<<

october 1936

French

Alexander Werth

Volume 15 • Number 1

The contents of Foreign Affairs are copyrighted.©1936 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution of this material is permitted only with the express written consent of Foreign Affairs. Visit www.foreignaffairs.com/permissions for more information. FRENCH FASCISM

By Alexander Werth

a and NEARLY million people marched with their red on tricolor banners through the streets the F?te to commemorate of Nationale of July 14, the capture to the Bastille and celebrate the victory of the Front Populaire in the last General Election. The Colonne de Juillet, marking the was with place where the old prison had stood, decorated flags were of and streamers, and round it large panels with pictures Rousseau and Voltaire and Diderot and Henri Barbusse and the obscure Lille workman who composed the Internationale. Julien torrent a win Benda, who had surveyed the vast human from a dow, wrote few days later in the Depeche de Toulouse: never seen was This giant procession, the like of which had yet been in Paris, the direct outcome of the events of February 6. So also were the formation of the Front Populaire and the last General Election. The Waldeck-Rousseau Cabinet was the outcome of the anti-Dreyfus agitation; the 1877 election, with its Left victory, was the outcome of the MacMahon coup. In the last sixty a years sharp offensive from the in has been followed, a with mathematical accuracy, by sharp, inevitable reaction from the Left. sure But The men who organized the February 6 riots could have been of it. as their stupidity, M. Herriot has said, is even greater than their wickedness. In the meantime, until they understand, let them contemplate their work from their balconies.

? "Le grand vaincu" as the French say, the "great defeated" ? was of the May election Colonel de La Rocque, the leader of a the Croix de Feu. In two years the Croix de Feu had grown from war small, select body of distinguished veterans into the greatest a "" force in the country. In April 1936 they claimed a membership of nearly million; and the rival fascist forces, the , the Solidarit? Fran?aise, as well as the Royal a ists of the Action Fran?aise (who, it must be said, had played far more active in the street of part rioting January-February 1934 than the Croix de Feu) had, in comparison, shrunk into insignificance. "French Fascism" came to mean the Croix de Feu. They denied being fascists, and their fascism was, indeed, of a as we in peculiar kind, shall see; but they had certainly become, two years, the greatest anti-democratic force in the country. The Croix de Feu did not run candidates in the General Elec

Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve, and extend access to Foreign Affairs ® www.jstor.org 1^2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS to an tion; they pretended be above such things. But they nounced far and wide that they would be the great "arbiters" of the election; and would, wherever possible, keep the Reds out by actively supporting the non-socialist and non-communist candi In even a date. certain cases, they said, they would support a was no "pink" against "red" if there other choice. In fact it was at was alleged the time (though this strongly denied by La Rocque himself) that in certain constituencies instructions had been given to the local Croix de Feu to support the com munists in the first ballot, with the result that he would be the only Left candidate in the second ballot, and in the expectation vote that many Radicals would, in the second ballot, for the Right candidate rather than for the communist. But even if this ma noeuvre was not resorted to, it did yield the desired result, any more than did any other of the Croix de Feu "arbitration" manoeuvres: for the communists, with 72 seats in the new Cham ber, instead of 10 in the old, were the great electoral winners. ac Curiously enough, wherever the Croix de Feu showed any at were not as a tivity all they regarded by anyone "super were party" but simply identified with the Right. During the election campaign I visited constituencies in various parts of France; and whenever I asked what election meetings were on, I was "A a almost invariably told: communist meeting, socialist and a Croix de Feu reaction meeting, meeting." Conservatives, Croix de come to mean same aries, Feu, had practically the thing. mean or Did it that the Right had gone fascist, that the Croix de an Feu had simply gone conservative? Actually, there was ele ment of truth in both. For, especially since December 6, 1935, the Croix de Feu were no what had once been. longer they ? The heroic days of the Croix de Feu were in 1934 between on the February riots and the fall of Doumergue November 8. It was then a romantic movement. After 6 February thousands of with the young men, sincerely disgusted Parliament, joined" Croix de Feu and its affiliated organizations in search of a better and cleaner" France. In January the Stavisky Affair had been to colossal in the magnified proportions press campaign? against the Chamber, and particularly against the Left for the Sta Affair was as an visky represented being eminently "Left" scandal. The of 6 were riots February largely organized by the leaders of various fascist and semi-fascist organizations, and with the men help of like Chiappe, the Paris police chief who had been FRENCH FASCISM 143 a dismissed by Daladier few days earlier. But these riots would not have been so effective had not thousands of young men, in censed by weeks of newspaper propaganda, and feeling genu inely revolted by the Chamber, joined in the riots. The primary as was object of this press campaign, supported it by "Big a Business," had been to bring National Government into power to men and disrupt the Left majority. The young who had their heads broken in the Place de la Concorde that had ? ? night " fought most of them spontaneously and thoughtlessly against the was out deputies"; and when the Daladier Government forced of was two a office by "the Street," but replaced days later by gov ernment over an man must presided by old of 72, many of them ? not have felt disappointed that they knew exactly what they would have preferred instead. But Colonel de La Rocque tried to console them. When the Daladier Government resigned he wired to the local Croix de on Feu committees: "First objective attained. Keep your guard." as And later he treated the Doumergue Government "a poultice on a ? a gangrenous leg" as temporary solution to be followed, a more came to before long, by better and complete solution. He as a be regarded by many the torchbearer of "better and cleaner as France." In his speeches in 1934 he treated politicians the as profiteers of the r?gime, and the socialists and communists the The Croix de Feu movement, he said, with its arch-enemy. ? ? spirit of the trenches l'esprit ancien combattant stood for disin terested service to France. The men who had risked their lives for France, he said, must at last have a say in the matter. La was not Rocque's "16 years of profiteering" unlike Hitler's "14 years of shame." He had no clear program, but said that there was no need for A was more than a any. mystique important pro a gram; and mystique he had undoubtedly created. And there were some men to young in the movement who scarcely hesitated call themselves openly fascists. Only the contempt that La Rocque professed for Doumergue in more than and when towards was, reality, apparent real; September 1934 Doumergue abandoned his grandfatherly airs a and launched campaign, full of senile rage, against the socialists to in and communists, proposing reform the Constitution by ac creasing enormously the powers of the Prime Minister (who, to the could henceforth dissolve the cording Doumergue plan, Chamber on his own initiative), competent observers began to 144 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

realize that there was a closer contact between the old Premier and the Croix de Feu than either would admit. The French con stitutional conflict of September-November 1934 has been largely misunderstood abroad, where there are still many who to believe that Doumergue "wished improve the French demo cratic and there were even some at system"; " English journalists the time who proclaimed Doumergue the last defender of French man a !" In reality, the old had by this time attained of and was dangerous degree megalomania working hand-in-glove with an innate anti-democrat like Tardieu (whose ideas had been in constitutional and with incorporated ? Doumergue's proposals),? the "Street" that is, the Fascist Leagues against the Chamber and the Senate, which was the first to rebel against him. a Doumergue felt in strong position. He believed that the deputies (whose memories of February 6, when the rioters nearly were broke into the Chamber, still fresh) would be too frightened of "the Street" to resist his demands. When Herriot and the a Radicals, whom the prospect of government crisis still made rather nervous, proposed compromise solutions, Doumergue on rejected them disdainfully. And when November 6, exasper to ated by his attitude, the Radicals threatened resign from the Government, one observed in the lobbies of the Chamber various unknown people who whispered ominously that if Doumergue were forced to resign there would be trouble, and that "our come ? fellows are simply itching to out" the "fellows" being the members of the Croix de Feu and of the other Fascist Leagues. some But after trepidation the Radicals called the bluff and a Doumergue resigned in great rage, saying that he had been out men war driven by the "who had shot down unarmed veter ans on February 6." A few hours later the Flandin Government was formed. was on It not until three days later, the night of Armistice that the Croix de Feu, the Jeunesses Patriotes and the Day, ? Solidarit? Fran?aise, held a demonstration not outside the Chamber, but outside M. Doumergue's house in the Avenue Foch. It was then that Colonel de La Rocque declared that "he a had for long time been in touch with M. Doumergue; and that to the Croix de Feu would continue keep in touch with him; for the day would come when he would save France for the secon4 time." FRENCH FASCISM 145 a The Left found the idea of moth-eaten politician like Dou mergue at the head of the fascist forces of France rather reassur on on ing. But, commenting the fascist demonstration Armistice a see night, M. Herriot told me, few days later: "You how right was to not to I have suspected Doumergue of the worst, and have was a surrendered to his demands. For it conspiracy against some men democracy." It is claimed by of the Croix de Feu that November 8, 1934, when Doumergue resigned, was the greatest ever opportunity La Rocque had missed. Bertrand de Maud'huy, on once one of La Rocque's henchmen,1 recently claimed that that on day the Croix de Feu could have marched the Chamber and seized power. I doubt it. Even moderate public opinion had be come rather tired of Doumergue, "the savior." It cared little for his constitutional reforms, and was more concerned about the economic crisis, which he had done nothing to remedy. A fascist not one coup that day would have received quarter of the popular support that had been given the riots of February 6, and in the probable absence of any support from the army and the police it would have failed. There would also have been an immediate were on reaction from the working class, who very much their guard during those days. Under the Flandin Government (November 1934-May 1935), a more normal democratic government, the Croix de Feu kept to extremely quiet. Their membership continued increase, and their semi-military organization, aided by donations from in was dustrial and banking magnates, improving; but the old fervor movement not had gone. The extremists in the could forgive La the he had and were Rocque opportunity missed, becoming was restive. In April there the first notable example of "direct action" when a number of them raided the socialist headquarters rue men were on in the Feydeau in Paris; several of the arrested the spot; and Colonel de La Rocque condemned and denounced them. His "uncomradelike" attitude on that occasion increased the discontent among the fascist extremists in the movement; and as it is about that time that several prominent members, such Bertrand de Maud'huy, resigned in disgust. were not out But the Croix de Feu played yet, and in June and July 1935, after the fall of the Flandin Government, their activity to were a increased again. La Rocque continued claim that they in to at position overthrow the Republic any time they chose. Thus, 1 Cf. "The French National Revival," by Bertrand de Maud'huy, Foreign Affairs, July 1934. 146 FOREIGN AFFAIRS over shortly after the double Cabinet crisis early in June (the throw, in one week, of the Flandin and Bouisson cabinets), which led to the formation of the Laval Government, La Rocque a claimed at memorable meeting at Algiers that "there would have been sport" if the President of the Republic had only dared to a to give cabinet post Daladier, the fusilleur of February 6. In other words, only governments and ministers tolerated by the Croix de Feu could take office in France. summer autumn of with The and 1935, the sympathetic Laval acute as Premier, marks the second phase of the "fascist of fensive" in France. The Croix de Feu by this time had about 600,000 members; their parade (with Laval's blessing) in the on was Champs Elys?es July 14, 1935, enormously impressive. an move It was something like apotheosis of the Croix de Feu was ment; and the west-end public that watched it in raptures. The Croix de Feu had money, both from donations and from the at membership fees which 30 francs per head provided the tidy sum of some 20 million At their at yearly francs. great rally motor Algiers, 30 aeroplanes took part in the display; and rallies a Croix de Feu exercise. on secret became regular Acting instruc tions, several thousand Croix de Feu men, travelling in private automobiles, would be mobilized from time to time and with at some on great swiftness specified point, usually the estate of some wealthy sympathizer. Laval was in close contact with the Croix de Feu leaders. To a once am on friend of mine he said: "I accused of being friendly are can terms with the fascists. But they the only people I fall back on, since the socialists and communists will have nothing more to do with me. But the Croix de Feu contain some very fine human material, and may become the backbone of an anti capitalist party." Whether he sincerely believed in their "anti capitalism" may be doubted; but, in any case, they suited his were and were effective in purpose. They pro-Italian conducting an were anti-sanctions campaign. The minor fascist leagues also useful. One night in October the Solidarit? Fran?aise (an organi a zation composed of few thousand young men, mostly ruffians) went so far as to call an anti-British demonstration in the Place to de l'Op?ra; and the British Embassy that night had be guarded by gardes mobiles. But the "lightning mobilizations" of the Croix de Feu were to beginning alarm the Left very seriously. Especially in Sep FRENCH FASCISM 147

tember and October the uvre, the Populaire and the Humanit? a published many hair-raising stories about Croix de Feu "plan of action," involving the occupation and "neutralization" of the an on "red" suburbs of Paris and eventual March the city. It was even ? ? explained complete with addresses how the fascist on eve troops would be concentrated the of the Great Day in on hundreds of private villas the outskirts of the Bois de Bou was cases logne. It under the impression of such stories (in many deliberately exaggerated and over-dramatized) that the Radical at Congress met in Paris the end of October. Pressed hard by a Herriot and his other Radical ministers, Laval had, few days a previously, given the Radicals sop in the form of three "anti a fascist" decrees of somewhat platonic character (preliminary declaration of any meetings in public places, etc.). The Radicals were not satisfied, and insisted upon the discussion of more measures met at stringent immediately the Chamber the end of November. In the interval, on November 16, there was the at a famous shooting affray Limoges, when crowd of workers who a were demonstrating outside hall where the Croix de Feu had were on 20 men were gathered fired by the latter. About wounded. The was not done without but it firing perhaps provocation;" " an provided the Left with argument against the armed Leagues met. course a when the Chamber In the of three-day debate Laval was accused of complicity with the fascists, and Paganon, his Radical Minister of the Interior, of incomprehensible leniency. "Either you change your methods," M. Guernut, the Radical we deputy, exclaimed, "or shall change the Government." And then, on the last of the debate, an ? day extraordinary thing happened the famous "National Reconciliation Scene" on of December 6. Speaking in the morning debate behalf of the M. Croix de Feu, Ybarn?garay appealed for national unity. The proposed dissolution of the Leagues, he said, would be in us us effective and dangerous. "Let keep the Leagues, but let are disarm. If all the Leagues and all individuals disarmed, the a problem will be solved." M. Ybarn?garay then proposed law in arms terms of which anyone found guilty of carrying in the street to one to would be liable from year's three years' imprisonment. M. Blum, the Socialist leader, then rose. "This discussion," he some said, "may yield welcome results. Only, inmy opinion, the question of individual weapons is of secondary importance; for can to me weapons always be found. The essential thing is the i48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

existence of formations which, by their organization, their disci are pline, and their method of recruitment, military in character. no Although there is close analogy between the Croix de Feu we and the small groups of self-defense which have organized am in the Socialist Party since February 6, I willing to say to are to M. Ybarn?garay: 'We prepared destroy and dissolve these to same formations. Are you prepared do the with your military formations?'" Mr. Thorez, speaking for the Communists, said as as that he identified himself with M. Blum's proposal far the communist formations were concerned. M. Blum semi-military a continued: "All this discussion may have salutary effect. to we are to Again I say you, M. Ybarn?garay, that prepared as our are so as our disarm in so far comrades armed. In far organ are we are to izations military in character prepared dissolve them. Are to do the same?" There was a moment you prepared so as our of tense silence. Then M. Ybarn?garay replied: "In far are I Yes." organizations para-military, say: This "national reconciliation" scene, though not quite spon taneous (M. Laval and M. Ybarn?garay had prepared much of it an enormous in advance), created impression in Paris. It seemed menace war that the of civil had been definitely averted. That night the Chamber passed the first of the anti-fascist bills giving the Government the right to dissolve by decree any organization a or of military semi-military character; any organization guilty or or of holding armed forbidden meetings in any public private and liable to be a menace to the terri places; any organization or to torial integrity of the country the republican r?gime. The a original government bill provided for complicated juridical text dissolution procedure; the amended by the Chamber gave the Government itself the powers of dissolution. The "reconciliation scene" wrought havoc among the Fascist were several from the Leagues. There spectacular resignations Croix de Feu, and Colonel de La Rocque and M. Ybarn?garay were savagely attacked by the smaller Leagues, whom the Croix so de Feu had succeeded well in eclipsing. M. Taittinger, the leader of the Jeunesses Patriotes, treated La Rocque as a traitor, much to the despair of M. de Kerillis, the head of the principal Right-wing propaganda organization, whose chief complaint had a always been the absence of solid Right-wing "front." Actually, if the Croix de Feu lost many sympathizers among the extremist on new elements December 6, 1935, they gained many sympa FRENCH FASCISM 149

thizers among moderate conservative elements. More than before, to the Croix de Feu promised become the backbone of all the conservative forces in France. Its vaguely fascist ideology had two already made much progress in the previous years among all the anti-Front anti-socialist, anti-communist, and, latterly, Populaire forces of the country. As for the smaller Leagues, not as as they did profit much from La Rocque's "treachery" was they had hoped. Little heard of them during the subsequent months. to The bill giving the Government authority dissolve the Leagues, and the bills prohibiting the carrying of arms and im to posing penalties for the incitement murder in the press (a measure directed chiefly against the paper of the Solidarit? were Fran?aise and against the Action Fran?aise) passed at by the Senate the end of December. The Right did not take the not bills unduly seriously, and did think that they would be strictly applied. On February 14, 1936, L?on Blum, the Socialist leader, driving together with M. Monnet (the present Minister of Agriculture) was and Mme. Monnet down the Boulevard St. Germain, stopped a by crowd of who had gathered there for the funeral of was , the Royalist historian. Blum dragged out car of the and savagely beaten, and would probably have to a been battered death but for the timely intervention of number of workmen. He suffered from severe loss of blood and was ill for several weeks. That night the Sarraut Government dissolved the and other Royalist organizations, was and action taken against , the editor of the Action for incitement to murder. The of Fran?aise, premises the Camelots du Roi and of the Royalist paper were raided and searched by the police. But except for their paper, which was not forbidden, and which has scarcely diminished in violence, nothing has lately been heard of the Camelots du Roi. No fleur-de-lis worn badges are in the streets any longer. Their dissolution seems to have been sufficiently effective. As for the Croix de Feu, they became respectable after Decem a ber 6. At few meetings he held in the earlier part of 1936 La no of Instead he said that the rich Rocque longer spoke "sport." was harvest of ideas which the Croix de Feu had sown rising lux uriously throughout France. "Our ideas will be in power." was Bertrand de Maud'huy remarked that it poor consolation for ISO FOREIGNAFFAIRS to a to ? fellows who wanted play part know that "their ideas" not ? in and they would be power. I referred earlier in this article to the fiasco of the Croix de Feu "arbitration" in the General Election. What has happened since? During the great strike epidemic of May-June the Croix de Feu an r?le in the strikes, and played ambiguous ? encouraging ? also to set without much success a net they attempted up own work of trade unions of their in competition with the C.G.T. Then suddenly, towards the middle of June, the Blum Govern a ment issued dissolution decree against the Croix de Feu, the Solidarit?, the Jeunesses Patriotes, and the Francistes (an un I saw important anti-Semitic organization of "blueshirts"). on Colonel de La Rocque the night of the dissolution. "All great he "have to a of movements," said, pass through phase persecu our a tion. But movement, which corresponds to vital reflex of this cannot die." He none the embar country, was, less, visibly rassed. "If we had run candidates in the General Election," he said, "we would have got two million votes. But what was the to we good, with that second ballot falsify the result? Still, have we count as we see 38 deputies whom may ours; and shall what can they do." The 38 deputies have done nothing. on The Colonel is one of the most charming persons earth; and a one to a to be successful fascist leader perhaps ought be ruthless a sane thug with touch of insanity. La Rocque is and balanced a must and anything but thug. He hate the idea of bloodshed ? on among Frenchmen did he not hate it February 6, when the Croix de Feu failed (though they probably could have succeeded) to break into the Chamber from the back? And La ?perhaps also knew in his heart that at no moment not even Rocque ? could a succeed in at under Doumergue fascist coup France, rate not a any without plunging the country first into period of war. deadly civil men The Croix de Feu has, nominally, disappeared. But the who it still exist. Like the smaller Fascist the composed ? Leagues, Croix de Feu now calls itself a the Parti Social party Fran?ais. La Rocque and his faithful Ybarn?garay go round the country and tell the ex-Croix de Feu members that their time will yet cannot sure to come, that the Front Populaire rule forever and is come to at grief. And the end of the meetings they all sing the Marseillaise. And in the meantime La Rocque has called upon FRENCH FASCISM 151

to out his followers and sympathizers hang tricolor flags of their a windows as protest against the dissolution of the Leagues and against the Blum Government generally. on But July 14 the Front Populaire held its giant demonstra tion in the east of Paris, and in the west there was no "counter demonstration." Former Croix de Feu members dropped flowers on as on individually the Unknown Soldier's grave, and, the were a previous Sunday, there few fights with the police in the were Champs Elys?es, and caf? tables upset and soda syphons were thrown about. The number of Croix de Feu members has decreased; but nobody quite knows in what proportion. It is said about of that they have lost one-third their members and have not more a are much than half million left. But, above all, they disorganized and demoralized. are The adherents of the former fascist and semi-fascist leagues too aware only well that fascism has been well beaten all along the two a line. Many of them have, in the last months, developed sneaking admiration for the Blum Government, which, they some realize (and admit it openly) is the first government for to years be doing something. While the others have been talking, amateurs these people have been acting. As for the fascist of can want "dynamics" they find all the dynamics they among the not as Communists. And, for that matter, is the Front Populaire a of a whole, with its procession million people, sufficiently "dy namic?" Some, indeed, have gone over to the Communists. Others have not joined anything; and like those who still believe La are in Rocque, they waiting patiently in the hope that the on new Blum "experiment" will fail and that its ruins possibili ties will open up for some form of fascism. are But what of those who finally disillusioned in La Rocque, who are not to wait for the of but who prepared collapse' Blum, not want "dynamics," though "dynamics of the Front Popu laire An amount of ? in variety? ? extraordinary publicity my view, undeserved has lately been given to the founded by , the former Communist leader, and of St. It mayor Denis. is called the Parti Populaire Fran?ais. a man a Doriot, solidly built with strong chin, curly black hair a and tortoise-shell glasses, began as workman and became in the of the time parliamentary leader Communist Party. Then, in a on 1934, he put forward proposal for something the lines of the ? a Front Populaire coalition between the Communist, Socialist 152 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

and Radical elements of the country; for (said he) France being can only one-fifth proletarian, nothing be achieved without the was support of the petite bourgeoisie. He expelled from the Com as a soon munist Party heretic; though afterwards the Com never munists adopted the idea themselves. Doriot forgave them. In the Senate elections last autumn he joined forces with Laval; and during the discussion of the Franco-Soviet Pact last February he denounced his former comrades with extraordinary violence. Amid loud cheers from the Right of the Chamber, he accused them of taking money from and of wishing to drag a war France into against for the benefit of the , with a Bolshevik revolution in France as the ultimate to objective. The Left listened his harangue in contemptuous silence. About the same time he gave a number of interviews to a German papers in which he advocated French rapprochement was with Germany against . In the last election he returned a narrow for St. Denis, for years his stronghold, by only majority votes over of 500 his Communist competitor. new And then, at the end of June, Doriot founded his party. Its program, rather flimsy, is reminiscent of the so-called "pro gram" of the Croix de Feu. It denounces communism and inter as a enemies, and demands: reform of the republican state; the creation of stable government (a phrase reminiscent of Doumergue) ; the creation of Economic Assemblies representing all the economic forces of the nation; the detachment of Parlia the the the and ment, Government, judiciary, administration, the press from the influence of the financial oligarchy (which is to otherwise, presumably, remain intact) ;defense of the workers, artisans, peasants and middle class (whatever that means); stimulation of trade between France and her colonies (an autarch ist various reforms formula); concerning education, town-plan ning, etc., which would tend to make the French "a stronger a and healthier race"; and the resurrection of France capable of playing "her traditional r?le in fostering human progress, justice, peace and the friendship between nations." Such isM. Doriot's Rather thin. "program." But, unlike La Rocque, Doriot is tough and brutal and is not an handicapped by being aristocrat. He also suffers deeply from thwarted ambition. of the who Many people supported financially seem to and otherwise the Leagues and the Royalists be support now. on ing Doriot His paper, UEmancipation Nationale, is sold FRENCH FASCISM *S3 same as the boulevards and read by much the public the Royalist are Action Fran?aise. De luxe booklets published full of senti at mental pictures of Doriot in his "humble little home" St. Denis, of his two little daughters, of the sofa he sleeps on, and of his of bedroom The text is like pair slippers. provided? by people and the de Jouvenel of a the famous "pro-French" Hitler interview week before Hitler a man a denounced Locarno, young with passion for Hitlerite a at "dynamics," and great believer in Franco-German unity same the expense of Russia. Dominique, though older, is of the a man a mettle. Though nominally of the Left, he is great admirer was of Mussolinian "dynamics," and violently pro-Italian and anti-British during the Abyssinian conflict. Bertrand de Maud' a huy has also joined the group. So Doriot has few "progressive" to extreme are fascist intellectuals help him. On the other his at an asso supporters Marseilles, altogether disreputable gang ciated with the shadiest possible side of the "Tammany Hall" are not politics of that great city. These people without consid erable local influence. Meanwhile Doriot's old friend Laval is asso watching his movement closely; and, if it succeeds, he may not a ciate himself with it openly. But he is sure yet whether it is horse worth backing. an For the present, however, the Doriot coterie is hardly im a one. not seem to pressive one, still less coherent It does likely a attract very large number of the respectable middle-class youths of the Croix de Feu movement, still less the proletarian or elements of St. Denis of anywhere else. Even if (as Doriot a hopes) there is breakdown of the Front Populaire, it is still difficult to imagine the French working class flocking into the arms a of the "traitor." Above all, there is widespread suspicion that Doriot is not "genuine." Now he denounces the Communists a for being in the pay of Moscow. But for ten years he was leading Communist himself and thought it all right to take money from an Moscow. If he "saw the light," he took extraordinarily long time to see it, and not until his fief of St. Denis was in danger of being captured by the Communists. Nevertheless, Doriot is being a supported by large part of the Right press, who have forgiven treat as a tomor him all his past sins and him possible "man of row." What his membership is is still uncertain: the highest seen figure I have is that of 50,000 given by Doriot himself in the Emancipation of August 1, which is not enormous. As already 154 FOREIGN AFFAIRS over even a said, it is doubtful whether he will win large propor tion of the Croix de Feu; for there is too much about Doriot that must go against their grain. The Doriot is above a of the Party all, perhaps, symptom present bewilderment among the forces of the Right in search of new not guidance. On the Left, where Doriot is taken very his with La is, if wel seriously,? competition Rocque anything, comed for it means that the fascist elements, instead of ? are If Doriot builds in Paris as he uniting, being split up. up ? an of perhaps may illegal army desperadoes, rather after the model of the Marseilles gangs of his friend Sabiani (but on a larger scale), he may become of some nuisance value; but he will ever a leader to scarcely become great popular unless he is pushed some new the front by entirely international situation in which his greatly advertised pro-Germanism and anti-Sovietism might be of use. a occur a Such situation might in the event of "fascist encircle a ment" of France resulting from fascist victory in Spain. The a feeling might then gain ground that normal democratic govern ment was no to to longer competent "stand up" the fascist neighbors of France, and that France could regain diplomatic equality only under some form of authoritarian government, with no to to League principles bother it. The encouragement given ? a the Spanish rebels by the French press of the Right violent campaign reminiscent of its pro-Mussolini campaign last year ? a has been symptom of this tendency. Fascism in France may also have another chance if the Front Populaire collapses, and if parliamentary government collapses with it. But just at present it is lost and bewildered.