NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and General George Joulwan meet at Brussels airport with Richard Holbrooke en route for Bosnia as Special Envoy for President Clinton (NATO)
Back to Basics on Hybrid Warfare in Europe A Lesson from the Balkans
By Christopher J. Lamb and Susan Stipanovich
he complex mix of aggressive by one scholar as “a tailored mix of political objectives.”1 North Atlantic behaviors Russia used in Georgia conventional weapons, irregular tactics, Treaty Organization (NATO) leaders T and Ukraine is commonly terrorism, and criminal behavior in the fear Russia will use hybrid warfare to referred to as hybrid warfare, defined same time and battle space to obtain destabilize or occupy parts of Poland, the Baltic states, or other countries. They are trying to devise more effective Dr. Christopher J. Lamb is Director of the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National responses to counter such a possibil- Strategic Studies (INSS), at the National Defense University. Ms. Susan Stipanovich is Program ity. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Manager for the Program on Irregular Warfare and Special Operations Studies at INSS. For an in- asserts that NATO must adapt to meet depth explanation of the Bosnia Train and Equip task force and its performance, see The Bosnian Train 2 and Equip Program: A Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power, Strategic Perspectives the hybrid warfare threat. Speak- 15 (NDU Press, March 2014). ing at the same event, U.S. Secretary
92 Features / Back to Basics on Hybrid Warfare in Europe JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 of Defense Ash Carter agreed and Countering Hybrid staunch opposition from European allies suggested “part of the answer” was Warfare in the Balkans reversed that decision. “increased readiness, special operation In the early 1990s, Yugoslavia disinte- The Clinton administration re- forces, and more intelligence.”3 Several grated in the wake of the Soviet Union’s doubled efforts to explore diplomatic months earlier, Carter’s deputy, Robert demise, releasing a mix of nationalist options for conflict resolution and scored Work, declared the United States also and ethnic movements. Ill-disciplined a success by brokering an agreement needed “new operational concepts” to combinations of regular and irregular to end the Muslim-Croat conflict. In confront hybrid warfare.4 Meanwhile forces struggled to control territory March 1994, the Washington Agreement some NATO countries are establishing and protect or herd civilians in attempts formally brought the two warring ethnic special units to counter hybrid warfare to produce ethnically homogenous factions together as a single political and tactics,5 and the U.S. Congress has populations, a process widely referred geographic entity, creating a Muslim- required the Pentagon to come up with to as “ethnic cleansing.” Serb forces, Croat Federation. A year later, however, a strategy to counter hybrid warfare.6 which had inherited the most personnel President Clinton’s chief negotiator for While senior leaders and scholars and weapons from the former Yugoslav Bosnia, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, continue to debate the merits of the army, captured 70 percent of Bosnia observed that the federation “existed only term and its defining characteristics,7 and laid siege to Sarajevo. By late 1992, on paper” and that “friction between the NATO appears to be in danger of miss- it was clear that the better equipped and Croats and the Muslims was enormous.”8 ing the most obvious aspect of hybrid trained Serbs were particularly guilty of By spring 1995, the Bosnian conflict warfare and what it demands. As the term ethnic cleansing, having placed thou- had taken 100,000 lives and generated implies, hybrid warfare fundamentally sands of Bosniak men in concentration more than a million refugees. Concerns involves an integrated mix of previously camps and women in “rape camps.” about the future of NATO as a strategic separate instruments of power, whether They also destroyed non-Serb cultural alliance and outrage over gross human military, diplomatic, intelligence, covert, and religious sites and ransacked and rights abuses began to soften U.S. public informational, or other capabilities. An burned non-Serb homes. resistance to intervention. Increasing effective response to a multidimensional In February 1992, the United numbers of government officials, threat requires an equally well-integrated, Nations (UN) Security Council had Members of Congress, and prominent multidimensional solution. To success- formed a protective force to facilitate a pundits called for action. Ambassador fully adapt in response to Russian hybrid ceasefire in Croatia and secure conditions Holbrooke and an interagency team warfare, NATO needs a new cross-func- for peace talks. In June, the Security conducted Balkan shuttle diplomacy tional command and control mechanism Council extended its mission to cover looking for a negotiated settlement, but that can quickly integrate the Alliance the Sarajevo airport and later widened it Serb military advantages diminished their response across its multiple bodies of again to provide protection of humani- incentives for compromise. One event functional expertise. tarian aid deliveries. By February 1993, in particular convinced Holbrooke that Skeptics will doubt this is possible, 9,000 UN troops were protecting six more military force would be required to but NATO has dealt successfully with specifically designated Bosnian “safe bring the Serbs to the negotiating table. hybrid threats before, most notably in areas” or security zones from Serb forces: In May 1995, NATO responded to Serb the Balkans in the mid-1990s. NATO’s Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Goražde, Bihac´, attacks on UN safe zones with “pinprick” European and American leaders were Žepa, and Tuzla. NATO backed up the airstrikes as it had the previous year. initially flummoxed by sectarian fighting UN forces with promises of air support However, this time the Serbs responded that mixed political warfare, propaganda, in case military force was necessary to by taking 350 UN peacekeepers hostage. diplomacy, and military force in a “hybrid protect the enclaves. Holbrooke encouraged the Clinton ad- threat” to European peace. Eventually, Meanwhile, European diplomats ministration to increase the bombing, but however, NATO, with U.S. leadership, struggled to find a political solution Europeans, particularly those countries adopted a multidimensional approach that would end the fighting. But after whose soldiers were hostages, opposed to conflict resolution that involved two primarily European diplomatic that course of action. some novel command and control ar- initiatives (the Carrington-Cutileiro and The Clinton administration began rangements. One such mechanism was Vance-Owen plans) failed to quell the looking for ways to shift the military bal- the Bosnia Train and Equip Program. fighting or stop atrocities, pressure for ance. While formally abiding by the UN A review of this little-remembered but U.S. intervention increased. Shortly after arms embargo, the United States tacitly important success is instructive. It dem- taking office in early 1993, President allowed arms to flow to the Bosnians, onstrates why a multidimensional threat Bill Clinton decided on a “lift and strike mostly from majority-Muslim countries requires a multidimensional response, policy” for Bosnia—that is, lifting the in the Middle East. In addition, the and how small, well-led, and integrated arms embargo and employing limited United States supported Croatia’s ef- cross-functional teams can spearhead ef- airstrikes against Serb targets. However, forts to build up its military forces. The fective responses to hybrid threats. Department of State quietly approved
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Lamb and Stipanovich 93 nonlethal assistance to the Croatian contentious issues. Finally, the par- first by eradicating the growing influence Ministry of Defense. The Croatians were ties agreed to terms, and the Bosnian, of radical Iranian-sponsored mujahi- assisted by the U.S. company Military Croat, and Serb leaders signed what deen, and second by instilling Western Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI), became known as the Dayton Accords on civil-military norms and NATO military which was led by former U.S. Army Chief December 14, 1995. standards. Congress made the military of Staff Carl Vuono. The Train and Equip Program. and economic assistance to the Bosnian The United States also lobbied its A military assistance program for the government contingent upon Iranian- European allies to accept a mix of di- Bosnians was part of the Dayton Accords, supported foreign forces leaving Bosnia. plomacy and military force. American in part because Bosnian President Alija Rapidly establishing the Train and Equip arguments were strengthened by notori- Izetbegovic´ refused to sign the agree- Program was meant to give the Bosniaks ous mass killings of Bosniak civilians, ment without a U.S. commitment to an incentive to take the politically painful including a mortar attack against the train and equip his forces. But the pro- step of dismissing their co-religionists Markale marketplace in August 1995. gram also had the support of several key who had flocked to Bosnia to fight with The tipping point was the appalling Members of Congress and senior Clinton fanatical commitment. However, U.S. massacre of more than 8,000 Bosniak administration officials. As Secretary of leaders would not permit the program men sheltered in the UN “safe zone” of Defense William Perry stated in justify- to deliver training or weapons until the Srebrenica in July 1995. Amidst wide- ing the program, “To achieve a lasting Bosnian government arranged the depar- spread outrage over the horrific event, peace in the Balkans, it will be essential to ture of foreign fighters. U.S. policymakers argued that such achieve stable and balanced force levels The Train and Equip Program was merciless disregard for human life and within Bosnia-Herzegovina and among controversial from the start. U.S. mili- contempt for international peacekeeping the states of the former Yugoslavia.”10 tary leaders feared the program would forces called into question the continu- The Dayton Accords were widely undermine the impartial peacekeeping ing relevance of NATO and jeopardized judged to be fragile. The warring par- image they needed to execute the IFOR transatlantic security relations. ties were expected to renew fighting if mission. They worried Serbs would In August 1995, several military NATO forces left, so the initial 1-year view the program as blatant favoritism developments finally pushed the Serbs duration for international peacekeeping and attack U.S. peacekeeping troops. to the negotiating table. First, Croatia forces (IFOR) was considered a “waffle The Europeans shared this concern launched punishing offensives against the of the first order,” an impractical, glar- and mostly refused to participate. The Serbs. The Croatian army evicted Serb ing signal that U.S. commitment was Europeans believed that if a military forces from the self-declared Republic limited.11 The precarious peace and short balance was necessary, it should be es- of Serbian Krajina, producing a large 1-year IFOR tenure underscored the tablished through arms reduction and number of Serb civilian casualties and sensitivity and urgency attached to the control. refugee flows. Then, operating in concert Train and Equip Program. The primary Many Balkan experts, journalists, and with Bosnian army units, Croatian forces objective of the program was to create a scholars thought the Train and Equip routed the Serbs who were occupying military balance of power in Bosnia by Program was misguided because the other parts of Croatia and Bosnia. And offsetting Serb advantages. If IFOR was tenuous Bosniak-Croat Federation would finally, on August 30, NATO launched only going to stay a year, it was impera- be overcome with nationalist ambitions airstrikes against the Serb targets. After tive the program begin immediately and and crumble. The Serbs, of course, 11 days of airstrikes, the Serbs stopped be executed rapidly. agreed that the federation was not viable their attacks on Sarajevo. The United States also intended to and that Train and Equip was destabiliz- Two months later, the United States use the Train and Equip Program to ing. They promoted the narrative that hosted a peace conference in Dayton, strengthen the Bosniak-Croat Federation. Bosniak forces were Muslim extremists Ohio. President Clinton justified U.S. A key assumption was that cooperation who wanted to see the establishment of involvement to the public, stating, “The between the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks an Islamic state in Bosnia. The Serbs were Balkans lies at the heart of Europe, next on security matters would facilitate prog- not alone in asserting that Washington door to several of our key NATO Allies ress in other sectors. Without agreement was being duped by wily Muslims. and to some of the new, fragile European on security, it was difficult to imagine Looking back, one former senior State democracies. If the war there reignites, much political progress in the federation. Department and UN official concluded it could spread and spark a much larger The sooner the Federation Ministry of the Muslims played the United States conflict, the kind of conflict that has Defense was integrated and working “like a fiddle.” drawn Americans into two European wars smoothly, the more likely it was that In sum, other than the U.S. in this century.”9 American and European other aspects of postwar reconstruction President, a handful of his top national actors shuttled among the various would gather momentum. security officials, some strong supporters Balkan factions promising security and The final objective of the program in Congress, and those directly involved aid and working through innumerable was to orient Bosnia toward the West, in the Train and Equip Program,
94 Features / Back to Basics on Hybrid Warfare in Europe JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic´ and Croatian President Franjo Tudman sign Washington Agreement, March 1994 (Central Intelligence Agency) most informed opinion in the U.S. schedule, traveling extensively, overcom- The IDA study team found the Croat Government and European leadership ing major setbacks, and beating back and Bosniak armies in dire need of training circles thought Train and Equip was bureaucratic resistance to secure interna- and basic equipment. The young, battle- destabilizing and counterproductive. tional donor funds and create a web of hardened troops in both armies suffered Nevertheless, the program succeeded. private- and government-sector entities from a lack of formal training at all levels. Team Performance, 1995–1998. to implement the program. Most of their weaponry was decades old After the Train and Equip Program was Pardew recruited a small team of and worn out from prolonged use. Pardew in effect for 18 months, many observers seven other people from Defense, State, used the IDA assessment to inform a considered it a juggernaut propelling the and the Intelligence Community, some Deputies Committee meeting (a National region toward renewed hostilities. Yet of whom had to eventually leave gov- Security Council staff meeting attended when it began in December 1995, the ernment service and come aboard as by the second highest officials from all program seemed anything but a runaway contractors. By August 1995, Pardew the major departments and agencies) on success. Jim Pardew, who had headed had secured an interagency agreement his program requirements. The deputies the Pentagon’s Balkan Task Force and that a Train and Equip Program should approved Pardew’s five-page paper laying traveled with Holbrooke’s interagency be “modest” and concentrate on “de- out policy, goals, leadership, objectives, negotiating team, led the program. He fensive capabilities,” but the exact size concept, and next steps for the program started with no staff, no budget, no and shape of the program was disputed.12 on December 28, 1995. They stipulated clear requirements, and no committed So an Institute for Defense Analyses that training and equipping required international support. Armed only with a (IDA) team was asked to travel to Bosnia Bosniak and Croat commitment to the mandate and drawdown authority from and make a complete assessment of the federation and for Bosniak leaders to sever Congress, Pardew went to work imme- military balance “to identify priorities for ties with Iran and mujahideen fighters. diately after the Dayton agreement was training and equipment improvements; Pardew immediately began looking signed. Over the next 2 years, Pardew and to develop alternative equip and for financial support to the program. and his team maintained a workaholic train packages.”13 Most of the congressionally mandated
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Lamb and Stipanovich 95 Bosnia Train and Equip: Lessons for Syria? In early October 2015, the Pentagon announced it was suspending the Syria Train and Equip Program about 9 months after it began. The decision came just 3 weeks after the Com- mander of U.S. Central Command testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that only “four or five” U.S.-trained Syrian fighters remained on the battlefield and that the program would not reach its goal of train- ing 5,000 fighters.1 Labeled a “total failure” by congressional leaders, the demise of the program eliminated a key piece of the Obama administra- tion’s strategy to end the conflict in Syria.2 It is more likely the program Syrian soldiers who have defected to join Free Syrian Army hold up rifles as they secure street in would have succeeded if modeled after Damascus suburbs, January 2012 (Freedom House) the Bosnia Train and Equip effort. No two cases are alike, but there are will run into trouble with the bureau- or replace a covert CIA-led arming and enduring lessons from the Bosnia Train cracy, and reports indicate it did. One training program.”6 A major lesson from and Equip Program, both for manag- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) con- the Bosnia Train and Equip Program ing complex foreign policy problems in tractor helping the rebels quit, stating, is that security assistance programs in general and security assistance programs “They’re asking us to perform miracles, war zones are complex politico-military in particular. To demonstrate why the but they’re giving us nothing.” Now- undertakings. They require multiple, Bosnia model would have improved retired Lieutenant General Michael tightly integrated instruments of power. chances for success in Syria, we need Flynn, USA, and former Director of the An interagency approach similar to to identify the most prominent reasons Defense Intelligence Agency recalls that the one used in Bosnia is much better why the Syria effort failed. Although we even small things were hard from the for such highly sensitive, situation- are still awaiting an Inspector General’s program. The process in Washington dependent missions. Lead agencies just report or some equally authoritative was “completely choked. It was always do not have the breadth of perspective explanation for the poor results in the a ‘mother-may-I.’ And the ‘mother- and collective experience to manage Syria Train and Equip Program, we may-I’ would take a long time.”5 By multiple instruments of power. They already have enough congressional contrast in the case of the Bosnia Train naturally follow their preferred ap- testimony and press exposés to identify and Equip Program, the White House proaches and procedures. A major study several key factors in the failure. strongly supported the program—even of the Afghan and Iraq wars by National First, the President and some of intervening to secure difficult-to-find Defense University scholars concluded his key advisors were notably skeptical funding—and the bureaucracy largely that DOD made the mistake of “try- about the program from the beginning. got out of the way as a result. ing to create forces that mirror-imaged According to some reports, “President Second, the administration assigned those of the West” in those conflicts. Barack Obama never seemed to want the complex Syria train and equip It “developed ministries and military a train-and-equip program for Syrian mission to lead agencies rather than forces modeled on U.S. institutions,” rebels.”3 “One former administration configuring it from the beginning as an and failed to make the effort “trans- official whose views are closely aligned integrated interagency effort. It began actional” and “conditional,” based with the President,” stated the objective as a CIA-run covert operation. Then the on shared objectives and situational of the train and equip program was a administration decided to increase the variables.7 It appears likely that the same “fool’s errand,” a way to make people scale and profile of the effort and gave it thing happened in Syria, which brings feel better about themselves while they to the Department of Defense (DOD). us to the third major reason for failure. watched Syria disintegrate.4 Lukewarm Accordingly, in the spring of 2015, The third factor cited in critiques of support from the White House for a Congressional Defense Committees the failed Syria train and equip effort is controversial program ensures that it approved $500 million to “supplement how divorced it was from local political
96 Features / Back to Basics on Hybrid Warfare in Europe JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 $100 million in drawdown authority for realities. Frederic Hof, a former senior presence of fighters sympathetic to Train and Equip would come from Army advisor on Syria for the Obama admin- extremist elements and terrorism who stocks, including rifles, machine guns, istration, notes that the “formula of were fighting on “our side.” Moreover, radios, tactical telephones, tanks, heavy recruiting people [nationalist rebels] American security assistance began artillery, armored personnel carriers, light who had been hammered for four while the fighting was still under way, antitank weapons, and utility helicopters. years by the [Bashar al-Asad] regime and as the fortunes of war shifted Otherwise, no taxpayer funds would be to fight exclusively against [the Islamic against the Serbians, U.S. diplomacy used for the program’s execution. Thus, State of Iraq and the Levant] was an used battlefield changes to help shape a Pardew had to appeal to other countries elegant Washington maneuver totally peace that all parties could support. We for cash and in-kind donations to finance disconnected from the reality on the cannot be sure that a program modeled the remaining $700 million of the esti- ground inside Syria.”8 Many others on the Bosnia Train and Equip effort mated $800 million program. make the same point, including the would have succeeded. However, it Turkey agreed to host a donor’s Syrians we were trying to train and does not take much insight to see that conference in Ankara on March 15, equip. The Syrian rebels’ elected com- White House support, a full-time inter- 1996, shrugging off complaints from mander, Amin Ibrahim, a former Syrian agency team to manage the effort, and the European Union. The conference army lieutenant colonel, was candid program leadership with deep expertise started well despite the absence of Russia about the trainees’ tense relationship on the Syrian crisis, would have signifi- and other key European countries. with American trainers: “I told them cantly improved chances for success. Thirty-two nations and five international the whole idea is wrong. I said, ‘We organizations attended, but the confer- are Syrians. Our problem is with the ence fizzled. The Europeans extolled [Asad] regime. Help us to get rid of the Notes the importance of arms control while regime.’ The response was, ‘You should 1 Muslim countries asserted the right to not shoot a bullet against the regime.’” “U.S. Strategy Against ISIS,” C-SPAN. org, September 16, 2015. self-defense. U.S. representatives made So, he continued, “we all got up and 2 Department of Defense, “Statement on eloquent arguments about the fragility walked out.”9 Syria,” Release No: NR-392-15, October 9, of peace and the need to build a deter- As others have noted, political 2015. rent force. In the end, concrete pledges correctness of this kind would have 3 Tara McKelvey, “Arming Syrian Rebels: of cash support did not materialize. In doomed efforts to support French Where the U.S. Went Wrong,” BBC News, October 10, 2015. Pardew’s words, the conference “was a resistance in World War II, where many 4 Ibid. complete disaster.”14 fighters harbored communist sympa- 5 Ibid. With time ticking and criticism of the thies. Ambassador James Pardew, who 6 Julian E. Barnes, Adam Entous, and program splattered across newspapers, led the Bosnia Train and Equip effort, Carol E. Lee, “Obama Proposes $500 Pardew turned to the White House. He had been working the problem for Million to Aid Syrian Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2014. reminded senior leaders that the pro- years and knew all the circumstances 7 T.X. Hammes, “Raising and Mentoring gram was a personal commitment from and major parties involved well. He Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,” in President Clinton. The President dis- resisted political handicaps that would Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long patched his lifelong friend and counselor, cripple his program—such as the early War, ed. Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph Thomas “Mack” McLarty, to the Gulf inclusion of Serbians—and successfully J. Collins (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2015). with a personal request for assistance. defended his approach multiple times 8 Joe Gould, “Was Syrian Train-and- A trip to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab before senior interagency bodies, warn- Equip Effort Always a ‘Mission Impossible’?” Emirates (UAE), and Kuwait on April 14 ing them that a failed effort was worse Defense News, September 21, 2015. and 15 netted $115 million in cash. With than no effort at all. 9 Roy Gutman, “What Really Happened funding from the Gulf priming the pump, Some will claim Bosnia and Syria to the U.S. Train-and-Equip Program in Syria?” McClatchyDC.com, December 21, a second trip to Malaysia and Brunei are not comparable, and that Syria—an 2015. eventually increased program donations active war zone—presented a tougher to $147 million. Although this was a far set of conditions for security assistance. cry from IDA’s estimated program needs, There are differences, of course, but the Train and Equip team doggedly pur- the relative level of difficulty is not one sued in-kind donations over the next 2 of them. Bosnia, after all, was notably years, securing pledges from 14 countries labeled as “the foreign policy problem valued at another $129 million. In addi- from hell,” and too tough to tackle. tion to the $100 million in U.S. military Just like Syria, it involved incredibly assistance, the total value of the program brutal internecine conflict and the was over $400 million in cash, equip- ment, training, and technical support.
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Lamb and Stipanovich 97 View of downtown Grbavica, a neighborhood in Sarajevo, March 1996 (Stacey Wyzkowski)
Successfully obtaining funds gener- duty to protect the property on behalf awarded the contract to MPRI, a deci- ated an unforeseen and pressing problem: of the donors, which meant ensuring sion that had unanimous support. The how to legally spend other countries’ the funds were allocated consistent with company was well known for its work in money for an American-led foreign donor intent. Obtaining support from Croatia, and Pardew believed that the military program. Constitutionally, the the Departments of Justice and Treasury company was committed to the mis- Executive is not permitted to spend ensured broad government support for sion and took pride in facilitating the money without congressional approval. It the funding mechanism. execution of U.S. foreign policy. With took a unique legal construct and a joint After securing interagency and donor experience working in the region, MPRI effort by State, Treasury, and the Justice agreement for this novel approach, the understood the conflict and the chal- Department to allow those funds to be Bosnian Defense Fund was established lenges it would be facing. used consistent with U.S. law and the on April 22, 1996. Through support- The Train and Equip staff also began policy objectives of the Train and Equip ing arrangements for administering the negotiating with the Department of the Program. A winning formula was found funds, including a set of administrative Army on what material could be drawn after a number of false starts. procedures, the program was able to down from Army stocks. Ultimately, the Legal advisors reasoned that be- ensure donor funds never passed through program secured a wide range of light cause the funds had been given to the Bosnian hands. The funds always went lethal and nonlethal assistance, includ- United States for a specific purpose, the directly for training and equipment that ing 45,100 M16 rifles, 1,000 machine Department of State could create a com- the Bosnian defense leadership agreed guns, an assortment of field radios and mon law trust for them. Setting up such was necessary. telephones, and other gear. The heavy a trust allowed the U.S. Government to Meanwhile, the Train and Equip team equipment included 45 upgraded administer the money but did not give had worked hard to put a contract in Vietnam-era M60A3 main battle tanks, it ownership rights or direct control place for training federation forces. Since 80 armored personnel carriers, 840 light over how the funds were to be used. the Department of Defense wanted to antitank weapons, and 15 Huey util- Washington would hold the funds in distance itself from the program, private ity helicopters.15 Train and Equip also the U.S. Treasury with an affirmative contractors were used. The federation obtained other items from U.S. excess
98 Features / Back to Basics on Hybrid Warfare in Europe JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 defense articles, most notably 116 large augment their technical competence with the more moderate Izetbegovic´. His towed howitzers. deft diplomacy. Initially, meetings were Iranian ties were well known, and in the In addition, team members went fraught with ethnic tension and occa- postwar environment, removing radical shopping throughout Europe and the sional threats of violence. But over time, Iranian fighters and persons of influence Middle East, hunting for the best equip- the animosity was replaced by bureau- was a nonnegotiable, congressionally and ment at the best price. Pardew’s team cratic struggles over offices and furniture. Presidentially mandated prerequisite for secured the help of some Army experts Eventually, with a great deal of MPRI the Train and Equip Program to begin. on foreign weapons systems to assess coaching and after-hours socializing, Pardew informed Izetbegovic´ that keep- attractive buying options. When pos- bantering and joking between the two ing people such as Cengic´ around “was sible and cost-effective, the task force sides became common. MPRI also faced not a strategy for security” but a “road to also wanted to stimulate the indigenous enormous technical hurdles. It had to isolation and partition.”18 Bosnian defense industry. It let a contract set up quickly in an austere postconflict The situation came to a head as the for the production of Kevlar helmets and environment with a tight budget, and United States prepared to deliver its first small caliber ammunition after ensuring it had to integrate and maintain diverse shipment of heavy weapons. Pardew in- the Bosnians could match a competi- used equipment donations, which arrived sisted that a letter signed by Secretary of tive price and obtained approval to buy at different intervals. State Warren Christopher and Secretary Bosnian-produced 122-millimeter (mm) Yet within seven months of hitting of Defense William Perry be sent to towed howitzers. the ground, an integrated Federation Izetbegovic´ demanding the removal of Most of the weapons had to be Army School and Computer Simulation Cengic´ as Minister of Defense. State obtained elsewhere, though. Western Center for both soldiers and officers considered removing ministers in other European opposition to the program opened, and brigade- and battalion-level governments extraordinary, inappropri- influenced some Eastern European training began in earnest. By the end ate, and fraught with political risks. The countries, such as Poland and the Czech of the program’s second year, 5,000 idea went against State proclivities, and Republic, to decline participation. But soldiers had concluded unit training, no immediate decision from Secretary others, such as Ukraine, Romania, and and 2,500 had gone through the school Christopher was forthcoming. While Slovakia, were eager to sell some of their and simulation center. MPRI also taught waiting, Pardew learned one day that excess Warsaw Pact equipment for cash. small unit tactics, conducted battle man- Secretary Perry was in the main State Egypt also offered a heavy equipment agement training with U.S. computer building for a ceremony. He button- donation to the federation, thus seizing systems at a combat simulation center holed Perry and made his case. Perry the opportunity to be a cooperative ally near Sarajevo, and established live-fire took Pardew to Christopher, who was and possible future seller to the Bosnian tank and artillery training at ranges in hesitant. However, with Secretary Perry’s military. western Bosnia and Turkey. encouragement, he agreed and added his In December 1996, the first non-U.S. Political tension between Bosniaks signature to the letter. donation to Train and Equip arrived at and Croats was a constant challenge. Pardew went to Sarajevo and deliv- the Croatian port of Ploc˘e: 36 105mm Both factions were “suspicious of ered the ultimatum to Izetbegovic´. The howitzers with ammunition and spare American commitment,” wondering insistence on Cengic´’s removal began parts from the UAE and 12 130mm if the United States was “in this for a tense period of high political drama field guns, 12 122mm howitzers, and 18 the long haul.”17 During the first year, involving numerous senior leaders in the 23mm antiaircraft guns with spare parts much effort went into forging a working U.S., Bosnian, and Croatian govern- from Egypt. Shortly thereafter, the UAE relationship between the two previously ments. While Izetbegovic´ considered the delivered 44 ML90 armored personnel warring groups. The Train and Equip implications of the ultimatum, the Train carriers and 42 French-built AMX30 Program had to tackle high-level political and Equip Program was put on hold, tanks, and in October 1997, the United problems, including passing new legisla- which meant the large U.S. merchant States delivered 116 refurbished 155mm tion so there would be a legal basis for ship carrying U.S. weapons idled in the field howitzers. As these arms flowed the new federation command structure Adriatic from October 24 on, burning to federation forces, Western European and suppressing usage of old nationalist fuel and program dollars. For the task diplomats and military leaders repeated symbols such as flags, insignia, and auto- force, wasting drawdown dollars in such their argument that Train and Equip was mobile license plates. a fashion was agonizing. As weeks passed, a “recipe for more war” and that “one In the midst of all this political ma- Pardew orchestrated support from U.S. day American-made tanks will be rolling neuvering, Pardew considered one issue leaders who, whenever they met with across Bosnia’s plains.”16 important enough to risk his entire pro- Izetbegovic´ or those close to him, en- MPRI moved to execute its contract gram: the removal of the Bosniak Deputy couraged the Bosnians to sever ties with as soon as it received U.S. Government Defense Minister Hasan Cengic´. As a Cengic´. approval. By any standards, it faced a Muslim hardliner, Cengic´ was perceived After considerable delay, Izetbegovic´ tough task. MPRI personnel had to as close to but ultimately out of step with agreed to let his longtime associate go on
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Lamb and Stipanovich 99 the condition that Bosnian Croat Deputy realizing it, the Bosnian Serbs were never Serbs might have had about the merits Minister of Defense Vladimir Šoljic´ also tempted to renew hostilities. of renewing hostilities. If federation be dismissed. Pardew was eventually able The Train and Equip Program also leaders ever harbored illusions about to secure the cooperation of the Croats helped orient Bosnia toward the West. renewing hostilities, they diminished as on this condition, and Šoljic´ resigned on Narrowly construed, this meant expelling the program’s limited scope and duration November 18. Several days later, the U.S. foreign forces and detaching the Bosniaks became clear to them. Both objectively, ship offloaded the American weapons at from their relationship with Iran, which in terms of actual military capability, and the Croatian port of Ploc˘e. For the Train largely succeeded. Pardew forced the dis- subjectively, in terms of perceived relative and Equip team, the firing of Cengic´ missal of Cengic´ to accelerate the process capabilities, the program did not over- had been a high-stakes gamble, but one of severing Bosniak ties with Islamic radi- shoot its mark as so many worried. On that paid off. It sent a signal to federation cals. Hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary the contrary, it diminished the influence officials: no more games and no more Guards and mujahideen forces were of extremists and foreign meddling in playing both sides. expelled from Bosnia. In later years, the Bosnian politics and moved the political Meanwhile, many Western European Bosnian government continued to coop- mainstream to favor greater integration. officials continued to oppose Train and erate with the United States in identifying Equip. The British, whose opposition and expelling extremists. In October The Way Forward was apparent from the beginning, were 2001, six Algerians were arrested by NATO’s experience in Bosnia, includ- by far the boldest and most adept. They the Bosnian police and later sent to ing the Train and Equip experience, considered the program akin to “pouring Guantánamo Bay. In 2007, the govern- illustrates that hybrid threats to NATO gasoline on a fire.”19 One British general ment revoked the citizenship of over 420 are not new and that the Alliance has in particular made a practice of harassing people connected to “foreign forces.” experience with successful mechanisms MPRI, disrupting meetings and under- Close observers have argued the United for managing them. Initially, NATO mining the program. British diplomatic States largely succeeded in thwarting al leaders hoped diplomacy alone would personnel worked in lockstep with their Qaeda influence in Bosnia. generate peace. Later, they hoped that military to prevent the Train and Equip Broadly construed, orienting Bosnia positioning military forces around safe Program from getting necessary permits toward the West meant imparting Western havens in Bosnia would suffice and, and approvals. They were particularly norms on civil-military relations and finally, that isolated airstrikes would do successful in delaying combined live-fire forging ties with Western leaders and the job. But lurching from diplomacy to training at the new Combat Training institutions, which most would conclude military force generated little progress. Center outside of Livno, which was is still a work in progress. Some partici- Resolving what one former Secretary located in the British-controlled sector pants in Train and Equip believed this of State called “the problem from hell” of Bosnia. It took more than a year and happened, asserting the program proved required a sophisticated and ongoing a half to overcome British impediments the federation could integrate its militaries mix of diplomacy, military force, and before the center opened. and professionalize them, which inclined other tools of statecraft. Net Assessment. It is not possible to military leaders to be more apolitical.20 Eventually, the United States put an enumerate all the administrative, techni- An International Crisis Group report in interagency team together that could cal, and political achievements of the December 1997 supported this assess- coordinate diplomatic, political, military, Train and Equip task force here. The im- ment, observing there was more evidence and informational activities quickly and portant point is that it achieved its larger of cooperation in the federation Ministry to good effect. The first team was led by goals, the most immediate of which was of Defense than in other sectors, and that Holbrooke and the second by Pardew. securing a military balance so the Bosnian the program provided transparency for Both pursued this integrated approach Federation could defend itself. The pro- federation military developments. Because to great effect. Indeed, Pardew used a gram was supposed to provide a rough Train and Equip helped Westernize similar approach later to facilitate peace balance between the federation and the postwar Bosnia, the report concluded it in Macedonia and Kosovo. Some NATO Republika Srpska. NATO forces would “would be foolish to scrap this asset.”21 partners were slow to learn the necessity of deter conflict among the larger regional Bosnia’s future remains uncertain, a multidimensional response, but having powers. The point of the Train and Equip but 20 years later, there is no doubt ceded the lead to the United States, they Program was local military stability in the program achieved its operational had to follow the American approach to Bosnia, which reduced the demands on goals. In less than 2 years, the task force move forward, and it proved a success. the program, and also meant the program rectified the military imbalance between Russia is a much more capable and was unlikely to precipitate a regional Bosnian Serb and federation forces, serious threat than Serbia but what the conflict because it was not a threat to and did so with only about half of the United States demonstrated in Bosnia, Croatia or Serbia proper. The task force resources originally estimated necessary. and what NATO must understand now, was highly successful in this respect and, The program reassured the federation is that all hybrid threats require new and eliminated any misconceptions the command and control arrangements.
100 Features / Back to Basics on Hybrid Warfare in Europe JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 There is nothing wrong with the military and periodically review the terms of refer- Peace Process and an Exchange with Report- ers,” Washington, DC, October 31, 1995. steps NATO has taken to date to reas- ence for the teams led by Holbrooke and 10 House Foreign Relations Committee, sure Eastern European countries facing Pardew. Approving the mechanism and prepared statement of Secretary of Defense Wil- hybrid threats from Russia—for example, procedures would be a worthy objective liam Perry, The Deployment of Troops to Bosnia, strengthening the Response Force and for NATO’s July 2016 Warsaw Summit. November 30, 1995. Perry made the same bolstering air policing and air surveil- Certainly these steps would be more point privately to President Izetbegovic´. Derek Chollet, The Road to Dayton Accords: A Study of lance in the Baltics. However, these practical than more speeches on the impor- American Statecraft (London: Palgrave/Mac- military steps need to be integrated with tance of hybrid warfare or debates about Millan, 2005), 169. informational, political, diplomatic, and the concept’s definitional parameters. JFQ 11 David Halberstam in Chollet, 196. economic measures. Russia will be much 12 These and other attributes were repeat- more easily deterred if it sees NATO can edly mentioned in discussions of the program and codified in the National Security Council match its multifaceted aggression with Notes (NSC) documents. See, for example, “Equip- multidimensional security measures that ping and Training the Federation,” tab C, 1 Frank G. Hoffman, “On Not-So-New are well coordinated, mutually support- September 29, 1995, Deputies Committee Warfare: Political Warfare vs. Hybrid Threats,” Meeting, Declassified Document C05961572, ing, and quickly implemented. WarontheRocks.com, July 28, 2014, available at September 21, 1995, Bosnia, Intelligence, and Some will argue that what was achieved
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