446 the contemporary pacific • fall 1998

NC, Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes. welcome boost for the peace process in Noumea. Daily. Bougainville, and by the end of the year most of the elements of the so- NH, Les Nouvelles Hebdo. Noumea. Weekly. called Burnham Declaration ham- mered out in New Zealand in July ran, Radio Australia News. English and were in place and yielding positive French. results. Meanwhile, another disaster, this one natural in origin, was gather- ing momentum throughout the coun- try as the worst drought in more than Papua New Guinea a century caused extensive crop fail- By any measure this was an extraordi- ures, putting many rural Papua New nary year in Papua New Guinea, Guineans at risk. where dramatic and often tragic events Government officials and military have become commonplace in recent leaders have long been frustrated by times. The government’s latest attempt their inability to combat the guerrilla to force a military solution to the long- tactics of the Bougainville Revolution- standing Bougainville secessionist ary Army (bra) and acutely conscious crisis, this time with the help of foreign of their dependence on Australia for mercenaries, backfired badly. It precip- military training and equipment. In the itated a constitutional crisis when the face of Canberra’s increasing reluc- Defence Force commander abruptly tance to support the military effort on withdrew his support for the plan and Bougainville, Defence Minister Math- elements of the military moved to ias Ijape began to seek private sources expel the mercenaries. Veteran politi- of military hardware in early 1996. A cian Sir Julius Chan was obliged to foreign business associate, with whom stand down as prime minister, in the he had worked on an earlier plan to face of overwhelming public support establish an elite police unit, put him for the defiant soldiers, and lost his in touch with Tim Spicer, a London- parliamentary seat in the general elec- based director of a military consul- tion later in the year. Unfortunately, tancy company soon to be called Sand- his successor, Bill Skate, did little to line International. In April 1996, Ijape, restore public faith in the badly dis- Secretary for Defence James Melegepa, credited political system. He rose to and Defence Force Commander Jerry power by forming a coalition with the Singirok met in Cairns with Spicer and remnants of the Chan government, another London-based consultant to people whose integrity he had vehe- discuss Papua New Guinea’s military mently attacked in the run up to the needs. Spicer then prepared a proposal general election. Later he was exposed called Project Contravene, which was on secretly recorded videotapes claim- presented to Singirok and Ijape later ing, among other things, to be the the same month. In December, after “godfather” of Port Moresby’s notori- Deputy Prime Minister Chris Haiveta ous raskol gangs. The mercenary became interested in the idea, Spicer debacle did, however, provide a visited Papua New Guinea for further political reviews • melanesia 447 talks and agreed to provide a more missiles, as well as sophisticated night detailed report for a fee of vision and remote-sensing equipment. us$250,000. He delivered the These services, many of which appear expanded report at the end of Decem- to have been subcontracted to a large ber 1996. South Africa–based security company, Project Contravene proposed a Executive Outcomes, would be pro- “high speed covert military operation” vided at a total cost of us$36 million. employing the “precise and surgical The plan appeared seriously flawed. application of combat power” with As Anthony Regan has argued, it two main objectives on the island of showed little understanding of the Bougainville. The first was to “neutral- nature of the crisis on Bougainville and ize” the Bougainville Revolutionary simply assumed that military action Army by silencing its broadcast could and would bring it to an end station, Radio Free Bougainville, and (Regan 1997). The military had not killing or capturing its senior com- succeeded on Bougainville, the report manders, named in the report as implied, partly because of tactical Francis Ona, Joseph Kabui, Sam errors but mainly due to inadequate Kauona, and Ismail Toarama. The training and equipment. More bizarre second objective was to “seize and was the suggestion that Australia and hold” the giant copper and gold mine New Zealand had conspired to pro- at Panguna, closed by the crisis in long the crisis to keep Papua New 1989. The attacks would be preceded Guinea from realizing its full economic by two preparatory phases, one to and regional potential. Nor does it train the Special Forces Unit of the seem likely that the more immediate Papua New Guinea Defence Force military objectives could have been (pngdf) and “a small detachment of achieved as planned. As the Defence resistance fighters” for the operation, Force discovered in August 1994, it is and the other to gather intelligence on relatively easy to seize the Panguna bra locations, and cut off transport mine site, but securing this huge moun- and communications links with neigh- taintop facility and its vast network of boring Solomon Islands. The subse- associated infrastructure against subse- quent contract between the state of quent attack would require an enor- Papua New Guinea and Sandline, mous commitment of security signed at the end of January 1997, personnel and resources. This part of required Sandline to provide the train- the plan could only succeed if earlier ing, gather the necessary intelligence, strategic attacks against the five “key conduct the military operation in con- targets” succeeded in “neutralizing” junction with the Defence Force, and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army. provide unspecified “follow-up opera- It would have been relatively easy to tional support.” It would also supply a destroy the one “hard” target on the package of military hardware featuring Sandline list, the radio transmitter, two Russian-built mi-24 attack heli- although it surely could have been copters and two mi-17 transport heli- rebuilt elsewhere without too much copters, a range of ordinance including trouble. Given the rugged nature of the 448 the contemporary pacific • fall 1998 terrain, and problems distinguishing operation before the current Parlia- bra soldiers from ordinary villagers, it ment dissolved in April. is difficult to imagine how the bra Events moved fast once Chan commanders could have been tracked decided to back the proposal, which down, positively identified, and was endorsed by cabinet on 15 Janu- eliminated through some “surgical” ary. Despite serious concerns raised by application of “combat power.” the officials who reviewed Spicer’s Even if all of these individuals were draft contract, the agreement was removed, surgically or otherwise, executed two weeks later and us$18 other disenchanted Bougainvilleans million (fifty percent of the contract might well emerge to continue the price) transferred to Sandline. By mid- struggle. February, just a month after cabinet The small group of senior Papua approved the operation, some seventy New Guinea officials involved in the foreign mercenaries were training with Sandline deal may have been aware of the Special Forces Unit in Wewak. these problems, but hoped that the However, by the end of March the military operation (codenamed Oyster) mercenaries were gone, Operation would at least force bra leaders to the Oyster had been abandoned, and negotiating table. The key player was, Papua New Guinea was reeling from of course, Prime Minister Chan, who its worst political crisis since indepen- initially rejected Sandline’s proposal in dence in 1975. September 1996, but apparently Initial public reaction to news of the changed his mind after meeting with Sandline deal, which first broke on 22 Spicer in January 1997. Chan was February, was relatively subdued. extremely eager to resolve the Bou- Although some Papua New Guinean gainville crisis, having seen numerous politicians and community groups military and political initiatives yield a were quick to voice their opposition, series of humiliating setbacks and the loudest protests came from govern- defeats. He was also acutely aware ment and media sources in Australia, that, if not resolved, the issue could with Prime Minister John Howard jeopardize plans to consolidate his declaring that the use of mercenaries political position in the upcoming was completely unacceptable. At first general elections. Chan may well have Chan attempted to downplay the sig- been impressed by Spicer’s military nificance of the contract, claiming that credentials and “can-do” attitude, Sandline employees were merely pro- especially after years of dealing with viding training services and would not an unwieldy military establishment at be deployed on Bougainville. Austra- home and unsympathetic officials in lia, he complained, was meddling in Australia. Certainly, Spicer’s proposal Papua New Guinea’s domestic affairs, was pitched to appeal to these con- a claim that received support from cerns, attributing a negative role to prominent opposition leaders. But Australia, emphasizing the “immense” domestic pressures proved to be political rewards that victory would Chan’s undoing. On 16 March, bring, and promising to complete the Defence Force personnel under the political reviews • melanesia 449 command of Major Walter Enuma sionalism of the permanent Defence launched Rausim Kwik, an operation Force. Fourth, the actions and motives designed to round up and expel the of the three key government ministers Sandline mercenaries. The following in the Sandline affair were highly ques- day Defence Force Commander Briga- tionable. According to Singirok, they dier General Singirok went on national wanted to reopen the Panguna mine radio to explain his opposition to the regardless of the human costs of doing Sandline contract, report the detention so, and may have been benefiting of the mercenaries, and call for the financially from the Sandline deal. resignation of Prime Minister Chan, There is no doubt that Singirok was Deputy Prime Minister Haiveta, and concerned about the devastating Defence Minister Ijape. impact of Operation Oyster, and sin- Singirok’s lengthy statement to the cere in his belief that military action nation raised rather more questions would not solve the Bougainville crisis. than it answered. He was clear about Yet the evidence suggests that he was his actions, announcing that he had familiar with the contents of the Sand- “canceled all further activities” with line proposal from its beginnings in Sandline. His demands were also clear: 1996, including the nature of the the prime minister, deputy prime min- equipment involved, and subsequently ister, and defense minister must resign facilitated its development and imple- within forty-eight hours and face a mentation. It could be that he became commission of inquiry, or he would increasingly disenchanted when his ask citizens to “join hands to force advice was effectively ignored in the them to resign.” He indicated several final stages of the negotiations, when reasons for taking these actions, which the Sandline training program yielded Chan described as “gross insubordina- nothing new, and when it became tion bordering on treason.” First, the apparent that senior politicians were planned military operation on Bou- engineering some sort of secret deal gainville was unacceptable. It would involving shares in Bougainville inflict unnecessary levels of human and Copper Limited. Certainly, the environmental damage, aggravate charges of underhand dealing and rather than solve the crisis, and cause corruption raised by Singirok struck a people throughout the country to turn chord with the general public and led against the government and the to a powerful groundswell of support Defence Force. Second, the contract for his stand. Ironically, although no with Sandline was flawed. It had been hard evidence to corroborate these pushed through without proper scru- charges of wrongdoing had emerged tiny and involved inflated prices for by the end of 1997, there was evidence obsolete equipment. Third, by involv- that Singirok himself had accepted ing foreign nationals on a temporary money under dubious circumstances. basis at such a high cost (equivalent to In an article in the Weekend Austra- one-third of the Defence Force’s lian, Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, the annual budget) the initiative served to journalist who first broke the Sandline undermine the credibility and profes- story, revealed that Singirok had 450 the contemporary pacific • fall 1998 received a total of a$70,000 in the and abuse of public office” had twelve months preceding the Sandline reached “alarming proportions” (PC, crisis from a London dealer who had 19 March 1997, 3). After several days been supplying arms to Papua New of negotiations behind closed doors, Guinea for some years. and with demonstrations continuing in It soon became apparent that urban centers across the country, Par- Singirok had the upper hand in the liament convened on 25 March to con- ensuing standoff with Chan. Although sider a motion calling on Chan to dismissed as commander, he clearly resign. The large crowd that had gath- had the support of most of the mili- ered outside the building became angry tary, whose Port Morseby barracks when the motion was defeated, leading became the focal point for large public those inside to fear for their safety. demonstrations over the next three Parliament House remained secure, days. The rallies were organized by but the presence of armed soldiers university students and community controlling traffic in and out of the action groups, and tensions ran high building led to speculation that a mili- when fringe elements took advantage tary coup was under way. Late that of the situation to smash shop win- night Major Walter Enuma, the leader dows and loot merchandise. The worst of Operation Rausim Kwik, arrived to incident occurred on the afternoon of assure political leaders that there was 20 March, when police used tear gas no bid to seize power, and managed to to disperse demonstrators outside calm a group of protesters intent on Murray Barracks and discharged auto- entering the building. On the after- matic weapons in the general direction noon of the following day, 26 March, of civilians fleeing into the military Chan told Parliament that he, Haiveta, compound. Intent on retaliation, some and Ijape would “stand aside” pending soldiers tried to break into the armory the results of the Sandline inquiry. The but were restrained at gunpoint by next day cabinet reversed the order of their superiors. Also under intense the two dominant parties in the ruling pressure from Australia, whose prime coalition by selecting Pangu Pati’s John minister sent a special envoy to Port Giheno as acting prime minister, with Moresby, Chan grudgingly bowed to Andrew Baing of the People’s Progress the inevitable on 20 March. He sus- Party as his deputy. pended the Sandline contract and Since there was no attempt to take announced a judicial inquiry into the over the government, the actions of circumstances surrounding the engage- Singirok and other military leaders ment of the company. during March 1997 did not constitute However, these actions by no means a coup (May 1997, 104). Nevertheless, satisfied the critics. They continued to illegal acts had clearly been committed, demand Chan’s resignation, a move and various state agencies began to that appeared to have the support of move against those involved. A Governor General Sir Wiwa Korowi, Defence Force board of inquiry was set who noted that the “termites of greed, up to investigate possible wrongdoing corruption, manipulation, selfishness by defense personnel, but its activities political reviews • melanesia 451 were postponed pending the results of lost their seats, and about one-third of a new judicial inquiry into the Sandline the members of the new House had no affair. Singirok was dismissed from the declared party affiliation. armed forces and later charged with Those who hoped that the elections sedition for his actions on 17 March. would restore some of the damage Meanwhile, Major Enuma, first cata- inflicted by the troubling political pulted to prominence by his role in events of the first part of the year were Operation Rausim Kwik, was back in soon disappointed. Some observers the news at the end of July, when he expected that veteran politician and was arrested and charged with raising “father of the nation” Sir Michael an illegal force to influence the results Somare could successfully build a of the general elections in an Enga elec- coalition around the eleven elected torate. On 28 July a group of armed members of his National Alliance soldiers forcibly released Enuma from party, and relegate the discredited the cells at the Boroko police station, Pangu and People’s Progress parties to and subsequently placed new Defence the opposition benches. However, on Force Commander Brigadier General 22 July the new Parliament convened Leo Niua under house arrest at Mur- and voted Bill Skate in as prime minis- ray Barracks. Five officers attached to ter by an overwhelming margin over the Special Forces Unit, including Somare. When earlier negotiations Enuma, were later charged by a mili- between Somare’s National Alliance tary court with mutiny for these and Skate’s People’s National Congress actions. Perhaps more troubling were broke down because neither man the police raids in early May on the would concede the prime ministership, offices of several community organiza- Skate quickly agreed to a partnership tions active in Sandline-related pro- with Pangu and the People’s Progress tests, and the subsequent arrest of their Party. In doing so, observed the Aus- leaders on charges of illegal assembly. tralian Financial Review, the country’s As usual, the national elections, first Papuan prime minister “aban- held 14–28 June, attracted a large doned every pledge he had made, every number of candidates, an average of policy he had advocated and every crit- about twenty for each of the 109 par- icism he had uttered against the PPP- liamentary seats. Also as usual, the Pangu Government” (AFR, 23 July decisive issues tended to be local ones. 1997). Just ten days before, Skate had However, the Sandline affair was a fac- stated categorically that he “did not tor in the 1997 elections, undoubtedly want to be involved with their dirty contributing to the ouster of Sir Julius politics....We are totally against the Chan from the New Ireland electorate activities and decisions of Pangu and he had represented for twenty-four PPP. We would be going against our years, and to the election of several people’s wishes if we began associating new members of Parliament who had with these parties” (National, 23 July been active in the Sandline protests. 1997). It was even more surprising to About half of the incumbent members, see several newly elected members including fourteen cabinet ministers, closely associated with activist com- 452 the contemporary pacific • fall 1998 munity groups, including the former criminal gangs in Port Moresby. “I can secretary-general of melsol, Peti Lafa- be very ruthless,” he was heard to say, nama, join the government ranks “I don’t need money...but if I tell my alongside returning Deputy Prime gang members to kill, they kill.... Minister Chris Haiveta and other indi- There’s no other godfather...I’m the viduals they had bitterly opposed godfather.” He also described how he earlier in the year. once told his “boys” to grab a man Less than a week after assuming who tried to attack him, and how they office, Skate ordered the police to sus- drove him to a beach and “cut him to pend action against military personnel pieces.” The tapes were secretly made and others who had opposed the Sand- by Mujo Sefa, an Australian business- line deal, ostensibly as an attempt to man with interests in Papua New reduce tensions within the Defence Guinea, who claimed to have helped Force. However, his intervention broker the deal that resulted in Skate’s appeared rather less impartial when it election as prime minister. The release was later revealed that he was related of the videotapes by Sefa, who appar- to Major Walter Enuma, and may have ently had fallen out of Skate’s favor, known in advance of the plan to free immediately provoked a barrage of him from the Boroko cells. On 10 demands for Skate to resign, and a August Skate announced expanded crisis within the coalition government. terms of reference for the new Sandline Citing a conspiracy to bring him Commission of Inquiry headed by Jus- down, Skate fired Haiveta as deputy tice Kubulan Los, but amended them prime minister, who then withdrew his again on 19 September. Among other Pangu Pati from the government. Skate things, the commission was asked to claimed that Haiveta had set him up by investigate whether there were any bringing him to Sefa’s office and get- secret financial kickbacks or business ting him drunk. Haiveta denied the deals associated with the Sandline con- charge, but did not deny that he was tract, and whether certain individuals, present when the tapes were made. In a including Haiveta, had traded in consummate demonstration of prag- Bougainville Copper Limited shares matic politics, Haiveta eventually when the government was planning to agreed to rejoin the government and purchase the mining company early in Skate announced that there was no 1997. Singirok’s actions during the need for a public inquiry into the sor- March crisis, as well as the possibility did affair. By the end of the year that he had received money from arms Skate’s support in Parliament had actu- dealers, were also issues to be probed. ally increased, as he managed to In November Skate faced what recruit three prominent figures, Sir appeared to be a major political set- Rabbie Namaliu, Sir Mekere Morauta, back when an Australian television sta- and Masket Iangalio, into his cabinet tion broadcast video extracts showing (Vulum 1998c, 27). the prime minister discussing payoffs The inability of Papua New for politicians and journalists, and Guinea’s state structures to deliver boasting about his connections with essential services was dramatically political reviews • melanesia 453 illustrated in 1997 when the country gardens to full production. The pros- was struck by an extended drought pects for rural Papua New Guinea in associated with the El Niño weather the first half of 1998 look grim indeed system phenomenon. All nineteen (Vulum 1998a, 1998b; Field 1998). provinces were affected by the lack of The Sandline catastrophe did create rain, which devastated subsistence and the conditions for significant advances cash crops alike in the second half of toward a lasting peace on the war- the year. It also caused the Fly River to ravaged island of Bougainville. The shrink, stranding shipping and inter- collapse of this initiative effectively rupting production at the giant Ok ruled out any possibility of a military Tedi mine. By the end of the year, the solution to the nine-year-old crisis, at Australian aid agency AusAID esti- least in the immediate future (Regan mated that as many as 1.5 million 1997, 64–72). Furthermore, when people, more than a third of the popu- members of the new Skate government lation, were without adequate food turned their attention back to the and water, and at least five hundred possibility of a negotiated settlement, people had died from starvation or the peace process was already well drought related disease. About under way. This was largely as a result 260,000 people were in a critical, life- of a concerted effort by senior New threatening situation, and a further Zealand officials, who managed to 980,000 were approaching that condi- persuade leaders from all of the key tion. Furthermore, according to one of factions on Bougainville to come to the authors of the AusAID report, Burnham army camp near Christ- “The worst is about to happen” church, New Zealand, to discuss their (Vulum 1998b, 19). differences. The two weeks of peace Although Skate announced that up talks in July resulted in the Burnham to 30 million kina would be set aside Declaration, which committed the to deal with the problem, it was clear parties to a process they hoped would that nothing like that level of funding produce a lasting solution to the crisis. had been made available by the end of The leaders called for a negotiated the year. It was also clear that Papua ceasefire with the Papua New Guinea New Guinea simply lacked the admin- government, the lifting of restrictions istrative and logistical capacity to on the free movement of goods and deliver the necessary assistance to the people in and out of Bougainville and rural areas. The relief campaign, which on the island itself, the complete with- involved the extensive use of helicopter drawal of the Papua New Guinea transport, was effectively orchestrated Defence Force, and the introduction of and implemented by military and civil- a neutral peacekeeping force ian teams from Australia. Even though (National, 22 July 1997). The meeting the effort was able to deliver some 1.2 was hailed as a great success, and in a million kilograms of food to about gesture of goodwill, the Bougainville sixty thousand people, many more Revolutionary Army released five were left hungry. Even when rainfall Defence Force soldiers whom they had resumes, it will take time to restore held captive since September 1996. 454 the contemporary pacific • fall 1998

There had been numerous high-profile ment that would make the truce per- attempts to free the prisoners, involv- manent. They also agreed to restore ing prominent figures such as Sir freedom of movement on the island, Michael Somare and Bougainville and to establish regular dialogue Member of Parliament John Momis. between the security forces, bra Meanwhile, the central government commanders, Resistance Force com- had also been working on a compre- manders, and local leaders. The agree- hensive peace strategy. This initiative ment was endorsed by Skate, who was launched in late January 1997 by described it as an “important step for- Peter Barter, the minister for provincial ward,” and generally welcomed it as and local government affairs in the representing the best prospect for an Chan administration, who was end to the Bougainville crisis so far. By alarmed about the implications of the the end of November, a 260-strong recently approved Sandline proposal. Truce Monitoring Group, which He chaired a committee that brought included soldiers and civilians from together representatives of the key New Zealand, Australia, Fiji, and national agencies involved in Bougain- Vanuatu, had been deployed on Bou- ville. The committee outlined a gainville. The unarmed group, domi- strategy for peace in a detailed docu- nated by New Zealanders, was warmly ment that was eventually adopted by received, and by the end of the year cabinet in the dying days of the Chan there had been no violations of the government, and endorsed by the ceasefire agreement. Skate government in August 1997. The One troubling aspect of the peace work of the Barter committee, and its process as it progressed in 1997 was extensive discussions with interested the nonparticipation of the self-styled parties on Bougainville, did much to president of the Republic of Bougain- rekindle interest in the process by ville, Francis Ona, who had launched which peace might be achieved. It also the secessionist rebellion in the late provided the Skate government with a 1980s. He refused to attend either sound basis for negotiations with the round of talks in New Zealand and rebel factions on Bougainville, which dismissed the resulting agreements, got underway in late September. which he said were destined to fail. These talks were also held at Burn- Ona has consistently maintained that ham, and included delegations from he will not accept anything less than the national government, and the main full independence for Bougainville, and legally recognized authority on the is fully aware that the eventual politi- island, the Bougainville Transitional cal outcome of the present process is Government, as well as the breakaway likely to be some form of autonomy Bougainville Revolutionary Army and for Bougainville within the state of its political wing, the Bougainville Papua New Guinea. Whereas most Interim Government. On 10 October Bougainvilleans, including most bra the Burnham Truce was announced. commanders, now seem willing to The parties agreed to an interim truce compromise their political demands in and to work toward a formal agree- the interest of peace, Ona and his political reviews • melanesia 455 group appear determined to continue May, Ron. 1997. The Military Factor in the struggle. As long as they do, the the Events of March 1997. In Challenging road to a lasting peace is unlikely to be the State: The Sandline Affair in Papua smooth. New Guinea, edited by Sinclair Dinnen, Ron May, and Anthony J Regan, 99–105. terence wesley-smith Canberra: National Centre for Develop- ment Studies and Department of Political THANKS TO Bill Standish for useful and Social Change, Australian National materials. For information on the University. Sandline controversy I have relied heavily on Challenging the State: The The National. Daily. Port Moresby. Sandline Affair in Papua New Guinea, PIM, Pacific Islands Monthly. Suva. edited by Sinclair Dinnen, Ron May, PC, Post-Courier. Daily. Port Moresby. and Anthony Regan, and especially the excellent chronology of events Regan, Anthony J. 1997. Preparation for presented in chapter 2. The appendix War and Progress Towards Peace—Bou- contains a selection of key Sandline gainville Dimensions of the Sandline Affair. documents, including the Project In Challenging the State: The Sandline Affair in Papua New Guinea, edited by Contravene proposal and the Papua Dinnen, May, and Regan, 49–72. New Guinea–Sandline International Agreement. Vulum, Sam. 1998a. Drought in PNG Worsens. PIM, February, 14–16. References ———. 1998b. The Worst Is Yet to Come. PIM, February, 19–20. AFR, Australian Financial Review. Daily. Sydney ———. 1998c. Skate on Thin Ice. PIM, Feb- ruary, 27–28. Field, Michael. 1998. Suffering Worse than Reported. PIM, February, 17–18. Weekend Australian. Weekly. Melbourne.