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* ;.. r 'JzSlI,, ., • il KEEl • «« «S» ft; . .* 5§vI» M WAR DEPARTMEiNT SPECIAL BULLETIN NO. 3 6 THE BATTLE OF SALUM JUNE 15-17, 194 ."t\ JOHNSTON • e i - a strg "yMopai PREPARED BY THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, D. C. is - I'M I' »' WAR DEPARTMENT SPECIAL BULLETIN No. 36 ERRATA: On pt 7 delete footnote "*This gun. t,per minute." and sub­ stitute """The Breda gun mentioned here is a dual purpose 20-mm. antiaircraft and antitank machine gun which is gas operated and fed "by plates of 12 rounds each. Its muzzle velocity is 2756 feet per second; its rate of fire 220 rounds per minute; and its maximum range approximately 6000 yards." On Map No. 4 for "Scale 1:146,000" substitute "Scale 1:146,100." NOTICE The information contained in this series of bulletins will be restricted to items from official sources which are reasonably confirmed. The lessons necessarily are tentative and in no sense mature studies. This document is being given an approved distribution, and no additional copies are available in the Military Intelligence Division. For provi­ sions governing its reproduction see Letter TAG- 350.05 (9-19-40) M-B-M. Prepared by the Military Intelligence Division War Department Washington, D. C., November 17, 1941 WAR DEPARTMENT SPECIAL BULLETIN No. 36 THE BATTLE OP SALUM, JUNE 15-17, 1941 NOTICE The information contained in this series of bulletins will "be restricted to items from official sources which are reasonably confirmed. The lessons necessarily are tentative and in no sense mature studies. This document is being given an approved distribution, and no additional copies are available in the Military Intelligence Division. For provi­ sions governing its reproduction see Letter TAG 350.05 (9-19-40) M-B-M. Prepared by the Military Intelligence Division War Department Washington, D. C., November 17, 1941 FOREWORD This Special Bulletin is based on material contained in a number of reports "by American official observers in Cairo. These reports, written in July, August, and September, 1941, present a comparatively full account of operations in North Africa, with particular emphasis on the Battle of Salum. In addition, supple­ mentary information has been secured by personal interviews with observers returning from l\Torth Africa. Explanatory notes are based on material available in the Military Intelligence Division. The account of the disposition and movements of British forces is reasonably complete., but adequate information on Axis forces is lacking. It has been impossible, therefore, to indicate more than a few movements of German and Italian units, and the Ger­ man and Italian troops referre.d to in the text and on the map must not be interpreted as comprising the complete Axis forces actually engaged. This bulletin may be utilized for training lectures pro­ vided attendance at the lectures is confined to members of the Armed Forces of the United States and that the confidential nature of the material is emphasized. TABLE OF CONTENTS Section FOREWORD ' INTRODUCTION—THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND ' ' 1-' ' • SEPTEMBER 19,39-JUNE 1941 2. TERRAIN . 3. TACTICAL BACKGROUND 4> ORDER OF BATTLE 5- PLANS AND PRELIMINARY MOVES OF THE BRITISH 6. OPERATIONS, JUNE 15-17 7- LESSONS AND COMMENTS APPENDIX A. AXIS FORCES IN THE TOBRUK AREA APPENDIX B. ARTILLERY RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE 7TH ARMORED DIVISION APPENDIX C. MEDICAL SERVICES OF THE 7TH ARMORED DIVISION APPENDIX D. SUPPLY OF.THE 7TH ARMORED DIVISION APPENDIX E. MAINTENANCE AND RECOVERY OF VEHICLES APPENDIX IF. LEAGUERING LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS i 'V. \\' ^ Facing Page Figure 1. Outpost Lines and Reconnaissance Patrols Prior to June 15 6 Figure 2. Shallow Depression among Sand Danes of the Coastal Plain 1 7 ' Figure 3. Area around Salum 8 Figure 4. British Armored Car Equipped with Captured Italian Sreda Gun 9 Figure 5. British Units in Assembly Areas 10 Figure 6. Formation for Movement of Escarpment Force 16 ' Figure 7. The. Escarpment . 18 Figure 8. German Armored Detachment near Salum 20 Figure 9. British Infantry Tanks Crossing the Desert 22 Figure 10. British Light Tanks on Patrol Crossing Rocky Terrain 24 Figure 11. German Mk.Ill and Mk.IV Tanks 26 . Figure 12. British A-13 Cruiser Tank Showing Dust Raised on Desert Terrain 27 APPENDIX C Figure 1. Schematic Disposition of Medical Units of the 7th Armored Division 1 APPENDIX E Figure 1. British Light Repair Section at Work on the Desert ' 1 APPENDIX F , Figure 1. Formation of theClose Leaguer 1 Map No. 1. General.Map of the Middle Eas t . Map No. 2. General Map of Battlefield Map No. 3. June 14-Noon June 15 Map No. 4. Noon June .15-Midnight June 15 Map No. 5. June 16 Map No. 6. June 17 . THE BATTLE OF SALUM JUNE 15-JUNE 17. 1941 1. INTRODUCTION--TflE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND - SEPTEMBER 1939-JURE 1941 (Map-No. l) In the desert warfare of North Africa, Tobruk stands as a fixed landmark in the ebb and flow of the fortunes of the British Middle East Command. Since April 14, 1941, this fortified seacoast town has "been dependent upon a precarious'supply line through the contested Mediterranean. Axis forces have stood at Salum, across the path of British forces, preventing the relief of Tobruk's garri­ son. The Battle of Salum marks the strongest British effort thus far made to relieve Tobruk. From a strategic point of view, the Battle of Salum is in itself not the most important battle of the North African campaign, but the details of the action are highly in­ structive in that, at the time, the battle marked one of the greatest tank-versus-tank actions in modern warfare. Furthermore, more au­ thentic details are available on this action than on any other single action in the North African campaign.' A. summary of events in the general area, therefore, from early fall 1939 to June 1941. is neces­ sary to place the Battle of Salum in proper perspective. In September 1939 General Wavell's Middle East. Command—•which included Egypt, the Sudan, Kenya, British Somaliland,. Palestine, Cyprus., and Trans Jordan-—consisted of 30,000 British and colonial troops stationed in Egypt, Palestine, and Transjordan. By June-10, 1940, when. Italy entered the war, reinforcements from India, Australia, South Africa, and Canada had raised the figure to 100,000 men trained and hardened for desert warfare. When Egypt became a theater of operations, France's collapse had destroyed all joint allied plans to protect the Eastern Mediter­ ranean. Even the French Army in Syria could not be relied upon to resist Axis, penetration there. In Libya, Marshal Graziani commanded an Italian Army of about 290,000 men, and, relieved of'the menace:of a French advance from Tunisia on his rear, he could now concentrate its full force against the frontiers of Egypt. In Italian East Africa, which included Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, ahd Ethiopia, .the Duke of Aosta threatened Kenya, Sudan, and. British Somaliland with a force estimated""at 240,000 white and native troops. Marshal Graziani f s Army, however, was considered the real threat to Egypt, for his aggressive tendencies suggested that an invasion of that country would quickly follow the Italian entrance into the war. On August 6, 1940, three Italian columns invaded British Somaliland. Since the defense of this area. had. been dependent upon support "by French Somaliland forces, the blow could not; "be parried. After a brief delaying action, the small Somaliland Camel Corps—500 British and 500 native troops--was withdrawn by sea to Aden, and Fascist forces entered Berbera on August 19. On September 14 Marshal Graziani1s Libyan Army left its bases in and around Bardia and swept past Salum into Egypt. By September 16 light tanks and armorpd cars, supported by aviation, had raced on through Buq Buq to Sidi Barrani, where the Italian forces stopped until December 194-0 to intrench, dig necessary wells, and perfect communications. Meanwhile, on November 11 Admiral Cunningham1s torpedo- bombers crippled the Italian Fleet at Taranto and cut Marshal Graziani1s sea communications. Timely reinforcements gave desert air superiority to the British and enabled them to put into action an armored division under General Creagh. Despite the fact that his troops were far inferior in number to the Italians concentrated near Sidi Barrani and those in support around Salum, General Wavell planned a surprise attack, under the field command of General O'Connor, Expecting a conventional frontal attack along the coastline, on Sidi Barrani., Marshal Graziani awoke on December 9 to a major flanking attack from a point southwest of Mersa Matruhy. preceded at dawn by an air attack and a naval bombardment. Two days later Sidi Barrani surrendered and the British took 40,000 prisoners and much military booty. Light British losses and the weak resistance of the enemy justified a further advance, and General Wavell,. with, command of .the air:, threw his; small striking forge against the retreating Fascists in an effort to destroy the whole Italian Army in Cyrenaica. There followed a series :of swift enveloping actions like the one that re­ sulted in the capture of Sidi Barrani. Salum, 60 miles west of Sidi Barrani* was captured on December 14. Bardia surrendered on January 6, 1941; Tobruk^ on January 22; Derna, on January 30; Bengasi, on February 7, Finally the. British seized El Agheila on February 10 and halted. By that time General Graziani1s Army had been annihilated and the British \nrTM. ,\vHyN \WpU o \ A \* V\Ulf I U l'iv had taken approximately 100,000 prisoners.Vv> On January 10, however, a British convoy passing through the Straits of Pantelleria under protection of cruisers and the aircraft carrier Illustrious had been attacked "by dive-bombers.

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