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446 the Contemporary Pacific • Fall 1998 Papua New Guinea 446 the contemporary pacific • fall 1998 NC, Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes. welcome boost for the peace process in Noumea. Daily. Bougainville, and by the end of the year most of the elements of the so- NH, Les Nouvelles Hebdo. Noumea. Weekly. called Burnham Declaration ham- mered out in New Zealand in July ran, Radio Australia News. English and were in place and yielding positive French. results. Meanwhile, another disaster, this one natural in origin, was gather- ing momentum throughout the coun- try as the worst drought in more than Papua New Guinea a century caused extensive crop fail- By any measure this was an extraordi- ures, putting many rural Papua New nary year in Papua New Guinea, Guineans at risk. where dramatic and often tragic events Government officials and military have become commonplace in recent leaders have long been frustrated by times. The government’s latest attempt their inability to combat the guerrilla to force a military solution to the long- tactics of the Bougainville Revolution- standing Bougainville secessionist ary Army (bra) and acutely conscious crisis, this time with the help of foreign of their dependence on Australia for mercenaries, backfired badly. It precip- military training and equipment. In the itated a constitutional crisis when the face of Canberra’s increasing reluc- Defence Force commander abruptly tance to support the military effort on withdrew his support for the plan and Bougainville, Defence Minister Math- elements of the military moved to ias Ijape began to seek private sources expel the mercenaries. Veteran politi- of military hardware in early 1996. A cian Sir Julius Chan was obliged to foreign business associate, with whom stand down as prime minister, in the he had worked on an earlier plan to face of overwhelming public support establish an elite police unit, put him for the defiant soldiers, and lost his in touch with Tim Spicer, a London- parliamentary seat in the general elec- based director of a military consul- tion later in the year. Unfortunately, tancy company soon to be called Sand- his successor, Bill Skate, did little to line International. In April 1996, Ijape, restore public faith in the badly dis- Secretary for Defence James Melegepa, credited political system. He rose to and Defence Force Commander Jerry power by forming a coalition with the Singirok met in Cairns with Spicer and remnants of the Chan government, another London-based consultant to people whose integrity he had vehe- discuss Papua New Guinea’s military mently attacked in the run up to the needs. Spicer then prepared a proposal general election. Later he was exposed called Project Contravene, which was on secretly recorded videotapes claim- presented to Singirok and Ijape later ing, among other things, to be the the same month. In December, after “godfather” of Port Moresby’s notori- Deputy Prime Minister Chris Haiveta ous raskol gangs. The mercenary became interested in the idea, Spicer debacle did, however, provide a visited Papua New Guinea for further political reviews • melanesia 447 talks and agreed to provide a more missiles, as well as sophisticated night detailed report for a fee of vision and remote-sensing equipment. us$250,000. He delivered the These services, many of which appear expanded report at the end of Decem- to have been subcontracted to a large ber 1996. South Africa–based security company, Project Contravene proposed a Executive Outcomes, would be pro- “high speed covert military operation” vided at a total cost of us$36 million. employing the “precise and surgical The plan appeared seriously flawed. application of combat power” with As Anthony Regan has argued, it two main objectives on the island of showed little understanding of the Bougainville. The first was to “neutral- nature of the crisis on Bougainville and ize” the Bougainville Revolutionary simply assumed that military action Army by silencing its broadcast could and would bring it to an end station, Radio Free Bougainville, and (Regan 1997). The military had not killing or capturing its senior com- succeeded on Bougainville, the report manders, named in the report as implied, partly because of tactical Francis Ona, Joseph Kabui, Sam errors but mainly due to inadequate Kauona, and Ismail Toarama. The training and equipment. More bizarre second objective was to “seize and was the suggestion that Australia and hold” the giant copper and gold mine New Zealand had conspired to pro- at Panguna, closed by the crisis in long the crisis to keep Papua New 1989. The attacks would be preceded Guinea from realizing its full economic by two preparatory phases, one to and regional potential. Nor does it train the Special Forces Unit of the seem likely that the more immediate Papua New Guinea Defence Force military objectives could have been (pngdf) and “a small detachment of achieved as planned. As the Defence resistance fighters” for the operation, Force discovered in August 1994, it is and the other to gather intelligence on relatively easy to seize the Panguna bra locations, and cut off transport mine site, but securing this huge moun- and communications links with neigh- taintop facility and its vast network of boring Solomon Islands. The subse- associated infrastructure against subse- quent contract between the state of quent attack would require an enor- Papua New Guinea and Sandline, mous commitment of security signed at the end of January 1997, personnel and resources. This part of required Sandline to provide the train- the plan could only succeed if earlier ing, gather the necessary intelligence, strategic attacks against the five “key conduct the military operation in con- targets” succeeded in “neutralizing” junction with the Defence Force, and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army. provide unspecified “follow-up opera- It would have been relatively easy to tional support.” It would also supply a destroy the one “hard” target on the package of military hardware featuring Sandline list, the radio transmitter, two Russian-built mi-24 attack heli- although it surely could have been copters and two mi-17 transport heli- rebuilt elsewhere without too much copters, a range of ordinance including trouble. Given the rugged nature of the 448 the contemporary pacific • fall 1998 terrain, and problems distinguishing operation before the current Parlia- bra soldiers from ordinary villagers, it ment dissolved in April. is difficult to imagine how the bra Events moved fast once Chan commanders could have been tracked decided to back the proposal, which down, positively identified, and was endorsed by cabinet on 15 Janu- eliminated through some “surgical” ary. Despite serious concerns raised by application of “combat power.” the officials who reviewed Spicer’s Even if all of these individuals were draft contract, the agreement was removed, surgically or otherwise, executed two weeks later and us$18 other disenchanted Bougainvilleans million (fifty percent of the contract might well emerge to continue the price) transferred to Sandline. By mid- struggle. February, just a month after cabinet The small group of senior Papua approved the operation, some seventy New Guinea officials involved in the foreign mercenaries were training with Sandline deal may have been aware of the Special Forces Unit in Wewak. these problems, but hoped that the However, by the end of March the military operation (codenamed Oyster) mercenaries were gone, Operation would at least force bra leaders to the Oyster had been abandoned, and negotiating table. The key player was, Papua New Guinea was reeling from of course, Prime Minister Chan, who its worst political crisis since indepen- initially rejected Sandline’s proposal in dence in 1975. September 1996, but apparently Initial public reaction to news of the changed his mind after meeting with Sandline deal, which first broke on 22 Spicer in January 1997. Chan was February, was relatively subdued. extremely eager to resolve the Bou- Although some Papua New Guinean gainville crisis, having seen numerous politicians and community groups military and political initiatives yield a were quick to voice their opposition, series of humiliating setbacks and the loudest protests came from govern- defeats. He was also acutely aware ment and media sources in Australia, that, if not resolved, the issue could with Prime Minister John Howard jeopardize plans to consolidate his declaring that the use of mercenaries political position in the upcoming was completely unacceptable. At first general elections. Chan may well have Chan attempted to downplay the sig- been impressed by Spicer’s military nificance of the contract, claiming that credentials and “can-do” attitude, Sandline employees were merely pro- especially after years of dealing with viding training services and would not an unwieldy military establishment at be deployed on Bougainville. Austra- home and unsympathetic officials in lia, he complained, was meddling in Australia. Certainly, Spicer’s proposal Papua New Guinea’s domestic affairs, was pitched to appeal to these con- a claim that received support from cerns, attributing a negative role to prominent opposition leaders. But Australia, emphasizing the “immense” domestic pressures proved to be political rewards that victory would Chan’s undoing. On 16 March, bring, and promising to complete the Defence Force personnel under the political reviews • melanesia 449 command of Major Walter Enuma sionalism of the permanent Defence launched Rausim Kwik, an operation Force. Fourth, the actions and motives designed to round up and expel the of the three key government ministers Sandline mercenaries. The following in the Sandline affair were highly ques- day Defence Force Commander Briga- tionable. According to Singirok, they dier General Singirok went on national wanted to reopen the Panguna mine radio to explain his opposition to the regardless of the human costs of doing Sandline contract, report the detention so, and may have been benefiting of the mercenaries, and call for the financially from the Sandline deal. resignation of Prime Minister Chan, There is no doubt that Singirok was Deputy Prime Minister Haiveta, and concerned about the devastating Defence Minister Ijape.
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