On Human Egalitarianism: An Evolutionary Product of Machiavellian Status Escalation? STOR ®

David Erdal; Andrew Whiten; Christopher Boehm; Bruce Knauft

Current Anthropology, Vol. 35, No.2. (Apr., 1994), pp. 175-183.

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http://www .j stor.org/ Tue Aug 811:26:422006 Volume 35, Number 2, April I994 I I75 shaped elements" rather than a "dense tapestry." He is here), "because," "wider implications," "prompt or con­ ambivalent about Marx, first dismissing him, then ele­ strain," "the how ... but not yet the why," "organiza­ vating him as "an older anthropologist" and reasserting tional armatures around which cultural forms ... form," the core proposition that "men make their own history, "agency," "feeds back," "produces." Is this rich plethora but they do not make it just as they please." He escapes justified by meaning, rhetoric, or e!lphony? from "modes of production" by concrete reference to The public horror of racial-cultural-ethnic terrorism slaves and peasants, warriors and priests. This avoids in Bosnia, however much media-manipulated, demands controversy without advancing understanding. a responsible and theoretically coherent approach from He opens with race, culture, and people (ethnicity) as anthropology. It is a geopolitical and religious situation three notions on the same dimension but treats them bearing a close analogy with that of the small states in very differently. He traces race through "the great ar­ Germany which Engels said it would be ridiculous to chaic civilizations of the Old and New World," empha­ explain in terms of economics even though Prussia arose sizing "differential location on a spatial continuum," from historical, ultimately economic causes. It is only with differentiation of life-styles and physical appear­ the ultimately determining element in history which is ance in the "dominant civilizational schemata." The the "production and reproduction of real life," perhaps Yanomami, introduced for contrast, lack the latter but a yet more perilous idea than the others. Political and share the former and surprisingly, in Wolf's version, philosophical ideas, religious beliefs, and the "traditions make finer discriminations than the archaic civiliza­ which haunt human minds" (culture and ethnicity) also tions do. Dubbing the Yanomami "egalitarian tribal" influence historical struggles "and in many cases pre­ clearly has evolutionary implications, despite the em­ ponderate in determining their form" (Marx and Engels phasis on spatial continuum, and cannot but suggest the 1977:487). We follow writers such as E. P. Thompson discredited Service evolutionary scheme that the latter and Raymond Williams in their understandings of deter­ himself was forced to abandon. minism, base and superstructure, productive forces, and Instead of treating culture and ethnicity on this wide means of communication as means of production (Wil­ canvas, Wolf returns to the professional categories liams 1980:32, 34, 50). This approach in no way margin­ which at first he avoided. After briefly contrasting alizes culture in human life. If it is in any way made French Enlightenment universalist rationalism and Ger­ secondary, it is only in the ultimate perspective. Culture man romantic uniqueness in Volksgeist passion and remains potentially preponderant in the ethnographic emotion, he seems to conflate the two by tracing the present. Greek Volksgeist through Winckelmann's beguiling po­ esy to the model of Western Classical education, ideal­ References Cited ized as a wholly integrated culture of perfection. So flowed the intellectual tradition of an "ideational ho­ CARRIER, J. Editor. n.d. Occidentalism. MS. lism at the root of culture," according to Wolf, through MARX, K., AND F. ENGELS. 1977. Selected works. Vol. 3. Mos­ von Humboldt, Hegel, Nietzsche, Arnold, Frobenius, cow: Progress Publishers. WILLIAMS, RAYMOND. I980. Problems in materialism and cul­ and Spengler to Ruth Benedict, as the very approach ture. London: Verso. which Boas opposed. Such a glittering genealogy defies WOLF, ERIC R. I982. Europe and the people without history. brief analysis and so is hardly open to question. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Wolf sees discourse on race predominant in the 19th --. Perilous ideas: Race, culture, people. CURRENT ANTHRO­ POLOGY 35:1-I2. century and discourse on culture increasingly so in the 20th, with ethnicity emerging as a "hot topic" in the eighties and nineties as world events also forced re­ newed attention to it. The trouble is that he introduces On Human Egalitarianism: ethnicity first simply as "people," then as "peoplehood/ An Evolutionary Product ethnicity," conflating abstract and concrete but no­ where even broaching the vexed question of how culture of Machiavellian Status and ethnicity are differentiated. Doing so would precipi­ tate theories of political economy which he seeks to Escalation? avoid. He sees definitions of ethnicity shifting to "for­ mulas of cultural distinctiveness" as though the two DAVID ERDAL AND ANDREW WHITEN were almost synonymous. Tracing these notions in the School of Psychology, University of St. Andrews, public arena seems to leave the anthropologists' own St. Andrews, Fife KYI69TU, Scotland. 8 IX 93 ideas hopelessly confused. Fearing charges of determinism, writers now employ Egalitarianism in hunter-gatherer societies continues to a bewildering variety of evasive metaphors for what present an evolutionary puzzle. It is not yet clear what might be in danger of being thought to be causation. social-psychological processes are responsible for keep­ In the present piece we find "shape," "reshape," and ing egalitarianism in place or how they evolved. The "shaped," "laying down," "preside over," "gave rise to," papers of Knauft (CA 32:391-428) and Boehm (CA 34: "has implications for," "prompted by," "limited by," 227-54) represent important advances in understanding "permitted," "one of the main causes" (great boldness both in their recognition of the unique puzzle repre- ry6 I CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY

sented by human egalitarianism from evolutionary and of which is characteristically descriptive of hunter­ comparative perspectives and in the solutions they offer. gatherers. Their initiatives, however, fall short of what we believe Boehm's great contribution is to establish clearly from an adequate evolutionary analysis must consider. We of­ the ethnographic literature that counterdominant be­ fer a critique of Boehm's thesis in particular which leads haviour is a widespread characteristic of humans. His us to theoretical and empirical extensions of the endeav­ model is static, offering an explanation of how egalitari­ our these authors have begun. anism is sustained rather than how it is generated in An evolutionary model will seek to explain stable the first place. Yet the universality of egalitarianism in tendencies in human social behaviour as adaptations to hunter-gatherers suggests that it is an ancient, evolved specific aspects of the ecological and social environment human pattern. in which Homo sapiens evolved. Archaeological data We had reached a conclusion similar to Boehm's about suggest that the ecological environment included vari­ the significance and ubiquity of counterdominant be­ ous mixtures of forests and savannahs, with scattered haviour, but our explanatory model is an evolutionary vegetable and prey resources which sustained a hunter­ one. An evolutionary hypothesis must explain why it gatherer mode of subsistence, at least for anatomically became adaptive for the hierarchically oriented ances­ modem humans (Foley 1987). Hunter-gatherer ethno­ tors of H. sapiens to behave in an egalitarian way and graphic data suggest that the social environment was will seek the source of that egalitarianism in the repro­ one of small mobile foraging groups in which most peo­ ductive consequences for individuals exhibiting that be­ ple were related, people knew each other intimately, haviour. In our model, counterdominant behaviour is a strangers rarely being encountered, and food and other stable tendency, an adaptation to the social and physical resources were shared. environments of the Plio/Pleistocene. It represents a There are well-rehearsed problems in taking data from pattern which structures the cognitive and motivational modem hunter-gatherers and using such data as indi­ psychology of each individual. It may only be manifested cative of conditions in the Plio/Pleistocene (e.g., Foley in specific circumstances, but it is an inherited ten­ 1987:75-77; Wilms en and Denbow 1990). However, dency. The conscious decisions to prevent dominance there are much greater problems in using data from soci­ catalogued by Boehm build on and elaborate it. eties which clearly had no parallel then. The evidence Boehm's model uses, as an explanatory variable, con­ strongly suggests that the context in which H. sapiens scious, intentional choice. An evolutionary model must evolved did not include domesticated food animals, do­ be compatible with the exercise-or sense of exercise­ mesticated plants, large usable food surpluses, systems of conscious intention, but to invoke it as an explana­ for storing food over long periods of time, or concen­ tory variable is simply to move the puzzle one step fur­ trated, highly productive assets. We agree with Knauft ther back. One is left, then, with the same question in that modem simple foraging societies provide the best a different form: how did conscious intention come to source for inferences about behaviour characterising hu­ play this role? And whatever role consciousness plays, man evolution. By contrast, Boehm takes data from 48 if humans as hunter-gatherers characteristically make societies a majority of which are not primarily hunters some specific patterns of choices rather than others­ and gatherers. Their modes of subsistence are known sharing meat, for example, or forming groups of 20-50 not to have developed until at most 12,000 years ago, persons, or countering dominant behaviour-then the long after the emergence of H. sapiens. In principle, no prior question is: are there specific cognitive and moti­ conclusions can be drawn from these data regarding be­ vational processes which lead people to make these par­ haviour evolutionarily adaptive for H. sapiens. ticular patterns of choices, and if so, how did those cog­ Because Boehm uses data from post-hunter-gatherer nitive and motivational processes evolve? societies, he mixes behaviour patterns characteristic of As illustration of the underlying evolutionary argu­ hunter-gatherers with behaviours that are simply not ment, we may recall Shepher's (1983) demonstration found among them. For example, deposing a leader im­ that the incest taboo is based on negative imprinting plies that there is a leader to depose (p. 231): this is not among children brought up together. The varied and true of hunter-gatherers, with the exception of some of enormously elaborated cultural definitions of the taboo the Indians of the Northwest Coast of North America, can thus be understood as extensions and elaborations whose social structures developed round rich productive of this basic inherited developmental psychological pro­ resources in relatively recent times (Kroeber 1939:29; cess. It cannot be countered by socialisation (we cannot Suttles 1968:I05). Boehm also states that "children are be trained or encouraged to feel sexually attracted to­ manipulated and not infrequently physically disci­ wards those with whom we have spent our earliest plined; younger males and females are very often treated childhood), but it can be culturally elaborated and ex­ as chattels in marriage arrangements. Married females tended. This in principle gives a general model of how may be controlled decisively by males, while in many conscious and culturally defined practices may be matrilineal-matrilocal societies married males meet founded on stable inherited tendencies. with very decisive economic control. More generally, Knauft and Boehm interpret culture and conscious in­ adult offspring may operate in domestic units that vest tent as undermining or counteracting biological motiva­ substantial authority in the parents" (p. 234)-none tions. For example, Knauft invokes culture as key in Volume 35, Number 2, April I994 I 177 bringing about food sharing instead of open competition pegs by those around them, and they are never "obeyed" for food (p. 395) and pair bonding instead of aggressive (Riches 1982:74). But this is best characterised as "coun­ inter-male competition for sexual access (p. 397). Like­ terdominant" behaviour rather than a reversal of hierar­ wise, Boehm argues that "the primary and most imme­ chy. It does not start with a hierarchy and reverse it: diate cause of egalitarian behavior is a moralistic deter­ good performers are generally heeded and enjoy receiv­ mination on the part of a local group's main political ing that attention, but they are prevented from attaining actors that no one of its members should be allowed to dominance. dominate the others" (p. 228). In our view these cannot In our model, this enjoyment of recognition is an echo be evolutionary explanations. The cultural and con­ of dominance behaviour exhibited by the ancestor that sciously intentional elements are not crucial so long as Homo shared with the apes. This dominance behaviour these behaviours are adaptive, and conversely they are was not entirely lost in evolution but was balanced by not sufficient if these behaviours are not adaptive. counterdominant tendencies which only evolved be­ Rather, we see the cultural elaborations of food sharing, cause they provided fitness advantages in the ecological pair bonding, and egalitarianism as being grounded in and social environments of the time. inherited tendencies. In hunter-gatherer conditions the fitness advantage If human culture and consciousness evolved on a bed­ provided by food sharing is the reduction of risk (Lovejoy rock of inherited cognitive and motivational mecha­ 1981, Wiessner 1982, Cashdan 1985, Smith 1988). How­ nisms which already underlay complex hominid social ever, food sharing is not a simple evolved predisposition. behaviour, it follows that conscious intention is un­ The reports of meat sharing include references to cheat­ likely to contradict seriously those inherited behaviour ing. For example, Turnbull (1965:198) reported that "it patterns. Both Boehm and Knauft cite Boyd and Richer­ would be a rare Mbuti woman who did not conceal a son (1985) in support of the contention that cultural portion of the catch in case she was forced to share with transmission can in principle allow such a contradiction others." And Tanaka (1980:122) said of the San that "a to develop, but in fact these authors stress the funda­ man may sneak a small catch of game into his hut to mental role of evolved predispositions without which share only with his family, or otherwise fail to share cultural evolution "would provide none of the fitness­ food as he should." Self-interest is at work at the indi­ enhancing advantages that must have favoured the evo­ vidual level. Those who have meat sometimes try to lution of capacities for culture" (Richerson and Boyd avoid sharing it all. Those who do not have meat some­ 1989: 206 ). times steal (Turnbull 1965:198). These behaviours are Therefore, in contrast to the Knauft and Boehm view tolerated to an extent. of culturally sustained, conscious intention running Among the same African hunter-gatherers, food shar­ counter to stable inherited tendencies, our model pre­ ing is characterised by arguments (Turnbull 1965: I 5 8; dicts that culture and conscious action will generally fit Tanaka 1980:95), and Bailey (1991:94) speaks of younger with, build on, and elaborate such tendencies. Efe men "yelling aggresively ... begging obsequiously, In our model, there is no reversal of hierarchy; we and even occasionally snatching pieces of meat.... question the evidence for Boehm's concept of a "reverse Never did overt physical violence break out, but ex­ dominance hierarchy." The tendency to recognise good tremely heated vociferous arguments were not uncom­ performance and to defer to individuals who achieve it mon." Envy and jealousy are sometimes observed to be is a cross-culturally stable tendency which would have important in this process of sharing (e.g., Marshall 1976 had a clear adaptive advantage in promoting the learning [1961]:368; Briggs 1970:47; Tanaka 198o:II3). These of effective behaviour and in structuring groups around motivations are interesting because they move the em­ effective individuals. Even among the most egalitarian phasis away from simple self-interest towards a sense of of hunter-gatherers there is evidence that such recogni­ fairness (Trivers 1971), an interest in ensuring that "oth­ tion was given and was enjoyed by its recipients. Thus, ers do not get more than I do" and then, through antici­ Turnbull (1965:183) observes among the Mbuti that pation of others' reactions, that "I do not take more than "some men, because of exceptional hunting skill, may others." Cosmides and Tooby (1987) have offered experi­ come to resent it when their views are disregarded." mental evidence that humans are well equipped to de­ This implies both that they are habitually listened to tect cheating. and that they enjoy it. Kaplan and Hill's (1985) work We propose the term "vigilant sharing" to cover this with the Ache suggests that although hunters achieve complex food-sharing behaviour. Kaplan and Hill's no material benefit from gaining such recognition, they (1985) tests rejected all hypotheses to explain food shar­ may have more frequent mating opportunities, an im­ ing except that food is distributed in such a way that portant consequence for an adaptive model. everyone is fed. We suggest that this is the result, at the Although effective individuals are recognised and gen­ level of the social system, of the behaviour of sociable erally heeded, the function of leadership remains situa­ and self-interested individuals whose motivations in­ tional and is not transformed into a permanent social clude a strong desire to get enough for themselves cou­ role with a distinct status. When leading individuals at­ pled with a strong desire to make sure that no one else tempt to achieve personal dominance through making gets more than they do. One important implication of such a transformation, they are brought down several this is that counterdominance ("no one is going to get 1781 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY away with more than I") is an economically efficient to hold the options in mind and measure them against predisposition: it ensures that sharing takes place, and, important aspects of the situation would provide a par­ given the risk profile of hunting, sharing rather than at­ ticularly important function for conscious deliberation. tempted dominance is the efficient strategy. This model stands Boehm's on its head. Egalitarian If dominance patterns were indeed balanced by coun­ behaviour patterns evolved because with the develop­ terdominant tactics rather than being eliminated, then ment of self-control individuals became so clever at not there would still be a psychological potential to create losing out to dominant individuals that vigilant sharing dominance hierarchies, given triggering circumstances became possible, and this was the most effective eco­ which rendered the counterdominant tendencies inoper­ nomic strategy in the circumstances in which H. sapi­ ative or ineffective. It is plausible that the concentrated ens evolved. As a result of the complex set of internally resource conditions created by herding and agriculture contradictory behavioural tendencies which were en­ provided exactly such triggering circumstances (Testart tailed, conceptual inputs to decision making became I987, Johnson and Earle I987). This model fits the time­ particularly crucial elements of human psychology. The scales required: first, an extended process of biologically extent to which conscious intention is the master rather driven evolution (>I million years) which led to the than the servant of our inherited behaviour patterns is expansion of the human brain and the evolution of egali­ not clear, but at minimum conscious deliberation seems tarian behaviour and viligant sharing, and second, a rela­ to have some effect in expanding the options for our tively sudden change of social behaviour (ca. I2,OOO behaviour. years B.P.) driven by an unchanged psychology meeting Subsequent hierarchies were built in response to new circumstances entirely different from those in which it economic circumstances with wholly different incen­ evolved. This led to the creation of hierarchies because tive structures, in which the counterdominant tenden­ the counterdominant tendencies were disabled by the cies became disabled and ineffective except on the spo­ new environment. Such hierarchies are not merely re­ radic basis documented by Boehm. born ape hierarchies but uniquely human in both their behavioural detail and their cultural recognition. In common with humans, chimpanzees display tac­ tics such as alliance formation and deception through Replies which dominant individuals can be socially manipu­ lated despite their inherent power (de Waal I982, I992). CHRISTOPHER BOEHM The "Machiavellian intelligence" expressed in such Department of Anthropology, University of Southern tactics (Whiten and Byrne I988) would thus likely California, Los Angeles, Calif. 90089-0032, U.S.A. have characterised the human-chimpanzee common an­ 9 XI 93 cestor. If the subsequent rapid evolutionary expansion of the Erdal and Whiten raise several interesting issues involv­ hominid brain was associated with greater Machiavel­ ing the conscious intentions of nonliterate human be­ lian intelligence (Dunbar I993), an escalation would ings. Ethnologically speaking, the effects of such inten­ have been set up between the capacities of group mem­ tions have been lost in the explanatory shuffle, mainly bers to manipulate the dominants and the ability of because anthropology's favorite paradigms are either dominant individuals to counter such skills. Indeed, "structural" or "formal" and are borrowed from disci­ such a spiral might have played a causal role in the en­ plines that deal with entirely self-organizing systems. cephalisation which took place. Given such an evolu­ One reason I chose to study egalitarian behavior was tionary escalation, eventually the maintenance of direct that it offered an opportunity to factor purposeful behav­ dominance would have become prohibitively costly in ior into the cultural equation. The thesis was that al­ time and/or energy. Under these circumstances there though egalitarian societies appear to be devoid of hier­ would have been a fitness advantage to the strategy of archical behavior among males, from time to time "vigilant sharing" or "playing fair"-of resisting domi­ certain men try to dominate their fellows. They are dealt nance by others but not attempting to achieve domi­ with through a variety of sanctions, most of which are nance oneself. This would have produced in each individ­ found among simple foragers as Knauft defines them. ual a complex set of competing motivations-including Sanctions are enacted purposefully by a moral commu­ tendencies both to dominate and not to dominate, both nity that coalesces around the issue of personal auton­ to defer and to resist domination, both to share and to be omy and equality of males. Their application is rarely opportunistically selfish, all according to circumstance. reported because they are so predictable to members of Such a psychology of balancing, contradictory tenden­ the society; most would-be upstarts remain cautious or cies would have created multiple choices for each indi­ cowed. Such purposeful group domination is, I argued, vidual in any specific social situation. This in itself the most influential causal common denominator would have given each individual great behavioural among a very wide range of egalitarian societies and, as flexibility. It could also have given an adaptive advan­ an independent variable, should be weighted more tage to what we experience as considerable conscious, heavily than the various ecological influences that are intentional choice. If there are multiple, competing, normally cited to explain egalitarian societies one at a contradictory psychological tendencies, then the ability time. Introducing conscious intentions into ethnology Volume 35, Number 2, April I994 I 179 in this instance provides an alternative way of ex­ tions for prehistoric interpretation. Erdal and Whiten plaining an important social type. Erdal and Whiten suggest that I improperly mixed societal categories by seem somewhat uncomfortable with this approach, per­ pooling egalitarian behaviors of simple foragers, com­ haps because it smacks of "teleology." Attempts to keep plex foragers, and sedentary tribesmen and by including ethnology distanced from the study of human "pur­ sanctions such as deposition when simple foragers are poses" have a long history, the most recent being a stri­ reported to lack leaders. Had my focus been on prehis­ dently antipsychological version of "cultural material­ tory this criticism would be appropriate. However, my ism." Erdal and Whiten seem to favor a psychological aim was to demonstrate that egalitarian political ar­ approach, yet they suggest that Knauft and I present cul­ rangements derive not mainly from special ecological or turally sustained intentions as running counter to inher­ social-structural circumstances but from moral sanc­ ited tendencies-that we view culture in its goal­ tioning. Because "egalitarianism" was not limited to directed mode as a kind of independent variable from simple foragers or even to foragers in general, I took it somewhere "outside the system." into account wherever I found it. It would be a simple I believe that egalitarian behavior results from a long matter to perform a similar analysis solely upon simple history of coevolution. Genes provide tendencies toward foragers. The first task, however, was simply to con­ domination and submission and generate psychological vince colleagues that "reverse dominance hierarchy" ambivalence over submission because dominance tends was a useful concept. to be more satisfying. The capacity for purposeful and Erdal and Whiten correctly state that I view "counter­ decisive collective action provides a cultural antidote to dominant behavior" as present in all human societies. the domination tendencies of would-be alpha males that Does this make politically centralized societies that over the generations ensures that stronger individuals curb their rogue politicians "reverse dominance hierar­ cannot establish despotic political styles or dynasties. chies"? I think not. What changed radically with the The cultural antidote is obviously not independent of transition to chiefdoms was the cultural definition of behavior genes, for it is built upon ambivalence over the threshold at which collective counterdominant be­ submission and is effective because group members use havior was activated. Leaders became able to command their potential for domination collectively. their former peers legitimately in many contexts, and Purposeful behavior becomes analytically important the strong egalitarian ideology ceased to drive behavior when it has behavioral outcomes that vary from what definitively and in most cases atrophied or disappeared. genes, environment, and self-organizing systems make Physical environmental factors and factors of social predictable on their own. An egalitarian state of political scale or group composition were obviously important, affairs results from what amounts to asocial compact: but more immediately it was the granting of limited adult males agree to give up their individual possibilities yet substantial authority and the general acceptance of for domination of others in order to be certain that no status differences that effected the transition to ortho­ one individual may dominate them. This set of concerns dox hierarchies. I disagree with Erdal and Whiten that directly underlies the preoccupation with personal au­ counterdominant tendencies became ineffective except tonomy that is so predictable among foragers (see Gard­ "sporadically" in orthodox hierarchies. Any prudent ner 1992). It is because groups deliberately and in­ leader understands that assassination or popular revolt sightfully enter into this compact that purposeful is possible, and a leader who is unrealistic or unlucky behavior becomes analytically importantj "culture" is may be deposed. This is not reverse dominance hierar­ shaping behavior in an important way here. I have called chy, however, because followers merely exchange an such societies "reverse dominance hierarchies" because, abusive leader for one who is not. Power remains con­ over time, there always seem to be upstarts who will centrated at the top rather than being neutralized as in try to gain personal power and because the group predict­ a band or tribe. ably curbs them. Thus, in egalitarian society moral sanc­ Social-biological scenarios that relate egalitarian dom­ tioning is a special, emergency type of domination by ination by the group to "the reproductive consequences the group that is considered politically legitimate even for individuals" are easy enough to imagine. Assuming though individual domination is not. that alpha-male-type hominids/humans had superior It is well known that morality works "counterhedoni­ nutrition, were siring more surviving progeny, and pos­ cally" to diminish the effects of various behaviors that sibly were in a position to help their closer kin, their we are genetically disposed to, for example, inappropri­ genetic advantage would seriously diminish with the ad­ ately lustful behavior or murder (see Campbell 1975). vent of egalitarian behavior. By contrast, rank-and-file Egalitarian manipulations are simply one more instance types would gain an improved reproductive position, for of humans' using moral sanctioning as a way of sorting each would gain equally (if modestly) by helping to cre­ through the effects of raw materials given by human ate a system of equal sharing of power and resources. If nature and making some choices about tendencies that this "revolution" was ancient, then many millennia of should be suppressed or reinforced. This purposeful ca­ egalitarian behavior probably modified the behavior pacity is an evolved one that is surely a function of our genes involved in domination and submission. This may large brain. It can neither be separated from our natural help to explain some of the differences between humans history nor taken for granted. and chimpanzees and gorillas with respect to agonistic Any new theory about egalitarian society has implica- potential. However, it is apparent that human nature 180 I CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY still had the potential to support orthodox hierarchies, that the group did not wish to see fall into the hands of for once domestication of plants was accomplished and dominantly selfish individuals: large-game meat and the group size and stability began to increase they indepen­ power to abrogate another adult's all-but-sacred personal dently reappeared in many locations. autonomy. The response in both cases was to see to it To explore such a scenario more fully, one would have that the commodity was shared, even though certain to speak to the issues of behavioral dispositions for both individuals might do so with reluctance. dominance and submission, for coalition formation, for Much of what Erdal and Whiten say about the evolu­ sensitivity to group opinion and self-control, and for tion of contradictory tendencies ("competing motiva­ whatever else it takes to maintain a moral community. tions") in human nature makes good sense to me. In­ One would also have to account for the context: the deed, in a different political context I have examined ecological constraints, group size and structure, individ­ ambivalence and compromise in some detail (Boehm ual differences in genetic predispositions and other be­ 1989). More generally, I believe that such an approach haviors relevant to political power, and the distribution will be necessary if we are to make our analyses of geno­ of wealth. Erdal and Whiten's notion of "vigilant shar­ typic dispositions and their impact on cultural behavior ing" of food resources by people who are ambivalent clearly relevant to anthropologists not directly involved about sharing fits nicely into this picture and is relevant with what Durham (1991) calls "evolutionary anthro­ to the equally vigilant sharing of power that I described. pology." It would seem that the two may have been interdepen­ Aside from our partly differing interpretations about dent. Indeed, the food-sharing arrangements of simple hierarchies' being reversed and their apparently limited foragers would not be likely to work if decisive political definition of evolutionary analysis, I find aspects of Er­ power remained in the hands of a few, while if large­ dal and Whiten's perspective quite useful insofar as mo­ game meat were not shared it could be difficult to equal­ tives and intentions are not set aside or minimized just ize power. Thus I would link three developments because they provide unwieldy. By giving greater atten­ (Boehm 1982): (I) the moral community capable of mak­ tion to such variables we may eventually be in a better ing rules for behavior and sanctioning deviants, includ­ position to elaborate the evolutionary branch of anthro­ ing those who committed incest, cheaters, and political pology. The analyses will go beyond the often very upstarts, (2) domination of potential alphas by the egali­ highly "theoretical" assessments of reproductive conse­ tarian group, leading to equalized power sharing, and quences associated with "sociobiology" to include hard (3) large-game hunting with compulsory sharing of meat. data and general considerations about human nature. The egalitarian political revolution may well have taken Sanctioning of potential upstarts by the rank and file place in conjunction with large-game hunting, since is purposeful and actively shapes the content of culture. among simple foragers individual proficiency at other In fact, it may be considered a form of "cultural selec­ types of food acquisition is less likely to lead to domi­ tion." After two decades of social/biological analysis in nation. anthropology, it seems curious that so much energy has I agree with Erdal and Whiten's implication that be­ been given to speculative inclusive-fitness scenarios and cause the cooperation of foragers is often so well­ so little to efforts to achieve breakthroughs in the direct routinized we may have missed its subtle conflict com­ study of cultural selection mechanics, an area that has ponent. My suggestion is that, like large-game meat, not yielded readily to empirical analysis (see Durham political power has been indigenously defined as group 1991). One way in which cultural content is shaped is property, and individuals who would challenge an estab­ through decisions and their implementation (Boehm lished tradition of power sharing can predict the group's 1978). This mechanism of cultural selection must be hostile reaction. That they nonetheless push such limits given serious consideration, for it was sufficiently po­ in simple foraging societies is apparent from my paper, tent to turn the usual primate social structure upside and I devoted considerable discussion to the Australian down until conditions were right for its reemergence. Aborigines because not only are they foragers (some of In less definitive form, counterdominant forces persist them "simple") but also their historical links to the late today in hierarchical societies, either as latent threats, Paleolithic are exceptionally solid. formal checks and balances in government, or revolu­ While egalitarian food sharing may be enjoyable in its tions and popularly based assassination conspiracies. My own right, it depends upon a latent political threat just suggestion, and I think that Erdal and Whiten might as does the sharing of power. An egalitarian way of doing agree, is that anthropology sort out the psychological political business largely redirects individual tendencies variables that are needed to explain such behavior and to compete or dominate from individually selfish self­ begin to take human nature into account. To name just assertion to collective Vigilance against selfishness. one benefit, further work in this direction might provide These are not very "benign" definitions of cooperative all anthropologists with a better conception of how cul­ behavior or of "primitive democracy/' but they do ex­ ture actually works.! plain why blatant cheating remains well controlled among simple foragers, in spite of the rough spots I. I thank Steven T. Lansing for commenting on a draft of this reply. pointed out by Erdal and Whiten, and why serious at­ The original research on which the article was based was supported tempts at domination remain rare in their political life. by H. F. Guggenheim Foundation and the National Endowment Among such people there were at least two commodities for the Humanities. Volume 35, Number 2, April 1994 I 181

BRUCE KNAUFT 1981, Trivers 1985). The spatial and sexual dispersal of Department of Anthropology, Emory University, decentralized human foragers-a pattern that makes us Atlanta, Ga. 30322, U.S.A. 14 x 93 distinctive as a primate species (Rodseth et al. 1991)­ combines with the great social fluidity of band compo­ Before addressing disagreements, I want to note points sition to undermine self-interested enforcement of re­ of convergence in the assessments of Erdal and Whiten, ciprocal altruism in human evolution. Rule-of-thumb Boehm (see also 1989), and me (see also 1987, 1988, sociality of the kind experimentally documented by Ca­ 1989, n.d.): (I) A strong tendency toward egalitarian be­ porael et al. (1989) seems a more likely candidate for havior over a significant portion of human evolution is promoter of pro social behavior. Rule following itself has likely. (2) A significant primate tendency toward social protoforms in chimpanzees and bonobos, as is illus­ dominance was not extinguished but effectively con­ trated by the blindman's-buff behavior that de Waal strained by strong counterpressures during much of this (1989:195-96) has observed in bonobos. Likewise, em­ period. (3) Marked male dominance hierarchies among phasis on gift giving in simple human societies has a Homo sapiens sapiens arose relatively recently, first in rudimentary protoform in chimpanzees' grudging trans­ complex hunter-gatherer adaptations and then more fers of prized food items such as meat. generally in the context of increasing sedentism, the do­ Humans are distinctive in their internalization of pro­ mestication of plants and animals, the accumulation of social rules that have diffuse potential benefits to the material property, and increasing sociopolitical com­ group, including increase of truthful information trans­ plexity. (4) These more recent dominance hierarchies fer and promotion of subsequent reciprocity as well as are, in Erdal and Whiten's felicitous phrasing, "not conflict reduction per se. Erdal and Whiten suggest in­ merely reborn ape hierarchies but uniquely human in creasing tension between dominance and counterdomi­ both their behavioural detail and their cultural recogni­ nance in human evolution; I concur wholeheartedly and tion." Together, these points indicate important move­ indeed made a similar argument myself concerning the ment beyond evolutionary models that assumed simple evolutionary arms race between sexual drive and cul­ continuity in structure between pongid dominance hier­ tural control in humans (1991:400 n. ra). I would add archies and those of Homo. only that what underlies this Machiavellian escalation Evidence from chimpanzees illustrates patterns of co­ is the competition between rule-governed egalitarianism operation preadapted for the counterdominance found and narrow self-interest that could preclude normative among simple human groups. De Waal (1982; I989:chap. and potentially quite risky cooperation between unre­ 2) describes a coalition involving two apparently unre­ lated males in leveling coalitions. Such a "psychology lated adult chimpanzees who violently killed a third of balancing, contradictory tendencies," incidentally, is chimpanzee stronger than either of them and poised to reminiscent of Boehm's (1989) argument, uncited by Er­ assume the alpha position in the group. Though such dal and Whiten, that "human nature" is not monolithic counterdominance may occasionally occur, the general but should be considered as the outcome of competing trend among chimpanzees, bonobos, and gorillas is to­ forces that commonly result in behavioral ambivalence. ward prominent male dominance hierarchies. The re­ The most important and stimulating disagreements verse is true among simple human societies: marked between Erdal and Whiten, Boehm, and me concern the male dominance is transitory and counterdominance causal mechanism of reverse dominance hierarchies or normative. counterdominance in human evolution. I concur with The key ape-human difference here may be the apes' Erdal and Whiten that models of prehistoric human so­ willingness to demonstrate subordination. All the so­ cial evolution should pay more attention to observa­ cial great-ape species have pronounced behavioral dis­ tional information from simple human societies, such plays of submission that are important if not crucial in as decentralized foragers, and less to information from facilitating social coexistence and, especially, reconcili­ food-producing societies and complex hunter-gatherers. ation (de Waal 1989). Such public and formal displays of I also agree with them that conscious intention is not deference to a leader or potential strongman are absent a suffiCient cause of counterdominance, though it may in simple human societies, and this lack of behaviorally certainly remain an important or even a necessary part formalized submission is elevated to a very strong cul­ of counterdominance in humans. Boehm emphasizes tural norm; informal status leveling through humor, in­ proximate behavioral causes of counterdominance while nuendo, and public social support is deeply entrenched Erdal and Whiten emphasize ultimate evolutionary (and may be internalized within the individual as a causes; in this restricted sense, their arguments are on check on aspirations to dominance). This reluctance to different levels of analysis and not mutually exclu­ show submission persists in a less publicly valorized and sive-a point that Boehm (p. 248) himself foreshadows. more individualized form in the "Don't mess with me" "Conscious intention" was likely not as important in ethic of men in the many more complex societies that the evolutionary origin of human culture as in its persis­ Boehm includes in his sample. tence and intensification. Among humans, intentional It is an empirical question whether the benefits of aversion to submission is importantly connected to social normative cooperation in counterdominance can be ex­ rules of status leveling; together, these lend more collec­ plained in terms of self-interested reciprocal altruism as tive support and social efficacy to counterdominance Erdal and Whiten imply (see Axelrod and Hamilton than either cultural rules or conscious intentions alone. 182 I CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY

I agree that culture must have developed through baum 1987, Boyd 1988, Richerson and Boyd 1989j d. evolved predispositions (indeed, I do not see how Erdal Rogers 1990) and the ease of cheating in situations that and Whiten could interpret my arguments otherwise). are not carefully monitored (such as the spatial separa­ The important implication is that human culture first tion of prehistoric men and women in a sexual division developed through the law of unintended consequences of labor) ground this one-sided paradigm in weak empiri­ whereby traits selected in one context were pre adapted cal assumptions for the study of distinctively human or "exapted" in others (Gould and Vrba 1982). Imitation evolution (see, more generally, Wilson 1989, 1992; Wil­ and learning through socialization were likely just such son and Sober I989, n.d.; Sober I992). features in human evolution. In partial contrast to What is still relatively lacking in the study of social Boehm, I afford a much greater role to imitation than to evolution is rigorous models that take into account both "intention" (a term that he does not define but that I biogenetic selection processes and the cultural channels take to be the conscious recognition of a desirable end of selection that increase the variability of human be­ point and the use of this end point as a self-recognized havior and its potential to be adaptive or maladaptive at motive for behavior). Conversely, as Boyd and Richerson the group level (e.g., Edgerton 1992; Knauft 1993:chap. (1985) suggest, adaptive "learning" may be overrated as 8; contrast Durham 1991). Aversion to submission in an originating force in the evolution of human culture, human evolution, both between males and between though its small incremental effect may have been sig­ males and females, is particularly important. The rela­ nificant when compounded and transmitted over many tionship between counterdominance and sex, sex roles, generations. and the development of gender rules needs special atten­ Whiten and Ham (1992) have emphasized that imita­ tion; what role do females play in dominance or counter­ tion in an experimentally rigorous sense is surprisingly dominance, and what is the relationship between coun­ rare in nonhuman species other than chimpanzees (and terdominance and female mate selection? Females and probably bonobos). This strongly suggests that the vastly their male kin in simple human societies often show a increased cognitive capacities of human metarepresen­ strong aversion to male suitors who are prone to domes­ tation led to a qualitative increase in human imitation tic violence or fail to respect the rights of women. Even (Whiten and Byrne 1991). This trend is highly consistent in the case of coalitional male-chimpanzee killing noted with the prolonged altriciality of H. sapiens and likely above, de Waal (1989:68) mentions that a smaller female evolutionary dependence on culturally constituted com­ who was a close social ally of the dead male became munication in the form of proto language and then lan­ enraged following his death, drove one of the victorious guage (Bickerton 1992j Goodenough 1990j Knauft, p. males up a tree, and by screaming and charging pre­ 398). Imitation and rapid horizontal transmission of phe­ vented him from descending for over ten minutes. As notypic variation allow the temporary spread of behav­ Worthman (1991:384) has noted, our study of domi­ ior that may be nonoptimal or slightly maladaptive from nance and counterdominance in human evolution re­ an individual point of view. In the absence of competing flects a strong male bias; human "egalitarianism" refers pressures, such behavior will be selected against through almost exclusively to political relations among adult standard biogenetic selection. If it also happens to be men. Models also overwhelmingly emphasize the indi­ exapted for group-adaptive results, however, this process vidual as the unit of phenotypic alteration, adaptation, may be slowed or even reversed. In this event, the sur­ and selection despite the unique role of cultural rules vival chances of members of the group may be margin­ and the rapid spread of behavior through imitation ally increased. The patchy and dispersed resource envi­ among humans. Given that cultural transmission has ronments characteristic of human evolution and the long exerted a significant influence on the social envi­ associated selective pressure for sharing of information ronment of humans, it is likely that cultural and bioge­ (Kurland and Beckerman 1985) make some degree of netic selection pressures on females and males have group-level adaptation empirically as well as logically been in complex tension for a significant portion of our plausible. genus's evolutionary history. My 1991 argument stressed that group-adaptive be­ havior did not eradicate selection for self-interested be­ haviorj both pressures persist and remain in tension References Cited today. One example is the ongoing conflict between self­ ALEXANDER, RICHARD D. 1987. The biology of moral systems. interested sexual desires and cultural rules that influ­ New York: Aldine de Gruyter. ence sexual behavior. It seems empirically inadequate AXELROD, R., AND W. D. HAMILTON. 1981. 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