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WAR DEPARTMEiNT

SPECIAL BULLETIN

NO. 3 6

THE BATTLE OF SALUM

JUNE 15-17, 194

."t\ JOHNSTON • e i - a strg "yMopai

PREPARED BY THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, D. C.

is - I'M I' »' WAR DEPARTMENT

SPECIAL BULLETIN No. 36

ERRATA: On pt 7 delete footnote "*This gun. t,per minute." and sub­ stitute """The Breda gun mentioned here is a dual purpose 20-mm. antiaircraft and antitank machine gun which is gas operated and fed "by plates of 12 rounds each. Its muzzle velocity is 2756 feet per second; its rate of fire 220 rounds per minute; and its maximum range approximately 6000 yards."

On Map No. 4 for "Scale 1:146,000" substitute "Scale 1:146,100."

NOTICE

The information contained in this series of bulletins will be restricted to items from official sources which are reasonably confirmed. The lessons necessarily are tentative and in no sense mature studies. This document is being given an approved distribution, and no additional copies are available in the Military Intelligence Division. For provi­ sions governing its reproduction see Letter TAG- 350.05 (9-19-40) M-B-M.

Prepared by the Military Intelligence Division War Department Washington, D. C., November 17, 1941 WAR DEPARTMENT

SPECIAL BULLETIN No. 36

THE BATTLE OP SALUM, JUNE 15-17, 1941

NOTICE

The information contained in this series of bulletins will "be restricted to items from official sources which are reasonably confirmed. The lessons necessarily are tentative and in no sense mature studies. This document is being given an approved distribution, and no additional copies are available in the Military Intelligence Division. For provi­ sions governing its reproduction see Letter TAG 350.05 (9-19-40) M-B-M.

Prepared by the Military Intelligence Division War Department Washington, D. C., November 17, 1941 FOREWORD

This Special Bulletin is based on material contained in a number of reports "by American official observers in Cairo. These reports, written in July, August, and September, 1941, present a comparatively full account of operations in North Africa, with particular emphasis on the Battle of Salum. In addition, supple­ mentary information has been secured by personal interviews with observers returning from l\Torth Africa. Explanatory notes are based on material available in the Military Intelligence Division.

The account of the disposition and movements of British forces is reasonably complete., but adequate information on Axis forces is lacking. It has been impossible, therefore, to indicate more than a few movements of German and Italian units, and the Ger­ man and Italian troops referre.d to in the text and on the map must not be interpreted as comprising the complete Axis forces actually engaged.

This bulletin may be utilized for training lectures pro­ vided attendance at the lectures is confined to members of the Armed Forces of the United States and that the confidential nature of the material is emphasized. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section

FOREWORD '

INTRODUCTION—THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND ' ' 1-' ' • SEPTEMBER 19,39-JUNE 1941

2. TERRAIN .

3. TACTICAL BACKGROUND

4> ORDER OF BATTLE

5- PLANS AND PRELIMINARY MOVES OF THE BRITISH

6. OPERATIONS, JUNE 15-17

7- LESSONS AND COMMENTS APPENDIX A. AXIS FORCES IN THE TOBRUK AREA

APPENDIX B. ARTILLERY RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE 7TH ARMORED DIVISION

APPENDIX C. MEDICAL SERVICES OF THE 7TH ARMORED DIVISION

APPENDIX D. SUPPLY OF.THE 7TH ARMORED DIVISION

APPENDIX E. MAINTENANCE AND RECOVERY OF VEHICLES

APPENDIX IF. LEAGUERING LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS

i 'V. \\' ^

Facing Page

Figure 1. Outpost Lines and Reconnaissance Patrols Prior to June 15 6 Figure 2. Shallow Depression among Sand Danes of the Coastal Plain 1 7 ' Figure 3. Area around Salum 8 Figure 4. British Armored Car Equipped with Captured Italian Sreda Gun 9 Figure 5. British Units in Assembly Areas 10 Figure 6. Formation for Movement of Escarpment Force 16 ' Figure 7. The. Escarpment . . 18 Figure 8. German Armored Detachment near Salum 20 Figure 9. British Infantry Tanks Crossing the Desert 22 Figure 10. British Light Tanks on Patrol Crossing Rocky Terrain 24 Figure 11. German Mk.Ill and Mk.IV Tanks 26 . Figure 12. British A-13 Cruiser Tank Showing Dust Raised on Desert Terrain 27 APPENDIX C Figure 1. Schematic Disposition of Medical Units of the 7th Armored Division 1 APPENDIX E Figure 1. British Light Repair Section at Work on the Desert ' 1 APPENDIX F , Figure 1. Formation of theClose Leaguer 1

Map No. 1. General.Map of the Middle Eas t . Map No. 2. General Map of Battlefield Map No. 3. June 14-Noon June 15 Map No. 4. Noon June .15-Midnight June 15 Map No. 5. June 16 Map No. 6. June 17 . . THE BATTLE OF SALUM JUNE 15-JUNE 17. 1941

1. INTRODUCTION--TflE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND - SEPTEMBER 1939-JURE 1941 (Map-No. l)

In the desert warfare of North Africa, Tobruk stands as a fixed landmark in the ebb and flow of the fortunes of the British Middle East Command. Since April 14, 1941, this fortified seacoast town has "been dependent upon a precarious'supply line through the contested Mediterranean. Axis forces have stood at Salum, across the path of British forces, preventing the relief of Tobruk's garri­ son.

The Battle of Salum marks the strongest British effort thus far made to relieve Tobruk. From a strategic point of view, the Battle of Salum is in itself not the most important battle of the North African campaign, but the details of the action are highly in­ structive in that, at the time, the battle marked one of the greatest tank-versus-tank actions in modern warfare. Furthermore, more au­ thentic details are available on this action than on any other single action in the North African campaign.' A. summary of events in the general area, therefore, from early fall 1939 to June 1941. is neces­ sary to place the Battle of Salum in proper perspective. .

In September 1939 General Wavell's Middle East. Command—•which included Egypt, the Sudan, Kenya, British Somaliland,. Palestine, Cyprus., and Trans Jordan-—consisted of 30,000 British and colonial troops stationed in Egypt, Palestine, and Transjordan. By June-10, 1940, when. Italy entered the war, reinforcements from India, Australia, South Africa, and Canada had raised the figure to 100,000 men trained and hardened for desert warfare.

When Egypt became a theater of operations, France's collapse had destroyed all joint allied plans to protect the Eastern Mediter­ ranean. Even the French Army in Syria could not be relied upon to resist Axis, penetration there.

In Libya, Marshal Graziani commanded an Italian Army of about 290,000 men, and, relieved of'the menace:of a French advance from Tunisia on his rear, he could now concentrate its full force against the frontiers of Egypt.

In Italian East Africa, which included Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, ahd Ethiopia, .the Duke of Aosta threatened Kenya, Sudan, and. British Somaliland with a force estimated""at 240,000 white and native troops. Marshal Graziani f s Army, however, was considered the real threat to Egypt, for his aggressive tendencies suggested that an invasion of that country would quickly follow the Italian entrance into the war.

On August 6, 1940, three Italian columns invaded British Somaliland. Since the defense of this area. had. been dependent upon support "by French Somaliland forces, the blow could not; "be parried. After a brief delaying action, the small Somaliland Camel Corps—500 British and 500 native troops--was withdrawn by sea to Aden, and Fascist forces entered Berbera on August 19.

On September 14 Marshal Graziani1s Libyan Army left its bases in and around Bardia and swept past Salum into Egypt. By September 16 light tanks and armorpd cars, supported by aviation, had raced on through Buq Buq to Sidi Barrani, where the Italian forces stopped until December 194-0 to intrench, dig necessary wells, and perfect communications.

Meanwhile, on November 11 Admiral Cunningham1s torpedo- bombers crippled the Italian Fleet at Taranto and cut Marshal Graziani1s sea communications. Timely reinforcements gave desert air superiority to the British and enabled them to put into action an armored division under General Creagh. Despite the fact that his troops were far inferior in number to the Italians concentrated near Sidi Barrani and those in support around Salum, General Wavell planned a surprise attack, under the field command of General O'Connor,

Expecting a conventional frontal attack along the coastline, on Sidi Barrani., Marshal Graziani awoke on December 9 to a major flanking attack from a point southwest of Mersa Matruhy. preceded at dawn by an air attack and a naval bombardment. Two days later Sidi Barrani surrendered and the British took 40,000 prisoners and much military booty.

Light British losses and the weak resistance of the enemy justified a further advance, and General Wavell,. with, command of .the air:, threw his; small striking forge against the retreating Fascists in an effort to destroy the whole Italian Army in Cyrenaica. There followed a series :of swift enveloping actions like the one that re­ sulted in the capture of Sidi Barrani.

Salum, 60 miles west of Sidi Barrani* was captured on December 14. Bardia surrendered on January 6, 1941; Tobruk^ on January 22; Derna, on January 30; Bengasi, on February 7, Finally the. British seized El Agheila on February 10 and halted. By that time General Graziani1s Army had been annihilated and the British

\nrTM. ,\vHyN \WpU o \ A \* V\Ulf I U l'iv had taken approximately 100,000 prisoners.Vv>

On January 10, however, a British convoy passing through the Straits of Pantelleria under protection of cruisers and the aircraft carrier Illustrious had been attacked "by dive-bombers. The cruiser Southampton and the destroyer Gallant were sunk, and the Illustrious was severely damaged* This was to change the complexion of the Libyan campaign. The British Navy lost control of the central Medi­ terranean to Axis air power and German mechanized equipment was shipped to TripoliA In February and March-1941 a mechanized force under General Rommel, the German tank commander Who was one of those mainly responsible for the quick breakthrough at Sedan, was concentrated west of Bengasi, and Luftwaffe squadrons appeared on the Libyan front. The Germans quickly gained superiority in both mecha­ nized and air strength, and British advanced positions were threatened

In the meantime the British were preparing to aid Greece against the impending Nazi invasion and were carrying out the con­ quest of Italian Somaliland, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. In February 1941—when the British Libyan drive had reached its crest at Bengasi— the Italian East African troops were attacked from four directions by a small British force dependent for air support upon the limited South African Air Force,

One British column advanced fromMoyale, in Kenya, to Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, by way of Mega and Neghelli. Another pushed from Kenya into Italian Somaliland, crushed the main Italian resistance at Mogadiscio., and then swung up to Addis Ababa through Gabudarre and Jigjiga, one part first splitting off to assist a British force which had landed at ..Berbera on March 19 to reconquer British Somali­ land.

Meanwhile a third British column moved from the Sudan to Addis Ababa through Burye and Debra Markos, and attacked the Italian garrison at Dessye. The fourth column, operating from Kassala, in­ vaded Eritrea and captured Agordat on February 2 and Gheren on March 28. It then divided, one half pushing through Massua to Asab, the other swinging south to hem in the Duke of Aosta at Amba Alagio. There with the Italian surrender on May 19, Italian East African empire collapsed.

While the British were occupied in North Africa, the Germans Were on their way to rescue the Italian Army in Albania. From late fall 1940 to early spring 1941 Nazi penetration of the Danubian and Balkan countries continued. Hungary, Rumania, and finally Bulgaria submitted, and the Germans drove toward Greece. Jugoslavia unex­ pectedly resisted Nazi domination, and this development coupled with prior political commitments, crystallized British determination to send an expeditionary force to Greece. Greek and Jugoslav resistance would thereby "be stiffened and Turkey encouraged, and though victory was not expected, a prolonged struggle was anticipated.

British Libyan forces were thus weakened "by the withdrawal of troops and equipment for Greece, Therefore, when General Rommel's German forces on the Libyan front struck at El Agheila on March 25, the small, ill-equipped British troops were forced to retreat. Meet­ ing but slight resistance, the Germans took Bengasi on April 4, and then, pushing rapidly eastward, passed south of the British garrison at Tobruk, and entered Salum, in Egypt, on April 14.

Meanwhile, on April 6 the German attack on; Greece shattered hopes of any lengthy resistance there. A swift German advance, paced by air and armored strength, cut the Jugoslav Army to pieces, expos­ ing the British and Greek left flank and forcing them to retreat. The Greek armies in Albania were isolated and compelled to surrender on April 23. Only their own heroic stand under savage air bombing at Thermopylae enabled the British to evacuate the main part of their troops by the end of April; but the 45,000 who were withdrawn had to abandon most of their heavy equipment, and they had little more than their small arms when they reached Crete and Egypt.

At this time General Wavell had to face a Nazi-inspired re­ bellion in Iraq which threatened Palestine and the Suez. Dangers inherent in the Arab Middle East situation and the distances involved made the problem of suppressing the revolt particularly difficult. Tanks and armored cars, ho\fever, were speedily transported "to Basra and were able to occupy Bagdad on May 31, and end the revolt,, but not beforei; defeat had befallen the British forces in Crete.

On the morning of May 18 Crete had become the scene of one of the strangest battles in history. The dust and smoke of a savage two-day dive-bombing attack had scarcely settled when, on the 20th, scores of glider-borne fighting units, each complete in itself, de­ scended upon the island to cover the thousands of parachutists who followed. Rapid reinforcement from the air in the form of men, equipment, and supplies was so perfect that Greek and British in­ fantry were gradually pushed back from the airports and Suda Bay. The few British planes stationed over the island were withdrawn al­ most as s.oon. as the fighting began, and the British" "Favy, after suffering its loss limit, was forced to withdraw a few days afterwards Since British air or land reinforcements were out of the question, the relentless German attack, pursued at all cost, forced the evacuation of the British forces on May 30. The British lost heavy equipment, but 15,000 men reached Egypt on June 1.

By its victory, German air power had gained valuable bases from which to harass British shipping.in the Mediterranean, to. make further raids on the Sorth African positions and Suez, and to pro-. tect Italian seaports.and the sea lanes to the Black Sea.

With signs pointing to a Hazi penetration of Syria, a small British and Free French: force under General Wilson moved into Syria on June 8. Peaceful penetration was the objcct, hut fighting soon broke out and the poorly equipped British and Free French forces moved.slowly, not capturing Damascus until June 21, just "before the startling announcement of the Russian invasion.

Accordingly, June 1941 saw a widely separated Middle East Command whose crippled units were spread over Syria, Egypt, the Somalilands, Kenya, and the Sudan. But Tobruk's need Was pressing; morale in the isolated city was weakening and political pressure from outside was growing. The-Axis attitude of passive defense: and.re­ ports of substantial withdrawals of German air strength from the Middle Siast furnished the deciding factor. On June 15 the British made a hold attempt to destroy Axis, frontier forces, capture: Salum, and relieve Tobruk.

2. T3SBAIN (Map lo. 2)

..- The general area of approach to Salum from the east divides into an arid triangular coastal plain with its apex at Salum,on the west,, and a flat waterless plateau extending,to. the South, and west. Separating the coastal plain and the plateau is a precipitous rocky wall known as the Escarpment, from 250 to 500 feet high, which ef- , fectively canalizes military operations. Wadies, or dried*-up stream beds, run dowis the; Escarpment to the east, providing fairly good cover for fobt troop's a^d artillery. Ascent of the; Escarpment is .extremely difficult except ;by mean.s of the larger wadies, which,, as in the case of Half ay a and the' Halfway House, sometimes become fairly negotiable passes. The Escarpment runs out into the plain 52 miles southeast Of Salum. : There are four passes, of military value in this distance: . Salum,. Halfaya,, Half\iray .House, and Sofafi, which is 33 miles south— east of Salum.

Both above and below the Escarpment 'the coxintry is a flat treeless expanse; so-called ridges are often a mile wide and only a very few feet high. The surface of the desert, consists principally of bare, hardv,soil littered with limestone shingle.. There are numerous large but extremely•-shallow, saucer-like depressions, or . ghots,11 in which drifting sand collects around bunch-grass and waist~high shrubs that are similar to mesquite. On the whole, how­ ever, the ground i.s-hard and well-s\iited to armored, or motorized travel. -• • • • • films WW

MSDITEEMHEAN /s 5 0 10 ' salum ±111 Miles

Halfaya^j,__ S Pass C

Bir Huh • P / M • Battuma/ -p, I / % N Sidi Omar ——C German ; / Alain el Arad K &erm / ^ > Bir \ an , # Sheferzen Qaret abu Sayid

11th Hussars—Reconnaissance . o o o Mobile Columns of Support Group

El Rabta Cairn o Port Maddalena 12 miles

Figure 1. Outpost Lines and Reconnaissance Patrols Pri>ri or Jb6 q* JimeSl5'^ y ft $I- 0 W. iiliMlit ! V'j

Terrain features shown on maps are mostly stone cairns, unused Ara"b wells, graves, and ruins. Movement of vehicles is almost ex­ clusively by compass and mechanical distance-measuring devices. The l/l00,000 map*, which is considered accurate, is used.

Visibility is limited principally by haze, mirage, and frequent dust storms, which often rise to a height of 6000 or 8000 feet, ef­ fectively preventing flyers from seeing or identifying objects on.the ground. Visibility of ground troops is also limited by these dust clouds. The air becomes very moist at night, and when the sun strikes it in the morning, the moisture condenses to form a mist.

' The average temperature above the Escarpment during June varies /from about 90° to 95° in mid-afternoon and from 45° to 50° at night. I Troops enjoy above-average health in the desert.

3. TACTICAL BACKGROUND

For some weeks the British outpost line, Batturna—Alam el Arad— Qaret Abu Sayid—Bir Sheferzen—Fort Maddalena (see fig. l), had been patrolled by the 11th Hussars with four squadrons** of armored cars,

*This 1/100,000 map is the basis for Maps Itfos. 2-6.

**British designations are used throughout this bulletin, but the reader should remember that, with few exceptions, they do not corre­ spond to similarly designated U.S. units. The following table lists the British designations used in this bulletin together with their approximate U.S. equivalents.

British U.S.

Artillery troop (4 or 6 guns) Artillery battery Artillery battery (2 troops) Artillery battalion Artillery regiment (2 batteries) Artillery regiment of armored brigade Armored (tank) troop (3 tanks) ^ Armored platoon Armored (tank) squadron (4 troops |V Armored company

plus headquarters, 16 tanks) si- Armored (tank) regiment (2 or 3 X\\ Armored battalion squadrons present) % Armored (tank) brigade (2 or 3 ^ Armored regiment regiments present) Infantry battalion (4 rifle Infantry battalion companies) Infantry brigade (3 battalions) Infantry regiment

(\En the British Army there is no tactical organization with the Figure 2. Shallow Depression among Sand Dunes of the Coastal Plain. many of which mounted captured Italian Breda guns*. This line was prolonged in a northeasterly direction from the Escarpment to the sea "by a troop of three armored cars and a squadron of light tanks. The German outpost formed a roughly parallel line extending through Bir Huh to Sidi Omar.

German reconnaissance patrols usually consisted of a group of several armored cars, such as the 8~wheelers, which day after day often followed the same route, similar to that shown in figure 1. Al­ though the shallow depressions and scrub afforded little concealment at short range, the undulations in the desert were often sufficient to screen vehicles at a distance. Occasionally the German patrols would include several tanks in addition to armored cars and would attempt to pierce the British outpost line for the purpose of getting more de­ tailed information on activity in the British rear. On the whole, German patrols were moro active than the British, since the British, limited "by lack of armament, were forced to confine most of their activity to observation. At times, if the German patrols followed the same route too often, the British would concentrate artillery at a point along the German route and would open fire on the column. Generally, however, there was no major activity on the outpost lines.

The British reconnaissance unit, the 11th Hussars of the 7th Armored Division, maintained the line of observation mentioned above and was supported by four Mobile Columns that were disposed in depth with three in front and one in rear, as shown in figure 1.

The barbed wire barricade constructed by the Italians along the Egyptian—-Libyan boundary no longer constituted an obstacle, for numerous gaps had been cut during operations of the preceding 8 months. Prior to the action, strong defensive works were known to protect the Halfaya area (see Map No. 2); lesser works, to exist at Musaid, Wadi Agrab, Fort Capuzzo, Salum, and the area B.P. 38**—Pt. 206. German forces intermittently occupied an old Italian stone fort at Pt. 207. Enemy activity had als© been frequently observed around Bir Vair and in the Bir Hafid Ridge area.

At this time the Desert Force of the British consisted of units

- official designation of an infantry regiment; the title is used only for certain administrative purposes.) -t£>**** Z6w,^ hA "7H fo 6\ *Thi-s gun is believed to be the air-cooled machine gun, which has a rate of fire of 46CT rounds per minute. UO '"**B.P. 38, 39, etc., indicate numbered beacon points along the wire fence between Libya and Egypt.

- 7 -

k

disposed as follows*:

11th Indian Infantry Brigade—on tl^ill^uq Buq—Alam • Samalus;

11th Hussars—reconnaissance, as indicated above;

Mobile Columns -of the Support Group of the 7th Armored Division—supporting 11th Hussars, as indicated above;

4th Indian Division, less one infantry brigade—Sidi Barrani area;

7th Armored Division, less Support Group and 4th Armored A Brigade—El Alam Yfael Qabr area;

4th Armored Brigade—near Alam el Rabia and to the south.

During the period of the concentration for the attack on Salum the mission of the Mobile Columns was to delay and harass. These columns carried 200 rounds per gun for 25-pounders**, motor vehicle fuel for 300 miles, and rations and water for 6 days.

4. ORDER 01* BATTLE

a. British Order of Battle

(l) Escarpment Force

Headquarters Group, 4th Indian Division; Armored Group, composed of

One squadron of the 3d Hussars (light tanks) 4th Armored Brigade", consisting of

*See fig. 3.

**The 25-pounder, approximately an 88-mm. (3.43 in.) gun, is the standard field gun of the British forces,

^It should be noted that there are three units whose designations in­ clude the number 4 and three the number 7, as follows;

4th Indian Division 7th Armored Division 4th Armored Brigade 7th Armored Brigade 4th Royal Tank Regiment 7th Royal Tank Regiment

In references to operations, an effort has been made to designate the Figure 4. British Armored Car Equipped with Captured Italian Breda Gun. Note the protection of tires with rocks. 4th Royal Tank Regiment*, less "C" Squad­ ron (infantry tanks**), 7th Royal Tank Regiment (infantry tanks),

One company of motorized infantry, One "battery of the 31st Field Regiment (twelve 25-pounders), Small units, including one company of engineers;

Halfa.ya Group, composed of

"C" squadron of the 4th R.T.R., 2d Camerons (infantry "battalion),

Artillery Group, composed of

One "battery of the 31st Field Regiment (twelve 25~pounders), 8th Field Regiment (sixteen 25-pounders), 212th Medium Battery (eight 6-in. howitzers), 4th Light Antiaircraft Battery (12 Bofors antiaircraft guns^"), One "ba/ttery of the 65th Antitank Regiment (twelve 2-pounder antitank guns";, Division ammunition company;

Guards Brigade Group, composed of actual combat unit rather than the higher organization. For example, "7th Armored Brigade" rather than "7th Armored Division" has been used where only the "brigade and its attached units took part.

*For convenience, Royal Tank Regiment will hereafter "be abbreviated R» T.R.

**These were Mk.II infantry tanks with the following characteristics: weight, 28 tons; crew, four; armor base, 2.75 in.; armament, one .303 machine gun, one 40-mm. gun. References to "infantry tanks" in the text do not imply that there were other tanks in the 4th and 7th R.T.R* "Infantry tanks" will be used simply as a reminder that these tanks were not cruiser tanks.

Bofors antiaircraft gun is a 40~mm. (1.58 in.) gun with a muzzle velocity of 2800 foot-seconds and a rate of fire of 120 rounds per minute.

^The 2~pounder is a 40~mm. (1.58 in.) gun. • , S( (\jV\V \^\^D\\\t -K

.> Salum -K*B.P. 38

Coastal Force Pt 206 Hal fay a •f, 11(-1 Bn)

Qaret Abu + jy» Paris Gds Brig Gp Battu /•"v -\(SiGds Mtztz [^l]<1-^65 AT(-1 Btry) Armd < Gp

<3 9(-l Sec) Ol 4{-l Sq) 3 Huss

Hq G-p Bir el CD 31 Regt L Khirei- Half ay a- Gp Operated with gat 3 21/4\| 1 . — * Half ay a Gp C 0> 4 2 Cam \ / AM June 15 L_ ]102 AT Arty G 212 M/ 7th Armd. Brig Gp --E5jh 31 Regt/ 65 AT Regt.

^ Mobile Column

11 Huss Ren

Figure 5. British Forces in Assembly Areas at Bir el Khireigat, Battuma, Qarei; Abu Far is., and. on the Coastal Plain. Note that British designations are used. s OHM ' M H !t;\" Xr^\:WU

22d Guards Brigade (motorized infantry*), 65th Antitank Regiment, less one battery and one troop (32 guns), 9th Australian Light Antiaircraft Battery, less one section (8 Bofors guns), Small units.

(2) Coastal Force

11th Indian Infantry Brigade, less 2d Camerons and one antitank platoon; Two troops of "A" Squadron of the 4th R.T.R. (6 tanks); 25th Field Regiment (sixteen 25-pounder guns); Medium Artillery Battery of the 27th Regiment (eight 6-in. howitzers); One antitajak company of 7th Indian 3rigade; Small units.

(3) Rear Headquarters of 4th Indian Division—located at Sidi Bar rani.

(4) Combat Trains of 4th Indian Division—located at the Halfway House (see Map Mo. 2).

(5) 7th Armored Division

Headquarters group,.composed of

2d Battery of 1st Light Antiaircraft Regiment (12 antiaircraft guns), 102d Antitank Battery (12 guns), Detachment of engineers, Divisional service units;

7th Armored Brigade, composed of

2d R.T.R. (cruiser tanks**), ,6th R.T»R. (cruiser tanks), 1 Mobile Column of the Support Group (see next paragraph for composition of this column), 11th Hussars (reconnaissance "battalion);

*3ecause of considerations of space, units of the Guards Brigade will be shown on maps simply as infantry rather than as motorized infantry

**The following table gives approximate details of the four types of cruiser tanks used by the 7th Armored Brigade: Support Group of 7th Armored. Division, composed of

Headquarters, 3 Mobile Columns (4th Mobile Column with 7th |Armored Brigade), each consisting of

1 company of infantry, 1 artillery troop (six 25-povmder field guns), 1 light antiaircraft section (two 40-mm. Bofors antiaircraft guns), 1 antitank troop (four 3-pounder antitank guns), Detachment of engineers.

Sear Headquarters, 7th Armored Division (service units under command of Division Supply and Administrative Officer).

b. Axis (German and Italian) Order of Battle

Prior to the "battle, the British Intelligence estimated Axis forces in the frontier and Tobruk areas as follows:

(1) Frontier Area

(a) German Forces

1. 15th Armored Division (less units at Tobruk)

1 tank battalion (14 Mlc. I, 26 Mk.II, 52 Mk.III, and 10 Mk,IV tanks*);

1 motorized infantry regiment;

Type Weight Crew Armor Base Armament

A-9 and one 40-mm. gun A-10 12 tons 6 .55 in. three .303 machine guns

A-13 18 tons 4 1.5 in. one 40-mm. gun two machine guns

A-15 20 tons 5 1.5 in one 1- or 2-pounder or 3-in, howitzer three 7.92-mm. Besa machine guns

*These German tajiks have the following characteristics: y ;

1 reconnaissance unit (approximately 25 armored cars*, 3 antitank guns, and, two 75-mm. close support guns);

1 motorcycle "battalion (including four 75-mm. infantry guns and 3 antitank guns);

1 antitank battalion (33 antitank guns);

1 antiaircraft unit (eight 88~mm. antiaircraft guns).

2, 5th Light Motorized Division (less units at Tobruk)

This division, although called a motorized unit, was actually a small armored division. The tanks and several other elements were at Tobruk. The units at the frontier consisted of

1 reconnaissance unit (approximately 15 armored cars, 3 antitank guns, and two 75-mm. guns).;

1 antitank battalion (about 30 antitank guns);

1 antiaircraft unit (eight 88-mm. antiaircraft guns);

1 artillery regiment (12 field guns).

(b) Italian Forces

1 artillery regiment (sixteen 105-mm. guns);

Front Side Type Weight Crew Armor Armor Armament

Mk. I 6 tons 2 .71 in. .55 in. 2 machine guns Mk.II 9 tons 3 1.58 in. .59 in. 1 machine gun 1 heavy machine gun lie. Ill 18-20 tons 4 2.76 in. 1.18 in. one 50-mm. gun 2 machine guns Mk.IV 22 tons 5 2.36 xn. 1.58 in. one 75-mm. gun 2 machine guns

*These armored cars were of the heavy 8-wheeler and light 4-wheeler types. (See fig. 8 for a picture of the 8-wheeler.) . m - 12 • ' ' tM \4W ww > •• • • 1 HA 1 or 2 "battalions of motorized infantry;

1 or 2 antitank companies, each containing 10 antitank guns..

(2) Tobruk Area

(a) German

In the Tobruk area, German forces consisted of ap» proximately the following units*:

2 motorized infantry regiments; 2 tank battalions; 2 machine-gun "battalions; 2 antitank "battalions; 1 antiaircraft "battalion; 1 artillery regiment; 1 pioneer "battalion.

("b) Italian

Italian forces in the Tobruk area consisted of ap­ proximately the following units:

1 tank regiment; 1 motorcycle "battalion; 4 artillery regiments; 2 antitank "battalions,; 2 antitank companies; 3 jnachine~gun "battalions; 2 infantry regiments; 6 motorized infantry regiments.

C. Approximate Strength Summary

British German** Italian**

Tanks 180 290 70

*]?or a detailed table of Axis forces in the Tobruk area, see APPENDIX A

**As indicated, some of these German and Italian forces were in the Tobruk area, 50 or 60 miles in the rear of the frontier. Part of them, hcwever, could be brought up to the frontier area if necessary,, and thsy were a,ll available to oppose the ultimate British objective of relieving the Tobruk garrison. \T? '• rs 'j "1 i J V. "I 1i v \£i

British German Italian

Armored cars 60 40 ? Field guns 80 42 136 Infantry guns 16 20-28 1 Antiaircraft guns 40 44 I Antitank guns 92 152-170 80 Infantry 5000 2000 9000

5. PLANS MP PRELIMINARY MOVES OF THE BRITISH*

a.- Plans

(l) General Objectives

The objectives of the Desert Force were:

(a) Defeat of the enemy forces in the forward area; (b) Subsequent relief of Tobruk; (c) Exploitation of successes as opportunities pre­ sented themselves.

(3) 4th Indian Division

The 4th Indian Division, comprising the Escarpment Force and the Coastal Force, was to he the main assaulting group and was organized into task forces, as outlined on pages8-10 under British Order of Battle. The 4th Armored Brigade was attached to the Indian Division. The left flank of the Indian Division was to be protected by the 7th Armored Division, which was also ordered to "take every opportunity of engaging and destroying enemy tanks." The plan for the destruction of the enemy forces in the general area Bardia—Salum— Halfay a Pass—Bir Wair— Fort Capuzzo, to be executed by the 4 th Indian Division, was divided into five phases:

Phase I. Capture of the Halfaya Pass position by an attack of the Coastal Force, with six tanks, below the Escarpment, and the simultaneous attack by the Halfaya Group with a squadron of tanks on top of the Escarpment.

Phase II. Capture of the area B.P. 38—?Pt. 206 by the Escarp­ ment Force, less the Guards Brigade Group and the Halfaya Group. The Escarpment Force was to advance in the general direction of Battumar— Qaret Abu Faris—B»P. 42—Musaid. In this advance the 4th Armored

*With a few exceptions, Map Ho. 2 may be used to locate names mentioned in this section.

- 14 Brigade was to attack the area Musaid—Bir Wair. The Artillery Group of the Escarpment Force was to "be prepared to engage all targets, in­ cluding hostile "batteries, in the general area Port Capuzzo—Musaid— Bir Wair. The Guards Brigade Group was to consolidate the gains made "by the 4th Armored Brigade. During this phase the Coastal Force was to clear the wadies between Halfaya Pass and Salum.

Phase III. Capture of area Port Capuzzo—Bir Wair "by the Es­ carpment Porce. The 7th R.T.R. (of the 4th Armored Brigade) which had "been held in reserve during Phase II, was to attack Port Capuzzo, crossing the wire fence at about B.P. 40. One "battalion of the Guards Brigade would take over Port Capuzzo when the tanks reported it under control.

Phase IV. Consolidation and mopping up of the area Musaid—; Salum "by infantry.

Phase V. Exploitation.

(3) 7th Armored Division

Under objective (a) of the Desert Force plan, the defeat of the enemy force in the forward area, the 7th Armored Division—less the 4th Armored Brigade—was to move in "bounds to the following points there performing the tasks noted:

(a) Bir el Khireigat—Protect the left flank of the 4th Indian Division while in the Halfway House area.

(b) Area Pt. 207—Cover the westerly movement of the 4th Indian Division.

(c) Area B.P. 42—Secure assembly area of the 4th Indian Division for its attack on B.P. 38 and the Port Capuzzo area. Strike any enemy withdrawal from the Capuzzo area.

(d) Area Pt„ 203—-Prepare to meet and defeat any threat coming from Sidi Azeiz.

The Support Group of the 7th Armored Division, operating in Mobile Columns, was to protect the rear of the 7th Armored Brigade. Detachments of engineers were to be attached to the Support Group and to the 7th Armored Brigade. ^

Under objective (b) of the Desert Porce plan, the relief of Tobruk, the commander of the 7th Armored Division prepared two plans:

(a) If the enemy force was defeated in the Port Capuzzo ia—Mi

- 15 - • TJ • S R.T.a o oir\ 500 Field. Jn ,,cI ron" s ^ad- 4th R.T.R.

1000 yds 1 mi AL 1000 yds 500 yds^ Trucks PDetachment of Engineers (f\ 100 yds 1000 yds 1500 yds 7th to T T3 R.T.R] 1 mi o O -i 4000 yds o cv Artillery Group 8th Field Regiment 212th Medium Battery 4th Light AA Battery One "battery of 65th T)CO AT Regiment i> oa m

Advanced Headquarters

4th Indian Division

Figure 6. Formation for Movement of Escarpment Force.

(The units indicated were dispersed generally throughout the rectangles shown above. The Guards Brigade moved in the rear independently.) area and. a rapid exploitation of the success was justified., the 11th ! J Hussars, under the Support Group Commander, were to maintain contact with the enemy. The Mobile Columns of the Support Group were to en­ gage and harass the enemy, and the armored "brigades were to follow as rapidly as possible.

(b) If, in view of the enemy forces in the Tobruk area the success had to he exploited in a more deliberate manner, the Support Group, with the 11th Hussars attached, was to reconnoiter and maintain contact with the enemy, protecting the left flank and rear of the division.

The artillery, as noted: in the British Order of Battle, was in general attached to the task forces. The task-force commander often attached this artillery to subordinate units.

The five fighter squadrons and two bomber squadrons were charged generally with covering of troop movements, strafing of light enemy vehicles, bombing of tank and motor concentrations and supply dumps, obtaining information on enemy movements, and general recon- 1 naissance. Specific, details of air, support and missions, however, were left to the R.A.I'. Command. *'

b. Preliminary Moves and Approach March

On June 14 the Escarpment Force moved by motor transport to the vicinity of Sofafi, reaching this area prior to 10 a.m. At 4 p.m., June 14, it started to move to an assembly area in the vici­ nity of Halfway House. Figure 6 shows the formation used by the Es­ carpment Force in this movement.

"Approach march of Coastal Force..,[was] «..normal infantry advance as directed by command.er*."

The 7th Armored Brigade moved during the afternoon and evening of June 14 to Bir el Khireigat. During this march it had the mission of protecting the left flank of the 4th Indian Division while the latter was in the vicinity of Halfway House.

6. OPERATIONS. JUNE 15-17

a. Summary of Operations

Except for the failure of the Coastal Force to capture the Halfay a Pass position, the British plans for the initial phases were

*4th Indian Division Operation Instruction Ho. 41 carried out successfully. The Escarpment Force, made up of the 4th Indian Division and a tank "brigade, with other units attached, pro­ ceeded to the wire fence at the Libyan—Egyptian "border and launched successful attacks on the B.P. 38—Pt. 206 area and on Fort Capuzzo, Masaid, and Salum, The 7th Armored Brigade and the Support Group protected the left flank of the 4th Indian Division as ordered. The 7th Armored Brigade, however, was driven out of its position inthe northwestern sector "by superior numbers of tanks of the 15th German Armored Division, and the -Support'.Group in the southwestern.,.sector found itself outnumbered "by the .motorized and armored forces of the 5th German Light Motorized DivisionT which included a battalion of 86 tanks.

Finding his flank protection giving way and thereby threatened with an enveloping movement, the Commander of the-4th Indian Division was forced to withdraw in order to prevent his lines of supply and communication from being cut. The decision to withdraw was also in­ fluenced by the fact that the Coastal Force, on the right flank, in spite of determined assaults, had been unable to take the Halfaya Pass position and join the forward units. The withdrawal was completed on the night of June 17. The Axis forces did not pursue the retreat­ ing British, but remained on approximately the ..same front that they had occupied prior to the battle. •

b. Phase I. Attempt to Capture Halfava Pass

(l) Morning. June 15 (Map Ho. 3)

The Coastal Force proper made sxi approach march from its assembly position and arrived in the vicinity of Wadi el Shaba with battalions in column at 6 a.m. Two batteries of the 25th Field Regiment had been attached, one to each of the two infantry battalions of the Coastal Force. The medium battery in the rear, however, did not arrive in a position area until about noon," and was of no use in the initial stages of the action.

The assault battalion of the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade was disposed in wadi-es up the slope of the Escarpment and attacked in a northwesterly direction, with its right flank generally at the foot of the scarp. The support battalion followed in the rear. Initial contact was gained at about 7:30 a.m., and the infantry advance was held up for the time being. Artillery fired no preparation for the initial assault, but began firing only after contact was made. All fires were conducted by forward observers. British artillery positions were generally in wadies.near. the foot of the Escarpment, below Pt. 193.

The six tanks of "A" Squadron of the 4th R.'I.R, had kept pace Figure 7. The Escarpment. This picture shows a section of the Escarpment near Bardia, where the elevation is not .so great as it is "below Salum. No pictures of the Escarpment near Salum are available.

I HNCLASSfi s / ; J .

with the advance on the right flank of the assault battalion, generally prolonging the front of the attack into the plain. When these tanks ran onto a mine field north of Vadi el Shaba, however, four of them were destroyed immediately. The mines used were of 10 pounds weight| and were detonated by 30 pounds pressure. As a result, personnel attempting to assist damaged tanks were also killed by these mines. A fifth tank was put out of action at the foot of Halfaya Pass by a gun, thought to have been either a heavy antiaircraft of naval gun.

The Halfaya Group, composed of the 2d Camerons battalion, "C" Squadron of tho 4th R.T.R., the 8th Field Regiment, the 212th Medium Battery, and one battery of the 31st Field Regiment, had left Battuma at 5:30 a.m., proceeding along the Escarpment to attack the top of Halfaya Pass. At this time they passed to the command of the Coastal Force.. . ' .

In an attack that generally coincided in timing with that of the assault battalion below the Escarpment, the 2d Camerons encircled the upper end of Halfaya Pass, and at one time their left flank is thought to have extended as far as the head of Wadi el Halfaya. The tank attack by "C" Squadron was broken up by two more of the heavy guns, just described, which put five of the tanks out of action in an estimated 90 seconds. At about 10 a.m. the Camerons were counter­ attacked by German tanks from the northwest and were forced to with­ draw to the area around the head of Wadi el Shaba. The German tanks withdrew under heavy shelling from the 8th Field Regiment, but the &• German motorized infantry,. which accompanied the tanks, held most of 'the gains made by the tanks.' The British forces both above and below the Escarpment were constantly subjected to severe artillery fire from German field guns emplaced in and around the pass. Tank obstacles below the pass were found to extend well out into the plain,

(2) Afternoon. June 15 (Map Ho. 4)

During the afternoon a coordinated attack, ; preceded by artillery preparation, by the 2d Camerons, and the two battalions of the 11th Indian, Infantrj. Brigade who• were below the Escarpment;, carried the British forward again to approximately their farthest advance of the morning, and here the situation became stabilized. In this attack the second Indian battalion below the Escarpment prolonged the' line of the first out into the plain and attempted to encircle the German position along the coast.. The Germans in the Halfaya Pass position, however, were never cut off from the sea throixghout this battle, al­ though access by vehicle along the top of the Escarpment was stopped.

c. Phase II. Capture of Area 3.P. 58—Pt. 206

(l) Morning. June 15 (Map Ho. 3)

- 18 lltJpW a The movement of the Escarpment Force, which is indicated on the map-as the 4th (Indian) Division, proceeded according to plan. Headquarters Group and the 7th R.T.R. left Battuma at about 5:15 a.m., reaching Qaret Abu Faris at about 7:15 a.m. The Artillery Group and "B" Squadron of the 4th R.T.R. left Battuma at about 5:15 also, and moved northwest to Pt. 207, reaching it at about 8 o'clock. There they relieved the 7th Armored Brigade, which had occupied the position at about 5:30 a.m. Both the Pt. 207 section of the Escarpment Force and the Q,aret Abu Faris section—now including the Guards .Brigade Group, which had advanced to Q,aret Abu Faris directly from Sofafi— then continued toward the wire, arriving in the vicinity of 3.P. 41 at about 11 a.m. At this time eight tanks of "A" Squadron of the :4th R.T.R.—the other six tanks v/ere with the Coastal Command—turned northeast south of the wire to attack the B.P, 38—-Pt. 206 position. This assault, supported by one battery of the 31st Field Regiment, was launched toward B.P, 38 at about 11 a.m. Four German field guns which had been emplaced as antitank guns were destroyed, and in a short time five of the British tanks were lost. The remaining British tanks v/ere forced to withdraw because of the German artillery fire.

(2) Afternoon. June 15 (Map No. 4)

At about 4:30 p.m.• "3" Squadron of the 4th R.T.R,, aug­ mented by the remaining tanks of "A" Squadron, launched another attack on the B.P. 38--Pt. 206 position, and this time the effort was success­ ful. During the course of the action a German counterattack by 15 tanks was repulsed.

For a considerable period during this actitm communications between British infantry and tanks failed to function. Consequently, infantry supports, which were waiting in the B.P. 41 area, were not ordered up, and extreme difficulty was experienced by the tanks in holding the position and stamping out resistance alone.

d. Phase III. Capture of Fort Capuzzo and Bir Wair

(l) Morning. June 15 (Map Ho, 3)

At about 11:30 a.m.(, while the initial assault on the area B.P. 38-—Pt. 206 was in progress, the 7th R.T.R. formed north • of B.P. 40 and attacked Fort Capuzzo. "B" Squadron assailed the, front of the position and "A" Squadron enveloped the left. "C" Squad­ ron was in brigade reserve. Fort Capuzzo was taken in the first rush, and the tanks proceeded to a line about 2000 yards north and north­ west of the fort. Radio communication failed, and the Guards Brigade, which was supposed to occupy and secure the Fort Capuzzo position, remained in the B.P. 41 area. • .*» I

. -

German Armored Detachment near Salum nlMl ; :••• 1 ' !

(2) Afternoon. June 15 (Map Ho. 4)

At 3:30 p.m. about 20 German tanks approached from the north and counterattacked the Port Capuzzo position, which was now in the hands of units of the 7th R.T.R. After a short action they were driven off "by the British tanks. Two hours later the attack was re­ peated with the same result-. After the capture of the B.P. 38—-Pt. 206 position, at about 5 p.m., one infantry "battalion, the Buffs, of the Guards Brigade, supported by twelve 25-pounders of the 31st Field'Regi­ ment and 22 antitank guns, finally occupied the Port Capixzzo area. At the same time, one company of infantry was sent into the B.P. 38—Pt. 206 position.

At this time the infantry tanks of the 7th R.T.R. were placed under command of the Guards Brigade Commander, who disposed "A11 Squad­ ron slightly north of Port Capuzzo for the night, with "B" Squadron at Bir Wair. "C" Squadron joined shortly before dark and took position northeast of Port Capuzzo. At dusk, about 8:45, the Coldstreams Battalion occupied Bir Wair and organized for the night. They were reinforced by seven antitank guns and the battery of the 31st Pield Regiment which had originally been left at Half ay a Pass.

The 8th Pield Regiment and the 212th Medium Battery, after having been heavily engaged at Halfaya Pass until after midday, had been moved northwest at about 3:30 p„m. to support the final assault on-Pt. 206. After its capture they proceeded to the B.P. 38 area, where preparations were made for protective fires in case of a night attack on Fort Capuzzo and Bir Wair.

Indian Division Headquarters had previously been moved to the B.P, 40—B.P. 41 area, and about 7 p.m. the 2d R.T.R. of the 7th Armored Brigade passed Indian Division Headquarters, proceeding south for servicing. Inasmuch as this tank movement left the Indian Division Headquarters without protection to the north and ^^est, the headquarters was moved to a point south of B.P. 39, where it received some protec­ tion from the 4th R.T.R., which was nearby in the B.P. 38 area.

. Throughout the day of June 15 German artillery fire from: field guns emplaced northwest of Salum had not only subjected the Port Capuzzo—Bir Wair area to severe shelling, but had also supported the numerous local counterattacks of small numbers of German armored ve­ hicles.

e. Phase IV. Capture of Musaid and Salum • June 16 (Map No. 5) ,

At moonrise on June 16, between 3 and 4 a.m., two companies of the Scots Battalion of the Guards Brigade made: a night attack without artillery preparation on the defensive area at Masaid. A silent approach by the two assault companies was met "by a defensive "barrage when the Scots were at a distance of about 200 yards from the advance German position. The barrage lifted after 15 or 20 minutes, and the position was rushed with bayonet. Seventeen German infantrymen were killed and 200 captured. Casualties of the Scots were only five.

In preparation for an attack on the Salum .barracks by the other two companies .of the Scots Guards, the 212th Medium Battery was moved to the Bir Wair area. Artillery ammunition was short, and 30 rounds per gun of the 31st Field Regiment and the Medium Battery were fired on the Salum barracks fortified area as a preparation for the , assault. The_Scots approached at high speed in their organic motor &•' transpbr^,.isfitix, exfcr.ejne,.jUsB.eEs:ijgn and arrived in the position as the ': artillery preparation ceased. This rush was successful; 40 German infantrymen were killed, and 400^ including some Italians, were cap­ tured. Casualties among the Scots totalled four.

Demolitions were then carried out, and the Scots withdrew tyo .Masaid after sending patrols down the Escarpment to Fig Tree Wells in an effort to establish contact with elements, of the 11th Indian Brigade, who at that time were thought to have penetrated up the coast beyond the Halfaya Pass position. The patrol, of course, was fruitless, since the Halfaya Pass position had not been captured.

f. Phase V. Subsequent Developments

(1) June 16 (Map lo. 5)

At the time the Salum barracks was evacuated by the Scots Guards, early on the morning of June 16, the situation in the Indian Division area was considered good, and its headquarters was optimistic..

The 7th E.T.E. was disposed generally around Port Capuzzo. The remainder of "A" and "B" Squadrons of the 4th R.T.R. was•dispersed in reserve near Division Headquarters in the B.P. 39 area. In view of numerous German armored vehicles in the Bir Hafid Ridge area, the squadron of light tanks* of the 3d Hussars was given a security and observation mission north of the wire between B.P. 38 and B.P. 42. Such Bren carriers as could be found in the vicinity were used to rein­ force this screen. With the exception of the. Scots Guards, the Guards Brigade and artillery remained in the positions gained in Phase IV: the Coldstreams at Bir Wair, the Buffs at Fort Capuzzo, and the Scots at MUsaid.

*These. light tanks were armored against small arms only and were use­ less as offensive weapons in an action of this kind. Figure 9. British Infantry Tanks Crossing the Desert. In the Halfaya Pass area there had., "been little change in the actual situation. Radio communication "between the Halfaya Group and Indian Division Headquarters had completely "broken down, and the Di­ vision Headquarters was in receipt only of a number of optimistic re­ ports.—really word-of-movth rumors—concerning the progress of the Halfaya Pass attack.

At about 10 a.m. German air activity increased appreciably. A number of single Stukas, widely dispersed in varying directions, flew over the area, and later during the day a series of dive-bombing attacks of destructive intensity were made upon the principle elements of the division. These ceased at about 4 p.m. Twenty casualties were suffered in Division Headquarters proper, and other units suffered proportionately. Three German armored, counterattacks from the north were made on Fort Capuzzo between daw and 2 p.m.

Of the 4th Armored Brigade, the 7th R.T.R. was in action throughout the day in the Fort Capuzzo—Musaid area; the . 4th R.T.R., in the B.P. 42—B.P. 38 area. Counterattacks were successfully fought off and positions generally maintained, throughout the day. Artillery activity was intense on both sides until early afternoon, when it finally diminished.

Infantry tanks of the 4th Armored Brigade had suffered severely during the two days of battle. At nightfall the 7th R.T.R. had only 5 tanks running, with the prospect of having an additional 11 repaired by dawn of the 17th; the 4th R.T.R. could muster only 18.

From the point of view of the Indian Division Command, which had generally held its positions, the situation appeared still to be optimistic during the forepart of the night of June 16. Little was known of the situation or events in the sectors, of the 7th Armored Brigade and the Support Group. Also, the situation at Halfaya Pass was thought to be more favorable than later proved to be the case.

(2) June 17 (Map No. 6)

At midnight June 16-17 an order arrived from the 7th Armored Division removing all infantry tanks from attachment to the Indian Division and directing that they assemble at Bir Fuh "by 6 atm, June 17 to form a divisional reserve for the 7th Armored Division. The Indian Division Commander, who had little information on the situa­ tion of the 7th Armored Brigade as it existed at that time, was some­ what surprised "by this order. After considering the condition of the. units concerned, he directed the 4th R#T.R. to move at dawn—-about 5 a.m.—in compliance with the order# The 7th R.T.R., however, was directed not to move but to hold itself ready to repel German attacks from the north and northwest. The 8th Field Regiment was directed to $ $33 ilsa move to the Pt. 207 area and was attached to ^'Tne *' 4th R.T.R. was late in moving, and at 6:30 a.m. a wave of enemy medium tanks came in toward B.P. 39 from the northwest. Division Headquarters evacuated hastily and caught up with the 4th R.T.R. about 1 mile north of Pt. 207. The 4th R.T.R. turned about and, supported "by artillery, caused the German column to withdraw. The Indian Division Commander then cancelled the withdrawal order .of the 4th R.T.R. and directed it to remain in place near B.P. 39 as flank protection for the supply lines of the infantry units. In addition, an improvised reconnais­ sance screen of trucks was put out to the southwest, the sector of the 7th Armored Division. This reconnaissance unit sent in reports of tank battles west, north, and south of Sidi Suleiman during the morning.

About 7 a.m. a German column estimated at 57 medium tanks, followed by motor transport, had also crossed the wire and had pro­ ceeded to a point north of Qaret Suweida along a line generally parallel to that taken by the German column which had threatened the Indian Division Headquarters a half-hour earlier. Fire from the 25- pounders of the Support Group, however, halted the attack*

During these thrusts by German tank columns, the Indian Di­ vision Headquarters remained in the vicinity of Pt. 207. At 7:30 a.m. the Indian Division Commander requested the Corps Commander for a decision regarding withdrawal. At about 9 a.m. the infantry tanks of the 4th ;B»T.Rt.. and- -the 7th . R.T ,R.. were driven in by new enemy . columns approaching from the....northwest and. so.uthwest,_and the_divi­ sion commander decided that the infantry must be withdrawn at once or be cut off.

The Buffs were ordered to withdraw from Port Capuzzo beginning at 11 a.m., the Coldstreams from Bir Wair at 11:30 a.m., and the Scots from Musaid at noon. The Camerons, at Halfay a Pass, were to 'move upon passage of the Scots and all were to rendezvous at Halfway House* The order was transmitted by radio and liaison officer* Simultaneously, about 10 a.m. an urgent request was transmitted for fighter protection for the withdrawal, but this did not appear until too late to be effective. At 12:30 p.m* the Indian Division Head­ quarters, the 65th Antitank. Regiment, and the one battery of the 31st Field Regiment withdrew to Halfway House and the artillery was dis­ posed to secure the area for the rendezvous.

When the withdrawal was ordered, the 7th R.T.R., with 14 tanks running, was ordered to act as the rear guard. The 4th R.T.R., also with 14 tanks remaining, was ordered to guard the left (western) flank until the infantry had passed the area swept by artillery fire from Halfaya Pass.

- 23 - T

Figure 10. British Light Tanks on Patrol Crossing Rocky Terrain.

! The 7th R.T.R., therefore, protected the rear of the motor movement from Fort Capuzzo and Musaid as far as the vicinity of Pt. 207, where it found itself in the path of both the German pursuit and the penetrations from the west. In the meantime, the 4th R.T.R. found itself drawn south and west in opposing German thrusts into the gap "between themselves and the 7th Armored Brigade. The 8th Field Regiment, with a part of the remaining battery of the 31st Field .Regiment, had been withdrawn to the Battuma area, where they could support the action of the 4th and 7th R.T.R.'s. The British motorized infantry infiltrated "between Pt. 207 and Halfaya. Pass with consider­ able intermingling hut with ti^re'Toss."""'"IDie',4th E,T.R, and the 7th R.T.R., supported "by the artillery, held their general areas and fought off German armored attacks throughout the afternoon.

Two German columns made a coordinated attack at about 3 p.m. and then suddenly withdrew. Twenty or 30 minutes later the 8th Field Regiment, in the Battuma area, siiffered a severe dive-bombing attack by 50 Stukas. Three guns, eight officers, and approximately 100 enlisted men became casualties in the first dive. Timely arrival of a patrol of Hurricanes, which formed a portion of General Wave11"s escort, resulted in the destruction of eight Stukas and the breaking up of the attack. • When the German armored columns renewed their assault, the remaining guns of the 8th Field Regiment materially aided the tanks in repulsing them.

After passage of the rear elements of the infantry,, the re­ maining tanks and artillery withdrew to Halfway House. The 4th R.T.R. arrived with a total of 6 tanks, and the 7th R.T.R. with a total of 7, making a total of 15 tanks lost in the withdrawal action out of the 28 tanks which started. This movement was completed about 7 p.m. The elements of the Escarpment Force were successfully evacuated down a single track defile at. Halfway House and were directed to Buq Buq, Alam Hamid, and Sidi Barrani. This movement from the Half™ way House to the positions mentioned was effectively covered by the British air force. Tanks of the 4th and 7th Armored Brigades re­ mained on top of the Escarpment unmolested by the enemy, which did not pursue the retreat.

The withdrawal of the 11th Brigade, the major element of the Coastal Force, had been ordered for 9 p.m. At that time the Germans made a determined attack below the Escarpment with infantry and tanks. They also used tanks on top of the Escarpment to enfilade the wadies in which the British had taken position. This attack was repulsed, however, and the brigade successfully withdrew about 2 hours later.

This completed the withdrawal of the 4th Indian Divisisn from action. In 3 days the Guards Brigade had lost 9 killed and 56 wounded The 11th Brigade had suffered about 500 casualWds^ "of whom 60 were killed and 80 knovm to have "been taken prisoner.

Insofar as can "be determined, the Indian Division had "been opposed by elements of the German 15th Armored Division and the 102d Italian Division. The German 5th Light Motorized Division had made the envelopment.

g. Operations of the 7th Armored Division

(l) 7th Armored Brigade

(a) Morning. June 15 (Map No. 3)

The two regiments of the 7th Armored Brigade were the 2d and 6th R.T.R. The 6th was equipped with new A-15 cruiser tanks, 49 of which entered the action on the 15th, while the 2d R.T.R. was equipped with 34 old A-9, A-10, and A-13 cruisers. One Mobile Column* of the Support Group was attached to the 7th Armored Brigade.

Jaxo column, the one attached to the 7th Armored Brigade, covered the advance of that unit during the forenoon of June 15 and during the remainder of the day jjrotected the left flank and rear. The column remained with the "brigade throughout June 16 and 17 and furnished the bulk of the artillery support, particularly in the tank- versus-tank actions around Bir Hafid Ridge.. The infantry company attached to the 4th Armored Brigade remained with that unit through­ out the action.

The 2d R.T.R. reached Pt. 207 at 5:30 a.m. June 15,. having left Bir el Khireigat at 2:30 a.m. and the Axis troops on the position withdrew; the 6th R.T.R. took position southwest of the Pt. 206 area at 7 a.m. The 2d R.T.R., after having been relieved by elements4of the Escarpment Force at 8 a.m., crossed the wire fence at the Egyptian Libyan border at 9 a.m. and moved into an. assembly area some 2 miles west of B.P. 42, while the 6th R.T.R. moved into an area' to the north­ west of the 2d R.T.R,

"B" Squadron of the 2d R.T.R. advanced toward Bir Hafid Ridge, but, upon being fired on, retired to a hull-down** position. "A" and "3" Squadrons of the 2d R.T.R., with artillery support, then attacked the ridge, with "A" Squadron on the right and "B" Squadron on the left

*See p. 11 for composition of the Mobile Columns.

**With hull in defilade. lit Tank (above) and Mk.IV Tank ("below) After some maneuvering "B" Squadron, with "A" Squadron supporting, charged the position in line and got among the Axis1guns. At the end of the action "both squadrons retired to the southeast. In this action, "B" Squadron lost 5 officers, 19 enlisted men, and 6 tanks.

(b) Afternoon. June 15 (Map No. 4)

During the early afternoon the 6th R.T.R., on the left, engaged 25 Axis tanks in a tank-versus-tank action in the south­ west section of the Bir Hafid Ridge area, and the Axis tanks withdrew.

The 2d R.T.R. waited in a position south of Bir Hafid Ridge, out of range of hostile fire, until 4 p.m., when approximately 30 German tanks approached from the northeast. The regiment moved to a more or less hull-down position and engaged the hostile tanks when they came within range. For about 20 minutes the two tank units fired at each other at a range of approximately 2000 yards with little effect. When fired on "by British artillery, however, the German tanks withdrew. After dark the 2d R.T.R, retired to the vicinity of B.P. 42 and bivouacked for the night*.

Although the casualties of the 2d R.T.R. had been fairly heavy during the tank-versus-tank actions, those of the 6th R.T.R, had "been comparatively light. Later, however, a small group of German tanks, accompanied by motor transport, fired on the 6th R.T.R, The regiment turned, pursued them at high speed, and suddenly found itself under fire from a number of 50-mm, antitank guils at a range of approximately 400 yards or less. Contrary to the usual German practice, these guns had been dismounted and were concealed among the brush and camel hump in a shallow depression on the flank of Bir Hafid Ridge, In the space of a few minutes the 6th R.T.R. suffered 17 tank casualties and withdrew, although they managed to destroy many of the antitank • guns. The 6th R.T.R, then retired across the wire fence for the night. Most of the 17 tanks were severely damaged,

(c) June 16 (Map Ho. 5)

Early on the morning of the 16th the 11th Hussars, on a reconnaissance mission, reported a column of 50 medium tanks, 20 light tanks, "and 20 motor vehicles moving southwest from an area approximately 2 miles west of Bir Hafid Ridge. About 8:30 a.m. they were sighted at a range of approximately 2500 yards by the 7th Armored Brigade, which was in a position about 2 miles west of B,P. 42 The 6th R.T.R,, with only 25 tanks, advanced in line, and, upon

*Hlght formation consists of leaauering. which is described in APPENDIX P. •

X;. v

Figure 12. British Ar-13 Cruiser Tank Showing Dust Raised on Desert Terrain. . . n v" r\ ^[Cd\y::] < r U ,- -' A WW n A f f\\h- M"v \W •

closing with the hostile tanks, turned into column and headed east, firing "broadside. The 6th R.T.R. then moved to an area to the left of the 2d R.I.E., which moved forward and engaged the hostile tanks at ahout 2000 yards. The 2d R.T.R. turned south, paralleling the' advance of the hostile column, and exchanged fire "broadside. Finally the 2d R.T.R, took up a hull-down position and was able to fire while stationary at a range of 1500 yards. As! the action continued, the German Column turned south toward 3.P. 44; and in order to oppose their advance, "both the 2d and the 6th R.T.R. took up a position facing west in the B.P. 43—3.P. 44 area. This action terminated sometime during the forenoon, the German tank column apparently fol­ lowing the usual German procedure of retiring from action in the late morning and resuming activity in the late afternoon.

At 6:30 p.m. the hostile column, advancing through the wire in the vicinity of B.P. 44, resumed attack upon the 6th R.T.R., which was in a hull-down position 2 miles south of B.P, 44. The 2d R.T.R., with only 20 tanks remaining in action, moved parallel to the German advance, supporting the 6th R.T.R. During several miles of the move­ ment the regiment was able to engage the hostile tanks with "broad­ side fire at a range of approximately 2000 yards. Seven of the 20 tanks of the 2d R.T.R. were: hit, and 12 of the 'German tanks were re­ ported put out of action. By nightfall, about 8:45, "both regiments of the 7th Armored Brigade had maneuvered themselves into a position 5 miles west of Sidi Suleiman, and rallied for the night 2 miles west of that place.

(d) June 17 (Map Ho. 6)

During the morning of the 17th the same German mechanized column took up a position near Sidi Suleiman. The 7th Brigade moved into the Ruweioit el Warani area, with the 2d R.T.R. on the right* The disabled tanks and rear echelon establishments were then in the Bir el Khireigat area.

When the Escarpment Force started to withdraw by way of the Halfway House during the midday, the German column continued its ad­ vance eastward in an effort to cut off this force, "but was delayed "by the 4th Armored Brigade on the east and the 7th Armored Brigade oh the south. After the Escarpment Force had completed its with­ drawal through the defile leading down the Escarpment at the Halfway House, the 7th Armored Division—the 4th Armored Brigade, with a total of 13 tanks remaining, had rejoined it—withdrew to a line west of the Sofafi area* The 11th Hussars and the Mobile Columns of the Support Group covered the tank units, which generally formed lines on the reverse slopes of small ridges in hull-down positions. The advanced elements of the Axis force remained approximately along the line Battuma—Sidi Suleiman—Sidi Omar. The enveloping action on the 16th and. 17th of June had "been made-by th6 German 5th Light Motorized Division, which had approxi­ mately 86 tanks, most of them Mk.. Ill's*

(e) tosses ' 6ffidiki tank casualties of the 7th Armored Brigade t Were as follows:

Tanks - Lost on *1 Engaged Battlefield Evacuated* "V June 15 80 17 22 June 16 49 7 16 June 17 27 0 ' 7

The 13 tanks of the 4th Armored Brigade added to the 27 tanks of the 7th Armored Brigade gave the 7th Armored Division a total of 40 tanks remaining iii serviceable condition out of the,/180,.with which it had started. - _• >

(2) Support Group

(a) Composition

The make-up of the four Mobile Columns was not changed**. During the action the Support Group retained control of three of them as well as a squadron of attached armored cars. The other column was attached to the 7th Armored Brigade..

The columns, for the operation, were called Jaxo-~-attached to 7th Armored Brigade—Ajew, Togs, and Medo.

(b) Mission

The Support Group was given the mission of providing security for the southwest flank of the division and preventing enemy activity to the south.

(c) Employment.

Ajew column, from its original position, secured the

*These figures include tanks evacuated both because of mechanical failures and because of damage in action.

**See p. 11 for the composition of these columns.

- 28— '-^:J ~ Ills S; hubwip11 rm»«§wyKJi». - Battuma area for deployment of the Escar^ipigt^iifepass^ »Af'te*r this mission, at dawn June 15 Ajew column reverted to division reserve in the southwestern sector, as indicated on Map No. 3.

Togs column covered the right flank of the 7th Armored Bri­ gade during its initial advance to Pt. 207 early on June 15. There­ after it was assigned the mission of protecting the trains and rear areias of the 7th ArmoredJDiyision.

In the advance of June 15 Medo column covered the left flank of the 7th Armored Brigade as far as the wire and saw little action on this day.

The attached squadron of armored cars patrolled a line, Cairn—El Rabta—Port Maddalena throughout the 3 days of action (see fig. l).

At 5;30 p.m. June 15 A.iew column arrived in the vicinity of Bir Sheferzen. Prior to darkness, the column advanced 20 to 25 miles northwest. No hostile forces were encountered, however, and the column returned to Bir Sheferzen at dawn June 16.

Throughout the 16th and 17th of June, Medo column on the right and Ajew on the left were constantly in action, maneuvering against the south flank of the 5th German Division which was pene­ trating eastward from Sidi Omar. In general they were effective- in • harassing and delaying the German penetration. German columns in the north were often forced to divert a part of their strength to the south in order to relieve their own units there from the fire of the British Mobile Columns. Medo and Ajew columns also continued in action against lesser elements of this German division during June 18. ,

About 5 p.m. June 18 a column consisting of approximately 20 medium and heavy German tanks and numerous motor transports sud­ denly advanced southwards toward Bir el Khireigat from the Sidi Suleiman area. Medo column immediately went into action against this thrust, which was aimed at the disabled British armored vehicles that had been collected near 3ir el Khireigat for evacuation and re­ covery, Some of the British vehicles were destroyed, and some were actually removed from the field by the Germans.

During the 24 hours from noon oja June 15, to noon on June 16 the four columns expended a total o £^38^40 rounds of 25-pounder ammu­ nition. Subsequent expenditures are unknown, but ammunition shortages were reported.

After withdrawal of the 7th Armored Division to the Sofafi nm\T,jSm area, the Support Group, including Jaxo column, returned, and, with the 11th Hussars, resumed its mission of covering the "entire front1

h. Air Operations*.(Map No. l) '

(l) German

The Germans employed about 90 Me-109's and Ke-110's plus some 30 Stukas. There were also available about four times that number of Italian aircraft, but apparently these were not used. Bases for German planes were reported to be only about 40 miles from the action. : ^

The plan for the employment of the German air force \>ras to neutralize the British air force on the German side rather than to attempt to gain air superiority over the whol-e theater. The Germans made no air attacks in the British rear areas. British airdromes and retreating troops offered ideal targets, but they were not molested.

Since there was no marked air superiority during the engage4| ment and since operations by places against ground troops were not| extensive, air operations were not the decisive factor. It is sf possible, however, that if the British had had air superiority and f" a large quantity of bombardment aviation, and if it had been boldly| employed, the inferiority in numbers of the British ground;'troops-' '•**• might have been offset to some extent.

One illustration of excellent German air-ground cooperation occurred on the afternoon of the 17th, German tanks found themselves hard-pressed by British tanks and artillery and apgaxentl^ called for air -support. In less than half an hour after the engagement began, 10 Me-109's appeared, and the German tanks managed to escape under cover of the dust and smoke from the bombs of their supporting air­ craft. -

(3) British

(a) General

Fighter protection was to be provided over the area of operations. Tactical reconnaissance missions were to be under the

*There is little detailed information on air operations, the few re­ ports covering only isolated instances rather than a chronological development of air action during the three days. This is partially due to the fact that there was no really unified plan for the employ­ ment of the relatively limited British air power.

- 30 - command of the Desert Force.

During the action, ground operations were supported "by five fighter squadrons operating from airdromes in the Mersa Bagush—Mersa Matruh area and. two "bomber squadrons from fields in the Mersa Bagush— Fuka area,' the latter of which is about 125 miles east of Salum. Minor repairs and routine inspections were made at Burg el Arab, some 270 miles from Salum in the same direction. In addition, nightly bombing raids on Bengasi were carried out by Wellington bombers based in the Suez Canal area. The fighters consisted of one South African and three- English Hurricane squadrons and one English Tomahawk squad­ ron. The bombers were all Marylands (Glenn Martin Company). The average available strength during the action was 60 fighters.and 30 bombers. Fighters penetrating to the enemy rear area were obliged to refuel at Sidi Barrani. All planes operated from desert fields which were inadequately supplied with antiaircraft protection. No camouflage was employed, but wide dispersal of planes was depended upon for protection. Two or three dummy airdromes were maintained.

(b) Employment

The Group Commander dealt directly with squadrons, the usual Wing Headquarters being inoperative. The bombers conducted daily distant reconnaissance missions over the enemy rear areas and a few horizontal bombing attacks on enemy columns. One fighter squadron acted as an army cooperative unit and conducted close recon­ naissance by visual and photographic missions. The other fighter squadrons were employed on protective missions over friendly troops and on ground-strafing of enemy columns. Throughout the engagement it was necessary to provide fighter protection for small naval vessels en route to Tobruk with essential supplies.

(c) Tactical Results

General British reconnaissance of enemy rear areas was very successful, in that movements of enemy columns anSTconceS^ trations were continually plotted on the situation maps. On the night of June 18, however, the entire -eHen^^roiSS^^prce^onipletely disappeared and their disposition was not discovered for 48 hours.

Although the general battle area was very conspicuous because of the high clouds of dust raised by the battling tank columns, the front lines were never definitely known to E.A.I, Headquarters dur­ ing the action.

The results of the horizontal bomber attacks on armored columns are not known, but they did not appear to affect enemy move­ ments very seriously, although one aerial photograph showed -a rs^lvoT^Tti ft

- 31 - that enveloped the head of an armored column."' The successful straf­ ing of one enemy airdrome was claimed to have resulted in the disabling of 10 German or Italian planes.

The German columns had flank guards with so much antiaircraft that the planes had to fly through a "barrage to -attack* Consequently, the losses on ground-strafing missions were extremely heavy, some­ times amounting to as many as five out of six planes* An insuffi­ cient number of fighters were available to provide adequate protec­ tion for the British columns*

British army-air cooperation was very sketchy* What commu­ nication did exist between planes and troops in action was by radio, and radio was the chief method used by ground troops to identify themselves to their own planes* It did not appear to be as effective as the usual German method of air-ground identification by Very signals*

The British fighting squadrons lost about one-third of their numbers, and the Group Commander thinks the air losses were about equal on both sides»

7. LESSONS AM3 COMMENDS*

a* General

The combat zone covered an area of approximately 250 square miles* The area might be considered generally rectangular in shape with an east-west measurement of about 19 miles and a north-south measurement of about 13 miles„ British units performed well, and the defeat might be ascribed to the greater fire power of the Germans and their superior numbers of tanks*

Two factors hampered the British during the operations:

(l) Failure of communications in the 4th Indian Division*

*Some of the lessons and comments in this section are not drawn directly from the account of operations in Section 6*. They are drawn, however, directly from reports and interviews with observers who had talked to officers of the British forces a short time after.the battle, and it is felt that many of these comments and lessons are of sufficient value to warrant their inclusion even though they can*- not be related to specific actions described under operations* It should be noted that these lessons and comments are based upon British equipment and British doctrine, and, while they are informative, they cannot always be applied directly to our own forces* The improper functioning of communications was probably due in part to the fact that the Guards Brigade, which had not previously been an organic element of the division, had had only a very short time in which to become familiar with the signal system and procedure of the 4th Indian Division. Also there was considerable trouble with storage-battery charging.

(2) An insufficient supply of ammunition, tfever before had British artillery and tanks taken part in so large an armored action. The result was that ammunition demands were underestimated, and at times the supply for both artillery and tanks temporarily ran out.

The desert terrain provided little cover. Location of posi­ tions was facilitated by the beacon points along the wire fence and the well-defined features of the Escarpment. At no time was there a situation in which a normal front could "be defined. Although early on the morning of June 16 the 4th Indian Division held a generally stabilized front extending along the line Fort Capuzzo— Musaid—Salum, at the same time isolated actions were taking place in the Ealfaya Pass and ?th Armored Division sectors. In general, the action appeared to be one in xfhich the infantry held while the tanks battled for the supremacy of the field.

b. Combined Arms

(1) Task-force commanders must be given adequate means to perform the tasks assigned them. The British commander at Halfaya Pass was apparently inadequately provided; the result was that this was the only position in the frontier a;rea which was not taken. If the battery of the 31st Field Hegiment, the 8th Field Regiment, and the 212th Medium Battery had been left in the position and if air bombardment had been employed, it is possible that the Halfaya Pass position might have been taken. Also, in the attack on the area B.P. 38—Pt. 206, some tanks might have been saved by employing a sufficient force to take the position in the first attack, at about 11:30 a.m. Instead, two attacks had to be made before the position was taken, and five tanks were lost in the abortive first attempt.

(2) Infantry commanders must understand the capabilities and limitations of infantry tanks in the support of infantry if they are to employ them properly. British infantry tanks at Port Capuzzo, after the seizure of the position, were improperly used as stationary pillboxes to cover the infantry, and, as a result, heavy losses were caused by protracted shelling.

(3) The British method of having infantry tanks call the in­ fantry to come forward after the tanks have secured a position was ineffective. While the tanks attempted to hold the position under hostile fire, they sometimes waited as much fantry to come up* This indicates the import means of communication and liaison "between tanks and supporting in­ fantry. At Halfay a Pass the German infantry apparently were in such close contact with tanks that even though the tanks were finally repulsed, the infantry held many of the gains. This illustrates the advantage of close cooperation "between infantry and tanks.

(4) If the situation demands that a "bridgehead "be set up in a mine field, consideration should "be given to methods of exploding these mines prematurely. If this is not done, the results are often disastrous, as was the case when four out of six tanks attacking "below the Escarpment at Hal fay a, Pass were destroyed "by one German mine field.

(5) In order to neutralize hostile fires, infantry tanks should "be supported in their attack "by heavy supporting-fire from infantry and artillery and "by dive-bombing. 105-mm. or 25-pounder H.E. artillery fire usually stopped "both British and German tank attacks. " ~ "

(6) Decentralized direct support "by artillery of armored units with hair-trigger promptness is essential. The area of the combat zone and the speed of the armored action were too great to permit the massing of artillery fire under divisional control.

(7) The small Mobile Columns, including as they did field guns, antitank guns, antiaircraft guns, and infantry, proved extremely effective against German tank attacks "because of their concentration and variety of fire power and their high maneuverability.

(8) In armored action, dive-bombardment aviation must be in­ stantly available to the division commander for use as counterbattery against field and antitank guns. The Germans proved the effective­ ness of dive-bombardment in counterbattery operations in the action at Battuma on the 17th.

c. Armored Units

(l) General

(a) The armored brigade commander must be at the point where he can observe the most important action of his forces and when critical situations arise, can give remedial orders quickly. A British tank squadron on Sir Hafid Ridge was decimated while it tried for more than an hour to get support from the brigade commander, who was over 3 miles from the scene of action.

-34 - imhiltJS4L B ... : |P* ' (b) The 40-mile per day range of action of the British infantry tajiks was wholly inadequate. Also, the maximum usable speed of approximately 5 miles per hour was entirely insufficient to cope with critical situations.

(c) British cruiser tanks engaged hostile tanks in the manner of naval warfare. Efforts were made to move in parallel columns, firing broadside and diagonally across the front of the hostile tanks, broadside "being used to secure a better gun platform, British tanks attempted to surprise German tank units from hull-down positions and to fire while stationary. They fired at ranges up to 2000 yards, while the German medium tanks, equipped with the 75-mm, gun, opened fire at ranges as great as 6000 yards. Tajiks seldom closed with each other*.

(d) Most of the British junior officers who were engaged in action expressed a desire for greater speed and heavier armament in tanks**, although they were not so insistent for heavier armor. Crews of reconnaissance vehicles also demand greater fire power in order to oppose the heavily armored German reconnaissance cars.

(e) More ammunition^,than the British provided is required for armored actions. British methods proved inadequate, and seemed j to indicate that in an action of this sort ammunition should be fur- / nished by a separate chain of supplyj and. that a large rolling re- j serve should be maintained. Staffs must be able to shift reserves j quickly according to the dictates of the situation. British tanks (

*Sufficient information to arrive at any conclusion about this type of action is not available.

**As noted in British Order of Battle, the British tanks were armed as follows:

A-9 and A-10 one Br en gun two .303 machine g^ins, one 40-mm. gun 1-13 two machine guns one 40-mm. gun A-15 one 1- or 2-pounder or 3-in. howitzer three 7.92~mm. Besa machine guns Infantry tank, Mk.II one 40-mm. gun one .303 machine gun

$See p. 2, APPENDIX D, for ammunition supply of tanks. -!.Tr; fe'i'i.V.,. - 35 '•1 X\\ %V\ '"j 3 used, four refills of ammunition, in less than 2 days and artillery units, which started with 200 rounds of ammunition per gun, ran out on the afternoons of "both the first and the second day. It is esti­ mated that German artillery ammunition expenditures were at least three times that of the British. ^

(2) Maintenance*

(a) The success of tank "battles may hang on the effi­ ciency of the field recovery system. In the light repair section of the 7th Armored Brigade, 15 out of 23 vehicles recovered from the battlefield were returned in 24 hours. Such recovery, of course, was of the utmost importance to a division commander who had only 40 tanks remaining fit for action.

• (b) The allocation of disabled tanks to recovery units must be organized to suit the action. If the brigades operate separately, the recovery and maintenance units must be decentralized to brigades rather than to divisions and must be placed well forward. For example, on the morning of the fourth day of action, when the 4th and 7th Armored Brigades together had only 40 tanks running, the 7th Armored Brigade light repair section had 23 tanks, whereas the advanced divisional workshop, with the best facilities, had only 2 tanks.

d. Artillery

(l) General

(a) G-erman

German artillery support was generally of a superior character, and indicated an efficient staff organization. The Ger­ mans apparently realized that continuous artillery support of tanks under all conditions is essential, for they never committed tanks to action without maintaining continuous fire on targets and_s_uaie_c_t_e_d. areas. Artillery in support of "German mobile columns apparently used observed fire. The Germans evidently^utiTIzed the bulk of their field guns in defense of fortified islands and in support of close-in action. In addition to firing at targets of opportunity the Germans also employed prearranged fires. ,

German 105-mm. self-propelled guns, and 75-mm. guns in medium tanks enabled their armored columns to move, with continuous artillery

*See APPENDIX E for further discussion of the maintenance and recovery system. 1 support, at an average speed of about 15 miles per hour. 105-mm. field guns apparently took over the artillery support whenever possible, although this was infrequent in the fluid action on the south flank. The motile gun support was estimated as "being 30fo as intense as that of the field guns. The Germans used 75-mm. time- shell and ricochet fire liberally against s\ispected antitank gun areas.

(b) British

The British used the combat-team principle, attach-? ing artillery to the units to be supported, except in the Indigji Divislonj^where they attempted to mass_^fir_e...^

The British attached 25*-pounders by 4- and 6-gun troops to the supported units of both divisions, and the fire in these troops was, conducted entirely by forward observers—usually troop com­ manders—in unarmored vehicles (because armored vehicles were not available). Sadio communication was used* Fire was delivered when­ ever suitable targets offered themselves. British artillery furnished effective local support in tank^-versus-tank action and less effective support against organized areas. No organized counterbattery pro­ cedure was followed, and counterbattery fire was. on~T5.e whole, in­ effective.

(2) Artillery Materiel

(a) German

British tank crews considered the 75-mm*. German tank gun ineffective against tanks. Although this gun can break tracks at 2000 yards, it seems to be inaccurate in tank-versus-tank action and is largely used to shell troops in unarmored transports and to search suspected antitank areas. Both the 50-mm. antitank gun? which was also effective against aircraft, and the 28/20-mm. chokebore anti­ tank gun proved to be excellent weapons. The 50-mnu antitank guns which knocked out 17 tanks in a few minutes on Bir Hafid Ridge used solid shot. The 28/20-mm. chokebore projectile and, at very short ranges, the 50-mm. projectile were the only ones which are definitely known to have penetrated the 3-inch turrets of the British infantry tanks in this action*

("b) British

The British 25*-poujader showed" itself to "be a very accurate, rugged, and thoroughly dependable divisional piece. It could "be towed over the open desert at high speed, and "both gun and caisson proved themselves to "be the only trailed loads in the armored

1 37 - ill! IllIR division to tear up under the strain of desertape,.| This gun , ; (l is very accurate at long ranges and has a ratW/of -fi're 'of' atout 'three to five rounds per minute* It was the conclusion of most British commanders that 50$ of the artillery in an armored division should "be on self-propelled mounts and 50$ should "be towed, the latter to "be used in the more slowly moving units of the division.

It was the universal opinion of British artillery officers that ammunition should "be carried in caissons and that at least one caisson per piece is necessary for artillery of the armored division. There are two reasons for this:

(a) The caisson can he more easily camouflaged than stacked ammunition.

(h) When the ammunition is on the same mobile "basis as the gun, there is less likelihood of the ammunition's "being abandoned in the sudden moves of armored actionv/

The British 25-pounder and the German 105-rnm., "both using H.E. projectiles, were found to be effective against all types of tanks. Although direct hits were few, when they did occur, they usually put tanks temporarily out of action. Damage was usually re­ pairable unless the fuel was ignited as sometimes happened* The fire of these guns was so effective that the tank crews of both forces were reluctant to remain in areas subjected to normal concentrations of these calibers. The Germans used single 105-mm. guns to stiffen antitank gun fire.

Desert warfare has proved that "run-flat11 tires*, with su­ perior self-sealing tubes, are absolutely necessary. One British unit lost two 6-inch howitzers from "near misses11 which riddled the tires. Although fire was continued, the guns could not be evacuated. Several other units had practically the same experience,, Another unit, how­ ever, had equipped itself with self-sealing tubes from trucks and suffered no loss, although a number of tires were punctured several times.

(3) Observation

All the British artillery organizations in the action furnished their own observers. Although casualties among the forward observers were low, it was the unanimous opinion of artillery com­ manders in both divisions that an armored OP is necessary. They in­ sist that this OP must have an abiolutely relTabTe engine, must have

*Bun-flat tires have a small tube and a very thick, heavy wall. at least the motility of the troops it accompanies, and should, if possible, have overhead cover against air attack, as well as a sil­ houette which cannot be easily distinguished from those of the ve­ hicles that normally are found in its vicinity. These commanders, however, place dependability and speed above protection.

The British artillery massed their fire in armored action on only two known occasions, in the action on the afternoon of June 15 and in the rear-guard action on June 17. While the guns remained stationary, the observers were ordered by radio to positions from which they could conduct fire against the highly mobile targets. In the latter instance the fire was sufficiently effective to permit the successful withdrawal of the Guards Brigade, British artillery commanders were unable, because of the impracticability of their methods, to direct the fire of more than one troop at mobile targets under desert conditions. Although most British officers admitted that the. massing of artillery fire would be valuable ,as an alternative system, they.thought it" not practical with their methods^

The British troops, both the armored and the infantry,. were unanimous in their praise of the artillery. That this confidence exists is proof enoxxgh of the aggressive determination with which the gunners delivered fire. Every British commander expressed a desire and need for additional artillery for the support of infantry and armored forces. -

(4) Counterbattery Fire

The British had no regularly organized counterbattery procedure, and the only counterbattery action effected by the British artillery, was the result Of chance observation by forward observers of German guns in action./ One of the most effective counterbattery methods used by the Germans was that of employing dive-bombers against known enemy artillery positions./ All commanders of British ground units stressed the necessity of having dive-bombardment under divisional control for critical targets. They pointed out, however, that the bulk of counterbattery fire would still be delivered by artillery units with some means of keeping up with armored action. They considered the answer to'be air adjustment..

Both, the 4th Indian Division and the 7th Armored Division re­ vealed that they had used counterbattery officers on only two occa­ sions, the sieges of Tobruk and Bardia, It is interesting to note that in these cases the counterbattery organization had been furnished by specialists imported for the purpose from the Middle East Counter- Battery School*.

- 39 - Communication within, the artillery of both-the' Indian Divi­ sion and the 7th Armored Division Was entirely by radio*. .

e. Antiaircraft Defense

(1) Active

Antiaircraft protection of British combat organizations was inadequate. The Mobile Columns of the Support Group were fur­ nished two Bof or s 40-mra. guns each. There were, however, numerous unauthorized Bren, Lewis, and Italian machine guns on improvised mounts scattered throughout all organizations. Wo special sights were issued for machine guns, and gunners relied upon tracer bullets to direct their fire.

Bofors antiaircraft guns must be placed within about 600| yards of each other for mutual support against simultaneous air at- J tacks from more than, one direction." /

The action in the Battuma area indicates the necessity for having strong organic antiaircraft defense in order to,repel enemy dive-bombers which are being used on counterbattery.missions. When the situation warrants it, this organic defense may be reinforced by attached antiaircraft units.

In opposing dive-bombing and machine-gun attacks, the 7th Armored Division practice called for.troops actually under fire to take cover and for all others within range to opera fire with every available weapon. Bren and Lewis guns on antiaircraft pedestals did not seem to be very effective against low-flying G-erman attack. Ger­ man air attacks were effective, and time bombs with 30-secohd delay were frequently used against artillery positions.

As previously noted, H.A.F. reports indicate that German antiaircraft protection of troops on the march and in action was very effective, numerous 15-mm. and 20-r-mm. dual purpose weapons were employed around the flanks of all German units.

(2) Passive

( Slit trenches were dug as soon as positions were occupied,

divisions are being trained at this school, and the need for counter- battery personnel within the division is recognized by all commanders.

,*See APPEHDIX B for description of the functioning.of radio communica­ tion within the artillery of the 7th Armored Division. even if gun crews were depleted in so doing, and British soldiers f were unanimous in their respect for this form of antiaircraft pro- tection. Similar cover was provided in all bivouac areas. I

Although artillery pieces in the Armored Division were not camouflaged "before or during the "battle, extreme dispersion and stagger were normal, and all combat zone vehicles were camouflaged with paint. Artillery commanders agreed that this practice is neces­ sary. AH glass and bright parts were habitually smeared with oil and dust; standing orders allowed a vision space in windshields and windows of 5 by 2 inches only.

The general antiaircraft warning system was not used in the artillery of the Armored Division. The Indian Division maintained a net of antiparachute and.antiaircraft warning patrols throughout its rear and flank areas*

f. Aviation

(1) Maximum strength must be used whenever planes are sent on a mission. Too often K.A.3T. fighters were sent on missions with a minimum strength only to find enemy planes or antiaircraft in greater number than they expected.

(2) Fighter planes engaged in ground-strafing must save a certain amount of a,mmunition with which to combat enemy planes which may attack them on their return flight. On several occasions British planes violated this rule and found themselves relatively defenseless against hostile air attack.

(3) German mobile antiaircraft units, which formed part of the flank guards of armored and motorized columns^ were able to go in­ to action very quickly and deliver extremely heavy and effective, anti* aircraft fire. Consequently the R.A.S1. found ground-strafing costly unless the following rules were observed:

(a) Approaches should surprise.

(b) Planes should stay flat and come in at 'maximum speed.

(c). Ijo second attack should be made unless the antiair­ craft guns have been knocked out in the first attack.

(d) Columns which are halted should not be attacked un­ less air power is sufficient to knock out the anti­ aircraft units.

Planes engaged in ground-^strafing also found that overhead protection was vetfy necessary if they were not to "be attacked "by the enemy planes which often accompanied ground columns.

g. Training

Emphasis must "be placed on tank identification "by silhouette in order to prevent "both planes and ground troops from firing at their own tanks, which frequently happened. In addition to identifi­ cation hy silhouette a ready means of recognition signals are neces­ sary.

h. Supply*

(1) The Supply Officer of an armored division must not he at rear division headquarters daring action, but at advanced division, headquarters, for it is only there that he can keep in touch with the tactical situation. The Division Supply Officer was constantly hampered by lack of knowledge of developments, and on several occa­ sions during the critical stages of the action, this lack of knowledge might well have proved disastrous.

(2) There must be a separate line of supply for ammunition.

(3) The present British allotments of ammunition are wholly inadequate for a.n action in which large armored units are engaged.

*The following lessons were drawn by the experienced 7th Armored Division Supply Officer. See.AFPSNDIX- D for a further discussion of supply. APPENDIX A

AXIS FORCES IN THE TOBRTK AREA

The following table shows the details of the Axis forces in the Tobruk area as estimated by the British. Intelligence.

1. GERMAN

a. 15th Armored Division (remainder)

1 tank battalion (102 light and medium tanks); 2 motorized infantry regiments, each composed of

.] I 2 battalions of infantry, ,• 1 infantry gun company, \ 1 antitank company;

1 artillery regiment (about 30 field guns); 1 pioneer battalion; 1 antitank battalion; 1 antiaircraft unit (twelve 88r-mm. antiaircraft guns).

b. 5th Light Motorized Division (remainder)

1 tank battalion (86 light and medium tanks); . 2 machine-gun battalions (approximately); 1 antitank battalion; 1 antiaircraft battalion.

2. ITALIAN

a. 132d Armored Division

1 tank regiment (about 70 light and medium tanks')-; 1 motorcycle battalion; 1 motorized artillery regiment (approximately eighteen 75-mm. guns); 1 antitank company.

b. 27th Infantry Division

1 infantry regiment (3 battalions); 1 infantry regiment (2 battalions); 1 mobile artillery regiment (24 field guns); 1 antitank company; 1 machine-gun battalion.

HV\'% H ,,, t,,., U[i-\ 5 1•|7\ j~l 1 ' IA i^V'/V •1 :• KA;' ' 102d Motorized Infantry Division fi'j1 • f§i 'if'- j£!| ll ' Bfr'ii -A] V 4 .*;! 'P A 1 motorized infantry regiment (3 "battalions); 1 motorized infantry regiment (2 'battalions—depleted); 1 motorized infantry regiment (2 "battalions); 1 machine-gun "battalion; \ : 1 antitank "battalion (30 antitank; guns); ; • 1 motorized artillery regiment.

17th Motorized Infantry Division (approximately the same organization as\that of the 102d Division) ARTILLERY RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS OF THE 7TH ARMORED DIVISION

Each artillery troop had. three No. 11 sets* using one princi­ pal frequency, and, for emergency use, one "switch" frequency. Each troop was part of a Mobile Column, which furnished No. 9 command sets. Switch frequencies were in the overlap "band of No. 10 and No. 11 ,sets, permitting use of No. 9 in displacement "by half-troop in case no extra infantry No. 11 set was available for the purpose. Artillery troops normally operated with two OP's using No. 11 sets. A third OP could "be manned for emergency use "by diverting a set from the infantry of the Mobile, Columns. Allowance of radio sets provided only one for the gun position. Six-gun troops were often fired—by half-troops-— from both OP's simultaneously using the one base station.

Radio was generally reliable, although British sets are heavy and cannot be removed from the vehicle. The range of the No. 11 set- voice 25 miles—was considered adequate for all troop uses during this battle. The remote control device is unnecessary for OP use in the desert.

Troubles with storage-battery charging became serious during the third day and were the cause of radio failure in several cases.

There was little enemy interference with artillery communication,

•These British radio sets have the following characteristics:

Approximate U.S. Army Voice Range .Frequency Weight Equivalent

No. 9 8-10 mi. 1875-5000 200 lbs. Radio Set S.C.R.-284

No. 10 Not a standard set; details are unknown-.

No. 11 3 mi. with loop 4200-7500 83 lbs. Radio Set antenna; 8 mi. S.C.R.-288 with pole anten­ na. (Special x devices are used for increasing the range) and that, apparently, was accidental. Also, there wasno indication of radio direction finding in location of English "batteries. British divisions did not attempt to interfere with enemy radio or operate direction-finding stations. All artillery transmissions were by voice in the clear except for, code names; locations were transmitted in a map reference code.

Wire was not used in the Armored Division at any time during the "battle. There was no evidence of visual signalling in the . artillery, "but messengers were liberally used and invariably mounted in trucks, since motorcycles are useless in the desert.

Action in the Western Desert shows that ruggedness and relia­ bility are of more importance than weight. |S>;M»8

Regimental Aid Posts

!RAP:

Advanced Dressing Stat

IADS 4th Armored '^5§J !—ff.J 7th Armored j_ADS j Support Brigade Brigade .Reserve Group Dressing ati^n

Bir el Khireigat

Mwaydiret Zagdin

Sofafi

Casualty Clearing Station

!CCS! Mersa Matruh

Base Hospital BH j Cairo

Figure 1. Schematic Disposition of Medical Units of the 7th Armored Division.. APPENDIX C

MEDICAL SERVICES OF THE 7TH ARMORED DIVISION

Figure 1 and the following explanation provide a brief out­ line of the organization of the medical service of the 7th Armored Division, which evacuated a total of 500 casualties during the four days of action. Many of these casualties, however, were from units of the 4th Indian Division.

1. • REGIMENTAL AID POSTS

Each of these Regimental Aid Posts has one medical officer and one or two ambulances.

2. ' ADVANCED DRESSING STATIONS

The Advanced Dressing Stations are designed to fill the gap between the Regimental Aid Posts and the Main Dressing Station. These Advanced Dressing Stations were never over 20 miles ahead of the Main Dressing Station.

3. MAIN DRESSING STATION

The Main Dressing Station, which will shelter about 20 patients and which may be moved in about 20 minutes, is a very mo­ bile unit using lean-to type tents which fasten to the back of a truck. Emergency surgery can be done at this station.

4. LIGHT FIELD AMBULANCE STATION:

The three Light Field Ambulance Stations each provided 14 ambulances for the evacuation of patients from the Regimental Aid Posts to the Main Dressing Station at Sofafi.

5. CASUALTY CLEARING STATION

The Casualty Clearing Station, placed between the Main Dress­ ing Station and the Base Hospital at Cairo, received patients which, were evacuated by the Desert Force.

6. EVACUATION OF A WOUNDED MAN IN THE 7TH ARMORED DIVISION

a. • The wounded man in the tank is given first aid by the re­ mainder of the crew. Morphia, to relieve pain, is provided in the tank first-aid kit. b. The man is taken out of action.

c. The medical officer at Regimental Aid Post meets the casualty, which was reported by radio if possible, and administers the neces­ sary emergency treatment,

d. The casualty, with others, goes to the Advanced Dressing Station in an ambulance.

e. In the Advanced Dressing Station the patient has his dressing adjusted, is fed, and then is sent on to a Main Dressing Station*.

f. The Main Dressing Station, which is the headquarters of the Light Field Ambulance, performs emergency surgery if necessary,

g. The patient is evacuated to the Casualty Clearing Station at Mersa Matrah.

h# The patient is finally evacuated to the Base Hospital in Cairo by rail or ambulance.

*If the distance which the brigade has advanced is great, additional dressing stations may be introduced in the line of evacuation in order to rest the casualties during their journey. : $' • !;••• v : . ••••••.'! 'S APPENDIX D -

SUPPLY OP THE 7TH ARMORED DIVISION

1. J INTRODUCTION f ! "The division commander should pick his "best officer to head ' his supply system*." This idea of General de Gaulle's, which was ex­ pressed last winter in a conference with U.S. Army observers in London, was repeated on several occasions "by senior British Armored Corps officers, and it is "believed that the truth of this statement was demonstrated in the action described in this bulletin. The j armored division supply system must be extremely responsive. It is j essential that one man head this supply system in the dual role of j commander and staff officer, and that he should be at advanced head­ quarters where he can keep in constant touch with the tactical situa­ tion. . . ' ' . ' ' • ' " ! During the 10 days preceding the action a field supply depot| in the Alam el Rabia area was stocked with sufficient supplies of all3 types to supply the 7th Armored Division for the anticipated period | of the action and to have a general level of 3 days of supply remain- \ ing in the depot on the morning of June 15. 1 a I The field supply depot covered an irregular area approximately! 6 miles square. The supplies were spread thinly over the area in | small- low piles and were camouflaged with dirt and brush. f

• •! Just before the action an emergency dump was.established well forward in the Q,aret el Ruweibit area in cas-e ""everything went wrong." In establishing this dump, the Division Supply Officer** had in mind especially the need for large amounts of.25-pounder ammunition as well as the needs of the infantry tanks,, with their 40-mile range of action.

2. BASIC SUPPLY PRINCIPLE

The basic principle of supply of the Armored Division is that the Royal Army Service Corps, which corresponds in many ways to our

*See Tentative Lessons Bulletin Ko. 89, "General de Gaulle on Armored Units."

**The correct title of this officer is "Assistant Adjutant and Quarter­ master General." Quartermaster Corps, delivers supplies, including ammnitio.n,, to the ] battalion or company trains. The "battalion or- company trains are called the "first line transport11 and are divided into an "A" Echelon'— vehicles such as mechanics* trucks which actually follow fighting vehicles into action—-and a "B" Echelon—the remainder of the trains. The R»A.S.C. provides truck companies which operate as "brigade trains and are referred to as the "second line transport." The "third line transport" is the R.A.S.C. transport which is used to supply the field supply depots from which the second line transport is replenished.

3. , "B" ECKSLON—FIRST LIME TRANSPORT

The "B" Echelon of the first line transport was pooled "by "bri­ gade. The brigade groups were controlled by the division through the commanding officer of "B" Echelon, who maintained communication with advanced and rear division headquarters "by radio.

4. LEVEL Off SUPPLIES III ORGANIZATIONS AND'TOIITS

a* Rations

Rations for each man •were distributed as follows:

On person 1 reserve ration; In vehicle 3 reserve rations and 1 battle ration; In "B" Echelon — 1 battle ration.

Cooking was by vehicle, and each vehicle was supplied with a small gasoline stove. Difficulty was experienced with the functioning of the stoves, however, and most of the groups preferred gasoline tins, using as fuel either scraps of wood or a mixture of gasoline and sand.

b. Ammunition

(1) Tank

There was one refill of ammunition on each tank*, a second one in the Echelon, half a' refill in the second line transport> and another well forward "on the ground." Most of the units ran out of ammunition on the second day, tanks having used over three and one- half refills.

*The capacities of the A-13 and A-15 cruiser tanks were as follows:

Gun Machine Gun

A-13 87 4275 A-15 151 5175 ifS&U

(2) Artillery ' ' " 'I There were approximately 200 rounds of artillery ammuni-| tion per gun at the guns and the same general distribution of refills/ as for the tanks,,

(3) Other Units

The distribution of ammunition for other units was generally the. same as for tanks and artillery.

cv G-asoline

The ,fB" Echelon carried one refill of gasoline and the second line transport carried another refill.

5. REPLENISHMENT

"B" Echelons were refilled by the second-line transport with supplies, petrol, and, ammunition as far as the situation would per­ mit. Early during the morning of the 15th the supplies for the 4th and 7th Armored Brigades, carried by the second-line transport, were dumped in the general area of Bir el Khireigat, and the second-line transport returned to the field supply depot to be refilled*

On the afternoon of the first day of action, the artillery, which had started with 200 rounds at the guns, ran out of ammunition, and had to wait for an hour or so for replenishment. All artillery ammunition was quickly exhausted, and when ammunition arrived at the Field Supply Depot by third^line transport, it was^necessarjr for the Division Supply Officer to move it directly forward to the ..units without transferring it to the secbrid-line transports, The needs for tank^"ammunxt^lon'^ln"'*a'''c'6nflx'c't: whicfiT"centers "around a tank-versus-tank action is many times greater than has been anticipated in the pas/b. It is believed that this battle demonstrated that the fluidity of a tank-versus-tank action requires that a larg£v^.o.^^ ,r e.s§r:ve !t ammunition be kept; wellforw^ The supply system must be capable of moving this mobile reserve rapidly in-order to keep pace with the changing situation.

6. SECOND LII\TE TRANSPORT

In the Armored Division the second-line transport is divided as follows: one company for each of the armored brigades, one for the Support Group,' and one for division units. Eacl^ has^a supply section, an,.ammunition__section, and_a,_gasoline sedfjb|jpi||f e s 'ev\ yk j.v !$__ nswans- K!_ x-i port carried the supplies in this action('f^pjliJ fjie, depot* ^ to the replenishing points . for. the MB,f EGj^b^sj.^ of^the

- 3 - companies was controlled "by the Chief jOfjflcer^of-i it?hg.i Division under^ the Division Supply Officer. In t^e'jtiks^t^t^e^rlVisli supply doctrine is that the daily main t enance runs bf ihe ^econd-Hnft trans- port should not he over 35 miles and that~of~the »B".Echelon not over RVA.S.C. 5fficer~malntains eommunication with"""' tKe second-line companies by means of a separate radio net.

s> > ^ feWi Figure 1. British Light Repair Section at Work oil the Desert APPENDIX E

MAINTENANCE AND RECOVERY OF VEHICLES

1. GENERAL ORGANIZATION

There are two Royal Army Corps Ordnance 'units. They axe the Armored Division Workshop and the Ordnance Meld Park. The Armored Division Workshops are divided into a main division workshop, three light repair sections, a recovery company, and several light-aid detachments. The main division workshop has an authorized personnel of 4 officers and 109 enlisted men, Each of the 3 light repair sec­ tions, which are usually attached to army brigades, has 2 officers and 44 enlisted men. The light-aid detachments are usually permanently attached, one each to "battalion, division, signal, and similar units. The personnel of the light aid detachment consists of 1 officer, who is -an ordnance mechanical engineer, and,16 enlisted men. The whole supply organization is under the supervision of the Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Service. The maintenance organization, however, is under the supervision of the Senior Ordnance Mechanical Engineer,

2. LIGHT AID DETACHMENTS

The Use of the light aid detachments varied with the organi­ zation. It happened that in the 2d R.T.R. the Ordnance Mechanical Engineer and his personnel had had no tank experience and so remained with the "B" echelon trains to look after the wheeled vehicles. Al­ though the squadron maintenance personnel were limited by instruc­ tions to jots requiring less than 2 hours work, in practice they per­ formed all the work possible with whatever tools were procurable. Under the maintenance system the light aid detachment takes over the repair of vehicles requiring, from 5 to 7 hours of work. In this or­ ganization also the general practice is to do all the work that tools and equipment permit.

3. LIGHT REPAIR SECTION

Although the light repair section maintains a fixed head­ quarters, it also has six service trucks, each carrying a sergeant , mechanic and a mechanic driver with hand tools. Under the maintenance system these troops go out and repair disabled vehicles. This method of utilization of the service trucks, however, has generally proved impracticable under desert conditions. There are three reasons for this. First, it is difficult to find the vehicle in need of repair. Second, parts are so scarce that each of these trucks cannot be equipped with enough spares to allow it to give proper service in the field. Third, vehicles canrrot be left alone, fo|$ ^le^pgL may be cannabalized; that is, the parts may "be r enfe$S

. The greatest, maintenance problem was the supply of parts. Constant improvization was necessary. Contrary to common practice, for the period of action light repair sections were placed in support of brigades rather than attached to them. Consequently these light repair sections took on any work that reached the bivouac,, although their first duty was to the brigade which they supported.- The bulk of the repair work apparently fell on these light repair sections, for on the fourth day of action, when there were 23 tanks in'the 7th Brigade light repair section, there were only 2 in the division workshop—the organization with the best personnel, equipment, and facilities was doing practically no work,.

It is of the utmost importance that maintenance and recovery units have a. maximum mobility. For example, German tanks, apparently acting upon information furnished.by air reconnaissance, made a raid in the vicinity of Bir el Khireigat and captured or destroyed 20 British tanks which had been collected by a recovery section for evacuation during the night but which had not yet been evacuated.

Only the highest praise can be given the recovery section for their work. The recovery section not only labored continuously and recovered many vehicles under fire, but demonstrated great, bravery and resourcefulness in towing damaged tanks out of action.. The im­ portance of this recovery cannot be stressed too strongly, for armored action is so fluid that disabled tanks are constantly in danger, of capture or destruction so long as they remain in the for­ ward areas. y~U—i !'B" Echelon Trains O Q

Figure 1. Formation of the Close Leaguer. APPENDIX F

LEAGUERING*

1- DAYLIGHT FORMATION

During the hours of daylight, units are formed into what is known as an open leaguer., which is a form of dispersed "bivouac. Vehicles are disposed in generally the same manner as when moving during the day. If air attack is expected, however, intervals and distances may be increased. In this open leaguer an all-round de­ fense is habitually maintained. Patrols are kept well out in order to give as early a warning as possible. 2. NIGHT FORMATION

Upon halting for the night, units of the size of a regiment are formed into what is known as a close leaguer**. Armored vehicles form either a triangle or a square facing outwards and the smaller units occupy the leg or side with 10 to 15'yards between vehicles. Close leaguers are usually formed about dusk, but if the troops be­ lieve themselves to have been observed from the air or ground, they often change position after darkness falls. The "B" Echelon of the supply unit comes forward after dark and moves inside the triangle or square. Unit vehicles then move to the rear of their respective organizations.

Night listening posts, as well as day patrols, are kept well out from the leaguer. Armored vehicles are not used for this purpose. Within the leaguer one tank or other armored vehicle is detailed to approximately every five vehicles. One man in each vehicle is always on the alert and these sentries are changed hourly.

The lights which are necessary for administration, mainte­ nance, and cooking are carefully concealed by tarpaulins. When there

*In the days of the South African wagon trains a circular formation was used at night to provide mutual protection. This formation was known as laagering or a laager. In some way this word was changed by the British to leaguer. Prior to the adoption of this word the British used the word harboring. The word leaguer is a little more specific in its meaning than the American term bivouac in that it signifies a specific type of formation.

**See fig. 1 for formation of the close leaguer. it mm / - is 110 danger of observation or attack, termittently in order to assist the "B" rib ."the| leaguer.

Except in cases of emergency, wireless silence is usually ob­ served during the hours of darkness and for at least half an hour before moving into the leaguer area,. Just prior to dawn the "B" Echelon moves to the rear. When there is no danger of an attack by enemy ground forces, the open leaguer is used for both day and night formations. This is done in order to provide dispersal protection against air attacks..

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1^0*AxisUnits Movement of Armored Units All Other Movemenfs

British designations of units are used on this map. The German TanK following table shov*s approxtm ate C/.S.egui v alents. Attac.K» BRITISH APPROXIMATE U S.EQUIVALENTS 3:30 PM and 1* 1 Arty Btry (8or 12guns) Arty Bn 5; 30 PM /?*? 1 * 1 Arty Reg f(2 Btfys) Arty Re gt of Armd Brig 1^2] Armd Sqd6TKs) Armd Co l^-N Armd Regt (2 or3 Sqs) Armd Bn X I0! Armd Brig (2 or 3 Re atsi Armd Re gt ii . Tank Actions 10 A M tnf Bn (4 RCos) /fiT Bn ff tnf Brig (3 Bns) /rjf Regt to Dark June 15 • Fort J 3 / » .cv—"\Capuzzo Scale 4:1+6,000

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—^Movement of Axis Units > »- Movement of Armored Units All Other Movements

British designations of units are used on this map. The folio wing t ab !e sh o ws appro*im ate U.S. ecfu i v alents

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