Pre-Electoral Coalitions and the Political Economy of Democratic Consolidation in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Some Critical Reflecti

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Pre-Electoral Coalitions and the Political Economy of Democratic Consolidation in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Some Critical Reflections for The Democratic Alliance (TDA) Michael Mugisha3, Yusuf Kiranda4 and Nele Krueger constrained financing sources, such Abstract as support from foreign donors. The findings of this study raise important The question of pre-electoral coalitions lessons for those exploring the remains salient in the discussion possibilities of establishing cohesive of democracy and development, and stable opposition coalitions in particularly so in emerging states. countries like Uganda. This paper examines why opposition coalitions succeed in some contexts 1. Introduction and not in others. It builds on At the time of writing, a major Arriola’s (2013) work to reinforce opposition coalition was at its the proposition that the existence formative stage, and there is evidence of an independent business class to point to its failure, as illuminated is a critical enabler for the political by the inability of the coalition to opposition to access financial choose a joint presidential candidate capital, and the building of the in preparation for Uganda’s 2016 social networks needed to facilitate general elections. This was largely bargaining, as well as the formation the driving force behind its formation. and sustenance of a cohesive pre- The Democratic Alliance (TDA) – as it electoral coalition. However, the has been named – attempts to unify paper underscores that the extent opposition political parties, activists to which financial liberalisation will and pressure groups to present a joint positively affect the development challenge to Uganda’s incumbent of an autonomous political-oriented president, Yoweri Museveni, and business community depends on the his party, the National Resistance existence of a local capitalist class Movement (NRM) in the next polls prior to liberalisation. Countries that planned for February 2016. lacked a domestic capitalist class preceding financial liberalisation After a series of private meetings only enhanced the entry of typically between aspiring presidential apolitical foreign firms following candidates, party leaders and the liberalisation. Yet, the existence of TDA summit held in September a local capitalist class is crucial as 2016, TDA failed to agree on a joint this can be emboldened to support presidential candidate. Prior to that, the opposition in mobilising financial two aspiring presidential candidates capital and managing coordinated – Professor Gilbert Bukenya and electoral strategies. Thus, in the Norbert Mao – who had previously absence of local business support, expressed an interest in running opposition coalitions tend to rely as TDA flag-bearers, pulled out of on largely unguaranteed and often the race, leaving Dr Kiiza Besigye and the Hon. Amama Mbabazi, the 3 Technical Advisor at UNIFOG and Graduate of MSc. Development former Secretary General of the NRM Management at the London School of and now leader of the Go Forward Economics and Political Science. movement, in the race. Eventually, 4 Director of UNIFOG and Graduate of a number of private talks between MSc. Development Management at the two candidates failed to yield a the London School of Economics and Political Science. 9 single candidate, resulting in each liberalisation can be expected to of the candidates running for the have the same effect on business 2016 elections. In the context of development, political alliance and TDA, and drawing from the Kenyan financing of PECs formation, which experiences, this paper attempts might not necessarily be the case. to examine why some coalition Indeed, the fact that many African formations succeed and why others countries have undergone financial fail. liberalisation but also registered varying democratic transition Extant literature has examined the outcomes certainly calls Arriola’s drivers of pre-electoral coalitions, argument into question. Our paper suggesting that institutionally attempts to correct this gap. related factors such as ideological compatibility and election rules, The central argument of this paper to mention only a few, are central is that the extent to which financial to pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) liberalisation fosters the emergence formation.5 However, Ghandi and and growth of the business community Reuter (2011) examine whether in a way that positively contributes these determinants have the to effective coalition bargaining and same effect on PECs formation formation, depends in large part on in both established democracies the nature of the capitalist class and authoritarian contexts. Their prior to liberalisation. In countries results are striking. They show that where a modicum of a capitalist because conditions in established class existed prior to liberalisation, democracies fundamentally deregulating the financial sector differ from those in authoritarian fostered the emergence of a well- environments, institutional factors diversified business community with tend to have modest effects on PECs linkages and significant ‘exit options’ in the latter. Their analysis supports within and outside the country, a conclusion that only party stability unencumbered by state control. and election repression tend to In this context, such a financially influence parties to form pre-election independent and emboldened coalitions in authoritarian contexts. business community finds it easier Arriola (2013) has pushed the debate to back the opposition in coalition further by examining what explains bargaining and formation as a way PECs formation and success in multi- of hedging their bets for acquiring ethnic authoritarian environments. favours or financial concessions, She underscores the importance depending on whichever government of business financing of opposition might win the election. On the parties and attributes this feat to other hand, countries where a local financial liberalisation. capitalist class was poorly or weakly developed prior to liberalisation, This paper supports the proposition financial liberalisation only that the existence of an independent facilitated the entry of foreign firms business class is a critical enabler within the local economy. In the long for the political opposition to run, the business community that access the financial capital and emerged is one dominated by foreign social networks needed to facilitate corporations often concentrated in bargaining as well as the formation only a few specific areas, such as and sustenance of a cohesive pre- extraction and telecommunication electoral coalition. However, we services, and with special ties with find the assumption underpinning the governing elites. This ‘unholy’ Arriola’s main argument somewhat alliance between the business problematic. It assumes that financial community and the governing 5 3. Wahman 2011; Golder 2005. 10 elites hinders the latter from Budge and Laver (1986) find these directly engaging in local politics. two motivations inextricably bound. As a result, their interest in local They show that office-seeking political processes extends only can be an ‘end and a means to an as far as the processes affect their end’. In the first place, office may investments within the country. be valued intrinsically in and for In this context, the opposition is itself because of particular payoffs significantly constrained because of that come with holding office its inability to mobilise the support such as prestige, power, financial of the most critical constituency – resources, and public limelight; and the business community. This often in the second place, office may be precludes opposition parties from valued only ‘instrumentally’ for the forming cohesive coalitions with ability it gives to influence policy the ability to secure cross-ethnic outputs.7 Specifically, membership endorsements. Thus, the propensity of government provides two different towards consolidating and deepening methods of influencing public policy: democratic transitions in such First, cabinet portfolios offer votes contexts is often minimal. in cabinet meetings and thus the opportunity to influence cabinet The rest of the paper is structured decisions; and second, all portfolios as follows: Section 2 examines why offer administrative control over opposition parties form pre-electoral government departments, with coalitions; Section 3. reviews the the wide range of opportunities to literature on standard explanations influence policy that this confers.8 of coalition formation; Section 4 examines the incentives of electoral Therefore, the extent to which coordination in both democracies coalition bargaining and the and authoritarian contexts, while subsequent formation are shaped by Section 5 reviews Arriola’s argument policy negotiation rather than a fair and advances a different theoretical distribution of office portfolios or vice approach. Sections 6 and 7 present versa depends to a large degree on analyses of Kenya and Cameroon the nature of political systems and, PECs experiences with important specifically, the power that voters lessons for TDA, which is discussed have to influence the behaviour of in Section 8. Section 9 concludes the political agents. Rational choice paper. theories portray voters as principally interested in policy maximisation, 2. Why do opposition parties while politicians as entrepreneurs form pre-electoral coalitions? that are primarily dealing in policies Theoretical literature claims in order to win votes and attain 9 that opposition parties engage in office. However, this is seldom as coalition formation primarily in straightforward as often portrayed order to get into government. Two by rational choice theorists. Arriola main motivations underlie this (2013), for instance, has shown that grand objective: first, to acquire in patronage-based political systems, office because there are specific the voting behaviour of voters is often distributional payoffs that come swayed by politicians who are willing 10 with holding a cabinet position; and and able to extend specific gifts. second, to influence the public policy Thus, from this context, voters’ decision-making process.6 However, interest in coalition formation may whichever motivation dominates not necessarily be shaped by policy coalition bargaining and formation representation but perhaps by how processes has remained a matter of 7 Budge & Laver 1986. contested discussion. 8 Ibid. 9 Carroll & Cox 2007. 6 Debus 2009. 10 Arriola 2013.. 11 the expected coalition alliance will are unwilling to compete with the effectively distribute patronage to opposition on a level playing field? different regional voting blocs. But even where voters’ behaviour has Several reasons feature in political a strong inclination towards policy science literature. Theorists have processes, as perhaps the case may argued that these regimes may be in most advanced industrial hold elections to enhance their democracies, owing to information legitimacy, curry favour with the asymmetries between voters and international community, gather politicians directly involved in information on supporters and coalition negotiations, Carroll and opponents, demonstrate their Cox (2007) show that politicians dominance, or assuage and co-opt 13. may adeptly sacrifice office portfolios domestic opponents. In the light in order to achieve greater policy of these arguments, one may ask: dominance in specific areas, or may To what extent is opposition parties’ sacrifice policy influence in order to behaviour in authoritarian elections achieve more office portfolios.11 driven by institutional factors that motivate parties competing in Therefore, the incentives that democratic contests? What factors structure the behaviour of political are unique to authoritarian elections actors in coalition bargaining and and how do they influence the formation depend on a complex behaviour of opposition parties? combination of many determining variables, including how voters Electoral coordination among influence politicians’ behaviour, competing parties in authoritarian the nature of party systems and elections is interesting for similar the overall structure of political but somewhat additional reasons as competition. But are incentives for in democratic elections. Legislatures coalition formation the same as in non-democracies are important those that operate in authoritarian institutional arenas in which some environments? groups have access to policy-making and rent-seeking opportunities.14 2.1 Incentives for coordination Thus, we should expect that PECs, to in an authoritarian the extent that they shape electoral context versus established results, will have important effects democracies on who gets what. However, the authoritarian context is very different In 2002, 72 per cent of authoritarian from the democratic context in so regimes held multiparty elections many ways, which may account for within the previous five years. the differences in incentives faced by Despite holding regular elections, political actors in both contexts. these regimes have become skilful in tilting and winning electoral contests Political actors in the authoritarian by relying on a ‘menu of options’ context enter the electoral market that facilitate the manipulation of facing a highly unlevelled field. elections12. These include: fraud, Authoritarian elections involve repression, patronage distribution, incumbents who have fewer limits to control over information and how far they are willing to go to win general abuse of state resources. elections. With the ability to create a From this context, an interesting non-level playing field, authoritarian question, therefore, would be: why incumbents can keep the opposition do authoritarian regimes hold divided. The incumbent may use elections very well knowing that they coercion or the power of the state

11 Carroll & Cox 2007. 13. Ghandi & Reuter 2013.. 12 Wahman 2011. 14 Ibid.

12 to ensure that opposition forces do Another issue that is characteristic not coalesce. In a study by Ghandi of authoritarian elections is and Reuter (2013), for example, it the uncertainty about the is reported that, in Russia, the pro- incumbent’s willingness to cede Kremlin United Russia Party survived power once he loses an election. In several close calls at the hands of democracies, elections are means electoral blocs in regional elections in of ‘institutionalising uncertainty’ in the 2000s. In response, the Kremlin that when an incumbent loses an moved to ban the formation of blocs election he or she will step down from at both the national and regional power.18 However, in authoritarian levels. Subsequent to these changes, elections, there are often great any parties wishing to unite before uncertainties about whether the an election would have to formally incumbent would be willing to step register a new party, a process that is down in the event of electoral defeat, subject to significant legal barriers. especially because ceding involves a regime transition. Also related is the At times, authoritarian leaders fact that an opposition coalition may may resort to co-optation to divide result in an electoral victory which is 15 the opposition. The autocrat may expected to be followed by a regime proffer patronage, perks and offices transition. This implies the stakes of to some members of the opposition an election are high not only for the while denying these benefits to incumbent, but also for opposition others. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, parties. As mentioned earlier, a pre- prominent opposition leader Almaz electoral coalition for a legislative Atambayev was neutralised as election entails an agreement about an opposition figure after being how parties are going to coordinate named prime minister by President their electoral candidates and Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Arriola has campaigns. It may also involve an further substantiated this claim agreement about the governing by arguing that the use of state coalition should the coalition win a ‘carrot-and-stick’ methods was more legislative majority, particularly, who pronounced during the 1960s and within the coalition will receive which 1970s when development was mainly cabinet portfolios.19 As electoral state-driven. This gave autocratic victory and a regime transition seem leaders untrammelled control of more likely, anti-regime parties may financial capital that they effectively be uncertain about how much they used to weaken and stifle any kind can trust their coalition partners 16 of opposition to their rule. In some to honour any deal during or after countries, autocracies have created an election. Ghandi and Reuter state-sanctioned opposition parties (2013:146) observe that: in order to chip votes away from the opposition but remain under ….a coalition member may renege regime control. Ghandi and Reuter on the agreement by sponsoring indicate that in Putin-era Russia, candidates in constituencies the Kremlin created a centre-left where it had promised to parastatal opposition party, Just withdraw in favour of a coalition Russia, which criticises the ruling partner. Alternatively, reneging party but not Putin.17 may happen after an election, 15 Ghandi & Reuter 2013.. such as when a party within a 16 Arriola 2013. pre-electoral coalition refuses to 17 Crucially, the party occupies a left-of- go into government with coalition centre ideological position, drawing members. votes away from the Communist Party but always refusing to cooperate with 18 Ghand & Reuter 2013.. either the communists or the non- 19 Martin & Stevenson 2001; Sened 1996; parliamentary opposition at election Lees 2010; Ghandi & Reuter 2013. time. 13 Mistrust among opposition business community is often parties may be a product of the more emboldened to support the authoritarianism, resulting from opposition in mobilising financial some parties having a chequered capital and managing coordinated past of cooperating with the regime; electoral strategies. Financial capital others are periodically harassed is not only important for financing and banned from competing. patronage by reaching out to notables Also because many authoritarian in various ethnic groups, but also countries have no or little experience allows for building broad cross- of a democratic past, opposition ethnic linkages that may potentially parties often have no experience of enhance social capital, galvanising effectively organising and governing. into a cohesive organisational As a result, many political parties in force that effectively challenges the authoritarian environments are more incumbent for power.21 likely to become what Ghandi and Reuter call the ‘ephemeral vehicles However, evidence has shown that it for advancing personal ambition’, is not true that financial liberalisation leading to high party volatility.20 will necessarily promote the growth of Without a stable past of cooperating a business community that positively 22 and with uncertainty about who contributes to democratisation. their bargaining partners might be The fact that nearly all African in future, parties may find it difficult countries have undergone to form meaningful reputations financial liberalisation but with and future expectations that are fundamentally diverging trajectories conducive to coalition-building. In of opposition party coalition- Putnam’s (1993) terms, the social building outcomes perhaps points capital among political actors within to the need to analyse the context the opposition rank operating in in which financial liberalisation is authoritarian environments is implemented; stated differently, the severely disfigured because of the initial conditions prior to financial conditions characteristic of the liberalisation in this case matter a context in which they operate. This lot. In what follows below, we develop has made it difficult for them to a theoretical framework that builds maintain cohesiveness, a central on Arriola’s work but goes further to element in coalition-building. demonstrate that initial conditions, specifically the nature of the However, Arriola (2013), in her capitalist class in different countries, seminal work, argues that financial may produce varying results in terms liberalisation holds the potential of coalition formation once financial for undermining the ability of liberalisation is undertaken. the incumbents in authoritarian regimes to monopolise financial 3. The political economy of capital, which, in the long run, democratic consolidation allows the opposition to marshal in multi-ethnic societies: A alternative sources of finance theoretical framework required to facilitate campaign Electoral coalitions in multi-ethnic investments. Arriola specifically societies have produced varying argues that financial liberalisation outcomes for two main reasons. fosters the emergence and growth First, PECs essentially represent the of a vibrant business community, coordination of electoral strategies which enables the opposition to among coalition partners, which, develop linkages with the business by definition, invokes coordination fraternity. A financially independent 21 Arriola 2013. 20 Ibid. 22 See Mkandawire & Soludo 1999

14 problems largely resulting from themselves use material inducements high transaction costs of building to secure political loyalty. Oftentimes consensus among ethnically they distribute cash, food or goods competing groups. This scenario is to ensure continuity of that support. particularly more problematic in Incumbents in authoritarian ethnically diverse societies where environments have overcome this political actors tend to exacerbate commitment problem by deploying ethnic divisions as an instrumentally state resources to secure cross-ethnic viable method of circumventing the endorsements that constitute multi- high transaction costs of building ethnic coalitions in most of Africa’s cross-ethnic majorities to win and greenhorn multiparty systems. retain political power.23. Second, Opposition parties, however, are elections are resource-intensive forced to rely on private resources exercises, not least in patronage- to do the same. Arriola has argued based political systems. Therefore, that during the 1960s and 1970s, when securing resources on the when the development paradigm basis of ethnicity becomes the mode was state-led, opposition parties had of structuring political life, following limited capital for financing material Daniel Posner, Arriola suggests inducements to guarantee political that, in coalition bargaining and loyalty. However, as the development formation processes, politicians who paradigm tilted towards market- make promises to share the spoils of oriented approaches beginning in power with members of other ethnic the 1980s, financial liberalisation groups are not likely to be viewed as specifically has enhanced the credible. Thus, a coalition candidate capability of opposition parties to for national office who happens to form multi-ethnic coalitions by be from one ethnic group cannot forcing the incumbents to relinquish be expected to win votes from other the historic state control over capital. ethnic groups through direct appeals. It is thus hypothesised that multi- Cross-ethnic endorsements are ethnic opposition coalitions are costly in patronage-based polities. unlikely to emerge where the state Incumbents in authoritarian regimes continues to serve as a ‘gatekeeper’ often circumvent this obstacle for credit and loans for the business through untrammelled control of class, principally because, as long state resources. Hence, a candidate as the incumbent exercises such who seeks to be a coalition leader or control, the business community will formateur – the candidate of a multi- refrain from funding the opposition. ethnic coalition –must have the This, in turn, means that no financial means to purchase cross- opposition candidate can afford to ethnic endorsements.24 secure cross-ethnic endorsements.25 Prospective coalition partners expect On the other hand, multi-ethnic to be compensated for delivering opposition coalitions should be more their co-ethnic votes because they likely to form under conditions of financial liberalisation because an 23. Conde (2015)’s dissertation submitted autonomous business class is more to the Department of International emboldened to extend support to the Development at the London School of Economics and Political Science, opposition without fear of reprisal. demonstrates how ethnic division The access to campaign resources among ethnically diverse communities among the opposition influences has been instrumentally used in the extent to which a would- Guinea, by both democrats and be formateur can overcome the autocrats, to circumvent the high transaction cost of building cross-ethnic commitment problems inherent in majorities to acquire and retain power. 24 Arriola 2013.. 25 Ibid. 15 coalition bargaining. However, if the While we may not dispute Arriola’s business community refrains from theory of financial liberalisation and funding the opposition coalition, its salient implications for coalition negotiations among the opposition bargaining and formation, one are limited to promises about post- central question can be asked: Why electoral payoffs.26 has financial liberalisation, that was foisted upon many Africans countries The would-be formateur can offer since 1980s, not generated similar power-sharing promises in exchange outcomes in opposition coalition for other political endorsements, bargaining and formation as nicely which involve standing down illustrated in Arriola’s work? That of from election and delivering their course is not to deny the impact that co-ethnic votes. These promises the liberalisation of the financial might include the vice presidency, sector can potentially have in a number of cabinet seats, or fostering the growth and development control of specific government of the business community and its ministries. Thus, a financially attendant effects on democratisation. constrained opposition formateur But rather it is to inquire why faces a commitment problem in this financial liberalisation facilitates the respect: her prospective coalition deepening of democratic governance partner knows that the formateur in some contexts and not others. has no means of enforcing those power-sharing promises once she is We build on Arriola’s work, but at installed in office. A politician might the same time subtly depart from find that she receives less than it by arguing that the extent to what was promised or nothing at all which financial liberalisation fosters despite having rallied her co-ethnics the emergence and growth of the in support of the formateur. This, business community in a way that therefore, poses a considerable risk positively contributes to effective for a politician whose own leadership coalition bargaining and formation, position depends on her ability to depends in large part on the nature deliver resources to her constituents. of the capitalist class prior to She may well prefer to withhold her liberalisation. In countries where a endorsement and compete for office modicum of a capitalist class existed independently.27 prior to liberalisation, deregulating the financial sector frees up the On the other hand, when the economic space, thus enhancing the opposition can secure campaign growth and expansion of the local funding from the business capitalist class. In the long run, community, a formateur can make the emergence of a well-diversified power-sharing promises as well business community with linkages as promise to undertake the costs and significant ‘exit options’ within associated with mobilising their co- and outside the country tends to ethnics. Thus business is central break the dependence of the business to this rendering of opposition community on the state for business coalition bargaining, not because contracts etc. Thus, in this context, it is inherently democratic, but a financially independent and because it seeks to protect its own emboldened business community, interests. Bankrolling the formation as Arriola suggests, will find it easier of a multi-ethnic opposition coalition to back the opposition in coalition enables business to demand favours bargaining and formation as a way or concessions from whichever side of hedging their bets for acquiring 28 wins the next election. favours or financial concessions, 26 Ibid. depending on whichever government 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 16 might win the election. Therefore, the on who would become the coalition inclusion of the business community candidate. However, in the 2002 in opposition coalition bargaining general election, the National processes significantly reduces Rainbow Alliance (NARC) – an the commitment problem involved opposition coalition – was formed in the distribution of patronage and defeated, the Kenyan African to key notables of various ethnic National Union (KANU) and won groups, in the end increasing the 13.3. parliamentary seats out of chances of garnering cross-ethnic 222, becoming the nation’s ruling endorsements. party.29 At the same time, Uhuru Kenyatta, KANU’s candidate for the On the other hand, for countries presidential election who had been where a local capitalist class named to succeed then president was poorly or weakly developed Daniel Arap Moi (Kenya’s second prior to liberalisation, financial president), lost to NARC’s candidate, liberalisation only facilitates the Mwai Kibaki. entry of foreign firms within the local economy. In the long run, the 4.1 The origins of opposition business community that emerges coalition politics in Kenya is one that is dominated by foreign corporations often concentrated in Following the restoration of the only a few specific areas, such as multiparty system in the 1990s, extraction and telecommunication Forum for Restoration of Democracy services, and with special ties with (FORD) – a cradle of Kenya’s the governing elites. This ‘unholy’ democracy – was formed and alliance between the foreign- provided the basis for the emergence dominated business community of the first opposition party. FORD and the governing elites hinders the enjoyed widespread support across latter from directly engaging in local the nation except only in Moi’s home politics. As a result, their interest in district and the region surrounding 3.0 local political processes extends only that district. However, within a as far as the processes affect their short time following its formation, investments within the country. FORD failed to agree on a candidate In this context, the opposition is to nominate for the presidential significantly constrained because of election. This forced it to splinter its inability to mobilise the support into two parties: FORD-Kenya and of the most critical constituency – FORD-Asili. Most of the executive the business community. This often members of FORD-Kenya were precludes opposition parties from ethnic Luos and Luhyas from forming cohesive coalitions with Nyanza and western provinces. By the ability to secure cross-ethnic contrast the executives of FORD- endorsements. Thus, the propensity Asili were predominantly ethnic towards consolidating and deepening Kikuyus, mainly from the southern democratic transitions in such part of central province. At the same contexts is often minimal. time, Kibaki, a former vice president and finance minister in the KANU 4. Case study: Opposition government, quit government and coalition formation in Kenya, formed the Democratic Party of 1991-2002 Kenya (DP), drawing the core support of wealthy businesspersons and Kenyan politicians had considered well-off farmers, mainly from Nairobi the possibility of forming a multi- and the northern part of central ethnic coalition in the run-up to province. Including Kibaki, who was the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections but they often disagreed 29 Tsuda 2010 3.0 Ibid 17 the chairperson of the DP, the party Kibaki as its sole candidate in the executives consisted of Kikuyus, presidential elections, but also Embus, and the Merus from the eventually succeeded in nominating northern part of central province parliamentary candidates of affiliated and the neighbouring districts of parties as NARC candidates in most eastern province. This gave the DP of the constituencies.3.2 The result an identity as a regional party.3.1 was a massive victory won by NARC and by Kibaki as the new president In the seventh general election held in of Kenya, bringing an end to the Moi 1992, three regional parties (FORD- era and ushering in a new dawn of Kenya, FORD-Asili and DP) that had peaceful democratic transitions. So, split from the main parties (FORD and why did the NARC coalition succeed KANU) ended up contesting against and yet earlier attempts had failed? KANU as opposition parties. The views of the opposition parties were 4.2 Going deeper to understand united in that all of them demanded the structural explanations democratisation. However, since the of NARC’s success opposition was divided into several parties, the vote in the elections NARC owes its success in large part was split. As a result, Moi was re- to the emergence of a strong local elected as president albeit receiving business community that resulted only 40 per cent of the vote. A from the a combination of policies similar event would be repeated undertaken by the earlier post- 3.3. in the eighth general elections as independence government, and the fragmentation of the opposition later financial liberalisation reforms parties further deepened. In the foisted upon Moi’s government in the parliamentary elections of 1997, the 1990s by the international financial 3.4 DP, FORD-Kenya and other small institutions (IFIs). Kenya’s colonial opposition parties each won from government had established a settler one to 41 seats respectively – which economy by forcefully expropriating constituted 40 per cent of the 210 over three million hectares of land seats). They again failed to bring to from Kikuyus, more than half of an end the KANU-Moi regime; KANU which was arable land sustainable 3.5 won 113. seats of the 210 seats or for cash crop farming. In the run- slightly over 50 per cent of the total. up to independence, the outbreak Receiving less than 40 per cent of the Mau Mau rebellion in the late of the presidential vote, Moi was 1940s and the subsequent state of again re-elected into office. In fact, emergency in 1952 clearly illuminated Tsuda (2010) suggests that had the centrality of the land question, the opposition parties united, they causing panic among white settlers. would have won. The economic decline that had begun to take effect forced the colonial Lessons of the experience of two government to concede to African general elections had been properly demands and begin implementing taken by the opposition parties. land resettlement programmes. In October 2002, NARC was Although the general mood among formed. It started as an umbrella the some post-independence elites organisation bringing together most was in favour of reinstating the land of the then major opposition parties, system prior to colonisation, unlike including mainly the DP, FORD- many other African governments, Kenya and a large proportion of the Kenyan post-independence ex-KANU MPs. Forming a coalition 3.2 Elischer 2008. for the ninth general elections, 3.3. Karuti 2009. NARC not only agreed to nominate 3.4 Arriola 2013.. 3.5 Karuti 2009; Swainson 1980. 3.1 Ibid. 18 government chose to prioritise community and Moi’s regime. In maintaining a stable economy and the immediate years following fostering a unitary government. liberalisation, Moi sought to retain Consequently, the government the support of Kikuyu entrepreneurs undertook land settlement measures because they were the most likely that particularly involved moving financiers of his strongest rival, Kikuyus off European farms. Though Mwai Kibaki, an ethnic Kikuyu and this move was very unpopular, it laid a former vice president and minister the foundation for the preservation of finance. It is reported that Moi of the local bourgeoisie that built personally contacted entrepreneurs in the resilience mechanisms for he suspected of providing funds Kenya’s economy throughout the to the opposition and persuaded 1970s and 1980s.3.6 them to make contributions to his campaign fund instead. Moi did However, a series of international not have to issue direct threats shocks pummelled Kenya’s economy, since these entrepreneurs assumed including falling commodity prices their businesses would suffer for coffee and tea exports, that by reprisals once they were found to be the 1990s Moi’s regime had grown contributors to the opposition. This to depend on external support for fear explains why several Kikuyu 3.7 45 per cent of its operating budget. entrepreneurs chose to participate But with priorities shifting at the in the Central Province Development end of the Cold War, Kenya’s donors Support Group (CPDSG), which chose to suspend their aid in 1991, coordinated Kikuyu elites on behalf when Moi slowed down progress of Moi’s re-election campaign in the on political and economic reforms. 1997 presidential election.3.9 Moi was eventually compelled by the IFIs to pursue financial However, with time, several liberalisation, although he resisted entrepreneurs became willing to efforts to dismantle the instruments publicly defect from the ruling that sustained his patronage-based party in support of the opposition. regime. Important multiple trends such as the continuous growth of privately Beginning in 1993. and continuing owned banks, the increasing over the next several years, a liberalisation of capital and number of reforms progressively credit, and the privatisation of the diminished Moi’s government country’s largest bank in 1998, influence over capital: interest rates were a reflection of Moi’s diminished were deregulated; foreign exchange capacity to exact financial reprisals. controls were eliminated; a flexible It was in this context that Kibaki, exchange rate was adopted; and who would become the coalition credit controls were removed. The candidate, expanded his pool government also began to divest of donors. A decade of financial itself of equity holdings in two of liberalisation had sufficiently the country’s largest commercial emboldened business entrepreneurs 3.8 banks. to publicly support Kibaki’s bid for Financial reforms created the president. Particularly, a Council environment that unleashed of Elders, as Kibaki’s close circle of the growth of the local business donors was named, included some 40 community and eventually changed 20 prominent businessmen. the relationship between the business This group was chaired by Joseph 3.6 Ibid. Wanjui, who had been a member 3.7 Arriola 2013. 3.8 O’Brien & Ryan 2000; World Bank 3.9 Arriola 2013.. 2003.. 40 Ibid. 19 of the CPSDG when it supported leading to the formation of a multi- Moi in 1997, and included other ethnic opposition coalition around former CPDSG members such Kibaki’s candidacy, Wamalwa had as Macharia and Kirubi.41 These sought to capitalise on latent anti- entrepreneurs did not simply raise Kikuyu sentiments by threatening funds for Kibaki’s campaign within to pull out of any coalition if Kibaki the broader business community; were selected as its candidate. they also acted as de facto campaign Wamalwa’s support for Kibaki’s advisors who developed the financial candidacy was secured only after he strategy required to reach out to was compensated upfront. In fact, politicians from other ethnic groups. individuals who represented both They also directly participated in sides in the coalition negotiations publicly brokering endorsements for confirmed that, though the promise Kibaki’s candidacy, crisscrossing the of vice presidency had already been country to secure the support of local extended, the bargain was sealed only notables as well as rival candidates once a monetary payment was used from other ethnic groups.42 to supplement the power-sharing promise. Wamalwa eventually agreed 4.3 Opposition bargaining: to Kibaki’s presidency in exchange Overcoming the commitment for the vice presidency and payment problem of a large enough sum of money to Negotiations for the formation of a settle outstanding debts associated 44 multi-ethnic coalition started shortly with his previous presidential bid. before the 2002 general elections What is important to note is that involving mainly Kibaki, Michael Kibaki did not merely seek Wamalwa’s Kijana Wamalwa and Charity withdrawal from the presidential Ngilu, all actors that had competed race; rather he also needed Wamalwa separately in the 1997 presidential to actively participate in the coalition elections against Moi. The multi- and convince his co-ethnic Luhya, ethnic opposition coalition that was one of Kenya’s largest constituencies built around Kibaki’s candidacy was (see Table 1), to support Kibaki’s announced a month before a faction candidacy. And Wamalwa did so. known as the Rainbow Alliance At a mass rally in Kakamega, the defected from the ruling party on 18 largest city in Luhyaland, Wamalwa October 2002. The members of the symbolically recognised Kibaki as an Rainbow Alliance were later joined by elder of the Luhya community and Kibaki to form an expanded coalition endorsed him as the best candidate 43. known as the NARC. for advancing their community The financing provided by the interests. As a result, three-quarters Kenyan business community of the votes cast by Wamalwa’s co- during the 2002 election campaign ethnics would subsequently go to enabled Kibaki to secure cross- Kibaki, enabling Kibaki, in 2002, to ethnic endorsements. For example, bring about Kenya’s first democratic 45 Kibaki’s negotiations with Wamalwa, transition. an ethnic Luhya who eventually became his vice-presidential 44 Ibid. nominee, illustrates the importance 45 Ibid. of such payments. In the months

41 Samuel Macharia was the owner of the country’s largest private radio network and Kirubi is a prominent businessman. 42 Arriola 2013.. 43. Ibid.

20 Table 1: Ethnic composition of Kenya

Ethnic group Percentage share of total population Kikuyu 21 Luhya 14 Luo 12 Kalenjin 12 Kamba 11 Kisii 6 Meru 5 Mijikenda 5 Maasai 2 Other/small communities 12 Source: Elischer 2008:10

5. Case study: Opposition constituencies. However, CRRN coalition formation in failed to agree on the selection of its Cameroon, 1991-2004 coalition candidate owing to severe disagreements between Fru Ndi and In the 1990s, an economic crisis, Ndam Njoya over the leadership of particularly the pummelling of the coalition.48 Subsequently Fru Ndi credit provision in Cameroon, led withdrew from the coalition, causing to the implementation of structural fragmentation of the coalition, which adjustment programmes prescribed largely accounted for their defeat by by the IFIs, which also coincided with president Biya. So, why was there the country’s transition to multiparty disagreement between Fru Ndi and politics.46 President Paul Biya Ndam Njoya over the choice of the had ruled the country since 1984 coalition candidate and the eventual when the first post-independence collapse of the coalition? president, Ahmadou Ahidjo willingly stepped down from power. He 5.1 Accounting for CRRN failure had ruled the country as a single- party state that significantly stifled The opposition parties failed to any opposition to his reign. In the effectively mobilise the business 1990s, the transition to multiparty community to back their campaign. politics encouraged the formation This is because the business of an opposition coalition intended community was weak and to dislodge Biya’s unyielding hold fragmented, and largely dependent onto to power. Specifically, the on the state for its access to finance formation of the Coalition pour la and trade.49 This structure of Reconciliation et la Reconstruction Cameroon’s business had its roots Nationale (CRRN) in the run-up in the colonial establishment of to the 2004 general elections was her economy and the subsequent seen as a progressive step towards policies implemented by the embracing democratic rule in post-independence government. Cameroon.47 CRRN was a proto- Cameroon had been created as a coalition between John Fru Ndi and plantation economy by the French and Adamou Ndam Njoya, both opposition the British, who controlled the north politicians who represented different and south respectively. Parastatals 46 Konings 1996. 48 Ibid. 47 Arriola 2013.. 49 Ibid.

21 and plantations were established to and economic reforms. But soon, the facilitate the production and export business community abandoned the of the then Cameroonian lucrative opposition once Biya’s regime proved agricultural commodities, mainly capable of withstanding several cocoa, tea, coffee, bananas and palm months of revenue losses.54 oil.50 The predominant French role in the national economy was clearly Biya’s regime continued to act as indicated by the import-export a financial gatekeeper vis-à-vis statistics; in 1961, France accounted business throughout the 1990s. for 59 per cent of Cameroon’s A former resident representative exports and 55 per cent of its of the IMF would note that by the imports, all under state control.51 mid-decade Cameroon’s finance The post-independence Cameroon minister still exercised ‘effective and government maintained control real authority’ in the allocation of over this lucrative international credit. Any representative seeking trade and resources in order to a commercial loan would have to generate revenues to finance its interact with a financial institution expanded bureaucracy. Moreover, directly or indirectly controlled by the agreement of cooperation signed the regime.55 between France and Cameroon before independence ensured the 5.2 Opposition and possible extension of France’s dominance in business alliance: Their the domestic and foreign policies Achilles heel of Cameroon. The control over the The unyielding government control bulk of oil revenue further enhanced over finance, coupled with historical the capacity of the government to weaknesses of the business undermine the emergence of an class, ensured that the business autonomous capitalist class.52 community was strongly allied to Biya. Entrepreneurs from the In the 1990s, after experiencing a Bamileke ethnic group, those who series of economic crises, Biya’s dominated commerce in Cameroon, regime agreed to implement understood that they could not structural adjustment programmes remain in business without reaching involving the removal of controls over an understanding with the regime, financial capital and exchange rates, especially as their financing options as well as divesting of the country’s narrowed in the 1990s. The business inefficient parastatals. However, oil community’s alliance with Biya was rents, coupled with French support, reflected in the number of Bamileke enabled Biya’s regime to maintain entrepreneurs serving as ruling control over capital and effectively party candidates. It represented stave off liberalising reforms despite a departure for a business mounting pressure from external and community that long eschewed 53. domestic sources. For instance, four electoral politics.56 In fact, with the agreements negotiated with the IMF return to multipartism, prominent between 1988 and 1996 were never business entrepreneurs entered implemented despite deteriorating politics as ruling party candidates economic conditions. Biya’s regime in constituencies that had become refused to yield even in 1991 when opposition bastions. For example the business community joined the Defosso, who had been previously pro-democracy forces in a national punished; Andre Sohaing, president economic boycott to demand political of the Groupement des Importateurs 50 Konings 1996. 51 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 52 Atangana 1997. 55 Ibid. 53. Arriola 2013.. 56 Ngayap 1983; Arriola 2013.

22 Camerounais; Pierre Tchanque, a because he could raise funds among long-time president of the national the Cameroonian diaspora. He left chamber of commerce, all became for France to meet with diaspora ruling party mayors.57 representatives almost immediately after being revealed as the CRRN Thus, the constraints on the local candidate. The CRRN, which business community, particularly potentially would have become the politicisation of finance, Cameroon’s first multi-ethnic contributed to the failure to organise opposition coalition, ultimately a cohesive multi-ethnic opposition fragmented when Fru Ndi chose to coalition in the run-up to Cameroon’s withdraw rather than endorse Ndam 2004 presidential election. Although Njoya, even after being promised a two prominent opposition leaders, cabinet position of his choice. Fru Fru Ndi and Ndam Njoya, managed Ndi’s departure was followed by to forge an opposition coalition that others who claimed that Ndam Njoya would present a viable electoral lacked the resources to compensate strategy to challenge Biya, these for their support.59 politicians could not afford to secure cross-ethnic endorsements 6. Lessons from Cameroon and without the support of the business Kenya and their implications community. According to the for The Democratic Alliance representatives who participated (TDA) in the CRRN negotiations, neither 6.1 Origin and structure of TDA of the opposition candidates had sufficient resources to impose On 10 June 2015, a coalition was himself as a coalition candidate. announced by opposition parties, Fru Ndi, who some analysts believe pressure groups and political defeated Biya in the possibly activists to build a united front rigged 1992 election, could find no against the NRM under president prominent business supporters for Museveni in the run-up to the 2016 his candidacy. As a result, he not general elections. The Democratic only had a difficult time holding his Alliance (TDA) tries to unify pro- own party together, but also could democratic forces in Uganda under not afford the payments necessary to one organisation to achieve political secure the endorsements of others, change. which were expected in the course of negotiations.58 The main agreement about coalition- building was made in April 2015. Two Consequently, opposition leaders months later, leaders of opposition agreed to leave the selection of a parties – the Forum for Democratic coalition candidate to a committee Change (FDC), the Democratic of CRRN members, since none had Party (DP), the Conservative Party the resources to act as a coalition (CP), the Justice Forum (Jeema), candidate. But in this context, Fru the Uganda Federal Alliance (UFA), Ndi, the once presumed leader of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) the opposition, failed to become and former vice-president, Professor the coalition flag-bearer, in part Gilbert Bukenya – officially signed because his partners concluded he the Protocol of The Democratic 60 could not raise the funds needed to Alliance. They agreed on the goal sustain a national campaign. The ‘to win power and form government CRRB instead chose Ndam Njoya, 59 Ibid. a member of an ethnic minority, 60 Online available: http://de.scribd. 57 Arriola 2013.. com/doc/27529963.1/The-Democratic- 58 Ibid. Alliance-Protocol.

23 in order to build a Uganda where budget, promotes the ideas of TDA there is equal opportunity and and do research on relevant fields. shared prosperity for all citizens.’61 The head of the Secretariat is the To achieve this goal, TDA is willing Chief Executive Officer.65One of the to mobilise its capacities among all most important organs that are members, to design a mutual policy anticipated to be established after agenda, to field candidates for all winning power is the Transitional electoral positions and the electoral Government of National Unity offices and to promote electoral (TGNU). During the transition reforms.62 period, the TGNU will implement electoral, political and economic The main governance organs which reforms and fight corruption. The rule TDA are the Summit, the National president under the TGNU will be Candidates Committee (NCC) and limited to serve in this position for the Secretariat. The Summit is the only five years.66 highest decision-making organ and, therefore, responsible for 6.2 Policies of TDA policy agenda-setting, the financial There are no clear policies TDA resources of TDA, admitting new members have agreed on yet, except members, settling conflicts between the electoral reform proposals which TDA members, and facilitating and are laid down in Annexes 1 and 2 coordinating processes for selecting of the Protocol of The Democratic a joint presidential candidate. In Alliance and the will to overcome order to ensure efficient realisation the old government. But even on of its tasks, the Summit established the issue of electoral reforms the a Campaign Strategy and members did not find a final solution. Coordination Committee, a Finance The majority of the members believe and Fundraising Committee, a that they should participate in the Legal Affairs Committee and a 2016 elections even though they are Dispute Resolution Committee. The unable to enforce electoral reforms. Summit comprises representatives Others, especially the FDC flag- of the political parties and the bearer in the 2016 presidential pressure groups and eminent elections, Dr Kiiza Besigye, are of Ugandan men and women. Two the opinion that elections without co-chairpersons are elected by the reforms are worthless. Their thinking Summit by consensus.63.The NCC advances the view that attaining is responsible for coordinating the joint candidates for the upcoming identification of joint candidates at elections contradicts the agreement all levels. Members of the NCC are to enforce electoral reforms.67 Thus, the Secretaries of Mobilisation of the it is likely to be difficult to build a parties. Five experts, six eminent strong policy agenda when there is Ugandan men and women and six disagreement on the main strategy youth representatives approved by of TDA. the Summit are part of the committee 64 as well. 6.3 Internal problems and selection of joint candidates All administrative and coordination tasks fall under the responsibility of TDA, in its formation, confronted the National Secretariat. It organises a serious challenge of internal meetings, plans events, prepares fragmentation stemming partly from documentation and the annual 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 67 Online available: http://www.observer. 62 Ibid. ug/news-headlines/3.83.09-will- 63. Ibid. opposition-coalition-deliver. 64 Ibid. 24 ideological differences, and at times presidential candidate. The selection on a number of personal issues. criteria for a joint candidate are laid For instance, many TDA member out in Article X of the Protocol of representatives could not reach a The Democratic Alliance. The NCC consensus on electoral reforms. One is responsible for ensuring a fair group, led by Dr Kiiza Besigye argued and transparent selection process. that without electoral reforms, it All parties and individuals should would be useless to participate be given the same chance to be in elections and thus they should recognised as a joint candidate.69 be boycotted; others insisted that The selection of a JPC is coordinated participation in elections was the by the NCC. In the TDA road map citizen’s constitutional right and, for the selection of joint candidates, therefore, argued that they should the nomination phase should have not be seen to be dissuading citizens been ended on 5 September, but the from participating in elections. nomination deadline was extended Other problems that erupted several times. pertained to the admission of Elias Lukwago, leader of the DP’s splinter One of the reasons for extending group, to the membership of TDA. the nomination deadline could Particularly, DP president Norbert have been that there was only Mao was not willing to accept the Professor Gilbert Bukenya, who membership of Lukwago’s group had been nominated.70 Another and threatened to walk out of TDA reason might be that the former if the Summit decided to accept prime minister, Amama Mbabazi – Lukwago’s request. The conflict not a member of TDA at that time between Mao and Lukwago has – asked the Summit for more time to had a direct impact on the internal deploy his supporters before joining condition of TDA. On the one hand, TDA. One day after the deadline, TDA needs the support of the DP Mbabazi was finally nominated to while, on the other hand, the alliance contest the JPC under TDA, which is open to all parties and pressure many claimed contradicted the groups promoting democracy and rules. Besides, Professor Bukenya good governance. Owing to more (independent) and the Hon. Amama urgent problems, such as agreeing Mababazi (Go Forward pressure on a joint presidential candidate group representative), Nobert Mao (JPC) and finding ways out of the (DP president) and Dr Kiiza Besigye crisis, the membership of Lukwago’s (FDC presidential flag-bearer) had group was not the subject of further ambitions to be the JPC for TDA.71 discussions anymore. Nevertheless, After long discussions within the this showed how the instabilities Summit, the members failed to agree within the member parties have on one JPC. Earlier on, Mao and severely affected the unity of the Bukenya had withdrawn from the whole alliance.68 In Robert Putnam’s race for the JPC. Neither of the main terms, this reflected the weak candidates, Mbabazi and Besigye, social capital of various opposition agreed to step down for the other, members within TDA. and since the Protocol provided strict guidelines for agreeing on The problem of weak social capital was most clearly reflected in the 69 The Democratic Alliance Protocol Article X. failure of TDA to agree on the joint 70 http://www.observer.ug/news- 68 http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/ headlines/3.9740-mbabazi-besigye- National/Lukwago-group-cannot-join- divide-alliance. TDA---Mao/-/6883.3.4/28293.72/- 71 http://observer.ug/news- /11fu7nsz/-/index.html. headlines/3.9842-mbabazi-nominated- for-tda-joint-presidential-candidate.

25 a candidate by consensus, the National Rainbow Alliance (NARC), Summit was unable to choose a accomplished taking power in the single candidate. past. The historical experience of Kenyan’s opposition parties can be During the process, two factions useful in avoiding the same mistakes around Mbabazi and Besigye were and learning from its success story. formed. While the CP and the FDC Although there is almost nothing supported Besigye, the DP, Go known about the content of the Forward, the PPP, UFA and the meeting, some sources reported that UPC preferred Mbabazi as their Odinga advised Mbabazi and Besigye presidential candidate. Bukenya to put the common TDA mission decided to run for president above their individual interests.76 independently and quit his support of TDA.72 Later on, he announced In another meeting held by both that he was going back to NRM to presidential aspirants (Mbabazi support President Museveni’s bid for and Besigye) and representatives of re-election – as NRM party flag-bearer TDA in London under the auspices – since he was the best candidate of the Kofi Annan Foundation, the in the 2016 elections.73. Bukenya’s outcomes of the meeting were quite U-turn clearly shows how unstable surprising and raised the question the cohesion of the coalition is and of whether the agreement, signed by that its members are ready to pull Mbabazi and Besigye, will contribute out as soon as difficulties arise. to settlement of the power play between the two candidates. The Once they failed to agree on a joint document commits the opposing presidential candidate for the 2016 parties to agreeing on only one elections, members of TDA went presidential candidate, which was to Kenya to meet the Coalition for the initial controversial issue. Just Reforms and Democracy (CORD) signing such an agreement does leader, Raila Odinga, and other not help when neither candidate is politicians. Mbabazi, Mao, former willing to step down and support the UPC leader Olara Otunnu and other one in order to win power and Besigye flew to Kenya with the aim form a transition government.77 In of finding a way to agree on one joint fact, as recent developments show, candidate; or rather to run with two both presidential aspirants have presidential candidates and learn been officially nominated by the from the Kenyan example how to Uganda Electoral Commission and unite opposition parties and pressure are actively campaigning across the groups under one umbrella.74 country for president. Despite the Although CORD failed to take power, current London agreement, it seems which NRM members consistently like TDA is following a strategy of emphasised when publicly allowing two candidates to run for discussing the value of that meeting, president. Under the slogan ‘One Kenya’s opposition coalition,75 the Campaign, One Message, One 78 72 http://www.elections.co.ug/new-vision/ Winning Team’, TDA has tried election/1000779/analysis-political- to unite both factions within the parties-plan-post-tda. alliance, which might endanger 73. http://www.newvision.co.ug/ news/6743.10-bukenya-makes-u-turn- 76 Ibid. supports-museveni.html. 77 https://minbane.wordpress. 74 http://www.observer.ug/news- com/2015/10/3.0/uganda-statement- headlines/40269-tda-seeks-lessons- of-principles-of-ugandans-committed- from-kenyan-alliances. to-democratic-change-29-10-2015/. 75 http://www.observer.ug/news- 78 https://www.facebook.com/ headlines/40336-officials-lash-out-at- TDAOfficial1/. odinga-after-nairobi-tda-meeting.

26 TDA’s mission to challenge the NRM may be, what is critical to note government for power. is that TDA without the backing of Uganda’s business community 6.4 Why did TDA fail to agree would not have much mileage, on a joint presidential especially when financial resources candidate are required to fund campaign The analysis of Kenya and Cameroon investments and to persuade some has highlighted the centrality of cantankerous coalition partners securing cross-ethnic endorsements, to back the coalition with greater particularly so in patronage-based commitment. politics. These endorsements, as indicated, are obtained not by 7. Conclusion selling the party ideology, though The literature on PECS has this is important, but by the ability demonstrated that politics in of the coalition candidate to use developing states need not be a financial resources to enhance zero-sum game. On the contrary, the commitment of his potential the paper has highlighted the contenders to the coalition as well possibilities of achieving democratic as be able to reach out to known transition without necessarily notables of various ethnic groups triggering political instability. The that are likely to swing the vote in his paper contributes to the current or her favour. This thus underscores literature by showing how financial the importance of mobilising the liberalisation can produce varying business community to contribute outcomes in business development financial resources to the campaign, depending on the initial conditions and also to participate in identifying, that precede liberalisation. Financial negotiating and securing cross- liberalisation underpinned by ethnic endorsements. Judging by the prior existence of a local the current precedent, TDA does capitalist class tends to enhance not appear to have the backing of business development that, in the any section of Uganda’s business long run, creates a critical mass community and neither does it have of autonomous entrepreneurs a strategy for mobilising business that may contribute positively to entrepreneurs. coalition-formation and a stable and sustainable democratic transition. Perhaps part of the reason lies in the On the other hand, financial fact that the business community liberalisation that is unsupported has historically eschewed direct by the existence of a local capitalist engagement in politics, albeit it being class often reinforces an ‘unholy suggested that certain sections of the alliance’ between a poorly developed business community are in cahoots and weakly connected business with the state. Since Uganda’s community with the governing elites. business community is comprised This tends to impede the ability of mainly Asians of Ugandan origin, of the opposition to mobilise the their forceful expulsion in 1971 business community, undermining under then president Idi Amin the possibility of coalition-formation appears to have left a sharp reminder and democratic transition. These of why business must never embitter findings have important implications the state agents. It is also possible for the opposition political parties in that opposition political parties have Uganda that are currently involved in not vigorously reached out to the negotiations of forming a coalition to business community – which partly challenge the incumbent president in explains their non-involvement in the upcoming 2016 general elections. politics. Whatever the explanation

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