Kabarebe on why RPA prevailed despite early setbacks

James Munyaneza, Felly Kimenyi The New Times, July 4, 2014

Minister Kabarebe speaks gema’s childhood friend Paul Ka- to The New Times on June game, then a Major, would later 23. He says the swiftness and abandon his military studies at the charisma of the soldiers ac- Fort Leavenworth in Kansas, US, count for the success of the and went to the bush to lead the RPA during those risky opera- struggle. tions. / John Mbanda On Octo- On June 23, 2014, The New Times’ ber 1, 1990, a few young men James Munyaneza and FELLY Kime- and women launched the libe- nyi sat down with the Minister for ration struggle through Kagi- Defence, James Kabarebe, who talked tumba near the Ugandan bor- about the RPA’s early losses, the reor- der, a war that would ultima- ganisation of the force after Kagame’s tely change Rwanda forever. The arrival, the campaign to stop the Ge- Rwanda Patriotic Army opted for nocide, the challenges that came with the armed struggle as a last resort the reconstruction process, the Congo after the Juvenal Habyarimana wars, and the RDF’s commitment to government rejected repeated at- the country’s security and social well- tempts by the former’s political being of Rwandans. wing, the Rwanda Patriotic Front Excerpts : (RPA), to have Rwandan exiles TNT : What would you say shaped who had fled the country during the liberation struggle between 1990 earlier ethnic killing episodes re- and 1994 ? turn home peacefully and to eli- JK : One can say that in spite of the minate institutionalised injustice challenges at varying times, our trajec- and discrimination back home. tory in terms of our vision and direc- But shortly after the launch of tion of where we are going is straight, the struggle, the RPA suffered de- we have not been derailed by the va- vastating setbacks, including the rious seemingly insurmountable chal- shocking death of their leader, lenges we have encountered. Maj. Gen. Fred Rwigema, the We have been able to overcome charismatic and battle-hardened these challenges because of ; one, the youthful commander who died on strong leadership we’ve had from in- the second day of the attack. Rwi- ception up till today, which has been

1 2 consistent, charismatic, courageous, fo- weeks, and recovery was very difficult. cused to maintain the course of the We had been defeated totally, comple- struggle irrespective of whatever chal- tely and wiped out of the area we held lenges. in Umutara, so to be able to organise The second is the spirit of the figh- the little that was remaining by Pre- ters, which never withered, never got sident Paul Kagame, and re-launch the lost under difficult circumstances, and struggle and pick momentum to make of the Rwandans in general because gains and achievements on the ground the spirit started with a small number was a turning point because otherwise of fighters who launched the liberation we would have registered a total defeat. struggle in 1990, but it has grown to The rest was the normal challenges incorporate very many Rwandans at one would encounter when confron- different stages, and that’s what has ting an enemy that is strong, virulent made the struggle carry on and achieve and supported. But the biggest short- its objectives and that’s what makes us coming was at the beginning of the confident that our struggle will live on struggle, we could have avoided that. to make Rwanda become what Rwan- TNT : Where were you personally dans want it to be in the future. at that time ? TNT : On October 1, 1990 the RPA JK : In the first week and the first launched the liberation struggle in the day itself, I and many others would form of a conventional war through see some form of disorganisation that Kagitumba. Don’t you think that was would inevitably put us at risk, we a mistake considering that this was a could see it but we didn’t have the conventional war in a region that’s geo- guts and the power to influence things. graphically flat and exposed ? Even after we struck Kagitumba, the JK : Of course, at the beginning very first day and the next day, you of the war we made many mistakes could see total disorganisation, lack of that were very costly in terms of lo- control of the situation, lack of pro- sing people. There are questions about per planning, to the extent that if the the manner in which we moved from enemy was smart, even on the first day Uganda to Kagitumba, the choice of or second of October he would have wi- Kagitumba itself, the lack of cohesion ped us out in that state in which we among the troops, the leadership pro- were. There were a lot of visible pro- blems that cost the death of most of blems, lack of self-discipline by senior the leaders themselves etc. We had so commanders, a lot of excitement and many fundamental weaknesses of ex- indeed it was all to be seen in the pre- citement and lack of the understan- ceding days when we lost very senior ding of the enemy we were to confront, commanders ; when we talk of senior under-looking and underestimating the commanders sometimes people think enemy, but also not doing the little de- of the top and maybe the next three tails that are necessary for adequate or four but we had very many charis- preparation if one has to confront a matic, combat-hardened commanders difficult situation like we were going who sacrificed and died in those first to. That cost us a lot in the beginning days and very many other charisma- to the extent that we had completely tic soldiers who were battle-hardened. lost the war in the first two or three Because of the poor command, control 3 and management of the whole force, we fighters and sent a message to Habyari- lost so many people. mana and to the international commu- Of course even after we reorganised nity that the struggle was still alive. and re-launched the struggle we lost After capturing Gatuna, very many people but in a manner that can be ac- other operations were launched. To counted for because when you are figh- put it simple, when President Ka- ting you lose people. game came, he did two things simul- TNT : So what major tactical taneously : reorganising and restric- and strategic decisions were made that ting the force, redefining the vision, breathed new life in the liberation mission and strategy, but at the same cause ? time carried out operations against the JK : Even with the initial defeat – enemy. He did not halt one to begin and that’s why you blame that defeat the other, the two went together si- to the leadership at the time – what multaneously. Besides Gatuna, Rwem- was not lost is the spirit of the fighters, pasha, Kaniga, Rushaki, Cyungo, and even at the time when they were being Kanyantanga were all attacked in No- massacred, being dispersed, those who vember. Nkana was attacked around survived retained the spirit to fight to December 24, 25 and by January 23, the last person because they had a le- a force was attacking Ruhengeri and li- gitimate cause. berating political prisoners. We did not And so the coming in of Paul Ka- give the enemy breathing space. game after two weeks, which most TNT : Going by what you are of the commanders and fighters were saying, it sounds like he came in as waiting for – after losing many com- your natural leader yet one would as- manders, – gave them hope, it kept sume that he would have instead fa- them going. So, when he came in, ced some internal opposition since he he came with a new strategy altoge- found commanders on the ground... ther, he changed the tactics, he chan- JK : I don’t think he could have fa- ged the operational concept and did ced opposition internally because even not approve of sending soldiers to an when we were in Uganda, he was al- open grassland to be bombed by anti- ready one of the top most leaders and aircraft, aircraft and tanks. This reor- that was a known fact. He is one of ganisation gave hope to the fighters those who started the struggle, the who were scattered and those who had RPF in 1987. Even before he went to run away. As a result, he organised suc- the US for military studies, he had cessful operations. For example on Oc- been organising, so all the commanders tober 28, 1990, the Habyarimana re- knew that he was their leader and im- gime recaptured Kagitumba success- mediately after the death of late Fred fully and reached the borderline, but a Rwigema on October 2, 1990, every- week earlier Paul Kagame had organi- body, including the commanders who sed a fresh force and sent it to Gatuna had not died by then were waiting for to open a new front. As Habyarimana him as their leader, so it was a natural was celebrating the recapture of Kagi- process. tumba on October 28, the RPF, on Oc- TNT : From what you’ve told us, tober 30, struck and captured Gatuna. it’s clear that the RPA was a disor- That reengineered the morale of the ganised force in the early days of the 4 struggle. That may seem to reinforce nyezi seemed to be in charge ; politi- the narrative that actually some of the cally and administratively, you could RPA commanders, including the top see late (Maj. Peter) Bayingana trying leaders like Gen. Rwigema, were vic- be in charge. What was apparent was tims of infighting. that there was a total vacuum, total JK : We don’t know where the nar- disorganisation. I myself, at one point, rative about the infighting in the RPA heard late Bunyenyezi also expressing came from, we don’t know who really desperacy over the situation. I heard manufactured it but the way each com- him saying ’we could only be lucky if mander died is well known. First of Paul Kagame came as soon as possible all, there was nothing like infighting. to help us’. These words proved that Never. It was not there. All the com- there was a vacuum. manders who died, their death can ea- TNT : And you blame the same sily be explained. They died during the chaotic situation for the death of both day and, all of them, in combat. How Bayingana and Bunyenyezi as well ? late Fred died is very well known be- JK : They both died in similar cause he was not alone, he was with a circumstances, that’s the most unfor- very big team of escorts. He was shot tunate part. There were problems of directly on the foreface by an enemy misjudgements and under-looking the that was retreating ; the enemy used enemy. Let’s start with late Fred, the a machine gun mounted on a jeep, circumstances in which he died. The and late Fred was on a hilltop, expo- enemy (government army) was advan- sed. You know the hills in Umutara cing and had started shooting. Al- are all exposed, he was an easy target. though we had our own forces, we were Maybe it must have been accidental, it redundant at Kagitumba where we had must have been a coincidence because spent the night to the extent of even I imagine the guy who operated the not putting in place a force to protect machine gun and shot randomly at a the area we had captured. Even the crowd of people did not identify late captive we had captured at Kagitumba Fred, he must have shot just randomly escaped at night and he’s the one who and unfortunately the bullet hit late guided that enemy in the morning, the Fred directly on the foreface and he fell enemy that killed late Fred. down. The soldiers who were fighting On the next morning, on October in an extended line saw the machine 2, late Fred, instead of organising the gun fire ; everybody saw how he was forces to go and encounter the enemy shot. that was advancing, he personally took TNT : When he died, who took the lead and went ahead of everybody. charge immediately before Kagame’s Of course most of us knew it was wrong arrival ? but nobody would go and stop him. JK : It’s very difficult to say who Other fighters of course followed him took charge because when he died, but in a manner that was not very there was total confusion. Maybe indi- well organised. But because our sol- vidual commanders took various initia- diers had combat experience, they or- tives but not coordinated. It was diffi- ganised very quickly along the road cult to know who took charge, because and repulsed the enemy. But he had operationally late (Maj. Chris) Bunye- gone to the right, climbed a very expo- 5 sed hill, and was facing the enemy. He ship, including those who died, because even saw the enemy retreating but the each one who died made a mistake enemy also saw him on top of the hill or was part of the mistakes that were and then fired in disarray and that’s made. how he was shot. TNT : It looks as though Maj. Bu- On October 23, Bunyenyezi was nyenyezi and Maj. Bayingana acted warned against the enemy that feigned contrary to the views of Kagame, who to be wanting to report to us ; in fact was the new overall commander ! Paul Kagame warned him against that, JK : No, they weren’t. You know saying ’how would you think that that Paul Kagame had just arrived. He arri- enemy around Lyabega wants to re- ved around October 14. He had met all port to you yet you have not fought those people, he gave them his views, and they have not suffered any ca- he questioned them why they had to sualties ? How would you be sure that stay in Umutara in an open terrain they are going to report ?’ But Bunye- being killed by the enemy at his will, nyezi and others kept thinking that the why they had not followed the ear- whole battalion of the enemy would re- lier operational plan (I think they had port to us, but the enemy was planning planned before the launch) of the un- to attack us around Lyabega, so when conventional way of fighting and also Bunyenyezi attempted to attack them, of properly utilising the terrain in the their plans had already been laid and northern part of Rwanda. I think that’s he fell in their ambush and was killed. why later on he chose to send forces to For Bayingana, it is even very Gatuna and to attack Nkana, Kaniga funny, how he died. When he heard which are all hilly areas. gunshots and bombs, he thought that So these things happened when Bunyenyezi was succeeding, so he he had just arrived and people on drove a pickup to join him. He was ea- the ground were still telling him how ger to join Bunyenyezi and even left his things were and he was still assessing escorts behind. He fell in the ambush of the situation. the enemy that had killed Bunyenyezi In the case of Bunyenyezi, who and died just hours, may be minutes was more of the operational comman- after, also around Lyabega. der, what I know is that he tried to Bayingana and Bunyenyezi died on convince Paul Kagame that he would the same day – October 23. hit that enemy successfully. Of course So in all this you see lack of proper Paul Kagame gave his views, but even planning, lack of seriousness and lack in command sometimes you give some of consciousness of the enemy. So how leverage to commanders to take initia- would you blame this on infighting ? tives. Unfortunately Bunyenyezi went I think the fact that we lost so ahead to attack Lyabega and it was di- many commanders consecutively, one sastrous. after the other, lacks a compelling ex- TNT : Fast forward to 1994. When planation and therefore people tend to the genocide broke out, was it a sur- think that it was infighting and plan- prise to the RPA ? ned, but the best explanation for that JK : The occurrence of genocide is that there were fundamental mis- was another episode that really caught takes that were committed by leader- us by surprise. We had not prepared 6 to fight a war stopping genocide, we international community and the UN did not know that genocide would take force (Unamir was here). We had not place let alone happen at the scale it had any experience with UN forces be- did. We did not anticipate that. What fore but there were so many guaran- we anticipated after the signing of the tors. The framework under which the 1993 Arusha Peace Accord, was that Arusha Peace Accords had been nego- the RPA and FAR (then government tiated was beyond Habyarimana him- forces) would integrate at 40 :60 ratio, self, therefore we thought things would and in our mind, we thought that after work out, of course with scepticism. integration, these people would turn You have to know that even the war against us and kill us within, that’s was the last option. We were open to a what we anticipated and that’s what peaceful solution. We had been defea- we were worried about. ting the government forces, and that’s But at the same time we were going what gave us the courage to move in to in it and we had faith that we would stop the genocide. Fighting had been defend ourselves, that’s what we were stopped because the RPA was conti- working towards ; that’s why during nuously gaining strength and defeating the Arusha peace negotiations and the Habyarimana forces on the battlefield, ceasefire, we concentrated so much on that’s what had forced Habyarimana training, so when genocide broke out to agree to the peace talks and cease- it was a surprise. I don’t think if we fire, because he could not hold us back. knew what was lying ahead we would TNT : Would one say that the ge- have sent the 600 (3 battalion) and our nocide was a result of a partner be- politicians to CND (in Kigali), because traying a partner in a peace process ? there was no plan to rescue them. It’s JK : Genocide was a manifestation like we had some faith in the negotia- of what we would expect anyway, in the tions in Arusha. The main effort was long-run : that those people were ex- to see how we integrated and survived tremists who would never agree to put within the system, that’s why we spent up with the Tutsi. If it didn’t happen much of the time making those prepa- at that time it would manifest itself in rations. some other form, maybe it would have When genocide broke out, what taken place even after we had integra- helped us to react very quickly and ted. adequately in those 100 days is our TNT : The Genocide against the force which was well trained and psy- Tutsi was a game changer. What we chologically prepared – It was very know is that once it started, the RPA easy to adjust to stop genocide. Our started moving forces from its stron- mobility levels, our physical fitness, ghold in the north to all corners of the our charisma... country to rescue people besides figh- TNT : Did the RPF/A have a le- ting the enemy forces. That was a very vel of trust in Habyarimana during the unusual situation, how challenging was negotiations ? it on the battlefield ? JK : We did not trust Habyarima. JK : During the three months of the But you have to know that the Aru- campaign against the Genocide, the si- sha deal was reached at with many tuation was very challenging. First of stakeholders involved ; the region, the all, the RPA was by far outnumbe- 7 red by the FAR. The FAR was aug- various parts of the country without lo- mented and supported by the Inter- gistical support yet they survived and ahamwe who were all over, in every they had to fight. sector, every village, every hill, everyw- Take the example of the troops here. The FAR and Gendarmerie (equi- that were at CND (present-day Par- valent to present-day police) maybe liamentary Buildings in Kimihurura), could have been about 70,000. Now for that moved and captured Mount Re- the Interahamwe, it is not even easy to bero and then to Nyamirambo to re- estimate their numbers, but they were scue people there. Between CND and in thousands and all of them trained Rebero, there were so many obstacles, and armed. there were so many enemy defences The RPA at that time, the effective and obstacles but they had to move force was 19,000. Numerically it was through the obstacles day and night, not something easy for us, but the RPA either transporting back the people gave their best, including a lot of sacri- who were rescued and their own ca- fices in the process of saving people. sualties or transporting logistics. It was The will, the sprit and the superio- a very difficult, challenging situation, rity in operational planning accounts and that’s why it took long anyway. for our success in stopping of the Ge- One would say that 100 days was a nocide within the 100 days. long period but that was down to the The dispositions at the time were difficulties involved, the enemy was vi- that we held the northern part of the rulent and fighting – real fighting. country, stretching east to west, but TNT : For four years you had been for every position of the RPA, within confined to a small part of the country, 200m or 400m, there was an enemy po- yet once Genocide started you procee- sition. To have broken through those ded to capture the whole country in enemy lines and moved on to stop the three months. Tactically, how did you Genocide was not something simple. move the forces ? There are just a few forces which mo- JK : When the Genocide broke out ved from our stronghold in the north on April 7, the Chairman of the High to Kigali without fighting, basically Command, Paul Kagame, called the each unit had to fight its way to Ki- sector commanders and assigned each gali. The forces that moved through one tasks. The Alpha Mobile Force, the east to Kibungo, to Bugesera, to which was under Sam Kaka, was to Gitarama and Butare, fought at every move to Kigali to reinforce the 3 batta- point, overrunning the enemy and lion, which was at CND (under Charles continuing ; the hastiness with which Kayonga), the 59 battalion which was they attacked the enemy and moved under late Ngonga also moved to Ki- along can be explained by the level gali, the 21 battalion which was un- of commitment, the level of discipline, der (now) Gen. Martin Nzaramba also the superiority in training, and also the moved to Kigali, 101 battalion un- will, the heart to fight, knowing what der (Charles) Muhire moved through we were fighting for. There were a lot Muhura and eventually to Kigali, 157 of obstacles, a lot of constraints ; of battalion under (Lt. Gen.) Fred Ibin- course including logistics. You can ima- gira had to move through Umutara, gine sending forces to Kigali and other Kayonza, Kibungo, Bugesera, Gita- 8 rama and then Butare. Bravo, under tered all over the country, we had In- Dodo (Twahirwa), also moved towards ternally Displaced People, we had ear- Kigali, specifically to Jali and Gat- lier caseload of refugees who had fled to sata areas ; Charlie, under late Kareba, Uganda, Burundi, and other countries was to take charge of the Ruhengeri- in the 1950s flocking in, we had others Kigali areas ; the 7 mobile force mo- coming in from the Congo because the ved along with the 157 battalion but Interahamwe had crossed over to DRC they separated at Kayonza, with the (then Zaire) and started killing the 7 battalion, under late Bagire, taking Tutsi in Masisi and other areas. The the Rwamagana-Kigali direction. The situation was very chaotic, it was a big military police and other the general problem. headquarters kept the rear. The High But for the RPA, the challenge was Command was mobile, President Ka- that the enemy, though defeated, had game and his protection unit were mo- just crossed into the DRC and was po- bile across almost all sectors, we had sitioned along the border, not far from abandoned the base because the mis- the border, and the French who had sion now was to stop the Genocide, come in through the Zone Turquoise sometimes they would be around Ki- (operation, that allowed the Genocide gali, sometimes towards Bugesera, and machinery to relocate to the Congo so on. along with millions of civilians) to sup- The swiftness and the charisma port them were still with them, and of the soldiers really account for the Mobutu soldiers who had come in 1990 success of those operations because to fight us in Umutara were now hos- we were highly mobile ; whenever we ting them. would learn that people are dying in So to us the priority was to secure here, forces would move there, et ce- the country as the RPF internally was tera. trying to organise what was there. It TNT : Finally, the RPA takes Ki- was a very big challenge. One would gali on July 4, but there was hardly say that at that point there was no a semblance of life everywhere. That country, no institution, nothing apart opened a new challenge in terms of from a handful of liberators who had reconstruction, how did you confront all this mess to clean up and put right. that new challenge ? To have moved to where we are today JK : I think the fall of Kigali and within 20 years, and reflecting on what the manner in which the RPF recons- the situation looked like at that parti- tituted itself and organised that despe- cular time, on July 4, 1994, it looks like rate and pathetic situation also shows a miracle for Rwanda to have recovered how strong the leadership of the RPF from that situation. and the RPF itself was and is, other- TNT : Looking at all that you had wise that’s not a situation that one to contend with on your own, with the would take over and move an inch in French siding with a genocidal regime, making it better. What did we have the UN pulling out peacekeepers when on the ground ? The Interahamwe were Rwanda needed them the most, and still all over the country, even in li- the rest of the international commu- berated areas, and some of them even nity watching from a distance even in killing people. We had dead bodies lit- the wake of a genocide, would it be un- 9 fair to say that RPF, with all its effec- has fought war under difficult circum- tiveness and prowess on the military stances from its inception in 1990, a front, it was possibly weak diplomati- force that stopped the Genocide, the cally ? force that defeated the insurgency bet- JK : I don’t think diplomatically ween 1997 through 2002, a force that the RPF had issues itself. When you defeated enemies who were backed by look at the diplomatic issues then and many strong nations that wanted to the diplomatic issues today they are recapture the country and reverse the not so much different. Diplomatically, gains, a force that has no history of lo- there are always issues because the sing war, and a force that in war time change that we ushered in in this coun- dœs its job perfectly ; in peace time try stepped on a lot of people’s in- it dœs its job perfectly well contribu- terests, and those people have had a ting to socio-economic development ; in stake in the history of this country, international peacekeeping missions it in shaping whatever we dealt with, dœs its job perfectly well, in different the ideology of genocide, and very circumstances, different environments, many other vested interests. This is and different situations. what we confronted during the time of It’s a force that is able to operate in the struggle and this is what we still different environments under difficult confront today – people who will not circumstances and a force that sustains readily accept that we had the right itself with meager logistical support. to change the course of things in this The fact that this force has not chan- country and determine our own direc- ged character for the last 24 years and tion as a nation without being patro- it’s a force that has been tested by nised by those who have done it be- difficulties at different points in time fore. On the diplomatic front, what we and overcame the challenges assures us confronted in 1990 still manifests even that this force has built its character on after 24 years later and we don’t see a very strong foundation that will live that changing anyway... on. The way we recruit, the way we TNT : Do you think we will still train, the way we prepare our forces have the same professional, highly dis- psychologically, mentally, the way we ciplined military force 20 years from administer our force, the way we com- now ? mand our force, the doctrine we have in JK : I think it’s all about the cha- place on how to do things... it ensures racter, the discipline, the doctrine in- that our force will be sustainable. culcated into the force ; how you grow TNT : And that I suppose explains the force, how you prepare your force, the strong linkage that exists between how you train, how you administer, the RDF and the rest of the com- how you command, the character you munity, especially through community inculcate into the individual within service ? the force. The fact that after 20 or JK : I said our military operates so 24 years, our force has not changed well both during war time and peace in anyway but continued to improve, time. During peace time they assume shows that we have laid a strong foun- their responsibility of reaching out to dation for the character of the force the population and contributing to the we need for Rwanda ; a force that social well being of the population be- 10 cause they know their responsibility is stay, it was a continuous exercise of li- to serve their people. And we look at berating the Congo. But also, it gave security in the broader sense of secu- us the opportunity to fight and neu- rity – social, economic, cultural, poli- tralise ex-FAR within eastern DRC, we tical and diplomatic attributes. So by also saw an advantage in it and we used reaching out to the public and working it. with them to better their lives that has TNT : So many things happened a security connotation, it is a respon- in the Congo between 1996 and 2002 sibility. when Rwanda withdrew its troops af- The character of our army is to- ter the second Congo war. Looking tally different from the colonial setup back, do you probably see any missed of our armies, that were just trained opportunities for Rwanda, any regrets and (put) in military barracks just to especially considering that we even still intimidate the people and to carry out have FDLR in eastern DRC ? coup d’états. There are some armies to- JK : I don’t have any regrets what- day which still behave like that, but sœver ; I look at the bigger picture. our army is totally different in terms First of all, what was the objective of of the way we perceive security of the going into DRC at that time ? The ob- nation. And that’s rooted in our ex- jective was not to allow the ex-FAR perience in the liberation struggle, has and Interahamwe, backed by their fo- been carried on afterwards, and it will reign allies, to reorganise and to re- be carried on because there is no point capture the country and complete the at which we shall declare that the libe- Genocide. Before we crossed into the ration struggle is over. Congo in 1996/97, the ex-FAR was TNT : Are you saying that the well organised, re-equipped, re-armed RDF has risen above political divides, and even trained from within the re- that it’s a force that can outlive any fugee camps across our border. If you political party, any president ? consider the number of trained Inter- JK : It’s a force that’s committed ahamwe militia by the time they cros- to its people ; so long as the people de- sed into the Congo in 1994, then the fine what they want, the RDF is there ex-FAR themselves and the Gendar- to protect the people. merie, plus the trainings that were on- TNT : You are probably the only going within the refugee camps inclu- person in the world who has served as ding Katare, Kahindo, Kashusha, Ru- military chief in two different countries mangabo, Kibumba, Mugunga I, Mu- – in Rwanda and DRC. How do you feel gunga II, Katana, Kamanyora, maybe about that ? you could say their total strength could JK : That was a task like any other have been up to 300,000. But we neu- task people were given within the RPA. tralised them and today, the FDLR are TNT : Did the Congolese ask for estimated to be 4,000 fighters. All this it ? is work that has been done from 1996 JK : Yes, the Congolese themselves to date, including those wars that were asked about it. My task was to orga- fought there. So there can never be any nise the Congolese army because those regrets so long as Rwanda is safe and people we helped to get to power had secured to date. If we didn’t take the no army for themselves, so we had to decisions at various points to do what 11 we did, I think the situation could have out of difficulty, killing the enemy, been different. neutralising FDLR, but on their own Maybe the fellows would have or- initiatives with less cooperation from ganised, supported by Mobutu, the FARDC except hosting them, instead French government, and others and FARDC was cooperating with FDLR. rolled things backwards and it would Are we open to working with them have been catastrophic. on this again ? Yes, as long as the DRC TNT : Do you have a feeling that will realise that it’s not profitable to the international community has pro- keep investing in FDLR because, ulti- bably not always appreciated Rwan- mately, FDLR has done more havoc in- da’s security concerns as far as Congo side the DRC to the Congolese them- is concerned ? selves. Until such a point when DRC JK : I don’t think it’s the whole in- will realise that they have wasted time ternational community but some mem- and make a choice to relate with a legi- bers of the international community, timate government as opposed to dea- states or individual members or orga- ling with a genocidal group ; if they nisations don’t. There are some people come to that realisation I think that’s who will perpetually remain our oppo- when things will work better. But so nents just because we ushered in this long as they are still bent to FDLR, change in this country. Chances are then I don’t see the situation getting that they will remain our enemies, and better. we shouldn’t bother about them. And TNT : Do you think Kinshasa still there is no alternative that they gave actively supports the FDLR ? us. JK : Sure. Honestly, even when you TNT : Do you see any possibility look at this so-called voluntary disar- of Rwanda and DRC working toge- mament arrangement of the FDLR, it ther again in joint operations against is just meant to hoodwink the interna- FDLR, the same way you did under tional community but also to sanitise Umoja Wetu ? and protect the FDLR, because the JK : Even the earlier joint opera- FDLR (fighters) have been returning tions were not as perfect as you think. home since 1996 – that’s why there They were just symbolic and with dif- is Mutobo (Demobilisation and Rein- ficulties. For instance, during Umuja tegration Centre), that’s why there Wetu, yes we worked with FARDC is the reintegration process either in (Congolese army) but FARDC was at the army or civilian life. For a long the same time working with FDLR, time there has been this open chan- so by the time we launched operations nel (to facilitate voluntary repatria- against a particular position of FDLR, tion) through Monusco (UN Stabilisa- the FARDC had already warned the tion Force in the Congo) and the re- FDLR and they had moved away. We ception centre at Mutobo ; so there is were just playing that cat-and-mouse nothing new in what they are publi- game. Symbolically we worked toge- cising today. It has been ongoing for ther yet practically there was nothing. a long time, in fact they are just dis- The same was the case with the Special rupting the ongoing repatriation pro- Forces that were operating in the Rut- cess and trying to organise and sanitise shuru area. Our troops did some work the FDLR to make it a credible force, 12 maybe because they saw that at the them. That’s why only a few very old rate at which the FDLR (individual people and a few old guns were collec- fighters) repatriates on its own, ultima- ted, just symbolically, to hoodwink the tely they would remain with no FDLR. world that the FDLR are no longer a It’s a way of holding them back, and threat. organising and rebuilding them. TNT : Throw in the recent at- TNT : But what is Congo benefi- tacks on the Rwandan territory by the ting from FDLR’s presence on its ter- Congolese soldiers, do you see a pos- ritory ? sible link between the two ? JK : That’s what we don’t unders- JK : It’s all related, it says a lot tand, maybe Congo is not operating on about their attitude. How could they its own, Congo may not be operating cross over the Rwandan territory to on its own. attack us leaving behind the FDLR TNT : Do you have an idea of which they are supposed to be figh- what exactly is going on on the ground ting ? besides the official statements from TNT : Maybe to provoke you there ? into moving back with them into the JK : You know after the defeat of Congo ? M23, the arrangement was that the JK : That’s also possible. It’s a pro- Intervention Brigade (under Monusco) vocation. But I think part of the in- were going to shift focus to FDLR ternational community and the DRC and ADF-Nalu (a Ugandan rebel force government see insecurity in eastern that’s also based in eastern DRC). We DRC as a profitable adventure for were told that ADF-Nalu have been some reason, otherwise how else would neutralised, naturally they should have you explain the lack of will to end the proceeded to take on the FDLR but insecurity there for all these years ? this is not what happened. Monusco says its ready to take on the FDLR TNT : Twenty years later, what’s but it says it can’t do so without the your message to Rwandans as far as cooperation of the DRC government. their security is concerned ? Now the DRC government comes up JK : Rwandans are secure and their with another mechanism that has not security is guaranteed. We have dealt been discussed and agreed on within with tougher situations before, we are the ICGLR (International Conference now well positioned to deal with wha- on the Great Lakes Region) of ; re- tever challenge. organising the FDLR, relocating them, The strength of the RDF has in- disarming them, this and that. To us, creased tremendously over the years this is totally different from the arran- and it continues to multiply, envisa- gement that was agreed on within the ging whatever threat we may face in ICGLR framework. It is a way of trying the future. My message is that Rwanda to avoid fighting the FDLR just like is safe and secure. the other negative groups have been Contact email : james.munyaneza[at]newtimes.co.rw fought ; it’s a way of trying to protect & fkimenyi[at]newtimes.co.rw