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Kabarebe on Why RPA Prevailed Despite Early Setbacks

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Kabarebe on Why RPA Prevailed Despite Early Setbacks Kabarebe on why RPA prevailed despite early setbacks James Munyaneza, Felly Kimenyi The New Times, July 4, 2014 Minister Kabarebe speaks gema’s childhood friend Paul Ka- to The New Times on June game, then a Major, would later 23. He says the swiftness and abandon his military studies at the charisma of the soldiers ac- Fort Leavenworth in Kansas, US, count for the success of the and went to the bush to lead the RPA during those risky opera- struggle. tions. / John Mbanda On Octo- On June 23, 2014, The New Times’ ber 1, 1990, a few young men James Munyaneza and FELLY Kime- and women launched the libe- nyi sat down with the Minister for ration struggle through Kagi- Defence, James Kabarebe, who talked tumba near the Ugandan bor- about the RPA’s early losses, the reor- der, a war that would ultima- ganisation of the force after Kagame’s tely change Rwanda forever. The arrival, the campaign to stop the Ge- Rwanda Patriotic Army opted for nocide, the challenges that came with the armed struggle as a last resort the reconstruction process, the Congo after the Juvenal Habyarimana wars, and the RDF’s commitment to government rejected repeated at- the country’s security and social well- tempts by the former’s political being of Rwandans. wing, the Rwanda Patriotic Front Excerpts : (RPA), to have Rwandan exiles TNT : What would you say shaped who had fled the country during the liberation struggle between 1990 earlier ethnic killing episodes re- and 1994 ? turn home peacefully and to eli- JK : One can say that in spite of the minate institutionalised injustice challenges at varying times, our trajec- and discrimination back home. tory in terms of our vision and direc- But shortly after the launch of tion of where we are going is straight, the struggle, the RPA suffered de- we have not been derailed by the va- vastating setbacks, including the rious seemingly insurmountable chal- shocking death of their leader, lenges we have encountered. Maj. Gen. Fred Rwigema, the We have been able to overcome charismatic and battle-hardened these challenges because of ; one, the youthful commander who died on strong leadership we’ve had from in- the second day of the attack. Rwi- ception up till today, which has been 1 2 consistent, charismatic, courageous, fo- weeks, and recovery was very difficult. cused to maintain the course of the We had been defeated totally, comple- struggle irrespective of whatever chal- tely and wiped out of the area we held lenges. in Umutara, so to be able to organise The second is the spirit of the figh- the little that was remaining by Pre- ters, which never withered, never got sident Paul Kagame, and re-launch the lost under difficult circumstances, and struggle and pick momentum to make of the Rwandans in general because gains and achievements on the ground the spirit started with a small number was a turning point because otherwise of fighters who launched the liberation we would have registered a total defeat. struggle in 1990, but it has grown to The rest was the normal challenges incorporate very many Rwandans at one would encounter when confron- different stages, and that’s what has ting an enemy that is strong, virulent made the struggle carry on and achieve and supported. But the biggest short- its objectives and that’s what makes us coming was at the beginning of the confident that our struggle will live on struggle, we could have avoided that. to make Rwanda become what Rwan- TNT : Where were you personally dans want it to be in the future. at that time ? TNT : On October 1, 1990 the RPA JK : In the first week and the first launched the liberation struggle in the day itself, I and many others would form of a conventional war through see some form of disorganisation that Kagitumba. Don’t you think that was would inevitably put us at risk, we a mistake considering that this was a could see it but we didn’t have the conventional war in a region that’s geo- guts and the power to influence things. graphically flat and exposed ? Even after we struck Kagitumba, the JK : Of course, at the beginning very first day and the next day, you of the war we made many mistakes could see total disorganisation, lack of that were very costly in terms of lo- control of the situation, lack of pro- sing people. There are questions about per planning, to the extent that if the the manner in which we moved from enemy was smart, even on the first day Uganda to Kagitumba, the choice of or second of October he would have wi- Kagitumba itself, the lack of cohesion ped us out in that state in which we among the troops, the leadership pro- were. There were a lot of visible pro- blems that cost the death of most of blems, lack of self-discipline by senior the leaders themselves etc. We had so commanders, a lot of excitement and many fundamental weaknesses of ex- indeed it was all to be seen in the pre- citement and lack of the understan- ceding days when we lost very senior ding of the enemy we were to confront, commanders ; when we talk of senior under-looking and underestimating the commanders sometimes people think enemy, but also not doing the little de- of the top and maybe the next three tails that are necessary for adequate or four but we had very many charis- preparation if one has to confront a matic, combat-hardened commanders difficult situation like we were going who sacrificed and died in those first to. That cost us a lot in the beginning days and very many other charisma- to the extent that we had completely tic soldiers who were battle-hardened. lost the war in the first two or three Because of the poor command, control 3 and management of the whole force, we fighters and sent a message to Habyari- lost so many people. mana and to the international commu- Of course even after we reorganised nity that the struggle was still alive. and re-launched the struggle we lost After capturing Gatuna, very many people but in a manner that can be ac- other operations were launched. To counted for because when you are figh- put it simple, when President Ka- ting you lose people. game came, he did two things simul- TNT : So what major tactical taneously : reorganising and restric- and strategic decisions were made that ting the force, redefining the vision, breathed new life in the liberation mission and strategy, but at the same cause ? time carried out operations against the JK : Even with the initial defeat – enemy. He did not halt one to begin and that’s why you blame that defeat the other, the two went together si- to the leadership at the time – what multaneously. Besides Gatuna, Rwem- was not lost is the spirit of the fighters, pasha, Kaniga, Rushaki, Cyungo, and even at the time when they were being Kanyantanga were all attacked in No- massacred, being dispersed, those who vember. Nkana was attacked around survived retained the spirit to fight to December 24, 25 and by January 23, the last person because they had a le- a force was attacking Ruhengeri and li- gitimate cause. berating political prisoners. We did not And so the coming in of Paul Ka- give the enemy breathing space. game after two weeks, which most TNT : Going by what you are of the commanders and fighters were saying, it sounds like he came in as waiting for – after losing many com- your natural leader yet one would as- manders, – gave them hope, it kept sume that he would have instead fa- them going. So, when he came in, ced some internal opposition since he he came with a new strategy altoge- found commanders on the ground... ther, he changed the tactics, he chan- JK : I don’t think he could have fa- ged the operational concept and did ced opposition internally because even not approve of sending soldiers to an when we were in Uganda, he was al- open grassland to be bombed by anti- ready one of the top most leaders and aircraft, aircraft and tanks. This reor- that was a known fact. He is one of ganisation gave hope to the fighters those who started the struggle, the who were scattered and those who had RPF in 1987. Even before he went to run away. As a result, he organised suc- the US for military studies, he had cessful operations. For example on Oc- been organising, so all the commanders tober 28, 1990, the Habyarimana re- knew that he was their leader and im- gime recaptured Kagitumba success- mediately after the death of late Fred fully and reached the borderline, but a Rwigema on October 2, 1990, every- week earlier Paul Kagame had organi- body, including the commanders who sed a fresh force and sent it to Gatuna had not died by then were waiting for to open a new front. As Habyarimana him as their leader, so it was a natural was celebrating the recapture of Kagi- process. tumba on October 28, the RPF, on Oc- TNT : From what you’ve told us, tober 30, struck and captured Gatuna. it’s clear that the RPA was a disor- That reengineered the morale of the ganised force in the early days of the 4 struggle. That may seem to reinforce nyezi seemed to be in charge ; politi- the narrative that actually some of the cally and administratively, you could RPA commanders, including the top see late (Maj.
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