Completing the Religious Transition? Catholics and Muslims Navigate in Democratic

by Aitana Guia (European University Institute, Florence)

Abstract In , Muslims are often seen as the enemies of secularism and laïcité, the strict separation of church and state pioneered in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century France. Yet the Spanish experience shows that European Muslims should not prima facie be considered opponents of secularism. Indeed, a majority of devout Spanish Muslims have demanded, rather than opposed, state neutrality on religious matters—this in direct opposition to a concerted effort by the and its supporters to maintain a privileged position vis-à-vis other confessions. In the protracted debates over the role of in the public sphere in Spain, devout Muslims have shown a preference for the secular Socialist Party over the militant Catholicism of Spanish conservatives. The leaders of the Protestant, Jewish, and Islamic federations demanded in 2011 that Spain complete its “religious transition” so as to ensure the equal treatment of all religious confessions by the state. Muslims in Spain, while they have echoed Catholic demands for the preservation of religion in the public sphere, have opposed Catholicism’s privileged status in the country. By demanding consistency of treatment and state neutrality on religious matters, Muslims have assisted, rather than hindered, the construction of secularism in Spain. Keywords: transition, Spain, religious rights, minority , secularism, education, , Catholicism

Religious Transitions The demands made by devout European Mus- state patterns within each of these countries” lims for religious rights should not be viewed in (2004: 7). The experience of Spanish Muslims, isolation from the larger historical and political in particular, demonstrates the extent to which contexts that have shaped, and to some extent Muslims’ deployment of collective resources in limited, Muslim life in Europe. Joel S. Fetzer and J. the struggle for religious rights, and their willing- Christopher Soper, in their comparative study of ness to take advantage of certain political oppor- the relationship between Muslims and the state tunities to implement and extend these rights, in Britain, France, and Germany, have shown that has been limited by the institutional pattern of the development of public policy on the religious church-state relations in Spain, as well as the rights of European Muslims should not draw resource mobilization of the country’s main con- solely on theories of resource mobilization, polit- tender for religious space—the Catholic Church. ical opportunity structure, and political ideology, Almost twenty years after the 1992 approval of since this relationship “is mediated in signifi- the Agreements of Cooperation between minor- cant ways by the different institutional church- ity confessions and the Spanish state, the leaders

New Diversities Vol. 17, No. 1, 2015 ISSN ISSN-Print 2199-8108 ▪ ISSN-Internet 2199-8116 New Diversities 17 (1), 2015 Aitana Guia

of Spain’s Protestant, Jewish, and Islamic fed- of . According to sociologist José erations demanded that the country complete Casanova (2006: 16), for a long time scholarly its “religious transition” (Europa Press 2011). Yet debate was fruitlessly divided between North all major players in religious matters—minority American scholars arguing that secularization religious federations, the Catholic Church, and was an artificial European construct, and that the Spanish political establishment—maintain it did not follow directly from modernity, and vastly different ideas about what a complete European scholars claiming that secularization transition should entail. According to Jewish, was empirically irrefutable, a linear fait accom- Protestant, and Muslim leaders, the state must pli that originated in the European Renaissance, implement and enforce the democratic frame- was strengthened during the Enlightenment and work on religious pluralism that guaranteed the French Revolution, and became consolidated constitutionally-mandated state neutrality in with the liberal fight to separate church and state. religion and equal treatment of all confessions. In France, secularization’s coup de grâce came For the Catholic Church, however, state neu- with the 1905 Law on the Separation of Church trality and the equality of all confessions could and State, the backbone of the French principle only mean a loss of privilege for Catholics and of laïcité. Other European countries have fol- the further separation of church and state; the lowed their particular trajectories toward secu- status quo, with the occasional reinforcement of larization (Swatos and Olson 2000). the Church’s position during periods of conser- Casanova convincingly argued that to bridge vative rule, was the best possible scenario. The the divide between North American and Euro- Socialist Party, on the other hand, viewed Span- pean interpretations required decoupling the ish Catholicism’s privileged status as a result of concept of secularization on several distinct lev- the compromise implemented during the Transi- els. Secularization, in Casanova’s view, entails tion period (1975-82)—a necessary compromise, 1) independence from religious institutions, certainly, but one that was in need of revision. 2) the decline of religious belief and practice, and For the Socialists, the process of secularization 3) the relegation of religion to the private sphere. in Spain, understood as the “institutional and According to Casanova, even though on a global cultural changes that take people and organiza- scale the second and third components have not tions away from the institutional authority of occurred, the European case has been different the church and weaken their religious referents” to the extent that a “progressive, though highly (Pérez Díaz 1993: 119), had to be encouraged and uneven, secularization of [the continent] is an reinforced. undeniable social fact. An increasing majority While these positions reflect a particular bal- of the European population has ceased partici- ance of power between religious denominations, pating in traditional religious practices, at least the constitutional and legal framework that on a regular basis, even though they may still determined church-state interaction in Spain maintain relatively high levels of private individ- since 1978, and the positions and priorities of ual religious beliefs” (Casanova 2006: 17). New the two main political parties—conservative and scholarship is premised upon the idea that divi- socialist—, the larger debate over a religious sions between the religious and secular spheres transition has not been confined to Spain; it fits, have resulted from social dynamics that are rather, within a broader European, and indeed constantly renegotiated. Thus, “entanglements global, discussion of the meaning and scope of of religion and politics must be viewed as sites secularization and the place of religion in liberal in which the boundaries between religion and democracy. secular spheres are negotiated, challenged, and North American and European scholars have redrawn” (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012: been engaged in fierce debate over the meaning 882). The ways in which these boundaries have

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been negotiated in democratic Spain form the lar culture. As Victor Pérez Díaz has put it, “all core themes of this article. these institutions implied a curtailment of the It took less than a decade after Francisco church’s power, a reduction of its influence, and Franco’s death, in November 1975, for the influ- competition for its souls.” Indeed, only in the last ence of the Catholic Church over ordinary Span- fifty years or so has the church “made its peace iards to decrease considerably. While 86 percent with [the] world, and only in the Second Vatican of considered themselves Catholic in Council has it officially recognized this” (Pérez 1984, the number of practicing Catholics dropped Díaz 1993: 123). from about 56 percent to 31 percent between Political events delayed, and even limited, the 1976 and 1983. During the same period, Span- development of this process in Spain. The Franco iards came to accept: contraception (65 percent), regime (1939-75), seeking to legitimize itself the dissolution of Catholic marriages (47 per- at the close of the , adopted cent), and the relaxation of premarital sexual Catholicism, the majority , as the relations (45 percent). Moreover, 43 percent of official religion of the state. This brought about Spaniards believed the church should not have a symbiotic relationship between the church any influence over government (Pérez Díaz 1993: and the regime, known as national-Catholicism. 173-175). Thirty years later, in 2014, the number Under Franco, the Catholic Church was given a of Spaniards considering themselves Catholic had prominent role in shaping social policies, like dropped a further 16 percent, to 69.4 percent of education and marriage, and was incorporated the population, while only 13.8 percent attended into the state structure through the subsidies regularly (CIS 2014). While it is undeniable its cathedrals and parishes received and by the that the second component of Casanova’s defini- salaries of clerics and teachers, which were paid tion of secularism—a decline of religious beliefs for by the state. A with the , and practices—applies to the Spanish case, state signed in 1953, confirmed the public status of institutions in Spain are not yet entirely indepen- the church, paving the way for the imposition dent from religious institutions, particularly in of church influence on matters both public and the area of education. Moreover, the relegation private. of religion to the private sphere has been vigor- The relationship between the Francoist state ously contested by many Catholics. and the Spanish Catholic Church began to change This article argues that while practicing Mus- after Pope John XXIII convened the Second Vati- lims, Catholics, , and Protestants have con- can Council in 1962, known as Vatican II. At Vati- tributed to a generalized increase in religious can II it was acknowledged that the church had observance in Spain since 1975, the main oppo- often failed to side with the poor, as well as the nent of state neutrality on religious matters has development of human rights and democracy— been the Catholic Church and its powerful lobby a failure exemplified by the Spanish church. of native Catholics who fear a loss of traditional Through Gaudium et Spes (“Joy and Hope”), the privileges dating back to the Franco Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Mod- and before. ern World, Vatican II also recognized the separa- tion and autonomy of the secular and religious The Catholic Church and the Spanish Transition spheres (1965c). Through Nostra Aetate (“In Our to Democracy Time”), moreover, Vatican II encouraged Catho- The transformation of the Catholic Church after lics to embrace religious freedom and respect the religious wars of the sixteenth and seven- non-Christian religions (1965b). teenth centuries has entailed a struggle against In Spain, Vatican II triggered legislative change modernity, capitalism, the modern state, and, that would culminate in the passing of the Reli- eventually, against liberal democracy and secu- gious Freedom Act of 1967. It also forced a reluc-

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tant Spanish church to revisit its relationship with tiations conducted thus far, as well as a suspen- the belligerently confessional Francoist state, sion of any further talks with the Vatican until a and, eventually, to accept that it must operate in constitution determined the principles by which a “market” of religious beliefs. Of course these church-state relations would henceforth be gov- changes were not felt immediately, for the simple erned (Callahan 2000: 554). reason that it took several years for the majority With the 1978 Constitution, the church was of the church’s hierarchy to be convinced that ultimately forced to embrace the principles of the regime, and its brand of national-Catholicism, religious freedom and a non-denominational had no future (Pérez Díaz 1993: 153). In 1973, the state (“No confession will have a state charac- Synod of Spanish approved the lengthy ter”). It also embraced a constitutional guar- document “The Church and the Political Commu- antee of cooperation between the state, the nity,” and the Spanish church was finally disas- Catholic Church, and other denominations: “The sociated from the Franco regime. In its place, the public authorities shall take the religious beliefs church sought a new, mutually independent col- of Spanish society into account and shall con- laboration with the state, and the Synod of Span- sequently maintain appropriate cooperation ish Bishops declared the church to be neutral in with the Catholic Church and the other confes- political matters and committed to political and sions” (Art. 16.3).1 Yet the Constitution struck a religious pluralism (Conferencia Episcopal Espa- compromise between the idea of a religiously ñola 1973). neutral , based on the model of the By 1976, it was clear to both the recently- French Republic and supported by the Socialist crowned king, , and the first post- and Communist parties, and a state, supported Franco government, led by , by conservative parties and the Catholic Church, that relations between the church and the Span- that recognized religion’s positive contribution ish state had to be revisited. To this end, the gov- to society by enacting a constitutionally recog- ernment entered into a series of negotiations nized juridical status—beyond a vague recog- with the Vatican. But while the government had nition of the right of religious freedom—for all hoped to conclude these talks in a timely manner, confessions. The one conception entailed a path church representatives were more concerned towards the privatization of religious practice about preserving their status and prerogatives and a stricter separation of church and state, than pleasing the government. While the nego- while the other granted churches special status. tiations were largely cordial, they were “not The 1978 Constitution lay somewhere in the mid- easy,” according to Minister of Foreign Affairs dle: it avoided the strict separation of church and Marcelino Oreja (Callahan 2000: 554). Nor were state by obligating the government to cooperate they quick—in fact, they lasted from 1976 to with religious confessions, but these confessions 1979, when the final four agreements between were not themselves protected by any special the Spanish state and the Vatican were signed. juridical status. The fact that talks had started before a demo- By 1978 the church had already foreseen fur- cratic framework was fully established, and that ther conflict with the state over things like educa- they were led by the centrist Unión de Centro tion, divorce, and abortion; it thus sought some Democrático (UCD), a party strongly connected sort of constitutional recognition of its position to the church hierarchy, naturally created ten- in Spanish society that could give it influence sions. In 1977, Socialist deputies raised the over the political process. It had some success in question of whether the government’s negotia- this regard. In particular, the drafters of the Con- tions with the Vatican were compatible with a yet-to-be-written democratic constitution and 1 SPANISH CONSTITUTION. 1978. http://www.se- demanded full disclosure to Congress of nego- nado.es/constitu_i/indices/consti_ing.pdf.

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stitution recognized the so-called “sociological lic Church. Political Scientist Omar Encarnación fact”—the notion that the Spanish Church was a argues that the Catholic Church’s “policy of fact of life in Spanish society, one the state was neutrality with respect to the transition to bound to respect. democracy” had enormous political ramifica- To this end, four Agreements of Coopera- tions—indeed it dealt “a final blow to Franco- tion between the Spanish government and the ism” (2008: 84). A dominant narrative of the Vatican were signed in 1979. While three of the late-Franco period argues that Vatican II shifted Agreements—related to legal and financial mat- the church’s priorities, which helped the Spanish ters and religious and military services—were Church to distance itself from the regime. The approved by substantial majorities in Congress, church’s repudiation of Franco’s national-Cathol- the one covering education was opposed by both icism and its subsequent embrace of religious the Socialists and the Communists.2 According to pluralism, albeit very slow, were fuelled by the historian William Callahan, the Agreements, for pro-democratic position of the Synod of Bishops all practical purposes, “constituted a new- con under Cardinal Vicente Enrique y Tarrancón, as cordat, although neither party wished to use a well as the demands of many younger priests term that had fallen from favour in the post-Vat- who were committed to helping their congrega- ican II world” (2000: 554-5). The Spanish Church tions weather the adverse effects of mass inter- was thus granted special treatment that was not nal migration and rapid urbanization. These were available to other religious groups. the famous “curas obreros,” or worker-priests, Among scholars who have sought to analyse who criticized the state-sponsored Francoist the post-Franco Transition, there has been sus- labour union, and defended independent labour tained controversy over the role of elites and civil unions’ right to strike. society in the establishment of democracy. Many In his influential study of the Transition, Víctor have argued that the key factor in the country’s Pérez Díaz calls the 1970s a period of “moder- successful democratization was elite agency— ate euphoria,” since the Catholic Church had suc- namely, the ability of certain politicians, such ceeded at the extremely delicate task of distanc- as the first democratically elected prime - minis ing itself from authoritarian power and embrac- ter of the post-Franco period, Adolfo Suárez, to ing a liberal democratic regime; “the church was find common ground with Francoist support- [thus] reliving an experience of co-protagonism ers (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986; in the events of the transition to democracy” Gunther 1992). Others have contradicted this (1993: 124). More recent scholarship has ques- claim by arguing that the Transition cannot be tioned how overt this embrace of democratic understood by elite agency alone: rather, such politics actually was; it highlights instead the agency was conditioned by the demands of a indirect role played by some church officials who, diverse group of civil society organizations—and for example, allowed opposition organizations to not just trade unions, but women’s groups and use church infrastructure to avoid the wrath of neighbourhood associations as well (Pérez-Díaz Francoist authorities (Radcliff 2007). 1993; Radcliff 2011). However, debates over the church’s role in the While these debates remain unresolved Transition have tended to obscure the less conge- (Encarnación 2003), there is widespread agree- nial position adopted by the Catholic Church vis-à- ment concerning the contribution of the Catho- vis the Spanish state since 1982. This is especially true when looking at the conflict over education. 2 “Instrument of Ratification of the Agreement be- It is perhaps more fruitful to consider the Transi- tween the Spanish State and Holy See on Education tion as merely a temporary consensus—one that and Cultural Matters,” Signed in Vatican City on Jan- uary 3, 1979, BOE 300, December 15, 1979, 28784- began to unravel in short order—concerning the 28785. ideal type of political settlement to bring about

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an end to . Moreover, recogniz- and its extensive demands in education, thus ing the limits of consensus during the Transition made it an unlikely ally of democratizing parties helps us to understand why certain issues, such and progressive actors (2011: 127). as the role of the Catholic Church in public edu- The church’s options during this period were cation, became so contentious so quickly. limited by its recent history. Had it chosen to mobilize the Catholic masses against the authori- Democratic Consolidation and the Demands of tarian order, it could have sown the seeds for Organized Religion the development of a pro-democratic, Catholic The myth of a durable consensus between social movement similar to those promoted by church and state actors must be replaced by a the church in communist countries (Encarnación more nuanced understanding of politics as an 2008: 84). Pérez Díaz argues that the deliberate arena of evolution and negotiation. The- differ failure on the part of the Catholic hierarchy to ent roles played by religious officials during the create a Christian-democratic party contributed period of democratic consolidation and deepen- to the cordial relations between the newly-emer- ing are best understood by looking at how the gent political class and the church (1993: 170). church and other confessions negotiated their While this is to some extent true, it also reduced relationship with the state, how religious and the church’s influence over more grassroots secular interests fought for public space, and political activity in Spain. how the church attempted to project its moral Indeed, the consolidation period resulted in outlook onto public policy. the emergence of new religious actors who had For the Catholic Church, the Transition not been visible during the Transition. The Catho- entailed “a passage from triumphalism to humil- lic Church could have welcomed these individuals ity” (Echarren Istúriz 1999: 424), or, to put it in and joined forces with them in its fight against the slightly different terms, a move “from a system of privatization of religion and its attempt to intro- privilege to one of rights” (Callaghan 2000: 554). duce its moral outlook on legislation and public Pérez Díaz, viewing this evolution in a broader policy. Notwithstanding occasional cooperation context, argues that the church was “furious between grassroots Catholic organizations and in the thirties, exalted in the forties and fifties, religious minorities, for instance in 2000, when troubled and inquiring in the sixties, moderately a Catholic Church in the Barcelonan neighbour- euphoric throughout the seventies, and discreet, hood of el Raval offered temporary prayer space showing a sense of both satisfaction and disillu- for a Pakistani Muslim religious association who sion, since the eighties” (1993: 123). was unable to secure it otherwise (Guia 2014: The earliest period of democratic consolida- 109-111), the Catholic Church has viewed minor- tion, from 1982 to 1996—which happened to ity religions as competitors in the marketplace of coincide with several Socialist governments in religious ideas and as challengers to its privileged —was a difficult time for the Church. The relationship with the state. earlier centrist government had passed a divorce law in 1981 and the subsequent Socialist govern- Muslim Demands for Equal Treatment ment partially de-criminalized abortion in 1985. Muslim organizations had been steadily growing Such measures forced the church to maintain a in Spain since the late 1960s, when Muslim lead- prudent distance from democratizing elites. His- ers in the North African city of —part of torian Gregorio Alonso reminds us that during Spain since 1497—began lobbying for the exten- this period the church hierarchy largely returned sion of the rights and privileges enjoyed by the to a pre-Vatican II isolation from civil society and vast majority of Spanish citizens. This process was popular demands. The church’s staunch defence accelerated by the approval of the Religious Free- of narrowly defined Catholic values and morals, dom Act of 1980. In 1992, the Socialist govern-

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ment signed an Agreement of Cooperation with The 1992 Agreement of Cooperation was Spanish Muslims.3 It was the goal of the Social- nonetheless a milestone. For the first time in ists to use the 500th anniversary of the Christian modern Spanish history, Islam would receive conquest of and the expulsion of Span- official recognition and its public practice would ish Jews to mark a reversal in the religious poli- be protected throughout the country; the cies of the preceding centuries. Spain was also Agreement’s preamble even recognized Islam’s hosting the 1992 Olympic Games in , “important role in the formation of Spanish as well as the Universal Exposition of Cultures in identity.”4 The Agreement granted imams special Seville, and the government knew that the coun- privileges, offered tax relief to groups registered try’s international image and democratic creden- with the Ministry of Justice, and conferred legal tials would be enhanced by an official recogni- protections on Islamic religious buildings and tion of its religious minorities. By simultaneously cemeteries as sacred spaces. It also recognized signing with Protestants, Jews, and Muslims, the Islamic marriage, with the exception of polygamy, government acknowledged each of these groups on an equal footing with Catholic and civil mar- as “deeply rooted” (notorio arraigo), thus com- riage. The government agreed to accommodate mitting the state to the encouragement and pro- Muslim religious practices—like dietary restric- tection of religious pluralism in Spain. tions—in prisons, hospitals, schools, and other A precondition for the signing of the 1992 public institutions, including the military. Finally, Agreement was the creation of a nation-wide the Agreement recognized religious , the organization that could speak on behalf of Span- need to regulate halal food production, and the ish Muslims. (Negotiations with Protestants and need to preserve Spain’s Islamic artistic and his- Jews, who already had nation-wide federations, toric heritage. The CIE was in charge of defend- went more smoothly as a result). Yet Muslim ing religious practices, training and appointing leaders were often unsuccessful in their attempts imams, and overlooking Islamic instruction in the to present a united front. For example, in negoti- public school system. ations to establish the Federation of Islamic Reli- The Agreement also encouraged the creation gious Entities of Spain (FEERI), which took place of new Muslim organizations affiliated with one in 1989, predictable disagreements emerged and of the existing federations. According to Spain’s Riay Tatary Bakry, a Syrian-born physician and Registry of Religious Entities, the number of the imam of Madrid’s largest mosque at the time, Muslim groups thus increased steadily to fifty- decided to create an alternative group called the one in 1994, seventy in 1996, 176 in 2001, and Union of Islamic Communities in Spain (UCIDE) 616 in 2011 (the latest published data). In twenty (Tatary Bakry 2006). The government refused years, the number had multiplied by a factor of to deal with two separate and feuding organiza- thirty (Guia 2014: 82). tions, and instead forced them to come together While on paper, the Agreement created one under one banner, the Islamic Commission of of the most progressive frameworks for the Spain (CIE). The Agreement stipulated that the treatment of Islamic minorities in Europe, it CIE would be in charge of monitoring its imple- paled in comparison to the privileges accorded mentation with the oversight of two secretaries- to the Catholic Church. For example, the finan- general, one from FEERI, the other from UCIDE. cial agreement between Catholics and the state It was a compromise destined to fail (Iglésias included a provision for “adequate funding,” Martínez 2004). which allowed taxpayers to allocate a portion of their income tax revenue directly to the Church. 3 Law 26/1992, on Approval of a Cooperative Agree- The church also enjoyed tax exemptions, such ment between the State and the Islamic Commission of Spain, November 10, 1992, BOE 272, November 12, 1992, 38214-38217. 4 Ibid., 38215.

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as value-added and property tax. Only the latter sidestepped these requests by arguing that the was extended to other religious groups. income tax provision was “a transitory measure Among the privileges available to the Catholic that was a hangover from the Spanish state’s for- Church that were excluded from the Agreement mer support of Catholicism and [as such] would with Muslims was a provision for state fund- soon disappear” (Escudero 1998: 12). Conserva- ing of recognized Muslim institutions. Mansur tive governments were likewise uninterested in Escudero, a psychiatrist from Córdoba who led pursuing equality of treatment, though for very Spanish converts and was a secretary-general of different reasons: they preferred maintaining the the CIE from 1991 to 2006, blamed Tatary, his co- status quo—or even altering it in favour of the secretary-general, for this disparity; he claimed Catholic Church—in order to please their well- it forced Spanish Muslims to rely on foreign organized Catholic supporters. capital for their religious needs (González 1999). Muslim representatives in Spain were becom- According to Escudero (1998), Tatary had more ing disillusioned with successive governments’ direct access to government funding because he lack of will when it came to implementing the was a member of the Ministry of Justice’s Advi- Agreement, something they now described as sory Commission on Religious Freedom, though a “papel mojado”, a worthless piece of paper Tatary did not view foreign funds as an issue that failed to protect Muslim rights (Escudero as long as they came from a variety of sources 1998: 12). Mohammed Chaib, founder of the (Tatary Bakry 2006). Escudero believed that immigrant association Ibn Battuta, and a Social- without state funding, Spanish Muslims would ist member of the Catalan Parliament from 2003 be entirely dependent on foreign donors, and to 2011, described the various governments’ would thus have to accept whatever theological treatment of religious minorities as “chaotic and or political interference was involved (Guia 2014: catastrophic.” As he pointed out, “[n]one of the 78-87). points fleshed out in 1992 when the Islamic Com- While the Spanish Constitution guarantees mission of Spain was created has been fulfilled. equal treatment of minority confessions by the Not religious teaching in schools, not freedom of state—including access to public funds on par religion—not one” (Chaib 2005: 42). with that enjoyed by the Catholic Church—the While the state did not actively pursue the imbalance remains egregious. In 2005, the Cath- violation of Muslim religious rights, this was an olic Church received 141 million euros in tax rev- inevitable result of simple government inaction. enue, compared to a mere 3 million euros for Local and regional authorities were reluctant to Jewish, Muslim, and Protestant groups combined. implement the Agreement, and Madrid was less Moreover, while the government paid the sala- than enthusiastic when it came to forcing the ries of 15,000 Catholic school teachers, only 100 issue. The Muslim vote was still scant and a strong Protestant and 36 Islamic teachers were hired pro-Muslim stance might alienate the large, well- with public funds. As for private schools receiv- organized contingent of Catholic voters. Imple- ing public subsidies, a similar imbalance exists, mentation and enforcement of the Agreement with 1,860 Catholic schools versus just four Prot- was more extensive when the Socialist Party was estant and two Jewish schools (Guia 2014: 83-4). in power—both under Felipe González (1982- This financial gap has only increased. 96) and José Rodríguez Zapatero (2004-11)—as Escudero called on Madrid to fund Islam to the the Socialists were committed to eliminating the same extent that it funded Catholicism. He also privileged position of the Catholic Church. More- asked that citizens be allowed to make income over, when some Muslims who were members tax contributions to minority religious institu- of the Socialist Party demanded equality among tions in the same way that they could contribute confessions, party leaders were therefore more to the Catholic Church. The Socialist government likely to act. Conversely, while the conservatives

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were in power, from 1996 to 2004, the national Indeed, as Tariq Modood and Riva Kastoryano government did little to implement the Agree- have pointed out, a general trend across Europe ment, claiming that the two Muslim federations has hindered Muslims’ access to the public could not agree on a common path. sphere in recent decades: During this period Escudero warned that the Those citizens whose moral, ethnic or religious Spanish government “needs to understand that communal identities are most adequately reflect- Islam is part of Spanish culture. Either [it] backs a ed in the political identity of the regime, those citi- home-grown reformist Muslim agenda or leaves zens whose private identity fits most comfortably it to foreign powers” (Valenzuela 2002). Jadicha with this political identity, will feel least the force of a rigidly enforced public/private distinction. They Candela, a lawyer and member of the Socialist may only become aware of its coercive influence Party, echoed this criticism of the government’s when they have to share the public domain with policies: “In the end the government preferred persons from other communities, persons who Muslims who did not ask for money, subsidies, may also wish the identity of the political commu- or Islamic teachers in public schools, but rather nity to reflect something of their own community too (2006: 170). turned to Saudi Arabia for mosques … Later … the government will realize that in those mosques Spanish society tends to view Muslim demands that were erected for free, a much more radical for equal access to public space as illegitimate, Islam will have arisen” (Guia 2014: 85). a challenge to the status quo, while Catholic For Spanish Muslims, the protection of reli- encroachment is somehow acceptable, custom- gious practice and equal access to the public ary, even banal. Indeed, many ethnic Spaniards— sphere were of vital importance, though they even atheists or agnostics—celebrate a variety of were largely taken for granted by Catholics. The Catholic holidays. As Mohammed Chaib has writ- success of a religious transition thus depended ten, “[t]hose who fear losing the secular state on the state’s recognition of things like dietary and who harden in the face of a group subcon- needs and ritual practices, as well as guaranteed scious filled with battles of and Christians access to prayer sites—something that took on and re-conquests of El Cid, often forget that … heightened significance in the early 1990s, when they bring flowers to the cemetery every Novem- the construction of new mosques were increas- ber 1st [All Saints’ Day]” (2005: 127). ingly challenged by neighbourhood coalitions. Indeed, over half of national statutory holi- Between 1990 and 2008, ethnic Spaniards days in Spain are Catholic. If one accounts for opposed proposals to build mosques and prayer regional and municipal statutory holidays as well, rooms in sixty Spanish towns, forty—or 67 per- it is difficult to celebrate anything in Spain that cent—of which were located in . These is not related in some way to Catholicism. While conflicts were triggered by Muslim attempts to this is largely habitual, it has also been fervently move from small prayer sites to newer, larger defended by the church and its supporters. When buildings; by the renovation of existing spaces; the Socialist government attempted to eliminate or by attempts to construct purpose-built, grand the Festivity of the Immaculate Conception on mosques (Moreras 2009). These conflicts were December 8, just two days after another statu- also related to the newfound visibility of, and tory holiday (Constitutional Day), church sup- claim of permanence made by, various local porters mounted stiff resistance, and the govern- Muslim communities in Spain. Of course, the dis- ment was forced to backtrack. Yet other confes- parities between Muslim and non-Muslim popu- sions have not been offered the same preroga- lations in terms of their access to public space, tives. Only in the North African cities of and enjoyment of public resources, and protection Melilla, where Muslims form over a third of the by public authorities, only exacerbated these population, has a non-Catholic religious holiday conflicts. been recognized: Eid al-Adha, the Feast of the

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Sacrifice, was introduced as a statutory holiday more than a third of the total number of Spanish in 2010 by local governments. This was the first students (Callahan 2000: 556). Islamic statutory holiday introduced not just in Under Francoism, relations between the Cath- Spain, but in Europe as a whole—perhaps a sign olic Church and the Spanish state were largely of changes to come in areas with a significant cordial, yet by 1970 the church was disparaging Muslim population (López Bueno 2013: 234-6). the new General Law of Education as “Statist” (Boyd 1997: 282-83). The church was steadfast Education: A Low-Key Battleground in its belief that Catholic representatives should In the nearly four decades since democracy was determine the curriculum of educational struc- established in Spain, the Catholic Church has tures under church supervision, and it began to had many disagreements with the state. Some resent the attempts of state authorities to con- have come out of the church’s efforts to retain trol curriculum and reorganize student catch- a monopoly over spiritual power and insert its ment areas. moral precepts into public policy; others from Vatican II would establish the road map for the church’s refusal to recognize the equality education the Spanish Church would follow in of other confessions. Others still are related to the wake of Franco’s death. Vatican II’s “Gravissi- church demands that public servants adopt an mum Educationis” acknowledged that the church exemplary moral character in line with a Catho- “has a role in the progress and development of lic . In these conflicts and in spite of education.” Of course, private Catholic schools strong internal disagreements among Catholic and universities could play an unrestricted role institutions at times (Griera 2007), the Catholic in their respective institutions, but the church’s Church has not only utilized the resources avail- influence would be severely limited if it had to able to the official church apparatus—papacy, rely only on those who could afford an expensive episcopate, secular clergy, and religious orders— private education. Yet Vatican II conceded the but also an increasingly planned and militant laity, primary and inalienable right and duty of parents or community of believers. This is particularly to educate their children in true liberty, which true when lay groups have protested in favour could only be guaranteed by their free choice of of what they call “traditional family values,” and schools. “Consequently, the public power … must against same-sex marriage and the decriminal- see to it… that public subsidies are paid out in ization of abortion. such a way that parents are truly free to choose The most sustained battleground, however, according to their conscience the schools they has been education reform, since it was in this want for their children” (Pope Paul VI 1965a). In area that the Catholic Church had the most to this line, the Spanish Catholic Church obtained lose if secularizing forces were to gain ground. a significant victory with the 1978 Constitution; The church’s hold on had been Article 27.3 gave legal validation to some of the cemented with the signing of the Concordat of church’s key demands—for example, that “pub- 1953, which reaffirmed the church’s right to mon- lic authorities guarantee the right of parents to itor the orthodoxy and morality of all aspects of ensure that their children receive religious and education (Boyd 1997: 274). The church took moral instruction in accordance with their own advantage of these favourable conditions to convictions.” construct an extensive network of schools that The 1979 Agreement of Cooperation on edu- received substantial government financial sup- cational matters was of great importance for the port, particularly after the approval of the 1970 future position of the Spanish Church who aimed Education Act. Thus, “[b]y 1976, nearly 2 million to secure Catholic instruction in public schools students were registered in the church’s primary and public subsidies for its network of privately- and secondary schools,” a figure that made up owned religious schools. One consequence of

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the 1978 Constitution was that students in public While the Education Law of 1980 did not inter- schools were no longer obliged to attend religion fere with the generous subsidies enjoyed by classes. For Vatican II, the defence of Catholic church schools, the approval, in 1983, of a new education in non-Catholic schools was of vital education law provoked passionate parliamen- importance, as was the provision of publicly- tary debate, large street demonstrations, and funded religious instruction by teachers chosen heated exchanges between church representa- by the Church. As Pope Paul VI himself stated, tives and the state, with the church officials argu- “the Church esteems highly those civil authori- ing that the Socialist government was trying to ties and societies which, bearing in mind the eliminate religious education through “starva- pluralism of contemporary society and respect- tion and asphyxiation” (Callahan 2000: 589). To ing religious freedom, assist families so that the a large extent the controversy revolved around education of their children can be imparted in questions of funding and control. For its part, the all schools according to the individual moral and government refused to continue providing an religious principles of the families” (Pope Paul VI equal funding formula for secular and religious 1965a). schools; it also challenged the independence Religious instruction in public schools by itself of religious schools by mandating that all insti- would not have satisfied the church; of equal tutions using public funds be administered by importance was the continuation of government elected councils comprised of members of the financial support for its extensive network of school’s legal proprietors, teachers, parents, stu- private religious schools. According to Callahan, dents, and non-academic staff. Moreover, state- the “hierarchy expected that Church schools subsidized schools were obliged to modify their would receive the same level of funding as the admission criteria so as to accept more students public system” (2000: 557). Indeed, the church from the neighbourhoods they occupied. They hierarchy tended to view the public funding of were obliged to recognize the academic free- private religious schools not as a privilege, but dom of teachers, and the freedom of thought of rather as an integral part of a single national teachers and students alike, who could no lon- educational system. The 1979 Agreement on ger be required to attend religious services or education acknowledged a general principle of live their private lives according to the church’s “equality of opportunities” for students attend- moral teachings. Of course, such measures were ing private religious schools and those attending perceived by many as an affront to the “Catholic public schools, but left the extent of public fund- identity” of private religious schools (Callahan ing undetermined (Callahan 2000: 558). 2000: 590-91), and from 1983 onwards, every While the majority Socialist government new education law would provoke controversy elected in 1982 declared its intention to observe and disagreement between Catholic and secular- the Agreement with the Holy See—an attempt izing forces. to forge a “definitive pacification” of the histori- Though minority confessions would fight after cal conflicts between church and state (Callahan 1992 to enshrine their constitutional right to reli- 2000: 274)—its decriminalization of abortion, gious instruction within the public schools, the its strict control of the financing and manage- constraints imposed by the conflicts between ment of church schools, and its attempts to cur- the church and various Socialist governments tail subsidies for clerical salaries reignited these could only bring about limited successes. In 1993, very same conflicts. The Socialist government the CIE created the curriculum for an Islamic did not entirely undo the consensus on religious course to be taught in public schools, and in 1996 matters forged during the Transition, but it cer- it signed an accord with the Socialist government tainly understood this consensus in very narrow to pay for the salaries of trained Islamic teachers. terms. Yet school authorities and civil servants in the

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regional ministries of education were nonethe- such as the Islamic Commission of Spain, led by less reluctant to hire teachers of Islam—some- Mounir Benjelloun since 2012, a Moroccan-born thing the national government did not promote, Muslim leader from the , or effectively hindering the introduction of Islamic Educaislam, led by convert, educator, and activ- education in public schools. Escudero com- ist Natalia Andújar—have successfully pressured plained that schools failed to inform parents and the government to pass a resolution detailing an students they had as much right to study Islam as official curriculum for Islamic religious instruc- they did Catholicism (Escudero 1998: 13). When tion for Spanish primary schools in 2014.5 This is the national government shifted to the right in a first step toward securing the rights of Muslim 1996, things did not improve. children to receive Islamic instruction in Span- Once the Socialists were back in government ish schools. However, no private Islamic school in 2004, they resumed their attempt at com- receives public funds in the way that thousands pleting the religious transition. The funding of of Catholic schools do. A clear sign of the com- Islamic education in public schools was made pletion of the religious transition would be the mandatory whenever ten or more students tangible promotion of Islamic education in pub- requested it as an elective. However, since edu- lic schools by the state, the extension of pub- cation is a shared jurisdiction, the law had to be lic subsidies to private Islamic schools, and the advertised and implemented by regional govern- public endorsement of the construction of new ments, many of which enforced it reluctantly and mosques. unequally—particularly since it required most However, not all devout Muslims agree on regions to pay the salaries of Islamic teachers. In the need for Islamic education; some, albeit a some areas, educational authorities attempted minority, feel it is an “unreasonable demand.” to manoeuvre around the state’s laws on reli- The Catalan-Moroccan Socialist Mohamed Chaib gious education by doing away with Islamic and claims that “[w]e as a society have more impor- Catholic instruction altogether, and offering a tant questions to resolve than Islamic teaching in joint secular course in the history of religion schools,” and continues to argue: instead. Only in Ceuta, Melilla, and — It’s important to remember that schools are not where the national Ministry of Education pays the place to teach religion, any religion. The big salaries directly—were teachers of Islam hired problem I see for our society is that we can’t tell according to the law. By 2005, only 36 teach- Muslims that natives have the right to learn Cathol- ers of Islam were active in the public system icism at school while Muslims don’t have the right to learn Islam. This constitutes visible discrimina- across Spain (Guia 2014: 83-84). Ten years later, tion…. Religion is for the private sphere, in church- in 2015, the number has only reached 46 (Casa es and mosques, but not schools, not as doctrine, Árabe 2011), a very paltry increase as estimates only as a course in the history and culture of world indicate the demand requires something closer religions (Chaib 2005: 66-67). to 450 (Berglund 2015: 28). In 2012, there were 2,953 teachers of Catholicism in Spain, at a cost Education and the Myth of Consensus to taxpayers of 94.2 million Euros (EFE ECONO- Omar Encarnación and others have started locat- MIA 2013). ing the exact point at which the consensus of the Though Article 10 of the Agreement of Cooper- Transition years began to unravel, with -Encar ation states that Muslim students are guaranteed nación (2008) arguing that a “second transition” the right to Islamic religious instruction in public began during the two governments headed by schools and subsidized private schools, its imple- mentation has been highly uneven (Lorenzo and 5 RESOLUTION 12886, approving curriculum for Is- Peña 2004; Álvarez et al. 2009). The recent lob- lamic religious instruction in primary school, BOE 299, bying efforts of certain Muslim organizations— December 11, 2014, 101207-101233.

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the Socialist José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero from negotiating the limits of the “religious transition” 2004 to 2011. Zapatero’s substantial reforms in for decades. In the dominant narrative of the the areas of the historical memory of the Spanish Transition, the 1978 constitutional settlement Civil War, abortion, same-sex marriage, and sup- between the Catholic Church and the Spanish port for the reform of the Autonomous Statute of state is often given more weight than it ever had Catalonia altered the consensus achieved in the in reality. While it is true that the Conservative’s Transition period to such an extent that we may 2003 education law returned some of the privi- indeed speak of a second Transition. leges the Socialists had managed to take away The problem with this interpretation is that it from the church, this was more a single battle implies that the consensus achieved during the in the low-key war to control education than a first Transition held until the second—a view that wholesale dissolution of some ideal post-Fran- obscures the ways in which certain aspects of coist consensus. A Spanish Catholic Church in tra- the Transition remained incomplete throughout. ditionalist hands was once again flexing its mus- Conflicts between church and state over educa- cle and using the conservative majority in parlia- tion show the limitations of thinking of the con- ment to return the “religious transition” back to sensus achieved during the Transition as stable 1982. and durable. In education especially, the consen- Unsurprisingly, one of the priorities of the sus embodied by the 1978 Constitution began to Zapatero administration after 2004 was the crumble with the Socialist and Communist oppo- reformation of the Conservative’s education sition to the 1979 Agreement of Cooperation on law. These measures were of course opposed Educational Matters, and received a further blow by the Catholic Church and its allies, since they with the Catholic opposition to the 1983 law on limited parents’ freedom to choose schools and education. decreased the academic status of now again Encarnación has spoken of the challenges to voluntary religious education. The church and the Transition consensus sparked by the Conser- its supporters focused their energies on a new vative Party’s formation of a majority government compulsory course called “Education for Citizen- in 2000. This period was marked by the govern- ship and Human Rights.” In particular, the church ment’s pursuit of “a more conservative political opposed the course’s emphasis on sexuality and program that in some respects can be seen as its positive portrayal of non-traditional families the first significant departure from the politics of (Aguilar Fernández 2012). As soon as the Conser- consensus of the post-Franco era” (2008: 62-63). vatives were elected again, in 2011, they elimi- Encarnación argues that one of the most radical nated the course and moved to extend the fund- policies implemented by the Conservative Party ing of religious schools. was its new educational curriculum in 2003. By In the realm of education reform, the Tran- making Vatican-approved religious instruction sition was not experienced as the erosion of a compulsory subject in primary and secondary one consensus and its replacement by another. schools, it aimed to inculcate a new generation Rather, education policy has unfolded in a back- of Spaniards in traditionalist values, “to return and-forth manner, with very little agreement education policy in Spain to its Francoist days,” concerning the role of the Catholic Church and and to blur the “very delicate church-state divi- privately-owned, but state-subsidized, Catho- sion established by the architects of the 1978 lic schools. The completion of a religious tran- constitution” (2008: 63). sition in education has meant irreconcilable Yet it would be misleading to think that the things for secularist forces, on the one hand, rightward turn after 2000 marked a sudden long represented by the Socialist Party, and the departure from the politics of consensus. At Catholic Church and its numerous allies on the least in education, church and state had been re- other.

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Conclusion ties; of the Socialist Party to introduce a French- In 2008, Spain’s Socialist government drafted inspired separation of church and state; and of a Religious Freedom Act. It was an attempt to minority confessions to implement the religious update the 1980 Religious Freedom Act and and cultural rights they were promised in 1992, to forge a definitive resolution to the ongoing indicate that Spain’s religious transition is far battle between religious and secular forces by from complete. What we have instead are some reinforcing a secular state. The draft of the 2008 very uneven results. On the one hand, the failure law introduced the concept of “state laïcité” for to complete the religious transition has placed the first time, and it tried to disentangle state a burden on education: the conflict between authorities from religious involvement by, for church and the state have only hardened the example, eliminating Catholic state funerals. But divisions between public and private education after years of Catholic mobilization in the street systems, which in turn has prevented the for- against the legalization of abortion and same-sex mation of a nationwide consensus around edu- marriage, and faced with an increasingly uncer- cational priorities. As a result, the religious and tain economic environment, the Act was hur- cultural rights of minority confessions have not riedly shelved. The debate over the role of the been given the proper consideration. state in collecting tax funds exclusively for the On the other hand, the religious transition, to Catholic Church, in giving generous tax breaks for the extent that it has succeeded, has allowed the property owned by the Catholic Church, in fund- Spanish government to strengthen the religious ing Catholic teaching in public schools and sub- rights of minority confessions in ways that other sidizing private Catholic schools, remained unre- European states have not. It has also led to the solved. A similar move would eventually come creation of a flexible institutional arrangement— from the opposite end of the political spectrum one that is adept at accommodating religious when the Conservative government, with the full pluralism—the likes of which could scarcely be support of the church, tried to pass an extremely imagined at the outset of the post-Francoist Tran- restrictive abortion act in 2014, and widespread sition. However, in spite of these developments, opposition from the left and centre forced the and in spite of the efforts of minority confessions government to backtrack. to forge a truly non-, the gap As a non-confessional state, one that is con- between a legal framework for religious equality stitutionally obliged to cooperate with all major and the day-to-day experience of minority con- religions, Spain is equipped to manage these fessions remains unbridged. conflicts in a non-partisan manner. Yet the gap between institutional rhetoric and actual prac- tice has endangered the religious and cultural rights of Spanish Muslims and other practitio- ners of minority religions. While radical secular- References ists and militant Catholics oppose institutional AGUILAR FERNÁNDEZ, S. 2012. “Fighting Against compromises with minority confessions and the the Moral Agenda of Zapatero’s Socialist Govern- Catholic Church focuses on protecting its inher- ment (2004-2011): The Spanish Catholic Church as a Political Contender.” Politics and Religion 5: ited privileges, a majority of Spaniards have 671-694. adopted a less provocative approach to religion, ALONSO, G. 2011. “Children of a Lesser God: The one rooted in the compromises of the Transition Political and the Pastoral Action of the Spanish and premised upon safeguarding religion’s pres- Catholic Church.” In: Gregorio Alonso and Diego ence in the public sphere. Muro, eds., The Politics and Memory of Demo- The ongoing efforts of the Catholic Church to cratic Transition: The Spanish Model, New York: maintain public funding of its sectarian activi- Routledge.

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Note on the Author

Aitana Guia is a Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, where she specializes in religious pluralism and immigration in Modern Europe. Dr. Guia’s second monograph, The Muslim Struggle for Civil Rights in Spain: Promoting Democracy through Migrant Engagement, 1975-2010, was recently published by Sussex Academic Press. She is currently looking at nativism and anti-immigrant backlash in Southern Europe.

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