1 The Northern Song Historical Context In the chaotic period of the Five Dynasties, an emperor was not an emperor, a father not a father, a son not a son. Even the human bonds governing older brother and younger brother, and husband and wife were completely destroyed. [During this time,] the prin- ciple of Heaven was almost annihilated. —Ouyang Xiu, Xin Wudai shi n the study of Song China (960–279), experts in the field tend to see the period as part of a long process of change dating back to theI Tang Dynasty (67–907). This six hundred years of change, or the Tang-Song transition, is believed to have drastically altered the politi- cal, social, and cultural structure of medieval China, thereby laying the foundation for the following centuries until the end of the monarchical system in 9.¹ Politically, many scholars see the period as a continu- ation of the weakening of the Chinese state while Chinese society became increasingly powerful and variegated. For these scholars, this weakening of the Chinese state may have begun in the Tang, but the process definitely quickened when the Song court was forced to move in 27 from Kaifeng (in the Eastern Yellow River basin) to Hangzhou (in the lower Yangzi River area). For them, the relocation of the Song court signifies not only the transition from the Northern Song to the Southern Song, but more importantly, the further disintegration of the national polity and the concomitant rise of the local gentry as the real power holders.² The Tang-Song transition was equally dramatic with respect to technology and the economy. Many historians of the Song describe the period as full of rapid technological and commercial progress. There occurred rapid urbanization, the rise of a monetary economy, 5 © 2005 State University of New York Press, Albany 6 The Yijing and Chinese Politics the creation of movable-type printing, the development of new staple and commercial crops, a rapid increase in population, and a robust maritime trade.³ Most significantly, these technological and commercial developments have led many historians to believe that during the Tang-Song transition, the economic center of China shifted from the Yellow River valley to the Yangzi River valley, and hence altered the basic structure of the Chinese economy in the follow- ing centuries.⁴ Corresponding to these social and economic changes, impor- tant intellectual changes took place during the Tang-Song transition. These included the rise of ancient prose style, the revival of classical studies, the emergence of civil culture, and the genesis of Daoxue. For many Song experts, these intellectual changes were not isolated events. Instead, they were attempts by the educated elite to redefine themselves in response to momentous sociopolitical changes. From “the aristocratic clans” to “the civil bureaucrats” and to “the local elite families,” each time the educated elite changed their self-definition, they altered the criteria by which the upper echelon of Chinese leader- ship was measured, and consequently redefined the boundaries within which they would operate in state and society.⁵ As a part of this broad scheme of development, the Northern Song (960–27) is often assigned an ambiguous role. Temporally located at the midpoint between the Tang and the Southern Song (27–279), the Northern Song is frequently seen as either a recipient of something that happened in the past or a forerunner of something important in the making. On the one hand, it is seen as an extension of the Tang, namely, the revival of guwen (old style) prose and of Confucian ethics started by Han Yu (768–824), and the continuation of the decline of the aristocratic clans in Chinese politics since the mid-eighth century. On the other hand, it is understood as a preparation for the Southern Song, such as the decentralization of state power from the civil bureaucrats to the local gentry, and the gradual crystallization of Daoxue eventually completed by Zhu Xi. There are certainly many valuable insights to be gained from seeing the Northern Song as a midpoint of some broad trends. At the same time, we also lose sight of the particularity of the Northern Song as a unique historical period. For the Northern Song people, especially the educated elite, their main concern was neither to imitate the Tang nor to pave the way for the Southern Song. Rather, their main concern was to find solutions to problems and conflicts that plagued their lives. To fully appreciate the historical significance © 2005 State University of New York Press, Albany The Northern Song Historical Context 7 of the Northern Song, it is imperative to keep in mind its particular historical context. Two Centuries of Military Governance One of the issues that the Northern Song educated elite had to grapple with was how to construct a lasting civil governance. The goal of con- structing civil governance—a sociopolitical order founded upon a civil code of behavior and administered by a group of learned men steeped in classical studies—was to replace its opposite sociopolitical order, military governance. Built on a military code of behavior and ruled by military generals, military governance stressed efficiency, a clear chain of command, and the absolute obedience of juniors in rank. While both forms of sociopolitical order accepted the paramount power of the emperor and the legitimacy of the imperial system, they differed fundamentally in ways by which to allocate political power, resolve conflicts, and structure political and social life. Immediately preceding the Northern Song, for over two cen- turies, much of northern China practiced military governance. This military governance, which first appeared after the Rebellion of An Lushan (755–763), was a combination of Central Asian nomadism and the Tang system of military governorship (jie du shi). This rise of military governance took several steps. It began with the division of the mid-Tang empire into a military zone in the northeast and a civil zone in the central and southern parts of the country. This bifurcation of China into military and civil zones led to what contemporary histo- rian Chen Yinke (890–969) calls the condition of “one dynasty, two states” (yichao liangguo).⁶ The process continued with the expansion of the military zone at the expense of the civil zone. It finally reached a point in the late Tang, around the time of the Huang Chao rebellion (875–884), when the military governors displaced the Tang court as the de facto rulers of China. This militarism reached its climate when the military governor of Henan, Zhu Wen (r. 907–92), brought the Tang dynasty to an end in 907. The fall of the Tang signaled the beginning of a period of fifty- three years of total military control of China, known in history as the Period of the Five Dynasties (907–960). The Period of the Five Dynas- ties includes five northern dynasties and ten southern kingdoms. The five northern dynasties, located in the Yellow River valley and the Wei River region, were Later Liang, Later Tang, Later Jin, Later Han, and © 2005 State University of New York Press, Albany 8 The Yijing and Chinese Politics Later Zhou. The ten southern kingdoms, clustered around or south of the Yangzi River valley, were Wu, Nan Tang, Wu Yue, Min, Nan Han, Chu, Early Shu, Later Shu, Nan Ping, and Bei Han. During those fifty-three years, changes of power took place frequently, sometimes as frequently as once every ten to fifteen years. Among the five northern dynasties, three of them (Later Liang, Later Tang, and Later Jin) were founded by Shatuo Turks, who had been present in China for centuries as Tang military officers. To indicate their link with the Tang imperial court, some of the Shatuo Turks carried the Tang royal family name Li, such as the first emperor of Later Tang, Li Cunxu (r. 923–926).⁷ Exemplifying the extent to which China had been militarized, the military generals were in complete control of the government, and the civil officials were at best secondary players in politics. This militarization of China also brought change to the family system. Family ties, rather than being based on blood genealogy as prescribed by Confucianism, entailed the widespread practice of adoption based on practical convenience and mutual interest, modeled after the military custom of “joining hearts by sharing the same family name” (xixing yi jie qixin) between generals and soldiers.⁸ Originally, the practice was a means for military generals to build up an elite army known as the “Army of the Adopted Sons” (yier jun). Personally loyal and directly responsible to the military generals, the “Army of the Adopted Sons” was the core army of the military generals in battle and the administrators in occupied territories. Related as lords and vassals, the military generals and the “Army of the Adopted Sons” pledged to share whatever they gained in conquest.⁹ This practice of “joining hearts by sharing the same family name,” which later spread to nonmilitary sectors, meant that once pledged, the two strangers would treat each other as father and son. The adopted father would regard his adopted son as if he were his son by blood, giving him full-fledged family privileges and property inheritance. Likewise, the adopted son would regard his adopted father as if he were his real father, cutting all connections with his biological father. This practice, a product of military governance, transformed the family structure in much of northern China during the ninth and tenth centuries. A case in point is how the second emperor of the Later Tang, Li Siyuan (r. 926–933), rationalized in 925 his decision to succeed his deceased stepbrother Li Cunxu.