Five years. In our profession, it is not unusual for things that soldiers live by.” We are the stewards an officer to stay in one place for five years. But to of that legacy, as much today as when he wrote remain in the same job, in the same office for that those words more than 40 years ago. long is rare indeed. The force has a bright future. In a previous era, Whatever we’ve been able to accomplish with this when some said that we were not needed, General publication and in the United States Armor Associ- Jacob L. Devers wrote in the old Armored Cavalry ation has been due to the great staffs I’ve been Journal in 1948, “The future of armor is limited only associated with in both organizations and to that by the ingenuity of American industry and the re- most precious of commodities - time. As I move sourcefulness of the officers and enlisted men who on to whatever lies ahead, I want to publicly ac- belong to armored units. To those qualities there knowledge the great work done by the folks at are no limits - nor are there to the future of ARMOR and the Association. You readers can be armor.” proud of what they have done and of what they will continue to do. The missions change. The doctrine evolves. The threat transforms. But there will always be a need I also want to thank the hundreds of individuals for a fast-moving, high-trained, professional, direct- with whom I have come in contact over the past fire ground force that can deploy anywhere in the half-decade: the authors, reviewers, commanders, world, fight, and win. No one else can do what we and many, many supporters and readers. I can do or do it as well. There are dragons out there, truthfully say it has been the highlight of my career and they have lots of tanks. So, there will always to have worked with you. Keep up the good work. be the possibility of work to do. In 1975, General Donn A. Starry wrote in ARMOR, “...modern war Our branch is strong. This job has given me an games show that a force in which tanks are either eagle’s-eye view of the force and left me with a not present, or present in insufficient numbers, sim- distinct impression of the professionalism, elan, es- ply cannot fight successfully against an enemy prit, and tradition of Armor and Cavalry. equipped with even a modest number of tanks.” We know that to be true, and we know we’re the Back in 1950, when Armor officially became a force for the job. branch, Hanson Baldwin wrote in ARMOR, “The cavalry is not dead; its spirit, its traditions, its im- So, keep those letters and articles coming, folks. mortal intangibles endure. Its tactics, its esprit are It’s been a great run. Thanks for the opportunity. the heritage of armor and the Army; the ‘yellow legs’ are gone, but they have left behind them the - PJC

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official: d?&d* GORDON R. SULLIVAN MILTON H. HAMILTON General, United States Army Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Staff Secretary of the Army 01557 The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB- 17-92-3

Editor-in4hief LTC PATRICK J. COONEV Features

Managing Editor 6 A Tale of Two Battles JON T. CLEMENS by First Lieutenant (P) John A. Nag1 11 Dragon’s Roar: 1-37 Armor in the Battle of 73 Easting Commandant by Second Lieutenant Richard M. Bohannon MG THOMAS FOLEV C. 18 Tactical Employment of the Military Motorcycle by Lieutenant Colonel Craig S. Harju Sr., ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published Sergeant First Class David F. Wilson, and Richard B. Armstrong bimonthly by the US. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Foct Knox. KY 40121. 21 Remembering by Major Dale E. Wilson and Disclaimer: The information contained in Command Sergeant Major Robert A. Murphy ARMOR represents the professional opinions of 24 Flying A Desk the authors and does not necessarily reflect he by Captain John K. Bartolotto official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information presented 26 Bernard Law Montgomery: A Question of Competence in other official Army publications. by David Crag Official distribution is limited to one copy for 32 The Battle of Arras each armored brigade headquarters, armored by Captain Charles H. Benson 111 cavalry regiment headquarters. armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head- 37 Using “Push Packages” To Resupply Cavalry Operations quarters, reconnaissance squadron head- by Captain Daniel A. Beach quarters, armored cavalry troop. armor company, 41 You Can’t Push Wet Spaghetti and motorized brigade headquarters of the by Colonel John C. Gazlay, USA, Retired United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM 42 MILES Rules the Battlefield staff agencies with responsibility for armored. by Sergeant First Class Richard S. Francis direct fire, ground combat systems, 44 Short Halt Maintenance organizations, and the training of personnel for by First Lieutenant Bradley T. Gericke such organizations may request two copies by (P) sending a military letter to the ediior-in-chief. 46 Remarks at the Dedication of the Abrams Auditorium, Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only Patton Museum of Annor and Cavalry those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor by General Donn A. Starry, USA, Retired Center has proponency. That proponency includes: all armored, direct-fire grwnd combat Departments systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these 2 Letters 20 Armor Soldiers Monument systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; 2 Contacts 48 Tank Design Contest any miscellaneous ‘kerns of equipment which 4 Commander’s Hatch 50 Bustle Rack amr and armored cavalry organizations use 5 Driver’s Seat 51 Books exclusively; training for all SC 12A. 128. and 12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted ATTENTION FREE DISTRIBUTION APO ADDRESSEES: Please send soldiers; and information concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and your new address and unit number to ARMOR, ATTN: ATSB-AM (Ms. armored cavalry units at the brigaddregiment Hager), Ft. Knox, KY 40121-5210. Be sure to include your current mail- level and below. to indude Threat units at those ing label. levels. Matetial may be reprinted, provided credii is given to ARMOR and to he author, except where copyright is indicated.

May-June 1992, Vol. CI No. 3 Fire Support for the ACR: headquarters in an armored cavalry regi- desiined to always fight as a heavy bri- Another Opinion ment. His argument is that the artillerymen gade, then Iwould agree, but they're not. in a regiment need branch specific cenbal- An armored cavalry regiment may occupy ized control for training, career manage- a screen line over 50 kms. wide, with three Dear Sir: ment, and to provide better overall fire sup- squadrons abreast. Under this scenario, it port. I disagree. would get little benefit from a TACFIRE I enjoyed reading Captain Reagor's arti- First. and foremost, the armored cavalry shelter and the maturity of a FA lieutenant cle, The Guns of the Cavalry," (Nov-Dec squadron is designed to fight independently colonel. The FA battalion commander 1991). However, my experience as the reg- of the other squadrons. That is the primary would be hard pressed just to talk to his imental fire support officer for the 2d ACR reason for an organic howitzer battery commanders, never mind provide adequate has led me to a different set of conclu- (HWB). Traditional cavalry missions attillery fires across the sector. sions. (screen, guard. cover) all may require the I also find the argument that available FA Captain Reagofs basic thesis is that unit to operate autonomously, separate staff positions adversely affect officer Wan- there needs to be a field artillery battalion from its sister units. If the regiment were sition and career development to be incor-

ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL Editor-in-Chief Commandant (ATZK-CG) Lieutenant Colonel Patrick J. Cooney 2249 MG Thomas C. Foley 2121 Managing Editor Assistant Commandant (ATSB-AC) Jon T. Clemens 2249 BG James L. Noles 7555 Editorial Assistant Vivian Thompson 2610 Deputy Assistant Commandant (ATSB-DAC) Production Assistant COL John B. Sylvester 1050 Mary Hager 2610 Command Sergeant Major Contributing Artist CSM Richard L. Ross 4952 SPC Jody Harmon 2610 Armor School Sergeant Major SGM Douglas K. Memll 2900 MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR ATI'N: ATSB-AM. Fort Maintenance Department (ATSB-MA) Knox, KY 40121-5210. COL Phares E. Noyes 8346 ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improvc speed and accu- Command and Staff Department (ATSB-CS) racy in editing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies. either COL Pat O'Neal 5855 typed or printed out double-spaced in near-letterquality printer mode. We also accept stories on 5-1/4" floppy disks in MultiMate. Weapons Department (ATSB-WP) Wordstar. Microsoft WORD, WordPerfect, XyWrite, Xerox Writer, COL E. G. Fish I1 1055 and ASCII @case include a double-spaced printout). Please tape cap- Directorate of Training Developments (ATSB-TD) tions to any illustrations suhitted. COL Joseph D. Molinari 7250 PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS: Report deliwry probkms or Directorate of Combat Developments (ATSB-CD) changes of address to Ms. Camie Bright, Secretary-Trwurrr. P.O. COL Edward A. Bryla 5050 Box 607. Ft. Knox. Ky. 40121 or d (502)942-8624. FAX (502) 942-62 19. NCO Academy/Drill Sergeant Schd (A'IZK-NC) CSM Taft D. Webster Sr. 5150 DISTRIBUTION Report delivery problems or Reserve Component Spt Div (AlZK-FIE) changes of address to Ms. Mary Hager. DSN 464-2610; commercial: (502)624-2610. Requests to be added to the free distribution list COL Eduardo Yates 5953 should be in the form of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief. Directorate of Total Armor Force (A'IZK-TF) Readiness FAX - 7585 ARMOR HOTLINE - DSN 464-TANK LTC Robert C. Mitchell 7809 (The Armor Hotline is a 24-hour service to provide assistance with TRADOC System Manager questions concerning doctrine. training, organizations, and equipnent for Armored Gun System (ATSB-TS) of the Armor Force.) COL Eugene D. Colgan 7955

2 ARMOR - MayJune 1992 rect. The MTOE positions within a HWB for ity, this is a large step for questionable plexing problem. Congratulations to Cap- lieutenants (FIST, FDO, platoon leader) are gain. In SWA, the regimental artillerymen tain Reagor for his thought-provoking arti- what young artillerymen need to learn to were able to link digitally. and had no more cle. do. I cannot imagine why a FA lieutenant trouble than most, with the supporting FA would want to serve as a battalion S1 or battalion's and brigade's TACFIRE shelter. JOHN V. KLEMENCIC assistant. The two captain positions (BC As far as standardization goes, I do not MAJ, FA and FSO) are again the right jobs for an buy the argument that all three HWBs have 2d ACR artilleryman. to operate differently. Within the 2d ACR Having said that, keep in mind that the there is a common companyhoophattety cavalry commanders are smart guys. They SOP for generic operations and reports. Some Past Innovations In will professionally develop all their officers There are three separate tank companies Guardrnesewe Trainlng regardless of branch. In my two years in (one per squadron), whose tactical opera- the regiment I have seen artillery officers tions and drills are the same. Being, as the Dear Sir: serve not only in their MTOE positions, but author states, "fiercely independent" is not as squadron Sls, squadron assistant S~S, an excuse not to get in step with the rest of The exchange of viewpoints on Guard LNOs. and even assistant regimental S3s the Army and have common procedures and Reserve ha'ning (Jan-Feb 92) between and S4s. and drills. Make the RFSO. SFSOs and the COL B~ceB.G. Clark and COL Joseph D. I would argue that due to the close asso- HWB leadership sit down and work out a Molinari is enormously important in light of ciation to the maneuver guys and the multi- common SOP with which they can all live. the restructuring of both the Active and Re- plicity of training opportunities, most Granted, this will be no easy task, and will serve Components now in progress. artillerymen leave the regiment as more most likely require RCO 'interest,' but the A bit of background may be helpful. qualified fire supporters (our business) than benefits are enormous. Sometime in the 1950s - sadly, I did not their peers in the DlVARTYs and FA bri- My final thoughts are rhetorical questions retain a copy - a tank troop commander gades. No one suffers professionally be- concerning task organization of FA assets from the 106th Armored Cavalry Regiment, cause he is a cavalryman. to support your combat operations. Captain Idaho Army National Guard, published an Training is another area on which Captain Reagor stated that during part of DESERT article in ARMOR desaibing how he had Reagor and I have divided views. HWB STORM the HWBs were in their organic gotten together with the command of a Ma- commanders are chosen because they status (i.e. not OPCON to 3-18 FA), and rine Corps Reserve rifle company and con- have already proved that they are compe- the FA battalion moved centered on the ducted weekend combined arms training in tent and mature leaders. Many have had two lead squadrons. I am curious as to the Idaho Guards superb Gowen Field training previous commands and all have vast ex- tactical relationship and the call for fire pro- area south of Boise. This was a time when perience in cannon units. The young com- cessing in this task organization. Was the the Army Guard and Reserve operated on manders within this regiment are more than FA battalion DS to the regiment; or was it the basis of 48 two-hour ewning drills and capable of designing, in concert with reinforcing the HWBs (certainly a nonstan- the traditional two-week 'summer camp." commander's guidance, the squadron S3 dard relationship)? To whom did the FlSTs In 1959, I took command of Troop D, and the RFSO, a training program that will send calls for fire? Docbinally, if 3-18 FA 104th Armored Cavalry, Pennsylvania prepare their battery for combat. was DS to the regiment. then all 15 ARNG. I was also at that time the State Captain Reagor's argument that the FISTKOLT teams would send their mis- Public Affairs Officer. That gave me daily HWBs lack experience with TACFIRE is a sions through the battalion shelter leaving direct contact with the late COL Clair Stouf- valid one. However, the TACFIRE argu- the HWBs out of the loop. If the FIST sent fer, former 104th commander, and by then ment needs to be kept in the proper per- its missions to the HWB, then 3-18 was in U.S. Property and Fiscal Officer for Penn- spective. In light of recent experiences, a reinforcing role and got all its fire mis- sylvania. To make a long story short, Colo- how important is TACFIRE to the regi- sions from the HWB through a request for nel Stouffer made available barracks, train- ment? Was it really a fire support multiplier additional fires (RFAF). Obviously, this is ing areas, five M-48s with OEM in place, in SWA? not the best way to get accurate, predcted, plus one spare, all needed maintenance We in the 2d ACR use the plan digital, massed fires. above company level, and some imagina- execute voice' manner of training, much Another option may have been to make tive pay and rations procedures to make like many of our DIVARTY bretheren the FA battalion DS to the regimental main possible application of the 106th ACR train- throughout the Army. We have developed effort squadron with its HWB OPCON to ing concept at what is now Fort lndiantown close training ties with nearby arbdlery bat- the battalion, and leave the other HWBs or- Gap. talions. While we are by no means experts ganic, or in a DS role to its squadrons. Po- I mean no disrespect to Colonel Molmari, in all areas of digital operations, the squad- sition the FA battalion so that it can cover but many of the objections he makes to ron FSEs all have variable format message the main effort squadron and at least some Colonel Clarke's training concept have a entry devices and are quite capable of in- of the other lead squadron's zone. This familiar ring. In various forms - in particu- putting targets, plans, and geometry. As far guarantees quickly massed fires in the lar the issues of personnel turnover and as the FlSTs are concerned, it is basically main effort zone. You will accept some risk absentees - many of the same arguments transparent who they send a digital mission in the other zone, but the regimental com- were used to attempt to defeat our efforts. to, the shelter or BCS. Our FDCs would mander does have attack helicopters he As it turned out, during a succession of rather work in the "A" mode. but, as a mat- can use to influence the fight. This will pre- 'platoon weekends" our attendance aver- ter of course, have to link digitally with a vent you from piecemealing your fire sup- aged 104 percent - a nice coincidence shelter to fire certain missions on each port and not supporting your main effort with the regimental designation - because ARTEP and most exercises. I do not mean when you need it most. of men, including the entire maintenance to imply that we could not have gotten bet- Supporting the ACR with adequate artil- ter, but in light of the system's overall util- lery fires is an interesting and often per- Continued on Page 48 ARMOR - MayJune 1992 3 MG Thomas C. Foley Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

A Bright Future: Armor Continues to

I wish every Armor and Cavalry sol- "lis year's conference was a show- built muna tne mored Gun System dier would have had the opportunity case of the vitality of your branch. Let (AGS). We will begin fielding the to attend this year's Armor Confer- me cite some examples of the good AGS beginning in 1995. The light ar- ence from 5-7 May. No one could news: mored cavahy regiment will be btnn have come away from those three .Armor's share of the Total Army in July of this year with the reflagging days without a renewed sense of ex- will increase over the rest of the de- of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade as citement at the momentum of Armor cade. Within the Active force, for ex- the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment as we drive into the challenges of the ample, we will grow from just over (Light). Many of the serving armor next century. What is especially strik- four percent of the force now to al- soldiers reading this article will spend ing is the contrast between this con- most five percent of the force by Fis- significant portions of their careers in ference and a much different setting cal Year 1999. Armor's share of the these exciting and challenging units. just two years ago. At that time, Army National Guard will also ex- .Tank modification and conversion Armor was facing another of the peri- pand. is on hack Funding realities have re- odic assaults of the false prophets .In concert with our changing na- quired a fundamental reshaping of the who announce the death of the tional strategy, our ability to deploy tank modernization program, but what branch. Yet again, the negativists read rapidly is improving greatly. We are is emerging is a clear cut set of pro- the signs incorrectly. The collapse of now is the pracess of fielding a true grams to address our near-, mid-, and the Soviet Union turned the strategic light Armor Force. Over the rest of long-term needs. The M1A2 program world upside down, but did not repeal this decade, the airborne armor sol- will produce 62 state-of-the-art tanks. the principles of war, nor make vic- diers of the 3-73rd Armor will be Prototypes are fielded and in training tory any less dependent upon the mo- joined by two more light morbattal- for a rotation at the National Training bility, firepower, and shock effect of ions and by a light armored cavalry the mobile mounted ann. regiment. All of these units will be Continued on Page 49 4 ARMOR - MayJune 1992 CSM Richard L. Ross Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

As We Face the Future The Glass Is Half Full

This is an exciting time to be return- will demand of us, there is a sense of heavy forces for war is the most diffi- ing to Fort Knox, and I want to say confidence across the force that, come cult task because of the need for how happy I am to be here. My X- what may, we will be ready. teamwork and coordination. Crews, rival coincided with the 1992 Armor The war also reminded our political not individuals, fight tanks, and the Conference, in the first week of May, leaders and military planners that new crews must train together, know each a gathering that set the tone and laid threats can develop quickly in smaller other’s strengths and weaknesses, down the challenges for our future nations that are quite capable of put- know their machines. When it works, Army while focusing on our most ef- ting very sophisticated armies into it is magnificent and irresistable. fective weapon system, the Armor/ motion, threatening our interests, and When it works, a good crew is more Cavalry soldier. that it will take more than lightly than a match for a poorly trained armed contingency forces to deal with enemy tank platoon; a great platoon It was a timely focus. In many ways, these threats. While heavy forces are more than a match for a company of we are at a crossroads. True, there expensive to equip and train, they are unmotivated, poorly led enemy tank- will be fewer Armor/Cavalry soldiers essential in a world where every tin- ers. Great crews are THE combat in the Army’s future, and the load is pot dictator has armor of his own and multiplier. always greater when fewer men must the will to use it. To break this will, carry it, but on the other hand, we go our nation must have the threat of de- Our job here is to make this training into the future with certainties we terrence in kind, and this means heavy happen, despite force cuts and budget didn’t have a few short years ago. We armor and well-trained crews. That trimming, despite uncertainty about know our training works; it’s battle- dictator must know, as a certainty, the kind of combat we will face, who proven. We know our weapons work. that if he threatens our interests, we’ll we will fight, or where it will happen. The Gulf War validated our strategy be making a visit. If you have a good idea about how we and tactics, too. And as monolithic Here in the Armor Force, we don’t can stretch our training dollars, how Communism splintered and decayed, know when this will happen, and we we can do more with less, how we it became more and more apparent don’t know where. We don’t have a can make our downsized force more that the kinds of wars we once feared lot to say about whether we go to war. effective, don’t keep it to yourself. In and mined for would be increasingly Our focus is tighter. Our focus is to many ways, we are all experts about unlikely. While we don’t know what prepare, and in a smaller Army, that what we know best. My door - and kind of conflicts will take the place of preparation will be harder. Each man my mind - is open. Visit, write, fax, the Cold War, or what these conflicts carries a heavier load. And preparing or phone. We have a job to do.

ARMOR - MayJune 1992 5 - A Tale Of Two Battles:

the enemy used against us, and the Victorious in Iraq outcome of the battles could hardly have been more different. An Experienced Armor Task Force Operation Deep Strike Gets Waxed at the NTC From February 15 to 19, 1991, the Blackjack Brigade of the First Cav- by FIrst Lieutenant (P) John A. Nag1 alry Division conducted a number of border raids and ahbushes against introduction ERT SHIELD, the Bandits replaced Iraqi positions in the Wadi al Batin in their old vehicles with new MlAls an attempt to convince the Iraqis that Task Fa1-32 Armor, part Of the and M2A2s while in Saudi Arabia the main thrust of the Allied attack 2nd (Blackjack) Brigade of the First (The scouts’ M3s were not replaced). would come up this historic approach. Cavalry Division, has fought in both At Ft. Irwin the task force drew These attacks were intended to cover Operation DESERT STORM and at MlAls and M~s,so the weapons sys- the movement of the VI1 and XWII the National Training Center in the tems with which we fought were sim- Corps westward, to confuse the Iraqis course of the past year. Much of the ilar in both battles. The terrain, the as to Allied intentions, and to fix as fighting was against dismounted in- mission, the weapons systems which many Iraqi forces as possible in place fantry, and offers a number of lessons to those interested in armored warfare. The purpose of this article is to com- pare two battles in which the task force fought - one in Iraq, one at Ft. IF M CAV Irwii - and to draw from these bat- A tles several crucial points about fight- ing dismounted infantry with tanks. 8 Task Force 1-32 &mor (Bandits) is a combined arms maneuver battalion A (CAM-B)permanently task-organized with a mechanized infantry company (Charlie Company) replacing one tank \cJ company. It is otherwise organized F l-32 ARMOR according to standard armored ,battal- ion MTOE. Equipped with M1 The Brigade Wedge Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley ar- mored fighting vehicles before its de- Used in the Attack Into Ira9 ployment as part of Operation DES- 6 ARMOR - MayJune 1992 Saddam’s Ramparts of Sand

The tracks of passing wheeled vehicles give some sense of the size of the Iraqi fire trench, at upper left.

At left, detailed view of an individual fighting po- sition, bolstered by sand- bags and ammo boxes.

At right, individual fight- ing positions were con- nected by a network of slit trenches. so that they could be taken from the field and breached it in stride with missed. (No crewmen were injmd, tear by the main attack from the west. mineplows, suffering one loss as D34 and the tank returned to action within The culminating attack of the decep- detonated a mine which a plow 24 hours.) A-10s and MLRS fought tion took place on 24-25 February, as the entire Blackjack Brigade attacked across the berm separating Iraq from Saudi Arabia and moved to contact.

Moving in standard brigade wedge FIRE TRENCHES on the morning of 25 February, Task Force 1-32 Anna protected the west- ... ern side of the formation. The task force was aligned in a diamond, with Delta leading in a wedge, Alpha on the left flank in echelon left, Bravo on the right in echelon right, and Charlie Mech trailing in a vee formation. The Bandits’ mission was to find a bypass through the minefields and fire . .:.. I trenches which protected dug-in Iraqi 15 forces to our north by 1230 hours, or km to withdraw after creating a successful j:: diversionary attack. ..;:.. ..r.. .. IRAQ >...... E Coalition forces to the brigade’s ..... __ eastern flank reported significant diffi- culties breaching minefields and trenches filled with oil that the Iraqis lit to create smoke screens. The task ...... , ...... force encountered an antitank mine- ...... 1.’:...... Iraqi Obstacle Belt 15 km North of Border Berm ...... >:: ARMOR - MayJune 1992 7 ...- .. a. mE TRENCHES

tanks, BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehi- -. cles, and infantry armed with effective .," antitank guided missiles. The task .. .. _- . . force deployed in a rough semicircle ..- designed to prevent enemy penetration and mass fires along both possible enemy avenues of approach. Alpha Company was nestled. against the .. foothills on the south of Tiefort * .- Mountain, Charlie Company tied in to the Tip of the Whale, with Delta on line between the two flanks, and ...a ...a I Bravo behind them in reserve. Alpha E00 M and Charlie had exchanged their third . : * .. platoons, so that Alpha Team had two -. . ...* .. platoons of tanks and one of mecha- .- nized infantry to help protect against

.YllES AND CONCERTlNA an expected dismount threat from the b north over Tiefort Mountain. priority of engineer effort went to Delta and Bravo, exposed along the * southern edge of Siberia and expected to face the brunt of the Krasnovian at- Flgute 2 A Company Encounters the lraql Obstacle Belt tack as they drove north and east to- I ward the Big Sandy Wash and Red Pass. However, it was Alpha Com- the deep battle as the task force came the brigade was ordered to withdraw pany which would do the fighting - on line and began engaging numerous back through the berm to Saudi Am- and the "dying" - on the night of dismounts entrenched in fighting posi- bia, but the deception mission was a February 15. tions with small arms and HEAT complete success; it froze an entife The fighting began at about 2100 rounds. Frustrated by fire trenches Iraqi Corps in place, and helped en- hours with Alpha deployed in a line, protected by minefields, the tank and sure the success of the VII Corps left tanks backed into wadis against the Bradley commanders put their hatches hook around the Iraqi defenses. foothills. Nine of the ten tanks were in open protected position to protect operational, but the platoon of Charlie themselves against the small arms and Task Force Destroyer and the Company was down to two vehicles mortar fire of the Iraqis. Tankers, un- Battle of nefort Spur because of maintenance problems. able to range the Iraqi positions with Worse, those two Bradleys had gone coaxial machine guns, fired HEAT Almost a year to the day after Task to guard John Wayne Pass to prevent rounds to destroy bunkers and mortar Force 1-32's battle against Iraqi infan- an attack into the task force rear area. positions and adjusted fm with the try during Operation DEEP STRIKE, This left the nine tanks of Alpha tank commander's -50 M2 by watch- the task force found itself in battle Company alone to guard against an ing the impact of the rounds through against a much more determined and expected enemy reconnaissance effort the Thermal Integrated Sight (TIS). betterequipped foe: the Krasnovians east along the Valley of Death and ex- Indirect fire fdled the void, as the of the National Training Center. On po& to infantry attack down the First Cavalry Division's 3-82 Eleld February 14, 1992, Task Force 1-32 slopes of Tiefort Mountain. Artillery fired more than lo00 rounds, horreceived the mission to defend Alpha succeeded in defeating the and the battalion mortars fired 129, the Whale Gap and the Valley of enemy reconnaissance effort, destroy- getting target effect on a number of Death against a Krasnovian regiment ing a total of four BMPs and four dismounted positions. At 1230 hours, equipped with T-72 and some T-80 BRDMs that snuck in and out of the 8 ARMOR - May-June 1992 wadis as they attempted to gain infor- accurate missions until their ammuni- MlAl tank company in detail and mation on the disposition of the task tion was completely expended, but rendered it combat ineffective. force. However, the company began most of the enemy infantry managed to see dismounts creeping down to survive. Lessons Learned Tiefort Mountain to its rear at approx- At approximately 0300 hours, the imately 2300 hours. Engaging the Krasnovian infantry began using Task Force 1-32 Armor faced a troops with coax and indirect was illumination to spotlight the western- mostly dimounted threat in two battles largely ineffective, as the enemy took most Alpha tanks, now dug in and separated by only a year in time, but up hasty defensive positions among still searching for enemy reconnais- worlds apart in terms of mission, ter- the rocks. Repeated calls for fire sance elements to their west and rain, enemy situation. and results. killed many of the dismounts, but they south. The Krasnovians deployed The task force was fortunate that the continued to advance, and one of the hunter-killer Dragon teams in groups Iraqis it fought in Operation DEEP two Bradleys was called back from of three and four against individual STRIKE did not have effective anti- John Wayne Pass to help protect the tanks at close range. The tanks, hav- tank weapons, had not emplaced them company. Charlie Company, 8th Engi- ing exhausted their small arms ammu- in overwatch positions protecting their neers bravely dug in the nine tanks nition, called for fire on their own po- well-designed obstacle, and did not from 2200 to 0100, even as the cover- sitions, but were overwhelmed one by have effective indirect fires available ing force battle and the fight against one as the enemy infantry mlled up to place on the obstacle. the enemy infantry were taking place. Alpha’s flank from west to east. Only A year later, fighting a more deter- Alpha tanks used their superior night two of the nine Alpha tanks escaped mined and better armed foe, Task vision capability to direct the Bradley by abandoning their prepared battle Force 1-32 Armor had one of its tank against known enemy positions, and position and fleeing southeast. The companies decimated by a light infan- task force mortars fired a number of Krasnovian infantry had defeated an try company of approximately 150 ARMOR - MayJune 1992 9 men. The Battle of Tiefort Spur demonstrates how effective good in- fantry can be against tanks that are not prepanxi to fight dismounts. The contra..t between the two battles offers us several lessons: .Infantry presents a very real threat to tanks. We don’t train to fight this threat enough. Talks with the ob- server-controllers at the NTC con- fmed that one of the biggest killers of tanks at the NTC is infantry fight- ing dismounted. The Battle of Tiefort Spur is a regular feature of NTC rota- tions; the observer-controllerscall the OPFOR infantry company “Task Force Destroyer” and told us that pressed all of us who fought against all of their personnel to accurately call fighting the dismounts in this situation them with their professionalism, en- for and quickly adjust indirect fire. is the hardest task the NTC presents thusiasm, and performance. These are just a few of the lessons to a tank company. .Tanks need dedicated indirect fiie Task Force 1-32 Armor learned as it .The best way to defear infantry is support on board. The experience of fought dismounts in the deserts of with infantry. Task Force 1-32 Armor fighting infantry on two different bat- Iraq and California in the last year. is permanently task organized with an tlefields in less than a year highlights They are presented here in the hope of infantry company, yet did not use its the need for a weapons system like inspiring further debate in the Armor infantry as effectively as it could have the Mark 19 Automatic Grenade community over how to best deal with in DESERT STORM or at the NTC. Launcher to defeat infantry at ex- the threat that determined, well-armed Tank companies need to work with tended ranges, even when they are dismounts present to an Armor Task infantry units on a regular basis to es- dug in. (See the excellent article by Force. tablish SOPS and to learn each other’s CPT Andrew Harvey and SFC Robert strengths and weaknesses. Without in- Firkins in Sept/Oct 1991 ARMOR for fantry to protect tanks from enemy details.) We found 120-mm HEAT dismounts, a lot of tanks will get rounds to be an effective bunker- killed. buster in Iraq; however, that is an ex- First Lieutenant (P) John .Infantry doesn’t have to be spec- pensive solution to the tactical prob- A. Nag1 is a 1988 graduate tacularly well trained to present a real lem. Our experience has demonstrated of the U.S. Military Academy threat to U.S. Armored Forces. The that tankers are at least as likely to and received a Master’s De- company commander of the Alaska fight dismounts as they are to fight gree in International Rela- National Guard Cavalry company tanks, tanks need a weapons system tions from Oxford University. which defeated Task Force 1-32 that will allow them to defeat dug-in A graduate of the AOBC, Armor at the battle of Tiefort Spur infantry at ranges beyond the killing Airborne, Air Assault, and (and earlier that week at the Battle of radius of hand-held antitank weapons Tank Commander Certifica- Red Pass) told me that his soldiers systems. tion Courses, he served as had seen a Dragon for the fmt time .Indirect fire support of armor units 1st Platoon leader of N1-32 only three weeks before they fought is essential, and training shows re- Armor, 1st Cavalry Division us. They learned fast, but so may the sults. Tank commanders and even during Operation DESERT next enemy that fights the United tank loaders called for fire at the STORM, and as XO of the States with advanced antitank weap- NTC, largely due to extensive use of same company during NTC ons. Kudos to the soldiers of the the Observed Fire Trainer before our Rotation 92-4. He is cur- Alaska National Guard, who im- NTC rotation. Tank units must train rently attending AOAC.

10 ARMOR - MayJune 1992 Dragon’s Roar:

1-37 Armor in the Battle of 73 Easting

by Second Lieutenant Richard M. Bohannon TOC personnel found they could op- erate more efficiently out of a Virtually all branches of the U.S. Commander LTC Edward L. Dyer HMMWV with lapboards. They used Army generated lessons learned as a made the decision to exchange some the battalion commander’s vehicle, result of Operation DESERT equipment with theater reserve in which had a three-net capability. STORM, particularly Armor. The order to better equip our scouts and In early February 1991, 1-37 Armor ideal tool for desert combat, Armor first sergeants for their missions. The reorganized into an armor heavy task met with extreme success in Iraq and scouts initially had three MI13 APCS force. We exchanged N1-37 Armor Kuwait. With the lessons we learned and three M901 ITVs. We turned in for C/7-6 Infantry. LTC Dyer chose there, we have the potential to be the ITVs and in return drew six not to task-organize further into com- even more successful, not just in the HMMWVs from theater reserve. pany teams, because, if we had to desert, but in any environment. These six HMMWVs, plus the first clear trench systems of large numbers One battle, in particular, showed us sergeants’ HMMWVs from B, C, and of dismounted troops, he wanted our - the 1st Battalion, 37th Armor Reg- D companies, were given to the scouts infantry concentrated under one com- iment - a score of strengths, as well and organized into three sections, mand. as areas for improvement. On the each with three HMMWVs. Each ve- On the afternoon of February 26, TF night of February 26,1991, we fought hicle had an M-60 machine gun 1-37 advanced east as the right flank against the 29th Brigade of the Iraqi mount and a crew of three scouts, one task force in the 3rd Brigade wedge, Tawakalna Division in what we now with an M16A2 rifle, one with an and as flank task force for 1st Ar- call the Battle of 73 Easting (or the M203 grenade launcher, and one man- mored Division. TF 7-6, a balanced Battle of the Tawakalna). The ning the M-60. Thus organized, the task force, led the brigade, and TF 3- Tawakalna, part of Saddam Hussein’s scouts had a lower profile and were 35 covered the left flank. Our mission Republican Guard, was established in better suited to provide intelligence to was to attack in order to destroy the a blocking position in an attempt to the commander and to avoid decisive Republican Guard Medinah Division allow retreating Iraqi forces to their engagement with the enemy. Each of at Objective Bonn. At about 1600, we rear an escape to the north. It turned the first sergeants in companies B, C, received in-flight reports from the out to be a costly attempt for the and D then received an MI13 AF‘C, brigade’s air scouts who spotted about Iraqis. providing them with armor protection fifty tanks and other vehicles in revet- Much thought went into the organi- on the battlefield. ments along our axis of advance 35 zation of 1-37 Armor prior to that It also became apparent that the kilometers west of Objective Bonn. night battle. When we arrived in the- M577 was an unsuitable vehicle for a We obtained six-digit grids that out- ater in December 1990, Battalion TOC during offensive operations. lined their battle position and distrib-

ARMOR - May-June 1992 11 Battle of 73 Easting 1930-2000 26 FEB 91 uted this information down to tank Commander level. 73 Easting The discovery of such a large and previously undetected enemy force in \ our sector came somewhat as a sur- prise. Before the ground war began, our S2 kept us informed daily of all shifts of major units, BDA inflicted by the Air Force, and other pertinent w I information. His sources included Air 3 AD Force reports that were usually less 88 Eastlng than 24 hours old, and aerial photo- graphs that enabled him to template El1.0 km enemy positions down to individual vehicle fighting positions. Our supe- rior intelligence gave us an enormous line formation, bringing TF 1-37 up Map 1 advantage on February 25 in our fight with TF 7-6. TF 3-35 remained in the with the Iraqi 26th Infantry Division, rear as the brigade reserve. In addi- The enemy’s new templated po- and in 1st and 2nd Brigades’ Battle tion, Task Forces 1-37 and 74 both sition straddled the operational for AI Basayyah. For both of those brought their teams/companies on boundary between 3rd Brigade, battles, all vehicle fighting positions, line. TF 1-37’s scouts moved to the 1AD, and 2nd Brigade, 3AD.” bunkers, buildings, and obstacles were right flank to Screen and maintain co- templated and exact numbers of vehi- ordination with 3rd AD. Enemy dis- cles known. mounted troops to the front opened of southern Iraq. Therefore, we had to Before Operation DESERT fm with machine guns but were inef- use GPS (Global Positioning System) STORM, the Tawakalna had been fective. TF 7-6 responded by engag- and LORAN (Long-Range Naviga- templated about fifty kilometers ing enemy vehicles at long range with tion) devices. AU together, TF 1-37 northeast of their position on February Bradley-mounted TOWS. had 26 individual navigational de- 26. They had recently moved out of vices. Three went to each tank com- the northern position, making our pre- Comments pany, six to the infantry company, vious information inaccurate. Throughout the war, direct support four to the scouts, and one each to the The enemy’s new templated position artillery and close air support were ef- mortar FDC, the TAC, TOC, LNO, straddled the operational boundary be- fective weapons for the deep attack. S4, S3, and battalion commander. We tween 3rd Brigade, IAD, and 2nd Bri- In desert environments, we must be had an adequate number of devices, gade, 3AD (Map 1). USAF A-10 prepared to use these assets primarily considering the openness of terrain strikes pummeled the position, and at brigade level. Of course, we will and the ease of guiding on someone 2nd Brigade, 3AD began to attack continue to tfain artillery call-for-fm, who was navigating with a LORAN with artillery and illumination in its at least down to the tank commander. or GPS. sector to the south. Third Brigade ap- One cannot overemphasize the value Such systems would even have value proached to within 10 kilometers of of rehearsal. Days of battalion-level on European terrain, expediting and the position. battle drills in the sandstorms of Saudi providing greater accuracy for maneu- Visibility worsened, due to a sand- Arabia paid immense dividends in ver, indirect fire, and reports. In Oper- stm mixed with rain. Thermal sights Iraq. Even before the ground war ation DESERT STORM, there was no effectively cut through the haze, but began, we were accustomed to operat- need to distribute the devices down to identifying vehicles by type beyond ing at night and in bad weather, with tank platoon leader level, but in Eu- 1500 meters was virtually impossible. few halts and no terrain features to rope, we should because of the in- guide on. creased probability that tank platoons 193O-2ooO Combat leaders must be skilled navi- will operate out of visual contact of gators, but even the most expert navi- someone with a LORAN or GPS. If Direct support artillety (3-1 FA) gator had little chance of knowing his such systems do become more widely began to prep the enemy’s position in location, calling accurate indirect fm, available, leaders must remember that 3rd Brigade’s sector using 155-mm or reporting enemy locations and ob- a GPS is not a substitute for tradi- DPICM. The brigade changed to a stacles in the unchanging nothingness tional methods of navigation. We 12 ARMOR - Maydune 1992 Battle of 73 Easting 2000-2030 26 FEB 91 I

73 Eestlng should continue to stsess standard land 1.0 krn navigation techniques. E

2000-2030

TF 7-6 was set at the 68 North- South grid line, oriented toward the enemy position 2.5 kilometers to the southeast (Map 2). TF 1-37 was on TF 7-6’s right flank, orienting directly east on the same position. TF 1-37’s combat trains were at the 63 grid line, Y five kilometers to the west, while Map 2 company combat trains continued to bail the companies. Battle of 73 Eastlng 2030-2230 26 FEB 91 Meanwhile, the pace of the fight ! began to accelerate. D/1-37 observed 73 Easting IN enemy troops 900 meters to its front 1.0 krn advancing in 3-5-second rushes, and H destroyed them with coax. TF 7-6 and TF 1-37 reported additional troops and vehicles at 20004000 meters. They destroyed these targets with coax, TOW, 25mm, and tank main 1 AD gun fire. Four unidentified vehicles Mw I fled to the east of the enemy’s posi- 3 AD tion and were not engaged, due to the 68 Easting extended range (4.04.8 kilometers). Meanwhile, 2nd Brigade, 3rd AD began a ground attack in the adjacent sector to the south. Map 3 Direct support artillery ceased fire on the objective, while MLRS rockets 6 began hitting deep targets to the east. ENEMYPOSmON I IN 3R0 BDE. 1 AD’S SECTOR Thud Brigade called OH-58Ds for- 2OOO HOURS, FEBRUARY m, 1991 :’ a 73 I a ward to determine battle damage, and TF 7-6 fired illumination rounds to improve surveillance of the objective.

Comments

The Bradley has proved to be a ca- pable weapon system. Not only was its TOW an effective tank killer, but its 25-mm gun was also capable of destroying or disabling most Iraqi I 1 AD EDEl tanks and PCs. Mw After the battle, we discovered that 3 AD our artillery did not hit the intended Map 4 ARMOR - May-June 199: meartillery strike was eflecfive psychological/y. During the strike, the lraqis believed they were under air attack, fled from their vehicles, and sought shelter in their underground bunkers Most didn’t realize they were under ground attack until it was too late. Many were killed by direct fire as they attempted to remount their tanks.” target. In fact, the entire barrage Some commanders opted to use a could then use the flashlights for sig- struck an empty area of desert several company commanddirected nets, naling. hundred meters beyond the enemy po- rather than platoon nets, and in some sitions. The difficulty of gauging dis- cases this expedited command and 2100-21 30 tance in the desert, in addition to the control. In other cases, it merely poor visibility conditions, made artil- added to the confusion. When using a The attack continued toward the lery range adjustment difficult. Never- company commanddirected net, if in- east. To our front we faced dis- theless, the artillery strike was effec- dividual tanks encounter problems or mounted troops in trenches and nu- tive psychologically. During the observe something that other tanks do merous armored vehicles in defilade, strike, the Iraqis believed they were not, you have the potential to have 14 consisting predominantly of T-72s and under air attack, fled from their vehi- or more people on one net, and com- BMP-1s. We fired at most of the ve- cles, and sought shelter in their under- mand and control is lost. hicular targets at ranges of 2200-2800 ground bunkers. Most didn’t realize meters, but engagements beyond 3000 they were under ground attack until it On the other hand, if an was too late. Many were killed by di- operation is simple rect fire as they attempted to remount enough that a lot of feed- their tanks. back is not expected, a commanddirected net 2030-2100 will allow the commander instant access to each Third Brigade Commander COL crew, speeding informa- Daniel Zanini instructed TF 1-37 to tion flow and response to sweep across the objective and halt 3 his order. The com- kilometers past the far side. TF 7-6 mander must carefully as- would lift fires and remain set in sess his unit and the spe- overwatch (Map 3). 1-37’s company cific situation before he trains and TOC would also remain set decides to use a com- as the tanks advanced on line. The in- manddirected net. fantry company followed lo00 meters Another measure we to the rear of the tanks in order to po- took to facilitate com- lice up any troops the tanks missed. mand and control was to BMP-1 armor pmved no match for M1 A1 or Bradley fire. We advanced at a slow 5-10 kph rate. use filtered light. While By 2100, at least eight enemy vehicles in Saudi Arabia, we removed taillight meters were not uncommon. One were burning. covers on all vehicles, mounted col- MlAl on the move hit a BMP with a ored flashlight filters on the inside, HEAT round at 3250 meters. The Comments and remounted the coven. The lights longest shot with a confirmed kill was served not only to identify a vehicle’s 3750 meters. The Iraqis returned fm, Forty-five tanks assaulting on line location, but its unit as well (the color chiefly with small arms and machine can wreak havoc on the enemy, but of one taillight identified the vehicle’s guns, but also with T-72 main gun are difficult to control during limited brigade: the other, its battalion). More and/or dismounted antitank missile visibility and combat conditions. We than one filter was used for each tail- teams. Apaches joined in the fight off had rehearsed this play, known to us light, in order to make them almost the flanks of TF 1-37. Five dismounts as “Dragon’s Roar,” several times in invisible to the naked eye, but they surrendered to D/1-37. Saudi Arabia, and we used it in our appeared as bright as a beacon with battle with the 26th Infantry Division night vision devices. One company Comments on February 25. These experiences took the idea a step further and greatly simplified execution during stacked filters in their flashlights until There were a lot of gunnery lessons the battle, as did continual cross-talk the light was invisible to the naked here. First, because one of the between companies and platoons. eye but visible with PVS-7s. They MlAl’s advantages is its stand-off ca- 14 ARMOR - May-June 1992 pability. we should consider long- range gunnery training. Our current tank gunnery tables are adequate training for European terrain and should be retained. However, we need to add long range tables specific to desert gunnery. In addition, we need to incorporate high fidelity friendly One of B Company’s M1 Als hit by enemy fire awaits recovery. targets into gunnery and penalize tanks that shoot them. TCI must keep his attention on the knocked the TC and loader up in the AFV identification definitely was overall situation. air and back down again.” difficult. Gunners could easily acquire Lastly, the concept of the “fighting As a precaution, the crew im- targets, but could rarely identify vehi- XO” worked. Keeping the company mediately engaged the Halon fire ex- cle type past 1500 meters. Part of the XO forward and talking to the task tinguisher system, which put out any problem was the sandstorm, but many force commander, while the company existing fire. soldiers pointed out that we need commanders stayed on their internal Suddenly, the tank was struck again. sights with higher magnification. The nets, proved effective. The crew evacuated and took cover M60-series tank had a 13-power sight, about 50 meters away as the tank and the MIA1 definitely has a higher 2130-2200 caught fire. Eventually, they were quality fue control system than the able to flag down a passing tank from M60. A 20-power sight would be We fought a close battle on the ob- Company D for assistance. ideal. This, or an IFF (Identify Friend jective. As we maneuvered around On the right flank, Company C had or Foe) system, would greatly assist burning vehicles and bunkers, we lost problems of its own. The first tank us. four tanks to enemy fire. The fvst was hit, C-12, was disabled, but the crew The MlAl’s fue control system D-24, which was struck in the left escaped uninjured and took cover dominated the battlefield. Boresights side. The explosion kilIed the engine under the front slope. Nearby, 1st Pla- held for 300 kilometers of travel with and injured the loader and gunner. toon leader, 2LT Albert Alba, saw the only MRS updates needed. Despite Tank Commander SK Anthony explosion and made his way to the the non-stop nature of operations, Steede immediately began the evacua- scene. He directed suppressive ma- very few fire control systems tion of his crew. On the ground, he chine gun fires on the suspected malfunctioned. Even our main gun maintained radio communication via enemy position and, upon spotting an ammunition appeared quite sophisti- an extra-long CVC cord. While Gun- undamaged BMP-1 in the immediate cated when compared with the pig- ner SGT James Kugler led the men to area, destroyed it with a sabot round. iron sabot rounds the Iraqis used We the safety of another tank, SFC Steede His loader, PFC Michael Hamouz, had no problem knocking the turrets remounted the vehicle and attempted dismounted and ran to (2-12 to offer off T-72s almost every time. to restart it. Unfortunately, the engine assistance. In the offense, gunners should be in was severely damaged and he was Suddenly, the company com- charge of the turret, acquiring and en- forced to abandon the tank. mander’s tank, also in the area, was gaging targets, while the TC controls struck. As the crew attempted to dis- his vehicle or subordinate unit. If tank At about the same time, a tank from mount, the tank was hit by a second commanders and platoon leaders Company B took a hit in the rear. The round, throwing the commander and spend too much time looking through engine quit, and all power controls his loader from the turret to the their GPSEs, they get tunnel vision ceased to function. Tank Commander ground. The crews from the two dis- and can’t see where their tank or pla- SGT Christopher Rhett said later, abled tanks ran to 2LT Alba’s tank. toon is going in the big picture. Dur- “From my perspective I knew it When all eight crewmen were safely ing defensive operations, the TC will wasn’t a mine. It definitely felt as on board, Alba hastily employed have more opportunity to assist the though we were hit.” smoke, executed a Sagger drill, and gunner with acquiring and laying the SGT Tracy Sells, the gunner, added, left the area. He soon rejoined the rest gun on targets, but on the move, the “It rattled our cages. In fact, it of Company C to the east.

ARMOR - MayJune 1992 15 I..

Upon hearing that the CO had beem The Abrams is a rugged I hit, 1LT Jeff Fuchs, Company C exec- tank. Within days, we re- f-l ! utive officer, immediately assumed covered three of the four command of the company until the disabled MlA2s with an A "beheaded" T-72, destroyed by 1-37 AR at 73 Eastmg. commander's return, 20 hours later. M-88 recovery Secondary explosions of burning With parts we had on hand Iraqi vehicles threw shrapnel and and enough time, two of other debris in all directions as pillars those could have been of flame rose to a ceiling of black driven off the battlefield. smoke. Only one of the tanks was Virtually all enemy vehicles in the a catastrophic loss. area were destroyed, but dismounted More important, the troops remained hidden in trenches Abrarns is a survivable and bunkers. Companies C and D tank. After our four tanks both reported receiving small anns were disabled by enemy fire from their rear as they swept to- fire, ten crew members ward the east. Fortunately, physical emerged almost unscathed clearing of the trenches wasn't neces- and the other six had non- sary, the Iraqis surrendered in force life-threatening injuries. and came forth voluntarily. But if the One oftdiscussed protec- infanby had been ordered to dismount tive feature of the MlAl from its Bradeys to clear the that is worth mentioning trenches, and if our previous artillery is the commander's hatch. attack had been on target, friendly In the open-protected po- forces would have hd to contend sition it provided excellent with unexploded CBUs (cluster bomb protection against raining units) and DPICM bomblets from air shrapnel while still allow- and artillery slrikes, in addition, to ing clear 36Odegree visi- MIA1 fire blew off the deck of this BMP-1. Iraqi bullets. bility. A combat lifesaver on Comments every tank is a must. When we tain radio communication without ctossed the objective, our combat remounting the tank and drawing Speculation continues concerning trains were still several kilometers to enemy fire. what shot our four tanks. The three our rear. Without personnel im- Lost leader drills proved their worth most probable answers are T-72main mediately available to stabilize casual- to Company C. They should be incor- gun, dismounted antitank missile, or ties, their status could have been porated into all field exercises. Apache-launched Hellfire missile. The much more critical. Finally, the use of DPICM and CBU fact that Apaches were operating to We already train tank crew evacua- use must be addressed in the opera- our rear and a witness's reports of tion, but we also need to address ac- tions order. Due to the large number high round trajectory support the tions after evacuation. Soldiers should of unexploded bomblets, an area at- friendly fire theory. However, ballistic have more than just their personal tacked with DPICM or CBUs should reports suggest that 125-mm HEAT weapon and Kevlar when they hit the be considered a minefield capable of rounds produced the damage on some ground. Their rucksack should be killing dismounted troops and dis- of the tanks. Visual examination of packed so that the soldier can survive abling wheeled vehicles. We must others reveals an obvious sabot hole. on his own for a period of days, and take ptcare when considering the Overall, the physical evidence implies should be easily removed. In addition, use of DPICM or CBU in the attack, that T-72 fire took Out OW tanks, but an extra-long CVC cord should be as this may preclude or make more the friendly fm possibility cannot be hooked into one of the crew stations hazardous the use of dismounted in- excluded. so that dismounted crews can main- fantry to clear the objective.

16 ARMOR - MayJune 1992 “Our biggest problem was transport tu the rear. We put prisoners in whatever was available: Bradleys, trucks, scout HMM WVs, engineer MI 13s, even ACE buckets.”

2200-2230 EPW operations need more thought. KIA, ZCTO MIA, six WIA. TF 1-37 Our biggest problem was transport to added two mmsuccessful battles to Iraqi troops surrendered in large the rear. We put prisoners in whatever its history by February 28th. When numbers to our infantry, and soon we was available: Bradleys, trucks, scout the war ended, we found ourselves a had over 100 EPWs. 1-37’s combat HMMWVs, engineer M113s. even few kilometers inside liberated Ku- trains rejoined the tanks to the east ACE buckets. wait. and MEDEVAC procedures com- We can attribute the success of 1-37 menced for casualties. Conclusion Armor, and the U.S. Army in Opera- tion DESERT STORM, to many Comments At 2300, the infantry reported the things, not the least our flexibility and area clear, and at 0050 the next mom- ability to adapt training and other op- Commanders need to consider com- ing, the brigade reformed and contin- erations to ever-changing situations. mand and control of the combat trains ued the attack east. Final BDA for TF We must apply lessons learned from when separated from the line pla- 1-37’s sector of the Battle of 73 East- DESERT SHIELDbTORM to current toons. In addition, first sergeants don’t ing included 21 T-72s, 14 BMP-1s. training if we want to maintain an ad- need to be on the battlefield in two 57-mm AA guns, one T-62, and vantage on the battlefield because, HMMWVs; they should have armored an MTLB destroyed, and over 100 next time, our enemy may not give us vehicle protection. EPWs. Our personnel status was zero time to train in his backyard.

Second Lieutenant Richard M. Bohannon is a 1990 Dis- tinguished Miliiary Graduate of Texas A&M University, and holds a B.S. degree in Biochemistry. He is also a graduate of the Army Air- borne School and the Armor Officer Basic Course. Dur- ing Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, he served in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait with 1-37 Armor as a M1A1 tank platoon leader. Since then, he has been a liaison officer for 1-37 Armor and is currently the execu- In March 1991, the officers of 1-37 Armor had a chance to go back over the 73 Easting tive officer for HHC, 3rd Bri- battlefield to conduct officer professional development and discuss lessons learned. gade, 3rd ID, Germany.

~~ ARMOR - May-June 1992 1’I t the eve of World War II. U.S. air trained to use bicycles. In photo above, a trooper fires his then-modem M1 Garand rifle from prone position in training at Fort Benning..

Thousands of Harley-Davidsons served during WWII. Tactical Employment of the Military Motorcycle

by Lieutenant Colonel Craig S. Harju, Sr., Sergeant First Class David F. Wilson, and Richard B. Armstrong

The necessity for speed and flexibil- cles, the forerunner to the motorcycle, ans such as Roy Bacon have noted ity on the modem battlefield poses a were used to cany dispatches. The that the World War I1 military motor- unique challenge for the cavalry U.S. Army formed the 25th Infantry cycle “played its part in all fields to scout. Although his primary missions Bicycle Corps in 1896 and continued cany messages, marshal convoys, po- are reconnaissance and security, the to use bicycles through the early lice troops, and act as a mobile tight- scout may also facilitate unit move- 1900s. ing unit.” ment, provide liaison between units, Today, the military motorcycle and restore communications. A scout With the introduction of small effi- (MILMO)is not currently a part of section or even an entire platoon may cient gasoline engines, the bicycle the Amy inventory, although many perform these duties. evolved into the motorized bicycle, or cavalry units have acquired them However, one or two mounted motorcycle. The Army’s interest in through local purchase. There is also a scouts often can perform the job just motorcycles increased dramatically proposal to add four motorcycles to as effectively and even more effi- with the outbreak of World War II. In the tank and mechanized infantry bat- ciently in terms of personnel re- early 194Os, the Army purchased Har- talion scout 1)latoon. sources. To accomplish these duties, ley Davidson and Indian motorcycle The primay purposes for tacticallY 1111--. ___ I the scout needs a vehicle with excel- models. Armored units used the Har- employing mlulary rnoivrcycies are LO lent cross-country mobility, agility, ley Davids on WLA, a military version enable mounted scouts to conduct de - and speed - such as the military mo- of the cor nmercial model featuring a tailed reconnaissance, conduct secu 1- torcycle. 45-cubic-ik.,,. u,m5xn.U. llrunv, yu. .-- ..LJ yuuu.0, ILAUIIILCL.” .IIu.vIIIUmm,, y.3- The origin of the military motorcy- son produced the WLA motorcycle vide liaison between adjacent units, cle can be traced back to the Franco- form 1940 through 1945 and from and restore communications between Prussian War of 1870 in which bicy- 1950 through 1952. Military histori- units. ia ARMOR - May-June 1992 An extra hand might have been essential to this 1930s corporal of cavalry, at left, whose military motorcyde mounted a drum- fed Thompson submachinegun.

The "high-technology testbed' 9th Infantry Division trained with Kawasaki-based military motorcydes in the mid-1980s

In terms of reconnaissance, the scout mounted scout may function as a Along similar lines, motorcycle platoon leader can use a motorcycle guide during a passage of lines, relief scouts can restore communications in scout team to reconnoiter potential in place, or other unit movement. situations in which enemy tactical op- areas of interest before dedicating a Again, the use of the motorcycle scout erations, NBC, or intense conven- BFV or other crew vehicle to that re- team provides speed and flexibility tional fire strikes have created gaps connaissance. However, a single mo- without requiring the platoon leader to between adjacent units. In this sce- torcycle scout should never be em- dedicate a full vehicle crew. During nario, the scout may have the mission ployed beyond the line of sight of an complex unit movement, the scout to locate friendly units that may have overwatching vehicle or fellow scout. may function as a traffic control point. suffered damage. If radio communica- A mounted scout, while moving, is In this scenario, the scout uses the tions have been damaged, the motor- constrained by having to control his motorcycle to move from location to cycle scout may also act as a messen- motorcycle and requires protection location without having to coordinate ger- from enemy elements. pickup after the traffic control point is The motorcycle scout may be used no longer needed. in other functions too, such as quarter- Motorcycle scout teams may also be A fourth use for the motorcycle ing party activities. Indeed, the pla- employed to conduct security patrols. scout is to provide liaison between ad- toon leader's use of the military mo- For example, they could patrol routes jacent units. Motorcycle scout teams torcycle is limited only by his tactical between observation posts that have can rapidly deploy to contact points creativity. been emplaced for extended periods and establish face-to-face communica- The military motorcycle has proved of time. tion to coordinate linkups, passage of its usefulness throughout military his- A third use for the motorcycle scout lines, and other operations requiring tory, even during Desert Storm. The is to facilitate a unit's movement. A secure, in-depth coordination. Army must continue to work toward ARMOR - MayJune 1992 19 making it a permanent part of the Caidin. Martin and Jay Barbree. Bicycles in Richard B. Armstrong is a War. New Yo&: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1974. Army inventory. The military motor- doctoral candidate in In- cycle provides combat leaders with an FKSM 17-19-3. Military Motorrycle structional Systems Tech- effective, flexible vehicle to maneuver (MILMO) Supplemental Text, MOS 19D, SWI nology at Indiana University. on the battlefields of today and tomor- Levels 1-4. Fort Knox. Ky: U.S. Amy Annor He works at the Armor School. April 199W TOW. School as chief, Analysis References Tactical Employment of the Military Motor- Branch, Training Division, cycle (training videotape). PAN #A0515-91- Directorate of Training De- Bacon. Ray, Military Motorcycles of World 0189. Fott Knox, Ky: U.S. Army Annor velopment. He is currently War London: Osprey Publishing 1985. II, Ltd.. school. 1991. developing a theory for pre- scribing jnstructional strate- gies for teams.

Lieutenant Colonel Craig S. Harju Sr. has previously served as cavalry platoon leader and assistant S2, 2- 17 Cav; tank platoon leader, XO, S2, and combat sup- port company commander, 1-32 Armor; assistant pro- fessor of military science at Upper Iowa University; dep- uty ACoS G2, AFCENT Re- serve Corps (Fwd) in Maastricht, Netherlands; as- sistant G3 plans, 3AD; S3, 2-32 Armor; and chief, Training Division, DOTD, and later Director of Train- ing Development at the Armor School. He is cur- rently the chief, War Plans Section of Headquarters, Al- lied Land Forces Southeast Europe in Izmir, Turkey.

Sergeant First Class David City of Radcliff Dedicates F. Wilson has previously Tribute to Armor Soldiers served as platoon sergeant with 2-69 Armor, 3-4 Cav, and 1-10 Cav. He taught scout platoon tactics while The City of Raddiff, Ky. has dedcated a new monument ann- memorating the soldiers of the Armor Force who have trained at assigned to the Command nearby Fort Knox since 1932. The 1 2-foot, bi-triangular structure, and Staff Department, formed of gold-anodized aluminum, was designed by LTC (Ret.) USAARMS. He currently Burton S. Boudinot. a Radcliff resident and former Edbr-in-Chief works as a 19D task analyst of ARMOR. The structure is mounted on a black granite base in a lighted, landscaped area outside Radcliff City Hall. Originally in the Analysis Branch, conceived in 1985. the idea languished for lack of funds until new Training Division, Director- interest arose during Operation DESERT STORM. Funds came ate of Training Develop from private citizens, businesses, and local civic clubs. ment.

~ 20 ARMOR - MayJune 1992 Remembering Two Officers, Two Outcomes The Difference Was People

by Major Dale E. Wilson and Command Sergeant Major Robert A. Murphy

The banner stretching across the out in ’94. Don, this is ‘Top’ Bill complete lesson in training young of- back wall of the Newburgh Holiday Smythe. He broke me in back at Car- ficers. Inn’s banquet mom welcomed the son during my first tour there.” “So what happened to you back at graduates of the U. S. Military We shook hands. Bassett looked Polk, Don?” the general asked “I Academy’s Class of 1991 to their much older than Jameson. The years know it’s a touchy subject, but I re- twenty-fifth reunion. The room was had been less kind to him. Who says member what a fire-breather you were virtually empty now, except for the Army life is so much harder on the as a cadet and how hard-charging you two gentlemen who’d just sat down at body? “It’s a pleasure, sir,” I said. were in AOB. I just can’t imagine you the bar in front of me. One was “I’m sure you gentlemen have a lot of not cutting it as a platoon leader and dressed in a sportcoat and tie, the catching up to do and I’ve got to get then getting passed over for captain.” other wore Class A with the two stars ready to close, so, if you’ll excuse Bassett chuckled. “Yeah, neither of a major general pinned to the epau- me.... could I. I remember everything they lets on his shoulders. “Sure, ‘Top,’ good to see you told us about hitting the ground run- “Bartender, how about a couple of again,” said Maj. Gen. Jameson. He ning, but it’s hard to run in mud.” Seven-Sevens for my friend and me,” turned back to Bassett and they began “What do you mean?” the general said. an animated conversation. “Well, for starters, I never really got I busied myself mixing the drinks As I tidied up behind the bar, I any help,” said Bassett. “My company while they began talking over old couldn’t help overhearing them. They commander was one of those guys times. From what I could hear, they’d started out with the usual stuff: family who wanted everything to be perfect. been roommates during their last year situation, bringing each other up to He never had any time for us lieuten- at the Academy, and they’d both gone date with what they’d been doing over ants, nor would he tolerate any mis- Armor. That was the last time they’d the years, etc. takes. If any of us made the least little seen each other before tonight. I set The general, it was clear, had fol- screw up, he’d start getting into our the drinks on the bar and glanced at lowed the fast track. Beginning with business. the general’s name tag. Jameson. promotion to major he’d been a “Nor did he ever meet with us or ask Damn, he sure looked familiar. Then below-the-zoner all the way. He’d just us what we thought. Rather than take it dawned on me: he’d been a platoon finished a tour as assistant division the time to explain what he wanted or leader and later company XO in A commander for ops and training with how he thought things should be Company, 2-77 Armor at Ft. Carson the 1st Armored Division at Ft. Hood done, or listen to any ideas we might back in the early ’90s when I was the - where the colors had been brought have, he just did things himself. I felt first shirt. from Germany back in ’95 - and as useless as the third leg on a duck.” “Hey, sir,” I said, “remember me? I was on his way to Ft. Stewart to take The bitterness in his voice was was first sergeant of Alpha 2-77 when over the 24th Mech. plainly evident. you were an LT.” Bassett, on the other hand, had had a ‘The SOB spent all his spare time ‘‘Well. I’ll be a son of a gun!” he tough go. He’d been passed over for up at battalion sucking up to the CO, said, as the recognition spread over promotion to captain and got his pink and if anything went wrong it was al- his face. “‘Top’ Smythe! Boy, those slip in late ’94. After that he’d gone ways somebody else’s fault. The old were the days, weren’t they?” back to grad school, got an MBA, and man never questioned him because he “Yeah,” I said with a laugh. “What a went to work for a Fortune 500 com- always had paperwork to cover his great outfit we had.” pany in New York - where he’d posterior.” He gestured to the man in civilian been ever since. The general nodded. “What about clothes seated beside him. “Meet Don It was typical reunion talk - until your platoon sergeant? Wasn’t he any Bassett. He was my roommate at the they started comparing notes on their help?” Academy the year we graduated. He’s tom as platoon leaders. What made Bassett shook his head. “Naw. He an ex-tanker. Spent time with the 5th their discussion of that experience so was one of those pretty boys who Mech at Polk and Hood before he got fascinating was that it sounded like a thought he was superior to officers. ARMOR - MayJune 1992 21 Remember how they always told us more than an hour and a half talking “Yeah,” I said, “Allenby was a super that the relationship between a lieu- about the company and the battalion, soldier. You know, sir, he went on to tenant and his platoon sergeant should their lineage and honors, what they’d become a command sergeant major be like a good marriage? Well, we been doing for the previous six and retired in ’09 with thirty years were estranged firom the get go. I got months, what we’d be doing for the after a tour as CSM of the 1st Cav.” the feeling he had no desire to work next six months, the six people I’d be “What about you, ‘Top’? When’d with me - or any platoon leader. I working with, where he expected me you hang up your spurs?” the general remember dropping by the snack bar to fit in, and what his expectations of asked. for lunch after my first ARTEP. He me were. I checked out of the net in ’04 and and several other platoon sergeants ‘Then he turned me over to you, came here. I never accepted a CSM from the battalion were sitting at a ‘Top.’ You filled me in on the job above battalion. Anything higher table near the serving line. He had his strengths and weaknesses of all the is too damn far away fro4 troops for back to me, so I know he didn’t see men in my platoon, including my pla- my taste.” me. I heard him discussing my map toon sergeant. You had nothing but “I know what you mean,” he chuck- reading skills with them. praise for him and I came to find out led. “I’d have been happy if they’d “My LT couldn’t find his backside he felt the Same way about you. Both just let me stay with battalions. But,” with both hands,” he said, and the you and the old man stressed the im- he glanced at his shoulder and shook others laughed. “Those guys they portance of my attitude toward SFC his head, “you know how it goes.” keep sending us from Knox are Allenby and the other NCOs in the “You know,” I said, “we had good worthless. I don’t know why they platoon. You said I should never for- NCOs back in Alpha Company, but it bother. We NCOs could do a damned get who was in charge, but that I wouldn’t have been that way if it sight better job than they do.” should always be open to suggestions hadn’t been for Captain Morton. He ‘The other NCOs muttered in agree- from them, to recognize that I was really knew his stuff. When he came ment. That’s all I heard. The line had new to the job and that they had years on board we had a bunch of pri- carried me out of earshot. But it was of experience that would benefit me madonnas, but he changed that in a so typical of our relationship. It al- greatly if I’d just listen to them. You huny.” ways seemed like he wanted me to were so right. Best of all, you’d made I looked at Bassett. “You see, sir, we fail,” Bassett concluded. them understand my limitations as a had a CO before Morton who was just The general shook his head and brand-new platoon leader and made like the one you described. He con- rubbed at the bridge of his nose, them aware that you held them ac- stantly bypassed the lieutenants, so thinking for a moment before re- countable for my success.” the NOSknew they were the key to sponding. The general looked at his old mm- his success or failure and got a real “You know, Don,” he said, “I’ve mate and put a hand on his shoulder. attitude. There wasn’t much I could seen similar situations over the years. “Rather than make jokes about my do about it. But Morton. Whew! Sadly, we lose a lot of good officers problems, my platoon sergeant pulled ‘‘When he first showed up he called that way. I’m just glad it didn’t hap- me off to the side and either taught all of us together and said the free pen to me. It sure wasn’t like that in me how to do things properly, or po- ride was over. From then on he was old Alpha 2-77, was it, ‘Top’?” litely and patiently explained what I’d going to take the lieutenants under his I looked up from the glass I’d been done wrong and suggested ways I wing and train them. He charged me polishing with a bar towel for the last might have performed better. with squaring away the enlisted side several minutes while eavesdropping “Although the old man’d made it of the house and told the rest of the on their conversation. clear that I was always responsible for NCOs that he and his officers would “It sure wasn’t, sir,” I said. “If I’d everything that went on in the platoon stay out of sergeants’ business, but ever caught any of my NCOs playing and had the final say so, SFC Allenby that they’d better be straight or he’d silly games like that I’d have ridden explained that in garrison I should let be all over them like white on rice. ’em out on a rail. And the old man him physically run the show - espe- They got the message in a hurry after was a real gem, too, remember? He cially when it came to individual sol- he sent a couple of tank commanders really knew how to train lieutenants.” dier training. But, as soon as we and platoon sergeants packing - with ‘That’s right,” the general agreed. “I rolled out the back gate and headed adverse NCOERs and bars to reenlist- remember how, when I first reported down range, that platoon was mine. ment as their reward.” in, he was in the middle of a nasty He stepped to the side and let me run “That was before I got there,” the Article 32 investigation. But he with it. He was always there with ad- general interjected. “When I rewed dropped everything and made me feel vice and ideas when I needed them, in, he immediately began training me. like I was the most important person but he never got pushy about it. What He had the XO tutor me in mainte- in the world at the moment. He spent a great NCO!” nance activities and he’d spend about 22 ARMOR - MayJune 1992 an hour a day with me discussing tac- Alpha Company - he’d take the time The authors served together as com- tics and leadership. Every so often to make a copy of it and send it along mander andfirst sergeant of Company during command maintenance periods with a personal note to the soldier’s D, 2-34th Armor at Ft. Carson in he’d get all of us lieutenants together parents or spouse. I’m convinced 198445. The unit was awarded the and quiz us on some aspect of mainte- those guys would have followed him FY ‘85 Draper Leadership Award. nance operations. into the gates of hell. “He was a real stickler for leader- “But he was a hard one to figure out ship by example. There was no BSing sometimes. He had a real Jekyll-and- around the orderly mom or platoon Hyde personality. Some days he’d run Major Dale E. Wilson offices during the duty day. If the around the company area with a big (USA, Ret.) is a former training schedule called for mainte- smile and a pat on the back for every- Armor officer who sewed as nance, we were all in the motor pool body. Other days he was like a fire- a cavalry platoon leader - including the CO and ‘Top.’ The breathing dragon. Nothing seemed to and tank company and tank old man was always in coveralls, and make him happy.” The general looked battalion headquarters com- you never knew where he’d turn up at me. “Come to think of it, ‘Top,’ pany commander. A 1979 when he wasn’t sweating over his you were the same way.” OCS graduate, he enlisted own tank with his crew. He said the I chuckled. “You never figured it in 1969 and sewed as an technique did three things for him: it out, sir? We had a ‘Mutt ’n Jeff rou- infantryman and combat helped him learn: it gave him a tine. Remember that round yellow correspondent in Vietnam chance to observe the skill level of the coffee cup with the smiley face he with the America1 Division in soldiers, NCOs, and officers in the kept on his desk?” The general nod- 1970-71. He holds a PhD. company: and it allowed him to ded. “Well, he had a frown painted on in military history from Tem- demonstrate his own competence and the other side. First thing I did when I ple University and sewed willingness to share the troops’ hard- walked into the orderly room was as an assistant professor at ships. The same thing applied to indi- look at that mug. Whichever face was the U.S. Military Academy vidual and collective training. He displayed was the mood he’d portray before retiring in September would just pick a platoon and show that day and I’d act the opposite. Sure 1991. He is the author of up and go through the training like a kept you folks on your toes, didn’t Treat ’Em Rough! The Birth private. I learned a lot from that and it?” of American Armor, 191 7-20 I’ve tried to do the same thing ever The general laughed until his eyes (Presidio Press, 1989). since, wherever I’ve been.” began to water and his companion The general looked at me and smiled wistfully. grinned. “You know, ‘Top,’ the thing I looked at the clock on the wall. It that most impressed me about old was five minutes to two. Almost time CSM Robert A. Murphy is Captain Morton was how much he to close. command sergeant major of cared for those soldiers. I mean really “Last call, gentlemen,” I said. the 2nth Cav at Ft. Carson, cared.” The general pushed himself up. Colo. A veteran of more He swiveled his stool to face his “Guess we’d better call it a night, than 20 years of sewice in companion. “You should have seen Don. It sure was good to see you Germany, CONUS, and this guy, Don. He kept a notebook again.” Korea, he is a 1989 gradu- that had vital statistics on every one “Same here, Harry,” Bassett said. ate of the Sergeant Major’s of the 64 of us in the company. And “See you at the game tomor - today, Academy. He has held he had most of it memorized. He I mean?” every Armor NCO leader- knew every man’s first name, age, “Yeah. Let’s hope Army kicks ship position from tank com- hometown, parents’ or spouse’s Lafayette’s butt.” mander to CSM, including names, and could tell you how he’d Bassett nodded in my direction. sewing as first sergeant of scored on his last SQT and AF’FT. “You know, Harry, if I’d been in a two companies at Ft. Car- “He required us to keep the same unit like you and ‘Top’ Smythe were son and one in Korea, as data on the troops in our platoons and in, I can’t help but think my life CSM of the 2-34th (later 2- would quiz us to see how well we would’ve been a whole lot different” 77th) Armor, and as an op- knew the men. The general put his arm around his erations sergeant major in “Whenever anybody in the company old friend’s shoulder. “I agree, Don,” Korea and at Forts Carson got an award, a letter of commenda- he said with a squeeze and a nod of and Bliss. He holds an as- tion, or a certificate of achievement his head, “it made all the difference sociate degree. - and that happened a lot in old for me.“ ARMOR - MayJune 1992 23 r 1 I IN I Flying 1 A Desk OUT by Captain John K. Bartolotto

So, your next assignment is the palms sweat, and you hope that you’ll 0730, and the normal work day is dreaded functional area utilization wake up from this bad dream and fmd completed by 1730. FT is on your tour. You wonder, “who at branch did yourself on a range with the sweet own, whenever you can find the time, I infuriate?” You want another troop smell of cordite burning your nostrils and you need to find the time. Your assignment, but you’ve done that part and fm commands crackling over spouse will inevitably be amazed at of your career.. Now it’s time to sit your cvc. sorry. the amount of time you can now behind a desk and earn your pay A functional tour is not the end of spend at home. You should take ad- working in your functional area. A lit- your career that you at first believe it vantage of this Army gift and plan on tle frustrated, you come to grips with is. If you consider it a growing experi- some outstanding family time. The the fact that you don’t have much of a ence that will further your knowledge opportunity to do things with your choice but to fly a desk for the next of how the other side of the Army op family is probably the best thing a three to four years. If you are a cap- erates and supports “the field Army,” functional assignment has to offer, tain, with between five and seven mixed with some great benefits, you’ll and after a troop assignment, your years of service, you’ve already been learn to tolerate your time away from family deserves it and so do you. or will be informed what your func- troops and maybe even enjoy it. Unlike the “outdoor Army,” unit ac- tional area will be. There are many, The majority of functional tour as- tivities are few and rare, so take ad- and one is not better than the other, it signments will fmd officers sitting be- vantage of the social activities that are depends on what you want to do with hind a desk doing some sort of staff offered in and around your new as- your career and future once you take work. No matter what functional area signment area. Career-wise, you’ll off the green suit. an oficer is assigned to, the old mili- find that your functional area offers ‘Ihis is the side of the Army your tary maxim, “The function of the staff some great military courses that you OCS, ROTC, and West Point instruc- is to sene the line,” applies. The should take advantage of and fight to tors never (really) told you about! Training and Doctrine Command get. Welcome to a world where most of motto best sums up what all officers Advancing your civilian education is the branch related things you’ve serving in functional assignments another option that you should ex- learned in a line unit, where the rub- must remember is their sole mission: plore. You’d be surprised how many ber meets the road, seem out of place. “Prepare the army for war.” Does that funds, grants, and programs are avail- Even the acronyms that you’ve grown make it easier for anyone in a func- able to further your education. A mas- accustomed to in your troop assign- tional area assignment to tackle the ters degree is an excellent line to have ment, like PMCS, have other mean- sometimes day-today challenges that on a resume if you’re contemplating ings like: Program Management Con- occur while you’re sitting behind your leaving the service. In this day and trol System, and not Preventive Main- computer? Probably not. So, what can age, having a plan of what you might tenance Checks and Services. Now, you do to make your assignment more do if you leave the service is just as your job will be to help design, plan, meaningful to you professionally and important as having one if you plan to research, develop, study, resource, and personally, and what should you be remain. Taking the Command and support the rubber that meets the mad. prepmd for? General Staff College course by cor- You’re a little overwhelmed at first, Functional area assignments give respondence is also an excellent re- and even have flashbacks of when you the opportunity to have an unbe- quirement to fulfill during your tour, you were a new lieutenant reporting lievable amount of personal time. Un- especially with your new found spare into your first unit. It’s a whole new, like troop assignments, where you’re time at home. Whatever you choose, different world, and you’ve been up and running PT at 0630, functional you’ll have the additional time to do planted right in the middle of it. Your area assignment hours usually begin at it, whether it’s spending time with

24 ARMOR - Maydune 1992 Networking is basically a way of making contacts your family or furthering your mili- seems to move fast with the leadership of civilian indusfry. It is cited by tary or civilian education. The key is enough. Mastering job placement WmpanieS as the most prominent to make the most of your spare time. computer pro- factor in getting a job in the private sector Working with civilians and comput- cessing and graphics ers will be your two most prominent programs is an area that you need to learn the overall picture, a functional and new challenges in these type of get ready to dive into. Most assign- assignment requires you to do just the assignments. Your professional devel- ments have computer courses avail- opposite. Remember you need to be- opment will definitely benefit from able, and even if they just make you come an expert, not a bureaucrat. both. me tremendous number of ci- less dangerous on the keyboard, I sug- Keep the following in mind during vilians at functional assignments are gest you take one. If you know how your functional tour: be innovative, the backbone of this side of the Army. to “touch type” (as opposed to hunt- learn to sell your projects, answer the Like noncommissioned officers in line ing and pecking for the correct key), question(s), don’t dwell on past his- units, civilians can provide you with you’ll be ahead of the pack when it tory of projects, keep an open mind, the vital resources of their knowledge, comes to working with a word pro- ask for help when you need it, and skill, and background that no func- cessing program and getting keep your sense of humor. After a tional area course can provide. Civil- paperwork completed. few months, all the new acronyms, ians are there to provide continuity for Which brings me to the next subject documents, and projects will be sec- the organizations, which military per- writing. Staff work at a functional as- ond nature and you’ll be an “expert.” sonnel, with their usual PCS moves, signment entails an enormous amount Your functional area assignment cannot. Working with civilians also of papemork; writing clearly and may not be as exciting as a branch as- provides opportunities for networking. concisely are keys to success. Your signment, but your career depends on Networking is basically a way of ability to communicate with the writ- your ability to successfully tackle this making contacts with the leadership ten work will make or break you. The challenge. Your knowledge of the of civilian industry. It is cited by job effective writing courses taught at total Army will increase tenfold, and placement companies as the most OAC and CAS3 will come screaming you might even be able to take some prominent factor in getting a job in back at you, and your paperwork will of the skills you learn at that assign- the private sector (something to keep be a reflection of you and on you. ment and apply them when you return in mind during these days of uncertain Concentrate on getting it correct the to troops. force reductions). The sooner you fittime. learn to take advantage of this vital Security. This is an important word resource, the sooner you’ll learn more that you must pay attention to at func- about your new job and enjoy it. tional assignments. Classified docu- Your interaction with the civilian ments and computer disks abound ev- Captain John K. Bartolotto work force will also broaden your erywhere. Take the time to ensure you is a 1983 ROTC DMG of the knowledge of another side of person- always safeguard classified material. State University of New York nel management, one that you just It may sound minor; but believe it or at Potsdam. He has served don’t experience in a troop unit. You not, many an officer has had his ca- as a tank platoon leader, will quickly realize that there is a dif- reer tarnished by leaving classified scout platoon leader, and ferent set of standards and expecta- material on his unattended desk or a tank company XO with 2-67 tions in dealing with soldiers versus safe unsecured. Use the same com- Armor, 3AD; S4 and tank your civilian counterparts. Don’t treat mon sense OPSEC thinking in the of- company commander with 4- civilians like soldiers. Your experi- fice as you would in a line unit. Be 67 Armor, 3AD; S3 Air for 3d ences in the office will actually help aware of the security SOP for your of- Brigade, 3AD; and assistant your leadership style to grow, believe fice, especially when it comes to OPS officer G3 OPS, 3AD it or not, as you come into contact using secure/nonsecue FAXes, tele- both in FRG and during DES- with various styles of executive lead- phones, and computers. ERT STORM. He has at- ership. Unfortunately, there are bad In all functional assignments there is tended AOB. AOAC, NBC apples in some functional assign- one thing that you must take heed of: School, Air Assault School, ments, just as there are in some line from the fmt day to the last day of CAS3, the Combat Develop- units. Take the opportunity to learn your tour, you will be considered the ments Course and Material what not to do from these people. Pa- expert in the area you are working. Acquisition Management tience and flexibility are two qualities You must quickly learn to work with Course. He is currently as- you’ll need as you learn to adapt and details. Unlike your branch assign- signed in his functional area function in a non-troop unit environ- ments, in which the NCOs are the ex- 51 (R&D) at HQ, TRADOC, ment where the paperwork never perts in one field, and the officer must Fort Monroe.

ARMOR - MayJune 1992 25 Bernard Law Montgomery:

by David Craig

In 1946, Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery was elevated to the lofti- est position in the British military, re- placing his friend and mentor, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS). His tenure proved to be disastrous be- cause of his abrasive personality,’ and he stepped down in 1948. Without Brooke to shield him, Montgomery could not cope. Even the royal family found his megalomania difficult to tolerate? Curiously though, it was his narcissism that kept him in the lime- light during the Second World War in spite of his gross incompetence as a field commander who knew little of high mobility warfare. Interestingly, the debacle at Dunkirk, in May 1940, propelled the career of- ficer Montgomery to prominence in British military circles. As command- ing general of the British 3rd Infantry Division, Montgomery acquitted him- self extremely well in Belgium, even though he never saw a German tank. He made the remark later that he felt a well-trained and mobile infantry di- vision could handle the finest Panzer? Yet it was common knowledge that German armor had won the victory. Colonel Baron Hans von Luck, who was with Erwin Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division at Dunkirk, recently sur- mised that, had Hitler not issued his famous stop order to von Rundstedt, the entire British Expeditionary Force chosen as Southeastem commander, upon himself to change the plans for - including Montgomery’s well- under Geneml Sir Bernard Paget of armored flanking attacks north and trained 3rd Infantry Division - Home Forces. Although this is not south of Dieppe, intended to isolate would have been overrun and de- widely known, one of his major tasks German forces in the city from their stroyed! was the planning of the Dieppe Raid, reinforcements, while infantry first called Operation RUITER, and launched its simultaneous frontal as- Role In the Dleppe Raid later, Operation JUBILEE. In one of sault. Instead, Montgomery eliminated the first of many blunders that re- the flanking attacks, changing the op- After the devastating defeat of the vealed his ignorance of modem mo- eration to a frontal infantry assault BEF at Dunkirk, Montgomery was bile warfare, Montgomery took it with supporting armor coming in be-

26 ARMOR - May-June 1992 A Question of Competence

hind the infantry? JUBILEE was a before the raid took place, he had tered and bruised Eighth Army at a total disaster. Had the raid been car- been ordered to El Alamein, in North dirty little Arab town called El Ala- ried out as originally planned, with a Africa7 mein. He formed a defensive line clear understanding of the value of from the Mediterranean Sea to the im- armor and infantry working together, Blundering In North Africa passable Qatarra Depression and it might well have succeeded. As it thwarted a determined Erwin Rommel was, 5,000 Canadian soldiers were By July 1942, the British com- from taking Cairo and the Suez Canal. lost, and German propagandists had a mander in North Africa, GEN Sir After the battle had ended, and a very field day! Montgomery, however, es- Claude Auchinleck had managed to frustrated Afrika Korps had fallen caped criticism because, two weeks stop a year-long retreat with his bat- back to regroup and await supplies

ARMOR - May-June 1992 27 victory to keep him in political office. Disaster at Dieppe: 5,000 Allied Troops Lost Montgomery was given command of the British Eighth Army? Montgomery, a traditional staff offi- cer from the First World War, was an advocate of the set-piece battle and at- trition warfare. He believed, as did his mentor Alan Brooke, that armor was to be used only as mobile support ar- tillery for the infantry.” He was 1appalled when confronted with Auchinleck’s new configuration and quickly assumed that Auchinleck was British Churchill tanks lie de- setting his army up for a mad dash to stmyed and abandoned on the banks of the Nile and a new the rocky beach at Dieppe de- after the Germans soundly fensive stand. Montgomery notified a trounced the invading Allied very frustrated Churchill that it would troops. The Churchills were take him two months to train the to- being employed in their first tally “demoralized army and mold it combat operation. The au- thor contends that Montgom- into a cohesive force, one capable of ery misused his armor as grappling with “a very tricky” Rom- supporting artillery for the in- mel.” vading Canadian infantry. In the combat that followed, 13,500 British troops fell victim to Mont- gomery’s WWI-style set-piece battle and fresh troops, the “Auk” started re- ing a page from his opponent, Rom- of attrition at El Alamein. Rarely in forming his army to go on the attack. mel, who had employed the same the history of warfa was military in- He abandoned the traditional format techniques with his highly successfu! competence more evident than in the of infantry forward with armor in sup- panzers.8 But before he could finish North African desert in October 1942 port to one of armor and “lorried in- making the changeover, he was igno- through May 1943. Men were slaugh- fantry” attacking together in tandem. miniously sacked by Winston Chur- tered needlessly advancing through Essentially, Auchinleck was borrow- chill, who was pressed for a military minefields in the face of murderous

North Africa: Victory at a High Cost

Despite his victory in the desert, Montgomery learned little of tank tactics and less about mobile warfare. Here, PzKw Ills of Rommel’s Afrika Korps race to reposition themselves in Libya.

28 ARMOR - May-June 1992 Sicily: Another Plodding Performance machine gun crossfire. Armor ad- vanced only reluctantly, and com- pletely unimaginatively, after the in- fantry had cleared the minefields. Six hundred of the 1,200 British tanks were quickly destroyed or im- mobilized by Rommel’s 200 war-tom and scarred tanks. Finally, after 11 days of brutal punishment, Rommel, with 30 tanks left and dangerously low on fuel, started a slow retreat westward across the North African desert. The Afrika Korps, virtudly eliminated as a viable force, still con- tinued to outmaneuver Montgomery and evade his entirely predictable, bludgeoning advance. Finally Rom- mel, after six months of highly skillful evasive action, escaped to fight an- other day,” while praise was heaped on Monty for having soundly British soldiers unload ammunition and vehicles trounced the Fox. on the first day of the invasion of Sicily. July 10, Desert 1943. The tank had played only a support- ive, inefficient, and unimaginative role under Montgomery. He knew nothing of tank tactics and would not Patton, however, had covered a dis- Overcautious At Caen permit his subalterns to express inno- tance three-and-a-half times that of vative ideas, even though Rommel, Montgomery with greater exposure to The key to the success of the Nor- with much inferior forces, was danc- enemy opposition. mandy invasion was the early capture ing elusively before him. Montgomery was relieved of his of the city of Caen, nine miles inland command of the British Eighth Army from the seaside resort town of Riva- The Sicilian Campaign: in Italy, although his slow and un- Bella, at the confluence of the Orne Comparison with a Master imaginative performance earned him River and the sea. Caen, Normandy’s the reputation in Great Britain for major road and rail center, was vital Montgomery’s performance in Sic- being prudent with the lives of his to Allied strategy and had to be taken ily, as well as in Italy, was equally troops. He returned to England to re- on the first day. Beyond Caen, the uninspiring. The Allied invasion of lieve Lieutenant General Frederick plains of Falaise to the southeast of Sicily in July 1943, while not epito- Morgan (COSSAC) from his 1943 the city were important also. The flat mizing the alliance’s finest hour, did preliminary planning for the assault to land was suitable for airfields and offer an example of the proper use of Normandy. ideal for tanks. Failure to take Caen armor, which was under the command The decision to appoint Montgomery the fmt day would dangerously com- of the master tanker, George Patton. as ground commander for the cross- promise the invasion.” Shunning Montgomery’s traditional channel invasion was a political one. approach, which had served the Brit- Harold Alexander was better qualified ULTRA code-breakers determined ish so well during the Boer Wars, Pat- because he was Army Group com- that Rommel had positioned the refit- ton pressed his armor into action mander in Italy, but Churchill really ted 21st Panzer Division (which had shortly after landing at Licata and had no choice. He would have been been destroyed in North Africa and Gela on Sicily’s southern coastline. keelhauled by the British people had had been reconstituted of mostly inex- He raced north for Palenno, than he chosen otherwise, because Monty perienced troop^)'^ southeast of the east to Messina, arriving the day be- was considered the messiah, the sav- city. It was the only obstacle facing fore Montgomery’s troops entered the ior of the British Empire since El Ala- Montgomery’s forces, other than light city from the south. Montgomery sus- mein, and he could do no wrong.14 beach defenses. The British, however, tained 11,843 casualties in the 38day Montgomery did not attempt to per- faced one major obstacle that came campaign, while Patton lost 8,731.13 suade them to the contrary. close to destroying them and over ARMOR - MayJune 1992 29 which they had no control - the Orne River and south to Cagny weather. in the general direction of Fala- A storm of considerable sever- ise. Before the assault, 7,000 ity struck the English Channel on tons of bombs were dropped on June 4, 1944. Eisenhower sum- German emplacements, crater- moned his meteorologist, who ing the area and creating a advised him that the storm would moonscape surface, not unlike abate long enough to allow the the battlefields of the First invasion to proceed before the World War. This hampered the storm closed in again. Eisen- "Questions quickly arose in SHAEF head- progress of his tanks. Colonel hower issued the command that quarters regarding Montgomery's compe- Baron Hans von Luck, Prussian set NEFTUNE in motion. Mirac- tence. Eisenhower was angered and dis- regimental tank commander of ulously, the weather lifted, and mayed with Monty's performance, and re- the 21st Panzer Division, vet- the invasion armada was set ir- crimination raged "... eran of the Polish, Dunkirk, revocably under way.I7 The tides Russian, and North African from the storm surge, however, were of Caen would remain elusive for the campaign^?^ now faced elements of very high. Bradley and the American British until late July, when Omar Montgomery's unsupported armor forces decided to launch their assault Bradley's Operation COBRA and with four 88-mm antiaircraft guns. He on Omaha and Utah beaches at 0630 George Patton's Third Army were persuaded a recalcitrant AA crew to hours, while Montgomery and the Ca- loosed hmthe strangling hedgerows use their guns to pick off the advanc- nadian and British forces opted for of Normandy. ing tanks, one by one, at close range. 0730 hours to achieve a higher tide Armor was absolutely essential for Within minutes, von Luck, with his with less beach to cross before reach- the capture of Caen and the open four 88-mm guns, had knocked out 16 ing the dunes. The higher tides had plains to Falaise. Yet Montgomery Shermans." Von Luck saw no infan- some effect on the American divi- and his commanders treated armor try advancing with the armor and was sions, but Sword Beach was a disas- like a stepchild. Confronted with nar- not concerned with small arms fue ter. Where the beach at Riva-Bella is row beaches and abnormally high taking out his gunners.= This action, normally 30 yards wide at high tide, tides, with beach defenses all but Operation GOODWOOD, was a di- this day the beach was a scant 30 eliminated by the commandos earlier, saster, with the Germans still holding feet," hardly enough room to accom- a skilled tank commander would the high ground at Bourgebus Ridge, modate a Sherman tank! never have put up with a h-afftc jam. as the British suffered 5,537 casualties A traffic jam of horrendous propor- Without question, he would have and lost 400 tanks, 36 percent of their tions developed, with tanks stalled in pushed his armor over the embank- armored strength in France?6 long lines of supply ~ehicles.'~No ments and into the village streets." Questions quickly arose in SHAEF priority had been given to armor even But Montgomery's tank commanders headquarters regarding Montgomery's though, according to Montgomery, we= not permitted any freedom to act competence. Eisenhower was angered three armored brigades were commit- on their own. The potential for disas- and dismayed with Monty's perfor- ted to take Caen before the 21st Pan- ter was there, with 21st Panzer in the mance, and recrimination raged un- zer Division could counter?' As it shadows, and 12th SS Panzer not far controlled among both his British and was, without any supporting armor, away. Warehousing tanks on the American staff members to send the British 3rd Infantry advanced cau- beach came very close to spelling di- Monty packing. But Re made the po- tiously to within three miles of Caen saster for the entire invasion, and per- litical decision to keep him, a decision before encountering elements of the haps the outcome of the war. most military men found difficult to 21st Panzer Division at 1400 hours. Fortunately for the British and Cana- The GOODWOOD Fiasco dians, confusion and uncertainty in A Bridge Too Far - the German high command had de- On July 18th, Montgomery launched What Could Go Wrong, Did layed the 21st Panzer Division from a massed tank assault against fixed counterattacking until 1400 hours, and enemy positions in a herculean effort In spite of his incompetence, Monty the 12th SS Panzer Division stationed to finally take the ravaged city of remained in command of 21st Army nearby was not released until 1500 Caen. With 3rd Infantry holding flank Group. Sequestered alone in his cap- hours!*' The 3rd Infantry was stopped positions, Montgomery forged his tured van, he contrived the plan in its tracks, and the prize of the city armor east from Benouville and the for Operation MARKET-GARDW.

~~ 30 ARMOR - MayJune 7992 Three airborne divisions would Notes exits could have been readily made. The sea- be wall could have been blown by the ~anm~dos dropped to secure five bridges along a to permit passage of tanks. and more than likely single road, 64 miles long, from De 'Hamilton, Nigel. Monty: The F~MIYears Of with less hazard because of the absence of land Groote to Amhem?' The three divi- The Field-Marshal, 1944-1976. (New York. mines. sions would be relieved by a double 1986). p. 727. =Van Luck. Hans, Panzer Commander, (New column of tanks (Guards Armored Di- 'lbid.. p 693. York, 1990). It is most rewading to find a man 'Hamilton. Nigel. Monty: The Making ofa stil alive (age 77) who had participated in so vision) forging northward to arrive at General. (New York. 1981). pp. 353-354. many campaigns in the Mediterranean and Eu- Amhem in no more than two da~s.2~ 'lntenriew with Colonel BmHans von ropean theatres. Murphy's Law prevailed. The tanks Luck. July 18. 1987. 3Hastings, p. 234. had no mom to maneuver. The: te& %obertson. Terence, Dieppc: The Show and ?ntewiew with Colonel Bamn von Luck. on each side of the mad was marshy the Glory. (London, 1963). p. 79. July 18. 1987. 'Ibid,. pp. 461469. %astings. p. 236. and unfit for tanks?' As a conse- 'Villa. Brian Loring. Unauthorized Action, 27Ambrose. Stephen E., Eisenhower: Soldier, quence, the Germans picked off the Mountbanen and the Dieppe Raid. (Ontario. General of the Amy. Presi&nt-Elect, 1890- advancing armor like ducks in a 1989). pp. 264-267. Villa is convinced that 1952. (New Yorlc. 1983). p. 320. shooting gallery, causing delay after Mountbatten acted on his own to aciivate the gRyan, Cornelius, A Bridge Too Far, (New delay. The tanks arrived at Amhem Dieppe raid. that he had neither the approval of Yo& 1974). p. 10. There are several fine ac- Brooke or Churchill. The king ultimately insu- counts relating the events of the nine days of seven days too late?' The plan amply lated his cousin fran his earned criticism. MARKETGARDEN. In my opinion, Ryan's is illustrated a complete abscence of un- 'Bameg Correlli, The Desert Generals, (New the most thorough. derstanding of the use of armor even Yo&, l%l). p. 218. stbid.. p. 166. in its most rudimentary aspects. The 'lbid.. pp. 223-226. ?bid.. p. 30. casualties reflected how appallingly ''Some historians believe this was the most "lbid.. p. 564. bad the plan was; more than 17,000 in serious mistake that Churchill committed. Au- %.id., p. 599. chinleck was a highly Rspected soldier with a the nine days of Operation MARKET- "Hamilton. Nigel. Master of the Banlcficld, track record in the desert, while Montganery Monty's War Years 1942-1944. (New York, GARDEN?^ knew nothing of desert warfare. Ihe 'Auk' had 1983). p. 137. just stopped Rommel and his Afrika Kop and "Fraser. David. Alan Bruoke. (New Yo&. won the first battle of El Alamein only to be Was Montgomery the Victim 1982). p~.112-121. relieved because he lacked the charisma and Of Ossified Doctrine? flash Churchill needed to flaunt a military vic- tory. Traditionalism, drummed into the in- "Montgomery did not like Auchinleck. was tellectually limited33 Montgomery as critical of him. and gave him no credit for any- David Craig left college to early as the Royal Military Academy thing. For that matter. Monty did not get along at Sandhurst and the Staff College at with any of his peen. His subalterns, however. enlist in the Army in Decem- considered him messianic and bought his nar- ber 1942, began active ser- Camberley, proliferated and was exac- cissistic behavior as reflecting genius. erbated by the British military estab- vice in February 1943, and '*Ellis. John, Brute Force. Allied Strategy and served as a combat infantry- lishment. Montgomery's training did Tactics in the Second World War, (New York. man in France until wounded not include tank tactics or strategy, 1990). pp. 256-288. other than peripherally, because the "D'Este. Carlo. World War I1 in the Mediter- in September 1944. He was ranean, 1942-1945. (Chapel Hill, North Cam awarded a Bronze Star and a British Army traditionalists did not li~.1990). p. 77. consider it acceptable. Tanks were to Purple Heart for meritorious I4Bameg pp. 235-250. conduct in combat and was be used only reluctantly as close sup- ''D'Este. Carlo, Decision in Normandy. (New medically discharged in May port mobile artillery for advancing in- York. 1983). p. 63n. fantry? "hwning. David, The Devil's Virtuosos: 1945. He received a BS de- German Generak at War. 194045, (New York:. gree from Butler University in 1977). p. 177. Indianapolis in 1947. After re- Montgomery was permitted only a "Ambrose. Stephen E.; Eisenhower: %Mer passing acquaintance with armor and tiring from a career in real es- andf'residcnt. (New York, 1990). pp. 137-139. tate, he earned a Master's had no training whatsoever in high "Hastings, Max, Overlord: D-Day and the degree in history from the mobility warfare. While his creden- Bank for Normandy. (New York. 1984). p- 113. 129. University of New Orleans in tials were considerable as an infantry DEste. Decision in Normandy, p. "D'Este. Decision in Normandy. pp. 129-130. May 1989. He now teaches commander, he knew nothing of ar- mlbid., p. 146. history on occasion at Tulane mored warfm. The cost in human life *'Downing. pp. 177-180. and treasure for his incompetency is University as well as other PBotting, Douglas, The Second Front. (Alex- schools and writes for military beyond estimate and will never be andria, Va.. 1978). p. 57. The scale model of known. Sword Beach indicates several points where periodicals.

ARMOR - May-June 1992 31 The Battle of Arras: Fifty-Year-Old Lessons For Today by Captain Charles H. Benson 111

Introduction the planners in Berlin had imagined of the German advance to the French possible. lines. Two infantry brigades, the “When I want to understand what is As the German offensive developed, 150th and 13th, under the command happening today or try to decide what it became evident to the commanders of Major General RL. Petre, received wiN happen tomorrow, I look back.” of the British Expeditionary Force that this mission? This plan met with their army was in imminent danger of some success initially, and on 20 -Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. being cut off from the main body of May, German units met strong resis- the Allied First Army Group, and tance in the vicinity of Arras and were The Battle of Arras, France, which their main lines of communication forced to bypass the village in order occurred during the opening days of and supply. The bulk of the B.E.F. to continue their march northward! World War 11, was a brief but histori- had come to reinforce the northern Leading the German column at Arras cally significant baffle. It is replete flank of the Allied defense and was at was the 7th Panzer Division com- with lessons in the massing and syn- this time deployed in Belgium. The manded by Major General Erwin chronization of combat power, espe- British commander’s worst fears be- Rommel. He was followed by the SS cially with regard to the employment came a reality on 21 May, when the Totenkopf Division on his left flank, of mixed formations of armor and in- spearhead of the Gman Second and the 5th Panzer Division on his fantry. Many of the problems that Army reached the coast south of right. faced the British during this battle are Boulogne. In just seven days, the Ger- The job of leading the British coun- problems with which we are wrestling man Army had driven about 150 terattack went to Major General Sir today: the compatibility of communi- miles, cutting the Allied armies in half Howard Franklyn. The force, commit- cations systems, the employment of and denying the British and French ted to this operation by Lord Gort, heavy and light forces, and the acqui- any opportunity to seize the initiative originally appeared to be quite large. sition and dissemination of tactical in- or mount an effective defense. The “Frankforce,” as the unit was dubbed, telligence are examples. This article speed of the attack caught the defend- was made up of two infantry divi- will review the Battle of Arras and ers so off-balance that General von sions, the 5th and 50th, and the First examine some of the problems that Kleist noted “my fmt encounter with Army Tank Brigade? The original the British faced and their relevance the British was when my tanks came plan also called for a simultaneous at- to us today. upon, and overran, an infantry battal- tack by two French divisions from the ion equipped with dummy cartridges south, but that plan was postponed. On 13 May 1940, the leading ele- for field exercises... this was a side- French participation was limited to a ments of the German Third Army light on the apparent unexpectedness force of approximately 70 light tanks Group crossed the Meuse River and of our arrival.”’ that protected the left flank of emerged from the Ardennes Forest The commander of the British Expe- Frankforce! into the countryside of eastern France. ditionary Forces on the continent, Lord Franklyn’s infantry divisions Catching the French defenders com- General Lord Gort, came under in- had also been whittled down drasti- pletely off guard, the Germans creasing pressure from his superiors in cally by the time that the attack was quickly drove through the center of London to assume the offensive and to have commenced. Instead of two the Allied First Army Group and break his army out of encirclement? divisions, Frankforce was limited to began their dash to the Atlantic. The To accomplish this he quickly con- two battalions of the Durham Light combination of speed and surprise that ceived a plan which called for the Infantry: the 6th and 8th. These units was gained by attacking with no commitment of two of his divisions to had no radios, no trucks, no support- fewer than three armored corps the vicinity of the village of Arras and ing artillery, and only half of their au- through the Ardennes completely dev- the Scarpe River. Here they wete to thorized number of machine guns? astated the Allied command structure. establish a defensive line from which The Durhams had marched almost sending panic and despair through the Lord Gort hoped to launch an attack continually for the previous ten days ranks. The Blitzkrieg was once again southward toward the village of in hot weather, and were by now succeeding more quickly than even Cambrai, and break through the flank badly in need of rest. Up until this 32 ARMOR - May-June 1992 \ VlMY MONT ST ELOY /

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time, they had been a reserve force sequently, many of the original force sternation among Rommel's troops and had received no training in ma- were lost en route to worn-out tracks during the battle, but unfortunately, neuver with tanks before their com- and other malfunctions. hen they did only 16 of the 74 available tanks were mitment to the battle. arrive in Arras on 21 May, only 74 of Mark 11s. Furthermore, in an attempt The tanks of Frankforce were in the original 100 tanks were available to even the distribution of heavy tanks equally bad shape. At this time, the for combat? among the attacking force, the Matil- First Army Tank Brigade consisted of The British tanks were of the Mark I das were divided between the two at- two battalions: the 4th and 7th Royal Infantry and Mark I1 ''MatiIda" types. tacking columns and thus not used in Tank Regiments. These two units con- The Mark I, although heavily ar- mass. stituted the majority of the armor mored, was extremely slow, with a Three additional factors added to the force the British committed to the maximum speed of eight mph and disadvantaged position the British continent thus far, and, gone hither armed with only an 8-mm machine held on 21 May. The first was a lack and yon across the front in vain at- gun. Designed as an infantry support of a coherent and effective chain of tempts to support the BB.F.'s de- vehicle, it was manned by a crew of command within Frankforce itself. fenses. In fact, before the 20th of two, and could withstand hits from all Though General Franklyn had placed May, they had been in Belgium, de- known antitank guns of the day. Due one of England's foremost experts in ployed along the Dyle Line? When to its light armament, however, it was tank warfare, Major General Sir ordered to rejoin the battle along the incapable of defeating an armored Giffard Le Q. Martel, in command of southern front, the tanks had to march threat." The Mark I1 tank was better the attacking force, his two attacking approximately 100 miles to reach the armored and at least as well gunned columns were commanded by the in- British positions at Arras with no op as any of the German tanks built to fantry battalion commanders. These portunity to conduct much overdue date. It was manned by a crew of four officers were relatively inexperienced, maintenance. These tanks had not and armed with a 37-mm main gun and traveled not with the tanks lead- been designed to operate for such in- and an 8-mm coaxial machine gun." ing the attack, but with their own in- tervals over such long distances. Con- The Matildas were to cause great con- fantrymen, who traveled well behind ARMOR - MayJune 1992 33 Right-Hand Cdumn accompanying infantry, and the two 7th Royal Tank Regiment elements became temporarily sepa- 8th Durham Light Infantry rated. They regrouped, but the column 365th Battery, 92nd Field Regiment, commander decided that the tanks Royal Artillery should proceed on ahead without the BRITISH MATILDA MK I 206th Battery, 52nd Anti-Tank Regi- infantry. The tanks had not gone far the tanks. Furthermore, no tank offi- ment, Royal Artillery when in the town of Dainville, well cers were present at the final orders One Platoon, 151st Brigade Anti- short of the start line, they ran into el- group, so they were not entirely in- Tank Company ements of the 6th Panzer Grenadier formed of the scope and conduct of ‘Z’ Company, 4th Royal Northum- Regiment. The British sent one troop their mission. berland Fusiliers of Mark I tanks and a company of the The second factor was the complete Scout Platoon, 4th Royal Northum- 4th Northumberland Fusiliers to deal lack of British close air support berland Fusiliers with this threat. Meanwhile, the re- throughout the operation. By this time maining tanks moved on without in- in the campaign, the Luftwaffe en- Lef’t-Hand Column fantry support and proceeded to wreak joyed complete air supremacy over 4th Royal Tank Regiment havoc among the main body of the the continent and constantly harassed 6th Durham Light Infantry 6th Panzer Grenadier Regiment’s col- Allied troop and supply columns. The 368th Field Battery, Royal Artillery umn, destroying many of its trucks R.A.F. had been recalled to protect 206th Battery, 52nd Anti-Tank Regi- and scattering its troops. the skies over the homeland and was ment, Royal Artillery Following this initial encounter, the in no position to provide fighter cover One Platoon, 151st Brigade Anti- left-hand column continued through for its ground force in France. The Tank Company the town of Achicourt to Beaurains, R.A.F. would not reappear in strength ‘Y’Company, 4th Royal Northurn- and in the process overran the Ger- until the evacuation operation in berland Fusiliers man antitank defensive screen. This Dunkirk, where it thwarted the Scout Platoon, 4th Royal Northum- was possible due to the inability of Luftwaffe’s attempt to finish the Brit- berland Fusiliers the German 37-mm antitank gun to ish forces off on the beaches. penelrate the armor of the British Finally, and perhaps most important The British faced the 7th Panzer Di- tanks. The British tankers were able to of all, was the failure of General vision and the 3rd SS kerDivision destroy many of these guns while the Franklyn’s headquarters to provide his “Totenkopf.” These two units had ap- 6th Durham Light Infantry cleared the front-line commanders with an accu- proximately 218 tanks between towns and collected prisoners. When rate estimate of the size and disposi- tt~em,’~and a numerid superiority in they reached the town of Beaurains, tion of enemy forces in the vicinity of men and equipment of every type the British encountered stiff resistance Arras. General Martel was told only over the attackers. The 7th Panzer Di- from 105-mm field guns that the Ger- that “enemy infantry and tanks were vision was composed of the 25th Pan- mans were using in a direct fire mode. known to be operating south and zer Regiment, 6th and 7th Panzer The British had finally met their southwest of Arras, but in numbers Grenadier Regiments, 78th Panzer Ar- match, and about 20 of their tanks not believed to be great.”” In fact, tillery Regiment, 7th Motorcycle Bat- were knocked out of action, bringing General Franklyn’s headquarters had talion, 37th Panzer Reconnaissance the left-hand column’s attack to a halt. received reports of strong enemy Battalion, 42nd Anti-Tank Battalion, Matters worsened as the day wore on, forces along the Arras-Doullens road 58th Panzer Engineer Battalion, and and the column attempted to withdraw and the Arras-St. Pol road. This the 83rd Panzer Signal Battalion.” under constant harassment from artil- placed the Germans squarely between The 3rd SS Panzer Division was com- lery and dive-bomber attacks. the British and the planned start line posed of the 3rd SS Panzer Regiment, Part of the reason that the left-hand of their attack. 5th and 6th SS Panzer Grenadier Reg- column had to stop in Beaurains was iments, 3rd SS Panzer Artillery Regi- the trouble that the right-hand column The Battle ment, 3rd SS Panzer Reconnaissance had in keeping to its timetable and Battalion, 3rd SS Anti-Tank Battalion, newly received reports of enemy The British left the town of Vimy, 3rd SS Panzer Engineer Battalion, 3rd tanks on the other side of town. The approximately five miles north of SS Panzer Signal Battalion, 3rd SS right-hand column had begun its Arras and nine miles north of the start Anti-Aircraft Battalion, and 3rd SS movement on time, but encountered line, at 1100 hours. Projector Battalion.’ ti problems in keeping its armor to a The attacking force moved in two Shortly after the British began their speed that accompanying infantry columns, which were made up of the march toward Arras, the tanks in the could match. As a result, communica- following units:I3 left-hand column ran ahead of their tions broke down almost immediately 34 ARMOR - MayJune 1992 between the infantry and armor com- turned to Vailly to see if they could When the attack ended early that manders. The 7th Royal Tank Regi- speed the infantry on their way. When evening, the losses incurred by the ment became separated from the 8th Rommel arrived, he found his troops British attack cost the advancing Ger- Durham Light Infantry following a in a state of panic, having just been man Army 7 officers, 17 NCOs, and brief engagement with elements of the attacked by the 7th Royal Tank Regi- 65 men killed; 116 men of all ranks 8th Panzer Division, which had occu- ment through their right flank. Rom- wounded, and 173 missing. Thirty pied the village of Duisans. Leaving me1 and Lieutenant Most attempted to tanks were destroyed, along with nu- the infantry behind to clear the vil- restore order to the situation by en- merous tr?lcks and artillery pieces?’ lage, the tanks rad ahead and, couraging the infantrymen to stand Approximately 20 of those tanks be- through some mishap, became snarled fast and bring fms to bear on the longed to the 25th Panzer Regiment. in the rear of the 4th Royal Tank tanks. Eventually they came upon a These tanks were lost when the regi- Regiment’s column in Dain~ille.’~ battery each of antiaircraft guns and ment attacked the British from the vil- This diversion from their intended howitzers which Rommel ordered to lage of Acq, in the north, while the route to Vailly caused them to nar- open rapid fire on the advancing British were withdrawing following rowly miss coming into direct contact tanks. Personally giving each of the their encounter with Rommel’s artil- with 150 PzKpw III and PzKpw IV guns its target, Rommel succeeded in lery. tanks of the 25th Panzer Regiment. knocking out the lead tank in the col- The Germans ran into a Screen of The 25th Panzer Regiment unknow- umn and halted the British attack.” British antitank guns that the 7th ingly bypassed the entire British force He was then able to restore his lines, Royal Tank Regiment had deployed and reached the village of Acq to the bring order to his troops, and regain around Duisans to cover its with- northwest of Arras without being the upper hand on the battlefield. drawal. Unlike their British counter- challenged. Later, General Rommel Rommel’s losses included his aide, parts, the German tanks lacked suffi- ordered the regiment to turn around Lieutenant Most, who was killed at cient armor protection from their and attack the British from the north his side during their engagement with enemy’s antitank gunfire and were while they were attempting to with- the tanks. easy prey for the British gun crews. draw. Though the Germans were able to The result of this action was that “up- The 7th Royal Tank Regiment even- regain the initiative quickly and force wards of 20 tanks were knocked out tually got back on course to Vailly, the British to abandon their attack and left burning on the ground.”” but only after losing its commander short of their planned start line, the Though the British attack was short- and adjutant to enemy fm. The at- battle was to have far-reaching conse- lived and too little, too late, its signifi- tack was by now completely uncoor- quences. The German commanders cance was inflated in the German dinated, and though it continued to had been expecting the British and commander’s minds because it cost wreak destruction and panic among French to attack their extended lines the German Army losses that were the German troops, including ele- of supply and weak flanks for some four times greater than the total suf- ments of the SS Totenkopf Division, time. The attack at Arras was per- fered during their breakthrough into it eventually ran aground outside the ceived to be the forerunner of such an Fran~e.2~ village of Vailly after receiving direct attack, which caused the German fm from the Germans’ 88-mm anti- commanders to slow their advance, al- Conclusions aircraft guns. lowing more time for their units to The 88-mm guns were employed as mass forces and assume more deliber- The British counterattack at Arras antiarmor weapons in a desperate at- ate and conservative tactics. provides us with numerous lessons in tempt to compensate for the failure of During the Nuremburg Trials, Gen- the conduct of armored warfare. The the German antitank guns to penetrate eral von Rundstedt noted that this at- first is the need for communication the armor of the British tanks. tack was more successful than any between tanks and their supporting, or These guns were under the direct other Allied counterstroke of the cam- supported infantry. This lesson is es- command of Major General Rommel paign in France.” Indeed, the attack pecially germane to the planning of himself. He had returned to the area panicked Rommel himself, who exag- operations involving a heavy-light in search of the 7th Panzer Grenadier gerated the size of the British force in mix of forces. If radio communication Regiment, which was supposed to be his communication with headquarters is not possible, then some sort of mu- supporting the 25th Panzer Regiment. on 21 May, stating that he had been tually recognizable signals should be Rommel had been riding with the -“attacked by hundreds of enemy used to communicate during battle. lading vehicles of the armored col- tanks,” and “situation maps marked Not only did the British infantry lack umn when he noticed that his infantry up in his own hand display arrows radios in this case, but few of the had fallen too far behind. He and his purporting a counteroffensive by five tanks’ radios were working by the staff officer, Lieutenant Most, re- enemy divisions.*920 time the battle began.

ARMOR - MayJune 1992 35 Second is the lesson of leaders Id- narrow front, as we did in this case, 7Nichdas Harmon. Dunkirk: The Patriotic ing from a position from which they eventually became a normally Myth. Simon and Schuster. New York. 1980. p. ac- 94. can see and influence the battle. cepted method.”26The superior armor ‘Douglas Williams. Retreat fran Dunkirk, Though it is essential that a com- protection that the British tanks pos- Brentano’s. New Yotic. 1941. p. 41. mander position himself that he sessed allowed them to dominate the so ’Nicholas Harmon. p. 93. can quickly maneuver his forces to battlefield initially and provoke terror %.T. white. TO& and Other AFV~4 the exploit opportunities that arise, none among the defending German infan- Blitzkrieg Era 193941. The Macminan Com- of the British commanders did so. In try, but their insufficient numbers ulti- pany, New Yo* 1972. p. 114. fact, they positioned themselves with mately resulted in their being forced “lbid.. p 123. the infantry, which followed the tanks, to withdraw. “Brian Bond. p. 73. rather than with the armored spear- Finally, the importance of mainte- 131bid., p. 67. head of their attack. They were unable nance as an ingredient of success was ‘%bat McQuie. ‘Historical Chrrrrteristia to assess accurately the situation to brought painfully home to the British of Combat for Wargames.” Benchmark, July their front, and could not coordinate during this attack. The British lost 1988, p. D-9. their infantry units to take advantage one-quarter of their armored force to ‘sSgn~elW. Mitcham, Jr., Hitler’s Legions: of the gains made by their tanks, and mechanical failure before the battle The German Amy Ordcr of Battle. World War assist in the silencing of the German even began. As the battle developed, 11, Stein and Day. New Yo* 1985. p. 356. antitank weapons. Because he was in more tanks were lost to broken tracks ‘61bid..p. 443. the vanguard of his division, Rommel and mechanical failure than to enemy ‘7Brian Bond, p. 65. was in a position to assess quickly fires. These vehicles were then com- ‘*B.H. Liddell Ha& The Ramrl Papers, and influence the tactical situation. pletely lost to the British because they Ham& Brace, and Company, New York. 1953. p. 31-32. He was able to prevent a disaster in lacked sufficient recovery assets, and I9Alist.ir Home, To hea Both: France his area of operation and quickly turn failed to provide infantry support to 1940. Little. Brown and Company. Boston. the British attack into a rout. protect the-recovery teams they did 1%9. p. 508. Third is the criticality of accmte have, when they attempted to operate 20rbid. and timely intelligence to the front under fire. 2’Brian Bond, p. 73. line commander. Had General Martel Thus, the Battle of Arras speaks to pLTG Sir Giffard Le Q. Mattel. p 68. been aware of the enemy situation to those of us today who are still trying =Alistair Home, p. 508. his front, he would probably have to master the lessons that were ”LTG Sir Giffd Le Q. Maltel. p. 66. adopted another, more conservative, learned in blood and frre in France =Ibid., p. 69. course of action. The timetable for the some fifty ymago. These lessons mlbid. entire operation was thrown out of are as important to us now as they kilter by this lack of intelligence when were then, and illustrate to us the the British discovered enemy units on need to reflect upon the past in our ef- their side of the start line that “had to fort to develop our future. be mopped up to clear the way for the Captain Charles H. Benson advance.”24 Notes 111 was commissioned through Fourth is the importance of commit- OCS in 1986. He holds a ting tanks in mass. While the British ‘B.H. Lidden Ha& The German Genmls Bachelors degree from the had enough tanks available to achieve Talk. Quill, New Yo* 1979. p. 130. University of Alaska at An- a limited local breakthrough, they 2Brian Bond, France ami Belgium 1939-1940, chorage and a Masters degree lacked the numbers necessary to sus- University of Delaware Press, Newark. 1975. p. 114. in anthropology from Case tain their advance. This was especially Western Reserve University in ’LTG Sir Giffard Le Q. Maltcl, Our true in light of the numerical superior- Armourcd Forces. Faber and Faber. Ltd.. Lon- Cleveland, Ohio. He served as ity that the Germans enjoyed in men don. 1945. p. 62. a tank platoon leader, head- and machines in the Arras area Gen- 4H.A. Jacobsen and J. Rohwer. eds.. Decisive quarters XO, and battalion ad- eral Martel, in reflecting on this battle Battles of World Wor 11: The Germon View, jutant with 3-8 Cavalry in Ger- stated that “if larger numbers of tanks G.P. htnam’s Sons, New York. 1965. p. 50. many. A graduate of Armor had been available, supported by ’Major LF. Eilis. The War in France and Officer Basic, Amr Officer stronger mobile columns, a great Flanders 1939-1940. Her Majesty’s Stationery Advanced, and Field Artillery suc- Office, London, 1953, p. 89. cess might have been achieved.”25 Officer Advanced Courses, he %rim Bond. ‘Arras. 21 May 1940: A CIM The British learned a valuable lesson Study in the Counter-offcnsive,” in Correlli is currently the squadron from this action, however, as “the use Bamett. et. al.. eds.. Old Bottles and New De- maintenance officer for 3d of tanks in coopention with mobile fenses: Can Ve Lawn From Military History?, Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 5th ID, columns of all arms, attacking on a Brassey’s, London, 1986. p. 65. Ft. Polk, La.

36 ARMOR - MayJune 1992

~~~ Using “Push Packages” To Resupply Cavalry Operations Replenishment by Exception Saves Time, Cuts Net Traffic by Captain Daniel A. Beach

The friction of the battlefield often Regular use and storage ca- prevents units from reporting logisti- pacity were the main criteria MlAl Class 111 & IV Bask Load cal requirements in a timely manner, for this. For example, putting if at all. Yet, this very activity that turboshaft on each tank means Quantity Item prevents reporting expends supplies. crew members can add oil and 8 Ouarts Turboshaft Does an S4 need a report to accu- continue the mission. This im- 4 Quarts 30W rately predict what the needs of a mediate maintenance is the 1 Gallon FRH troop will be? Is waiting for a troop’s converse of transmitting a re- 1 Gallon GAA 1 Gallon CLP exact ammunition status worth delay- quest and waiting for the oil to 2 M21 AT Mines ing their resupply for hours until the come forward from the field 5 M18 AP Mines S4 establishes contact? Isn’t a push trains. 25 sandbags 1 Box of Trip Flares package of some ammunition better The Class IV operational 4 Rdl of Cmna than none? loading came next. Obstacle 11 U-Shaped Pickets This article presents one successful material provides each vehicle example of a true push package logis- increased local security or the M3 Class 111 & IV Baslc Load tics support system. The troop does ability to emplace a point ob- not have to be in constant radio con- stacle. Combining all mines Quantity Item tact with the combat trains. Lengthy and wire from an M3 platoon 6 0- 1W40 reports for required daily supplies do yields enough material to start 1 Gallon GAA not clutter the Administrative and LQ- a hasty obstacle. opera- 1 Gallon GMD This 1 Gallon FRH gistics (a)radio net. This system tional load can support delib- 1 Gallon CLP allows the logistics personnel in the erate obstacle construction by 4 M21 AT Mines reinforcing engineers with ad- 5 M1B AP Mines squadron to focus on exceptions, 50 sandbags rather than on every detail. The S4 ditional Class IV material. 1 Box of Trip Flares and support platoon leader have the Three pickets are candy 4 Roll of Concertina flexibility to deal with rapidly chang- striped for marking fighting 11 U-Shaped Pickets ing situations inherent to cavalry oper- vehicle positions (see Figure M978 Packaged Product Bask toad ations. 1). The base of this system is the devel- Packing lists for the.support for a Cavalry Troopmank Company opment of individual vehicle basic vehicles came next. The cav- Quantity Itom loads. The S4 coordinated with the alry troop and tank company squadron fust sergeants and identified each have a specially tailored 48 OuartslW40 A 24 Tubes GAA the supplies most likely consumed Class I11 and V load. spa- 24 Quarts Turboshaft when deployed (see Figure 1). We de- rate load suits the headquarters 6 Gallons FRH veloped the MlAl and M3 POL and headquarters troop (HHT) 5 Gallons Antifreeze or howitzer battery. Each 1 Gallon CLP packaged products stockage first. The 2 Quarts OEA high density of these vehicles (versus driver stocks these items in his 24 Quarts 30WT M109s or M106s) provided more op- M978 HEMTT fueler’s stor- 24 Ouarts 1ow portunity for quick returns. They also age box (see Figure 1). Exten- 6 SGallon Cans of MAS constitute the majority of the unit’s sive training at Fort Bliss and Figure 1 combat power. the National Training Center ARMOR - MayJune 1992 37 Class V Package for Cavalry Troops

SABOT SABOT SABOT SABOT 30 30 30 I 30 SABOT HEAT SABOT HEAT 30 30 30

25mm SABOT 2-m SABOT 25mm SABOT 25-mm SABOT 810 810 I 810 25-mm HEI-T -1 25mm Ha-T 2knm HU-T 25mm Ha-T 810 810

TOW 9 41 4x 50 HE I 50 HE TOW 46 WP I 46 WP 9 I

120mm SABOT 180 50 CAL 2400 1-m HEAT 60 7.62inm 4800 TOW 36 4(knm HE 144 25-mm SABOT 3240 25mm HEI-T 3240 4-2" HE 100 LAWS 8 WP 92 Fuzes 192

Tank Company Round Count for Two M977s

120mm SABOT 360 120-m HEAT 120 .SO CAL 3600 7.62-m 9600 Smoke Gmnadeo 32 Figure 2

0 confirm that these configura- the number of cans to six. The cans tome ratio of SABOT to HEAT. He tions satisfy the great majority of unit strap onto the M978 fenders without keeps 25-mm ammunition in pure pal- requirements. modification to the vehicle. lets and stacks them two pallets high The presence of 1/4-ton trucks The 3/3 ACR system requires two to speed loading. TOW pallets stack forced the strapping of ten MOGAS Class V packages due to the number two high also. Figure 2 also lists the cans to the top of each HEMTI' fu- of different weapon systems in a cav- tank company package round count. eler. Current fielding of the High Mo- alry squadron. Figure 2 depicts a The 4.2-inch mortar round pallet re- bility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle troop's ammunition configuration quires tailoring to arrive at the mix (HMMWV) leaves the 42-KW gener- when loaded by pallets on the cargo depicted. We did not include any ator as the only MOGAS consumer. bed of an MW7 HEMTT. Each driver illumination rounds in this configura- Therefore, current load plans reduce loads 120-mm ammunition in a three- tion. This is due to the density of ther- 38 ARMOR - May-June 1992 LOGPAC Breakdown mal sights in the MIAl/M3 squadron. The unit commanders deemed an anti- Element M9Tls M978s personnel/anti-vehiclehmoke round much more valuable than an illumina- I Troop 2 tion round. K Troop 2 The objective is to provide the maxi- L Troop 2 mum flexibility possible while meet- M Company 2 ing the combat unit's needs. Quick Howitzer Battery 0' transfer of ammunition requires HHT 0 downloading some pallets on the Combat Trains 4 ground. The recovery of empty pallets Field Trains 4 was not deemed critical when weighed against the increased amount This figure reflects the 16 Oct 88 MTO&E. The suppart platoon is authorized 16 Mg77s under of ammunition carried. We configured this document. The howitzer battery is authorized six 54011dmpside trudcs, each with a 1 Ston the M977s nearly the same. This pro- ammunition trailer. vides a quantity of each type of am- The 16 Sep 89 MTOCLE authorizes the howitzer battery six M977s for in ammunition s&n. munition in the event enemy fire de- The support platmn is authorized 13. This will1 necessitate the use of all but one M977 fram the stroys one of a unit's two M977s. field trains for a LOGPAC. This also allows for maintenance losses as well. Figure 3 The Modified Table Of Organization And Equipment (MTO&E) effective 16 Oct 88 authorizes the howitzer bat- tery six 5-ton trucks. Each truck has a tion is another possibility. Augmenta- Attachments integrate easily into the 1.5-ton ammunition trailer. The new tion of the LOGPAC sent to a troop LOGPAC flow if the S4 teaches them document (effective 16 Sep 89) au- with unusually high ammunition or the system. Attachment leadership thorizes six M977s. The organic am- fuel requirements is also possible. must also participate in the system. munition section handles the battery However, their primary use is for The unit must give a copy of the unit requirements. The battery often finds emergency resupply. The S4 bases Tactical SOP (TACSOP) to them. - itself attached or OPCON to a DS bat- HEMlT use on the current tactical Unit leaders must provide extra in- talion. Therefore, this independent situation. An offensive mission may struction and coaching if new arrivals ammunition capacity is essential. dictate a mix of four fuelers with one are unfamiliar with the TACSOP. Nonetheless, the support platoon can troop and one tank company M977 in Time spent with the attachment logis- assist in this high tonnage require- the combat trains. A defensive sce- tics leader pays handsome dividends. ment, if necessary. nario would dictate two troop M977s, This system also facilitates the quick Figure 3 depicts the distribution of two tank company M977s. and one addition of Class IV support pack- HEMlT assets into LOGPACs for the M978. Prestocking ammunition in or ages. Stake and platform trucks, sent 1988 and 1989 MTO&Es. Vehicle near battle positions is also a consid- by regiment to assist the squadron, readiness or combat losses may dic- eration in defensive planning. Attach- move out with the LOGPAC at the tate the use of extra HEMlTs from ments to the squadron need special at- normal time. The first sergeant simply the field or combat trains to fill out a tention. First sergeants must plan for leads it to his troop area, along with LOGPAC. These vehicles return to the ADA platoon operating in his the rest of the LOGPAC. Attached en- their respective location after reload- area. For example, the K Troop sup- gineers working in the area can pick ing at the ammunition transfer point. ply sergeant can transport the Stinger up preconfigured barrier material pal- Habitual relationships between missiles his troop needs on his supply lets when they rotate through the M977/8 drivers and troopdcompanies truck with the normal LOGPAC. This LOGPAC service station. The estab- prove very helpful to the timely exe- prevents the attachment's limited re- lished Logistic Resupply Points cution of the LOGPAC. supply assets from traversing the bat- (LRPs) furnish a simple framework The HEMlTs located in the combat tle area unnecessarily. The ADA pla- for positioning this material separately trains provide great flexibility to the toon 5-ton truck must remain in the when time is short. S4. One option is immediate combat trains loaded with an emer- A daily meeting of the key support LOGPAC resupply for a troop estab- gency resupply of 20-mm and mis- leaders at the LRP is essential. The lishing a screen. Prestock of ammuni- siles. CSM, first sergeants, S1 or S4, and ARMOR - MayJune 1992 39 squadron motor officer can briefly ment system that fills their require- This system simplifies command and meet to coordinate and solve prob- ments. Taking orders from each troop control. The planning process is lems. The S3 can send additional for each type of ammunition and POL streamlined because each element graphics for distribution. This simply packaged product is unrealistic. The knows exactly what it will receive. provides another opportunity to ensure overwhelming majority of these re- LRPs along the main direction of at- information flow. quests do not change. It is UM~C~S- tack can suffice if planning time is at The support platoon leader conducts sary to send a request for two fuel a premium. The support platoon ser- face-to-face coordination with the S4 HEMlTs each day. Units always need geant has more important issues to at the combat trains while the 120-mm/25-mm sabot, HEAT/HEI-T, deal with than whether I Troop LOGPACs are with first sergeants. He TOWS, 4.2-inch, etc. Address excep- wanted 37 or 38 rounds of SABOT. eats and then replaces the platoon ser- tions, rather than every small detail. This push package system has geant at the LRP. Always manning The M977 driver knows how much served 3/3 ACR quite well. The con- the LRP is essential to solve problems of each type of ammunition to load clusion of the squadron's NTC rota- and supervise local security. upon returning to the regimental sup- tion resulted in the observer/ The support platoon leader/sergeant port area. He has the load plan taped controller's grudging acknowledgment begins cross leveling HEMTT loads to the inside of his vehicle door. The of two successes. First, no ammuni- as they retum from the forward units. driver doesn't have to wait for the re- tion rack was ever less than full be- This prevents each HEMlT from quest to pass through the combat fore a battle. Second, maneuver was traveling all the way to the regimental trains, field trains, support platoon never inhibited for lack of Class III. support area with needed material still leader, and support platoon sergeant. The NTC is by no means the ulti- aboard. The support platoon leader These people are concentrating on ve- mate test. It is, however, the most re- can dispatch a third HEMlT to a unit hicle maintenance, or refitting for the alistic training for combat that logis- with unusually high fuel or ammuni- next LOGPAC. This makes more time tics systems receive. The standard tion requirements as well. available for planning and inspecting. support package that meets the sup- Some minor weak points exist in the It also minimizes turn-around time for ported units' requirements is an effec- "push package" system. If a troop has reloading support vehicles. tive, flexible, and responsive resource only light contact, two full M977s of for success. Commanders are confi- Class V may be more than is needed. The squadron could decide to pass dent that fuel, ammunition, and other A few additional rounds may end up the maintenance reports and requests supplies required for sustained opera- in the first sergeant's track, in the through the supply sergeant. Or, it tions will arrive when and where M88 boom and strappea into bustle may designate the flow of mainte- needed. That is the bottom line for racks. Cross leveling between M977s nance documents between the troop tactical unit support. at the LRP will provide another troop and squadron motor sergeants. It is with needed additional rounds. At important to recognize, however, that worst case, an M977 may have to re- a redundancy exists that can remedy a turn to the rear with ammunition. A failure in whichever the primary pro- unit's failure to communicate needs cedure is. accurately can lead to wasted trans- This system normally requires mini- Captain Daniel A Beach portation assets. mal reporting to execute. The first ser- graduated from the United The responsibility to maintain their geant knows precisely what types and States Military Academy in basic load rests squarely on the shoul- quantities of supplies are enroute to 1984. He served as a pla- ders of each vehicle crew. Vehicle his troop. He knows if he has a criti- toon leader, troop XO, and commanders must constantly know cal issue that requires the use of the liaision officer for 3-7th Cav- the status of their basic load. Remind radio. He must request only excep alry in Schweinfurt, Ger- the driver to get those quarts of oil. A tions. This reduces radio traffic. The many. Following the Armor tired M978 driver will want to sleep system functions when distance, or Officer Advanced Course, instead of chasing down turboshaft or the loss of a key element, disrupts he served as S4, 3/3 ACR. tapping off his MOGAS cans. Dis- communication links. An effective He is currently the S4, 135th Battalion (CEWI) cipline minimizes these performance SOP cuts out unnecessary radio trans- MI problems. missions. This reduces enemy radio and a graduate student of The strengths of this system are direction-finding opportunities. The history at the University of many. The greatest benefit is that S4 handles the exception or emer- Kansas. leaders are confident in a replenish- gency via FM. 40 ARMOR - MayJune 1992 You Can't Push Wet Spaghetti by Colonel John C. Gazlay, USA, Retired

The newly recruited American soldier leaves a demo- completed? and what are the results desired? Have the cratic society and joins a regimented formation. His pre- man in charge "play" the elements back to you to ensure vious group experience allowed the question, 'Why are understanding. When the allocated time has expired, re- we doing this?" It is against this background that Ameri- turn to the man in charge. 'Is the task com- can military leaders face challenges far greater than pleted?"...' Yes sir." "Then you won't mind if I check." those experienced by the leadership of other free world .When Subordinates Make the Right Decision, armies. They Get All of the Credit. When Their Decision Is A new soldier's career begins with drills to instill dis- Wrong, You Get All of the Credit. This produces cre- cipline and rapid response to orders. Frequently there is ative energy and, when necessary, creative risk-taking. not time, nor is it required, to provide "WHY?" 'Yes, sir," There will be a self-generation of quality control. Be sup- is the expected reply. portive of the good tries. After a wrong call, privately Many scholarly theories address the art and practice of counsel the man in charge, 'That's one way to do it, but leadership. History has shown that successful leaders if I had been here I might have done it this way." distill theory and practical experience into a personal for- .Manage by Wandering Around. Get out of the of- mula for leadership. fice/CP every day. Have a purpose for wandering It is the purpose of this article to present some obser- around ... "What am I looking for?" Being on your vations from one leader's experience in leading Ameri- soldiers' "turf" opens communications. You will see and can soldiers. be told things that would have otherwise remained un- .You Can't Push Wet Spaghetti. In garrison, most known to you. When units are detached, try to visit them units are full of starch. This rigidity allows leaders to daily... deliver their mail, food and beverages, clean push them. Once in the field and "wet down" by fatigue, clothing. confusion, and apprehension, much of their starch dis- *It Is Better to Hold a Good Man &wn Than Hold appears. These units require leadership from closer to a Weak Man Up. Encourage and demand initiative. Ev- the front...p ulling. Leadership by example and through eryone should know that he is required to do something. professional competence engenders willing response to Bridle the energy of your "hard chargers" and gently pushing or pulling. steer them on the required course. .Who's In Charge? Everytime you approach a group .You Must Always Be Your Men's Friend. You Can of two or more soldiers ask, "Who's in charge?" Initially, Never Be Their Pal. Being a friend means you are ap- they will form a circle and point to the soldier on their proachable. Your answer may not always be what they right. Continued daily posing of this question to every want to hear, but you always listen. Being a pal breeds group you encounter ultimately pays off. In the absence contempt, eroding response to orders. You can play vol- of orders, one voice comes through loud and clear, "This leyball with them during organized athlet ics... you can't is what we are going to do. I'm in charge." shoot pool with them in the day room. You can mess .Catch Your People Doing Something Right. Pro- together in the field... you can't meet them in a restau- vide positive feedback with on-the-spot recognition of a rant downtown. You can have a few beers with them task well done... "Good job, Jones." "Looking good, during unit day ... you can't drink together at the club. Smith." Dwelling on the negative makes soldiers "gun- None of the preceding are revelations. However, they shy" in the presence of their leaders. Label a soldier a are a collection of devices that may increase your effec- loser often enough and he will behave like a loser. tiveness as a leader. If some don't work for you, discard .Praise Publicly, Reprimand Privately. Praise is ad- them, and try something of your own invention. Those dressed in the preceding observation. Use a draft devices that do work for you are added to your reservoir OER/EER as a reprimand tool. Begin the session with, of experience in the art of leadership. "If I had to rate you today, here's what I'd write." Explain your reasons, and what specific actions will change your mind. Both parties datelsign the report and place it in a Colonel John C. Gazlay was commissioned through sealed envelope. The envelope is opened only when ROTC in 1953 from Pennsylvania State University. He needed to support more serious disciplinary action. The commanded infantry units at platoon, company and bat- departure of either signatory causes the envelope to be destroyed without having been opened. talion levels, and sewed in various staff assignments in- .An Organization Only Does Well Those Things cluding GUG3 advisor to an infantry division in RVN; 7th That the Boss Checks. When assigning a task, include Amy G-3; and operations staff officer, DA DCSOPS. He all the elements, i.e., what do I want? what assets will has received the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star (V and 2 be provided (men, materiel, equipment)? when is it to be OLC), and the Meritorious Service Medal.

41 *Some units still try to relate MlLES boresight with real boresighting, but the two techniques vary greatly, As a result, many units at the NTC experience frustration when conducting training.” MILES Rules the Battlefield by Sergeant First Class Richard S. Francis

3/F3/1-52 horprepared defensive review (AAR). Throughout the course boresight is complete, no information positions throughout the night. Un- of the AAR, the platoon members dis- is entered into the computer. Because known to the platoon, the enemy’s cuss what happened, and why the we cannot use our full-up fm control axis of attack will move directly into third platoon was unsuccessful. For system to boresight, we must man- its engagement area. After extensive the crew of Bravo 32, it was a frus- ually compensate for parallax. This is preparations, the- task force com- trating experience, casting doubts on where MILES boresight and regular mander orders Bravo Company to oc- individual skills and eroding confi- boresight differ. cupy its prepared positions to await dence in their equipment. Success on any battlefield requires the enemy’s arrival. soldiers to have 100 percent confi- As third platoon’s last tank occupies This scene occurs on numerous oc- dence in their equipment. Improper its fighting position, an OPFOR mo- casions at the National Training Cen- MILES boresight techniques have torized rifle battalion (MRB) comes ter (NTC). Although the tactical les- caused the MlAl tank crew to lose into view. As enemy forces enter the sons are learned, it may be a frustrat- confidence in its tank killing ability. company’s engagement area, the third ing lesson in MILES gunnery for that Proper MILES boresight procedures platoon leader initiates his rehearsed one tank crew. will allow tank crewmen to simulate fire command. The platoon’s MlAl MILES boresight techniques for the accurately the effects of the main gun tanks move onto their firing platforms MlAl and M1 tank do not We full in forcean-force engagements. The to engage the OPFOR in the flank at advantage of the system. For example, following checklist outlines the proper 2500 meters. Suddenly, the command procedures found in TM 9-1265-375- procedures to boresight MILES on the ‘FIRE” is heard over the platoon net. 10-1 do not verify kills at various M1 and MlA1. The tanks engage and re-engage ranges: FM 17-12-1 does not address with little or no effect, Bravo 32 en- MILES boresight procedures. One of gages a T-72 with five rounds and a the limitations with MILES is that the BMP with four rounds with no effect. full-up fire control system cannot be Sergeant First Class Rich- As the battle rages, the enemy identi- used. Even the MlAl procedures of ard S. Francis is a tank pla- fies a firing signature generated by indexing new ranges does not work toon combat trainer on the one of the platoon’s tanks. This tank effectively. Scorpion 11 team. He has is Bravo 32. Within seconds, a T-72 Some units still hy to relate MILES previously sewed as platoon destroys Bravo 32. The OPFOR MRB boresight with real boresighting, but sergeant in 2d ACR and 2-35 rolls through the Bravo Company en- the two techniques vary greatly. As a Armor at Fort Carson. He is gagement area to its final objective. result, many units at the NTC experi- a graduate of M60A3 and After the battle, pertinent data is col- ence frustration when conducting M1A1 Master Gunner lected and transmitted to the platoon training. Courses and has attended observer controller (OC). Later, third Proper MILES boresight procedures the Armor Advanced NCO platoon assembles for an after-action bypass the computer. Once MILES Course. 42 ARMOR - May-June 7992 STEP-BY-STEP MILES BORESIGHTING

Setup for Boresight Boresighting at Longer Ranges

*Remove X-MTR and clean optics *Once all tanks in the platoon/company are complete, *Index APDS send the tank out to 2000 meters. *Place X-MTR in breech. Ensure tightness. *Again, the loader talks the gunner on target. *Look through sight and ensure it is not blocked by *Gunner fires and confirms a kill. gun. If all the tanks in the platoon can kill at this range, mn- *Open CCP door and turn power on. tinue to send the boresight tank wtin increments of 200 *Push crosswind button and enter 00. Push enter but- meters until one tank can no longer kill. Have boresight ton. Ensure crosswind remains lit. tank return to last effective kill range. This is the MILES *Push CANT button, enter 00. Push enter button. En- 8ff8diV8 rang8 for the entire platoon. sure CANT button remains lit. *Again, have loader talk gunner to the center mass of tar- *Push LEAD button, enter 00. Push enter button. En- get. sure LEAD button remains lit. *Push boresight key. *Push RANGE button, enter 1200. Push enter button. *Toggle reticle of GPS to center mass. Push enter. Ensure RANGE button remains lit. Push zero key. *Open SUBDES door, push SUBDES button, enter 1 *Toggle reticle to center mass. Push enter. on M1 or 59 on MlA1. Push enter and close door. The MILES boresight of main gunlcoax is now com- (The individual setup is now in place and boresighting plete. may now be done.) Engaging Targets

During full-up main gun engagement, the computer will Close-In Boresighting compensate for parallax. But, in MILES gunnery, we do not want any computer inputs because the laser &hoots" *Send one MILES operational tank with a green key in a straight line, unlike a main gun round. This is why out 400-600 meters from the platoon or company. We boresight at three different ranges. (MILES boresight should be done at platoon level. *When targets are closer than 900 meters, or when en- The following procedures are for a platoon or a com- gaging with coax, use the GAS. pany-) *When targets are 900-1800 meters away, use the TIS. *Have the boresight tank present a frontal target. *When targets are 1800 meters or more, use the GPS to *Have the loader look through the MILES sight and engage. talk the gunner to the center mass of target. *Gunner fires and confirms a kill. *After a kill is confirmed, the gunner refers his 1200 CAL SO Setup meter line of the GAS to center of target (APFSDS-T reticle). This is done because it is the most clearly *Ensure transmitter is secured to machine gun. defined point on the reticle. The close-in boresight is *Wipe off laser optics with soft cloth. now complete. *Put in a fresh 9V battery and key up transmitter with a green key. *Put in orange key and turn. *Secure a dry fire cable and hook up to transmitter. Intermediate Boresight *Send a soldier out 100 meters with a green key and op- erational MWLD. *After all tanks in the platoonkompany have finished *Point machine gun at soldier and fire until you kill the with close-in boresight, send the tank out to 1100- MWLD. 1300 meters. Have soldier stop at that point. *Looking through the MILES sight, the loader again *Refer SO cal. sight. Lay off, then re-lay on soldier. Stop talks the gunner to center mass of target. at that point. *Gunner fires and confirms a kill. *Confirm that aiming point will result in kill. *Once a kill results, refer the TIS to center mass of *If dry fire cable is not available, live blanks will need to tank. The intermediate boresight is now complete. be fired.

ARMOR - Maydune 1992 43 Short Halt Maintenance Keeping Combat Power Rolling Forward in the Attack

by FIrst Lieutenant (P) Bradley T. Gericke

Union Major General George H. ficient and cumbersome to access dur- about execution of these checks later. Thomas, the famous “Rock of ing extended periods of movement The second component for success is Chickamauga,” once told his young and around-the-clock operations. a clear priority of work established by officers that “the fate of an army may Likewise, crews could not expect any the chain of command. Tank crews depend on a buckle.” The same is true downtime to execute the “before” and can then rapidly translate their today in our Armor Force of high “after” checb of the full schedule. leaders’ guidance into aggressive technology weapon systems: every Short halt maintenance maximizes maintenance on the ground. component must always be in work- the quality of PMCS within the abso- As the tank company rolls to a stop, ing condition. The fate of soldiers and lute minimum time afforded by high whether it be for ten minutes or an units now rests on wedgebolts and fil- intensity operations. Although devel- hour, the commander or executive of- ters, roadwheels and batteries. oped in the desert, the concept itself is ficer must prioritize and quickly pub- Our maintenance efforts have im- adaptable for any type of climate. lish a maintenance effort that is proved in recent years, particularly in Two distinct components comprise the sharply focused, based upon the esti- the motor pool. But what about dur- program. . mated length of stay, recent mainte- ing-ops maintenance, that critical time First is a list of maintenance checks nance accomplished, and upcoming when there is much to do, and sol- distilled from TM 9-2350-264-10, operations. Other important activities diers are alternately keyed-up or ex- written in bullet format for simplicity will compete for your time: refueling, hausted due to the stress of battle? (Figure 1). The particular content of orders updates, and feeding must all Our doctrine calls for continuous op- this list is certainly flexible. It does be accomplished. The maintenance erations, but how can we maintain not pretend to be all-inclusive, and order may be given on the ground or equipment over long periods to ensure can be modified anytime the Opera- over the radio, using the number of our combat power remains up front on tional tempo or maintenance the objective? posture changes significantly. The “Iron Dukes” of 2-67 Armor Each crew gets a copy of solved the problem in a manner much these checks while in the as- Short Halt Checks -like an Indy pit team swarms over its sembly area. The list should vehicle at the Speedway. At each op- be on an index card, or af- 1. Inspect roadwheel hubs erational halt, vehicle crewmen dash fixed where it is readily ac- 2. Clean engine and transmission oil coolers from one point to the next, scurrying cessible within the turret. A 3. Blow V-Packs and predeaner 4. Check scavenger fan and hose from driver’s compartment to suspen- brief, backdeck demonstra- 5. Checkfluids sion to engine. Moments later the tion for the tank command- 6. lnspact and brush heat exchanger word to move is sounded. The crew- ers, conducted by the com- 7. Inspect rear grilles and seals men mentally check their list once pany XO and maintenance 8. Field strip and clean weapons more: refueled, filters cleaned, sus- team chief, pays tremendous 9. Walkback 10. Sweep backdedc pension lubed, fluids full, all is ready. dividends. You may think 11. Dust radios They climb aboard and speed away. that, as these tasks come di- 12. Clean turret interior This technique of rapid, yet thor- rectly from the PMCS table 13. Clean ammo door rails ough, maintenance on the move is of the -10, no instruction is 14. Check and dean batteries termed short halt maintenance, a con- needed. However, this pro- 15. Clean and inspect wind sensor 16. Dust optics, vision blocks and MRS cept that arose from the need to con- vides a great start point for 17. Dust fire extinguisher sensm sistently combat the harsh effects of the program, and affords tank 18. Inspect and clean NBC equipment the desert on the MlAl during peri- commanders the opportunity ods of continuous operations. Tankers to ask questions. In this way, quickly found that the “during-ops“ everyone on the team will Figure 1 checks from the -10 TM proved insuf- know the standard. More 44 ARMOR - MayJune 1992 the chec.. -.-...,. Another the other three, then SWILII W~IW method is to publish the mainte- to the tank with the second attach- nance priority of effort for short ment to have its own packs blown. halts in the OPORD. The minimum Of course, a tank must never at- goal is to complete your list daily. tempt to blow out its own packs! A typical short halt may unfold Ensure that your crews are re- like this: Y minded. A company has been on the move for the last three hours. Five miles As much as possible, blow the from their current location, the task dust from the inside to the outside force is going to halt for not longer of the filters to prevent dust from than ten minutes to give command- being blown through the material ers a new map overlay. Knowing of the filter element. Wear gloves this, the company XO radios on the to handle the wand, and do not company net, "All Blue elements, blow the packs on the back deck. this is Blue 7. At next halt., execute Place them on a tarp or cloth on the checks 1, 5,7, 14, 15, and 17. Pri- ground to preclude further dust set- ority to 1 and 14. Length of halt tling in the engine. Finally, replace ten minutes. Out." the V-Packs in the exact sequence Tank crews will soon anticipate they held before cleaning. This en- this guidance and develop the skill to standard. However, certain checks sures a better seal. The amount of dust transition rapidly from tactical open- may require specific practice before and dirt that comes out of each V- tions to productive maintenance work crews become proficient under field Pack after a few hours of running in with a minimum of disruption. The conditions. The process of blowing the desert is amazing. time spent at the halt will, therefore, the V-Packs and pre-cleaner is one of be fully utilized with productive activ- these and bears mention. As the example of the Indy pit team ity that supports the maneuver plan. In a dry, dusty environment, blowing illustrates, the aggressive spirit of No time is lost while crews mill the V-packs becomes a critical and short halt maintenance applies any around seeking information. time-consuming process. There is def- time the tank is not moving. Such an In executing the checks, adherence initely a right way and a wrong way attitude fosters crew pride and team- to the procedures outlined in the -10 to do this. work. Caring for the tank becomes is the rule of thumb. The purpose of A good technique is to have one second nature for every soldier, a short halt maintenance is to empha- wand and two base attachments in comfortable, instinctive routine which size and supplement during-ops each platoon, so that each platoon is ensures that our combat power is con- checks, not to deviate from the TM self-sufficient. One tank may blow out stantly prepared to fight.

First Lieutenant Bradley T. Gericke is a 1988 graduate of

I the United States Military Select -10 Tasks Demonstrate In Academy. He has completed Codlfy 8 Bullet Format AA/Rehearse the Armor Officer Basic, Air Assault, Jungle Warfare, and I I I J Airborne Courses. He sewed as a tank platoon leader and tank company XO with 2-67 Armor, 3AD. Friedberg, Ger- I I many. While in Iraq after XO Evaluates Upcomlng DESERT STORM, he be- Halt; Determlnes Tasks FM (or OPDRD) came the battalion S1, 2-67 Armor, his current position. He is scheduled to attend AOAC this fall. Figure 2

ARMOR - May-June 1992 45 At left, the Abrams Audi- riurn dedication. General Abrams is seen at right as U.S. MAWcomlnander in Vietnam. July 1968. Remarks at the Dedication of the Abrams Auditorium, Patton Museum of Armor And Cavalry This is the res of the dedication .For those of us who were there, he all of us, especially those of us who speech by General Donn A. Starry is vividly remembered as commander served for him in many capacities, US.Army, Retired. of the 63rd Tank Battalion, 1st Infan- many times. For he represents, to- try Division, as the Korean War fired gether with perhaps but one other of- Today, we have the happy task of up and tensions in Europe bounded ficer in my lifetime, the character we dedicating this superb new auditorium upward. strive to infuse into Army leadership addition to the Patton Museum of .Again, to those of us who were in schools like the Armor School. Armor and Cavalry to the memory of there, he is remembered as 3rd Ar- My own perspective is drawn from a General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. It mored Division’s steadfast corn- 25-year association with General is ever important that an army remem- mander as we sought to react in some Abrams. I was a platoon leader, part- ber its heroes. But it is also important relevant way to the sudden appear- time company commander in his bat- that we not only memorialize our he- ance of the Berlin Wall. talion: a brigade operations ofticer roes, but that we do so in such a way .Whomever remembers the civil and battalion executive officer in his that their legacy to us survives the disorders in Oxford and Birmingham division: a battalion commander in his memorialization: in other words, it is in the civil rights years, remembers corps, a regimental commander in his not just a matter of naming some him as the guy in the rumpled seer- command in Vietnam. As his staff of- plap or thing after those we seek to sucker suit who became Robert ficer in Vietnam, I mtethe plans to memorialize. It is a matter of doing so Kennedy’s man on the ground. Vietnamize the war. As his staff offi- in such a way that we are continu- .Many of us recall his post-Tet cer in the Pentagon, I presided for ously reminded, and so ever mindful, strategy for South Vietnam, and his him over post-war restructure of the of the lessons they taught us. conviction that, given the means, the Army. As TRAMX formed up in Like any famous man, General South Vietnamese could go it alone. 1973, he sent me to command Fort Creighton Abrams is different things .All of us surely remember his all- Knox, with the parting admonition to, to different people, depending on the too-brief tenure as Chief of Staff, his “Go Out there and get the Army off its vantage point from which his service determination to rebuild our Army in ass.” It was a charge he laid on many, is viewed. the face of a reduction mania not at I’m certain; but to me it had a per- all unlike the one thrown up before us sonal ring, for knowing him so well, I .Those old enough to remember daily in our so-called postcold war knew precisely what he meant, and World War II may remember him time. that he was holding me responsible leading the 37th Tank Battalion and for more than my fair share of what-’ the 4th Armored Division in the relief In all those assignments, and more: ever got done. of besieged Bastogne. in all those crises, his professional .Early post-war students at the performance was more than sufficient So, as one who has spent a consider- Armor School surely recall him as to cause us to memorialize him. able part of a lifetime trying to meet head of the Command and Staff de- But I have a somewhat different per- the demanding standards of a man partment, hard at work digesting the spective of General Abrams, and I be- who accepted no less than the highest war’s lessons into doctrine for ar- lieve it worth reflecting on for these in performance, I bear the scars of our mored forces for the next decade, per- few moments. For I remember him for long association. Despite that - per- haps more. what he taught me; €or what he taught haps because of that - I hold him in

46 ARMOR - MayJune 1992 the highest regard; for what he did, sponsibility of leaders is to lead the concerned about soldiers, but his was for what he stood for, for what he way in that training. Know your job, a special kind of concern. I do believe was. For my view of him is that he he would say, but it was quite clear he sincerely liked people, but his embraced a very few simple values, in that, to him at least, it was no job, it ovemding concern was that the sol- which he believed deeply, and to was a calling. diers be capable in the face of the which he returned again and again in So much of him can be summed in tough tasks of battle. He was a tough everything he did. Moreover, I am one word courage. trainer - some of us at the time con- convinced that those very values are sidered him almost merciless, espe- at the heart of what we, following his He blew the whistle when he found cially on leaders. He was that way be- example, would imprint in the corps a few soldiers in his battalion selling cause of his certain conviction that we of leaders of the Armored Force who nearly a hundred thousand gallons of all need be well enough trained, not pass all too briefly this way periodi- gasoline on the black market every only to slwive in battle, but to sur- cally. month: he tracked the problem to the vive and go on to win. Above all, General Abrams put the source and brought the offenders to In many forums, before so many au- highest premium on the professional trial. Courage. diences, he reiterated all or parts of competence of leaders. He was, as our He tackled, without flinching, the that marvelous speech he delivered to battalion commander, the best tank powder kegs in Oxford and Birming- the AUSA convention in Washington, commander in our battalion. He de- ham. the one in which he cited the tremen- lighted in showing us, by example, He believed in the South Vietnam- dous price our country has tradition- what he expected us to know about ese, and stood forth for a program that ally paid for unpreparedness. He sized being tank commanders. would enable them to swive on their that price in terms of the cost to the Too well do I remember a long pe- own. nation in the resource it could least af- riod of study in tactics, terrain, and He agonized at the sure outcome of ford to expend - the lives of its map reading George Patton and I en- post-Vietnam reductions in prepared- young men. Always the soldiers. dured after the two of us had attacked, ness, and spoke eloquently so many Know your men, he would say, and with great zest, the wrong hill in a times of the price inevitably to be be ever watchful of their willingness live fire exercise, in plain view of our paid for our folly in the lives of sol- and ability to survive and to go on to battalion commander, watching from diers in the first battles of the next win, whatever the odds, whatever his own tank. war. Courage. state shortsighted reductions in force My wife reminds me of the SO-cali- He had the courage to let his subor- had brought us to at the onset of bat- ber machine gun that hunkered down dinates falter, and to pick them up and tle. on our living room floor for several start things aright; the courage to Through everything he did shines weeks after Colonel Abrams found stand between his subordinates and those abiding values: strength of pro- that some folks in our battalion higher headquarters witch hunters. fessional excellence on the part of weren’t too well trained in its use. His He had the courage of good humor. leaders; courage to face the dangers of view was that the fault lay with the He had a subtle, almost pungent wit. battle, and courage to face the more leaders not knowing that weapon well He liked a good story, liked to tell a subtle but equally threatening dangers enough, and so not training the sol- good story. But there was more to it. not always found in battle itself; deep diers well enough. So we learned to Listening closely, most of those sto- faith in the soldiers, and concern that do it blindfolded. I believe I could do ries were about himself; things he’d they be well enough trained and led to it that way to this day. done wrong, times he’d got caught avoid unnecessary casualties in battle, As a trainer of soldiers and units, he short. They were humbling stones. I and that the nation be sufficiently pre- was a tough taskmaster. Not because came to believe he liked to tell them pared that its soldiers not be foolishly he had some kind of training fixation: because they reminded him to be sacrificed because we lack political but because he believed. that from humble. For the mighty to be humble resolve to pay the price for peace. tough, demanding training comes the requires the ultimate in courage. That’s what I learned from him. That sure ability to fight well and win on Know yourself, he would say. And be is what he taught me. the day of battle, even though out- humble for the knowing. Courage. That is his legacy to us. His name numbered and against weapons about One of General Abrams’ most on this marvelous auditorium will as good, perhaps better, than our own. quoted statements is his observation to continue to remind us of those les- He believed that soldiers will do a congressional committee that people sons. He will teach generations anew well in battle only what they had been are not in the Army: people are the what he taught all of us. Let us hope trained to do to perfection before Army. His was a deep and abiding that we learned as well as he taught. battle’s onset; and that the primary re- concern for soldiers. Many of us are Thank you. ARMOR - May-June 1992 47 LElTERS - Continued from Page 3 and recovery secbon. who volunteered to months since I was on a tank, and four for *Soldiers attending schools can miss up return on successive weekends without my gunner. We got 4 to 7 hours tank oper- to four months of drills or annual training pay. The training ran regardless of weather ation on a weekend, with the remaining (20 to 40 percent of available training time, and included the first mounted night train- hours used for travel, draw, deanup, tum- equivalent to 10 to 21 weeks of an.active ing with night vision devices any part of the in, details, and equipment accountability. duty unit's time). This is going to get worse regiment had ever conducted. Our reenlist- All too many people run on three to five with the budget crunch. ment rate went to nearly 100 percent, rep- hours sleep a day, and are exhausted resenting retention of soldiers who had when they anive for drill. By Saturday To upgrade National Guard training, completed their legal military obligation. nightlsunday morning, safety is a real seri- make replacement parts available in a few All of this was reported in ARMOR ous problem, so operations slow down. hours, make annual training three weeks, (March-April 1962) and in what is now Na- *Our equipment is so old that some of cut some dills down to one day and tional Guard (January 1962) and led to the Active Duty advisors do not know how lengthen single-day drills to 2100 hours, abandonment of the evening drill in favor of it works. Soldisrs coming off Active Duty have the armories next to the tanks and the present weekend training. have to be de-trained on our older tanks. make their upkeep the unit's responsibility, Colonel Clarke takes the matter another *National Guard divisions are going to re- speed up conversion to new equipment, big step forward. He recognizes that, as in organize. Existing Armor and Cavalry units and do not convert existing- National Guard the Idaho and Pennsylvania experiments, will convert to something else, and other Armor/Cavalryunits. facilities and logistics are the keys. units will convert to ArmorlCavalry. It takes Colonel Stouffer started in the 104th as a about five years to completely retrain a CHRlSTOPHERF.SCHNElDER horse trooper, and he lived the regiment's unit. (I went through this.) SSG. Armor, Indiana National Guard motto, "Over, Under or Through." From some distant ridge, most assuredly once again horse mounted, I suspect he sees in Colonel Clarke a kindred spirit.....

WILLIAM V. KENNEDY COL. Armor, AUS, Ret. Wiscasset, Maine

Improve GuardlReserve Training By Focusing on Basics

Dear sir. Future Main Battle Tank

All these ideas on how to improve the training of ReserveNational Guard Design Contest Armor/Cavalry units fail to correct basic problems. The U.S. Armor Association is planning a Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT) Design Contest. What do you think a main battle tank in *The tanks are not capable of sustaining the Year 2010 should look like? What should it be able to do? How training for more than two or three days without a 20- to 70-percent deadline rate. would you design the tank of the future? Would it be heavy or light? In 12 years, I have yet to see the National How many crew members? Does your idea include Stealth or super Guard repair a deadlined tank in less than speed? How "air transportable" should it be? three or four days, and have often ob- served a tank deadlined on the first day of These are everyday questions considered by tank developers all annual training be towed in at the end of over the world, and now you can tell the Armor community how you annual training. Crews will operate tanks with major system failures, just so they can would design a tank that would be used on the 2010 battlefield. train. There are so few fully operational tanks that crews rotate on them for gun- Details of the contest are being formulated by the Armor Associa- nery. I have not fired a tank I drew since tion and the US. Army Armor School. So, start wriiing down ideas 1987. and making sketches. Prizes will include cash awards, one-year *Gunnery should be fired during annual honorary memberships in the U.S. Armor Association, and honor- training. Crews need time together ON THEIR TANK. Firing Table VI the day be- able mentions. fore VllNlll makes a big difference. Since transition in October 1990 I have had less We are looking forward to good ideas for a follow-up to the than 10 hours practice time on the M60A3 Abrams when it reaches its 25-year production anniversary, so before firing VlllA in April 1992. I did not stretch your imaginations. (Do not call for information now. Details fire VlllB because intmders in the range will be announced later.) fan delayed firing until the 2200 locally-im- posed ceasefire time. It had been two

48 ARMOR - May-June 1992 Commander’s Hatch (Continued from page 4)

Center this fall with the 1st Cavalry Guard, Army Reserve, and Active requirements for the future in the Division. This tank is the fmt third- Army organizations. Fort Knox is one areas of doctrine, organizations, train- generation tank to be fielded in the of the prototype National Guard Re- ing, leader development, materiel, and world. It revolutionizes mobile ar- gional Training Centers, starting this soldier support. For example, we are mored warfare and will serve as our summer. During its active training pe- already examining the payoffs of link- bridge to the future. Our far-term tar- riod, the 2nd Battalion, 252nd Armor ing the new intervehicular information get is the future main battle tank. We will negotiate an unprecedented pro- system that is on the M1A2 tank expect it to be in the 50-ton weight gram of individual, crew, and small with the OH-58 scout helicopter, and class and hope to have it fielded by unit lane training prepared by Readi- the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The the second decade of the next century. ness Group Knox and based upon the Mounted Warfighting Team is already To get your ideas, the Armor Associa- lessons learned in the DESERT hard at work on this exciting and his- tion is sponsoring a Future Main Bat- STORM mobilization. Much of the torical mission with our counterparts tle Tank design contest. For the near training will be conducted by the at the other TRADOC schools and term, and for the next two decades, 100th Division (USAR), which plays with the Army Materiel Command. we will pursue a comprehensive and a key training role in both the peace- This year’s Armor Conference con- continuous program of modifying and time readiness and the wartime mobi-. fmed that now is a time for Armor improving the Abrams to ensure that lization of the Total Armor Force. All soldiers to be optimistic and confi- it remains the world’s premier tank. this is part of the Army’s Bold Shift dent. The unpleasantness of downsiz- Armor soldiers will see the Abrams initiative to enhance the readiness of ing and inactivating is a reality that grow to include onboard navigation, the Total Force. The Armor School is we will work our way through. The independent thermal viewers for the also one of the key players, along Army has a plan, and it is being im- tank commander, and the installation plemented. Promotion and leadership of an auxiliary power unit and self- Our nation will continue to look opportunities will improve in the near cleaning air filters. to Annor as the arm of fast-mov- term. Soldier quality will remain high. .The quality of the Armor leader ing maneuver and decisive ac- We will capitalize on the -*--* ’-’-”* tion. We will be expected to con- technology, and we will a] and soldier remains very high. Com- tinue to prepare, as we always manders of all branches in DESERT have, for the day we are needed our light armor and cavalry STORM were unanimous in their to carry firepower and shock ef- for the Total Armor Force. praise of the competence, resourceful- fect to the heart of our enemies. Yes, the future will have ness, tenacity, and flexibility of the and exciting features, but il Armor soldier, NCO, and officer. By with the National Guard Bureau and one constant with the past. Vur nation all indicators, that excellence will the Defense Advanced Research Pro- 7 will continue to look to Armor as the continue. New recruits entering tanker jects Agency, in adapting the newest arm of fast-moving maneuver and de- and scout one station unit training breakthroughs in the science of virtual cisive action. We will be expected to have the highest aptitude scores in reality to the training of our units at continue to prepare, as we always history. Their enthusiasm and spirit their armories and even in their have, for the-day we are needed to reflect their solid records of success homes. carry firepower and shock effect to as students and athletes, as well as We also announced at the Armor the heart of our enemies. their intense desire to join the fast Conference the formation at Fort It’has been a great honor, privilege, moving and challenging life of the Knox of the Mounted Warfighting and adventure to have served as the Armor and Cavalry trooper. Many Battle Space Laboratory. Over the 33rd Chief of Armor here at the will aspire to and join the ranks of our mext few years, this special task force Home of Mobile Armored Warfare high quality NCO Corps. The quality will create, refine, and explore new for these last three years. My pride in story is the same in the officer ranks. concepts in what we refer to as the our victories in the Cold War, in Pan- Never have so many cadets from battlespace dynamic for brigade and ama, and in the desert has been ROTC and USMA put Armor as their below. Using simulation and actual boundless, and my pride in the quiet top choice of branch. Armor will con- testing and experimentation, we will excellence of the Armor soldier has tinue to build on a solid foundation of explore the challenges and opportuni- been the bright spot of every day. I top quality people. ties we see emerging on the future leave the Army with great confidence .Armor is maturing as a true total battlefield. Our work is not just for for the future, and charge every man force. Several major initiatives are un- Armor and Cavalry, but for every who wears crossed sabers to guard derway to ensure that, when the branch of the mounted combined arms this tradition and this reputation vigi- Armor Force next goes to war, it will team. The Mounted Warfighting Bat- lantly. be as a full partnership of National tle Space Laboratory will identify the FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT! ARMOR - MayJune 7992 49 The US. Army Armor Center Wants Your Ideas

Your past and future military experiences Armor Hotline Adds bined Arms Command, AlTN: Am-ClT, represent an extensive source of ideas on 1-800 Service Ft. Leavenworth. KS 66027. Comments how to improve our Armor Force. To may be faxed to DSN 5524458. If you have any questions, contact CPT Bill demonstrate the potential of your ideas, the The U.S. Army Armor Center and Fort Hedges, DSN 552-3919. Annor Center established the THUNDER- Knox has enhanced the Armor Hotline with BOLT Program. a toll free senrice (1-800-525-6848) for What is the THUNDERBOLT Program? CONUS users. The number will connect Official File Request Option Implemented in October 1988, the program callers to the 24-hour answering machine Added to Phone Access provides the means to gather ideas and that serves as the Armor Hotline. The fol- suggestions, to evaluate their potential ben- lowing numbers may also be used to reach The U.S. Army's Enlisted Records & efit, and to process these ideas into actual the Hotline: DSN 464-TANK or Commercial Evaluation Center will provide NCOs a results. With existing test and evaluation (502) 624-0265. copy of their official file. Personnel records resources and YOUR ideas, many common The Armor Hotline may be used to Can in will be mailed to soldiers at their unit of as- problems can be resolved. A considerable questions or retrieve messages from Armor signment mailing address. The official file number of THUNDERBOLT suggestions re- Center organizations. The initial greeting on request is the latest addition to existing in- lating to armor and cavalry tactics, training, the Hotline provides callers with a list of or- teractive voice responses available to and hardware have been approved for im- ganizations and subject areas that may be NCOs. plementation. selected with touch tone phones. Callers Since March 1990, NCOs have been able The exact nature of your idea is not im- using rotary dial phones will not be able to to obtain the date of their offiaal photo- portant. What is important is its potential to access the voice mailboxes; they will be graph and the end-date of their last evalw- benefit the Armor Force. We solicit your asked in the initial greeting to stay on the tion report. ideas relating to: line and leave a message. important Armor The new opfon allows NCOs to valiite .the redesign or modification of existing messages will be placed in the initial greet- information on documents available to equipment or operation procedures; ing so that rotary dialers will receive this A~YWtraried promotion boards. .a new piece of equipment; information. Callers will be asked to provide a Socisl .changes to unit structure or its equip- Callers are reminded to leave their name, Security Number. As many as five numbers ment; rank, unit, phone number, and address may be entered. .an innovative training method; when they leave a message. Additionally, To select one of the options, call DSN .an effective application of- tactics. callers should remember that the Armor 699-3714 or commercial (317) 542-3714. A The THUNDERBOLT Program's primary Hotline is unsecure. Classified information push-button tone phone is required. focus is toward low cost. easily applied cannot be left on or retrieved from this line. Four options are presented: fixes; however, all proposals will be consid- POC is Mr. Schaffner, DSN 464-1543. .For complete board information, press ered. Proposals which might exceed the 1. followed by the number (#) symbol. scope of THUNDERBOLT will not be ig- .For photo data only, press 2, followed nored, but will be routed to the appropriate CAC-TNG Wants Comments by the number symbol. office or agency having action authority. on FM 25-101 .For NCO evaluation, press 3, folkwed Submitting your ideas to the THUNDER- by the number symbol. BOLT Program will not preclude you from Combined Arms Command-Training .For OMPF request, pms 4. folkwed by being eligible for an incentive award (CAC-TNG) at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., is the number symbol. through the Army Suggestion Program or the proponent for Army training manage- NCOs should allow sufficient mail time for the Model Installation Program. It may, in ment doctrine contained in FM 25-101, Bat- the receipt of the official records. In the fact, increase your chance of SUCCBSS. tle Focused Training. CAC-TNG is looking event of a recent transfer, allow time for The format you use to provide us your for suggestions on how to improve the the Enlisted Master File to reflect an up- ideas is not important - just that you sub- manual prior to its next scheduled rewrite. dated unit of assignment. mit them! Include any picture, sketches, or Suggestions should indude the specific As always, NCOs may submii a mitten example you might have. Send your ideas, page/paragraph and specific recommenda- request for a copy of their official files. suggestions, or proposals to: Commander, tion to include textual changes or additions. Send a signed request to: Commander, U.S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, Those wishing to provide recommendations US. Army Enlisted Records B Evaluation ATTN: ATSB-CDE (THUNDERBOLT), Fort should provide their comments to Deputy Center, AlTN: PCRE-RF, Fort Benjamin Knox, KY 40121-5215. Commanding General for Training, Com- Harrison, IN 46249-5301.

50 ARMOR - MayJune 1992 German PzKpw 111 tanks ford a river in Russia in 1941.

A new WWll history ar- gues that Hitler planned a long siege to conquer Russia, when he could have won quickly. Rethinking German WWll Strategy

Hitler's Panters East: World break with this attitude, and its dramatic the eventual defeat of Germany in the Sec- War II Reinterpreted by R.H.S. success was a surprise to both sides. ond World War. The author contends that Stolfi, University of Oklahoma Stolfi examines the planning and prose- the traditional turning points of the war in Press, Norman, Okla., 1992, 286 cution of the BARBAROSSA campaign. He Europe - Stalingrad. El Alamein, and makes it clear that the General Staff had Kursk - were anticlimactic episodes. The pages, $24.95. begun to realize that the Wehrmacht was turning point of the Second World War Seldom does a book challenge basic as- capable of conducting successful blitz cam- was, in the author's view, the decisions sumptions about something so established paigns, perhaps even of defeating the So- taken in the summer of 1941 to concen- as Second World War history. Stolfi's book viet Union in a single effort. Their plan was trate first on the advance to Leningrad and does just this. The traditional interpretation designed to accomplish just that. then the Ukraine. of the German image of war, and Hitler's The General Staff focused on the Red image of war in particular, is one of blitz- Army and the political centers of the Soviet stolfi does not neglect the logistical argu- krieg, an intentional attempt to win quick Union. Their plans were well thought out ments. He goes into detail attempting to victories. and balanced appraisals of the chances for prove that the German Army was capable Stolfi instead detects a dear pattern success. Stolfi demonstrates, through the of launching the TYPHOON offensive in within Hider's thinking - and in the deci- extensive use of the German's own esti- August and seizing Moscow in September sions he forced on the General Staff in mates, that they did not underestimate the of 1941. His case that the Soviets were on 1939. '40. and '41 - of the operation of a potential of Soviet resistance. the verge of military collapse in August is siege mentality. Stolfi focuses on the BAR- However, Hitler's siege mentality was plausible and convincing. The discussion of BAROSSA campaign of the summer of also apparent in his direction that the pri- the importance of the Moscow region to the 1941 to prove his point. He contends that, mary objectives of the offensive be eco- Soviet war effort is well documented with if the General Staff's realization that blitz- nomic targets. His obsession with such tar- numerous charts and maps. kriegs were possible was supported politi- gets as Leningrad, the Baltic, the Ukraine, cally by Hitler. Germany would have won and the Donets Basin clearly demonstrates Historically, this book will force us to take the war in the late summer or early autumn that he was thinking, not in terms of gain- another look at how we interpret German of 1941. ing quick victory, but rather of strengthen- strategy and effort in the Second World He briefly reviews the planning process ing Germany's position for a long war of War. Hopefully, other scholars will respond that led to the Manstein Plan Yellow attack attrition. to Stolfi's arguments. Although convincing, on France. That review illuminates the hes- This failure to agree on the objectives for other views of Stolti's thesis are needed. itant attitude of both Hitler and the General the campaign was the cause of Germany's This book is important, if for no other rea- Staff in assuming an attritional war against failure to knock the Soviet Union out of the son than it forces us to think through the the west. Manstein's plan was a distinct war in the fall of 1941, and led directly to possibilities.

ARMOR - MayJune 1992 51 I

At left. tankers in a Polish light armor unit at the onset of the war. I .' Below, an antitank gun I crew prepares to fire.

No, Polish Horse Cavalry Didn't Charge Tanks... Untangling Myths And Undoing Propaganda About Poland's Fight in WWII

Stolti's thesis, if accurate, should stimu- The Polish Campaign 1939 by mounted cavalry units, dstinguished since late a fresh look at the Wehrmacht It ap- Steven Zaloga and Victor Madej, their days of Napoleonic service, were pears even more effective than the com- Hippocrene Books, New York, used for scouting, screening, and reinforce- monly held view. If this is true, we have not 1991, 195 pages, $11.95 (paper- ments. yet begun to huly understand how the Wehrmacht achieved the level of success it back). Other myths that the authors address: did. *Contrary to popular belief, the Polish Air Although more than 900 books and arti- Force was not destroyed on the ground the The discussion of the failure of political cles have been written on this topic, this is first day of fighting. In fact, according to and military authorities to come to an the first major work in English to explain Zaloga and Madej, the Luftwaffe was "sur- agreement on the objectives of the cam- the genesis and conduct of the campaign prisingly ineffective' in striking Polish air paign present meaningful lessons on the with a Polish view. units. The record of Polish flyers who es- integration of the two spheres, even today. This five-week campaign, 1 September to caped and fought with the Royal Air Force The political and military integration implicit 6 October. commonly known as the start of was a 'distinguished one by any measure." in Airland Battle doctrine is not easy to ac- World War II. has been a victim of major .The Poles had wanted to mobilize much complish. historical inaccuracies, according to the au- sooner, but delayed at the insistence of the Whether the pollical leadership is that of thors. They cite a variety of myths and dis- French and British, who feared mobilization dictatorial Nazi Gennany or the democrati- tortbns "more reminiscent of German war- would provoke Germany. The Germans, cally elected leadership of the United time propaganda than serious scholarship.' however, did not succeed in gaining tactical States, the political-military integration is Foremost among the myths is the "rub- surprise as some historians suggest, say the key to success or failure. bish" about Polish cavalry charges against the authors. Poland's defeat was inevitable Rather than steal the author's thunder in German tanks. This often repeated ac- so long as France and Britain avoided en- this review, I encourage you to read the count. first reported by Italian journalists as gaging invading German forces. Even book This one is a must-read for every German pmpaganda, concerned an action under favorable conditions, argue the au- thoughtful senior officer and noncommis- by the Polish 18th Lancer Regiment near thors, Poland could not have resisted the sioned officer in our Army. Chojnice. Two Polish cavalry squadrons German threat singlehandedly. surprised and wiped out a German infantry While the Polish armored forces would formation with a mounted sabre charge. not compare with those of Germany or the SFC JOHN T. BROOM The story arose because some German Red Army, it was large, and 'in some re- US. Army Armor School armored cars appeared and gunned down spects, more modern than tank units in the Ft. box. Ky. 20 troopers as the cavalry escaped. Polish United States at the time.'

~~ 52 ARMOR - May-June 1992 Of particular interest to armor officers are descriptions of one of the rare cavalry vs. cavalry engagements of the war and the largest tank vs. tank encounter of the campaign. Al- though armor played a subordinate role in the campaign from the Polish view, they insist that Polish tactical antitank policy was "sensible and vigorously pursued.

*Polish troops fought as well as the Ger- Many of the stories are humorous; in "Pri- As a professor of geography at Florida man infantry when the odds were even, vate Minelli Assumes Command," we leam State University, Mr. OSullivan has already and better than the French and British once the incredible story of doubtlessly the low- produced a much better book on this sub- they engaged in 1940. Of the 1.1 million est-ranking soldier ever to command a ject, The Geography of Warfare, written Polish mobilized in 1939. 320,000 died dur- DIVARTY. The "real leader' type described with J.W. Miller. Terrain and Tactics is a ing the war - half of these in the Septem- in "Mustaches" will be recognized by most distinct second ,to the earlier work. This is a ber campaign. Polish troops continued soldiers who have met at least one leader scholarly book, written with dry, academic fighting after Poland fell; their scattered displaying the described traits (or recog- prose, given to occasional antiwar sar- forces making up the fourth largest Allied nized those traits in themselves, as the casm. Referring to General Custer's 7th army by the end of the war. case may be). Cavalry as "imperial troops" is a good ex- While much of the book defends the Pol- George M. Hall's biographical sketch of ample. Mr. OSullivan proudly states in the ish situation at the time of Germany's inva- Major General Adolphus Washington first chapter that his purpose is to show sion, it still offers a balanced presentation. Greely is an informative look at a soldier that war is immoral and futile. Polish handicaps during 1939 were the lack who, although celebrated in his day, has Using the backgrounds of recent wars, of operational mobility and poor communi- fallen into relative obscurity as of late. the book attempts to analyze the use of cation and control, say the authors. Polish 'Harry S. Truman, Cannoneer" details the terrain and tactics through O'Sullivan's mili- High Command was surprised by the little known military career of America's 33d tary terrain considerations of key terrain, speed of the Panzer division and shocked president (a man despised by many for his avenues of approach, obstacles, points of by the intervention of the Red Army against relief of General of the Army Douglas Mac- observation, fields of fire, and cover and Poland. Arthur during the Korean War). The story of concealment (sounds like KOCOA to me). CW4 Michael J. Novosel. who left an airline This is an interesting approach to modem Zaloga. a professional defense analyst, job and a Air Force Reserve Commission battlefield analysis, but is not fully devel- and Madej, a World War II specialist, have as a lieutenant colonel to become the old- oped. He devotes much of the book to ter- written a highly readable book. Accompa- est Medal of Honor recipient of the Vietnam rain analysis in guerrilla and counterinsur- nying details of the campaign are sections War, is sure to impress. gency operations and in urban combat. on Polish Army organization, operational All leaders, whatever their rank, should The final chapter is focused entirely on ter- doctrine, equipment, a combat chronologv, learn from "An Order From Override Eight" rain and tactics in Northem Ireland. Most and orders of battle. that offhand comments made without troublesome to the reader will be Of particular interest to armor officers are thought can have a profound impact on OSullivan's use of geometrical representa- descriptions of one of the rare cavalry vs. how much (or how little) our soldiers per- tion and statistical analysis of terrain char- cavalry engagements of the war and the ceive we care about them. 'Daryl's Last acteristics to predict the winner or loser in largest tank vs. tank encounter of the cam- Christmas" is the touching story of a a guerrilla war, based solely on terrain fac- paign. Although armor played a subordi- soldier's family learning that he has made tors such as slope and rainfall. The human nate role in the campaign from the Polish the ultimate sacrifice. element apparently plays no part in his view, they insist that Polish tactical antitank Front and Center should be a welcome evaluation. policy was "sensible and vigorously pur- addition to the library of any soldier or mili- Despite the books significant shortcom- sued." tary buff. It is genuinely fun to read, but the ings, there are some pearls of wisdom. topics covered are broad and enlightening. OSullivan reminds us that weapons tech- THOMAS J. VANCE nology changed our use of terrain, not vice Major, USAR (IRR) CHARLES A. COLLINS, JR. versa. In modem warfare, airspace must be Kalamazoo, Mich. 2LT. Armor, SCARNG recognized as a part of military geography. Myrtle Beach, S.C. Terrain itself is good or bad, depending on its use for offense or defense. What Front and Center: Heroes, War OSullivan does not emphasize is that ter- Stories, and Army Life edited by Terrain and Tactics by Patrick rain itself does not win or lose a battle - L. James Binder. Brassey's (U.S.), O'Sullivan, Greenwood Press, the people who use or fail to use the ter- New York, 1991, 250 pages, New York, 1991, 182 pages, rain wisely do! $32.00 (hardcover), $15.95 (soft- $42.95. OSullivan's premise that rural guerrilla cover). wars and combat in urban areas will pre- This book is like a bad meal at a good dominate in future conflicts is certainly rea- The Association of the United States restaurant - undercooked, poorly sea- sonable and agreeable. The price and con- Army (AUSA) has compiled some of the soned, and way overpriced. As a topic, the tent of this book are neither. Read it from best articles from Army magazine, its offi- relationship between terrain and tactics is a the library, but save your money. cial publication. The result is Front and fertile area, rich with historical application Center, a book that offers hours of profes- and imagination. Unfortunately, Mr. W.D. BUSHNELL sional reading that is educational and en- O'Sullivan's latest book offers little that is COL, USMC tertaining at the same time. new or useful. Shawnee Mission, Kan.

ARMOR - May-June 1992 53