chose not to. The actions of Sweden and Poland in both these cases are interesting and stand out from other countries. In the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, Poland was one of only four countries that took part and was the only non-anglophone country to participate. In the 2011 Libyan intervention Sweden’s participation also stands out as the only participating country that was neither a member of Nato nor the Arab League. Moreover,

Poland’s choice not to participate in the Libyan intervention also stands out from its previous track record of participating in numerous Nato-led and European Union-led interventions. Poland’s non-participation has been claimed to break with its “atlanticist” foreign policy and its previous commitment to participate in Nato-led interventions (Dicke, R., Anson, N., Roughton, P. & Hendrickson, R. 2013, p. 47, 49).

Poland and Sweden are fitting cases since they are comparable cases. The two countries are both European countries that are part of the European Union and both have a track record of participation in military interventions. In several military interventions, both Poland and Sweden have participated such as in the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the Kosovo Force in Kosovo and the Stabilization Force in Bosnia & Herzegovina. Sweden and Poland are thus not fitting for a variation finding type of case study since the two countries share many similarities. As is often the situation when comparing countries, there are however also significant differences that are relevant for this study. Whilst Poland is a member of Nato, Sweden is not. Sweden has however since the end of the Cold War increasingly integrated with Nato and has participated in several Nato led operations including the Libyan intervention. Important to note are Sweden’s and Poland’s similarities as it pertains to factors that previous research have connected to when states participate in military interventions. Sweden and Poland are relatively comparable in military strength. The countries are of a similar distance to Iraq and Libya and neither had participated in an armed conflict with Libya whilst both had very limited roles in the 1991 Gulf War. In regard to these two cases, Sweden and Poland are similar in many of the factors that in previous realist explanations have been described as influencing decisions to partake in interventions (Corbetta, 2010).

2.3 Qualitative Text Analysis In order to examine the differences in Swedish and Polish motivations for participation or non-participation in the military interventions in Iraq and Libya, a qualitative text analysis will be performed on the materials. This method has been chosen with consideration to the research question. A qualitative text analysis is used to closely examine something other than the whole of a text, or in other words examining something where some parts and passages of a text is more important to the research question than others. A qualitative text analysis is

10 suited to examine a phenomenon where meaning is of interest. What is meant by this is that the actions of actors can be influenced by their ideas and what meaning they ascribe to actions and other actors. A central starting point for the qualitative text analysis is that meaning and ideas are social and is shared by different actors (Esaiasson, Gilljam, Oscarsson, Towns & Wägnerud, 2017, p. 211). Thus the qualitative text analysis is a suitable method for analyzing the motivations of Sweden and Poland in their decisions to intervene or abstain from intervening in Iraq and Libya. This analysis will take the form of a systematic analysis. The systematic analysis aims to bring meaning to attention thematically and systematically. This is done by sorting the content of texts into simplified categories (Ibid, p. 213-214). This also relates to the reliability problems that face a qualitative text analysis. By creating clear categories, the reproducibility of the analysis is improved and the approach of the analysis is more transparent. The transparency is also improved by presenting the quotes and passages that are analyzed in the appendix.

In order to analyze the materials, two questions have been constructed. 1. What is presented as the reasons for participating or not participating in the military intervention? 2. What, if any reason, is presented as the most important reason for participating or not participating in the military intervention?

2.4 Materials This thesis will use a combination of open-source materials including policy documents, interviews with relevant policy makers available online and opinion pieces by relevant policy makers. From these quotes will be examined as evidence in the analysis. Due to the limitations of available open sources from some relevant actors this thesis aims to examine, sources have also been used from previous studies. Some of the most central sources used include the “Nationell strategi för svenskt deltagande i internationell freds- och säkerhetsfrämjande verksamhet” the Swedish governments proposition outlining Swedish strategy in peace promoting operations and ‘Doktryna Komorowskiego’ the outlining of the Polish National Security Bureau review of Polish national security strategy. Other important sources used for this thesis include statements by relevant policy makers. In the examination of the Iraq case these include statements by the Swedish and Polish prime ministers at the

11 time of the Invasion of Iraq, Göran Persson and Leszek Miller, statements by the Polish president Aleksander Kwasniewski and statements by the Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh. In the examination of the Libya case statements by relevant policy makers that have been used include statements by Polish prime minister Donald Tusk and Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski. ‘Regeringens proposition 2010/11:111’ proposing Swedish participation in the Libya intervention has been used in examining the Libya case. The languages of the materials are Swedish, Polish and English with some of the documents in Swedish having been translated for this thesis whilst much of the Polish materials used have been previously translated in other studies. In those cases, the previous translations have been used. The materials that are in Polish that have not been previously translated have been translated by me for this study. The limited open access of original materials has in some cases meant that text passages have been quoted from previous studies and is in those cases clearly stated in the citation.

A clear reliability problem that might arise due to the materials and method used is that the empirical analysis is at its core based on taking the sources at their word. With other words, it is assumed that the motivations given by the sources for intervention or non-intervention are the actual motivations. This problem is however taken into consideration by using several different sources for each case. Moreover, the motivations given by policy makers are also examined against the respective national strategies concerning military interventions.

The delimitations for the materials firstly and primarily consist of the selection of two countries, Sweden and Poland. Only materials from these two countries are used. Secondly, the materials are selected for their relevance to the research question. What is meant by this is that statements and reports must be made by relevant policy makers that had influence in the decisions of Poland and Sweden in regard to the Iraq and Libya interventions. Moreover, materials are selected for their relevance to the two interventions which means that only materials that are of relevance to the Polish and Swedish decisions on Libya and Iraq are analyzed. This study is actor centered, or in other words concerns itself with the two actors, Sweden and Poland. This means that the materials used will be that of Polish and Swedish policymakers. This can be contrasted with an idea centered study, where the content of the materials take precedence over who produced the materials (Esaiasson, Gilljam, Oscarsson, Towns & Wägnerud, 2017, p. 211). This also ties in with the approach of this analysis towards validity. In order to actually measure what this thesis aims to measure, only sources

12 that have relevance to the outcomes are analyzed. This has been done through groundwork that has consisted of sorting through materials in order to find what is relevant to the analysis.

2.5 Operationalization This thesis examines the willingness and lack of willingness of Sweden and Poland to participate in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq and the 2011 Intervention in Libya. To examine this the concept of “willingness to participate” has to be operationalized. This will be done by examining what the motivating factors for Swedish participation in an intervention are stated to be and what Poland’s motivating factors for participating are stated to be in the materials that are used.

For the purpose of operationalizing the concept of “willingness to participate”, three categories are constructed. These categories are simplifications of the different aspects of military interventions that previous research has found to be factors that influence the decisions of states to intervene. This is thus in line with the systematic analysis approach to text analysis where simplified categories are constructed (Ibid, p. 213-214).

The following categories are constructed:

● Authorized by the United Nations Security Council ● National Security Benefits ● Humanitarian Goal and/or R2P

Sweden’s participation in military interventions and Poland’s participation in military interventions, will thus be examined through the above mentioned categories, whether the intervention is authorized by the United Nations, if participating in the intervention will yield national security benefits, whether the intervention is motivated by humanitarian goals and/or R2P. This will make it possible to examine which of these variables contribute to Swedish and Polish participation or non-participation in the military interventions that will be examined. These categories thus constitute the independent variables that are examined to see which have an effect on the dependent variable, i.e. the outcome of the decisions Poland and Sweden made on the Libya and Iraq cases.

2.6 Variables

2.6.1 Authorized by the United Nations Security Council The first variable used in the text analysis is whether or not the intervention being authorized in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is of importance for participating. UNSC authorization of the intervention is defined as interventions where the UNSC has invoked Chapter VII and Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter thus the intervention has legal basis as a United Nations peace operation (United Nations Charter, 1945).

2.6.2 National Security Benefits The second variable, national security benefits is defined as expected benefits to national security from participating in the intervention. More precisely this thesis will use Harold Brown’s definition of national security which defines it as:

"National security then is the ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institution, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders." (Brown, 1983, p. 4).

Thus, the variable national security is defined as whether or not the country can expect to gain improvements to its ability to preserve its physical integrity and territory, preserve its economic relations and preserve all its facets from outside interference.

2.6.3 Humanitarian Goal and/or R2P The variable humanitarian goal and/or R2P is here defined as the intervention having a clear humanitarian purpose or it espousing the concept of Responsibility to protect. Responsibility to protect, often abbreviated R2P is a principle in international law affirmed in the 2005 World Summit that entails the responsibility of states to protect their own populations from crimes against humanity and genocide as well as providing support for other states being obligated to intervene outside their own borders when other governments fail to prevent or

14 actively pursue such crimes (United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, n.d.). The hypothesis this thesis posits is that this variable differentiates Swedish and Polish decision making, being more heavily emphasized in Swedish decisions to partake in or not partake in military intervention than in the Polish decisions.

3. Empirical Analysis This section will first provide a background to the two cases, i.e. the Invasion of Iraq and the Intervention in Libya and will then explain the previous experiences of Sweden and Poland in participating in military interventions. This will be followed by an empirical analysis of Sweden’s and Poland’s decisions on the Iraq and Libya cases. Finally, a comparative analysis is performed to highlight the differences and similarities in the Swedish and Polish decisions in order to answer the research question.

3.1 Background to the interventions

3.1.1 Case 1: The Invasion of Iraq On the 20th of March 2003, Iraq was invaded by a coalition of states led by the United States. The invasion by a combination of forces from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland came as the climax of a prolonged period of tensions between Iraq, the international community and the United States. Ever since the end of the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had been obliged to allow access to arms inspections looking for weapons of mass destruction “WMDs”. Disputes over the access of said inspections led to tensions and the 1998 United States airstrikes on Iraq (BBC News, 2016). On September 12th, 2002 US president George W. Bush during his address to the United Nations General Assembly, warns Iraq that non- compliance with the UN resolution on disarmament will lead to military action against Iraq. After the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1441 stating that Iraq had “A final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” (Ibid). France and Russia stated they would veto a new resolution that would only give Iraq seven days to completely comply with resolution 1441. After this on March 17th the United States and the United Kingdom seized attempting to pass a new resolution, and on the same day US President

George W. Bush stated that Saddam Hussein has 48 hours to leave Iraq and that if Hussein fails to comply with this, there will be war (Ibid). On March 20th the invasion named Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) started. Only 19 days later the coalition entered Baghdad and on May 1th George W. Bush in a famous speech declares “mission accomplished” in Iraq. In the following months no weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq and an insurgency that would continue for years began to form (Ibid).

On January 14th Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski stated that Poland would support the United States in a prospective intervention to disarm Iraq (Lubecki, 2005, pp. 72-73). On March 18th Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller officially announced the Polish participation in the operation with 200 soldiers and Polish President Alexander Kwaśniewski signes the decision to participate in the operation (Lubecki, 2005, p. 74, & Kwaśniewski, 2003). It was however only on March 25th that the Polish parliament held a debate on supporting the United States in an intervention against Iraq with Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller clearly stating his support. Six days after OIF had begun, US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, announced that Polish forces had participated in the operation. Towards the end of April 2003, news broke that Poland would continue to participate in Iraq with “stabilization forces” to support any post-war effort (Lubecki, 2005, pp. 74-75).

3.1.2 Case 2: The Intervention in Libya In February 2011 demonstrations started in Libya's second city Benghazi and spread throughout the country, prompting a violent response from the Libyan government led by Muammar Gaddafi. Defections from the Libyan armed forces starts and the opposition starts being armed resulting in the Libyan government losing control of several towns and cities including most of the eastern part of the country (Reuters, 2011). On March 5th, the opposition aligned Transitional National Council (TNC) was formed claiming itself the sole government of Libya (Ibid). When Libyan government forces start gaining territory and threaten to enter Benghazi, the United Nations Security Council votes on March 17th to authorize a military intervention in Libya. This results in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 being adopted, authorizing a no-fly zone over Libya (Ibid). Resolution 1973 authorizes states to take all measures to protect civilians from attacks by the Libyan government forces excluding an occupation force (S/RES/1973, 2011, p. 3). Following the passing of Resolution 1973, the intervention was initiated on March 19th. Eight days later on

March 27th, Nato took command of the intervention (Reuters, 2011). On June 1th the United Nations commission investigating war crimes in Libya stated that the Libyan government forces have committed crimes that can be classified as crimes against humanity. On August 23rd the opposition forces took control of Libya’s capital Tripoli. On October 20th, after Sirte, the final city held by the Libyan government, was captured by rebel forces, Muammar Gaddafi was killed. Seven days later the United Nations Security Council voted to end the military intervention in Libya (Ibid).

Amongst the participating states of the intervention was Sweden that joined the Nato led Operation Unified Protector (OIF) on April 1th. Sweden contributed with fighter jets, a transport plane, and a signals intelligence aircraft in the first military operation of the Swedish Air Force since the Congo Crisis of the 1960s (Försvarsmakten a, n.d.). The Swedish contribution to the intervention came after a formal invitation by Nato to Sweden to participate in the intervention. Following this on March 29ht, the Swedish government bill 2010/11:111, “Swedish participation in the international military intervention in Libya'' was passed to the “Sammansatta utrikes- och försvarsutskottet” (UFöU) that recommended the bill be voted on in the parliament (Regeringens proposition 2010/11:111, 2011, 2010/11:UFöU3, 2011). On April 1th the bill was passed in the parliament with the reservation that Swedish forces are not allowed to attack ground targets but only uphold the no-fly zone over Libya.

3.2. Swedish participation in military interventions Since 1956, Sweden has had forces involved in 120 different military operations around the world (Försvarsmakten b, n.d.). The “National Strategy for participation in international peace-support and security-building operations” (2007) outlines the aims of Sweden in its participation in interventions. The National Strategy states the willingness of Sweden to increase its role in international peace and security building operations. In other words, Sweden aims to play a greater part and increase its contributions to interventions (Regeringens skrivelse 2007/08:51, 2007, p. 5). In the same report, the motivations for Sweden to commit to such an increase in its involvement and its participation in interventions in general is also outlined. A focus on the humanitarian aspects of interventions is clear but it is also clear that national security plays a role in the Swedish national strategy as stated in the

Government’s national strategy for peace operations: “By contributing to international operations, Sweden contributes not only to the security and development of others but also improves our own security at the same time as we gain experiences that benefits the development of our national crisis management” (Regeringens skrivelse 2007/08:51, pp. 5-6). That humanitarian aspirations in participating in military interventions is a central aspect and that R2P is embraced is however also clear: “Sweden will work towards that the obligation to protect populations from severe violations of the international humanitarian right and the human rights is factored into all phases of peace promoting operations.” (Ibid, p. 5). The centrality of humanitarianism and R2P is stated as an explicit goal in Swedish participation in military operations: “A point of departure for Swedish engagement in peace promotion is to promote and strengthen international peace and security, as well as to develop and protect democracy, the principles of rule of law and the human rights” (Ibid, p. 6).

3.3 Swedish non-participation in Iraq The Swedish position on involvement in a potential conflict in Iraq was not static but changed over time. While initially, the central argument of the Swedish government was that all actions taken against Iraq must be done through the United Nations, Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson was also open with the idea of a Swedish contribution to an intervention in the form of a field hospital. The position of the Swedish government from the very beginning was however that no Swedish forces would participate in potential fighting (DN, 2002). These proposals were however made with the prerequisite that a new United Nations resolution be passed authorizing armed force against the Iraqi regime (Ibid).

Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh at the time concurred with this stance arguing that Iraq must cooperate fully with the United Nations and if Iraq fails to do so, that Iraq must be made to comply but made it clear that it is the responsibility of the United Nations to enforce any demands on Iraq (Lindh, 2002). Anna Lindh continued this line later in May 2003 when stating that only the United Nations has the right to decide on military interventions. Lindh also elaborated on the same reasoning Göran Persson had presented to the Swedish parliament stating that without the principles of international law there is no safety for small countries. This argument against intervention against Iraq without the mandate from the

United Nations was reinforced with Anna Lindh stating: “No to self proclaimed world police, we say yes to the UN that is the only legitimate keepers of order in the world and yes to international law” (Lindh, 2003).

Swedish prime minister Göran Persson openly stated that the United States were breaking international law when invading Iraq without a United Nations mandate. In the Swedish parliament, Göran Persson elaborated on the importance of this from the Swedish point of view: “No matter what happens, we will be loyal to the decision the United Nations make. We have decided that the best protection for a small country is that an international rule of law is in such a way argued for and built up” (Riksdagens Snabbprotokoll 2002/:44). By the time the war with Iraq had begun, the Swedish Government reiterated that it is only the United Nations that can legitimately enforce an armed intervention against Iraq and that the United States and other participating states were thus in breach of international law (Swedish Government, 2003). The main reason for Swedish non-participation is clearly stated as being the illegitimacy of the intervention due to it being in breach of international law (Ibid).

3.4 Swedish participation in Libya On the 29th of March a bill authorizing Swedish participation in the Libya operation was signed. The bill emphasizes the human rights situation in Libya citing that UNSC 1970 classified the actions of the Libyan government against civilians as possible crimes against humanity. Moreover, an emphasis can be found on the international nature of the intervention and that it is backed by the United Nations Security Council. In describing the at the time current situation in Libya the bill states: “The situation in Libya is deeply concerning, most of all the ruthless attacks by the regime against civilians and the lack of respect for human rights and international humanitarian law” (Regeringens proposition 2010/11:111, p. 6).

The inability of humanitarian actors to gain access to conflict areas in Libya is also cited in the bill (Ibid, p. 6). The mandate in international law that the intervention is based in is also given emphasis in the bill stating that: “The right of participating states to use force is based on the Security Council’s mandate in accordance with UN-stature chapter VII which also gives the international intervention a special position of international law in regards to the parties to the conflict” (Regeringens proposition 2010/11:111, p. 8). This citation of the

19 legality of the intervention is consistent with the Swedish choice not to partake in the Iraq intervention. In that case the lack of legal justification in the form of a UNSC mandate was central to the argument against Swedish participation as stated by prime minister Göran Persson and foreign minister Anna Lindh.

The central purpose of Swedish forces deployed to the intervention is stated to be the protection of civilian populations that are threatened by violence in Libya (Ibid, p. 9). It should however be noted that there were no clear references to R2P in the government bill. According to the findings of Fredrik Doeser (Doeser a, 2014) there were almost no official statements made by the Swedish government during the period of February-April 2011 that gave support to R2P.

3.5 Polish participation in military interventions

Since 1956, Poland has participated in 71 different military operations (Ministry of National Defence, n.d.). Throughout the period following the fall of communism Poland participated actively in military interventions during the 1990s and early 2000s, including in Bosnia, Kosovo and Haiti. This period saw a significant rise in Polish participation in military operations with a fourfold increase in the number of personnel sent on missions abroad (Ibid). During the years preceding Poland becoming a member of Nato, Poland participated in a number of Nato-led operations (Lubecki, 2005, p. 71). Poland also invested heavily in the international mission in Afghanistan from its onset (Ministry of National Defense, n.d.). Whilst Poland would continue this engagement with international missions a shift would occur during the period from 2010 to 2012 when the Polish National Security Bureau were instructed by the Polish president Bronislaw Komorowski to examine what Poland’s main priorities in its national security strategy should be. The result of this would be the “Komorowski doctrine” (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, n.d.). The new doctrine is summed up as “a shift in the strategic priorities of the Polish Republic from participating in expeditionary missions to tasks relating to assuring directly the security, including the defence, of the state” (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, n.d., see Reeves, 2014). The Polish policy towards participating in military operations is described with Poland being expected to participate selectively (White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland, 2013).

3.6 Polish participation in Iraq In January 2003, Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz stated that Poland could lend its support for a United States-led intervention in Iraq with or without a United Nations Security Council resolution (Doeser b, 2014). Polish president Aleksander Kwasniewski stated the view that: “Poland will take decisions when we gather more information, but undeniably the strategic partnership with the United States implies some duties upon us: our soldiers are already in the region, they are not many, but of course we are looking forward to see new developments.” (Kwaśniewski, 2003, see Doeser b, 2014).

On March 25th Prime Minister Leszek Miller spoke in front of the Polish parliament affirming Polish support of, and participation in, the Invasion of Iraq. Miller presented the reasoning behind Polish participation in the intervention as it being in the national interest of Poland and that it strengthens Poland’s transatlantic links with the United States (Miller, 2003, see Lubecki, 2005, p. 74). Miller also maintained that the participation had legal justification in the United Nations Security Council Resolution. It can thus be ascertained that Miller was arguing that Polish participation in the intervention in Iraq would be to the benefit of Polish national security due to ties being strengthened with the United States. While the purported legal justification of the intervention was also used as an argument for Polish participation, Miller’s central argument revolved around that participating in the intervention would enhance Poland’s security (Ibid, p. 74).

After the United States had failed to push for an UN-resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq the Polish president Alexander Kwasniewski stated the view that the decision to participate in the interventions is based on a need to ensure peace and commit to Poland’s obligations to its allies. “I am convinced that the Cabinet’s request and my decision are right given the threats we must overcome, given the need to ensure global peace, and given commitments to our allies.” (Kwaśniewski, 2003). Kwaśniewski also motivated the decision by referencing the threat posed by Iraq stating: “We have emphasized on a number of occasions that our concerns follow from the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, a threat that comes from Iraq. We also believe that we should all take measures against terrorism.” (Ibid).

3.8 Polish non-participation in Libya Polish prime minister at the time of the Libyan intervention, Donald Tusk gave several reasons for polish non-participation in the intervention. These reasons included that Poland simply had no interests in Libya and that Poland was too heavily involved in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and thus did not have the military capabilities to participate (Dicke, Anson, Roughton & Henrickson, 2013, p. 47). Tusk however also gave more critical views of the reasons given for the Libya intervention including stating:

“Do Sudan and Ivory Coast not also face drama that is comparable to what is happening in Libya? My dream would be for the EU to always respond according to the same set of standards. Is Europe really prepared to defend the human rights of citizens in all those countries where rights are violated?” (Tusk a, 2011).

Tusk also critiqued the intervention for the possible image it might portray of Europe by arguing that it creates the image that European states only intervene in oil rich countries when it suits them (Ibid). Despite these criticisms however, on March 20th, the Polish government lent support to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and supported European humanitarian aid to Libya. The government also stated that Poland would not in any way contribute military forces to an armed intervention in Libya but would however, in line with the support of the Polish government to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, pledge to contribute with humanitarian aid to Libya (Reeves, 2019).

One of the reasons for Polish non-participation given by Polish policy makers at the time was that Poland simply lacked the capability to contribute in any meaningful way since Poland was already contributing to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. It has however been noted that Poland still had the capabilities to send a symbolic contribution (Ibid, 2019). With this in mind it is important to acknowledge that the Polish decision to not partake in the intervention in Libya came in the aftermath of the previously discussed development of the Komorowski Doctrine that prioritized territorial defence and explicitly stated that Poland would be selective in its participation in military interventions (White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland, 2013, p. 15). In line with this doctrine President Komorowski stated that even tough Nato would be involved in Libya "that does not mean Poland's involvement." (Komorowski, 2011, see Dicke, Rachel A., Anson, Nicholas, Roughton, Phillip A.,

Henrickson, Ryan C., 2013, p. 51). Prime Minister Tusk also stated that Poland simply did not have a strategic interest in participating in the intervention in Libya, saying "The situation in Libya poses no threat to Poland's interests and Poland's security or to NATO's security in general." (Tusk, 2011, see ibid, p. 51). This motivation for not participating in the intervention was also clearly put by Tusk, stating that “there are no military or strategic reasons to send Polish soldiers there.” (Tusk, 2011, see ibid, p. 48).

3.9 Comparative Analysis In analyzing the materials, the following questions have been asked to the texts: 1. What is presented as the reasons for participating or not participating in the military intervention? 2. What, if any reason, is presented as the most important reason for participating or not participating in the military intervention?

In the following section the answer to these questions are presented and the differences or similarities between the Polish and Swedish texts are analyzed through comparing the importance of the three variables.

Variable 1: Authorized by the United Nations Security Council

The various statements by Swedish and Polish policy makers point to both similarities and differences in the motivations for participation and non-participation. Whilst it is clear that a criteria for Swedish participation in an armed intervention is that it is mandated by the United Nations Security Council, with this being argued as an important point as to why Sweden would not participate in Iraq and why it would participate in Libya, this does not seem to be the case with Poland. In the arguments for Swedish non-participation in the intervention in Iraq, the lack of a United Nations mandate is consistently brought up as a central reason. In both the statements by Prime Minister Göran Persson and Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, this lack of a mandate is emphasized. The importance of this for the Swedish decision to not partake is also evident from the statements by Anna Lindh that alludes to a possible Swedish involvement in an intervention should such an intervention be mandated by the United Nations. Likewise, Göran Persson’s proposal of a Swedish field hospital being sent in such an

23 intervention also points to the lack of a mandate being a central obstacle for Swedish participation. As opposed to the importance given to this in the Swedish materials, nowhere in the Polish materials used is a United Nations Mandate emphasized as a central point for Polish participation or non-participation. The fact that Poland chose to participate in the Iraq invasion that was not mandated by the United Nations whilst choosing to not participate in the United Nations mandated Libyan intervention also points to this not being the central consideration for Polish policy makers in regard to participating. Whilst Polish Prime Minister stated in his address to the parliament that the United Nations Resolution 1441 provided a legal foundation for the intervention the resolution never mentioned an armed intervention against Iraq, only that Iraq must support the arms inspections which makes this claim dubious (UNSC, 2002). Moreover, it is not given any emphasis in the statement and is only briefly touched upon. Instead it is Polish security gains that is given the most importance in the statement.

Variable 2: National Security Benefits Whilst having a United Nations mandate has been shown to be central to Sweden and not to Poland, gaining national security benefits has been shown to be central to Poland. This variable is also prevalent in Swedish explanations for participating but has also been shown to be, in the Swedish view, correlated with the United Nations mandating an intervention. This is shown in Göran Persson’s statements in the run up to the Iraq War, where a clear link between Sweden’s security and maintaining international law (Göran Persson, 2003). This position of Swedish policy makers aligns with the liberal defence of international institutions as preventing instability and that unilateralism and self-interest in interventions harm these institutions. (Boke, 2019) The Swedish National Strategy for Swedish Participation in International Peace and Security Promoting Operations also shows that national security considerations also influence Swedish decisions concerning participation (Regeringens skrivelse 2007/08:51). In Polish materials used, gaining national security benefits are the most emphasized reason for polish participation in armed interventions. It has been shown that Polish policy makers believed that participating in the intervention against Iraq would yield benefits to Polish security in the form of strengthened links to the United States. This motivation was clearly demonstrated by Jerszy Miller, stating that participation was in the national interest of Poland and explicitly stated that strengthening trans-atlantic links was a reason for participating (Miller, 2003, see Lubecki, 2005, p. 74). On the other hand, participation in the Libya intervention does not seem to have been of national security interest

24 to Polish policy makers. This is clearly illustrated by Prime Minister Tusk’s assertion that the situation in Libya did not pose a threat to Poland’s security (Tusk, 2011, see Dicke, Rachel A., Anson, Nicholas, Roughton, Phillip A., Henrickson, Ryan C., 2013, p. 29). This is also clear when put in the context of the shift in Polish strategic priorities as seen in the Komorowski doctrine where Polish participation in military operations abroad were stated to be selective (White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland, 2013, p. 15). Extrapolating from this, it thus seems that the most central consideration of Polish policy makers in deciding whether or not Poland will participate in military interventions is the possible gain of security benefits that would benefit Poland’s territorial defence. This does, to an extent match with Catherine Gegout´s assessment of European countries interventions in Africa, where humanitarian goals were not the central explanation for engagement in these interventions but rather security gains (Gegout, 2017). In examining the Polish materials, the reasoning for Poland’s participation in military interventions align with the realist explanation for why states participate in military interventions with Poland factoring in strategic interests when deciding on participation (Regan, 1998, & Cem, 2019).

Variable 3: Humanitarian Goal and/or R2P Participating in an intervention with a humanitarian goal or for the purposes of R2P has been shown to be a central reason for Sweden to participate. The previously mentioned national strategy of Sweden stresses the importance of protecting humanitarian rights and the human rights of the populations in the conflict zones Sweden intervenes in (Regeringens skrivelse 2007/08:51). In fact, the protection of human rights is stated as the central point of departure for any Swedish involvement in armed operations and the norm of humanitarian intervention is clearly espoused. This holds true for the motivations given for Swedish participation in the Libya intervention too, where the attacks on civilians and lack of protection of human rights is emphasized as the central motivation (Regeringens proposition 2010/11:111). This also illustrates the importance of the norm of humanitarian interventions in the Swedish decision making. The norm of R2P was however not explicitly espoused (Ibid). In the Polish materials humanitarian purposes and R2P are rarely mentioned and at no point were these reasons for participation stressed as the most central motivation. The norms of humanitarian intervention and R2P are throughout the materials consistently emphasized in the Swedish materials whereas security considerations take precedence in the Polish materials.

4. Conclusions & Further Research The research question this thesis has strived to answer is: Why did Poland participate in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq whilst Sweden did not and why did Sweden participate in the 2011 military intervention in Libya whilst Poland did not? The analysis of materials during the periods of the Iraq intervention and the Libya intervention has shown the comparative importance of humanitarian intervention and R2P in Swedish decision making as compared to Polish decision making. Contrary to this, whilst national security and territorial defence has importance in both countries, it is given greater weight in the Polish decision making. It is clear that the norms of R2P and humanitarian intervention are given greater importance in Swedish decision making as it pertains to interventions. It is however also clear that United Nations authorization is of central importance to Swedish decision making which also ties in with national security as the international rule of law is seen as beneficial to the security of a small state by Swedish policy makers. Polish decisions to participate or not participate in the interventions has been shown to have been primarily based on the effects on national security participation or non-participation could have had.

The results of this study suggest that the motivations of states participating in military interventions are complex and manifold. It is also clear that the norms of R2P and humanitarian intervention bear different levels of importance in the decision making of different countries. These results do not align with most realist explanations for military intervention. Moreover, the results suggest that purely material explanations such as the military capabilities of the intervening state that previous research have suggested as having explanatory power, do not sufficiently explain the differences in decisions between states that in most relevant aspects are similar. The differences between the Swedish and Polish motivations suggest that different states align with norms to different extents, in this case Sweden being more strongly aligned with the norms of humanitarian intervention and R2P with Poland having a more pronounced focus of seeking security oriented gains from participating in interventions.

Something important to keep in mind is that the analysis of this thesis is based on the interpretation of a single individual. Whilst this thesis has strived for reliability and transparency, this could be further improved by combining qualitative and quantitative methodology in examining Polish and Swedish participation in military interventions. A

26 further area of improvement would be to examine differences across more than two cases of military intervention something that could help better illustrate differences and similarities. Furthermore, the significant shifts in Swedish and Polish foreign policy concerning interventions highlights that these changes over time further warrants further research. Poland’s shift in its policy between 2003 and 2011 that was highlighted in the analysis would be of interest for further research. The differences between the two countries that this thesis has examined also suggests that further comparative research of other states would be of interest.

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United Nations, Mandates and the Legal Basis for Peacekeeping. Undated. Available: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mandates-and-legal-basis-peacekeeping Retrieved: 2020-05- 07

United Nations office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Responsibility to Protect. Undated. Available: https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml. Retrieved: 2020-05-07

Appendix Regeringens skrivelse 2007/08:51. Nationell strategi för svenskt deltagande i internationell freds- och säkerhetsfrämjande verksamhet. 2008-03-13. Available: https://www.regeringen.se/49b739/contentassets/a8a143bd09f049bfa5a1dadf73731399/natio nell-strategi-for-svenskt-deltagande-i-internationell-freds--och-sakerhetsframjande- verksamhet-skr.-20070851

“Den övergripande målsättningen är att Sverige ska ta ett större och mer samordnat ansvar i freds- och säkerhetsfrämjande insatser. Den svenska ambitionshöjningen ska uppnås genom aktivt svenskt engagemang, där det multilaterala systemets möjligheter fullt ut tillvaratas.” (P. 5)

“Sverige ska arbeta för att skyldigheten att skydda befolkningar mot grova kränkningar av den internationella humanitära rätten och de mänskliga rättigheterna vägs in i alla faser av fredsfrämjande insatser” (P. 5)

“Genom att bidra till internationella insatser bidrar Sverige inte bara till andras säkerhet och utveckling, utan vi ökar även vår egen säkerhet samtidigt som vi får erfarenheter till nytta för utvecklingen av vår nationella krishanteringsförmåga.” (Pp. 5-6)

“En utgångspunkt för Sveriges engagemang på det fredsfrämjande området är att främja och stärka internationell fred och säkerhet, samt utveckla och skydda demokrati, rättsstatens principer och de mänskliga rättigheterna.” (P. 6)

H.E. Ms. Anna Lindh Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden In the General Debate of the 57th Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 19 September 2002. Available: https://www.un.org/webcast/ga/57/statements/020919swedenE.htm

“The defiance of Iraq in the face of the Security Council must come to an end.”

“But if that does not happen, to quote the Secretary-General again, "if Iraq's defiance continues, the Security Council must face its responsibilities." That could be a very delicate decision for the Council, weighing the risks of various options. But the credibility of the United Nations requires that Iraq is made to fulfill its obligations.”

Anna Lindh, 1a Maj Tal 2003. Available: https://www.svenskatal.se/20030501-anna-lindh-1-maj-tal-2003/

“Det är därför bara FN, som har rätt att fatta beslut om militära aktioner, när inget annat hjälper. Utan FN får vi djungelns lag, där den militära styrkan är viktigare än styrkan i argumenten. Utan folkrättens principer finns ingen trygghet för oss och andra länder. Rätt måste alltid gå före makt.”

“Därför säger vi nej till självutnämnda världspoliser, vi säger ja till FN som den enda legitima ordningsmakten i världen och ja till folkrätten.”

Riksdagens Snabbprotokoll 2002/03:44. 2002-01-22. Available: https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/protokoll/riksdagens- snabbprotokoll-20020344-onsdagen-den_GQ0944

“Att i det här läget uttrycka någonting annat än en förhoppning om en fredlig lösning är naturligtvis fel, samtidigt som vi vet att det i FN:s resolution finns möjligheten att, om man inte kommer fram i samarbete med Irak, också ta till militära medel efter ytterligare ett beslut i säkerhetsrådet. Sker så är det folkrätten som har talat. Om inte så sker, sker någonting annat under tiden som förändrar situationen, troligen baserat på vapeninspektörernas arbete. Oavsett vilket som sker kommer vi att vara lojala mot det beslut som FN fattar. Vi har bestämt oss för att det bästa skyddet för ett litet land är att en internationell rättsordning på så sätt hävdas och byggs upp.”

The Swedish Government. The Swedish Government's view on the Iraq issue. OCHA. 2003-20-03. Available: https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/swedish-governments-view-iraq-issue

“The United States and its allies are attacking Iraq without a UN mandate and are therefore acting in breach of international law and threatening the lives of thousands of people.”

“The Swedish Government does not share the US-held opinion that the use of military force is in line with international law. In our opinion, the US cannot have recourse to Security Council resolutions adopted in the early 1990s which authorised the use of force in response to a situation which differs from the one we are facing today. Nor does resolution 1441 provide a mandate for the use of force.”

“The Swedish Government has been able to accept the prospect of military action against Iraq as a last resort in the event of a refusal by Iraq to cooperate with the United Nations Security Council in accordance with resolution 1441, and Iraq's continued development or possession of weapons of mass destruction. However, it is only the UN Security Council that has the right to evaluate the actions of Iraq and to decide on the use of force, not any individual state.

Swedish military forces will not take part in a military operation which we consider to be in breach of international law.”

Regeringens proposition 2010/11:111, Svenskt deltagande i den internationella militära insatsen i Libyen, 2011-29-04. Available: https://www.regeringen.se/49b732/contentassets/2058bdf6b67843eaae667654e11264d0/prop osition-201011111

“Situationen i Libyen är mycket oroande framför allt när det gäller regimens hänsynslösa angrepp på civila samt bristen på respekt för mänskliga rättigheter och internationell humanitär rätt.” (P. 6)

“FN:s humanitära samordningsorgan OCHA beräknar att 600 000 personer i Libyen kan komma att behöva humanitärt stöd. Om striderna intensifieras kan situationen förvärras. Humanitära aktörer har mycket begränsat tillträde i Libyen på grund av det svåra säkerhetsläget. Internationella rödakorskommittén (ICRC) har verksamhet utifrån Benghazi och samarbetar med libyska Röda halvmånen.” (P. 6)

“Deltagande staters rätt att använda våld grundas ytterst på säkerhetsrådets mandat i enlighet med FN-stadgans kapitel VII, vilket också ger den internationella insatsen en folkrättslig särställning i förhållande till parterna i konflikten.” (P. 8)

“Sverige ska bidra till den militära insatsen i syfte att verkställa FN:s säkerhetsråds resolution 1973. FN har konstaterat att grova och systematiska brott mot de mänskliga rättigheterna pågår och att de vitt spridda och systematiska angreppen mot civila kan vara brott mot mänskligheten.” (P. 9)

‘Doktryna Komorowskiego’, Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego (n.d. ), quoted in From Intervention to Retrenchment: Poland's Strategic Culture and the 2011 Libyan Campaign, Reeves, Christopher. Available: https://www-tandfonline- com.ezproxy.its.uu.se/doi/full/10.1080/09668136.2019.1627290 “a shift in the strategic priorities of the Polish Republic from participating in expeditionary missions to tasks relating to assuring directly the security, including the defence, of the state”

Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland, 2013. Available: https://en.bbn.gov.pl/en/news/332,White-Book-on-National-Security-of-the- Republic-ofPoland-now-in-English.html “supporting and selectively participating in international operations aimed at preventing the emergence of new sources of threats or the spread of existing crises to supra-regional level, based on a explicit international mandate.” (P. 15)

Kwasniewski 2003, quoted in When governments ignore public opinion in foreign policy: Poland and the Iraq invasion, Doeser, Fredrik Available: https://www-tandfonline- com.ezproxy.its.uu.se/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2013.808190 “Poland will take decisions when we gather more information, but undeniably the strategic partnership with the United States implies some duties upon us: our soldiers are already in the region, they are not many, but of course we are looking forward to see new developments.”

Kwaśniewski, Alexander, 2003. Available: https://www.prezydent.pl/en/archive/news-archive/news-2003/art,9,president-of- the-republic-of-poland-sign-a-decision-to-use-polish-troops-outside-poland.html “I am convinced that the Cabinet’s request and my decision are right given the threats we must overcome, given the need to ensure global peace, and given commitments to our allies.”

Der Spiegel, Interview with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk 'I'm Incapable of Getting Angry with Angela Merkel', 2011-04-08. Available: https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/interview-with-polish-prime-minister- donald-tusk-i-m-incapable-of-getting-angry-with-angela-merkel-a-755965.html

Komorowski, 2011, see Dicke, Rachel A., Anson, Nicholas, Roughton, Phillip A., Henrickson, Ryan C., 2013 "that does not mean Poland's involvement." (P. 51)

Tusk, 2011, see Dicke, Rachel A., Anson, Nicholas, Roughton, Phillip A., Henrickson, Ryan C., 2013 “there are no military or strategic reasons to send Polish soldiers there.” (P. 48)

"The situation in Libya poses no threat to Poland's interests and Poland's security or to NATO's security in general." (P. 51)